TLL and Ansal University'S 1 National Online Moot Court Competition, 2020

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
TM09 (P)
TLL AND ANSAL UNIVERSITY’S 1ST NATIONAL ONLINE MOOT

COURT COMPETITION, 2020
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA
IN THE MATTER OF
SHISHLAMIC LEAGUE LEADER SIYARAM UMESH........PETITIONER
RJD LEADER TANUJ JHA...............................................PETITIONER
TMC M.P. SAHIYA BOITRA.............................................PETITIONER
ASIS LEADER OSAWUDDIN KUWAISI.............................PETITIONER
V.
UNION OF INDICA AND OTHERS…………....................RESPONDENT
WRIT PETITION N o . - - - OF 2020
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND OTHER HON’BLE

JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
Page 1 of 34
TABLE OF CONTENTS
S. No. HEADING Page No.
1. COVER PAGE 1
2. TABLE OF CONTENTS 2
3. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3
4. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4-6
5. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 7
6. STATEMENT OF FACTS 8-9
7. ISSUES RAISED 10
8. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 11
9. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 12 - 33
1. Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is

12 - 17
Constitutionally Valid?
2. Whether or not the Protests leading to riots could be

18 - 22
included as valid peaceful protests?
3. Whether or not the Fundamental Rights of any Section is

being violated by the Act and Whether or not the Govt. 23 - 26
failed to fulfill any constitutional directives?
4. Whether or not the Internet Ban has violated any

26 - 33
Fundamental Right to the Indican Constitution?
10. PRAYER 34
Page 2 of 34
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
Co. Company
Ltd. Limited
Art. Article
Hon’ble Honorable
Ors. Others
Anr. Another
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
v. Versus
UOI Union of India
SLP Special Leave Petition
PIL Public Interest Litigation
CAA Citizenship Amendment Act
DPSP Directive Principles of State Policy
Para Paragraph
Govt. Government
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
UDHR Universal Declaration on Human Rights
Page 3 of 34
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
❖ TABLE OF CASES
1. Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225

2. SR Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1
3. State of Arunachal Pradesh v Khudiram Chakma, 1993 SCR (3) 401
4. Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1
5. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501
6. Young Indian Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2018) SCC 1690
7. State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75
8. Justice (Retd.) K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India,(2017) 10 SCC 1
9. State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656
10. Gnanaprakasam v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, 2008 (Mad) 435
11. NCT of Delhi v. Union of India and others, AIR 2019 SCC 193
12. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241
13. Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary 2012 SCC 1
14. D Anantha Prabhu v. District Collector, AIR 1975 Ker 117
15. Himmat Lal v. Police Commissioner AIR 1973 SC 87
16. Maneka Gandhi v. UOI AIR 1978 SC 597
17. S. Rangarajan v. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574
18. Dalmia case; S.I.S. Mills Assn. v. Union (1972) A.A.P. 75
19. Om Prakash v. J&K (1981) A.SC. 1001
20. D.D. Joshi v. Union (1983) A.SC. 420
21. KangshariHaldar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 457
22. Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1
23. National Human Rights Commission vs State of Arunachal Pradesh, 1996 SCC (1)
742
24. Gnanaprakasam v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, W.P.No.18373 of 2008 (Mad)
25. Louis De Raedt v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 554
26. Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu,AIR 1974 SC 555
27. Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789
28. Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi vs Union of India And Ors,(1999) CriLJ 919
Page 4 of 34
29. Sabu Mathew George v. Union of India, AIR 2016 SCC 681
30. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594 at 602
31. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1
32. Guarav Sureshbhai Vyas v. State of Gujarat, (W.P. (PIL) No. 191 of 2015)
33. PUCL v Union of India, (2013) 10 SCC 1
34. Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 Ker 35
35. Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam, (1964) 5 SCR 975
36. Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118
37. Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731
38. State ofMadras v. V. G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196
39. Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India [AIR 1971 SC 530]
40. Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar
41. V.G. Rao v. State of Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 147
42. Gulam Abbas v. State ofUP, (1982) 1 SCC 71
43. Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 1236
44. P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 8 SCC 139
Page 5 of 34
❖ BOOKS
S. No. Books Referred Edition & Year
1. B.N. RAU, INDIAN CONSTITUTION IN THE MAKING 1960
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 9th edition, 2009
3. D.D. BASU COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 8th edition, 2008
4. H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 4th Edition, 2008
5. KD GAUR, INDIAN PENAL CODE 6th Edition, 2016
6. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6th Edition, 2010
❖ WEBSITES
1. www.judis.nic.in
2. www.liiofindia.org
3. www.scconline.com
4. www.manupatra.com
5. www.supremecourtcaselaw.com
Page 6 of 34
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica has the jurisdiction in this matter under Art. 32 of the
Constitution of Indica which reads as follows:
“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.”
Page 7 of 34
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Indica being the largest democracy in the world has the lengthiest written Constitution. In a
democracy, the right and duties of the citizen are broadly specified. In India the concept of
Citizenship, at the same time is very essential, as it being the second most populous country,
can provide certain exclusive rights only to her citizens. However, the idea of citizenship was
alleged to be largely disturbed by the influx of a number of illegal immigrants in the country
via the undefined and poorly demarcated North eastern border of the country. The country
surrounded by multiple nations from the Northern Frontier, has been periodically reporting the
instances of the arrival and settlement of many illegal immigrants since independence.
Owing to this reason, the Central and State Govt. in collaboration, launched the National
Register of Citizens for Nassam, which contained entries of the people being original
inhabitants of the state and as the Govt. claims, excluded all the illegal immigrants. The
Register was informed to be released with the aim to identify the real citizens and provide them
with certain exclusive citizenship rights, and reach to a nodal decision w.r.t. the illegal
immigrants. However, to the astonishment of many, even a big number of Citizens who claimed
themselves to be the original residents of the state did not find their names in the register.
Meanwhile, to tackle the issue of illegal immigrants at National Level, the Central Govt. came
up with a bill called Citizenship Amendment Bill, which was alleged to have some provisions
being grossly against secularism, and being discriminatory against Shislamians. Despite of the
objections, the bill was passed in both the houses of the Indican Parliament, which led to
widespread protests around the Nation.
The constitutional validity of the Citizenship Amendment Act was challenged into various
High Courts and Supreme Court, by the Shislamians, claiming that the bill arbitrarily
discriminates against Shislamians. On the other hand, the Central Govt. denied any such claim
and argued that the Act is constitutionally valid and in no way challenges the Fundamental
Rights of any Religious Community and also the citizenship status of the community.
The protests soon turned violent and led to mass bloodshed between the two religious’ groups.
It majorly involved students from certain universities and political groups like PMI and KNU,
leading to large scale loss of lives.
In response to the legislation, several sit off protests were organised by the member of
Shislamik community. One such site of protest being Rahim Baugh witnessed a sit in protest.
Page 8 of 34
However, soon after a few days a complaint of road blockage and Public Nuisance to started
finding their place in media reports. Various state Govt. took cognizance of the situation asking
the protestors to hault their actions. However, continuous denial and an explicit incident of
making a call through loudspeaker from a local mosque, which called the members of the
Shislamik community to continue their fight for justice, invited prompt action by the Govt. and
some of the state Govt. in turn ordered an Internet ban in various cities. Local people including
organisers of protest moved to High Court on the ground of violation of their Fundamental
Rights.
Page 9 of 34
ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE- 1
Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is Constitutionally Valid?
ISSUE- 2
Whether or not the Protests leading to riots could be included as valid peaceful
protests?
ISSUE- 3
Whether or not the Fundamental Rights of any Section is being violated by the Act and
Whether or not the Govt. failed to fulfill any constitutional directives?
ISSUE- 4
Whether or not the Internet Ban has violated any Fundamental Right to the Indican
Constitution?
Page 10 of 34
SUMMARY OF ARGUEMENTS
[1.] Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is Constitutionally Valid?
It is humbly submitted that the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 is unconstitutional and is
liable to be struck down on three grounds, Firstly, The Amendment Act discriminates on the
basis of Religion and is against the basic tenants of the Indican constitution, Secularism [1.1].
Secondly, The Amendment Act violates many Fundamental Rights and is primarily Exclusory
in nature [1.2]. Thirdly, The Amendment is not in conformity with Indican’s international
obligations [1.3].
[2.] Whether or not the Protests leading to riots could be included as valid peaceful
protests?
It is humbly submitted that the protest leading to riots could be included as valid peaceful
protest under various circumstances. Firstly, the Anti-CAA protests were taken place within
the ambit of the Constitution and under various International rules & regulations [2.1].
Secondly, there was no mens rea in the riot by the protestors [2.2]. Thirdly, there was no mere
preparation by the protestors to do any unlawful acts [2.3].
[3.] Whether or not the Fundamental Rights of any Section is being violated by the Act
and Whether or not the Govt. failed to fulfil any constitutional directives?
It is humbly submitted that the Fundamental Rights of any Section is being violated by the Act
and the Govt. failed to fulfil constitutional directives on two grounds, Firstly, The Amendment
violates Art. 14 and 21 of the Indican Constitution as it didn’t pass the prism of Art. 14 of
Indican Constitution [3.1]. Secondly, The Govt. failed to fulfil constitutional directives under
Art. 51(c) of Indican Constitution [3.2].
[4.] Whether or not the Internet Ban has violated any Fundamental Right to the Indican
Constitution?
It is humbly submitted that the Internet Ban has violated Fundamental Right to the Indican
Constitution on three grounds, Firstly, The Internet Ban violates Art. 19(1)(a) and 21 of the
Indican Constitution, and fails the test of proportionality under Art. 19(2)[4.1]; Secondly, The
Internet Ban violates Art. 19(1)(g) of the Indican Constitution[4.2]; Thirdly, The Internet Ban
violates Art. 21A of the Indican Constitution[4.3].
Page 11 of 34
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE CITIZENSHIP AMENDMENT ACT IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
[¶1] It’s the applicant contention that the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 is unconstitutional
and is liable to be struck down on three grounds, Firstly, The Amendment Act discriminates
on the basis of Religion and is against the basic tenants of the Indican constitution, Secularism
[1.1]. Secondly, The Amendment Act violates many Fundamental Rights and is primarily
Exclusory in nature [1.2]. Thirdly, The Amendment is not in conformity with Indican’s
international obligations [1.3].
[1.1] The Amendment Act discriminates on the basis of Religion and is against the basic
tenants of our Indican constitution, Secularism
[¶2] Indican secularism is defined by an equal concern and respect towards all religions. The
Citizenship Amendment Act violate not only the ‘secular’ fabric of our constitution, but it also
proposes un-favourable treatment of people based on their religious identities. Citizenship is
a legal right, the outlines of which are regulated by law, as argued above the nature of this legal
regime cannot contravene the Basic Structure of the Constitution. Moreover, the very concept
of religious identities is, and remains, foreign to the basic tenets of citizenship as identified
under Art. 5 to 8 of the Constitution.
[¶3] The Amendment Act is therefore manifestly arbitrary for privileging an entirely illegal
and unconstitutional purpose for justifying discriminatory classifications drawn between
groups of persons within the territory of India.A thirteen-judge bench of this Hon’ble Court in
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala1affirmed that secularism is part of the basic structure
of the Indian Constitution. This Hon’ble Court reiterated this view in SR Bommai v. Union
ofIndia2.
[¶4]This Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Arunachal Pradesh v Khudiram

