Modernisation' and The Structural Constraints of Greek Politics

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West European Politics
ISSN: 0140-2382 (Print) 1743-9655 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20
Introduction: ‘Modernisation’ and the Structural

Constraints of Greek Politics
Kevin Featherstone
To cite this article: Kevin Featherstone (2005) Introduction: ‘Modernisation’ and the
Structural Constraints of Greek Politics, West European Politics, 28:2, 223-241, DOI:
10.1080/01402380500058753
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West European Politics,
Vol. 28, No. 2, 223 – 241, March 2005
Introduction: ‘Modernisation’ and

the Structural Constraints of Greek
Politics
Downloaded by [LSE Library Services] at 10:51 09 April 2016
KEVIN FEATHERSTONE
ABSTRACT Contemporary Greek politics are marked by tensions between pressures

for reform and the structural constraints to their realisation. The pressures combine
those emanating from processes of Europeanisation (European Union agendas on
economic reform, for example) and the domestic demand for ‘modernisation’ (the
agenda of former Premier Simitis). The two have been seen as synonymous in Greece.
The resultant tensions have created a fundamental issue of governability: in a number of
areas, Greece is une société bloqué. There are systemic weaknesses deriving from the
institutional capacity of the state, the regime of ‘disjointed corporatism’, and cultural
practices of clientelism and ‘rent-seeking’. These constrain agency and leadership
strategies. The analysis places the recent Simitis project in an historical context and
attempts to delineate patterns of change and continuity. The reform process has been
asymmetrical and uncertain in character. The problem of governance remains and, in
turn, it questions the nature of Greece’s convergence with the EU.
Politics and policy-making in contemporary Greece display the tension

between pressures for reform, on the one hand, and the structural
impediments to their realisation, on the other. The Greek state has long
suffered from problems affecting its institutional capability – clientelism and
bureaucratic inefficiency, for example – but since at least the early 1990s
these problems have been made more acute by a combination of reform
pressures involving both domestic and European Union stimuli. The latter
have been constituted by the internal demands for ‘modernisation’ and the
increasing domestic consequences of the European integration process. The
clash between the reform pressures and the structural impediments
constitute a severe constraint on government in Greece, posing strategic
dilemmas in how to tackle them.
Moreover, Greek society exhibits a complex set of changes that challenge
both its traditions and notions of modernity (Demertzis 1994). As elsewhere,
cynicism about the political process is part of a wider disenchantment with
Correspondence Address: Hellenic Observatory, European Institute, London School of

Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online # 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/01402380500058753
224 West European Politics
established structures. The old ideological divides and the resonance of

historic political conflicts – both of them felt intensely in the recent past –
have abated. Leadership styles have adapted in parallel to these trends. In
early 2004, the new leader of the then governing party sought confirmation
of his position from a vote on the Internet. The number of Greeks educated
at universities in the UK and North America is increasing, and Greek youth
shows a strong embrace of European modernity in fashion and habits.1 New
public infrastructure investment is transforming the Athenian landscape,
with notable improvements in transport and public facilities.2 Despite
earlier scepticism, Greece proved a highly successful host for the 2004
Olympic Games.3 Economically, Greece has become an importer of labour
from the surrounding region – creating unprecedented pressures of adapting
to a multicultural society – as well as a leading source of foreign direct

investment in the rest of the Balkans. At the same time, the Greek Orthodox
Church has in many ways grown in political importance. Its populist (and
somewhat charismatic) Archbishop, Christodoulos, has a strong public
profile, which he promotes by appearing in all manner of places. His cultural
nationalism and opposition to ‘European-inspired’ modernisation strikes a
chord, not least with a stratum of society that feels vulnerable and excluded.
The politics of identity has become more central: with crises over Greece’s
support for Serbia; whether national identity cards should bear an
individual’s religious affiliation; and whether a schoolboy of Albanian
descent should be allowed to front a local parade with the Greek flag.
Alongside support for ‘modernisation’, old habits colour ways of doing
things: clientelism, patronage and, on occasions, corruption. The culture of
state administration continues to display a suffocating legalism, inefficiency
and lethargy. The social contrasts are juxtaposed collectively, but often also
individually.
Greece is not unique in facing conflicts over the economic and social
reform process, but the character of the setting is exceptional in the
intensity of the constraints. Both politically and socially, Greece faces a
problem of governance that is being redefined by these changes. The
problem circumscribes future political options and it raises a number of
important themes. The political tensions attest to the institutional capacity
of the state, the nature of leadership strategies, patterns of interest
mediation, and the inclusiveness of existing structures of political
participation. The capability of the Greek state to adapt to the obligations
of European Union (EU) membership relates to the nature of Europeanisa-
tion processes and the capacity of the Union to manage transition across
diverse domestic settings.
Amidst the pattern of change and continuity, the overall picture is of
Greece moving away from the distinctive, impassioned and populist politics
of the 1980s. The external image of Greece has thus shifted: from that of the
‘black sheep’ of European foreign policy and a lost cause in the European
economy, to that of a more consensual partner gradually building a
Introduction 225
‘stabilisation state’ at home (Pagoulatos 2003). Greek foreign policy has

built a new rapprochement with Turkey, shown greater consensus with
Western partners on the Balkans, supported the Anan Plan to settle the
Cyprus problem, and attempted to build bridges between partners on Iraq.
It is against this background that a particular focus on the impact of the
‘modernisation’ project is warranted. ‘Modernisation’ here refers to the
package of economic, social and political reforms defined by their
liberalising character, advocated by Costas Simitis whilst he was Prime
Minister from 1996 to 2004. The explicit purpose of Simitis’ project was to
secure Greece’s position at the core of the EU. The breadth and ambition of
his project provides a framework within which to delineate patterns of
change and continuity, but also to highlight the structural constraints on the
realisation of such ‘modernising’ reforms.

