ISSUE 3

Imperia Structures Ltd. vs. Anil Patni and Ors. (02.11.2020 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0811/2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 3581-3590 of 2020 (Arising out of Civil Appeal Diary No. 9796/2019)

Decided On: 02.11.2020

Appellants: Imperia Structures Ltd.

Vs.

Respondent: Anil Patni and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit and Vineet Saran, JJ.

15. In the last mentioned judgment, National Seeds Corporation Case

MANU/SC/0038/2012 : (2012) 2 SCC 506, this Court referred to the earlier judgments in
Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. v. N.K. Modi MANU/SC/0141/1997 : (1996) 6 SCC 385,
Thirumurugan Coop. Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha MANU/SC/1025/2003 :
(2004) 1 SCC 305, Skypak Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. MANU/SC/0845/2000 :
(2000) 5 SCC 294 and Trans Mediterranean Airways v. Universal Exports
MANU/SC/1126/2011 : (2011) 10 SCC 316 and held that the remedy available under the Act
is in addition to the remedies available under other statutes and the availability of alternative
remedies is not a bar to the entertaining of a complaint filed under the Act. (Footnote: 134)

Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (25.01.2019 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0079/2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 99, 100, 115, 459, 598, 775, 822, 849, 1221 of 2018, Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 28623 of 2018 and Writ Petition (Civil) No. 37 of 2019 (Under Article 32
of the Constitution of India)
 Decided On: 25.01.2019

Appellants: Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Vs.

Respondent: Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and Navin Sinha, JJ.

18. The Court must always remember that "legislation is directed to practical problems, that
the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular
and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and
are not to be measured by abstract symmetry"; "that exact wisdom and nice adaptation of
remedy are not always possible" and that "judgment is largely a prophecy based on meagre
and uninterpreted experience". Every legislation, particularly in economic matters is
essentially empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error
method and therefore it cannot provide for all possible situations or anticipate all possible
abuses. There may be crudities and inequities in complicated experimental economic
legislation but on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid. The courts cannot,
as pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Secretary of Agriculture v. Central
Roig Refining Co. [MANU/USSC/0055/1950 : 94 L Ed 381 : 338 US 604 (1950)] be
converted into tribunals for relief from such crudities and inequities. There may even be
possibilities of abuse, but that too cannot of itself be a ground for invalidating the legislation,
because it is not possible for any legislature to anticipate as if by some divine prescience,
distortions and abuses of its legislation which may be made by those subject to its provisions
and to provide against such distortions and abuses. Indeed, howsoever great may be the care
bestowed on its framing, it is difficult to conceive of a legislation which is not capable of
being abused by perverted human ingenuity. The Court must therefore adjudge the
constitutionality of such legislation by the generality of its provisions and not by its crudities
or inequities or by the possibilities of abuse of any of its provisions. If any crudities,
inequities or possibilities of abuse come to light, the legislature can always step in and enact
suitable amendatory legislation. That is the essence of pragmatic approach which must guide
and inspire the legislature in dealing with complex economic issues. (Footnote: 137)
 Malay Kumar Ganguly vs. Sukumar Mukherjee and Ors. (07.08.2009 - SC) :
MANU/SC/1416/2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1191-1194 of 2005

Decided On: 07.08.2009

Appellants: Malay Kumar Ganguly

Vs.

Respondent: Sukumar Mukherjee and Ors.

[Alongwith civil Appeal No. 1727 of 2007]

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Sinha and Deepak Verma, JJ.

52. Section 22 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 provides that Sections 12, 13 and 14
thereof and the rules made thereunder for disposal of the complaints by the District Forum,
shall with such modification as may be considered necessary by the Commission, be
applicable to the disposal of disputes by the National Commission. Section 12 of the 1986
Act provides for the manner in which the complaint shall be made. Section 13 prescribes the
procedure on admission of the complaint. Sub-section (3) thereof reads:

(3) No proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in Sub-sections (1) and (2) shall
be called in question in any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not
been complied with.