Chakma3approving the dictum of the Supreme Court of the United States - “citizenship is a
most precious right”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the basic structure theory,
1
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225
2
SR Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
3
State of Arunachal Pradesh v Khudiram Chakma, 1993 SCR (3) 401
Page 12 of 34
which states that any law in violation of the basic structure of the constitution is
unconstitutional. The very same preamble gives the principle of secularism, which means that
India is a secular state. Secularism means that every religion is respected and treated in the
same way and the people of every religion stays together without any discrimination. The Act
in question excludes only the Muslim community from any citizenship rights to the migrants,
which is violative of the principle of secularism as it is discriminative of one religious’
community.
[¶5]In the landmark judgment of Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of
India4, it was observed by the Hon’ble Justice Khehar that for examining the constitutional
validity of an ordinary legislative enactment, all the constitutional provisions, on the basis of
which the concerned “basic features” arise, are available and even the breach of a single
provision is sufficient to render the legislation as unconstitutional. In covering only some
religious communities and not others, the Act violates the principle of secularism which is a
part of constitutional morality.5
[¶6] The main drawback of this Amendment Act is that it is primarily exclusionary in nature
and has been enacted aiming to target Muslims, further it also violates the secular principles
mentioned in the Constitution of India as Religion can’t be ground of granting citizenship.
Therefore, the Amendment Act had breached the core tenants of secularism and violates basic
structure of the constitution.
[1.2] The Amendment Act violates many Fundamental Rights and is primarily
exclusory in nature
[¶7] The main drawback of Amendment Act is that this Act primarily exclusionary in nature
and has been enacted aiming to target Muslims, further it also violates the secular principles
enshrined in the Constitution of India as Religion can’t be ground of granting citizenship. The
Amendment Act violates Art. 14, 15 and 21 of Indican Constitution. The classification created
by the amendment is not found on any intelligible differentia and has no rational nexus with
the object it seeks to achieve. The test for Art. 14 requires the classification to have an
intelligible differentia and a reasonable nexus with the object of the legislation. The Citizenship
Amendment Act has neither. This Hon’ble Court in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar
4
Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1
5
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501 (paragraph 308); Indian Young Lawyers
Association v. State of Kerala, (2018) SCC Online SC 1690 (paragraph 189).
Page 13 of 34
Ali Sarkar6had explained that there must be a yardstick to differentiate between those included
in and excluded from the group, however in the present case there are communities who have
arguably been more prosecuted, and yet have been left out.
[¶8] The Citizenship Act 1955 provides five ways of acquiring Indian citizenship, viz-Birth,
Descent, Registration, Naturalisation and Incorporation of some territory into India.
Shockingly the latest Citizenship Amendment Act seeks to grant citizenry rights to religious
minorities of neighbouring countries on the basis of religion, which is fundamentally
impractical and also against the Art. 14 of the Indian Constitution. The “reasonable
classification” defence taken by the Govt. not tenable under the eyes of law. Rather it is not
“reasonable classification” but “class legislation” hence fundamentally wrong and
unconstitutional.
[¶9] Furthermore, none of these justifications withstand constitutional scrutiny. This pernicious
logic of the “minuscule minority” was emphatically rejected by a nine-judge bench of this
Hon’ble Court in Justice (Retd.) K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India.7 Consequently, the fact
that a history of migration might have resulted in more refugees from Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Bangladesh (a fact that remains unsubstantiated and unproven) does not authorise the State
to create invidious distinctions on the basis of the country of origin. The Amendment Act creates
two classifications, viz., classification on basis of religion and the classification on the basis
of geography, and both the classifications are completely unreasonable and shareno rational
nexus to the object of the impugned Act i.e., to provideshelter, safety and citizenship to
communities who in their nativecountry are facing persecution on grounds of religion.
Secondly, the Act treats equals as unequals, i.e., allpersons facing religious persecution in their
native country are notbeing treated alike as only Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis
andChristians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan are beingmade eligible for Indian
Citizenship.
[¶10] It is further contended that purely religious classification is manifestly arbitrary. The
classification is bad as under-inclusive. This Hon’ble Court in State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica
Mills Ltd.8 has held that: - “A reasonable classification is one which includes all who are
similarly situated and none who are not. A reasonable classification is one which includes all
6
State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75
7
Justice (Retd.) K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
8
State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656
Page 14 of 34
persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.” While it is true that
the protection of Art. 21 extends to citizens and foreigners (including refugees) alike, it has not
been accorded such an expansive interpretation as to require admitting them to the privileges
of citizenship9 or residing and settling in any part of the territory of Indica. The Citizenship
(Amendment) Act, 2019 not only creates a class within a class of people fleeing religious
persecution but also creates a group of people who would be rendered stateless and without
proper procedures put in place would be left in absence of any protection of the law.
[1.2.1] The Amendment Act is Constitutionally Immoral and should be Struck down
[¶11] The Amendment Act fails to meet the threshold of constitutional morality. The
Amendment is passed not in the public interest and is constitutionally immoral. Because the
exclusion of citizenship rights solely based on religion is with a malafide intention of
discriminating against the religious groups not covered by the Amendment and is therefore
violative of secularism, which is a basic feature of the Constitution. With the recognition of the
principle that for a law to be valid needs to be constitutionally moral, the principle that the
intention of legislation cannot be seen stands diluted. In NCT of Delhi v. Union of India and
others10, Dipak Misra, the then CJI had observed: - “Constitutional morality, appositely
understood, means the morality that has inherent elements in the constitutional norms and the
conscience of the Constitution. Any act to garner justification must possess the potentiality to
be in harmony with the constitutional impulse.
[¶12] This Amendment Act is also against the constitutional ethos of establishing an egalitarian
society and it will definitely push the country towards majoritarian state. Citizenship
Amendment Act has potential threat to change the basic and primary character of Indian state-
Democratic, Secular Republic of India. The main drawback of Citizenship Amendment is that
this Act primarily exclusionary in nature and has been enacted aiming to target Muslims,
further it also violates the secular principles enshrined in the Constitution of India as Religion
can’t be ground of granting citizenship. The Constitution of Indica explicitly prohibits religious
based discrimination (under Art. 14, 15 and 25) against its citizens, and guarantees all person’s
equality before the law and equal protection of the law.
[1.3] The Amendment is not in conformity with Indica’s International obligations.
9
Gnanaprakasam v. Government of Tamil Nadu, W.P.No.18373 of 2008 (Mad).
10
NCT of Delhi v. Union of India and others, 2019 SCC OnLine 193
Page 15 of 34
[¶13] Indica is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.11 However, these instruments require
contracting states to provide refugee status to those who have a “well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion” and not merely on grounds of religious persecution.12 Contracting states have
to apply these instruments “without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin”.13
The Amendment Act would fall foul of these instruments had India been a signatory to them.14
[¶14] The Amendment Act is not in conformity with Indica’s international obligations. The
freedom from discrimination is considered as one of the core principles of human rights and
the same has been provided in Universal declaration of human rights (UDHR), International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Social, Cultural
and Economic Rights (ICESCR).
[¶15] The Indica has a constitutional duty to honor these internationally recognized rules and
principles. Art. 51 of which forms part of the DPSP, requires the State to endeavor to “foster
respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with
one another”.
[¶16] The Art. 26 of ICCPR15 clearly imposes obligation to prohibit any discrimination on the
ground of religion and mandates effective protection against discrimination on the basis of
religious identity. This Hon’ble Court in case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan16held that, “Any
international convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with its
spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote
the object of the constitutional guarantee. This is implicit from Art. 51(c) and the enabling
power of Parliament to enact laws for implementing the international conventions and norms
11
For a discussion of the law governing asylum seekers in India, see, Bhairav Acharya, “The Future of
Asylum in India: Four Principles to Appraise Recent Legislative Proposals”, (2016) 9 NUJS L Rev 239.
12
Art. 1, 1951 Convention.
13
Art. 3, 1951 Convention.
14
Under Art. 34 of the 1951 Convention, Contracting States have to facilitate the “assimilation and
naturalization of refugees”. For a discussion of how the CAA might violate other international law
instruments, see, Poddar, supra note 87.
15
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the
law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
16
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241
Page 16 of 34
by virtue of Art. 253 read with Entry 14 of the Union List in Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution”.
[¶17] Similarly, this Hon’ble Court in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India17held
that “India is a responsible member of the international community and the Court must adopt
an interpretation which abides by the international commitments made by the country
particularly where its constitutional and statutory mandates indicate no deviation. In fact, the
enactment of the Human Rights Act by Parliament would indicate a legislative desire to
implement the human rights regime founded on constitutional values and international
conventions acceded to by India”.
[¶18] The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act declares that its object is
to protect those who suffered “persecution on grounds of religion in those countries”. 18 The
exclusion of persecuted Jews, atheists, agnostics, Shias, and Ahmadiyas from those countries
bears no rational nexus with this object. As far as binding international commitments go, of
particular relevance is Art. 26 of the ICCPR that is couched in language almost identical to Art.
14 of the Constitution of India.19
[¶19] The Amendment Act is extremely dangerous for the India’s unity, diversity and its
secular identity and also hitting the doctrine of Basic Structure as propounded by Supreme
Court in Keshvanand Bharti (1973) case, and violates Art. 14 and 21 of Indican Constitution
as well as International Conventions, hence it is ultra-vires ab-initio. The Amendment is
unjustified, unconstitutional, arbitrary and discriminatory law. Hence, it is submitted that the
Citizenship Amendment Act unconstitutional and is liable to be struck down being
unconstitutional.
Hence it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Citizenship Amendment Act is
Unconstitutional and is liable to be struck down.
17
K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1
18
See, Statement of Objects and Reasons, Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019.
19
ICCPR, art. 26 reads: All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. See art 25 as an exception
(applicable only to ‘citizens’).
Page 17 of 34
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROTEST LEADING TO RIOTS

