ities, Counter-terrorism and Policies on Islam in the United Kingdom and France FRANK PETER Introduction ‘This artile examines policies o Islam in France and the United Kingdom 1 particular focus on their relation to and their embeddeduess counteting urban violence and terrorism. It is based on the as icies concerning the incorporation, regulation and administration of Is- policies and a variety of policy measures directed against phenomena of urban violence and delinquency. Stating with a rethinking of our understanding of power in the context of Buropean Is Iytical framework for state policies whic analytical focus on national juridico-pol spective on the functioning of political rationalites in a govemmentalized state, The application ofthe framework proposed here will bring into focus & type of counter-terorism policy which is not based on mechanisms of surveil lance and exclusion of suspected individuals or groups, but instead on target- teem determine interrelated Muslim practices, belief and institutions. policy is thus not based on a distorted legal framework, but on evaluations of nmFranc Peven feasibility and costs, prognostcs of future developments in the Islamic milieu, and shifting stan cceptable religious practices and beliefs by Mustim citizens. My attempt to broaden our understanding of on Islam beyond an analysis of the national jurido-potitical order! though citizenship legislation, state-eligion regimes, and, more generally national political cul- tures and underlying political theories — is motivated by two aims. First, by ‘considering the juridico-political order as merely one of several mechanisms of power, I seek to foreground the questions of whether those state policies ‘which deviete ftom this order are commanded by a specific rationality (and ‘and how we ean study this rationality in relation to investigation pursued here aims at contributing to ‘our understanding of discrimination against Muslims ~ a crucial topic in stud discursive rendering of the concept of power used here will lead us as being partly constitutive of Muslim underst different appraisal of remedies a the ways in which the ltr are consrsned by and specific tothe exercise of bio-power in a gov- 1; Foucault 1997 and 2004). My point 1 fametioning of politics stems from three ‘what personal or in and biologized end who now constitute the ‘Mustim community’ of France and the U.K,, usually equated with immigrants (and descenc ity Muslim countries. Following Silverstein, I define racials process through which any diariic of social personhood ~ cthnicity, generation, Kinship/atfinity, positions within fields of power — 1 Forstudcs who seek to transcend this orientation in ways othe than mine see {or example Maussen (2004 and 2006). 20 PPoUTicAL RATIONALES comes to be essetialized, maturalized andor biologized” (Silverstein 2005: tovined with the legal ord by adjusting the legal system ~ and the subject of law — to varying ‘often conticting knowle« ‘universal community of the libe In the following analysis, Iwill seek to identify the divergent policy con- particulerism and the concomitant shift in the combination of political rtion- alites and explore how we can study Islam both as an effect of this double ‘movement of poitcisation and normalisation and as its vehicle. More particu- larly, Iwill argue thatthe increased importance of a anticipatory rationality as policy sim and as specific remaking of the Islamic tradition by Mustims ~ the application of ity provides one means to grasp the commonalities of Europ jes on Islam beyond national boundaries and nation-specfic modes of regulating re- ligionFrank PeTER Political Rationalities Im his study ‘Security, Territory, Population’ (2004), Foucault distinguished between three mechanisms of power ~ juridical system, disciplinary system, security apparatus ~ all of which Foucault them to each other, In ‘Security, Tersitory, Population’ he begins to do so by siving @ simple and illuminating example, namely that of state policies con- cceming thet. In he context of legal rationality, ‘ng to the law which contains « numt tion of the delinquent. Finally, inside ‘both the legal and disciplinary syst ries of questions conceming thet, punishment of thieves; the cost and so forth, The rise of security ‘mechanisms partially reconfigures apparatus; while it enables a spe- cifie application of the law, no I es this application follow directly ‘rom the binary code of prohibition vs. permission which underlies legal ra- tionality, Instead, the security apparatus operates on the basis of a reasoning ‘based on evaluations of what is socially and economically acceptable and fea- sible. In the course of the application of its policies, prior understandings of spended, even while continuing to determine the aims which disciplinary insittions, but as part