Read The Cultural Other

Read the Cultural Other
≥
Language, Power and
Social Process 14
Editors
Monica Heller
Richard J. Watts
Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin · New York
Read the Cultural Other
Forms of Otherness in the Discourses
of Hong Kong’s Decolonization
Edited by
Shi-xu
Manfred Kienpointner
Jan Servaes
Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin · New York
Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague)
is a Division of Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Read the cultural other : forms of otherness in the discourses of

Hong Kong’s decolonization / edited by Shi-xu, Manfred Kien-
pointner, Jan Servaes.
p. cm. ⫺ (Language, power, and social process ; 14)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 3-11-018267-X (hardcover : alk. paper) ⫺ ISBN 3-11-
018268-8 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Hong Kong (China) ⫺ Languages. 2. Sociolinguistics ⫺
China ⫺ Hong Kong. 3. Sociolinguistics ⫺ China. I. Shi-xu.
II. Kienpointner, Manfred. III. Servaes, Jan, 1952⫺ IV. Series.
P40.45.H66R43 2005
306.441095125⫺dc22
2005013474
앪
앝 Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines
of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.
ISBN 3-11-018267-X hb
ISBN 3-11-018268-8 pb
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Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche
Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the
Internet at ⬍http://dnb.ddb.de⬎.
쑔 Copyright 2005 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin.
All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book
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from the publisher.
Cover design: Christopher Schneider.
Printed in Germany.
This work is dedicated to those cultural communities
whose discourses are marginalized, repressed or excluded
Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Part 1. Paradigmatic reorientation
Chapter 1
The study of non-Western discourse 3
Shi-xu
Chapter 2
Communication theory and the Western bias 21
Denis McQuail
Chapter 3
Towards multiculturalism in discourse studies 33
Shi-xu and Robert Maier
Chapter 4
Beyond differences in cultural values and modes of communication 49
Jan Servaes
Part 2. The discursive dominance of the West
Chapter 5
Reporting the Hong Kong transition:
A comparative analysis of news coverage in Europe and Asia 73
Jan Servaes and Sankaran Ramanathan
Chapter 6
The contest over Hong Kong:
Revealing the power practices of the Western media 89
Shi-xu and Manfred Kienpointner
Chapter 7
Hong Kong’s press freedom:
A comparative sociology of Western and Hong Kong’s views 103
Junhao Hong
viii Contents
Part 3. Complexity, diversity and Otherness of non-Western discourse
Chapter 8
Unfamiliar voices from the Other:
Exploring forms of Otherness in the media discourses
of China and Hong Kong 119
Shi-xu
Chapter 9
Media and metaphor:
Exploring the rhetoric in China’s and Hong Kong’s public discourses
on Hong Kong and China 139
Lee Cher-Leng
Chapter 10
Voices of missing identity: 165
A study of contemporary Hong Kong literary writings
Kwok-kan Tam
Chapter 11
Identity and interactive hypermedia:
A discourse analysis of web diaries 177
Hong Cheng and Guofang Wan
Chapter 12
Narrating Hong Kong history:
A critical study of mainland China’s historical discourse
from a Hong Kong perspective 197
Lawrence Wang-chi Wong
Chapter 13
A nascent paradigm for non-Western discourse studies:
An epilogue 211
Narcisa Paredes-Canilao
Contributors 239
Index 243
Acknowledgements
We would like to express our sincere thanks to the series editor, Monica
Heller, for her continued interest in and invaluable suggestions for the book. We
also want to thank Lut Lams for her enthusiastic help and support in the initial
stage of the project. Shi-xu and Manfred Kienpointner are grateful to the editor
of Pragmatics for allowing them to reproduce part of their paper (2001, 11 [3])
in Chapter 6. Finally, all of us wish to thank Wendy Zhao as well as Xiao Yang
and Hu Rong for their meticulous work in the last stage of editing.
Part 1. Paradigmatic reorientation
Chapter 1
The study of non-Western discourse
Shi-xu
The present volume offers studies of non-Western discourse. It has two interrelat-
ed aims. First, it will argue that non-Western discourse cannot be contained in a
“universal”, “general” or “integrated” theory of linguistic communication or dis-
course but must be understood in a culturally pluralist perspective. To that end,
the book will critically examine the dominant universalist discourse in the pro-
fession in terms of its theoretical inadequacy and political consequences. Further,
it will explore the thoroughly cultural nature of discourse, scientific language in-
cluded, as it outlines a culturally pluralist vision. In addition, it will present em-
pirical research to show the incommensurable difference and contrast between
the Western and non-Western discourses on the “same” and different issues. In
this way, the book makes for a case of non-Western, non-White and Third-World
discourse as a legitimate, necessary and normal part of discourse research.
To take the proposed pluralist view of discourse seriously, secondly, the present
book will also study the case of China and Hong Kong’s public and mediated dis-
courses on the latter’s historic transition from colonialism. In particular, as a way
of reclaiming non-Western discourse, it will attempt to highlight the complexity,
diversity and forms of otherness of those discourses. To achieve these purposes,
it will focus on the discourses which have been marginalized in their Western
counterparts and seek to identify and document the Chinese and Hong Kong’s
specific ways of speaking – their concepts, concerns, aspirations, resistance, ver-
bal strategies, etc. – with reference to similar or different issues. In the process, it
will draw upon culturally different methods and local specific context.
Let me make explicit the problems that have motivated the present book; this
will make clear the relevance and urgency of our endeavor here. On the one hand,
there seems to be a dominant universalistic ideology operating in the mainstream
discourse scholarship. That is, here linguistic communication or discourse is of-
ten assumed to be an independently given and neutral means of representation
and, furthermore, to have universal properties and therefore function universal-
ly. So, (inter-/multidisciplinary) models of language, discourse and communica-
tion are frequently presented as more or less comprehensive and valid across all
cultures, implicitly or explicitly. Think of the familiar grand narratives of “hu-
man language”, “interpersonal/intercultural/mass communication”, “discourse”,
4 Shi-xu
etc. Issues, questions and data in empirical research, too, are routinely proffered
as universally interesting and replicable. Think of English data as the “normal”,
questions of “self ” and “identity” as the “central”, or the issue of “politeness” as
the “natural”. On closer inspection, however, theoretical notions more often than
not turn out to derive from Western traditions, Western Weltanschauung and West-
ern realities; in many cases they can be traced to the Western projects of Structur-
alism and the Enlightenment (Carey 1992; McQuail this volume; Shi-xu 2000).
Empirical questions, too, often embody Western phenomena, experiences, inter-
ests and concerns. When Western theoretical discourse totalizes, non-Western,
non-White and Third-Word metadiscourses are effectively excluded or margin-
alized. Further, when Western phenomena are privileged as the “central”, “gen-
eral” or “standard” object of enquiry, discourses from Non-Western, non-White
and Third-World cultures, including the constituent outlooks, perspectives, con-
cerns and aspirations, etc., are relegated to a “local”, “particular” or “other” po-
sition in (or, one might even argue, outside) the international scholarship. To re-
claim non-Western discourse, at both theoretical and empirical levels, then is ur-
gently called for.
On the other hand, as we enter the new millennium, the division and alien-
ation among the world’s populations are being deepened (Bauman 1998; Hunting-
ton 1998). The erstwhile Cold War is now replaced by the new world (dis)order:
neocolonial repression and anti-imperialist resistance occur simultaneously be-
tween groups, nation states, regions, blocs and so on. Indeed, the global animos-
ity, coupled with world capitalism and neo-colonial expansion, has made cultural
coexistence and common progress more difficult than ever before. The irony of
this international antagonism and fragmentation is that the global village is be-
coming increasingly interconnected and interdependent at the same time, in fi-
nance and trade, the environment and health, and regional and international af-
fairs, through accelerated advancement in communication technologies, human
migration and international travel. Time and again, we have seen that what we
say or do “here” can impact upon, change, even eliminate, lives “there”; prob-
lems “there” can quickly become problems “here”. To pay more attention to non-
Western discourses, then, is also badly needed for the survival of the human cul-
tural world.