COULD BE INCLUDED AS VALID PEACEFUL PROTEST?
[¶20] It is humbly submitted that the protest leading to riots could be included as valid peaceful
protest under various circumstances. Firstly, the Anti-CAA protests were taken place within
the ambit of the Constitution and under various International rules & regulations [2.1].
Secondly, there was no mens rea in the riot by the protestors [2.2]. Thirdly, there was no mere
preparation by the protestors to do any unlawful acts [2.3].
[2.1]The Anti- CAA protests were taken place within the ambit of the Constitution and
under various International rules & regulations.
[¶21] Freedom of speech is the bulwark of the democratic Govt. This freedom is essential for
the proper functioning of the democratic process. It occupies a preferred position in the
hierarchy of liberties giving succour and protection to all liberties20.Freedom of speech plays a
crucial role in the formation of public opinion on social, political and economic matters. It has
21
been described as a "basic human right", "a natural right" so, as in the moot proposition
“making a call through loudspeaker from a local mosque, which called the members of the
Shislamik community to continue their fight for justice, invited prompt action by the Govt.22”
shows that the Govt. is intervening in the right of the protestors, as it was already ruled that the
right to use loudspeakers can be regarded as Fundamental Right in itself being a part of the
right of the freedom of speech & expression23. It was also held that at a public meeting,
loudspeakers should not be used at any time infringes Art. 19(1)(a)24. Hence the intervention
by the Govt. in the protest is invalid as they infringe the freedom of speech & expression of the
protestors.
[¶22] The respondent may argue that the freedom of speech and expression is not absolute and
restriction can be imposed but the petitioner humbly submits that the restriction imposed by
the Govt. under Art. 19(2) and Art. 19(3) is unreasonable as the Govt. has taken action when
the protestors were making a call through loudspeakers to fight for their justice. It is not valid
20
Report of the Second Press Comm, Vol I, 34-35
21
Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary 2012 SCC 1
22
Moot Proposition, para 14
23
MP JAIN, Indian Constitutional Law, eighth edition, pg no. 1091, para 9
24
D Anantha Prabhu v. District Collector, AIR 1975 Ker 117
Page 18 of 34
to confer uncontrolled discretion on administrative officers to regulate the freedom of

