PART VI

CASE 23
PHILIPPINE PIZZA, INC., vs. JENNY PORRAS* CAYETANO, RIZALDO G. AVENIDO,
PEE JAY T. GURION, RUMEL A. RECTO, ROGELIO T. SUMBANG, JR., AND JIMMY
J. DELOSO
G.R. No. 230030, August 29, 2018
FACTS: Herein respondents were hired as by CBMI, a job contractor which
provides kitchen, delivery, sanitation, and allied services to PPI's Pizza Hut chain of
restaurants. They alleged that they worked for Pizza Hut for about 7 to 11 years, hence,
they were regular employees of PPI and not of CBMI. They claimed to have been
initially hired by PPI but were subsequently transferred to CBMI so as to prevent them
from attaining their regular employment status. Thus, respondents filed separate
complaints for Illegal Dismissal against PPI and CBMI.
PPI denied any employer-employee relationship with respondents, averring that it
entered into several Contracts of Services with CBMI to perform janitorial, bussing,
kitchen, table service, cashiering, warehousing, delivery, and allied services in PPI's
favor. CBMI admitted that respondents were its employees, and that it paid their wages
and remitted their SSS, PhilHealth, and Pag-IBIG contributions. It insisted that it is a
legitimate job contractor, as it possesses substantial capital and a DOLE Certificate of
Registration; that it undertakes a business separate and distinct from that of PPI; and
more importantly, retained and exercised the right of control over respondents.
ISSUE: Whether CBMI is a labor-only contractor
RULING: No.
As the NLRC aptly pointed out, CBMI is presumed to have complied with all the
requirements of a legitimate job contractor, considering the Certificates of
Registration issued to it by the DOLE. Although not a conclusive proof of legitimacy, the
certification nonetheless prevents the presumption of labor-only contracting from
arising. It gives rise to a disputable presumption that the contractor's operations are
legitimate. The NLRC was also correct in holding that CBMI has substantial capital and
investment.
More importantly, the NLRC correctly gave credence to CBMI's claim that it
retained control over respondents, as shown by the deployment of at least one (1) CBMI
supervisor in each Pizza Hut branch to regularly oversee, monitor, and supervise the
employees' attendance and performance. The existence of the element of control can
also be inferred from CBMI's act of subjecting respondents to disciplinary sanctions for
violations of company rules and regulations as evidenced by the various Offense
Notices and Memoranda issued to them. Lastly, the NLRC correctly found that no
employer-employee relationship exists between PPI and respondents, and that the
latter were employees of CBMI. Records reveal that respondents applied for work with
CBMI and were consequently selected and hired by the latter.
From all indications, the Court finds that CBMI is a legitimate job contractor, and
thus, the employer of respondents.
 CASE 24
CONSOLIDATED BUILDING MAINTENANCE, INC. AND SARAH DELGADO,
vs. ROLANDO ASPREC, JR. AND JONALEN BATALLER
G.R. No. 217301, June 06, 2018
FACTS: Respondents alleged that they are regular employees of PPI. Respondent
Asprec averred that after the expiration of his contract, PPI advised him to go on leave
for one (1) month and ten (10) days. Thereafter, he was called for an interview and after
passing the same, he was told to proceed to the office of CBMI where he signed a
contract. Asprec stated that except for the fact that the payslips were then issued by
CBMI, work proceeded as usual with him being assigned at the same branch and
performing his usual duties as "Rider/Production Person." Respondent Bataller had a
similar experience. In their Complaint, the respondents argued two points: first, that their
transfer from PPI to CBMI constituted labor-only contracting and was a mere scheme by
PPI to prevent their regularization; and second, that they were illegally dismissed
without cause and due process of law.
ISSUE: Whether CBMI is a labor-only contractor
RULING: No.
It is not disputed that CBMI is a duly licensed labor contractor by the DOLE. The
Certificate of Registration issued by DOLE recognizes CBMI as an independent
contractor as of February 13, 2008 and regards the validity of the latter's registration as
such until February 14, 2011. In this light, it then becomes incumbent upon the
respondents to rebut the presumption of regularity to prove that CBMI is not a legitimate
contractor as determined by the DOLE, which they failed to do.