The situation is almost desperate, but not hopeless. In fact, we believe that a
cultural-political approach to discourse research can intervene and make a dif-
ference. In particular, we want to advocate as a most timely and effective strate-
gy a radical cultural turn to non-Western discourse, hence the titular imperative,
Read the Cultural Other.
In drawing critical attention to the domination over and marginalization of non-
Western discourses in the discourse scholarship, we have no intention of course
to deny or overshadow the work already existing in the field (e.g. Dissanayake
1988; Gumperz and Levinson 1996; Ngŭgĭ 1986; Shen 1999; Silverstein and Ur-
ban 1996; Young 1994). But endeavors such as these are few and far between
and rather weak under the West-dominated, universalizing aura. Given the cur-
rent international cultural imbalance and disorder in the social sciences and hu-
manities, the struggle against cultural imperialism in general and universalism
in particular will be a long and arduous process. To resist the rampant universal-
ist discourse and to combat the continued marginalization of non-Western, non-
White and Third-World concerns, materials, methods, theories and worldviews,
more groups and institutions must get involved and more systematic and wider-
ranging research conducted.
1. Theorizing non-Western discourse
What constitutes “non-Western discourse”? We shall try to answer this question

by way of outlining the framework of the present studies (this will be detailed in
the rest of Part I). At the outset, we would like to note that the concept of non-
Western discourse could not be easily and clearly defined. For one thing, non-
Western discourse, or in that connection, “China’s discourse” or “Hong Kong’s
discourse”, is not a homogeneous and monolithic entity. It is diversified and dy-
namic. Within “Hong Kong’s discourse”, there are people who favor reunion with
China but also people who oppose it. And people’s opinion changes through time
and across situations. For another, the definition depends on, to say the least, one’s
goals, interests and perspectives; it cannot be neutral. The notion of “non-West-
ern discourse” may, for example, presuppose what “Western discourse” is like,
which is subject to further variable conceptualizations. A reader who has “exot-
ic” tastes may not have the same notion of non-Western discourse as a political-
ly committed researcher who looks for alternative or oppositional forms of dis-
course from the non-Western world.
“Non-Western discourse” does not have a well-defined boundary; surely it is
a contested category and concept. In the present project, our understanding is
motivated by a cultural politics that aspires to resist the domination of Western
discourse and to reclaim cultural freedom and cultural identity of non-Western
discourse. Thus, first of all, non-Western discourse may be conceived of as dis-
course produced by a cultural community different from that of the West. That
is, it involves a different community of speakers (Wuthnow 1989) with a differ-
ent historical and cultural background from that of the West (Bhabha 1994). One
only needs to be reminded of the large non-White Third World population under
a continued, basically American/Western hegemonic, order, who has a very dif-
ferent experience than the White, European and American population (Bauman
1998; Huntington 1998). Second, such discourse may be thought of as on some
6 Shi-xu
topic, shared or otherwise, that is of some particular interest to the West(ern read-
ership), say the environment, poverty or in the present case, Hong Kong’s historic
transition as part of the world’s postcolonial history. That means that non-Western
discourse would be a selected entity, rather than a totality. Third, such discourse
speaks of the “same” subject matter in different ways or patterns from Western
discourse (Bhabha 1994; Césaire 1972; Lee 1994; Ngŭgĭ 1986; Said 1978, 1993).
Different cultural symbolic forms construct different worlds and convey differ-
ent meanings. From Wittgenstein’s (1968) perspective, these can be said to be
different “language games” which share a family of resemblances but nothing
in common for all. For example, Asian communication is supposed to maintain
harmonious relationships (e.g. Dissanayake 1988; Heisey 2000) whereas Ameri-
can-Western communication often strives to express individuality (Bellah et al.
1985). Finally, non-Western discourse must be understood from the global his-
torical perspective of colonialism, postcolonialism and neocolonialism. For, non-
Western discourse is not, and has never been, in an equal relationship with West-
ern discourse but remains marginalized (Pennycook 1998; Spivak 1988b); at the
same time, however, it also possesses the agency to reinvent culturally liberating
experience and reality.
The last point deserves some elaboration, as this will have particularly signif-
icant implications for our project. In the field of (mediated) linguistic commu-
nication, national cultures and ideologies are often assumed to be the dominant
influence (e.g. Knight and Nakano 1999; Lee et al. 2002). Accordingly, com-
municative practice is frequently accounted for in terms of the characteristics
of the individual nations or the nation’s ideological systems. Consequently, not
only does research result in relativism but the relations and practices of cultur-
al power between the national discourses are smoothed over as well. For exam-
ple, studies in the international reporting on the Hong Kong transition have usu-
ally explained the media discourses as relative to the respective national – say,
British, American, Chinese or Hong Kong – political economies and ideologies.
But, as much work in postcolonial studies (e.g. Ashcroft et al. 1989; Hutcheon
1989) and, more generally, cultural studies (e.g. Bhabha 1994; Hall 1996; Said
1978, 1993; Spivak 1988a, 1988b) has shown, linguistic communication, includ-
ing print, broadcasting and digital media, cannot be adequately understood with-
out taking into account the world’s cultural history – the long and continued his-
tory of cultural imperialism. For the present project, then, the discourses of Chi-
na, Hong Kong and diaspora and the counterpart discourses of the West cannot
be understood from the respective “national” perspectives. Crucially and funda-
mentally, these culturally differentiated discourses must be viewed as steeped in
the world’s cultural-historical context of continued and continuing imperial, he-
gemonic order – through first colonialism, then post-colonialism to more recent
forms of neocolonialism.
Western and non-Western worlds, including their discourses, are not consid-
ered here as essentialized, homogeneous and monolithic entities. Cultural dis-
courses, Eastern and Western, are internally diversified and externally indistinct
and constantly shifting. The same complexity may be said of “Chinese discourse”
and “Hong Kong’s discourse”. In the present project on non-Western discourse,
what we want to point to is broad Chinese and Hong Kong patterns of discourse
vis-à-vis the relevant Western discourse. Furthermore, it should be noted that
categories of such discourses, just like those of any other reality, are always con-
tentious. For, cultures or cultural discourses interact with one another and with
speaking individuals, on the one hand and on the other hand speakers categorize
discourses with vested interest. This would suggest that we should speak of non-
Western discourses in the plural. But as a research starting point and cultural-
political process, “non-Western discourse” may be used as a form of “strategic
essentialism” (Bucholtz 2001) to valorize and to empower the non-Western, non-
White world vis-à-vis the dominant white Western discourse.
A number of implications for discourse research follow from the above ac-
count. To start with, if Western and non-Western discourses are not a matter
of center and periphery, but different ways of constructing and acting upon the
world – or different “language games” offering different worlds of experience,
then Western discourse must not be taken as the sole object worth studying. Non-
Western discourse, which has hitherto been marginalized and subordinated, must
also be treated seriously. Local and culturally pluralist theoretical perspectives
should then be adopted to make sense of the culturally relevant issues and data.
More importantly, if the relation between these language games – e.g. Eastern
and Western discourses – is not symmetrical but saturated with power, then dis-
course research and the study of non-Western discourse in particular must help
make explicit, highlight and undermine the cultural power relations and practices;
it must help reclaim, valorize and empower the repressed non-Western discourse.
In addition, if non-Western discourse is not autochthonous and monolithic, but
hybridized, diversified and possessed of creative agency, then discourse studies
must explore the complexity, new identities and the possibility of cultural rela-
tion building and transformation.
2. Methodological considerations
The empirical focus of the present project is China and Hong Kong’s discourses.