The present volume seeks to contribute to the discussion of both
these general and specific foci. In part, it is an assessment of Simitis’
record as premier: what he managed and did not manage to change.
Yet it is not limited to Simitis or to the past. Rather, it is an analysis
of political processes and policy-making structures that addresses issues
of identity, social change, institutional settings, leadership strategies and
external adaptation. By delineating patterns of change and continuity,
the perspective is relevant to the new post-Simitis era. With its coverage
of the modernisation project and its aftermath, the volume seeks to
offer a more contemporary and focused coverage than that available in
much of the rest of the literature. Moreover, the emphasis placed on
policy-making is also exceptional: public policy analysis remains a
relatively less developed part of the political science discipline in Greece
and only recently has a relevant literature emerged (see below). Still,
there is a need for more studies of agenda-setting, policy entrepreneur-
ship, the role of expertise, and problems of implementation in the
policy process.
The purpose of the present paper is to provide an appropriate frame for
the rest of the volume. It seeks to do this by placing current issues of change
and continuity in an historical context and to highlight analytical issues
relevant to their assessment. The historical context is the contrast between
the Simitis project and the inherited structures of Greek politics. The
analytical issues to be addressed are those explaining change in relation to
both domestic and external stimuli; more specifically, political leadership
and the obligations of EU membership.
The paper previews the later case studies. In doing so, it develops an
argument that relates to a problem of domestic governance in Greece: the
limitations on the institutional capability of the state to deliver reform, and
the blockages to reform emanating from the particular pattern of interest
mediation and associated cultural attitudes.4 The problem of governance is
systemic and the will to reform is to be seen in this context: agency
structured by the existing setting. In some areas, the impediments to reform
appear much stronger than elsewhere: in certain sectors, Greece has

displayed a character close to that of une socie´te´ bloque´, a political setting of
stalemate between contending veto points. Convergence towards the
nominal monetary indicators of EMU was much easier politically than,
for example, structural economic reforms affecting pensions or labour
markets.
The case of Simitis’ modernisation project is thus highly relevant to these
issues of governance. It is a useful starting point to assess the contemporary
character of Greek politics and policy-making.
The Modernisation Project of Costas Simitis

The election of Costas Simitis as leader of PASOK (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό

Κίνημα, Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement) and his installation as Prime
Minister, both in 1996, represented a major turning point in Greek politics.
His personality involved a significant change of leadership style. The hugely
charismatic, and populist, Andreas Papandreou was the founder of the
party after the fall of the Colonels in 1974 and had served as Prime Minister
for a total of 11 years (1981–89; 1993–95). PASOK had been moulded in his
image and had adapted under his direction. Papandreou exercised a
dominant authority over his party. PASOK had enjoyed electoral success
(1981, 1985, 1993) and suffered political humiliation (1989) in line with his
personal fortune. In 1988 the party (and government) had awaited his
recovery from heart surgery, but by 1995 his failing health meant that his
demise was inevitable. After some delay, he resigned as premier on 15
January 1996 (and died later on 22 June 1996), leaving the way clear to his
succession.
On 18 January 1996, Simitis defeated his rivals in a contest for the
premiership. Simitis was the candidate that offered the greatest prospect for
change. Akis Tsohatzopoulos and Gerasimos Arsenis were both, in varying
ways, associated with the populist and clientelistic traditions of PASOK.5
Both had substantial ministerial experience and a body of supporters within
the party. Taken together, both were probably closer to the party’s soul than
Simitis, at least in recent times.6 Tsohatzopoulos, in particular, was seen as
the leader of the ‘proedrikoi’ (leader’s faction) protecting the inheritance of
Papandreou. The election by MPs was in fact a close-run affair. Simitis
secured 53 votes on the first round, the same as Tsohatzopoulos, with
Arsenis just behind on 50 (and Yiannis Charalambopoulos, a PASOK
veteran, on 11). In the second round, Simitis defeated Tsohatzopoulos by 86
votes to 75. The latter and his supporters would continue to be an
oppositional faction more or less throughout Simitis’ period as premier. On
1 July 1996, a party congress elected Simitis as PASOK’s new leader (by
53.8% to Tsohatzopoulos’ 45.7%). Simitis’ position was further legitimised
when he led PASOK to victory in the October 1996 parliamentary elections
(by a margin of 41.4% to 38.1% over New Democracy – Nέα Δημοκρατία
Introduction 227
ND): elections that he had called early in recognition of the need to secure
his position (Featherstone and Kazamias 1997). Simitis’ second victory in
parliamentary elections, in April 2000, was a much closer affair: PASOK led
ND by just 43.8% to 42.7%.
At a personal level, Simitis was a quiet, reserved character. As party
leader, he never matched the dominance of Andreas Papandreou or his
charismatic style. The leadership style was consciously shifted to be more
managerial and technocratic. Electoral campaigns were correspondingly
adjusted: whereas ‘Andreas’ held mass rallies of up to three-quarters of a
million people crowding the streets of central Athens, Simitis lacked the
rhetorical skills and tried to minimise such set pieces. Politically, he had
shifted his ideological ground from his radical youth to adopt a strongly
technocratic stance, formed in particular when he was a fiscally prudent