assembly25 hence, the intervention of the Govt. in the protest must be declare void as the anti-
CAA protest were taken place within the ambit of the constitution.
[¶23] In India a citizen had, before the Constitution, a right to hold meetings on public streets
subject to the control of the appropriate authority regarding the time and place of the meeting.
But the State cannot by law abridge or take away the right of assembly by prohibiting assembly
on every public street or public place26. If the right to hold public meetings flows from Art.
19(1)(b) and Art. 19(1)(d) it is obvious that the State cannot impose unreasonable restrictions.
It must be kept in mind that Art. 19(1) (b), read with Art. 13, protects citizens against State
action27 .
[¶24] As in the instant case there was arbitrary use of power to remove the protestors from the
roads and public streets as the Govt. cannot prevent the protestors to assemble on every public
place. Also the Wajahat Habibullah, one of the Supreme Court’s interlocutors for the Rahim
Baugh protests, has called the protest peaceful and beautiful, and blamed the police for
unnecessarily blocking roads and if any action, within the scope of the authority conferred by
law is found to be unreasonable, it means that the procedure established under which that action
is taken is itself unreasonable28. Hence, the Anti-CAA protest were taken place within the ambit
of constitution and it was the Police because of whom the nuisance was created.
[¶25]It is submitted that the Supreme Court had stated, “Citizens have a fundamental right to
assembly and peaceful protest which cannot be taken away by an arbitrary executive or
legislative action.29”Also the Justice Bhagwati had said, “If democracy means Govt. of the
people by the people, it is obvious that every citizen must be entitled to participate in the
democratic process and in order to enable him to intelligently exercise his rights of making a
choice, free & general discussion of public matters is absolutely essential.30” But the problem
of defining the area of freedom of expression when it appears to conflict with the various social
interests enumerated under Art. 19(2) may briefly be touched upon here.
25
Himmat Lal v. Police Commissioner AIR 1973 SC 87
26
27
28
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, MANU/SC/0133/1978: AIR 1978 SC 597
29
30
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI MANU/SC/0133/1978: AIR1978 SC 597
Page 19 of 34
[¶26] There does indeed have to be a compromise between the interest of freedom of
expression and special interests. But we cannot simply balance the two interests as if they are
of equal weight. Our commitment of freedom of expression demands that it cannot be
suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the
community interest is endangered31. Hence, in the instant case the road blockage is caused by
the police as per the report of SC interlocutor and Art. 19(2) is applicable only when there is
endangered caused to the society but there was no such thing happened so, the protest done is
within the ambit of the constitution and also in the case of Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home
Secretary, Union Of India & Ors.32, the Supreme Court had stated, “Citizens have a
fundamental right to assembly and peaceful protest which cannot be taken away by an arbitrary
executive or legislative action.”
[¶27] Further the Freedom of expression is also recognised as a human right under Art. 19 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and recognised in international human
rights in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)33.It also states that
everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression & the right to hold opinions without
interference. The version of Art. 19 of the ICCPR later amends this by stating that the exercise
of these rights carries special duties and responsibilities and restriction can be imposed for the
protection of national security. But in the instant case there was no any act caused by the
protestors which threats the national security so, the protest must be declared as valid peaceful
protest.
[2.2] There was no mens rea in the riot by the protestors
[¶28] It has been humbly submitted that there was no mere preparation by the protestors to do
any unlawful acts as various high courts have given their viewpoint on the protest. Karnataka
High Court held that imposition of Section 144 by the district magistrate is illegal. Further the
court also granted bail to protestors and held that the arrest was an attempt by the police to hide
its own excesses and photographs produced by the petitioners discloses that the policemen
themselves were pelting stones on the crowd34. Also, the Allahabad High court after the riot
ordered compensation for six students who were injured during the protest. Court said that
31
S. Rangarajan v. Jagjivan Ram, MANU/SC/0475/1989 :(1989) 2 SCC 574
32
33
Published in Art. section, www.manupatra.com
34
Art.: How HCs looked at Anti-CAA protest/ www.bloombergquint.com
Page 20 of 34
“policemen can be seen in CCTV visuals as being involved in stray incidents of damaging
motorcycle and unnecessarily causing the apprehended students”.
[¶29] It is further submitted that to establish any crime there must be fulfilment of Actus reus35
and Mens rea36. Mens Rea is the whole essence of crime as without having an intention to act
in a manner that it causes harm to person or property then in front of law it is not a crime37. For
a crime to be establish there must be intention and motive but in the instant case the intention
of the protestors is to protest against the Govt. for the CAA not for any riot.
[¶30] Hence from the above point of various High Courts shows that there was not any kind of
mens rea in the riot by the Anti-CAA protestors and the courts admitted that in many places
the riot was being raised by the police and because of the police acts the peaceful protest led
down to riot, there was no any kind of unlawful act done by the protestors so, this protest must
be declared as peaceful protest.
[2.3] There was no mere preparation by the protestors to do any unlawful acts
[¶31] Preparation is the second stage amongst the stages of crime. It means to arrange the
necessary resources for the execution of the intentional criminal act 38. But in the instant case
there was no any preparation by the Anti-CAA protestors to do any crime or riot. There sole
preparation is to do protest against the Govt. to take back that act. Also the Former Chief
Information Commissioner Wajahat Habibullah visited the site pursuant to the direction by a
bench of Justices S K Kaul and K M Jospeh and said that “Rahim Baugh stands tall as a firm
example of peaceful dignified dissent, more so in the face of various instances of state
sponsored violence on similar dissent across India”. He also states that “we have seen sad and
mute witnesses to police brutality and negative typecasting of a particular community across
the country. Crushing dissent instead of entering into a dialogue is the new form and because
of these barricading of unconnected roads that has led to a chaotic situation.” So, the mere
preparation of the protestors is to protest against the Govt. lawfully but is the police who makes
the situation chaotic so, the protest must be declared as a peaceful protest.
[¶32] Hence, it is humbly submitted that the protest must be declared as valid peaceful protest
because the protest was taken place within the ambit of the constitution under Art. 19(1)(a) and
35
Physical activity that harms another person or property
36
Intention of wrongdoing that constitutes a crime
37
Art.- Mens Rea: Mental Element in Crime/ www.lawtimesjournal.in
38
Art.- Stages of Crime/ www.legalservicesindia.com
Page 21 of 34
Art.19(1)(b) and followed all the procedure of international norms also. Further as per different
High Courts there was no involvement of Anti-CAA protestors and it was the police who was
responsible for creating nuisance by blocking unnecessary roads because of which the riot
arises out and there was no mere preparation of the protestors to do any unlawful acts, they
were just protesting against the Govt. for taking back the act within the ambit of the
constitution.
Hence it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the protest leading to riots
should be included as valid peaceful protest.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ANY