The methodological account here will therefore center around this focus. To start
with, it may be observed that we study discourses in various genres (e.g. jour-
nalistic, literary, political and historiographic) and modes (e.g. print and digital
media) and do so with a diversity of specific tasks in mind. The methodological
8 Shi-xu
procedures and techniques to be employed then will vary from case to case. How-
ever, given the shared purpose of the present endeavor, we observe two overarch-
ing principles of source and data selection.
To understand these principles, it may be useful to make clear a more basic
consideration underlying them. That is, the aim of this project is not to describe
what the discourses of China, Hong Kong and their diaspora are like or do, as
such. Such discourses, or any other, are neither pre-given nor unified, and the
boundaries are in flux rather than clearly marked; therefore, a purely descriptive
account cannot be given. So, in making material selections and analytical claims,
we generally do not try to achieve “representativeness”. Rather, the present proj-
ect is meant to introduce, interpret and highlight some aspects of China, Hong
Kong and their diasporic discourses, for a largely Western readership. So the cri-
teria for choice of data and source will have less to do with what is “typical” of
the Chinese and Hong Kong’s media discourses than with what we believe the
Western audience ought to know.
We judge what the Western discourse community should know by what they
already know. To help us determine this background knowledge, we draw chiefly
on two broad bodies of reference material as alluded to earlier. On the one hand,
we refer to existing literature on the dominance of the relevant Western media
discourse on the Hong Kong transition (e.g. Cao 2000; Flowerdew and Scollon
1997; Knight and Nakano 1999; Lee et al. 2002). On the other hand, we rely on
first-hand information such as furnished in Part 2 of the book (i.e. Chapters 5, 6
and 7). From those sources of information, we observe that, around the time of
Hong Kong’s historic transition, the Western discourse community is saturated
with a set of interrelated (sub)discourses. On the one hand, Great Britain is por-
trayed as the cause of Hong Kong’s success and as “handing over” Hong Kong ac-
cording to an “international agreement”. On the other hand, China is being doubt-
ed, discredited and threatened with sanctions from the West if it fails Western
expectations. At the same time, Hong Kong is stereotyped as unique and having
no real relation with China. Effectively, this string of dominant discourses un-
dermines, dismisses or excludes any possible discourses from China and Hong
Kong and their diaspora.
Considering this Western discourse background, we decide on two major prin-
ciples in identifying (sources and) data and presenting the resultant discourses.
One principle is that a discourse must reflect some form of marginality. That is,
the discourse must be either absent from, or meagerly engaged with or discredited
by the corresponding Western media. So for example, a discourse about why the
return of Hong Kong to China is possible at the time when it occurs qualifies as
such marginalized as it is ideologically repressed in the Western media discourse.
Chinese and Hong Kong’s expressions of their interrelations, which are frequently
constituted out of metaphors of bodily and familial connections, form an impor-
tant focus in part because these are rarely taken up in the Western understanding
and definition of the interrelation except perhaps as objects of irony.
Alternatively, the other principle is that a discourse must reflect difference.
That is, the discourse to be studied and highlighted must embody a version of
events, or a form of action, that is different from that in the relevant Western dis-
course. For instance, the accounts for Hong Kong’s success by the Chinese and
Hong Kong’s media constitute significant exemplars of non-Western discourse,
unfamiliar yet interesting to Western readership, because they provide a great
variety of explanations, whereas the Western media attribute the success virtu-
ally exclusively to British colonial rule. Similarly, the rich variety of metaphors
in the Chinese and Hong Kong’s media constructing the interconnections and
interdependence of China and Hong Kong is taken up as a topic of interest here
because the Western discourse has insisted on the uniqueness and independent
character of Hong Kong.
In order to deal with the complexity of marginality and difference and the
broader imperial order, we have tried to include a variety of genres, ranging from
journalistic publications, political speeches, magazine articles, web diaries, lit-
erature and historical accounts. But there are still other discursive phenomena in
the Chinese and Hong Kong media that are not presented here, revealing and in-
structive as they may be. As I indicated above, it is not the intention of this book
to present a comprehensive and even-handed survey. For the same reason, we
have not been exhaustive in the selection of sources and data. In that connection,
it may be mentioned that the materials in the Hong Kong media which express
points of view contrary to those in the Chinese media but are close to those in
the Western discourse are not given prominence. This is because they would al-
ready be familiar to the Western audience.
In the analysis of media texts, we have pursued a qualitative, discourse ana-
lytic approach in most cases (except Chapter 5). This is because, as we indicat-
ed above, cultural discourses are neither internally homogeneous nor external-
ly discrete, but diversified and contested and, furthermore, our research objec-
tive is precisely to explore discursive subtleties and complexities. In particular,
it may be mentioned that the analytical tools of contemporary theories of met-
aphor, argumentation, etc., can be useful because they provide insights into the
strategic use of certain metaphorical images (e.g. Chapter 9) and certain argu-
ment schemes (e.g. Chapter 6) by the different political agents and social groups
involved in the historic transition.
However, there will surely arise tensions between the “standard” methods on
the one hand and the local issues and ideas on the other. Existing dominant meth-
ods of analysis are often Anglo-American-Western in origin and orientation. Chi-
na and Hong Kong’s discourse materials and questions will require new concepts
and approaches. For instance, identity is not a universal concern; local, particular
10 Shi-xu
issues, such as that of harmony or relation (re)building, may be real and pressing.
Inter-/cross-/multidisciplinarity is thus not sufficient for global social science; it
must be coupled with cultural diversity, in worldview, theory, methodology, top-
ics, data and concerns. Thus, under the general principle of ethnographic appro-
priateness, we draw on methods eclectically and adapt them to non-Western ma-
terials and issues as closely as possible.
It may be mentioned, too, that most of the authors here live in between the
East and the West and have direct experience with intercultural difference and
tension. The hybridized, diasporic and living-in-between-East/West cultures’ po-
sition is an advantage and a source of strength, because it not only constitutes a
moral-rational basis for building cultural co-existence, but also provides the best
vantage point and resources to help achieve it.
3. Hong Kong in international communication and world

history
That China, Hong Kong and diasporic discourses on the Hong Kong transition
constitute interesting exemplars of non-Western discourse can be seen from not
only the broader, hegemonic pattern of international communication on the top-
ic, but also the colonial-historical background behind it. Crucially, unless one
recognizes the larger network of cultural struggle between the imperialist and
anti-imperialist discourses, and unless one sees the Western colonial past (and
neocolonial ventures), one can easily frame, or dismiss, the discourses of Chi-
na, Hong Kong and diaspora as “nationalistic”, “ideological” or “imperialistic”.
In fact, much of the West-dominated research has reached precisely such con-
clusions. One of these might be termed the discourse of “liberal-nationalism”.
That is, all the international communication on Hong Kong is driven by the ide-
ologies of particular nation-states, East and West alike (see, e.g., Knight and Na-
kano 1999; Lee et al. 2002). Another might be called the “tu-quoque” discourse.
That is, after the British colonists’ departure, China is recolonizing Hong Kong
(see, e.g., Chow 1992).
In the international communication order, China, Hong Kong and diaspor-
ic discourses on Hong Kong’s historic transition belong to the non-Western, not
merely for their different languages, topics and concerns, but also for the subal-
tern position they occupy. It may be observed that the Chinese diaspora is, gener-
ally, rarely written, read about or spoken to by the Western discourse community.
On the whole, there had been little journalistic coverage of China, Hong Kong
or Asia in the Western media (see Chapter 5). As an exception, however, the ex-
traordinary international media attention on Hong Kong and China in 1997 only
reflected Western media logic and ideological interests (Flowerdew and Scollon
1997; Knight and Nakano 1999; Lee 2000). Namely, the dominant Western me-
dia projected the transition to be a dramatic event, or as Lee et al. (2002) call it
“global media spectacle”, merely in order to attract audience. At the same time,
Western media discourse predominantly doubted the Chinese handling of the re-
turn of Hong Kong precisely to satisfy its continued imperialist desire (see Chap-
ters 6 and 7). As soon as Hong Kong’s return failed to produce the turbulences
that the West had expected, Western media attention quickly waned.