Further, CBMI have a substantial capital to maintain its manpower business.
From the evidence adduced by CBMI, it is also clear that it runs a business independent
from the PPI. Above all, CBMI maintains the "right of control" over the respondents.  The
contract of service, while of itself is not determinative of the relationship between the
parties, nonetheless provides useful leads into the relationship between the principal on
the one hand, and the job contractor on the other. In this case, the "Contract of
Services" between CBMI and PPI for the year 2000, imposes upon the former the
obligation to provide not only the necessary personnel to perform "kitchen, busing,
rider/delivery, and sanitation services" but as well to provide tools and equipment
necessary for the rendition of such services.
All these, without doubt indicate that CBMI possesses the power of control over
the respondents, which in turn supports the conclusion that CBMI carries a business
independent of PPI.
 CASE 25
EMMANUEL D. QUINTANAR, ET. AL. vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILIPPINES,
INC.,
G.R. No. 210565 June 28, 2016
FACTS: Complainants allege that they are former employees directly hired by
respondent Coca-Cola assigned as regular Route Helpers under the direct supervision
of the Route Sales Supervisors. After working for quite sometime as directly-hired
employees of Coca-Cola, complainants were allegedly transferred successively as
agency workers to several manpower agencies, including respondent Interserve
Management and Manpower Resources, Inc. Respondent Coca-Cola denies employer-
employee relationship with the complainants pointing to respondent Interserve with
whom it has a service agreement as the complainants' employer.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are deemed employees of respondent Coca-Cola
RULING: Yes.
Contrary to the position taken by Coca-Cola, it cannot be said that route-helpers,
such as the petitioners no longer enjoy the employee-employer relationship they had
with Coca-Cola since they became employees of Interserve. As early as May 2003, the
Court in Magsalin struck down the defense of Coca-Cola that the complainants therein,
who were route-helpers, were its "temporary" workers. In that case, the Court held that
the repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing need for their services
clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct of the
business or trade of petitioner company. There are likewise several cases wherein the
Court has ruled that the employer of the route-helpers is Coca-Cola and not the
supposed independent contractors.
From all these, a pattern emerges by which Coca-Cola consistently resorts to
various methods in order to deny its route-helpers the benefits of regular employment.
Despite this, the Court, consistent with sound pronouncements above, adopts the
rulings made in Pacquing that Interserve was a labor-only contractor and that Coca-
Cola should be held liable pursuant to the principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere.
 PART VII
CASE 1
CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE WESTGROVE
G. R. No. 187226 January 28, 2015
FACTS: Respondent SSCW hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW’s
Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate. Sometime in 2003,
the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW learned
of the petitioner’s pregnancy, SSCW’s Directress advised her to file a resignation.
Petitioner replied that she would not resign from her employment just because she got
pregnant without the benefit of marriage. She explained that her pregnancy out of
wedlock does not amount to serious misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an
employee. SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual relations, even if
between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry, is considered a
disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which are grounds for the
termination of employment. Eventually, petitioner was terminated from her employment.
Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a valid ground
to terminate her employment
RULING: No.
The determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-
step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing
norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable. That
the petitioner was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not
absolutely determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral.
There is still a necessity to determine whether the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock
is considered disgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms of
conduct.
In this case, the Court does not find any circumstance in this case which would
lead the Court to conclude that the petitioner committed a disgraceful or immoral
conduct. It bears stressing that the petitioner and her boyfriend, at the time they
conceived a child, had no legal impediment to marry. Indeed, even prior to her
dismissal, the petitioner married her boyfriend, the father of her child. Admittedly, the
petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the teachings and doctrines of
the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital sexual relations, is strictly upheld and
taught to the students. That her indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of
wedlock, is anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against
the prevailing norms of conduct, the petitioner’s conduct cannot be considered as
disgraceful or immoral; such conduct is not denounced by public and secular morality. It
may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not disgraceful or immoral within the
contemplation of the law.
