PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DOCTRINES.

ARTICLE 16
BELLIS v. BELLIS
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; LAW APPLICABLE WITH
REFERENCE TO THE INTESTATE AND TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION OF
AN ALIEN; SCOPE OF ARTS. 16 (2) AND 1039, CIVIL CODE. — Article 16, par.
2, and Article 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a)
the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.  (Bellis v.
|||

Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, [June 6, 1967], 126 PHIL 726-733)

ID.; LEGITIMATES; FOREIGN NATIONALS. — It is evident that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimates,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For its has chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.  (Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, [June 6, 1967], 126 PHIL 726-
|||

733)
ID.; ID.; ID.; FOREIGNER'S WILL; CASE AT BAR. — Appellants point out
that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in
executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court
ruled in the Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil., 867) case, a provision in a foreigner's will
to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern. The parties admit that the
decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.  (Bellis v. Bellis,
|||

G.R. No. L-23678, [June 6, 1967], 126 PHIL 726-733)

ARTICLE 17
TENCHAVEZ v. ESCANO
HUSBAND AND WIFE; FOREIGN DIVORCE BETWEEN FILIPINO
CITIZENS DECREED AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE;
REMARRIAGE OF DIVORCED CONSORT. — A foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the new Civil
Code (Republic Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in the
Philippines; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce entitled to validity
in this country.  (Tenchavez v. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, [November 29, 1965],
|||

122 PHIL 752-776)

 ID.; ID.; ID.; INNOCENT CONSORT ENTITLED TO LEGAL
SEPARATION. — The remarriage of the divorced wife and her cohabitation with
a person other than the lawful husband entitles the latter to a decree of legal
separation conformably to Philippine law.  (Tenchavez v. Escaño, G.R. No. L-
|||

19671, [November 29, 1965], 122 PHIL 752-776)

 ID.; ID,; ID.; INVALID DIVORCE ENTITLES INNOCENT CONSORT TO
RECOVER DAMAGES. — The desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages.  (Tenchavez v.
|||

Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, [November 29, 1965], 122 PHIL 752-776)
DEL SOCORRO v. VAN WILSEM
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound
and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied.||| (Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, [December
10, 2014], 749 PHIL 823-840)
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws||| (Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, [December 10, 2014],
749 PHIL 823-840)
ARTICLE 18
INSULAR v. SUN LIFE
While, as just noticed, the Insurance Act deals with life insurance, it is
silent as to the methods to be followed in order that there may be a contract of
insurance. On the other hand, the Civil Code, in article 1802, not only describes a
contract of life annuity markedly similar to the one we are considering, but in two
other articles, gives strong clues as to the proper disposition of the case. For
instance, article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "In matters which are
governed by special laws, any deficiency of the latter shall be supplied by the
provisions of this Code." On the supposition, therefore, which is incontestable,
that the special law on the subject of insurance is deficient in enunciating the
principles governing acceptance, the subject-matter of the Civil Code, if there be
any, would be controlling||| (Enriquez v. Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada, G.R. No. 15895, [November 29, 1920], 41 PHIL 269-275)
DOLE PHILIPPINES INC. v. MARITIME COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES
MERCANTILE LAW; CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT;
EXTRAJUDICIAL DEMAND DID NOT TOLL ONE YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD; CASE AT BAR. — The pivotal issue is whether or not Article 1155
of the Civil Code providing that the prescription of actions is interrupted by the
making of an extra-judicial written demand by the creditor is applicable to
actions brought under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The question has
already received a definitive answer, adverse to the position taken by Dole, in
The Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. American president
Lines, Inc. There, in a parallel factual situation, where suit to recover for
damage to cargo shipped by vessel from Tokyo to Manila was filed more tan
two years after the consignee's receipt of the cargo, this Court rejected the
contention that an extrajudicial demand tolled the prescriptive period provided
for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, viz: x x x. "We have already decided
that in a case governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the general
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on prescription should not be made
to apply. (Chua Kuy vs. Everett Steamship Corp., G.R. No. L-5554, May 27,
1953.) Similarly, we now hold that in such a case the general provisions of the
new Civil Code (Art. 1155) cannot be made to apply, as such application
would have the effect of extending the one-year period of prescription fixed in
the law. It is desirable that matters affecting transportation of goods by sea be
decided in as short a time as possible; the application of the provisions of
Article 1155 of the new Civil Code would unnecessarily extend the period and
 permit delays in the settlement of questions affecting transportation, contrary
to the clear intent and purpose of the law. x x x."  (Dole Phils., Inc. v. Maritime
|