In addition to this subjugated discursive position of China and Hong Kong, we
must understand the broader colonial history. Hong-Kong-China’s modern histo-
ry is a history of Western (British, French and Japanese) imperialist domination
– a history that has largely been repressed or conveniently forgotten in Western
(media) discourse. Let us give a brief description. This serves as a general his-
torical framework for the book, but individual chapters will supply further de-
tailed information relevant to their particular data.
Geographically, Hong Kong is composed of three parts, Hong Kong Island,
Kowloon and the New Territories. Historically, they were part of China’s Guan-
dong province. In the middle of 19th century, however, the British waged two
Opium Wars against China and forced the Qing government to sign the Treaty of
Nanking (1842), whereby Hong Kong Island was ceded to Britain, and later the
Treaty of Peking (1860), whereby Kowloon was ceded. In 1898, the British ob-
tained from the Qing government the lease of the New Territories (91% of today’s
Hong Kong area) for a term of 99 years; it expired on 30 June 1997.
The aforementioned treaties are not recognized by any of the subsequent Chi-
nese governments. After many failed attempts by the subsequent Chinese govern-
ments, in 1984 China succeeded in the negotiations with the British government
and signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration. This, as may be noted, occurs in
the context of tremendous economic success at home and enhanced political po-
sition abroad. The declaration provides for British withdrawal from Hong Kong
on 30 June 1997, and the restoration of Chinese sovereignty on 1 July 1997. Ac-
cording to the agreement, Hong Kong becomes a Special Administrative Region
of China, to be administered by the people of Hong Kong, with its existing sys-
tem to remain unchanged for 50 years. When Hong Kong was returned to China
in 1997, 156 years of British colonial control came to an end.
However, there is little mention in the Western media discourse of the econom-
ic pressure or considerations of international politics as at least part of the causes
of Hong Kong’s decolonization. Further, China has even been called “imperialist”
or the “neocolonizer” of Hong Kong. The details and implications of such cultur-
al memory loss and negligence will be revealed in the rest of the book.
12 Shi-xu
4. The organization of the book
Finally, let us briefly describe the contents of the rest of the book. Chapters 2, 3
and 4, in conjunction with the present introduction, form Part 1; this provides the
rationale and a general framework for the proposed cultural-political project on
discourse and communication. In Chapter 2, Denis McQuail examines the bias
of Western theory of mediated linguistic communication and suggests culturally
more inclusive and more reflective ways of theorizing and researching. He first
traces contemporary communication and media theory to the dominant body of
social science of Western Europe and the United States during the latter part of
19th and the early part of 20th centuries. He then points out that such historical
origins and cultural characteristics have manifested themselves in the values that
are assumed and expressed in the principles and methods of communication re-
search and in the way that language, media and society are problematized. For
instance, the spread of mass communication around the world and the related the-
ory and research have everything to do with Western self-styled superiority: it is
the latter that motivated the mass production of communication and that makes
Western forms of communication the center of attention. Therefore, what theo-
rists should do now is to rewrite about linguistic communication and media by
taking into account other cultural, especially non-Western, contexts and perspec-
tives; further, researchers should openly challenge ethnocentric forms of investi-
gation and adapt to the changing cultural realities. In particular, scholars should
take up the experience, concerns and issues of non-Western worlds so that new
hypotheses, new concepts and new theory can become possible.
In Chapter 3, Shi-xu and Maier develop a culturally pluralist perspective on
linguistic communication allied with cultural studies. They start off by critiqu-
ing the aculturalist or universalist discourse in mainstream language scholarship.
Here they show how it smoothes over its ethnocentricism and consequently mar-
ginalizes non-Western, non-White intellectual traditions. Then drawing on criti-
cal insights from cultural studies, they propose that an in-between-cultural strat-
egy be adopted in a theoretical reorientation. Accordingly, they outline a cultur-
al-political framework, whereby discourse is seen in oppositional relationship:
namely, as a set of divergent and competing “language games” that construct
and act upon reality. A number of consequences follow. For one, totalizing truth
claims is rendered questionable. For another, interaction, negotiation and solidar-
ity amongst different and contested discourses and corresponding communities
become desirable. Above all perhaps, taking a cultural turn to the hitherto mar-
ginalized non-Western discourses in the general language scholarship becomes
an urgent, necessary and essential task.
In Chapter 4, Jan Servaes turns to the issue of interaction between the diverse
human communication systems and argues that a genuinely dialogical, ethically
negotiated form of communication must be worked out and practiced for the sur-
vival of the human cultural community. He begins by examining the differences
in thinking, value system and modes of communication between the East/Asia
and West/Europe, with reference to two cases: human rights and Thai culture.
From here arises the question of what human communities have to do with cul-
tural differences in ways of speaking, especially in the current conditions of hu-
man suffering, environmental disasters and global risks. In opposition to cultur-
al and national relativism, Servaes suggests that intercultural criticism is neces-
sary, as is the imagination of a shared global community. To achieve these ends,
negotiation and consensus on the ethical principles of communication between
the world’s cultures (e.g. motivation to understand, respect and critique) are re-
quired as a prerequisite. The multiculturalist stance taken here further warrants
non-Western discourse as a legitimate topic and the basic ethics for intercultural
communication suggested here provides a moral starting point for the study of
non-Western discourse.
Part 2 examines Western media discourse on Hong Kong and China during the
historical transition; this will serve as both the methodological background for
selecting non-Western, Chinese and Hong Kong’s discourses and an important
motivation for studying discourses from non-Western cultures. Thus, in Chap-
ter 5, Jan Servaes and Sankaran Ramanathan, through qualitative and quantita-
tive investigations, reveal huge and alarming imbalances between the European
and Asian presses in cross-cultural representation. Through studying 15 newspa-
pers and magazines in Asia and Europe each, published between 27 June and 6
July 1997, they show how many and what kind of European events were reported
in the Asian media, and, conversely, in the European media. One major finding
is that, despite intense international travel, digital media and the so-called glo-
balization, reporting of Asian events by the European media is significantly less
than that of European events by the Asian counterpart. Of the total of 3725 news
items studied, 1563 European events and 1413 stories about Hong Kong, respec-
tively, are found in the Asian media, whereas only 749 Asian events are covered
in the European counterpart – of which almost half actually relate to the “me-
dia spectacle” of the Hong Kong event. Another major finding is that the cover-
age of Europe by the Asian press is far more extensive and elaborate than that of
Asia by the European counterpart. In that connection, while Asian publications
tend to be more balanced in their reporting of European events, Asian stories in
the European publications are represented more often than not in a negative light
and frequently from a nationalistic and ethnocentric perspective.
In Chapter 6, Shi-xu and Manfred Kienpointner offer a critical analysis of the
Western media discourse on Hong Kong’s transition. Based on multinational and
multilingual media sources, they identify and highlight two major, recurrent sorts
of discourses of cultural repression. One is that of ad baculum in which China is
14 Shi-xu
warned, or its role in Hong Kong’s future development threatened, with possible
sanctions by the West. For instance, it predicts or describes the negative conse-
quences that will follow from the West on China if and when the latter fails to act
in the way the West expects. The other is a discourse in which the West (media)
defines the identities for Hong Kong and China, instead of letting them have an
opportunity to do it themselves and, further, in which it uses these identity defi-
nitions to prescribe what Hong Kong and China must and must not do. For exam-
ple, they characterize Hong Kong as an “international city” and then use it as a
reason to caution against China’s attempt to change it. In conclusion, the authors
place these discourses in the broader historical and cultural context to reveal the
underlying, continued Western pattern of colonialist desires.