SECTION IS BEING VIOLATED BY THE ACT AND WHETHER
OR NOT THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO FULFILL ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTIVES?
[¶33] It’s the applicant contention that the Fundamental Rights of any Section is being violated
by the Act and the Govt. failed to fulfil constitutional directives on two grounds, Firstly, The
Amendment violates Art. 14 and 21 of the Indican Constitution as it didn’t pass the prism of
Art. 14 of Indican Constitution[3.1].Secondly, The Govt. failed to fulfil constitutional
directives under Art. 51(c) of Indican Constitution[3.2].
[3.1]. The Amendment violates Art. 14 and 21 of the Indican Constitution as it didn’t
pass the prism of Art. 14 of Indican Constitution
[¶34] Art. 14 of the Constitution of Indica includes the constitutional guarantee as to the right
to equality conferred upon all the persons within the territory of India. The right to equality
under the Indian constitution is not reserved for citizens alone.39 The Amendment violates Art.
14 as Art. 14 states equality before law and equal protection of law. The classification created
by the amendment is not found on any intelligible differentia and has no rational nexus with
the object it seeks to achieve. The test for Art. 14 requires the classification to have an
intelligible differentia and a reasonable nexus with the object of the legislation. The Citizenship
Amendment Act has neither. This Hon’ble Court in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar
39
Art. 14, Constitution. Art. 15 of the Constitution, however, does not apply to this argument because it governs
only citizens.
Page 22 of 34
Ali Sarkar40had explained that there must be a yardstick to differentiate between those included
in and excluded from the group, however in the present case there are communities who have
arguably been more prosecuted, and yet have been left out.
[¶35] Before going into the analysis of the first issue it is pertinent to consider the form and
objective of Art. 14. The Art. speaks that, the state shall not deny any person equality before
law or equal protection of the laws provided nothing therein contained shall prevent the State
from making a law based on or involving a reasonable classification.41 The concept of
reasonable classification means a law must operate alike on all persons similarly placed in
similar circumstances. It involves putting persons or things together in a class; and the equality
clause requires that the class thus formed must not leave out any person of thing which falls
within the class. The Supreme Court in Dalmia case42points out that reasonable classification
must satisfy two conditions; (1) it must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and
(2) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute
in question.43 Reliance may be placed on Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal wherein
Gajendragadkar,J. has held that if either of the two criteria are not satisfied then the act is liable
to be struck down as unconstitutional.44
[¶36] Further, this Hon’ble Court in the case of Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India45held
that intelligible differentia must fulfil two sub-tests: 1) that there must be a yardstick to
differentiate between those included in and excluded from the group, and 2) that yardstick must
itself be reasonable. This Hon’ble Court also opined that “Where a legislation discriminates on
the basis of an intrinsic and core trait of an individual, it cannot form a reasonable
classification based on an intelligible differentia.”
[¶37] The religious classification of this Amendment Act violates the twin test of classification
under Art. 14, wherein it requires that (i) there should be a reasonable classification based on
intelligible differentia; and, (ii) this classification should have a rational nexus with the
objective sought to be achieved. Art. 14 of the Indian Constitution forecasts that the ‘all should
40
State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75
41
H.M. Seervai, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, A CRITICAL COMMENTARY, 4TH ED, LEXIS
NEXIS page 442
42
Dalmia case; S.I.S. Mills Assn. v. Union (1972) A.A.P. 75, 81-82
43
Anwar Ali Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal (1952) S.C.R. at pp 340-41; Om Prakash v. J&K (1981) A.SC.
1001; D.D. Joshi v. Union (1983) A.SC. 420.
44
Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 457
45
Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1
Page 23 of 34
be treated equally alike’, wherein it implies that the law should give equal treatment for all
equals. However, this Amendment Act runs against the concept of equality enshrined in the
Constitution.
[¶38] In National Human Rights Commission vs State of Arunachal Pradesh46, the question
was about Chakma refugees, who were undocumented immigrants from Bangladesh. The court
observed that the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 of the constitution
is also available to Chakmas, though they were not Indian citizens. In light of that, the
Amendment Act is unconstitutional as it violates both Art. 14 and 21 of the constitution. While
it is true that the protection of Art. 21 extends to citizens and foreigners (including refugees)
alike, it has not been accorded such an expansive interpretation as to require admitting them to
the privileges of citizenship47 or residing and settling in any part of the territory of India.48In
Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu49 and Maneka Gandhi v Union of India50 where the Courts
have held that Art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness in state action and ensures fairness and equality
of treatment. The Act is fraught with arbitrariness as it has intended to bring in artificial
difference between migrants of different religion. Hence, the Act is bound to fail the test of
Art. 14 of the constitution.
[¶39] The Citizenship Act 1955 provides five ways of acquiring Indian citizenship, viz-Birth,
Descent, Registration, Naturalisation and Incorporation of some territory into India.
Shockingly the latest Citizenship Amendment Act seeks to grant citizenry rights to religious
minorities of neighbouring countries on the basis of religion, which is fundamentally
impractical and also against the Art. 14 of the Indian Constitution. The “reasonable
classification” defence taken by the Govt. not tenable under the eyes of law. Rather it is not
“reasonable classification” but “class legislation” hence fundamentally wrong and
unconstitutional.
[¶40] If unpinning the very motive of Act, it is nothing but face saver for the Govt., as first test
of NRC exercise in Assam has been failed brazenly, now Govt. want to impose Act which is
also against the Assam Accord of 1985. The certain provisions of the Act are direct onslaught
on cultural and ethnic identity of Assam people. In India under the Assam Accord, only those
46
National Human Rights Commission vs State of Arunachal Pradesh, 1996 SCC (1) 742
47
Gnanaprakasam v. Government of Tamil Nadu, W.P.No.18373 of 2008 (Mad).
48
Louis De Raedt v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 554.
49
Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555
50
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
Page 24 of 34
Bangladeshis who came into Assam before March 1971 would be granted citizenship under
the Citizenship Act. But Act will make people of six religions – Hindus, Sikhs, Christians,
Parsis, Buddhists and Jains – who came from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh Indian
citizens, provided they have lived in India since before 2014.
[¶41] It may be noted that under the Indian constitution while certain rights, like those
mentioned in Art. 19, are available only to citizens, others like the right to equality mentioned
in Art. 14 and the right to life and liberty mentioned in Art. 21 (which has been interpreted by
the Supreme Court to mean the right to live with dignity) are available to all persons. A non-
citizen is certainly a person, and hence is also entitled to those rights.
[¶42] Furthermore, the classification does not satisfy the nexus prong test of Art. 14. If the
object of the Amendment Act is to protect the ‘minorities who faced religious persecution in
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh’. Then, the exclusion of sect based discriminated faced
by the Ahmaddiyya and Shia sect among these countries are entitled to equal treatment for the
benefit of this Amendment Act. It permits differential treatment of a class of illegal migrants
without and basis. This is a class legislation and so it violates Art. 14 of the Indian Constitution.
[3.2] The Govt. failed to fulfil constitutional directives under Art. 51(c) of Indican
Constitution
[¶43] The Govt. failed to fulfil constitutional directives under Art. 51(c) of Indican Constitution
as Citizenship Amendment Act violates the Art. 51(c) of the Indian Constitution which says to
foster respect to international law and treaties…” read with Art. 253 which talks about to give
effect to international agreement. In Art. 2(1) of ICCPR, 1966 it is clearly mentioned that each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status and hence through Art. 26, it is to be
ensure that the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground which India has ratified on 10 April
1979 and come into force from 10 July 1979 onwards. The above-mentioned DPSP (DPSP) in
Art. 51 (c) protects the rights of the citizens and are fundamental in the governance of the
country. It is hereby necessary to say that the basic feature of the constitution is to maintain
harmony between fundamental rights such as Art. 14 (The state shall not deny to any person
equality before the law and equal of protection of laws within the territory of India), Art. 21
Page 25 of 34
“No person shall be deprived of his life” and DPSP Art. 51 (c) which state that the State shall
endeavour to foster respect international law read with Art. 253. Both Fundamental Rights and
DPSP as per the Supreme Court judgment in Minerva Mill case, 51 are complementary and
supplementary to each other and are the basic structure of the Indian constitution which if
violates through any amendment law will automatically violates the founding principles of
constitution and make that law unconstitutional.
[¶44] The case of Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi vs Union of India And Ors.52may be referred,
where the Gujarat High Court held that “In view of directives under Art. 51(c) and Art. 253,
international law and treaty obligations are to be respected when they are not inconsistent with
domestic law.”23 Similarly, in Vishakha vs. State of Rajasthan,53 it was held that International
law conventions may be adhered where there is a void in domestic law.24 In view of the above-
mentioned international instrumentalities and the directives given under Art. 51(c) and Art. 253
of Constitution, so the Amendment Act is violative of the jus cogens of international law.
Hence it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Fundamental Rights of many
sections is being violated by the Act and the Govt. failed to fulfil many constitutional
directives.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE INTERNET BAN HAS VIOLATED

