NatRes Case Digests
1st meeting
Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP
Facts:
The MILF, a rebel group, attacked a number of municipalities in
Central Mindanao. In response, then President Joseph Estrada
declared and carried out an “all-out war” against the MILF.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military
offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government
sought a resumption of the peace talks.
President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia to help convince
the MILF to return to the negotiating table. MILF eventually agreed.
After several exploratory talks, between the parties in Kuala Lumpur,
eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final
form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to
materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically
those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-
AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the
MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the
commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and
respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and
pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or
force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the
substantive agenda are on-going.
Petitioners filed the instant petition invoking the right to information
on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the
MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing
of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-
AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
A day before the signing of the MOA-AD, the Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order against said Agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the MOA-AD is constitutional.
Ruling:
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying
them, namely, the associative relationship (a state within a state)
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for
the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions
thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be
effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its
defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an
associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government
is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the
President, dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace
panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that
the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will
eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the
President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome
of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.
 La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos
Facts:
In 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942, or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, to govern the exploration,
development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources. Its
Implementing Rules and Regulations were embodied in a DENR
Administrative Order.
On March 30, 1995, the President entered into a financial and
technical assistance agreement (FTAA) with Western Mining
Corporation Philippines, Inc. (WMCP) covering 99,387 hectares of
land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato.
Counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR secretary,
demanding that the Department stop the implementation of RA 7942
and its IRR. Subsequently, they filed before the Supreme Court a
Petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order.
They alleged that RA 7942 was unconstitutional, because it allowed
fully foreign-owned corporations to explore, develop and exploit
mineral resources in a manner contrary to Section 2 (paragraph 4) of
Article XII of the Constitution.
Petitioners also claimed that the FTAA between the President of the
Republic of the Philippines and WMCP was illegal and
unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7942 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine, under
which all lands of the public domain and all natural resources were
deemed owned by the State.
The constitutional policy of the State’s “full control and supervision”
over natural resources proceeded from the concept of jura regalia, as
well as a recognition of the importance of the country’s natural
resources, not only for national economic development, but also for
security and national defense.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 was the proviso in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses,
concessions, or leases for the exploration, development or utilization
of natural resources. By that omission, the exploitation of inalienable
lands of the public domain through those modes was no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
The fourth and the fifth paragraphs of Section 2, allowed the
participation of foreign-owned corporations in the exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources, subject to certain
limitations or conditions:
1. Only the President, on behalf of the State, may enter into
these agreements, and only with corporations.
2. Only large-scale exploration, development, and utilization was
allowed.
 3. Restricted to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils
(areas where Filipino capital may not be sufficient)
4. Only for FTAA
5. The President shall notify Congress within 30 days
For being a constitutionally prohibited service contract, the WMCP
FTAA was also nullified by the Court.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS, pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30-51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent MHC.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares for
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995
matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad.
Petitioner sent a manager’s check issued by Philtrust Bank for 33M
which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
Perhaps apprehensive that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by respondent GSIS, petitioner came to the Court on
prohibition and mandamus. The Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the
sale to the Malaysian firm.
Petitioner’s argument:
1. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony.
2. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS
being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of
the national economy.
3. It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part
of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably
part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred
after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm.
Respondent’s argument:
 1. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires implementing legislation.
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel
does not fall under the term national patrimony which only
refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna
and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive
marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec.
2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still
inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building
nor the land upon which the building stands.
4. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a
matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for
any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block
of Shares.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII is self-executing.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing.
If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.
But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as
the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution.
Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing
the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
2. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement.
When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that-- qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred.
3. Manila Hotel has become a landmark- a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage- While it was restrictively an American
hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to
be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the
Cultural Center of the 1930Ês. It was the site of the festivities
during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth,
Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine
 Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors
who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.
Magallona et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an Archipelagic State pursuant to
UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting
some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around
Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the
UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten
one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify
KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main
reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages
hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken
our claim over those territories.
Issue:
Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it
is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other
hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts,
serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the
international community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact
legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such,
international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both
passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental
coastal state. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no
modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped
by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space.
Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them,
we’ll breach the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration
of the archipelago.
Oposa v. Factoran
Facts:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary
of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the
country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing,