of a probable series of events; this since the security apparatus is fundamentally concemed with the probl ‘uncertainty. This problem of uncertainty is tackled to an important de terms of milieu is an attempt to problem of uncertainty by under- standing and calculating ‘the action ata distance of one body on another’ and, more generally, by grasping how, inside of a space conceived of as ‘mili’, 2 PoumicaL RATIONALES subjects capable of voluntary action ~ which would be the case of sovereignty and instead of affecting them as a multiplicity of organisas, of bodies capa ble of performances, and of required perform: iscipline - one tries to affect precisely a population’ (Foucault Inthe following analysis, Iwill study how ‘pert knowledge in this process is necessery, since the reliance on anticipatory ‘analysis and the reasoning in terms of an Islamic milieu attribute a significant nat I will refer to as expert knowledge on Islam. This assertion Islam and whe 10 in public ~ by politicians, journalist, als, Church leader, [..]~ 88 expert knowledge is not considered scientific by scientists, whether they be fy there is no need to ent the content of expert kn group of and/or legitimates a specific idiom for making reality amenable to delibera- vant toa study of cal field which has been opened up by the increasingly prominent workings of plan poli Geliberation. Finally, importantly, expert knowledge on Islam ~ and not least the type of rationality which it enables and disseminates ~ is an important 2 The specific contribution of scademi research on European Islam an tion o expert knowledge cannot be dealt with hee, but see, forthe fe, Peter (forthcoming), ‘French Scholarship on Islam inthe ‘scented st Forum for Islamforskning-Workshop ‘Research on Islam Repost- ‘ned, Copenhagen, May 2007. ‘on Rose and Mill's definition of politcal rationalities (Rose(Miller 8Fran PeTeR clement in policies on Islam, since it directly reshapes the ways in which jc conduct in the context of France and the ert knowledge on Islam is the primary vector through which state policies reconfigure what they target The Case of the United Kingdom In the case of the United Kingdom, anticipatory rationality becomes signifi- some of which are politically nar- ers not (ant-discriminstion politics and ‘The following anslysis will touch only the emergence and functioning of an- rationality which notably underlies ination policies were formally intro- the restriction on iamigration inst- bly extended in 1976 with the creation of legislation; trian pol briefly upon them and concentat ticipatory rationality in relation to Society ‘white’, the term ‘Asians’ being litle used until andre 2002; Modood 2005: 46 f). As concerns al, 2001: 227-29; Ansari 2004: 340-88), 1 consider these policies as an outcome of a legal rationality not only be- se policies are founded on the stable identity, whether itis black, Asian or Muslim, which they themselves obviously contribute to stabilize. Both the empt ced on the normalisa- 4 Foramore detailed study of these se Pets 8 al | | POUTicAL RATIONALES tion of difference on the ane hand and the assumption of stable difference and {deatty on the other distinguish this rationality in contrast to anticipatory ra- fore 2001, have largely functioned in this framework but not fully extended from racial groups to Muslims over tion of British Mustim iden stable Muslim identity and they are realized by Labour, of debates on legislation against religious discrimination, of Muslim demands for amendment to the exclusively Anglican law on blas- phemy and, later on, ofthe debate around the law against incitement to reli ‘ious hatred (adopted in 2006) demonstrate this. patory rationality is already in the influential Cantle Report which con- tains the reslts of one of the government ordered enquiries made into the dis- s. The Cantle Report is important in two respects: fist, ‘ contribution to establishing the use of an ‘analysis in the elaboration of policies for governing ‘modem mult econd, because it insists strongly on ances and the need for more ‘coh that itis necessary to define and values in order to guarantee ‘community cob is precisely the result of en anticipatory analysis of Britain’s multicultural so- ciety. According to the report, the absence of common values bas strongly contributed tothe disturbances in northem England. The entire report is thus besically an attempt to discern and to relate the diverse causes ~ political, so- ‘manifold recommendations, a substantial number ‘enhance social eohesion through increased “cr reflected for example in the demands to confessional schools to take in more ‘pupil from other confessions and the proposition to make funding of cultural, ‘religious or ethnic associations dependent on their contribution to social cohe- sion (Home Office 2002),hank PETER, “While the report is relatively vague about many issues and deploys entici- ing some British Muslims to join the Taliban in the fight against the al forces in Afghanistan have been debated since 2001 in British media.