Co. of the Phils., G.R. No. L-61352, [February 27, 1987], 232 PHIL 128-133)

HUMAN RELATIONS
ARTICLES 19-21
DEVELOPMENT BANK v. CA
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a
legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of said
provision. 52 Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty
to prove the same. 53 Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to
abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence,
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of
the nature of fraud. 54 Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
Malice is bad faith or bad motive.   (Development Bank of the Phils. v. Court of
|||

Appeals, G.R. No. 137916, [December 8, 2004], 487 PHIL 9-31)

The Spouses Gotangco failed to prove malice on the part of the
petitioner. There was, for sure, a divergence of opinion between the petitioner,
on the one hand, and the Spouses Gotangco, on the other, relative to the issue
of whether Cucio's payments were mere deposits or partial payments for the lot
covered by TCT No. NT-177647, and whether the respondents Spouses
Gotangco had agreed to the offer of the pool of insurers to pay the amount of
P167,149.14 as indemnity for the loss of their poultry farm. However, the bare
fact that the petitioner filed its application of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage, notwithstanding those differences, cannot thereby give rise to the
conclusion that the petitioner did so with malice, to harass the Spouses
Gotangco. The records show that, time and again, the petitioner had sent
notices to the respondents spouses and demanded the updating of their
account and the payment of the balance thereof, but the respondents spouses
failed to comply. In the meantime, interests and penalties on the loan
considerably accrued. Under the terms of the real estate mortgage and its
charter, the petitioner had the right to foreclose the said mortgage
extrajudicially. Hence, the petitioner was constrained to file its application for
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage for the Spouses Gotangco's past
due obligation. Instead of settling their account, the Spouses filed their petition
for writ of preliminary injunction. Because of the preliminary injunction issued by
the trial court, the foreclosure was aborted. Under the circumstances, it cannot
be gainsaid that the petitioner acted in bad faith or with malice in seeking the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage in its favor.  (Development Bank of the
|||

Phils. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137916, [December 8, 2004], 487 PHIL 9-
31)

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP v. CA

CIVIL LAW; HUMAN RELATIONS; PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS;
CONSTRUED. — Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed
not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes
the primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercises, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is different, these
three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator
Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article (Article 21), combined with Articles 19
and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened;
it has become much more supple and adaptable that the Anglo-American law
on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right
which could not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1
Civil Code of the Philippines 72). There is however, no hard and fast rule which
can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may
be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has
been violated, resulting in damages under Article 20 and 21 or other applicable
provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778
[1989]).  (Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694,
|||

[January 11, 1993], 291 PHIL 17-34)

ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS. — The elements of an abuse of right under
Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do
not especially provide for their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus,
anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or
duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered
thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following
elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals,
good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury
to another may be made the basis for an award of damages.  (Albenson |||

Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, [January 11, 1993], 291
PHIL 17-34)
 ID.; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; CANNOT BE AWARDED IN THE
ABSENCE OF WRONGFUL ACT OR OMISSION OR OF FRAUD OR BAD
FAITH. — The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the
latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand
was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible means
by which they could collect the sum of money due them. A person who has not
been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the
debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the
issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or
omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that
the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and
subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant
to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141
SCRA 488 [1986]).  (Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
|||

88694, [January 11, 1993], 291 PHIL 17-34)

VDA. DE LAIG v. CA
LAND REGISTRATION ACT; LIABILITY OF PERSONS
FRAUDULENTLY PROCURING CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. — Whoever
fraudulently procures, or fraudulently assists in procuring, or is privy to the
fraudulent procurement of any certificate of title or owner's duplicate of title may
be criminally prosecuted under he provisions of the Land Registration Act. The
offender may likewise be civilly liable for failure to observed honesty and good
faith in the performance of his duties if he is a public officer or a member of the
Bar, or for wilfully or negligently causing damage to another, or for willfully
causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs and/or public policy as provided for in Article 19, 20, and 21 of the New
Civil Code. All these actions are without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken in case the offender is a public
officer.  (Vda. de Laig v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-26882, [April 5, 1978],
|||