In Chapter 7, Junhao Hong critically examines the Western view of press free-
dom in Hong Kong with a view to showing the need to understand the latter’s
press from its own cultural perspective. Here he proceeds from the standpoint
that freedom of the press is not universal but culturally defined and provides a
contrastive analysis of the Western discourse on freedom of the press and the lo-
cal people’s own. He shows that in the Western media the Western perspective
and criteria are used in evaluating freedom of press issues in Hong Kong, where-
by the views of the people of Hong Kong, a population of seven million, are ig-
nored. And yet, not only does the Western view of Hong Kong’s freedom of the
press not necessarily reflect the experience of the Hong Kong people, but also
their strong criticism of Hong Kong’s press freedom has reflected the Western
hegemonic tendency to use Western models for other countries as the “univer-
sal” standards. In addition, he explores the reasons for these differences in per-
spectives and their implications.
Part 3 presents empirical studies of Hong Kong and China’s discourses and
highlights a range of discursive, historical and political issues for the Western
as well as non-Western discourse communities. In Chapter 8, Shi-xu examines
Chinese and Hong Kong print media discourses and tries to characterize certain
forms of difference or “Otherness” compared with the sorts of dominant, Western
discourses considered in Part 2. Based on contrastively selected data and through
general and specific accounts of their textual and contextual properties, he high-
lights a range of discourses unfamiliar yet significant to the Western audience.
One such discourse is a series of statements formulating a variety of kinds of
symbolic significance of Hong Kong’s return to China, a topic at best minimally
treated by any Western media. Another is a discourse which gives prominence to
the reasons why the return of Hong Kong has become possible at all, which are
left almost completely implicit in the Western discourse. Still another important
kind of Hong Kong and China’s discourses is a construction of the relations and
interconnections between Hong Kong and China – against the backdrop of the
Western insistent discourse of Hong Kong’s unique identity. Equally meaningful
is the discourse that accounts for Hong Kong’s success in ways that oppose West-
ern attributions to British colonial administration. These discourses effectively
reclaim the new identity and relationship, the agency, and hence the “Otherness”,
of the Hong Kong and Chinese people. At the same time, these discourses are
culturally rhetorical in the sense that they serve to argue against the dominant
Western discourses of Hong Kong (e.g. the implicit discourse that Hong Kong is
being “handed over” according to an international agreement).
In Chapter 9, Lee Cher Leng scrutinizes media political discourses in Hong
Kong and China and documents the cultural, linguistic and rhetorical ways that
they represent Hong Kong’s history and future. It is thus an attempt to detail “lo-
cal”, non-Western discourses in terms of their form, meaning and complexity.
Here she focuses on the metaphors that politicians as well as other media actors
use in the formulation of Chinese identity, Hong Kong’s identity and their inter-
relationships. Thus she observes such metaphors as “homecoming”, “becoming
one’s own master”, “a bridge between China and rest of the world”, “being pro-
tected by a shield”, “flesh and blood”, “root and shoot” and “lips and teeth”. This
string of metaphors from both sides reproduce and maintain strong links and re-
lationships between China and Hong Kong, despite or as opposed to the West-
ern discourse of Hong Kong’s uniqueness and autonomy. Within this metaphori-
cal discourse, further, she also finds differences of use between China and Hong
Kong’s metaphorical language. For instance, the Chinese media tend to favor some
kinds of metaphors (e.g. “return to the fatherland”) whereas the Hong Kong me-
dia favors others (e.g. “reunion of the big family”); they sometimes also use the
same metaphors in different ways. Lee shows how these metaphorical uses re-
flect particular political interests and specific cultural circumstances. For exam-
ple, the metaphor of “Hong Kong as its true master” realizes China’s commit-
ment to Hong Kong’s freedom as well as its declaration of the ending of colonial
rule. Hong Kong media’s metaphor of “China and Hong Kong as a big family”
serves to stress the equality between China and Hong Kong.
In Chapter 10, Kwok-kan Tam studies Hong Kong’s identity from the per-
spective of Hong Kong’s recent literature. Here Tam offers a complex account of
identity construction in the fictional, dramatic and poetic genres from the 1950s
through the 1990s. Here he shows a variety of forms of identity discourse that
are caught up in a web of local historical, cultural, socio-economical and politi-
cal contexts. Further, he shows how such discourses appear, disappear and reap-
pear. In particular, he points out that these discourses of identity are not stable
and not restricted by any particular temporal and spatial boundaries as concep-
tualized in Western theory of post-coloniality. They do not build cultural iden-
tity by accumulation or upon tradition. Rather, Hong Kong’s “literary” identities
form a discursive space where everything floats and nothing settles. The fact that
Hong Kong’s recent literature has continually engaged with the issue of identity
16 Shi-xu
and transformed its shape and meaning is a reflection of Hong Kong’s persistent
search for new identities that may adapt the people of Hong Kong to the new re-
alities facing Hong Kong. In this sense, the important question is not what iden-
tities the Hong Kong people “have”, but rather how they quest for them.
In Hong Cheng and Guofang Wan’s contribution, Chapter 11, we see an explo-
ration in the Hong Kong diaspora’s attempt to construct identity through the new
media. McQuail, Servaes, Shi-xu and Maier earlier argued for the need for theo-
ries of communication and culture to take account of new experiences, new con-
texts, and new modes of communication. Here, Cheng and Wan focus on some
dozens of diaries contributed by twenty individuals from the Hong Kong diaspo-
ra to the Public Broadcasting Service’s Web site < http://www.pbs.com >, during
a six-month period before and after the transition ceremony. They not only offer
a discursive perspective on the construction of identity by the local people them-
selves amidst global media attention, but also explore the intricate and dynamic in-
terconnections between identity development and Internet mediation. They show
that the Hong Kong diaspora’s identification with China is not uniform but varied
with different – social or cultural – aspects of China. Further, the discourse of
identity is not constant but changes in the digital mode through time. This study
raises new questions about the relationship between identity and hypermedia: it
has to do with crosslinguistic translation, with the audience, with other informa-
tion sites, with the interactivity of the web page, and further afield.
Finally, in Chapter 12, Lawrence Wang-chi Wong presents penetrating and re-
flective analyses of historical discourses of Hong Kong by Mainland China and
Hong Kong historians. Through historical and rhetorical analysis, Wong identi-
fies a number of specific narrative strategies which modern Mainland China and
Hong Kong historians use to suit specific historical, political circumstances. Fur-
ther, he suggests that these narrative strategies also reflect the broader colonial
history and, consequently, forms of cultural struggle and resistance in it. For in-
stance, he shows that due to the British colonial authority, Hong Kong scholars
took care not to write about Hong Kong’s history after the arrival of the Brit-
ish. Modern Chinese historians, on the other hand, in order to reduce British in-
fluence and reclaim the historical links with Hong Kong as the decolonization
was approaching, almost without exception begin with a preferred – ancient –
point in history, when Hong Kong was undeniably part of China. In addition, he
shows that, before the Opium War, Chinese historians had showed little interest
in Hong Kong.
We have saved the most important for the last and here we want to highlight
a number of benefits that may be derived from the present undertaking. First of
all, by promoting, practicing and publishing a study of non-Western discourse
within the mainstream language scholarship, we contribute to rendering mar-
ginalized and differentiated cultural discourses as a normal, legitimate and nec-
essary object of enquiry. In doing so, we also realize one important form of in-
tellectual cultural politics, which I outlined at the beginning of this chapter. If
we take this exercise to be part of the broader, ordinary world, cultural politics,
then it may be said that we are giving a turn to the non-Western Other to let them
speak. Such a cultural and ethnographic turn, badly needed in our times of dom-
ination and conflict, provides for more informed and deeper intercultural dia-
logue and understanding and, consequently, increases chances of cultural cohe-
sion. At the same time, it may be observed that listening to local cultural voic-
es enables us to see instructive aspects of the cultural Other(’s discourse). The
Chinese view of discourse as maintenance of harmony, for example, beyond the
Western notion of discourse as expression of individual identity, makes it possi-
ble to reveal interesting ways of relation building in the Chinese and Hong Kong
discourses, a research topic much needed for the contemporary antagonistic in-
ternational community.