* soon, the disaffection of Muslims towards British pol hheusive and preventive approach to tis threat. This latter approach is based ipatory analysis. Government policies are informed by both ap- secrorat strategy put into practice in 2002, Contest, at hunting terrorists end preparing how to deal with the aftermaths of future terrorist attacks, but also at reducing the numberof individuals supporting ter- ‘Commitee 2006). On the one band, the governme 2001, a new anti-terror legislation (Bamford 2004: tice new police stategy which ffectvely discriminates against Bris cit ‘zens of Asian origin? On the other hand, there are attempts to develop a more preventive approach tothe terrorist threat and iti in this eon ie conceming the incorporation and administration of Islam enter. This second sions in the public and among policy tive impact which British foreign policy int and segregation and the radicalisation of ‘young 7 “Insdo the Mind of a Terrors’, The Observer, 9 March 2003, 8 ‘Making ofa Martyr: From Pacifism to Fihad, The Observer, 4 May 2003, 9 “Muslims face inreased stop and search’, The Guardian, 2 March 2008. PoUricAL RATIONALES ‘Fundamentally, this implies a shif in the configuration of political ration lating to it. Certainly, the question of equality has not simply been at by British politicians. To the contrary, social, economic or legal equality is seen to varying degrees asa crucial factor ~ but insufficient on its own ~to in- fluence positively the development of the Muslim community. The Home Of fice’s insistence in its 2005 programme on the nee to strengthen equality and {in turn community cohesion can be cited as one example 2005a)."” However, today, this policy of equality and normalisation to tionality, the principle of equa Jam, can be suspended, openly or not, asa function ofthe results of such an analysis. The policies in favour of disseminating civil Islam are just one ex- migrants from Islamic background in order to reduce the risk of socio- identify the policy reasons in terms of an Is these policies, a reading of ing eset fom th Home Os” md preteating efectos on the soFranc PETER should be noted first chat the government's reasoning in matters of ter orism is in several ways incomplete. Policy-makers continue to struggle, for instance, with the question of whether there is an unambiguous correlation be- posedly facilitate tis process (Tims 5). While these points are left in limbo, the Home Office report clearly identifies other causes and possible “The roport relates the now radicalisation: the ato-segregation of Mus of extremism and terrorism by ‘moc control by state authorities of Muslim activists, notably because oftheir trans- civities, What are the solutions pro are to be supported by the state to reject and fight against extremism and ter orism; increasing the ratio of nationally rooted or trained activists in British ptation tothe British context done, that British foreign pol- 40 recognizes, as ot , Afghanistan, rag, [ countered by a mc ‘Moats. This analysis has been stongly rejected by members ofthe British ‘government, notably Prime Minister Blair. However, it would be wrong to ‘of anticipatory rationality foundly ambivalent nature Of agar ror Hae, The Observer, 28 A patsie, say Muslim MPs, The Guardian, 15 Ave POUTICAL RATIONALES of power and mens fr vrons pesos soups = a+ ive effects of poli- of opposition which it enabl Inter-religious Dialogue and the Imams ‘Afer 2001 and even more so after the bombings of July 2005, civil Islam is ‘being institutionalized and this is done primarily via policies concerning inter- religious dialogue and imams. Firs, the goverument decides networks (Home Office 2005a: cf, idem 2003 forthe situation vel), While itis too early to evaluate the results ofthis attempt to insert Islam more firmly into the multi- religious landscape, this policy will, generally itutionalisation while at the same giving advantage to those Muslim stiational or individuel, two have the necessary profil, in tems of professional, social and cultura ‘competencies, in order to fully participate in inter-religious activities. "The reasons for granting this supporto interreligious groups are indicated without ambiguity by the Home Office whose position here illustrates well the changed political approach pointed to inthe discussion of the Cantle Re- port. According tothe ministry, ‘a more cohesive society needs more than just quality of opportunities for alindvidul’ an also depends on cerns cial conditions’ enabling citizens to get to know each other and to develop “shared values’ (Home Olfice 200Sa: 11). Now, British