Minister of National Economy in 1985–87. His mantras had become
‘modernisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’, which he suggested were synon-
ymous for Greece. Simitis, during this period, led a faction within PASOK
comprising Theodoros Pangalos, Yiannos Papantoniou, Vasso Papandreou
and Georgios Papandreou. Their agenda was defined within the frame of
‘Europe’: it had little meaning without reference to the need to adapt to the
EU; the latter defined and legitimised their project. Pangalos had served as
Alternate Foreign Minister, covering EU matters, then as Foreign Minister.
He identified himself as a long-term supporter of the European integration
process, though he had had to adapt to the tactics of Andreas Papandreou.
Papantoniou had been Minister of the National Economy since May 1994
and would become the chief architect of Greece’s entry into the euro
currency regime. Vasso Papandreou – no family relation to Andreas or
Georgios – had served as EU Commissioner (1989–92) and then
Development Minister (1996–99). Georgios Papandreou had been Deputy
Foreign Minister, amongst other posts, responsible for EU affairs. Thus, all
the leaders around Simitis were clearly identified with a more pro-European
agenda. Tactically, Georgios Papandreou differentiated his position from
that of his father, Andreas, and helped Simitis by publicly supporting his
leadership aspirations. This ‘patricidal’ break paralleled that of Andreas
from his father, Georgios, and the latter’s Centre Union (Ένωση Κέντρου,
EK) party.
Simitis’ modernisation project was both bold and comprehensive in
intent. It began with a sense of urgency. Greece needed to place itself at the
core of the European Union, which meant that entry to the single currency
had to be secured. In the mid-1990s, the performance of the Greek economy
remained an ‘outlier’, the most divergent in the EU from the Maastricht
convergence criteria. The government of Constantine Mitsotakis (1990–93)
had been over-optimistic in believing that it could establish a rapid
convergence. In reality, it failed to meet the conditions for the EU aid
provisionally allocated to Greece. It had also been thwarted by strong union
opposition to its neo-liberal reforms. Andreas Papandreou reaped the
benefit at the 1993 election, promising an easier path to EMU, but Greece’s
prospects remained uncertain. Simitis stressed the urgency of his moder-
nisation project. Greece had an historic opportunity to fulfil its European
interests, but this would not last.
Thus, Greece had to undertake a big leap forward by following a new
national development strategy. This had to entail structural economic
reforms to introduce greater flexibility and competitiveness: an agenda that
foreshadowed, in inspiration, the EU’s Lisbon 2000 project. It was evident
that these reforms had to embrace further privatisation, greater liberal-
isation of the labour market, and a more just and efficient pension system.
These foci are taken up, in turn, by Pagoulatos, Papadimitriou and Tinios in
this volume. The overall thrust was of a modernisation project couched in
the frame of contemporary social democracy. Indeed, whilst the state’s

economic role had to be leaner and more efficient, it had a basic
responsibility to strengthen social solidarity. Simitis referred to a ‘new
social state’, a theme that was shared elsewhere in Europe, not least in
Romano Prodi’s Italy.
Economic and social reform was to be placed alongside a fresh start
politically. Simitis and his supporters advocated a greater separation of
the ‘party’ from the ‘state’: a break with the incestuous ‘rousfetti’ politics
or bureaucratic clientelism of the recent past. This was a condemnation
of the Andreas Papandreou years, but also of ND. The ‘clean hands’ and
modesty of Simitis were extolled. Simitis’ modernisation project also
embraced the reform of the Greek Constitution, continuing a momentum
established by the ND government of Mitsotakis. The latter had talked
of the ‘re-foundation’ of the state, whilst the Simitis government inserted
the principle of the ‘social welfare state’ into the Constitution
(Eleftheriadis this volume).
The ambition and scope were expansive. They struck a strong chord
with an electorate growing cynical about the politics associated with the
old leadership ‘dinosaurs’. The reform content also appealed to the
centre-ground and, in particular, the increasing number of university-
educated, middle class professionals. The rejection of the ‘old’ politics
also highlighted the magnitude of the constraints surrounding the
modernisers, however.
A Stylised Model of Greek Politics and Policy

The daunting task facing the Simitis project can be sketched by reference to
the manner in which Greek politics had developed since the restoration of
democracy in 1974. More generally, the key themes of this development will
serve as a framework for the analysis of change and continuity.
The process of transition to democracy (‘metapolitefsis’) constituted a
major break with the regime established after the Civil War (1946–49), with
its anti-communist discrimination and its illiberal triarchy of political power
Introduction 229
(Crown–Army–Parliament) undermining democratic activity (Mouzelis

1978: 126). Continuities were evident, nevertheless (Featherstone and
Katsoudas 1987), most obviously in terms of political personnel and
political culture. The politics of the Karamanlis (1974–80), Rallis (1980–81),
and the first Papandreou (1981–89) premierships displayed an adaptation to
contemporary European liberal democracy, albeit mixed with the social
foundations of clientelism, populism and charismatic leadership, and the
inefficiencies of the state structure and the new conflicts of labour relations.
A body of literature delineating the new modes of Greek politics
gradually developed in the 1970s and 1980s. At the risk of some
vulgarisation of this scholarship and the prevailing international perception
of Greece, the following propositions can be advanced to represent key
features of Greek politics in this period:
1. The state is a ‘colossus with feet of clay’ (Sotiropoulos 1993; Mouzelis