Second, when we take a culturally contrastive approach to studying non-West-
ern discourse, a new, refreshing and complex picture emerges, not just of the un-
familiar non-Western “Other”, but the Western Self as well. New topics, narra-
tives, explanations and arguments are revealed, which the Western media has de-
nied its community. For instance, where the Western media remain reticent, the
Chinese discourse frequently brings up the topic of why the decolonization oc-
curs at the time it does and maintains that the British colonizer would not have
given up (the whole of) Hong Kong at the time it did, had it not been for the
great economic, political and international position that China had gained. Fur-
ther, alternative or even contrary accounts, other than those which the Western
community had been led to believe, are made available. For example, different
from the recurring Western attribution of Hong Kong’s success to British colo-
nial rule, the Chinese discourse offers a comprehensive account, linking up his-
torical, cultural, social, geographical and economic factors. Research findings
such as these may compel readers to become more reflexive upon familiar and
taken-for-granted regimes of truth, assumptions and versions implicit or explicit
in the Western Self discourse.
Thirdly, our cultural perspective on discourse has revealed the plurality, com-
plexity and forms of opposition of non-Western discourses, beyond nationalistic
notions of human discourses. The variety of studies above shows that Hong Kong’s
discourse of identity is not static but shifts and changes with local historical cir-
cumstances, not homogeneous but multivoiced through different genres and me-
dia. More importantly, the Chinese and Hong Kong discourses identified are not
merely “new” or “different”, but embody cultural power struggle with opposing
Western discourses. Specifically, whereas the Western discourse on Hong Kong
and China appears culturally repressive and hegemonic with its ideological as-
sumptions, exclusive definitions of the Other, incredulity, warnings and threats,
18 Shi-xu
China and Hong Kong’s discourses put up cultural resistance by providing oth-
erwise missing accounts, reclaiming identities and rebuilding relationships. Re-
sults and insights such as these highlight the marginal and marginalized nature
of non-Western discourse on the international scale and hence the need, interest
and urgency to read it in terms of cultural power relation and practice.
From this limited study, it will become clear that cross-cultural reading and
research should be a continuous and expanding process. In particular, similar and
parallel studies of other cultural discourses, from the Arab world, Africa, Latin
America and so on should all be taken more seriously in the mainstream schol-
arship. When the study of non-Western, non-White and Third-World discourses
is accepted as normal, legitimate and routine in language, discourse and com-
munication research, the cultural Self may hope to become so open and free as
to include the cultural Other.
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Chapter 2
Communication theory and the Western bias
Denis McQuail
1. Origins
Much of contemporary communication and media theory has its origins in the
general body of the Western social sciences, including history, anthropology, eco-
nomics, psychology and sociology that originated mainly in Western Europe in
the latter 19th and early 20th century. These disciplines were then further devel-
oped and amplified in the United States. Despite their aim of universality as sci-
ences of human behavior and their claim to generality, there is little doubt that
they were indelibly marked by their own cultural context and circumstances of
time and place. This showed itself in the values that were assumed or expressed
in the principles and methods of the disciplines and also in the way social life
was problematized.
The Western social sciences were themselves children of the Enlightenment
and were underpinned by a more or less axiomatic belief in progress, with reason
both as method and as ideal. They were dedicated to the advancement of mate-
rial welfare and the conquest of problems of society. They followed the model of
science and engineering that was applied to the control of the environment, im-
provement of health and increase in productivity. There was little or no room for
doubt in the new sciences of society about the desirability of progress nor about
its main manifestations. Even so, the tensions of change were recognized, not
least that between the individualism and community.
The good society envisaged as an outcome of scientific progress would re-
quire cooperation and lawfulness, but with individuals equally free in principle
to pursue their own welfare, with benefits accruing to the whole society or com-
munity. The governance of such a society would be carried out by consent and in
a civilized and rational manner. The culture of the more economically advanced
(in practice the most commercialized or industrialized) societies was favorable
to innovation and change. The past was often viewed as steeped in ignorance,
superstition and primitive ways. In religion the bias of the times was towards the
Protestant form of Christianity, that was associated with capitalism and moder-
nity. In this context, modernity meant rationality, objectivity, science, the oper-
22 Denis McQuail
ation of the free market, individualism, hard work and an ethical emphasis on
good deeds rather than ritual.
Attitudes towards other forms of culture, society and religion had their com-
plexities, but the predominant attitude seems to have been one of superiority, jus-
tified by the wonders of industrialism, the power of capitalism, benefits of bu-
reaucracy and the rule of law. Without this sense of superiority, it is hard to ex-
plain how the Western world’s projects of global colonization could be regarded
as legitimate. The best known work of the master sociologist, Max Weber (The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 1904/1985) accounted for the rise
of capitalism in the West and not the East, primarily in terms of its more “appro-
priate” Western philosophical orientation to the material world or greater world-
liness. Similarly, it occurred earlier in Northern rather than Southern Europe be-
cause of the easier cultural accommodation of Protestantism than Catholicism to
the spirit and practice of capitalist enterprise.
2. The rise of mass communication and early communication

theory
From this brief sketch it might seem that the story of Western bias has been writ-
ten long ago and quite a lot of the early history of media theory and research fits
the pattern that had been established before the “media” in their modern forms
were instituted. As the media developed in the first half of the 20th century, mass
communication was treated by many theorists either as an instrument of social
engineering and control or as a potential threat to cultural and social values (see
McQuail 2000). It could be harnessed for propaganda and persuasion (for public
or private purposes), for mass education and universal information. Mass com-
munication made mass politics possible and promoted mass consumption through
advertising and images of the desirable life. Mass media encouraged ambition
and the mobility of labor and population needed for industrial development, and
they helped to hold society together with a common stock of information, beliefs
and opinions, during an era of radical social change.
The perceived contributions of early mass media to social progress in Western
industrial societies were matched by potential dangers. The mass media could
also detach individuals too much from their society adding to alienation and ano-
mie, causing social dislocation and dysfunctional degrees of conflict and compe-
tition. They could undermine the orderliness of society, especially amongst the
young and the working classes, by promoting personal gratification, idleness and
stimulation to sexual or other misconduct. The power of mass media could also
be harnessed by powerful economic and political elites to impose a more or less
consensual social order characterized by conformity, obedience and loss of in-
dividual will and creativity (Mills 1955). Dystopian visions of modern society,
such as that of Orwell’s 1984, reversed the role of the media into the all-seeing
eye of Big Brother, with no place to hide for the deviant.
What these remarks underline is that the mass media were almost exclusively
viewed by early theorists in the light of current preoccupations of actual societ-
ies, most of them geographically or culturally “Western”. Much the same could
be said of the large exception represented by the long experiment of communism.
Mass media were equally or even more strongly identified with economic and
material progress and treated as instruments of social and cultural change and
of control in the new order. Soviet theory integrated the work of media into the
larger project of transforming society, with little attention to the “dysfunctional”
elements, as perceived in capitalist society.
3. The media and ‘development’ tradition
The bias of media theory is often and most directly exemplified by reference to
theories of development (or “modernization”) that preoccupied some, especially
American, researchers in the immediate post World War II era. In the tradition
initiated by Schramm, Lerner and others in the 1950s (e.g. Lerner et al. 1958),
the mass media were seen as the vehicle for bringing the message of “moderni-
ty” to less enlightened and advanced corners of the world, especially the part la-
beled as “undeveloped” or “traditional”.