or appraising new TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs
just and equitable under the premises.”
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have the locus standi in the case.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds no difficulty in ruling that petitioners can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and
harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible
to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
 Resident Marine Mammals v. Sec. Angelo Reyes
Facts:
In 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE,
entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with
JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of
the Tañon Strait. JAPEX also conducted geophysical and satellite
surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.
In 2004, JAPEX and DOE formally converted this to a service contract
for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum
resources in a block thousands of kilometers offshore the Tañon
Strait.
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well which is in the marine
waters declared to be a protected seascape, it agreed to comply with
the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to PD
1586.
Months after being granted an Environmental Compliance Certificate,
JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well.
The petitioners, collectively referred to as the “Resident Marine
Mammals” are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other
cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon
Strait represented by their legal guardians and Stewards and FIDAC, a
non-profit organization for fisherfollk established in Region VII, filed a
complaint against the respondents for the SC-46’s violation of the
1987 Constitution.
Petitioners filed the present Petitions for Certiorari, Mandamus, and
Injunction to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to
have it nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution
and certain international and municipal laws.
In opposition, public respondents argue that the Stewards don’t have
legal standing on the ground that they are representing animals,
which cannot be parties to an action.
Issue:
Whether or not the Stewards have the right to represent animals.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court in its ruling cited the landmark Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases which allow for a "citizen suit,"
and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violations of our environmental laws. The rationale behind the rule is
on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine
Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the
Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos
and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident
Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal
standing to file this petition.
Finally, although the petition was filed years before the effectivity of
said rule, rules of procedure has been held by the Court to apply
retroactively as there is no vested right in it.
 Concerned Citizens vs. MMDA
Facts:
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically the
Philippine Environment Code.
Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila
Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the
purpose.
Petitioners, for their part, contended that the pertinent provisions of
the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Petitioners also
asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act
which can be compelled by mandamus.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
which the CA sustained. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act
which can be compelled by mandamus.
Ruling:
Yes. The MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate
sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other
alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a
statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste
disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment
Code and RA 9003, but in its charter as well.
This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be
characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to
act officially according to their judgment or conscience.
A discretionary duty is one that “allows a person to exercise judgment
and choose to perform or not to perform.” Any suggestion that the
MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste
disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling
statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these
government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly
to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the
Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these
duties.
Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically
prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and
women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future
generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean
and clear as humanly as possible.
Cariño vs. Insular Government
Facts:
The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the Province of
Benguet, where the land lies. For more than 50 years before the
Treaty of Paris, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his
ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather, father and
himself had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had
inherited or received the land from his father, in accordance with
Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had issued from the
Spanish Crown.
In 1901 the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the
mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process,
however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.
An appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Benguet, on behalf of the Government of the Philippines, and also on
behalf of the United States, those governments having taken
possession of the property for public and military purposes.
Ruling of the Court of First Instance:
The Court of First Instance found the facts and dismissed the
application upon grounds of law
Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Philippines:
This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court, 7 Phil. 132, and
the case then was brought here 9 (US Supreme Court) by writ of
error.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff owns the land in question.
Ruling:
Yes. The US Court held that every presumption is and ought to be
against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps,
be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same
way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land. Certainly, in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the
Spanish law, the Court ought to give the applicant the benefit of the
doubt. Whether justice to the natives and the import of the organic
act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle examination of ancient
texts, or perhaps even beyond the attitude of Spanish law, humane
though it was, it is unnecessary to decide.
 Cruz vs. NCIP specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated
by the IPRA.
Facts: 2. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court 3. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join
voted as follows: in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority
was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
1. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
2. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and
Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of
natural resources and should be read in conjunction with
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
1. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the
view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and
66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
 Calalang vs. Williams et al.
Facts:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer
of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of
prohibition against the respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its
resolution resolved to:
1. Recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario
Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarinas Street, from 7:30 a. m. to 12:30 p. m. and from
1:30 p. m. to 5:30 p. m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague
Street, from 7 a. m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from
the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic;
2. Recommended the adoption of the measure proposed in the
resolution aforementioned pursuant to CA 548.
3. That as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not now allowed to pass and pick up passengers
in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of
their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548, by
which the Director of Public Works is authorized to promulgate rules
and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic
on national roads and streets, is unconstitutional because it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
The petitioner also avers that the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people.
Issue:
1. Whether or not CA 548 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the IRR infringes upon the constitutional
concept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people.
Ruling:
1. No. The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the
law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or
intends to make, its own action depend.
CA 548 does not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them
is merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national
roads and to determine when and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road
or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
 convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.

2. No. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not

through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.

Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the

people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition

of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."