policy is conceived tn effort to create the conditions necessary for the dissemination, iving more support to inter-eligious th Network 2002, idem 2005 and Iues'. Apart from measures such as funding for sport or artistic ies and the introduction of civic education in schoo ialogue thus benefits from increased financial support. The ort are to & certain degree distinct from the smmunitarian ideas (Bevir 2003; Smith 2004), the consultation and cooperation with religious communi- funding (Home simply to sup- Office 2005b: 3-35). After 2001, the government's aim. 1 Peter (forthcoming), ‘French Scholarship on resented at Forum fr Islamforskning- Workshop Copenhagen, Mey 2007, 16 For a discussion ofthis Islam ia the Republic’ “Research on Islam Repos 29Rank PETER port the activites of religious communities, but to orient them in their setvi- ties in order to turn them into forces of cohesion, and not factors of divisive- ness, While the Anglican establishment — its ‘minimal 1994; 73) ~ might have facilitated at various points in incorporation of Islam into the United King space for action between goverment agencies ‘groups which is commended by varying 1a- ely by an anticipatory one. because of language problems. The Home Office as ministers for persons with residence in B ‘ges. Apart from the fact thatthe professional qua are easier to validate, the Home Offic cause of their knowledge of society," to the context of the United Kingdom’ tations of these persons these persons are, be- ‘competencies whose standard has been raised considerably; other measures are being prepared in order to verify, after their entry into Britsin, their ‘knowledge of and engagement with British society (Home Office 2005b: 20 5.) This poliey of closure towards foreign imams is continued, as shows Birt (2006, in the field of chaplainey where new posts subsidized by the state are exclusively destined for candidates who hold a certificate from one ofthe two existing institutes in Britain preparing Muslim cheplains. °0 = | | PoUnCAL RATIONALES The State's Quest for ‘Moderate’ Muslims “The government's attempts to reshape British Islam are not limited to policies aiming at imams and chaplains, but also rely on & policy of support for spe- cifie Mustim groups, From the government's point of view, one ofthe princ- pal aims of is policy isto reinforce 1d to support it ~ and — in the fight ogainst extremism ply reflect a division, whic “good” and ‘bad’ Muslims (Bonnefoy 2003). The rectly their Muslim inteslocutors ‘government agencies, comprises a ‘eoessarily into the government Office, cited previously, provides us these criteria, Following this report, ex- tremisn is defined 2s against Brtsh or allied forces ‘on Muslims to reject engagement with British society and poi- MOB, the m: ‘and for this reason and others regularly denigrated as ‘a government creature’ by other Muslims (Glynn 2002: 972 and, more receatly, BBC News 2005), does not have, according to this report, satisfying relations with the govern- 17 See also Home OfSice (200Se: 1 fra similar definitionFranc PETER ‘meat. The government's is rather to make and intensify contacts with a more important ‘government might vary, but who need to be influential. Ina second step, the task isto convince them, “in private’, as the report underlines, to adopt a more {ntransigent postion towards ‘extremism’ while atthe same time developing their human and material epacities (Timesonline 2005), Pot another way, the government ecognizes differences with respect to bo. 36 relate to its policies. or not, but re- ‘ultimate policy aims regarding the transformation of ‘Muslim groups. On the one hand, British policy towards Muslims x clusionist, as for example in the case of the Mubajirom (and suc - ganisations) or Hizb ut-Tabrr (Taji-Farouki 1996; Wiktorowicz 2 more generally, legally discriminating against Muslims and/or British Asians; ‘on a more prospective approach which f British Muslims by transforming, in & the field’s intemal structure snd relations between ‘This latter policy has been challenged more recently following the reshuffle of the cabinet and the appointment of Ruth Kelly to Department for Communities and Local Government. er-terorism strategy does not depart from that of the pre ‘CB's position inthe long run end, more importantly, if this chen the abandonment ofa prospective approach in policies on Istam remains to be spport for civil Islam perceived by Muslim organi- ftom the partial convergence of government ob- various Muslim organisations concerning the in- tegration of immigrants of Islamic background and the strengthening of rli- ‘gious institutions. From the point of view of Muslim groups, the new gov- ‘emment approsch can be beneficial, since it directly leads to an acceleration jectives and aims pur ‘of the incorporation of Islam. A