The earlier period had exhibited a quite specific bias that implied the neces-
sity for would-be beneficiaries of material progress to adopt “Western” attitudes
(and life styles) especially by becoming ambitious, opinionated, secular, compet-
itive and consumption oriented. They also needed to learn to think and behave as
individuals. The perceived need was for mass communication originating in the
“West” to overcome the obstacles of “traditional” society. This stood in as a term
to summarize a mixture of conditions, including lack of democracy, localism, fa-
milism, fatalism and “Eastern” religious beliefs that covered the spectrum from
Islam to Confucianism. This represents some updating and revision of the Webe-
rian thesis and a shift of emphasis from collective religious beliefs to individual
psychology, but not an escape from its ethnocentrism (see McQuail 2000).
The main escape route on offer in a new branch of development theory (e.g.
Rogers and Shoemaker 1973) was a more neutral and less ethnocentric approach
under the heading of “diffusion of innovations”. This concentrated on technocrat-
ic solutions to a wide range of specific material problems relating to agriculture,
health, economics, population, planning and so on. It was and remains hard to
argue that many of the technologies that are the collective outcome of human en-
deavor in many cultures are specifically “Western”, especially following the spec-
24 Denis McQuail
tacular rise of Asian economies from the 1970s onwards. Nevertheless, the mass
media vehicles for carrying the revised message of modernity were not divested
of certain characteristically “Western” features in their institutional forms and
professional ideologies, nor was the general direction of flow of influence “from
West to East” fundamentally changed. The “instructional kits” for material de-
velopment were still packaged in various forms of social implementation that re-
flected the originating cultural and social context (McQuail 2000).
4. Critical dependency
From the 1970s onwards, attention shifted to a new critical paradigm for ana-
lyzing the mediation of East-West relationships. This was variously identified as
the “cultural-” or “media-” imperialism thesis, or as one of “imbalanced flow” of
global communication, understood as a result of structured and exported underde-
velopment and dependency (McQuail 2002). The components would be very fa-
miliar to people from earlier generations, although perhaps absent or fading from
younger memories as they are replaced with more recent debates about globaliza-
tion and the information society. The empirical contents of the then new critical
paradigm were actually not very new, but, of its very nature, the new paradigm
was dedicated to exposing the Western bias of global information and cultural
flow. What is less clear is whether or not the theory itself could be considered, by
virtue of its critical orientation, as thereby being free from Western bias. Prob-
ably not, since many strong advocates of the theory were certainly Western by
origin (even if the Latin American influence was strong) and in their manner of
thinking and in varying degrees drew on elements of Marxism and other West-
ern theories of capitalism.
Moreover, the imbalanced-flow critics tended to assume that the contents of
global media, especially international news, fiction and entertainment, with their
strong American imprint, would have powerful ideological and cultural effects on
their audiences. This assumption implicitly overvalues the appeal, potency and
persuasiveness of the message of Western media. It also underestimates the vi-
tality and flexibility of the receiving cultures and ignores the cultural and intel-
lectual poverty, superficiality and ephemerality of much of the new global me-
dia culture.
In this breathless sprint through some decades, we have now arrived in the
1980s, with McBride et al. (1980) behind us and new geopolitical scenarios on
the way, as well as potentially revolutionary technological developments. Dur-
ing the period just described, it was possible and convenient to use approxima-
tions such as “modern versus traditionalist”, “East versus West”, “North versus
South”, “capitalist versus communist” without attending very closely to the re-
alities referred to in particular situations. The world was really more complicat-
ed and it has become more so in the post-Soviet era. The point to underline for
present purposes is that for most of the time period that has been discussed, there
was some consistency about what was general understood by the term “Western”.
This coincided essentially with the communications media of the United States
and Western Europe, especially of the ex-colonial powers.
But there was no clear fix on what might be meant by the “non-Western”, a
term that is in fact hard to find in any theory. Such a concept, where it lurked,
could cover communist regimes and their distinctive media cultures, the Islam-
ic world, the underdeveloped world (mainly much of Africa and various parts of
Asia). Latin America figured prominently in the applications of dependency the-
ory, but was in no way “Eastern”. The term “South” was also in use to designate
the general state of lower development of the Southern Hemisphere, despite the
disparate causes of underdevelopment. In addition, the category of “non-West-
ern” covered a large part of the world’s population in China, Japan and South East
Asia that was certainly “Eastern” in Western eyes, but not at all homogeneous in
cultural, social, economic or political terms, or in the eyes of those referred to.
In itself, this lack of specificity about “the other” constitutes a bias and it also re-
flects an unacceptable lack of interest and often of ignorance, as if it were really
not necessary to know about the real cultural attributes of those at the receiving
end of Western globalizing influences. It is not just a question of bias in media
theory, but also of fundamental deficiencies in the epistemological and method-
ological stance that still persist (McQuail 2000, 2002).
5. Beyond confession
In order to make some progress beyond simply exposing or confessing to the eth-
nocentrism that has quite evidently characterized media theory from the begin-
ning, we need to break the issue down into a number of subquestions. Firstly, it is
useful to inquire a bit more deeply into the sources of “Western bias”. Secondly,
we should look at different forms and levels of its expression (not just at what is
meant by the idea, but at what points it is manifested). Thirdly, we need to con-
sider some possible solutions to what has been recognized as a problem for any
serious claim to media theorizing.
On the question of origins, a first cause has already been identified in a gener-
al way in the Western social scientific tradition that emerged as part of the trans-
formation to modern industrial forms of society. Secondly, it is hard to ignore
the fact that most media theorizing has been done by “Western” scholars, living
in and observing the media of their own countries, and inevitably influenced by
their own familiar social cultural context and its typical values. It does not matter
26 Denis McQuail
much if the scholars in question openly espouse the values of their own society
(as some have done in advocating such goals as libertarianism, “modernization”
or repression of moral deviance), or take a stand against them (as critical theo-
rists have done). A condition of value neutrality is not to be attained. But these
things are at least out in the open, and some allowance made for them by “non-
Western” scholars, as a result, alternative paths can be consciously chosen.
More difficult to expose and deal with is the problem posed by the object of
theorizing itself – the mass media. It is arguable that the mass media institution
in its main features is a distinctive product of the original Western industrial so-
ciety and the process of mass communication along with it. This proposition is
complex and has itself to be examined by reference to one or more of the follow-
ing: the technology; the production process; institutional forms taken by media;
and the various applications and uses, on the part of audiences and other agen-
cies. The same degree and kind of “Westernness” is unlikely to reside in or de-
rive equally from each of these elements.
The ghost of media technological determinism, first theorized by Innis (1951),
McLuhan (1964) and others, has never been exorcised. Early versions of “medi-
um theory” presupposed that technologies of reproduction and transmission of
meaning would in themselves be “culture-free”. However, the same technology
might be applied differently in different cultural contexts, and the original tech-
nological invention and its application are bound to be conditioned by the cultural
context. The consequences of use of particular forms of media (e.g. printing) then
interact with the culture to have long-term consequences in use that become inti-
mately associated with the medium in question. Media develop certain require-
ments for effective application and become defined as appropriate for particular
purposes. To this extent, they acquire specific cultural meanings and associated
values that are not easy to disregard or avoid.
It is arguable that the “mass media”, as they developed in their 20th century
“northern” industrial society contexts and were applied to characteristic purpos-
es of public entertainment, information and propaganda, carried with them an
indelible stamp of “modern”, therefore “Western”, society. These uses (and the
institutionalized means for achieving them) are, in turn, characterized by cer-
tain values and appropriate attitudes. These include hedonism, moral relativ-
ism, secularism, materialism and individualism in various manifestations, on
the part of both media communicators and audiences. The public and universal
features associated with broadcasting in particular make it even more difficult,
for instance, to compartmentalize their contents or their audiences than was the
case with printing.