172 PHIL 283-297)

MAGBANUA v. IAC
Under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs (now petitioners) are entitled
to a measure of moral damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the
award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same code
and the latter stipulates that: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage."
It appears that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm
lots in order to make them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated
the plaintiffs' rights and caused prejudice to the latter by the unjustified
diversion of the water.
The petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the
defendants acted in an oppressive manner. (Magbanua v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66870-72, [June 29, 1985], 221 PHIL 680-685)
PEOPLE’S BANK v. DAHICAN LUMBER COMPANY
On the question of plaintiffs' right to recover damages from the
defendants, the law (Articles 1313 and 1314 of the New Civil Code) provides
that creditors are protected in cases of contracts intended to defraud them,
and that any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting party. Similar liability is
demandable under Arts. 20 and 21 — which may be given retroactive effect
(Arts. 2252-53) — or under Arts. 1902 and 2176 of the Old Civil
Code.  (People's Bank and Trust Co. v. Dahican Lumber Co., G.R. No. L-
|||

17500, [May 16, 1967], 126 PHIL 354-371)

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; RULE;
RATIONALE. — The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per
se is not an actionable wrong (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil.
629 [1960]; Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960]) Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have
made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote: "The
elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia (58
Phil. 866 [1933]). The history of breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to
abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which
has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in
many of the American states . . ." This notwithstanding, the said Code
contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books (Philippine National
Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978]).  (Gashem Shookat Baksh
|||

v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97336, [February 19, 1993])

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF DAMAGES, JUSTIFIED BECAUSE
OF FRAUD AND DECEIT BEHIND IT; CASE AT BAR. — In the light of the
above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual
act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of
such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case,
respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and
sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to
their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished
possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example
earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal
seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of
age at the time of the seduction. Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest
that Article 21 may be applied-in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction.  (Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of
|||

Appeals, G.R. No. 97336, [February 19, 1993])

 ID.; PARI DELICTO RULE; DEFINED; NOT APPRECIATED IN CASE
AT BAR. — The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed,
the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of
intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not
out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had
qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out
that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault;
in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." (Black's Laws
Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004). At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto. "Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the
parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition or
undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud." (37 AM Jur 2d. 401). In Mangayao vs. Lasud, (11 SCRA 158 [1964])
We declared: "Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there
should be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This
rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate
or intelligent and the other one is not (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil.
209)."  (Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97336,
|||

[February 19, 1993])

WASSMER v. VELEZ
 DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; WHEN
ACTIONABLE WRONG. — Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is
not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the erring promisor must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil
Code.  (Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, [December 26, 1964], 120 PHIL
|||

1440-1447)
 ID.; ID.; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED
IN AN ACTIONABLE BREACH OF PROMISE SUIT. — When a breach of
promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may be awarded under Article 2219 (10) of the said Code.
Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code
where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner.  (Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, [December 26,
|||

1964], 120 PHIL 1440-1447)

HERMOSISIMA v. CA
DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; NOT ACTIONABLE.
— It is the clear and manifest intent of Congress not to sanction actions for
breach of promise to marry.  (Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
|||

14628, [September 30, 1960], 109 PHIL 629-635)

 ID.; ID.; SEDUCTION AS GROUND FOR AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES; NATURE OF SEDUCTION CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE
2219 OF NEW CIVIL CODE. — The "seduction" contemplated in Article
2219 of the New Civil Code as one of the cases where moral damages may
be recovered, is the crime punished as such in Articles 337 and 338 of the
 Revised Penal Code.  (Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-14628,
|||

[September 30, 1960], 109 PHIL 629-635)

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN SEDUCTION DOES NOT EXIST. — Where a
woman, who was an insurance agent and former high school teacher, around
36 years of age and approximately 10 years older than the man,
"overwhelmed by her love" for a man approximately 10 years younger then
her, had intimate relations with him, because she "wanted to bind" him "by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy,"
it cannot be said that he is morally guilty of seduction.  (Hermosisima v. Court
|||

of Appeals, G.R. No. L-14628, [September 30, 1960], 109 PHIL 629-635)
CONSTANTINO v. MENDEZ
CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AS A GENERAL RULE, MERE SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE IS NOT BY ITSELF A BASIS FOR RECOVERY;
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — As regards Amelita's claim for damages
which is based on Article 19 & 21 of the Civil Code on the theory that through
Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree
with the Court of Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis
for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a
product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's
Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was
attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the
reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or
deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately
severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual
contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her
declaration that in the months of September, October and November, 1974,
they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the
alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit
herself to Ivan  (Constantino v. Mendez, G.R. No. 57227, [May 14, 1992],
|||