comparison of propositions end demands in this field made by diverse Muslim personalities after the bombings of 2005, and government projects (concerning institutes for Islamic studies, the promo- tion of ‘moderate’ ‘the role of imams) suggests that there is a partial convergence of aims between the two groups (Home Office 2005d). However, in the course of consultations about specific ‘gences can emerge, as shown in the 92 PoUTicaL RATIONALES ‘Mslim Council was asking for government support for its work. For Muslim organisations, the cooperation with the government in fact regularly raises jmportant problems of legitimacy (Home Office 2005¢; Muslim Couneil of ‘Britain 2006). Another major divergence should be mentioned in this respoct. ‘While state policies clearly aim at ensuring the population's “devotion to the tunity ofthe social body’ (Willaime 1993: 572), civil Islam, for may Muslim ions, is part of @ much broader (and older) tradition of understanding ‘As for Muslim associations, their commitment to civil Islam partly results ‘fom politcal and public pressure which has increased formiably since 2001 and which has contributed to reorienting the older civic engagement rooted, 28, for example inthe case ofthe MCB and its constitutive members, in the trad- tion of Islamic movements (Birt 2005; McLoughlin 2005). In fact, the MCB the role of mosques as social and delinquency. More generally, the M¢ ing public authorities to cooperate with Muslim associations." In 2004, ater the bombings of Madrid, the MCB is taking a further step on this path and is explicitly asking Muslim leaders and activists to cooperate with security forces to prevent a tezorst stack (Muslim Council of Britain 2004). The Case of France ‘The incorporation of Islam in metropolitan France i, forthe first time, just as level and it : strategy. Contrary to the UK, this process started ‘for along time been ‘gmportant exception of Franco-Algerians who left Algeria after independence 18 For this reason, I donot speak here of ‘civic religion’ (ee Willime 1993), mon Good The Newsletter of and the press releases ofthe MCB.38 is well known, the adoption of restrictive poli- rita, in 1962, precedes by more than a decade simi- ‘in other European countries. This has led to a process of Ja started much earlier in the United Kingdom than elsewhere tributed to accelerating the creation of Muslim institutions f these groups into French society, cond, the French state puts in mo- cally according to three cond ‘and/or administrative meas ‘cooperation with or simply pression of this approach (Kepel 199 1980s that France wakes up tothe reality ‘The important national debates sbout the tims that the incorporation of Islam becomes politically important and Muslim identities politicized to a degree hitherto unknown. Boyond Laicité A large number of dies often do diverge Pouca, RATIONALES tainly true to say that great emphasis has been placed by many of them on andings of the appropriate policy relate to specific un- More specifically, many studies have pointed to a fun ion structuring theso debates. Essentially, two different to confront each other in the course of these debates are Gistinguished. On the one hand, there are the defenders ofa ‘new" or ‘open’ Jafeité who demand that lafcté be adapted to a changed religious landscape and the sometimes new needs, in tems of religious practice and organisation, articulated by Freach Muslims. Furthermore, this process of adaptati often argued, should be conducted in a way which reflects the peaceful rel tons between the state and religions today. On the other hand, there are those who defend an understanding of Inicité as being ‘not negotiable" end who consider that its adaptation equals its dilution into suppos models of politics. As many sbadies have pointed out, these often diametrically opposed policy proposals concerning demonstrated notably with regard to the headscarf case.™” {just outlined has proven its utility in the analysis of French ‘will suggest here a different approach to their study. Basic the elaboration of poli two distinct rationalities which do not they sometimes do, but in many respects nation. Conflicts about the course of polices on Islam, to a large degree, cor- ‘of the ways in which they should combine andthe relative ‘weight of each of them. In terms of rationality, we can say that those who defend lafcité as non- negotiable give priority to an instance of a legal rationality which I will des- ‘Republican, The Republican rationality can be characterized by ‘conception ofits policy object, the citizen, and by its refusal t0 it proclaims in ¢ given moment as universal). This rationality is justified by a discourse which makes s0 sambent upon a type of normalisa- tion subsumed in the prin dance par la citoyenneté) 2003), The principle of separation of ‘state and religion isa central mechanism for enabling this practice of ctizen- stance of anticipatory retionalty, This isso, since the outright refusal to ree~ ognize particular identities regularly conflicts with the state's fundamental 120 On this question see notably Amir-Moszami (2001); Rochefort (2002); Bous- ‘mama (2004); Tévanian (2005); Asod (2006). 