ANY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO THE INDICAN
CONSTITUTION?
[¶45] It is humbly submitted that the Internet Ban has violated Fundamental Right to the
Indican Constitution on three grounds, Firstly, The Internet Ban violates Art. 19(1)(a) and 21
of the Indican Constitution, and fails the test of proportionality under Art. 19(2)[4.1]; Secondly,
The Internet Ban violates Art. 19(1)(g) of the Indican Constitution[4.2]; Thirdly, The Internet
Ban violates Art. 21A of the Indican Constitution[4.3].
[4.1] The Internet Ban violates Art. 19(1)(a) of the Indican Constitution, and fails the
test of proportionality under Art. 19(2)
51
Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789
52
Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi vs Union of India And Ors, (1999) CriLJ 919
53
Vishakha vs. State of Rajasthan, 1997 (6) SCC 241
Page 26 of 34
[¶46] With the advent of the new technologies many rights have come into light with right to
communication and right to express oneself on a bigger platform. Denial of such right is a very
grim way of expression domineering power of the Govt. Recently, the Supreme Court observed
that that Right to Internet Access is a part of Art. 19(1) (a) of the Indian Constitution. The three-
judge bench headed by Dipak Misra J., observed that every Indian citizen has “the right to be
informed and the right to know and the feeling of protection of expansive connectivity”.54 In
this case Internet was metaphorically said to be a “virtual world” with tangible and discernible
nature. This right has been granted as a quid pro quo for no violation of any right of privacy
and no act done of condemnable or criminal nature.
[¶47] In the case of Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting vs. Cricket
Association of Bengal,55the Supreme Court opinioned that electronic media is a means to
disseminate information. In the case of Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras56, this Court stated
that freedom of speech lay at the foundation of all democratic organizations. In Sakal Papers
(P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India, this Court said: "It may well be within the power of the State
to place, in the interest of the general public, restrictions upon the right of a citizen to carry on
business but it is not open to the State to achieve this object by directly and immediately
curtailing any other freedom of that citizen guaranteed by the Constitution and which is not
susceptible of abridgment on the same grounds as are set out in clause (6) of Art. 19.”In the
present case, the order of Internet Ban by some of the Govt. in various cities57 violates Art.
19(1)(a) of the Indican Constitution because access to the internet is a basic and essential facet
of the freedom of speech and expression and the Right to Know. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of
India,58even in the context of the internet. The fact, therefore, that communication is faster and
more extensive on the internet does not change the legal standard of proportionality that this
Hon’ble Court must apply while adjudicating the validity of restrictions upon the freedom of
speech and expression.
[¶48] It is contended that freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of