284-A PHIL 442-449)

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING v. QUINONES
The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. 33
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication
between the cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the
receipt to respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a cash count
and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans
was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make
such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent
whether she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the
question now is whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went
overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a
person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be
liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. 34 Good
faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
and unscrupulous advantage of another. 35 Malice or bad faith, on the other
hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. 36 DSHcTC

Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent

whether she paid or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent
at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned
sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and
the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views
insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was
in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official
receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such
payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have
been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went
overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding.
In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to
respondent's employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing
bad acts on the part of respondent.
 (California Clothing, Inc. v. Quiñones, G.R. No. 175822, [October 23,
|||

2013], 720 PHIL 373-384)

It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter
to respondent's employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance
in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondent's reputation in the
eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and
despite the latter's possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly
impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability. 38 The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. 39 In this case,
petitioners obviously abused their rights.  (California Clothing, Inc. v.
|||

Quiñones, G.R. No. 175822, [October 23, 2013], 720 PHIL 373-384)
 BDO v. GOMEZ
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties must act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The principle
embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the "abuse of right
principle."   (Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Gomez, G.R. No.
|||

199601, [November 23, 2015], 773 PHIL 387-398)

Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear
violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages.
While the PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the
right must not be exercised unjustly and illegally. In the instant case, the PCIB
made deductions on Josephine's salary even if the investigation was still
pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine
grossly negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank
erroneously paid to Harrington's impostor. When Josephine asked for legal
and factual basis for the finding of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any.
Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary,
allowances, and bonuses.  (Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
|||

Gomez, G.R. No. 199601, [November 23, 2015], 773 PHIL 387-398)
COCA-COLA v. SPOUSE BERNANDO
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for
the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever another
person commits an act in violation of some legal provision; or an act which,
though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates
certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved  (Coca-Cola Bottlers
|||

Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Bernardo, G.R. No. 190667, [November 7, 2016],

798 PHIL 28-44)
Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner had employed
oppressive and high-handed schemes to unjustly limit the market coverage
and diminish the investment returns of respondents. 49 The CA summarized
its findings as follows: 50
This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what appellant did in order to
take over the market: directly sell its products to or deal them off to
competing stores at a price substantially lower than those imposed on
its wholesalers. As a result, the wholesalers suffered losses, and in
 [respondents'] case, laid off a number of employees and alienated the
patronage of its major customers including small-scale stores.
It must be emphasized that petitioner is not only a beverage giant, but
also the manufacturer of the products; hence, it sets the price. In addition, it
took advantage of the information provided by respondents to facilitate its
takeover of the latter's usual business area. Distributors like respondents, who
had assisted petitioner in its marketing efforts, suddenly found themselves
with fewer customers. Other distributors were left with no choice but to fold.
(Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Bernardo, G.R. No. 190667,
[November 7, 2016], 798 PHIL 28-44)

ARTICLES 22-23
REPUBLIC v. BALLOCANAG
Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest. 28 This basic doctrine on
unjust enrichment simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or
enrich himself inequitably at another's expense. 29 There is unjust enrichment
when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles
of justice, equity and good conscience. 30 Article 22 of the Civil Code states the
rule in this wise  (Republic v. Ballocanag, G.R. No. 163794, [November 28,
|||

2008], 593 PHIL 80-99)

The requisites for the application of this doctrine are present in the instant
case. There is enrichment on the part of the petitioner, as the State would come
into possession of — and may technically appropriate — the more than one
thousand fruit-bearing trees planted by the private respondent. There is
impoverishment on the part of Reyes, because he stands to lose the
improvements he had painstakingly planted and invested in. There is lack of
valid cause for the State to acquire these improvements, because, as
discussed above, Reyes introduced the improvements in good faith. Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not commit any error in ruling that Reyes is entitled to the
benefits of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.   (Republic v. Ballocanag,
|||

G.R. No. 163794, [November 28, 2008], 593 PHIL 80-99)