95Rank PETER im of normalizing these identities, an objective which, furthermore, cannot be realized solely by enacting prohibitions. Anticipatory rationality, in the onan assessment of presently ex- ity. Furthermore, it inquires into part of an Islamic milieu which terized notably by social and spatial exclusion, discrimination and the context of tion an assessment jan types of Muslim religiosity and en evaluation of the state's possi- change this state of affairs. To varying degrees, the application of ly defined, and the (re)definition of normaley are made dependent ‘upon this process of evaluation. Also, law is applied by taking into account its effects on the milieu and, more generally itis but one means within a brosder policy which pursues normalisation with means other than that of probibi- tion ‘As I seid, these two rationalities function in varying combinations. By assumption thatthe s ily Himited. In the first particulars through ‘the impossibili ‘the Islamic milieu as 8 whole is targeted by various measures aiming at nor- smalisation. example the ‘wearing beadscar in the context ofa specific milien and the law by virtue of is enacting a prob dopee Titel debates on Islam including those parcipants wishing to reafim Re~ publican soversignty. 98 rT | | | | PoumcaL RATIONALES The Ethnicisation of the Republic” ‘As I stid, it would be wrong to consider the Republican rationality tion. In fact, since the 1980s, the wilful denial of ethnicity and reli comes increasingly ‘maintain in France. The direct reason for this js the perceived failure of what is often called the Republican model of inte- tration, i, process of integration through state institutions which dissolves tethnic and other communities into the French nation. After the settlement of {immigrants and as new generations of French-bom Muslims France witnesses the “birth of a religion’ (Kepel 1 parily simaltaneous emergence of Islamic institut and the coming of age of French-bom Muslims, increasing! ‘eligion, was mostly seen as the opposite of a desirable course of In this Context, the question of how to regulate the practice of Islam arose ‘with a new urgency and Muslim identity became politicized to a degree hith- certo unknown, “This isin many respects a new and contested development as is illustrated foundational study of Freach Islam, ‘Les banlieues ‘eld, it would offer a specious description of immigrant populations and the cultural pretext for discriminating agninst them.’ But, as Kepel points out with reference to the rise of the extreme right movement in France, “the circum- spection of some becomes aphasia and opens up the space forthe noisy phan- tasms of the others’. And then ‘only a thorough analysis of social phenomena ‘without any concessions can break this vicious circle’ (Kepel 1991: 10). ofthis case, the argument made here is interesting, ‘predicament of adherents to the Republican ra- tionality and outlines the configurations of forees which make it necessary 1a their point of view, to espouse a more ethnicized perspec ocicty. By doing ths, their aim remains, of course, to work ‘Nevertheless, the effects of their discourse. rectly to legitimate a new conception of terms of ethnic or religious groups, and thus also legitimates specific policies ion, th Iw of associations is modified igners to crea in the mumber of Muslim associations during theFrank PETER ‘which, openly or not, are based on such a conception of France even when, ‘which isthe case, the policy-makers ultimately aim to crete the conditions for successfully dissolving these communities. ty of measures taken during the 1980s ates to this development. It towards doing this since the late 1980s. peroeived crisis of the Republican mod topies continues to increase. The ground and their relation to the French political and Ie security and delinguency in the suburbs, the rise ‘mong immigrants from Ts- the task of analysing the In recent year, this development has clearly inten- ‘ified (ee Centre d’Anaiyee Statégique 2006). While the standardize col 24 See Fassin (2006) for a ential assessment ofthe policy tum in the question of ‘thn diseimination, 98 Pouca RATIONALES tection of ethnic data for policy-making is stil strongly criticized, the refusal ‘nereasingly linked to the endorsement of more indirect ethnic data (for one example sce Haut Conseil & but that various types of expert figured Islam as an object of pol cxeliy of rps ad spin of state and religion ere partly suspended