1978; Tsoukalas 1993): a large, ill-coordinated, inefficient state
administrative structure (Spanou 1996; Tsinisizelis 1996; Sotiropoulos
2004b).
2. State–economy relations are marked by, on the one hand, heavy
legalism and over-regulation and, on the other, an incestuous and
sometimes corrupt relationship with respect to the allocation of
favours and contracts (Featherstone 1990; Kazakos 2001).
3. Interest mediation is characterised by ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour with
sectional interests competing for favours, resources and subsidies
(Krueger 1974; Featherstone forthcoming; Lyberaki and Tsakalotos
2002; Pagoulatos 2003) and a ‘disjointed corporatism’ (Lavdas 1997;
Mavrogordatos 1988; Koukoules 1984; Tsoukalas 1987) involving
problems of representation and social dialogue (Ioannou 2000;
Papadimitriou 2005; Featherstone forthcoming).
4. The public policy process is structured hierarchically around ‘heroic
leadership’ typically by ministers, supported by close personal advisers,
with weak civil service support and with the near-absence of relevant
‘policy communities’ and ‘think-tanks’, to provide wider technocratic
legitimation (Lavdas 1997; Ladi 2002; Featherstone, forthcoming),
making political initiatives vulnerable to conflicting or changing
interests within government.
5. For the non-communist spectrum, political parties are the agents and
foci of a bureaucratic clientelism (Lyrintzis 1984; Spourdalakis 1998;
Haralambis 1989; Mouzelis et al. 1989), rely on charismatic leadership,
are prone to populism, have relatively weak ideological identities, and
operate in a heavily top-down fashion internally.
6. Inter-party relations are highly conflictual, based on opposing social
identities (closely shaped by past regime crises) and systems of
patronage (Haralambis 1989; Lyrintzis and Nikolakopoulos 1990;
Voulgaris 2002).
7. Civil society, as conventionally understood, is weak: participation rates

are low and organisations lack independence from the state and/or
political parties (Tsoukalas 1993; Mouzelis 1986; cf. Sotiropoulos
2004a).
8. Political culture shows strains of a deep-rooted mistrust of the state,
especially in its regulatory and distributive roles, albeit alongside rent-
seeking behaviour (Demertzis 1994; Diamandouros 2000);
9. The traditional homogeneity of society has led to an exclusivist notion
of ‘Greekness’ (as distinct from the export of Hellenism), and politics,
with varying degrees of intensity, respects the social strength of
‘Helleno-Christian’ norms (Lipovats 1993: Pollis 1987; 1992).
10. The constitutive rules of politics reflect party supremacy and are
vulnerable to change: most notably those concerning the electoral

system, but also those affecting institutional authority (e.g. the
presidency) (Lyrintzis and Nikolakopoulos 1990; Spourdalakis 1998;
Voulgaris 2002).
11. The political system is unitary and highly centralist: government in
Athens determines the allocation of resources, sets the rules and
determines planning, with sub-national authorities highly dependent
on its authorisation and favour.
12. Foreign policy-making lacks institutionalisation and is constrained by
a domestic populism, emphasising a nationalist discourse on key
regional issues and disturbing international attempts at stability (on
the Western critique of the 1980s and early 1990s, see Pettifer 1996; on
policy-making, see Ioakimidis 1999).
If these propositions represent a reasonable synopsis of the relevant

literature on Greek politics for the 1974–96 period, the critical question
becomes: what has changed and why? Addressing such questions will help to
evaluate the impact of the Simitis modernisation drive. Moreover, given that
the agenda of the latter was consciously placed within a European frame,
the analysis will serve to outline the relevance of Europeanisation processes
in contemporary Greece. The failure of Greece to live up to its full European
potential was defined, at the start of the Simitis era, as the ‘Greek paradox’
(Allison and Nicolaidis 1997).
Processes of Europeanisation
The pressures for reform evident in Greece over the last decade combine a
domestic discourse on ‘modernisation’ with an instrumental belief in the
importance of Greece remaining part of the ‘core’ membership of the EU. In
various ways, ‘Europeanisation’ is thus relevant to the discussion of domestic
political change in Greece in this period. ‘Europeanisation’ may be cited in a
general or indirect manner (for example, in an ideational or cultural sense
stemming from EU or cross-national European factors) or in relation to
Introduction 231
specific EU-level commitments prompting a domestic response (for example,

in policies, institutional operation) (Featherstone and Radaelli 1993). Either
way, ‘Europeanisation’ in the Greek context is typically seen as synonymous
with ‘modernisation’, and this was certainly the case for Simitis.
Explaining the significance of ‘Europeanisation’ requires careful atten-
tion, however. The recent literature on ‘Europeanisation’ is vast and varied
(e.g. Hix and Goetz, 2000; Cowles et al. 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli,
2003; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). Distinguishing causal mechanisms
between external stimuli (from the EU level or from other ‘European’
sources) and the domestic level, and identifying the distinct impact of
intervening variables within the domestic polity (for example, by compar-
ison across a range of national cases) is a challenging mix of exogenous and
endogenous variables. Defining ‘Europeanisation’ in terms of a distinct set

of stimuli, conditions and outcomes is no easy task.
Recent attempts at outlining what Europeanisation involves have
indicated progress, rather than resolution. The focus remains primarily
EU commitments and pressures, rather than other sources (e.g. cross-
national diffusion, transfer). Ladrech’s (1994) early definition of EU
‘dynamics’ becoming ‘part of the organizational logic of national politics
and policy-making’ lacked an elaboration of causal mechanisms. Radaelli
(2003) gave an extensive range of relevant processes,7 incorporating both
rationalist and constructivist perspectives on adaptation. Dyson and Goetz
(2003: 20) have also offered a synthesis; to them:
Europeanization denotes a complex interactive ‘top-down’ and