53. Apart from the procedures laid down in Section 12 and 13 as also the Rules made under
the Act, the Commission is not bound by any other prescribed procedure. The provisions of
the Indian Evidence Act are not applicable. The Commission is merely to comply with the
principles of natural justice, save and except the ones laid down under Sub-section (4) of
Section 13 of the 1986 Act.
54. The proceedings before the National Commission are although judicial proceedings, but
at the same time it is not a civil court within the meaning of the provisions of the Code of
civil Procedure. It may have all the trappings of the civil Court but yet it can not be called a
civil court. [See Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd.
MANU/SC/0030/1950 : 1950 SCR 459 and Nahar Industries Ltd. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation etc. civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 24715 of 2008 etc decided
on 29th July, 2009)] (Footnote: 141)

Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. vs. Abhishek Khanna and Ors. (11.01.2021 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0013/2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 5785, 7615, 7975, 8454, 8480, 8482, 8785-94, 9139, 9216, 9638 of 2019
and 3064 of 2020

Decided On: 11.01.2021

Appellants: Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd.

Vs.

Respondent: Abhishek Khanna and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee, JJ.

11. From the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the scheme of the 1986 Act, it is
apparent that the main objective of the Act is to provide for better protection of the interest of
the consumer and for that purpose to provide for better redressal, mechanism through which
cheaper, easier, expeditious and effective redressal is made available to consumers. To serve
the purpose of the Act, various quasi judicial forums are set up at the district, State and
national level with wide range of powers vested in them. These quasi-judicial forums,
observing the principles of natural justice, are empowered to give relief of a specific nature
and to award, wherever appropriate, compensation to the consumers and to impose penalties
for non-compliance with their orders.
12. As per Section 3 of the Act, as already stated above, the provisions of the Act shall be in
addition to and not in derogation of any other provisions of any other law for the time being
in force. Having due regard to the scheme of the Act and purpose sought to be achieved to
protect the interest of the consumers better, the provisions are to be interpreted broadly,
positively and purposefully in the context of the present case to give meaning to
additional/extended jurisdiction, particularly when Section 3 seeks to provide remedy under
19 the Act in addition to other remedies provided under other Acts unless there is a clear bar.
(Footnote: 143)

Forum for People's Collective Efforts and Ors. vs. The State of West Bengal and Ors.
(04.05.2021 - SC) : MANU/SC/0339/2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (C) No. 116 of 2019

Decided On: 04.05.2021

Appellants: Forum for People's Collective Efforts and Ors.

Vs.

Respondent: The State of West Bengal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and M.R. Shah, JJ.

27. In view of Section 34(2) of the Recovery Act, this Court held that despite the fact that the
non obstante Clause contained in the Recovery Act is later in time than the non obstante
Clause contained in the Sick Act, in the event of a conflict, the Recovery Act i.e. the later Act
must give way to the Sick Act i.e. the earlier Act. Several judgments were referred to in
which ordinarily a later Act containing a non obstante Clause must be held to have primacy
over an earlier Act containing a non obstante clause, as Parliament must be deemed to be
aware of the fact that the later Act is intended to override all earlier statutes including those
which contained non obstante clauses. This statement of the law was departed from in KSL &
Industries [KSL & Industries Ltd. v. Arihant Threads Ltd., MANU/SC/0961/2014 : (2015) 1
SCC 166 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 462] only because of the presence of a Section like Section 88
of RERA contained in the Recovery Act, which makes it clear that the Act is meant to be in
addition to and not in derogation of other statutes. In the present case, it is clear that both tests
are satisfied, namely, that the Code as amended, is both later in point of time than RERA, and
must be given precedence over RERA, given Section 88 of RERA. (Footnote: 144)

Imperia Structures Ltd. vs. Anil Patni and Ors. (02.11.2020 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0811/2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 3581-3590 of 2020 (Arising out of Civil Appeal Diary No. 9796/2019) and
Civil Appeal No. 3591 of 2020 (Arising out of Civil Appeal Diary No. 9793/2019)

Decided On: 02.11.2020

Appellants: Imperia Structures Ltd.

Vs.

Respondent: Anil Patni and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit and Vineet Saran, JJ.

1. Section 100 of 2019 Act was akin to Section 3 of the CP Act and Section 107 saves all
actions taken or purported to have been taken under the CP Act. It was significant that
Section 100 was enacted with an intent to secure the remedies under 2019 Act dealing with
protection of the interests of Consumers, even after the RERA Act was brought into force.
Thus, the proceedings initiated by the complainants in the present cases and the resultant
actions including the orders passed by the Commission were fully saved. (Footnote: 146)

Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and
Ors. (09.08.2019 - SC) : MANU/SC/1071/2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 43, 99, 124, 121, 129 of 2019, Civil Appeal No. 1486 of 2019, Writ
Petition (Civil) Nos. 130, 135, 919 and 941 of 2019 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India)

Decided On: 09.08.2019

Appellants: Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited and Ors.