To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have
no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of
wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to
a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
 CASE 2
CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ vs. BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES, INC.
G.R. No. 187417 February 24, 2016
FACTS: Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent. She was
suspended on the ground of Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting to
Unwed Pregnancy. It appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent
imposed the suspension until such time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance
with law. Cadiz thereafter filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive
Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and Damages with prayer for Reinstatement.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes immorality and
hence, a valid ground for her dismissal
RULING: No.
Brent's Policy Manual and Employee's Manual of Policies do not define what
constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a ground for disciplinary action.
Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary definition of fornication as a
form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that Cadiz's acts fell under such
classification, thus constituting immorality.
The totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify the conclusion that
Cadiz committed acts of immorality. Similar to Leus, Cadiz and her boyfriend were both
single and had no legal impediment to marry at the time she committed the alleged
immoral conduct. In fact, they eventually married on April 15, 2008. The fact that Brent
is a sectarian institution does not automatically subject Cadiz to its religious standard of
morality absent an express statement in its manual of personnel policy and regulations,
prescribing such religious standard as gauge as these regulations create the obligation
on both the employee and the employer to abide by the same. 
Brent, likewise, cannot resort to the MRPS because the Court already stressed
in Leus that "premarital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no
impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock,
gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a
disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS."
 CASE 3
UNION SCHOOL INC. ET. AL. vs. CHARLEY JABE DAGDAG
G. R. No. 234186 November 21, 2018
FACTS: Respondent Dagdag was employed as an Elementary School Teacher on
a probationary status by petitioner Union School. During her employment, she found out
that she was pregnant and thereafter informed andapat of her pregnancy and that the
father of the child was marrying another woman. As Dagdag was single, the matter of
being charged with gross immorality and Dagdag's resignation was discussed. During
the hearing, Dagdag acknowledged the contents of the school's Faculty and Staff
Handbook, which includes the offense on gross immorality and the Professional Code of
Ethics for Teachers. Eventually, Dagdag was terminated from her employment. For its
part, Union School denied the accusations of Dagdag and maintained that they did not
suspend, transfer, demote, or prevent Dagdag from performing her work as a result of
her pregnancy out of wedlock.
ISSUE: Whether Dagdag was illegally dismissed
RULING: Yes.
As aptly observed by the CA, Mandapat's act of suggesting that Dagdag should
simply tender her resignation, as the school may impose harsher penalties, left Dagdag
with no choice but to discontinue working for Union School. Also, the CA noted that
although there was a conduct of grievance meeting, its outcome was already
predetermined as petitioners were already resolute in their decision to terminate
Dagdag's employment. This is evident by the fact that Dagdag was left with two choices
—resignation or dismissal and threatening her with possible revocation of her teaching
license.
Further, the totality of evidence in this case does not justify the dismissal of
Dagdag from her employment considering that there was no legal impediment to marry
between Dagdag and the father of her child at the time of the conception. To reiterate
the ruling of this Court in Leus and Capin-Cadiz, pregnancy of a school teacher out of
wedlock is not a just cause for termination of an employment absent any showing that
the pre-marital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are
indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.
 CASE 4
PLANTATION BAY RESORT and SPA and EFREN BELARMINO vs. ROMEL S.
DUBRICO, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 182216 December 4, 2009
FACTS: In compliance with RA 9165, petitioner Plantation Bay conducted surprise
random drug tests on its employees. Respondent Dubrico failed to take the drug test.
He was later tested and found positive for use of shabu. Twenty other employees were
found positive for use of shabu including herein respondents Ngujo and Villaflor. When
petitioner found their explanations lacking, it dismissed them from their services.
Respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed
the complaint. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision, but reversed the same on a Motion
for Reconsideration. In finding for respondents, the NLRC held that the results of
the confirmatory drug tests cannot be given credence since they were
conducted prior to the conduct by the employer of the drug tests.
ISSUE: Whether respondents were illegally dismissed
RULING: Yes.