‘bottom-up’ process in which domestic polities, politics and public
policies are shaped by European integration and in which domestic
actors use European integration to shape the domestic arena. It may
produce either continuity or change and potentially variable and
contingent outcomes.
Like that of Radaelli, the conception can be challenged in the name of

positivist science: predicting specific outcomes from specific conditions
remains hazardous.
The fundamental problem here is the complexity of the real world
experience of member states like Greece. ‘Europeanisation’ signifies a set of
recognisable processes in need of explanation. The equation of modernisa-
tion and (west) Europeanisation is part of a long Greek (and southern
European) cultural tradition (Diamandouros 1994). In a wide-ranging
survey, Diamandouros referred to the EU as ‘a potent agent of
rationalization and reform in the Greek economy and polity’ (1994: 43).
Indeed, it is ‘the single most important force’ in this regard’ (1994: 39).
Ioakimidis (1998; 2001), amongst others, has highlighted the breadth and
depth of EU impact on politics, polity and policy in Greece.
The strength of EU obligations (‘commitment devices’) may not

necessarily be equated with the significance of EU effects, though.
Privatisation, for example, is an agenda where the EU has played only an
indirect role. Single market legislation requires the liberalisation of state
monopolies in various sectors (e.g. telecommunications, transport), but it
does not require a change in the ownership structure of the state enterprise
itself. In the Greek case, however, those identifying themselves as pro-EU
‘modernisers’ supported the privatisation agenda. In the relevant political
discourse, the two agendas became largely synonymous. The privatisation of
the state telecommunications corporation, OTE (Οργανισμός Τηλεπικοινω-
νιών Ελλάδος), and the (admittedly unsuccessful) attempts at the
privatisation of Olympic Airways owed much to the EU, as Pagoulatos
notes (this issue: 358–80). The EU legitimised an agenda that it did not
directly mandate.
As this case suggests, the relevance of leadership and strategy remains to
be explored. The empowerment that may be gained from an EU obligation
needs to be interpreted and deployed with sensitivity to the domestic context
(Morth 2003). In Greece, as elsewhere, ‘manipulation is the key to
understanding the dynamics of policy-making’ (Zahariadis 2003: 2). EU
stimuli may legitimise a domestic reform programme and the evidence for its
use and effectiveness can be derived, in part, by an analysis of the policy
discourse used by advocates domestically (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004).
Simitis’ leadership of the modernisation project is a relevant case here: his
identification of the external imperative, his stress on a certain time frame
affecting choices, and his interpretation of how EU pressures and domestic
needs are to be made compatible are all crucial to an understanding of his
mission.
The domestic impact of the EU is also to be related to variations in state
capability and social capital. Common EU commitments can have diverse
domestic effects, not least because of differences in the capacity of state
administrations to implement the associated reforms and in the relevance of
veto players (Heritier and Knill 2001). Schmidt has highlighted the
institutional capacity of the state to respond to external pressures as a key
intervening variable in processes of Europeanisation (Schmidt 2002). The
attempts at reform of the Greek labour market (Papadimitriou this volume)
and the pensions system (Tinios this volume) were frustrated at different
points by the domestic strength of veto players. Similarly, strategies of
adaptation may be related to the culture of trust between political actors:
‘social capital’ as conceptualised by Putnam (1993). Neo-corporatist social
pacts may succeed or fail partly on this basis, as evident in the abandonment
of the ‘Confidence Pact’ of November 1996 promoted by the Simitis
government.
Many of the case studies included in this volume address the theme of
‘Europeanisation’. In doing so, they recognise the relevance of this theme at
the level of political discourse and, in some cases, as an ideational stimulus
Introduction 233
or direct policy constraint. The relevance of ‘Europeanisation’ is discussed

in relation to a range of domestic conditions as intervening variables:
institutional capacity, political strategy, timing and policy coalitions. A key
focus is the actions of the Simitis government in individual policy areas. The
task is primarily empirical, rather than conceptual: to assess the relevance of
‘Europeanisation’ to political change.
Patterns of Change and Continuity in Greece

This volume offers a range of empirical case studies that suggest
patterns of change and continuity across contemporary Greek politics
and policy-making. In doing so, they chart the impact of the Simitis
modernisation project. The case studies cover the political process,

policy-making and structural reform. So, the essential question is: what
has changed? In pursuing this question, the following discussion
develops an argument about the constraints on reform: a problem of
governance in Greece.
At the level of political process, Lyrintzis portrays the changes that have
occurred in the party system. A major theme is of uncertainty, even self-
doubt, over party purpose and public support. The role of ideology and the
style of campaigning have changed, whilst a new debate has started over the
internal structures of parties. The Communists (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα
Ελλάδος, KKE) are isolated within a nationalist-populism of the Left: an
anti-globalisation and anti-EU stance. On the far Right, the new, but small,
LAOS (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός – Popular Orthodox Alert) party
promotes an anti-modernisation position that parallels the appeal of
Archbishop Christodoulos. Synaspismos – the former Eurocommunists –
struggle to break through a level of support of around 3% of voters. The
ideological divide between ND and PASOK has lessened. ND has shifted
from an ill-defined ideological identity in the transition to democracy, to an
embrace of neo-liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, and to a retreat to a more
populist and ecumenical stance under different leaders. Costas Karamanlis
seeks to emphasise public sector reform and managerial competence,
eschewing ideology. With the withdrawal of Simitis, Georgios Papandreou
attempted to launch a new politics around PASOK, seeking to address
issues of participatory democracy, the invigoration of civil society, and the
response to multiculturalism. This signified an updating of the modernisa-
tion project and its early impact came with a sense of unpredictability over
its future direction. Lyrintzis emphasises the fluidity in the period after
Simitis: old assumptions are challenged by new conjectures. The effective-
ness of parties in the political process is under renewed challenge.
The electoral support of the major parties is examined by Nikolakopou-
los. Important social changes have occurred to parallel those at the level of
party system elites. He characterises the period since the mid-1990s as one of
declining political interest amongst voters and increased cynicism towards
politics. A major shift has occurred in political personnel and their

