Intod vs.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

FACTS:
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino DAligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of
Bernardina Palangpangan. Afterwards, they all went to meet Aniceto Dumalagan. He (Dumalagan) told Mandaya that due
to a land dispute between Palangpangan, he wanted her to be killed; and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4)
men, otherwise he would also be killed.

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod with Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig went to kill
Bernardina Palangpangan due to a land dispute.

At around 10:00 pm of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod with his companions armed with firearms arrived at
Palangpangan’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. With Mandaya’s instructions, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig fired at the bedroom of Palangpangan. However, it turned out that Palangpangan was in another city, and the
home was being occupied by son-in-law and his family who were not at the room during the gun fire.

Witnesses has identified the petitioners and his companions, and one even testified that prior to leaving the
premises, they shouted: “We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if
you were not injured.”

The Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder after the trial and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. A modification of the judgement was sought by Intod by holding him liable only for an impossible crime.

ISSUE :
Whether or not Intod is criminally liable for an impossible crime?

RULING:
Yes. As per Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal responsibility shall be incurred by any
person performing an act which should be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility
of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. Palagpangan’s absence from
the room on the night of the crime where his companions threw a gun fire made the crime inherently impossible.

However, the crime was not impossible as argued by the Respondent People of the Philippines, and the facts were
enough to establish an attempt to convict Intod for attempted murder, since there was intent. In the Comment to Petition,
the respondent pointed out that:
“The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment as described
in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner’s and his accused’s own
spontaneous desistance as per Article 3, Palagpangan did not sleep at her house that time, making the crime possible.”

Intod may have not been held as criminally liable only if the following conditions were not present:
 Execution of the act has been commenced
 That the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed
 Employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become reality
 That the result or end contemplated shall have been physically liable.
Article 4(2) refers to protection against criminal tendencies wherein, it recognizes the offender’s capability of an act which
were it not aimed at something quite impossible that would establish felony against a person or property.
In this case, execution of the act has been commenced though there was a failure to accomplish its expected result
since the victim was not present at the time and place the incident happened.

However, the factual situation present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment due to the absence of Palangpangan which makes him not liable to the criminal act of attempted murder,
but will be held liable and guilty of an impossible crime, considering the social danger and degree of criminality as stated on
Article 4 par. 2 and 59.