Thus, even if we accept the OSG's submission that Reyes' entitlement to
these benefits is not absolute because he can no longer claim good faith after
the filing of the reversion case in 1987, still, there is no gainsaying that prior to
that — all the way back to 1970 — he had possessed the land and introduced
improvements thereon in good faith. At the very least, then, Reyes is entitled to
these benefits for the 17 years that he had been a planter in good
faith.  (Republic v. Ballocanag, G.R. No. 163794, [November 28, 2008], 593
|||

PHIL 80-99)
ARTICLE 24
DE LIMA v. LAGUNA TAYABAS COMPANY
 ID.; RULES ON PROCEDURE; LIBERALLY APPLIED; CASE AT BAR. — This
Court is inclined to adopt a liberal stance in this case as We have done in
previous decisions where We have held that litigations should, as much as
possible be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Pleadings as well as
remedial laws should be construed liberally in order that the litigants may have
ample opportunity to pursue their respective claims and that a possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities may be avoided. The said heirs
who did not appeal the judgment, should be afforded equitable relief by the
courts as it must be vigilant for their protection. The claim for legal interest and
increase in the indemnity should be entertained in spite of the failure of the
claimants to appeal the judgment.  (De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co., G.R. Nos.
|||

L-35697-99, [April 15, 1988], 243 PHIL 235-243)

ARTICLE 26
RCPI v. VERCHEZ
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts,
though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention, and other relief||| (Radio Communications of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Verchez, G.R. No. 164349, [January 31, 2006], 516
PHIL 725-742)
RCPI's negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly
disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As
observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them
as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The
tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are, therefore,
analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are
among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages
under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.  (Radio Communications of the
|||

Philippines, Inc. v. Verchez, G.R. No. 164349, [January 31, 2006], 516 PHIL
725-742)
HING v. CHOACUY
Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual's
right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be
committed against him by other individuals.  (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr.,
|||

G.R. No. 179736, [June 26, 2013], 712 PHIL 337-354)

 This provision recognizes that a man's house is his castle, where his right
to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of
intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another
without the consent of the latter." 49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of
another's residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is
entitled to privacy.  (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736, [June
|||

26, 2013], 712 PHIL 337-354) Thus, an individual's right to privacy under Article
26 (1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it
may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another's residence," therefore,
covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as
private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may
not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the
application of Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code only to residences.  (Spouses
|||

Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736, [June 26, 2013], 712 PHIL 337-354)
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to
pry into the privacy of another's residence or business office as it would
be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No.
4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law  (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No.
|||

179736, [June 26, 2013], 712 PHIL 337-354)

ARTICLE 27
LEDESMA v. CA
  CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF IS
PROPER WHERE A PARTY UNDERWENT A PAINFUL ORDEAL CAUSED
BY PETITIONER'S NEGLECT OF DUTY AND CALLOUSNESS. — We
find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be
reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful
ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and
callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the
case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
"There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or omission." (People v. Baylon,
129 SCRA 62 [1984]).  (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 54598, [April
|||

15, 1988], 243 PHIL 591-600)

  ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF PETITIONER TO ENFORCE THE DIRECTOR'S
DECISION TO GIVE AN HONOR AWARD TO THE DECEASED STUDENT. —
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to
inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish
her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was
nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have
done so considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even
though he sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the
whole of it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner should
have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the
latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to do,
and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly
pointed out in its decision.  (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 54598,
|||

[April 15, 1988], 243 PHIL 591-600)

VDA. DA LAIG v. CA
LAND REGISTRATION ACT; LIABILITY OF PERSONS
FRAUDULENTLY PROCURING CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. — Whoever
fraudulently procures, or fraudulently assists in procuring, or is privy to the
fraudulent procurement of any certificate of title or owner's duplicate of title may
be criminally prosecuted under he provisions of the Land Registration Act. The
offender may likewise be civilly liable for failure to observed honesty and good
faith in the performance of his duties if he is a public officer or a member of the
Bar, or for wilfully or negligently causing damage to another, or for willfully
causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs and/or public policy as provided for in Article 19, 20, and 21 of the New
Civil Code. All these actions are without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken in case the offender is a public
officer.  (Vda. de Laig v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-26882, [April 5, 1978],
|||