discourse. At the same time, voters are less loyal and more distant. Voter
alignment has shifted: PASOK acquired higher levels of support amongst
the higher paid and the more educated in Simitis’ 1996 election victory, only
to lose them by 2004. Indeed, it is the support of the younger and better-
educated voters that is crucial to current election outcomes – and, perhaps,
the ‘modernisation’ agenda.
Change is also evident, at one level, in the domestic policy process. Ladi
examines how new ideas have entered the Greek process. She focuses, in
particular, on the areas of constitutional reform, environmental policy and
local governance. Ladi argues that the link between ‘Europeanisation-
modernisation’ has led to a number of innovative policy reforms, given greater
profile to policy expertise and led to expectations of greater rationalisation in

policy-making. There is more recognition of the need to support reform with
research evidence and various new institutes have emerged. Yet the process is
discontinuous – there is little evidence of an established pattern of policy
learning – and the dominance of party over process has not been removed. A
transition between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ is evident, but the significance and
sustainability of the change is still questionable. Key figures combine
technocratic expertise with a party embrace.
Indeed, the fate of ministers like Tassos Yiannitsis in relation to labour
market reform or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ like Yannis Spraos on pensions
suggests scepticism as to the extent of change. Papadimitriou, in his
discussion of the attempt at labour market reform in 2000, highlights the
exposure of Yiannitsis to conflicting government strategies and the failure to
engage the ‘social partners’ in a structured and stable dialogue. The Spraos
Report on pension reform in 1997 was evidence of an accepted need for
technocratic legitimation, but it too fell prey to divided political purpose
and conflicting strategies with the immediate recourse of political leaders to
disowning the technocratic process (Featherstone et al. 2001). Tinios,
himself a key player in the reform process, offers an overall perspective on
the fate of pension reform in Greece. The dominant characteristic of the
process, he argues, is policy immobility, resulting from the structural
features of the pension system itself. These features allow the short-termism
of political actors to thwart reform efforts and encourage them to rely on
external stimuli to initiate progress.
The theme of reform thwarted by producer interests is also relevant to the
discussion by Allin and Mossialos on the attempts to reform the Greek
National Health System in 2000–02. The establishment of the system in 1984
had been one of PASOK’s proudest achievements, but the demand for its
later reform went unmet due to the opposition of entrenched interests within
system. ‘Stakeholders’ (the producers of health care) with diverse interests
were able to protect the privileges they derive from an ‘anarchic’ system. The
system is undermined by fragmented and regressive financing, distortions in
the allocation of resources, perverse incentives for providers, a reliance on
Introduction 235
expensive outputs, and the impact of clientelistic politics between govern-

ment and interest groups. The increased number of doctors has not lessened
their political strength; quite the reverse, Allin and Mossialos argue.
Multiple interest groups see change as a zero-sum game and act to protect
their interests. The Simitis government was forced to back down and the
prospect for substantive reform in the short to medium term is low, though
there may be retrenchment for reasons of fiscal discipline.
The cases of health, labour market and pension reform highlight the
problematic domestic relationship between the government’s reform agenda
and its negotiation with the trade unions and business organisations. Lavdas
explores the process of social dialogue in Greece in the context of what he
identifies as a ‘disjointed corporatism’ in the domestic process of interest
mediation. The challenge is to adapt to the EU agenda of market

competitiveness by means of social consensus. Yet the problems of social
dialogue in Greece, he argues, stem from the fact that the relevant power
relations are structured by a weak and asymmetrically penetrated state
apparatus. Isolated political will to adapt, on the part of union leaderships,
is overcome by structural features of the Greek system of interest mediation.
Whether the pressures of Europeanisation will prove strong enough to
prompt more substantive adaptation is, he concludes, an open question.
The relevance of ‘Europe’ to domestic reform is further taken up by
several case studies. Pagoulatos, in his study of the Greek privatisation
process, notes that Simitis reactivated an agenda originating with the
Mitsotakis government, but one also shaped by the twin pressures of the EU
and globalisation. The strategy was pragmatic, gradualist and non-
conflictual. Consensus over aims and means was limited, however. Policy
initiatives provided plenty of opportunity for renewed opposition amongst
the relevant unions. Consequently, policy implementation was unilateralist
in nature. Government strategy displayed both softness and an unwilling-
ness to relinquish control. Public enterprises were ‘privatised’ on the basis of
successive stock market flotations, leading to a retention of state control
even through minority stakes. Seen in historical terms, the achievements of
privatisation under Simitis were substantial: abandonment of a post-war
development model and of Andreas Papandreou’s programme of nationa-
lisation. European convergence was facilitated, to some degree, and new
market actors emerged. However, seen in comparative terms, it can be
added that the Greek policy shift has been slow and irregular, with a limited
adjustment of traditional statist philosophy. It is a record that leaves many
questions unresolved about the effectiveness and separation of the state’s
role, as well as its ability to respond to new external conditions.
The foreign perception of Greece’s EU membership is often related to the
large budget transfers enjoyed by Athens and the effectiveness of (indeed,
occasional corruption in) their domestic deployment. Paraskevopoulos
examines the response of the Greek state to the receipt of EU monies under
the structural funds – Community Support Frameworks and the Cohesion
Fund – with particular reference to transport infrastructure and the theme

