Bradley King

PHI 1010: Introduction to Philosophy

2/9/2022

Are you Certain?

Many philosophers ponder on the objectivity of knowledge, what it is, and whether or not

we are truly capable of knowing something in terms of truth. A group of these philosophers

argue for the idea of skepticism, in whether we can truly be certain that we know anything.  Peter

Unger’s famous epistemic theory, as befits a prominent philosopher, is emblematic of such an

example of skepticism. He espouses a thought-provoking assertion that, essentially no human

being really knows anything about anything.  He expands on this conjectural koan of sorts by

validation of his personal argument in thorough detail. As illustrated in Unger’s work, “An

Argument for Skepticism,” Unger, while he makes claims of no insignificant grandiosity, argues

that we do not know anything about anything.  More specifically, that knowing something

requires absolute certainty, and in reality, nothing is certain. This is corroborated by the scientific

method’s central assertion that a theory can be in turn highly corroborated but can never be

proven true. Also, Unger’s argument of knowing nothing does indeed undermine Descartes’s

cogito and the commonsense knowledge claims of the average citizen such as the assertion that I

(the author) am seated in my study typing on my computer at this very moment. Even this is not

certain, as this can be refuted with arguments such as the brain in the vat or in more modern

terms a technological virtual reality simulation argument. Though this is stated in simplistic

terms, it merits further elaboration.

Unger constructs his argument in a very matter of fact style with only two premises

needed to argue his theory (page 131).  He first posits that if someone knows something to be so,
then they must be absolutely certain it is so (page132), and this is a relatively new idea for

skepticism. To cement this exposition, an example is presented: Jane meets Jack online via social

media, such as the Zoom chat service or Facebook. Jack knows or thinks he knows Jane exists;

however, he cannot be certain Jane exists as it is possible that Jane is merely a non-sapient

technological artifice, (e.g., a chat bot). Therefore, Jack may believe that he is absolutely certain

that Jane exists and yet the Jane he knows does not exist for certain nor absolutely. According to

Unger you must be absolutely certain that Jane is a being in order to be certain of her existence.

From his argument, if someone says Jane exists then he is absolutely certain that she is a person

and implies that she is not a chatbot. Therefore, she does not exist as a sentient being and thus

John is not able to be certain of her existence.

Rene Descartes, whom Unger opposed, often argues for skepticism despite his near

certainty of things. In particular, he argues for one extreme example, as outlined in his argument

following the famous cogito example. He believes that something can exist objectively whether

or not our perception of it is accurate. He states, “I think therefore I am” or “I am, I exist”. He

believes that it does not require complete certainty. So, in the example above, Jane does exist

regardless of whether she is perceived accurately. John does know that she exists. It’s just that

the nature of her existence is uncertain and in turn, proves that certainty is not required, albeit

with uncertainty.

 There is also a valid counter argument to Unger’s proposal that knowledge requires

absolute certainty.  Absolute certainty of something is improbable to the point of near

impossibility and thus that no person knows anything about anything, in the works of previous

philosophers, most prominent among them, is, again, Rene Descartes, ironically the very same

philosopher whose previous argument Unger deposed. Descartes, after his famous cogito “I am, I
exist” statement, constructs an elaborate argument about why he exists. His reasoning culminates

in arguing that because something external is providing the sensations, in layman's terms this

“something” is a material world.  

Descartes lists several potential options for the external cause of sensations some relate to

his argument for materialism and some of which are immaterial.  These various arguments

include his personal deity, the Christian God, of which cannot be material or immaterial

substance. Another of his assertions is that of corporeal substance (material). Or the third and

final option is that some other created substance is responsible; he concludes in more simplistic

terms that the cause is either an infinite substance (God), or finite substance (corporeal or

something else). The error in his logic is that Descartes eliminates options (a) and (c) by appeal

to God being no deceiver, if God is supremely good, then he will not deceive. This is a faith-

based argument not backed by evidence and so, Descartes brings God into the argument in an

effort to assure himself that the material world is as it seems. Of course, by Descartes arguing

this assertion, his argument produces its own issues, and thus many argue that Descartes has not

established the existence of a material world. And due to such lack of evidence, Unger forms the

foundation of his argument on assaulting this weakness. 