172 PHIL 283-297)

CORREA v. CFI OF BULACAN\
A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess
or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally
liable therefor like any private individual. 9 This principle of personal liability has
been applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or
discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason
of non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from
office, the officials were acting outside their official authority.  (Correa v. Court
|||

of First Instance of Bulacan, G.R. No. L-46096, [July 30, 1979], 180 PHIL 719-
726)
ARTICLE 29
SARMIENTO v. CA
ID.; ID.; PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE; EXPLAINED. — In a belated
attempt to establish the legitimacy of Leogarda Arguelles, petitioners have
theorized for the first time, in the present Petition, that the birth certificate of
Leogarda Arguelles which they allegedly presented during the trial below,
shows the legitimate status of Leogarda Arguelles. Concededly, such birth
certificate may be used to show the alleged marriage. But be that as it may, the
totality of evidence for the private respondent preponderates over petitioners'.
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one
side outweighs that of the adverse party. Compared with the evidence
introduced by the private respondent, petitioners rely heavily on the legal
presumption of marriage which, as earlier pointed out, has been effectively
rebutted.  (Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96740, [March 25, 1999],
|||

364 PHIL 613-622)

ARTICLE 31
ABERCA v. VER
CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; DAMAGES FOR
VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; PERSONS COVERED. — All
persons, be they public officers or employees, or members of the military or
police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat,
violate or in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil
liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for damages
as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.  (Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 69866, [April
|||

15, 1988], 243 PHIL 735-756)

ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR; NOT
APPLICABLE TO OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR
SUBORDINATES. — The case at bar rejects the automatic application of the
principle of respondent superior or command responsibility that would hold a
superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages, including moral
and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such
transgressions.  (Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 69866, [April 15, 1988], 243 PHIL
|||

735-756)
 ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPERIOR OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR GROSS
NEGLIGENCE IN ABDICATION OF PROPER SUPERVISION OF
SUBORDINATES. — The judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer
must not abdicate is duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the
risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the
cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with
the tortfeasor.  (Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 69866, [April 15, 1988], 243 PHIL 735-
|||

756)
 ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The rationale for this rule of law was
best expressed by Brandeis in this wise: "In a government of laws, existence
of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.
Our government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches
the whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the government
becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man
to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of criminal law the end justifies the means . . . . would bring
terrible retribution."  (Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 69866, [April 15, 1988], 243
|||

PHIL 735-756)
LIM v. PONCE DE LEON
DAMAGES; AWARD OF ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES FOR
VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. — Under Article 32 and 2219 of
the New Civil Code, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or
impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or
employee responsible therefore. In addition, exemplary damages may also be
awarded.  (Lim v. De Leon, G.R. No. L-22554, [August 29, 1975], 160 PHIL
|||

991-1003)
ID.; ID.; MALICE AND BAD FAITH, NOT REQUIRED TO BE LIABLE
UNDER ARTICLE 32 NEW CIVIL CODE. — To be liable under Article 32 of the
New Civil Code it is enough that there is a violation of the constitutional rights of
the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with
malice or bad faith.  (Lim v. De Leon, G.R. No. L-22554, [August 29, 1975], 160
|||

PHIL 991-1003)
ID.; ID.; REASONS. — Public officials in the past have abused their
powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of
their duties. Precisely, the object of Article 32 of the Civil Code is to put an end
to official abuse by the plea of good faith.  (Lim v. De Leon, G.R. No. L-22554,
|||

[August 29, 1975], 160 PHIL 991-1003)

 ID.; SUBORDINATE OFFICER MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR
EXECUTING UNLAWFUL ORDER; EXCEPTION. — While a subordinate
officer may be held liable for executing an unlawful order of his superior officer,
there are certain circumstances which would warrant exculpation from liability.
Thus, where it is shown that the motor launch was impounded by a subordinate
officer only after repeated request by the fiscal, after being shown a letter
justifying the necessity of seizure, and after he was made to explain the delay
of the seizure by his superior, he cannot be held liable for damages.  (Lim v. De
|||

Leon, G.R. No. L-22554, [August 29, 1975], 160 PHIL 991-1003)
ESGUERRA v. GONZALES-ASDALA
In Ang v. Quilala, 28 we further explained that it is settled doctrine that
judges are not liable to respond in a civil action for damages, and are not
otherwise administratively responsible for what they may do in the exercise of
their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction.
Certain it is that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
More importantly, the error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious,
or incurred with evident bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive
or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest
or ill will for ulterior purposes.  (Esguerra v. Gonzales-Asdala, G.R. No.
|||