Vs.

Respondent: Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman, Sanjiv Khanna and Surya Kant, JJ.

4. Allottees/home buyers were included in the main provision, i.e. Section 5(8)(f) with effect
from the inception of the Code, the explanation being added in 2018 merely to clarify doubts
that had arisen. The Amendment Act to the Code does not infringe Articles 14, 19(1)(g) read
with Article 19(6), or 300-A of the Constitution of India. The RERA is to be read
harmoniously with the Code, as amended by the Amendment Act. It is only in the event of
conflict that the Code will prevail over the RERA. Remedies that are given to allottees of
flats/apartments are therefore concurrent remedies, such allottees of flats/apartments being in
a position to avail of remedies under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, RERA as well as
the triggering of the Code. Section 5(8)(f) as it originally appeared in the Code being a
residuary provision, always subsumed within it allottees of flats/apartments. The explanation
together with the deeming fiction added by the Amendment Act is only clarificatory of this
position in law. (Footnote: 148)

Imperia Structures Ltd. vs. Anil Patni and Ors. (02.11.2020 - SC) : MANU/SC/0811

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 3581-3590 of 2020 (Arising out of Civil Appeal Diary No. 9796/2019) and
Civil Appeal No. 3591 of 2020 (Arising out of Civil Appeal Diary No. 9793/2019)

Decided On: 02.11.2020

 Appellants: Imperia Structures Ltd.

Vs.

Respondent: Anil Patni and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit and Vineet Saran, JJ.

1. Proviso to Section 71(1) of the RERA Act entitles a complainant who had initiated
proceedings under the CP Act before the RERA Act came into force, to withdraw the
proceedings under the CP Act with the permission of the Forum or Commission and file an
appropriate application before the adjudicating officer under the RERA Act. The proviso thus
gives a right or an option to the concerned complainant but did not statutorily force him to
withdraw such complaint nor do the provisions of the RERA Act create any mechanism for
transfer of such pending proceedings to authorities under the RERA Act. As against that the
mandate in Section 12(4) of the CP Act to the contrary was quite significant. Again, insofar
as cases where such proceedings under the CP Act were initiated after the provisions of the
RERA Act came into force, there is nothing in the RERA Act which bars such initiation. The
absence of bar under Section 79 to the initiation of proceedings before a fora which could not
be called a Civil Court and express saving under Section 88 of the RERA Act, make the
position quite clear. Further, Section 18 itself specifies that the remedy under said Section
was without prejudice to any other remedy available. Thus, the parliamentary intent was clear
that a choice or discretion was given to the allottee whether he wishes to initiate appropriate
proceedings under the CP Act or file an application under the RERA Act. (Footnote: 151)

ISSUE 5

Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. vs. Abhishek Khanna and Ors. (11.01.2021 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0013/2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 5785, 7615, 7975, 8454, 8480, 8482, 8785-94, 9139, 9216, 9638 of 2019
and 3064 of 2020

Decided On: 11.01.2021

 Appellants: Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd.

Vs.

Respondent: Abhishek Khanna and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee, JJ.

2..... A scrutiny of various definitions such as 'consumer', 'service', 'trader', 'unfair trade
practice' indicates that legislature has attempted to widen the reach of the Act. Each of these
definitions are in two parts, one, explanatory and the other explanatory. The explanatory or
the main part itself uses expressions of wide amplitude indicating clearly its wide sweep, then
its ambit is widened to such things which otherwise would have been beyond its natural
import. Manner of construing an inclusive Clause and its widening effect has been explained
in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps [1899 AC 99 : 15 TLR 61] as under:

'include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the
words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, and when it is so used these words or
phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according
to their natural, import, but also those things which the definition Clause declares that they
shall include.