Irrespective of the question of whether or not Unger’s argument undermines Descartes’

first argument, his cogito, is or is not valid, which it is, in fact, valid, nonetheless.   Descartes

argues regardless of whether he is or not on this point, he experiences things which implies an

external environment. Therefore, it is not necessary for certainty within one's mind as something

exists independent of the mind providing experience even highly subjective as it is, therein lies

the key, where a mind perceives experiences subjectively and for knowable based on that
premise. There is an external environment that is somewhat objective and thus negating the need

for absolute certainty within the mind.

Steering back to the original argument, by Unger, he further discusses in his second point

that it is never all right for anyone to be certain that it is so, that is to have that level of certainty

of anything (page 132). Ergo, Unger reasons that any knowledge must be justified in some way,

shape or form; furthermore, it has to be justified utterly with no margin or incidence for error at

all. (The foundation of Unger’s need for certainty is that, according to Plato and other

philosophers, it is said that knowledge is justified true belief.). Unger begins his justification

with an example of knowing that Napoleon is a French general.  He says that if a person knows

that Napoleon exists, then it is perfectly reasonable for the person to argue that this is true with

absolute certainty (page 132). He says this is a problem because no person should have an

“attitude of absolute certainty” (page 132). 

As Unger argues certainty requires dogma, which is irrational, because with dogma, one

is certain no matter what outside evidence is provided subsequently, no matter how irrefutable

the proof, the arguer's position cannot and will not be changed.  And therefore, no-one really

does know anything about anything. 

 The quintessential assertion of science further lends credence to Unger’s belief in

skepticism for while one can formulate a hypothesis and while another can test and validate the

newly formed theory. Said theory cannot be totally proven true with absolute certainty because

the theory is created from phenomena that were observed. And these phenomena only are as

good as the current state of scientific knowledge. This is very much like Unger’s assertion of the

inability to be absolutely certain of some things. Indeed, scientific theories are expected to be
supplanted with new findings that invalidate at least part of said theory, reinforcing evidence for

but not completely proving the inability to hold absolute certainty.  

  While Unger makes reference to this undermining of his argument, he does not seem to

provide a suitable rebuttal to the counterargument, in turn, to his assertion. 

There are a number of possible responses that can be offered to these objections.  In this,

possible responses with these objections/arguments shall be examined and discussed and

paraphrased. Unger's argument as follows: Neither 'know' nor any similar expression comes to

mind when asking. The human species conveys much in terms of subtlety, it is suggested,

because we all agree that, if one does know something then it is all right for one to be certain of

it-but if one doesn't then it isn't. This suggests that there is some analytical connection between

knowing, on the one hand, and on the other, it's being all right to be certain.  Unger’s argument

comes off as superior to Descartes’ discourse for one key reason.  Unger’s assertion is predicated

on logic alone and does not require belief in theism, as Unger questions everything implicitly,

nothing is sacred.

In summation of these arguments, support of Peter Unger’s dissertation is well founded.

But it has been shown, though not completely proven, that as Unger said, “knowing something

requires absolute certainty, and in reality, nothing is certain (page 132).”  The implications of

this, that we do not know anything about anything, has profound implications for multiple fields.

In the field of criminal justice, for instance, how can we know something to be true, or someone

to be guilty if we cannot know anything about anything? That alone is a revelation. In current

politics, to state another example, the lack of certainty will affect when and where nations will

engage in realpolitik or other underhanded means and when they will employ more beneficent

means of stately conduct.  In all this, we are only beginning to scratch the surface of Unger’s
arguments, the impact and ripple effects of which indubitably go well beyond this paper and will

hopefully stimulate discussion for some time to come.

Descartes, Rene.  “Meditations on First Philosophy.” Meditation I, II, & IV Translated (1901)

Unger, Peter.  “An Argument for Skepticism.” Philosophical Exchange Vol 5 No.1 Art 3 (1974)