168906, [December 4, 2008], 593 PHIL 458-476)

The records do not show that Judge Asdala was moved by bad faith, ill
will or malicious intent when she did not grant the TRO and preliminary
injunction Esguerra prayed for. Bad faith must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. 29 It is not presumed and the party who alleges the same
has the onus of proving it. 30 Esguerra has not, in fact, adduced any proof to
show that impropriety attended the actions of Judge Asdala.   (Esguerra v.
Ca|||

Gonzales-Asdala, G.R. No. 168906, [December 4, 2008], 593 PHIL 458-476)

Finally, Esguerra is still litigating her civil case against JWT and AGL
before RTC-Branch 215, Quezon City, in which she also prays for
compensation for the damages she had suffered from the airing of the Ovaltine
commercial. To insist on recovering damages from Judge Asdala for the same
act, i.e., the showing of the Ovaltine commercial, suspiciously appears to be an
attempt to recover double compensation.  (Esguerra v. Gonzales-Asdala, G.R.
|||

No. 168906, [December 4, 2008], 593 PHIL 458-476)

ARTICLE 33
DYOGI v. YATCO
Petitioners as plaintiffs in the court below, explained that their action for
damages rested on culpa aquiliana, defendants' liability 1 being independent
from the criminal offense of reckless negligence. Indeed the complaint's
allegations quoted in respondents' memorandum sufficiently describe a
demand for damages caused by defendants' quasi-delict, negligence, or
tortious conduct. "Joint tort-feasors", "negligence" were the words used. Such
being the situation, in line with article 2177 above quoted, the demand must be
considered separate, and apart from the criminal proceeding, not subordinate to
the outcome of the latter. 2 The reason is evident: whatever the result of such
proceeding, it can not affect the civil action, the course of which may not
consequently be suspended.  (Dyogi v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623, [January 22,
|||

1957])
MARCIA v. CA
CIVIL LAW; HUMAN RELATIONS; ART. 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE; NOT
APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — Art. 33 of the Civil Code speaks
only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries while the charge against Felardo
Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries. Hence the latter
case is not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code
and therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution.  (Marcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34529, [January 27,
|||

1983], 205 PHIL 147-158)

ARTICLE 36
BENITEZ v. CONCEPCION
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES ARISING
FROM SAME FACTS; CRIMINAL CASE TAKES PRECEDENCE;
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION AS AN EXCEPTION. — Where a civil case and a
criminal case arising from the same facts are filed in court, the criminal case
takes precedence (Sec. 1, Rule 107, Rules of Court), except where there exists
prejudicial questions which should be resolved first before action could be taken
in the criminal case and when the law provides that both the civil case and
criminal case can be instituted simultaneously (Art. 33, NCC).  (Benitez v.
|||

Concepcion, Jr., G.R. No. L-14646, [May 30, 1961], 112 PHIL 105-109)
 PREJUDICIAL QUESTION DEFINED; WHEN A CIVIL CASE MAY BE
CONSIDERED PREJUDICIAL TO A CRIMINAL ACTION. — A prejudicial
question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that
the said civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue
or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. (D. S. Mendiola, et al. vs. Macadaeg, L-16874,
February 27, 1961).  (Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr., G.R. No. L-14646, [May 30,
|||

1961], 112 PHIL 105-109)

ZAPANTA v. MONTESA
PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS; DEFINITIONS. — A prejudicial question is
one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
(People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil., 357; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4863).  (Zapanta v.
|||

Montesa, G.R. No. L-14534, [February 28, 1962], 114 PHIL 428-431)
 ID.; ID.; WHEN ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE
DEEMED A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE. — The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to
try the same must be lodged in another court. (People vs. Aragon, supra.)
Hence, where the defendant in a bigamy case in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan claims that the second marriage is void on the ground that he entered
into it under duress, force and intimidation, and, as a matter of fact a case is
pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the annulment of said
marriage, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action
for bigamy can proceed.  (Zapanta v. Montesa, G.R. No. L-14534, [February
|||

28, 1962], 114 PHIL 428-431)