of policy learning. The development of the physical infrastructure has been
transformative, with ample evidence of large new projects undertaken. He
argues that the Greek response shows a process of learning from past
mistakes and of learning from abroad (particularly the cases of Ireland and
Portugal). However, the evidence of adjustment in terms of social learning is
much less: a consequence of problems concerning social capital and
cooperative culture. The main features of the Greek institutional setting
remain statism and clientelism, major barriers to the modernisation process.
There are clear parallels here between privatisation and EU structural
funding in the gap between the headline achievements on the one hand, and
the foundations of policy values and policy practice on the other.
This theme also relates to Eleftheriades’ argument that one of the biggest
impacts of the Simitis project has been to make the issue of government
competence the central political focus of the day. The ‘businesslike task of
improving real life’ replaced the posturing, passion and bombast of the
Papandreou and Mitsotakis years. As a result, the legal institutions and
servants of the state became more important to political debate. The cultural
shift, he argues, explains the background to the debate over constitutional
reforms that developed over the course of the 1990s and culminated in the
package of reforms passed in 2001. The amendments ‘did not touch on some
of the deepest problems of social and political life’. Greece is marked by the
contrast between high ideals and poor practice. This contrast, it can be
noted, stems from the failure to enact a thorough reform of the state
administration and to change wider social and political attitudes. As
Eleftheriadis argues, the contrast drains the Constitution of its real meaning.
The relevance of ‘modernisation’ in this area is to strengthen the rule of law.
The amendments of 2001 were not intended primarily to achieve this aim,
but instead focused on a series of low-key reforms. In part, this was because
the prevailing philosophy was not oriented to limiting the strength of
majorities, but rather endorsed the principles underlying them. Venizelos,
the leading architect of the reforms, explicitly rejected the theory of ‘checks
and balances’ in favour of strengthening central power and the state as a
champion. How far Venizelos’ conception matched the instincts of Simitis –
himself a former law professor – is unclear. Venizelos’ ‘communitarian’ view
of the Constitution is rooted in Greek political culture, with implications for
the conception of the ‘nation’ as well as of the state (Pollis 1987; 1992). The
2001 package did not fundamentally disturb this cultural tradition.
Anagnostou distinguishes the liberal reforms undertaken in the 1990s to
overcome the exclusion of Muslims or ‘Turks’ in Western Thrace. The
impetus owed much to the ‘shaming’ effects of action by the Council of
Europe, though the cross-party consensus behind reform had to tread warily
for fear of an anti-European backlash domestically on the part of the
majority. The impetus centred around a Council of Europe threat in 1997 to
open a ‘monitoring procedure’ and policy leadership came from the
Introduction 237
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had undergone a shift to a more liberal

stance. The instrumental advantage of compliance with European norms
was a crucial motivation. The case has not led, however, to a wider
reconceptualisation of Greek national identity in the context of increasing
multiculturalism. The challenge of adapting to the new social pressures has
not been resolved: as is evident in the varying positions adopted within the
party system and by the Archbishop.
The external perception of Greece’s position in Europe has been genuinely
transformed, however. Here, foreign policy changes may be said to belie the
reality of limited domestic adaptation to the demands of EU membership.
Economides charts the nature and extent of change in Greek foreign policy
in the context of EU membership. The Europeanisation of Greek foreign
policy has developed over different phases: from normalisation to

denationalisation and multilateralism. Greek foreign policy preferences
and interests have been ‘translocated’ in two prime areas – Turkey and
Cyprus – to the EU level. Both policy style and substance have changed.
Thus, like Anagnostou, Economides identifies an area of domestic
adaptation to European pressure and both relate to foreign policy. It is
an area more amenable, perhaps, to elite manipulation and presentation: the
self-image to which a liberal, Europeanised leadership aspires in order to
gain acceptance within the EU’s core.
Conclusion
It is instructive to relate the findings of these contributions to the earlier
stylised model of Greek politics in the 1974–96 period. The current volume
cannot claim to cover all the terrain of change and continuity, but it does
highlight some important themes. Key features remain. The stress of Costas
Karamanlis on ‘renewal’ reflects a continuing concern with state inefficiency,
clientelism and corruption. Privatisation sustains norms of state control.
Structural reform is heavily circumscribed by opposition within the system
of disjointed corporatism. Rent-seeking behaviour and mistrust are central
attributes of policy-making. The power of the party over the policy process
and much of civil society continues. Parties remain dominated by their
leaders in a top-down manner. The cultural attachment to an exclusivist
notion of ‘Greekness’ means that adaptation to multiculturalism needs
reinforcement from external pressure. The Constitution is reformed, but the
underlying philosophy of the power of the majority remains intact, with a
resistance to the notion of power being exercised through ‘checks and
balances’.
But the evidence of transition is also significant, despite its direction and
extent being unresolved. Inter-party relations are less conflictual, and party
campaigns are not as bombastic and emotional. Populism is less evident.
Voting behaviour shows declining party attachment. There is disaffection
with traditional party politics, though the emergence of a new politics is
unclear. Attention is devoted to the contrast between political rhetoric and