The importance of the confirmatory test is underscored in Plantation Bay’s own
"Policy and Procedures," in compliance with Republic Act No. 9165, requiring that a
confirmatory test must be conducted if an employee is found positive for drugs in the
Employee’s Prior Screening Test, and that both tests must arrive at the same positive
result.
However, records show that the confirmatory test results were
released earlier than those of the drug test, thereby casting doubts on the veracity of the
confirmatory results. Plantation Bay’s arguments that it should not be made liable
thereof and that the doubt arising from the time of the conduct of the drug and
confirmatory tests was the result of the big volume of printouts being handled by Martell
do not thus lie. It was Plantation Bay’s responsibility to ensure that the tests would be
properly administered, the results thereof being the bases in terminating the employees’
services.
Time and again, we have ruled that where there is no showing of a clear, valid,
and legal cause for termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of
illegal dismissal. The burden is on the employer to prove that the termination of
employment was for a valid and legal cause.
 CASE 5
MIRANT (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION AND EDGARDO A. BAUTISTA vs.
JOSELITO A. CARO
G.R. No. 181490 April 23, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner corporation is a holding company that owns shares in project
companies such as Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (Mirant Pagbilao). Respondent was
hired by Mirant Pagbilao as its Logistics Officer. In 2002, when Southern Company was
sold to Mirant, respondent was already a Supervisor of the Logistics and Purchasing
Department of petitioner. At the time of the severance of his employment, respondent
was the Procurement Supervisor of Mirant Pagbilao assigned at petitioner corporation’s
corporate office. During a random drug test conducted by petitioner corporation,
respondent was informed that he was among the selected employees for random drug
testing. Respondent was duly notified that he was scheduled to be tested after lunch on
that day. However, he received a phone call from his wife’s colleague that a bombing
incident occurred near his wife’s work station in Israel. As such, he proceeded to the
Israeli Embassy and was not able to participate in the said drug test. Eventually,
respondent was terminated from employment.
ISSUE: Whether respondent was illegally dismissed
RULING: Yes.
Petitioner corporation’s subject Anti-Drugs Policy fell short of being fair and
reasonable. First, the policy was not clear on what constitutes "unjustified refusal" when
the subject drug policy prescribed that an employee’s "unjustified refusal" to submit to a
random drug test shall be punishable by the penalty of termination for the first offense. 
To the mind of the Court, it is on this area where petitioner corporation had fallen short
of making it clear to its employees – as well as to management – as to what types of
acts would fall under the purview of "unjustified refusal."
Second, the penalty of termination imposed by petitioner corporation upon
respondent fell short of being reasonable. Company policies and regulations are
generally valid and binding between the employer and the employee unless shown to
be grossly oppressive or contrary to law as in the case at bar. To be sure, the
unreasonableness of the penalty of termination as imposed in this case is further
highlighted by a fact admitted by petitioner corporation itself: that for the ten-year period
that respondent had been employed by petitioner corporation, he did not have any
record of a violation of its company policies.
 CASE 6
YOLANDO T. BRAVO vs. URIOS COLLEGE
G.R. No. 198066 June 7, 2017
FACTS: In addition to petitioner Bravo’s duties as a part-time teacher in Urios
College, he was also designated as the school's comptroller. Urios College organized a
committee to formulate a new ranking system for non-academic employees for school
year 2001-2002. The proposed ranking system was presented to Bravo for comment.
He recommended the position of Comptroller should be classified as a middle
management position since it was informally merged with the position of Vice President
for Finance. Bravo further suggested that since he assumed the duties of Comptroller
and Vice-President for Finance, his salary scale should be upgraded. The committee
allegedly agreed with Bravo and accepted his recommendations. In October 2004, Urios
College organized a committee to review the ranking system implemented during school
year 2001-2002. The committee found that said ranking system caused salary
distortions among several employees, and that there were also discrepancies in the
salary adjustments of Bravo and of two (2) other employees. The committee
recommended, among others, that Bravo be administratively charged for serious
misconduct or willful breach of trust. Eventually, Bravo was terminated from his
employment. Hence, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether Bravo was illegally dismissed
RULING: No.