It has been approved by this Court in Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance
Corporation v. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha and Sons
[MANU/SC/0607/1991 : (1991) 3 SCC 617]; CIT v. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad
[MANU/SC/0239/1971 : (1971) 3 SCC 550] and State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor
Sabha [MANU/SC/0200/1960 : AIR 1960 SC 610: (1960) 2 SCR 866: (1960) 1 LLJ 251].
The provisions of the Act thus have to be construed in favour of the consumer to achieve the
purpose of enactment as it is a social benefit oriented legislation. The primary duty of the
court while construing the provisions of such an Act is to adopt a constructive approach
subject to that it should not do violence to the language of the provisions and is not contrary
to the attempted objective of the enactment. (Footnote: 199)

Maula Bux vs. Union of India (UOI) (19.08.1969 - SC) : MANU/SC/0081/1969

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 Civil Appeal No. 851 of 1966

Decided On: 19.08.1969

Appellants:Maula Bux

Vs.

Respondent:Union of India (UOI)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.C. Shah, Acting C.J., A.N. Grover and Vaidynathier Ramaswami, JJ.

4. Under the terms of the agreements the amounts deposited by the plaintiff as security for
due performance of the contracts were to stand forfeited in case the plaintiff neglected to
perform his part of the contract. The High Court observed that the deposits so made may be
regarded as earnest money. But that view cannot be accepted. According to Earl Jowitt in
"The Dictionary of English Law" at p. 689 : "Giving an earnest or earnest-money is a mode
of signifying assent to a contract of sale or the like, by giving to the vendor a nominal sum
(e.g. a shilling) as a token that the parties are in earnest or have made up their minds." As
observed by the Judicial Committee in Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup A.I.R.1926
P.C.1

Earnest money is part of the purchase price when the transaction goes forward : it is forfeited
when the transaction falls through, by reason of the fault or failure of the vendee.

In the present case the deposit was made not of a sum of money by the purchaser to be
applied towards part payment of the price when the contract was completed and till then as
evidencing an intention on the part of the purchaser to buy property or goods. Here the
plaintiff had deposited the amounts claimed as security for guaranteeing due performance of
the contracts. Such deposits cannot be regarded as earnest money. (Footnote: 200)

Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors. (04.09.1990 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0031/1991

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2876 of 1986 and C.A. 1115 of 76

 Decided On: 04.09.1990

Appellants:Delhi Transport Corporation

Vs.

Respondent: D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sabyasachi Mukherjee, C.J., K. Ramaswamy, B.C. Ray, L.M. Sharma and P.B. Sawant, JJ.

194. It is convenient to refer in this context relevant passage in paragraph 4 in Chitty on

Contracts, 25th Edition, Volume 1:

These ideas have to a large extent lost their appeal today. 'Freedom of contract', it has been
said, 'is a reasonable social ideal only to the extent that equality of bargaining power between
contracting parties can be assumed, and no injury is done to the economic interest of the
community at large.' Freedom of contract is of little value when one party has no alternative
between accepting a set of terms proposed by the other or doing without the goods or services
offered. Many contracts entered into by public utility undertakings and others take the form
of a set of terms fixed in advance by one party and not open to discussion by the other. These
are called 'contracts d'adhesion' by French lawyers. Traders frequently contract, not on
individually negotiated terms, but on those contained in a standard form of contract settled by
a trade association. And the terms of an employee's contract of employment may be
determined by agreement between his trade union and his employer, or by a statutory scheme
of employment. Such transactions are nevertheless contracts notwithstanding that freedom of
contract is to a great extent lacking. (Footnote: 207)

Satyabrata Ghose vs. Mugneeram Bangur and Company and Ors. (16.11.1953 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0131/1953

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 80 of 1952

Decided On: 16.11.1953

Appellants: Satyabrata Ghose

 Vs.

Respondent:Mugneeram Bangur and Company and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose and N.H. Bhagwati, JJ.

12. We hold, therefore, that the doctrine of frustration is really an aspect or part of the law of
discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to
be done and hence comes within the purview of Section 56 of the Indian Contract, Act. It
would be incorrect to say that Section 56 of the Contract Act applies only to cases of physical
impossibility and that where this section is not applicable, recourse can be had to the
principles of English law on the subject of frustration. It must be held also, that to the extent
that the Indian Contract Act deals with a particular subject, it is exhaustive upon the same and
it is permissible to import the principles of English law de hors these statutory provisions.
The decisions of the English Courts possess only a persuasive value and may be helpful in
showing how the Courts in England have decided cases under circumstances similar to those
which have come before our Courts. (Footnote: 209)