the reality of implementation. Government competence, rather than historic
identities, is increasingly the key benchmark for electoral support. The
policy style has changed, with a greater recognition of the need for
technocratic input. The constitutive rules of politics are more stable and are
supported by a cross-party consensus. There has been some decentralisation
of power from Athens, prompted in part by EU structural funding. Foreign
policy has undergone a ‘Europeanisation’, involving a redefinition of
interests and process.
The pattern of change is thus asymmetrical and uncertain. The sources of
change are diverse: combining a liberal, reformist domestic constituency
with the pressures of EU membership. Greece is in transition: change is
evident, though its contours and depth remain unclear. The future
modernisation agenda will inevitably return to perennial problems of state
efficiency and integrity, the loosening of state intervention in the domestic
market, and the separation of the state from civil society. In these respects,
the impact of the Simitis project was often limited and superficial. A fresh
start was promised by Costas Karamanlis, after the election victory of ND
on 7 March 2004, to make the Greek state leaner, cleaner and closer to the
citizen. Civil service reform was soon on the agenda.8
Yet the problem of governance remains. State capabilities to deliver
policy change will remain severely limited without the substantive reform of
administrative institutions and agencies. Their capability is also dependent
on their relationship to wider social and economic forces. In areas of
structural reform (e.g. pensions, labour market, privatisation), government
is often entrapped in a stalemate bargaining game, unable to offer sufficient
incentives to change the process and overcome powerful vested interests.
Moreover, the political and social power of such interests undermines the
strength of will and purpose of government itself.
The problems of governance are most acute in some of the policy sectors
that are central to Greece’s adaptation to the new agenda of social and
economic integration within the EU. They thus question not only the
direction and extent of modernisation domestically, but also the ability of
Greece to remain within the EU’s core. The problems of governance have
deep historical and social roots and cannot be readily changed by
government. Though not fundamentally new in character, the problems
are given a new twist by the demands of EU membership. It is thus one of
history’s ironies that Greece – which invented the very name ‘Europe’ and so
much of its identity – should be faced with some of the strongest challenges
in remaining a core part of it.
Notes
1. The number of Greek students registered for degrees at UK universities and colleges is
forecast to be 28,000 in 2005, second only in number to those from China (32,000). The
Introduction 239
number from Cyprus is estimated to be 4,200 for the same year. The forecasts are contained
in a report for the British Council and Universities UK (The Times, 21 April 2004).
2. Major investments have involved a new airport, arterial roads, tram and metro lines and
suburban railway.
3. Note, for example, the comments of The Times, a fierce critic obliged to eat humble pie: ‘To
Athens, an apology. The world media has let you down. We said these Olympic Games
would be a disaster and they have not been. [The Greek] achievement has been to give us an
Olympics, of which they can be proud. If only the rest of the world had realised that sooner’
(31 August 2004).
4. The argument relates to domestic policy; foreign policy may be a limited exception.
5. Arsenis was also associated with the nationalist tradition.
6. Simitis had himself been a founder member of PASOK and he came from a distinguished
left-wing family.
7. Radaelli defines ‘Europeanisation’ as: ‘Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c)
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘‘ways
of doing things’’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in
the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic
discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies’.
8. On 15 July 2004, Prokopis Pavlopoulos presented a new Bill to reform the civil service.
Amongst other reforms, it proposed a new process of re-evaluation for all general directors
and directors in each ministry, counteracting changes introduced by PASOK in 1982.
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The challenge of modernisation: politics and policy in Greece [special issue]

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Introduction: ‘Modernisation’ and the Structural

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Introduction: ‘Modernisation’ and

ABSTRACT Contemporary Greek politics are marked by tensions between pressures

Politics and policy-making in contemporary Greece display the tension

Correspondence Address: Hellenic Observatory, European Institute, London School of

established structures. The old ideological divides and the resonance of

to a multicultural society – as well as a leading source of foreign direct

‘stabilisation state’ at home (Pagoulatos 2003). Greek foreign policy has

realisation of such ‘modernising’ reforms.

appear much stronger than elsewhere: in certain sectors, Greece has

The Modernisation Project of Costas Simitis

The election of Costas Simitis as leader of PASOK (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό

technocratic stance, formed in particular when he was a ﬁscally prudent

the frame of contemporary social democracy. Indeed, whilst the state’s

A Stylised Model of Greek Politics and Policy

(Crown–Army–Parliament) undermining democratic activity (Mouzelis

features of Greek politics in this period:

1. The state is a ‘colossus with feet of clay’ (Sotiropoulos 1993; Mouzelis

7. Civil society, as conventionally understood, is weak: participation rates

vulnerable to change: most notably those concerning the electoral

If these propositions represent a reasonable synopsis of the relevant

speciﬁc EU-level commitments prompting a domestic response (for example,

endogenous variables. Deﬁning ‘Europeanisation’ in terms of a distinct set

Europeanization denotes a complex interactive ‘top-down’ and

Like that of Radaelli, the conception can be challenged in the name of

The strength of EU obligations (‘commitment devices’) may not

or direct policy constraint. The relevance of ‘Europeanisation’ is discussed

Patterns of Change and Continuity in Greece

modernisation project. The case studies cover the political process,

politics. A major shift has occurred in political personnel and their

proﬁle to policy expertise and led to expectations of greater rationalisation in

expensive outputs, and the impact of clientelistic politics between govern-

mediation. The challenge is to adapt to the EU agenda of market

Fund – with particular reference to transport infrastructure and the theme

Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, which had undergone a shift to a more liberal

policy has developed over diﬀerent phases: from normalisation to

unclear. Attention is devoted to the contrast between political rhetoric and

Ioakimidis, Panagiotis (2001). ‘The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment’, in

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