A dismissal based on willful breach of trust or loss of trust and confidence under
Article 297 of the Labor Code entails the concurrence of two (2) conditions: first, the
employee whose services are to be terminated must occupy a position of trust and
confidence; and second, the presence of some basis for the loss of trust and
confidence.
Set against these parameters, this Court holds that petitioner was validly
dismissed based on loss of trust and confidence. Petitioner was not an ordinary rank-
and-file employee. His position of responsibility on delicate financial matters entailed a
substantial amount of trust from respondent. The entire payroll account depended on
the accuracy of the classifications made by the Comptroller. It was reasonable for the
employer to trust that he had basis for his computations especially with respect to his
own compensation. The preparation of the payroll is a sensitive matter requiring
attention to detail. Not only does the payroll involve the company's finances, it also
affects the welfare of all other employees who rely on their monthly salaries.
Petitioner's act in assigning to himself a higher salary rate without proper
authorization is a clear breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Petitioner's
position made him accountable in ensuring that the Comptroller's Office observed the
company's established procedures. It was reasonable that he should be held liable by
respondent on the basis of command responsibility. 
 CASE 7
TECHNOL EIGHT PHILIPPINES CORPORATION vs. NLRC and DENNIS AMULAR
G.R. No. 187605 April 13, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner hired respondent Amular and assigned him to Technol’s
Shearing Line together with Ducay, and Mendoza was their team leader. One evening,
Amular and Ducay confronted Mendoza and engaged him in a heated argument
regarding their work in the shearing line. The heated argument resulted in a fistfight that
required the intervention of the barangay tanods in the area. Upon learning of the
incident, Technol’s management sent to Amular and Ducay a notice of preventive
suspension/notice of discharge. When Amular failed to attend the administrative
hearing, he was sent a notice of dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether respondent was illegally dismissed
RULING: No.
Contrary to the CA’s perception, we find a work-connection in Amular's and
Ducay’s assault on Mendoza. As the CA itself noted, the underlying reason why Amular
and Ducay confronted Mendoza was to question him about his report to De Leon –
Technol’s PCD assistant supervisor – regarding the duo’s questionable work behavior.
The motivation behind the confrontation, as we see it, was rooted on workplace
dynamics as Mendoza, Amular and Ducay interacted with one another in the
performance of their duties.
The incident revealed a disturbing strain in Amular's and Ducay’s characters –
the urge to get even for a perceived wrong done to them and, judging from the
circumstances, regardless of the place and time. The incident could very well have
happened inside company premises had the two employees found time to confront
Mendoza in the workplace as they intimated in their written statements. Having been the
subject of a negative report regarding his work must have rankled on Amular that he
resolved to do something about it; thus, he confronted Mendoza.  To reiterate, they
were purposely there to confront Mendoza about their work-related problem. 
Under these circumstances, Amular undoubtedly committed a misconduct or
exhibited improper behavior that constituted a valid cause for his dismissal under the
law and jurisprudential standards.
 CASE 8
ROQUE B. BENITEZ AND SANTA FE LABOR UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS vs. SANTA FE MOVING AND RELOCATION SERVICES/VEDIT
KURANGIL
G.R. No. 208163 April 20, 2015
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal against
respondents, alleging that his employment was terminated supposedly on grounds of
serious misconduct or willful disobedience for allegedly uttering abusive words against
Kurangil during the company's Christmas Party. He further argued that the penalty of
dismissal is disproportionate to his alleged offense, considering that it was committed
during a casual gathering and had no connection to his work.
ISSUE: Whether Benitez committed a serious misconduct that warranted his
dismissal
RULING: Yes.
Despite his denial, there is substantial evidence that Benitez maligned the
company's managing director and the company itself during their Christmas Party. His
display of insolent and disrespectful behavior, in utter disregard of the time and place of
its occurrence, had very much to do with his work. He set a bad example as a union
officer and as a crew leader of a vital division of the company. His actuations during the
company's Christmas Party on December 18, 2010, to our mind, could have had
negative repercussions for his employer had he been allowed to stay on the job. His
standing before those clients who witnessed the incident and those who would hear of it
would surely be diminished, to the detriment of the company.