FORTICH-CELDRAN v. CELDRAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRE-JUDICIAL QUESTION DEFINED. — A
pre-judicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent to the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal; that is, it is determinative of the case before the
court and jurisdiction to pass upon the same is lodged in another
tribunal.  (Fortich-Celdran v. Celdran, G.R. No. L-22677, [February 28, 1967],
|||

125 PHIL 903-909)

ID.; ID.; AUTHENTICITY OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW ON BEHALF OF
A PARTY, WHICH IS AMONG PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN CIVIL CASE,
CONSTITUTES PRE-JUDICIAL QUESTION IN CRIMINAL CASE FOR
FORGERY FILED BY SAID PARTY. — Where in a civil action for partition one
of the plaintiffs allegedly signed a motion to withdraw as plaintiff upon monetary
consideration and ratified the partition agreement, but later it was found out that
his signature on the motion for withdrawal was forged and such co- plaintiff
instituted a criminal case in another court for falsification against the culprits,
the civil action, now on appeal, poses a pre-judicial question to the criminal
prosecution since such ratification and the authenticity of the motion for
withdrawal are among the questions involved in the civil case and determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, said question should first be
decided before the prosecution can proceed in the criminal case.  (Fortich-
|||

Celdran v. Celdran, G.R. No. L-22677, [February 28, 1967], 125 PHIL 903-909)
JIMENEZ v. AVERIA
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION,
DEFINED. — A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in
a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in
said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
(Encyclopedia Juridical Española, p. 226). The question claimed to be
prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the case before the court and that
jurisdiction to try and resolve it must be lodged in another tribunal. (People vs.
Aragon, L-5930, Feb. 9, 1954).  (Jimenez v. Averia, G.R. No. L-22759, [March
|||

29, 1968], 131 PHIL 494-498)

 ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF RECEIPT IN CIVIL CASE NOT PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION IN CRIMINAL CASE OF ESTAFA; REASONS. — The validity of a
receipt raised in a civil case is not a prejudicial question determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the parties charged with estafa. Even if the execution of
said receipt was vitiated by fraud, duress or intimidation, the guilt of the
accused, could still be established by other means, such as by evidence
showing that they actually received from the complainant the sum of P20,000
with which to buy a fishing boat and that instead of doing so they
misappropriated the money and refused to return it to him upon demand. Were
we to sanction the theory advanced by the respondent and adopted by the trial
judge, no case for estafa could be prosecuted speedily because the accused
could easily block the proceedings by the simple expedient of filing an
independent civic action against the complainant raising therein the issue that
he had not received from the latter the amount alleged to have been
misappropriated and that any receipt purporting to show the contrary was a
forgery or was obtained through fraud, duress, or intimidation. A claim to this
effect is a matter of defense to be interposed by the party charged in the
criminal proceeding.  (Jimenez v. Averia, G.R. No. L-22759, [March 29, 1968],
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131 PHIL 494-498)

LANDICHO v. RELOVA
ACTIONS; PROSECUTION FOR BIGAMY; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION;
WHEN ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE CAN BE CONSIDERED A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE. — The mere fact that there
are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy
case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil
actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case
of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy
case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to
such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force
and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary
and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.  (Landicho v.
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Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, [February 23, 1968], 130 PHIL 745-750)
The situation in this case is markedly differently. At the time the petitioner
was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March
15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity
on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June
15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a
third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her
should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge
relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to
such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A
party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy  (Landicho v. Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, [February 23,
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1968], 130 PHIL 745-750)

BELTRAN v. PEOPLE
 CIVIL LAW; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS;
PENDENCY OF CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
NOT A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO CONCUBINAGE CASE. — The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case
to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined  (Beltran v. People, G.R. No. 137567, [June
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20, 2000], 389 PHIL 447-454)

PIMENTEL v. PEOPLE
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the
filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information 7 for Frustrated
Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25
October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14
February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7
February 2005. 8 Respondent's petition 9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4
November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for
annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.
As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of
the criminal action.  (Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, [September 13,
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2010], 645 PHIL 1-8)

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
the crime of parricide, 12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse." 13 The relationship between the offender and the
victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder 14 or
homicide. 15 However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.  (Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060,
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[September 13, 2010], 645 PHIL 1-8)

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution
which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner's will. 16 At the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that
was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if
the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could
still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent.  (Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No.
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172060, [September 13, 2010], 645 PHIL 1-8)