demonstration and processions or threats of violence which would tantamount to negation of
the rule of law and the surrender to blackmail and intimidation. However, whether there lies an
opportunity for everybody to exercise such right and to what extent should they manoeuvre
54
Sabu Mathew George v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 681.
55
Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting vs. Cricket Association of Bengal, 1995 SCC (2) 161.
56
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594 at 602
57
Para 15, Moot Proposition
58
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1(Kindly see paras 30-31)
Page 27 of 34
such right with respect to their ability to use certain force for its application is a complex
question of law.59 In addition, access to the internet is an indispensable requirement for access
to various other fundamental rights, such as access to healthcare and statutory welfare schemes,
to which persons are entitled in law. Today, the internet is an essential and basic attribute of
news-reporting. Consequently, any interference with access to the internet is a direct violation
of the right itself. As this Hon’ble Court has long held, fundamental rights guaranteed under
the Constitution also include ancillary guarantees that make those rights
meaningful.60Furthermore, an obiter dicta in another landmark case, Maneka Gandhi vs. Union
of India61, points to the importance of Internet as a limitless phenomenal to gather, transmit
and receive information. It is argued that the right as guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (a) shall only
be fulfilled when people will have ‘adequate’ opportunities, to express themselves, that are
relevant to the contemporary lifestyle.
[¶49] Further, the Internet ban also violates Art. 21 of the Indican Constitution. Access to the
internet was judicially recognized as a fundamental right in a recent decision of the Kerala
High Court in Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala62. In this case, the Kerala High Court has held
that the right to access the internet is a part of fundamental right under Art. 21 of the
Constitution. The widespread and indiscriminate communication shutdown, which was
enforced by the Respondents, by removing the internet as a platform, effectively suspended the
right itself. It is settled law that once it is established, prima facie, that fundamental rights have
been restricted or infringed, the burden is on the State to justify their reasonableness under Art.
19 and 21.63
[¶50] In the context of recognizing the role that the internet and an independent media play in
a democracy, the Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations, namely: David Kaye Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
stated: “Access to the internet and telecommunications networks arecrucial to prevent
disinformation, and they are crucial to protect the rights to health, liberty and personal
integrity, by allowing access to emergency help and other necessary assistance. Access to
telecommunications networks is also crucial to ensure accountability of authorities for possible
59
Guarav Sureshbhai Vyas v. State of Gujarat, (W.P. (PIL) No. 191 of 2015)
60
PUCL v Union of India, (2013) 10 SCC 1
61
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597.
62
Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 Ker 35
63
Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam, (1964) 5 SCR 975, para 35
Page 28 of 34
human rights violations, including the excessive use of force against peaceful protesters and
others.”
[4.1.1] The Restrictions Imposed are not valid restrictions under Art. 19(2) of the
Constitution, as they fail the test of proportionality
[¶51] It is contended that the Internet Ban do not satisfy the requirement of a validly enacted
law as necessary to impose restrictions on free speech/communication as it do not bear a
rational nexus to any aim legitimate aim under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution of Indica. It is
settled law that State action, when it intervenes with the Fundamental Rights, in order to be
permissible under the Constitutional scheme and framework, must conform to the doctrine of
proportionality. The doctrine of proportionality is not foreign to the Indian Constitution,
considering the use of the word 'reasonable' under Art. 19 of the Constitution. In a catena of
judgments, this Court has held "reasonable restrictions" are indispensable for the realisation of
freedoms enshrined under Art. 19, as they are what ensure that enjoyment of rights is not
arbitrary or excessive, so as to affect public interest. This Hon’ble Court, in Chintaman Rao v.
State of Madhya Pradesh64interpreted limitations on personal liberty, and the balancing thereof,
as follows: The phrase "reasonable restriction" connotes that the limitation imposed on a person
in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is
required in the interests of the public. It has been argued that the restrictions Under Art. 19 of
the Constitution cannot mean complete prohibition. In the case of CPIO v. Subhash Chandra
Aggarwal, the meaning of proportionality was explained as: ...It is also crucial for the standard
of proportionality to be applied to ensure that neither right is restricted to a greater extent than
necessary to fulfil the legitimate interest of the countervailing interest in question...
[¶52] In Modern Dental College case (supra), this Court also went on to analyse that the
principle of proportionality is inherently embedded in Indian Constitution under the realm of
the doctrine of reasonable restrictions and that the same can be traced Under Art. 19. The Court
Observed: “We may unhesitatingly remark that this doctrine of proportionality, explained
hereinabove in brief, is enshrined in Art. 19 itself when we read Clause (1) along with Clause
(6) thereof. While defining as to what constitutes a reasonable restriction, this Court in a
plethora of judgments has held that the expression ‘reasonable restriction’ seeks to strike a
balance between the freedom guaranteed by any of the Sub-clauses of Clause (1) of Art. 19 and
the social control permitted by any of the Clauses (2) to (6).” At the same time, reasonableness
64
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118
Page 29 of 34
of a restriction has to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint of the
interests of the general public and not from the point of view of the persons upon whom the
restrictions are imposed or upon abstract considerations.65The Internet Ban in the present case
can’t be considered as reasonable Restriction under as it is against the interest of general public
and violates Art. 19(1)(a).
[¶53] The restrictions imposed by the State are in the nature of prior restraint i.e. restraints that
are placed on speech before it is spoken or uttered. Under the Indican Constitution, such prior
restraints on speech are generally considered unconstitutional and the State carries a “carries
a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.”66This Hon’ble
Court has consistently held that the State has a duty to protect the freedom of speech and cannot
simply state that it cannot provide such protection.67This Hon’ble Court has held that
restrictions on speech should be imposed in a manner and to an extent which is unavoidable in
a given situation; furthermore, the measures in question can be taken only if there exist no
conceivable alternatives that restrict the right to a lesser extent.68In Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao
Scindia v. Union of India,69 this Hon’ble Court held that: “in civil commotion, or even in war
or peace, the State cannot act ‘catastrophically’ outside the ordinary law and there is legal
remedy for its wrongful acts against its own subjects or even a friendly alien within the State”.
In the present case, the act of State of internet ban70 is outside the ordinary law.
[¶54] In light of their clarity of purpose and impact, it is clear that orders of Internet ban have
been imposed by an overzealous executive to prevent all forms of protests, unmindful of their
disproportionate impact on the rights of citizens. However, the State cannot prevent lawful
discussions and demonstrations by civilians.71In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras72, this
Court held that an order made under Section 9(1)(a) of the Madras Maintenance of Public
Order Act (XXIII of 1949) was unconstitutional and void in that it could not be justified as a
measure connected with security of the State. This Hon’ble Court has laid down what
"reasonable restrictions" means in several cases. In Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh73, this Court said: "The phrase "reasonable restriction" connotes that the limitation
65
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731
66
S Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan, (1989) 2 SCC 574
67
S Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan, (1989) 2 SCC 574
68
State ofMadras v. V. G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196, para 15
69
Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India [(1971) 1 SCC 85: AIR 1971 SC 530] (SCC p. 131, para 44)
70
71
Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, supra, para 16
72
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594
73
Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1950] S.C.R. 759
Page 30 of 34
imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature,
beyond what is required in the interests of the public. Applying the tests referred to in
Chintaman Rao case74and V.G. Row’s case75, it is clear that the internet ban is arbitrarily,
excessively and disproportionately invades the right of free speech and upsets the balance
between such right and the reasonable restrictions that may be imposed on such right.
[4.2] The Internet Ban violates Art. 19(1)(g) of the Indican Constitution
[¶55] Since the last decade Internet has not only transformed how people communicate and
express their views, it has also transformed how individuals carry on their respective trade and
professions. With the emergence of Internet, the definition of trade and profession has been
completely altered, to now include, out of other things, e-commerce. Internet is; therefore, a
trans-border means for realising the Fundamental Right guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (g) of the
Indican Constitution. Even a day of Internet shutdown could bring down their businesses
immensely.76
[¶56] Internet has acted as a conduit by paving way for individuals to realise their Right to
practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. “Understanding the
Internet as a platform for trade highlights its broad economic potential. The global nature of
the Internet means that these opportunities are no longer limited to domestic markets, but are
embraced wherever Internet access is available.” Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively
invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes
a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Art. 19(1)(g) and the social control
permitted by clause (6) of Art. 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality." In the Present
Case, the Internet Ban is arbitrary because in order to prevent the Prevent Protest by few
Citizens, one can’t infringe the Fundamental Right of all the Citizens. The orders as a general
rule must be issued against the wrongdoer and not against innocent civilians merely on grounds
of convenience and expediency.77 It is therefore imperative that there shall not be internet
shutdown by the Govt., because by doing so it is violating Art. 19(1) (g) of the Indian
Constitution. In the present case, the order of State Govt. to ban Internet in various cities78 is
74
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R 1951 SC118
75
V.G. Rao v. State of Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 147
76
See, e.g., Gujarat banks lose Rs 7,000 crore, telos Rs 30 crore on restricted internet services, DNA INDIA (Sep.
1, 2015 09:45 AM), available at: http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report-gujarat-banks-lose-rs-7000-crore-
telcos-rs-30-crore-on-restricted-internet-services-2120685.
77
Gulam Abbas v. State of UP, (1982) 1 SCC 71, para 27
78
Page 31 of 34
violative of Art. 19(1)(g) as Internet has acted as a conduit by paving way for individuals to
realise their Right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
[4.3] The Internet Ban violates Art. 21A of the Indican Constitution
[¶57] Internet as a platform for learning in India has not only been beneficial for secondary or
higher education, but also for imparting primary education to children up to 14 years of age. In
2016, the market for primary and secondary supplemental online education itself accounted for
a massive USD 73 million.79This is also evident from the fact that number of people have
doubled up since the past year in search for learning videos on YouTube. Furthermore, various
studies have shown that Internet as a learning platform is more beneficial for school students
and every school should make use of the vast pool of knowledge available therein.80
[¶58] It is stated that internet provides access to any information at the touch of a button; there
has been a rise of massive online open course platform through which the people across the
world can access various educational courses taught by professional teachers; when the
quantum of knowledge available online is increasing every day, arbitrary restriction to access
the information is serious disadvantage and it amounts to a restriction on the right to freedom
of speech and expression as held in Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket
Association of Bengal & Anr.81
[¶59] The Supreme Court in the case of Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.82, held
that in the light of Art. 51(c) and 253 of the Constitution of Indica and the role of judiciary
envisaged in the Beijing Statement, the international conventions and norms are to be read into
the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India in the absence of enacted
domestic law occupying the fields when there is no inconsistency between them. Going by the
aforesaid dictum laid down in the said judgment, the right to have access to Internet becomes
the part of right to education under Art. 21A of the Constitution of India. It can be seen that
Internet helps in imparting quality education to primary school children as well, hence it
facilitates in the effective realisation of Art. 21A of the Indican Constitution. Therefore, any
disruption to access to Internet by the Govt. is akin to violating this Fundamental Rights of
79
Online Education in India: 2021, KPMG AND GOOGLE 10 (May 2017),
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2017/05/Online-Education-in-India-2021.pdf.
80
See Arun Gaikwad and Vrishali Surndra Randhir, E-Learning in India: Wheel of Change, INT. J. E-
EDUCATION, E-BUSINESS, E-MANAGEMENT AND E-LEARNING (2015), available at
http://www.ijeeee.org/vol6/390-4E201.pdf
81
Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 1236.
82
Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 3011: (1997) 6 SCC 241
Page 32 of 34
citizens.83 In the present case, the Internet ban violates Art. 21A as Internet is one of the main
source of education from primary to higher education, so the Internet ban hampers the right to
education of Citizens at large.
Hence it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Internet ban has violated
many Fundamental Right of the Indican Constitution.
83
P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 8 SCC 139.
Page 33 of 34
PRAYER
It is hereinafter humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica that in the light
of issue raised, argument advanced, authorities cited and pleadings made, the Hon’ble Court
may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. That, the Citizenship Amendment Act is unconstitutional and is liable to be struck down.
2. That, the Protests leading to riots should be included as valid Peaceful Protests.
3. That, the Fundamental Rights of many sections is being violated by the Act and the Govt.
has failed to fulfil many constitutional directives.
4. That, the Internet ban has violated many Fundamental Right of the Indican Constitution.
OR / OTHERWISE
PASS ANY OTHER ORDER OR DIRECTION THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY
DEEM FIT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD
CONSCIENCE.
FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE COUNSELS SHALL FOREVER PRAY.
Sd/-
(Counsel for the Petitioner)
Page 34 of 34