icies are made dependent upon knowledge on Islam and Muslims. The is development are, a8 in the case of the United Kingdom, am- reconfiguration of Islam as religion takes place by considering it as, part ofan Islamic milieu which is characterized notably by discrimination, i. the state's failure to realize the Republican promise of equality, and the breakdown of autherity, both being supposedly crucial factors in processes of ‘sadicelisation’. Today, a surprisingly varied and large group of Muslim activ- is, experts on Islam and poiticins insists on the effet ofthe renew, ‘and state authority when explaining the rise of ‘radical .ged absence of religious authorities, the intergen jak authority of parents and the fuilure of socialisa- all these elements have supposedly contributed to the radi- number of actors agree upon the ‘one cause for adopting ‘fundament ‘Maslim actors ~ imams, preachers, as3 sx = i this process of ‘radi- calisation’ is also widely agreed upon. In the context of such a reading of ‘adicel Islam’, it is Muslim leaders who, to a large degre, decide if the ex- 9Franc PETER pesiences of discrimination by believer lead to ‘radical Islam or not, In fact fiven te limited possibilities forthe state to putan end to discrimination, iis ‘argued by some that Muslim associations fulfil a fundamentally important stabilizing role in society. One should add thatthe function of Muslim ‘leed- fers’ becomes even more impertant due tothe fact that a large number of Mus- tims — together with the majority society — today hold that an effort to develop 1 specifically French reading of Islam is indispensable (Peter 2006a), In brief, easing importance of anticipatory rationality policies conceming specific Muslim institations and practices are debated by taking {nto account their role in processes of ‘radicalisation’ and thei effects, direct or indires, on the evolution of the Islamic milies s a whole, Civil Islam a la Francaise “The anticipatory analysis of Islam in France stars from the thesis that the buted to the rise of an “Islam intégriste and it concludes estly to build solid structures of authority in French Islam, Hence the interest for Muslim federations and var- ‘ous individual actors to cooperate with the state, in spite of all difficulties — the constuction of authority structure ral to French policies on Islam and this implies significant opportuni (Peter 2006s). This analysis is int lim positions with so-called Republican values, my point here is is ‘common in French polities to abandon this type of ree- soning in favour of a more complex thinking wt "The later reasoning is based on the recognition andlor directly refashion Islam in any desirable way without the cooperation fof Muslim actors, including some of those often considered problematic. The inclusion of the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOTE) ~ ‘usually considered part of the Muslim Brotherhood ~ into the stte-created representative body of French Muslims, the Conseil Francais du Culte ‘Mustdman, itustrats this perfectly (Caciro 200: ‘an approach is fn 100 Poumca. RATIONALES ‘groups, such as the UOIF, are considered by some politicians particularly in- teresting partners tothe state (Peter 20062). 'A variety of policies can derive from this approach and 10 exhaustive pic- ture can be drawn here. Some examples of primary fields of application, con- cceming the fanding of mosques, Muslim associations and imams, wil illus- wate its relevance here, French policies conceming the construction of thatthe majority of mayors grants subs Without doubt, these measures can p about the public finding of mosques initiated by former minister of the inte- tor Sarkozy. In the course of these debates, Sarkozy's propositions have ‘been and are certainly very much criticized to the point that Sarkozy has sim to put ‘appropriate’ places of worship atthe disposal of Mus- clearly indicates the limited capacity of anticipatory ration al change declared as such, itis important to note that many ors did not put into question the necessity to develop new readings 1905, These readings do not only displace the emphasis from the principle of separation of state and religion towards the legitimate ‘means of intervention by the state in the religious domain, but they also en- derstand these interventions as targeting a set of interrelated phenomens in- ‘indirect subsidies to mosques and Muslim asso- solely by a policy aiming to get rid of ‘radial’ ‘Muslims. In fact, such an approach can also be based on @ new conception of the educational role of associations, particulary religious associations, and its legitimate place in processes of socialisation and citizenship education in the various possibilities to finance ia consultation des Musulmans de Fras- inistry of the interior has called upon also Kaltenbach/Teibalat (2002) 101Fran PETER, ‘France. Put differently such an approach is grounded in en implied or explicit ‘new understanding of what counts as acceptable belief and religious practice of French Muslims. Whether on the local or nati 5, there are a sigifi- of Muslim groups who are will policy which the state today fee 295). The support granted to int large degree by the same motivations (Lamine 2004). Finally, the political in- i 1998) agencies are lacking, they are sometimes to make the youth adhere to certain values ‘This perspective, I ‘an important di- so provides a way for idico-political orders culerity in relation to tion and regulation of Islamic institutions and practi have argued, allows us to grasp not only the ‘mension of policies conceming Islam and Must ‘understanding ongoing transformations in nat and, ultimately, a new starting point for an analy Buropean Islam. "The approach outlined here also leads us to & different understanding of the power configuration within which Muslims practice Islam. While this ‘configuration needs in part to be examined as one subordinating Muslims, this study hes shown hove the stat also exercises power through the reconfigura- accountable for various problems in the racialized Muslim com- unity and to demand policy changes. At the same time, however by institu- sionalizing Islam as a means for ensuring social peace and preventing radi- 102 POLMeAL RATONALTES calisation, and by adopting anticipatory rationality, civil Islam risks entrench- ing the perception of Islam as a potential threat. Finally, it certainly rein- scribes the determination of ‘acceptable’ Islamic practices and beliefs through expert assessment of the milieu in which they are embedded as well as prog- nostis ofits future development. Acknowledgements “This chapter is based on material presented in Peter 2006e and develops fur ther the argument made there. Research for this study has been made possible ty fellowship fom the German Historical Istte in London (2004) andthe Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Inemationles at the Université de Mon- tral (2008). I woul like to thank both istntios andthe Centre Canadien {Btades Euopéennes et Allemandes tthe Université de Montel forsup- poring my research and I graeflly acknowledge the opportnity they have igiven me to present the initial results of this project. My thanks also go to ‘lena Arigita, Alexandre Casiro, Ruth Mas, Wemer Schiffauer and Barbara ‘Thériault for comments on earlier versions of this text. References ‘Alexandre, C. (2002); ‘Beyond Black. Re-thinking the Colour/Culture Di- Ethnic Minorities and the British Po~ rapt Mustim Event’, 19 April 2005. Culture, West Indians Have Problems. Dis- 1d Eshnicity in and out of Anthropology’. In: T.0. 103Frank Peres Ranged/Y, Samad/O.W. Stuart re, Identity and Politis, Ethnic ‘Minorities in Britain, Aldersho 41-56. (2003): "Narrating the British State, An Interpretive Critique of ‘New Labour's Insttutionsism’, International Political Economy, 10(3): Jobying and Marching: British Muslims and the State’ In: ), Muslim Britain. 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Muslim Extremism in the ‘West, London: Rowman & Litlfield“La Religion Civile a la Frangaise et ses Métamor- ‘ompass, 40(4): 571-80 108 Documents, Security and Suspicion: the Social Production of Ignorance Production of Ignorance ‘Topias KELLY {In April 2005 Kamel Bourgass, described by the media as being of ‘North Af- ican origin’, was found guilty ofthe murder ofa British police officer and for plotting to ‘spread poisons". Bourgass was implicated in a plot thet, it was claimed, would have poisoned thousands of Londoners by spreading ricin, a toxin reportedly 6,000 times more deadly than eyanide, on car door ‘cross north London, Although the case against eight other suspects col- lapsed, Bourgass was sentence to life in prison. Two of the other defendants -were convicted of possessing false passports. During the ti ged that ‘Bourgass had arrived in the UK. on false papers which he had destroyed shortly before claiming asylum in January 2000 under the name of Nadir “Habra. Habra was refused asylum in August 2001 and his appeal against the decision was dismissed in October 2001, when he became liable tobe arrested and deported. In July 2002 he was arrested for shoplifting, but escaped detec- tion as he used the nam rather than Habre. When he was finally ar~ rested he was found wit fake IDs and he is believed to have had up to ‘our different documented identities. There was considerably confusion over ‘whether he was Tunisian or Algerian, and indeed whether his real name was ‘Bourgass at all fore the U.K. general clection the Bourgass case showed the government had no idea who was in the coun- tay daspite the ‘terrorist threat” and that all people who arrived in the U.K.