TLL and Ansal University'S 1 National Online Moot Court Competition, 2020

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

TLL and Ansal University'S 1 National Online Moot Court Competition, 2020

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

TLL AND ANSAL UNIVERSITY’S 1ST NATIONAL ONLINE MOOT

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

SHISHLAMIC LEAGUE LEADER SIYARAM UMESH........PETITIONER

RJD LEADER TANUJ JHA...............................................PETITIONER

TMC M.P. SAHIYA BOITRA.............................................PETITIONER

ASIS LEADER OSAWUDDIN KUWAISI.............................PETITIONER

UNION OF INDICA AND OTHERS…………....................RESPONDENT

WRIT PETITION N o . - - - OF 2020

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND OTHER HON’BLE

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

S. No. HEADING Page No.

4. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4-6

6. STATEMENT OF FACTS 8-9

1. Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is

2. Whether or not the Protests leading to riots could be

3. Whether or not the Fundamental Rights of any Section is

4. Whether or not the Internet Ban has violated any

AIR All India Reporter

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reports

UOI Union of India

SLP Special Leave Petition

PIL Public Interest Litigation

CAA Citizenship Amendment Act

DPSP Directive Principles of State Policy

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

UDHR Universal Declaration on Human Rights

1. Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225

S. No. Books Referred Edition & Year

1. B.N. RAU, INDIAN CONSTITUTION IN THE MAKING 1960

2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 9th edition, 2009

3. D.D. BASU COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 8th edition, 2008

4. H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 4th Edition, 2008

5. KD GAUR, INDIAN PENAL CODE 6th Edition, 2016

6. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6th Edition, 2010

“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-

Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is Constitutionally Valid?

[1.] Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is Constitutionally Valid?

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE CITIZENSHIP AMENDMENT ACT IS

[¶4]This Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Arunachal Pradesh v Khudiram

[1.3] The Amendment is not in conformity with Indica’s International obligations.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROTEST LEADING TO RIOTS

to confer uncontrolled discretion on administrative officers to regulate the freedom of

[2.2] There was no mens rea in the riot by the protestors

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ANY

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE INTERNET BAN HAS VIOLATED

[¶48] It is contended that freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of

FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE COUNSELS SHALL FOREVER PRAY.

(Counsel for the Petitioner)

You might also like