The mass media, so characterized, are, arguably, most appropriate for open
and fluid societies without strong or unitary religious belief systems or communal
and patriarchal family systems. The values and attitudes embedded in much con-
temporary mass media production still tend to be those mentioned above. While
it is true that quite different cultures have succeeded in developing somewhat
different versions of mass media, and in governing the experience of audiences,
this has not been achieved without some struggle, without restrictions on free-
dom or with any certainty of continuance. The theory of globalization (e.g. Bau-
man 1998; Ferguson 1992) stresses the continuing pressure towards “synchroni-
zation” of systems and lifestyles. It seems as if media underdevelopment is some
defense in the short term, but in the long term, the logic of the media branch of
the information revolution receives little effective resistance.
A familiar example of the imperialism of “Western” values comes from re-
search into the “one-sidedness” of international news flow and into the “nature
of news” in general. It was established that what we call news is largely select-
ed and presented according to certain “news values” which reflect the conditions
and cultural outlook of “Western” news audiences, as perceived at least by West-
ern news media. In Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) famous analysis of bias in foreign
news, factors of a sociocultural kind were identified as shaping news selection,
especially “negativism” and personalization. In short “bad news” about (espe-
cially famous) individuals is likely to get privileged treatment in the news flow
process. Abstract ideas, slow developments and beneficial (or just normal) pro-
cesses in distant places are not news. Other theories about the powerful influence
of a particular “media logic” were later developed to explain selection. The de-
mand in Western media for “news” to fit its values is bound to have an influence
on journalism in other parts of the world.
In any case, in dealing with the issue of the moment, it is hard to resist the
proposition that “media” as we know them carry many “Western” attributes and
that any theory about media will have to recognize and deal with this fact even
if it does not have to do so in the same way as in “the West” itself. This opens
the way to the possibility of a critical theory of media that does not take as its
guiding values the same principles that have characterized Western critical the-
ory in the past.
6. From critical to media cultural theory

As already suggested, the self-critical tradition of Western theory that certainly
exposed the bias of media in the context of global communication relations did
little to offer any alternative “less Western” approach. Critical theory was and re-
mains essentially an alternative Western project that emphasized values of equal-
ity, diversity, freedom, material progress. It promoted liberal and emancipatory
causes that did not necessarily fit very well with social and cultural realities and
preferences of more “traditional”, less secular, societies. They were not intended
28 Denis McQuail
to do so. This is not an argument for preferring relativism on matters of human

rights, but it is at least an argument for greater awareness, information and em-
pathy in dealing with other cultures.
Apart from mainstream (Western) critical theory, some of the self-acknowl-
edged bias of early communication theory, especially its behaviorism and sci-
entism, was addressed by new, more humanistic and qualitative approaches that
eventually shaded over into cultural studies. There are many different degrees and
varieties of media cultural theory. Many contributions were and remain enriching
as to insight, methods and interpretation of the varied phenomena of media com-
munication. They have provided tools for interpreting the received or perceived
meaning of media “texts” and for understanding the process of media reception
and use. In their open-ended and creative approach, they have allowed many va-
rieties of cultural experience to be better appreciated. In principle the cultural-
ist approach should be more suited to the study of non-Western and of media in
non-Western contexts. It should also provide some protection or antidote against
the cruder forms of Western bias.
In practice, however, media and cultural studies do not seem to have really pro-
vided a solution. This may be in part because, as they have developed in a post-
modern direction, they have followed the leading edge of Western cultural change
and become even more alienated philosophically from “non-Western” reality. The
question arises here, as with the older “dominant paradigm” of media research,
as to whether method can be separated from underlying premise or spirit.
7. Distinguishing between types of theory

This leads directly to another point on where the “Western bias” in theory may
be located. There are several different varieties of media theory (McQuail 2000).
One has been mentioned in the shape of “medium theory” that hypothesizes about
consequences of particular technologies. Another focuses on the text, language
or discourse and opens a number of different doors, with different implications
for analyzing bias and prejudice. Several different kinds of textual analysis, in-
cluding semiology and the analysis of visual codes, seem intrinsically capable of
freeing themselves from “Western” origins, or other contextual limitations at least
when treated primarily as methodologies. Nevertheless, interpretative proposi-
tions about texts, their meanings and effects are often culturally limited in their
range of application. It is not clear that semiology has traveled far enough from
its Western theoretical roots. The idea of “media logic”, similarly, arises mainly
from particular usages in certain established genres, often typically “Western”,
although a variety of logics can be envisaged.
Going further, we can distinguish between theories of media and society on
the one hand, and empirical propositions about the communication process on
the other (for instance, about the effects of media in behavioral terms). In the for-
mer instance, the particular society to be considered in some theoretical proposi-
tion can be replaced by another (e.g. non-Western) society. In respect of the latter,
quite a lot of middle-range propositions about processes of media use or certain
kinds of effects are based on general features of human behavior and are open
to testing in a variety of cultural contexts. However, very few of the more famil-
iar general propositions of media effects can be claimed to be “culture free”, and
they generally involve some built-in assumptions about typical uses of media and
patterns of social behavior that are familiar in “Western society”. This applies
for instance to “theories” of personal influence, agenda-setting, the spiral of si-
lence, framing, etc. We may also take the view, however, that this is less a case
of “Western” bias, but one of intercultural differences in communication and so-
cial life. Quite a lot of variation can also be expected within supposed “Western”
societies themselves. It is also possible for non-Western theorists to take certain
elements from such theory in order to construct different and more appropriate
hypotheses about basic processes of communication that are more or less com-
mon to a wide spectrum of human societies.
The branch of media theory usually labeled as “normative” (McQuail 1992)
is in some ways easier to deal with, because the origin and nature of bias is quite
transparent in the values that are adduced to guide, advocate or assess the per-
formance of media in respect of many possible responsibilities and expectations.
A good deal of extant normative theory, especially in relation to the supposed
“social functions” of media does depend on Western social theory about soci-
ety as well as media. Much is based on sometimes implicit assumptions about
the nature of democracy that are built into the political procedures of liberal de-
veloped societies (competing political parties, elections, etc.). Although we may
have shaken off our mantle of subordination to the famous “four theories of the
press” (Siebert et al. 1956), we are still struggling to diversify the basis of nor-
mative thinking about media. Professional journalism globally, for instance, still
adheres to very much the same codes of ethics and practice that were first advo-
cated in the 1920s, which, to a large extent, still privilege certain forms of “ob-
jectivity” that are defined in the legal-rational tradition. On the other hand, there
has been a significant growth in awareness of aspects of media performance that
have implications for human rights, especially on the international arena and in
relation to challenges posed by new media. However, there is not much recogni-
tion of the restricted and ritualistic character of the Western electoral process.
The point to underline is that there is considerable scope for rewriting norma-
tive media theory to take more account of non-Western value priorities, or even
to write it quite differently and to openly challenge the ethnocentric versions that
we have today. In practice, such theory, whether Western or not, has to be contin-
30 Denis McQuail
ually adapted to changing social norms and interpretations of human rights. The
collection of writings on communication ethics edited by Christians and Traber
(1997) records, for instance, a wide range of ideas about culture society and com-
munication, drawing on non-Western traditions. The moral and ethical values of
Islam, the communalism of Africa, the philosophic traditions of India, the com-
munication values of China and Japan, with their stress on harmony, solidarity
and empathy, are reminders of alternative prescriptions for judging media per-
formance and guiding media practice. Insofar as normative theory has a critical
and prescriptive rather than just descriptive role, there is much potential for in-
novation and much to be done.
It is worth pointing out that not all existing theory is equally limited by its bi-
ases, leaving aside the varying personal capacities and awareness of theorists. For
instance, much of the theory about small scale, participatory, local, community
or alternative media that has not figured much in my account (perhaps because
of another unfortunate bias towards “big” media) has much to offer and can ap-
ply in diverse social and cultural contexts (McQuail 2002). Work of this kind is
expanding and has a more universal range perhaps than theory of dominant mass
media. Western theorists can learn as much from non-Western models of small-
scale communication principle and practice as from cases close to home, and the
same applies in reverse to non-Western theorists. Such forms of communication
have a promising future in the “real world”. The arrival of new media such as the
Internet opens up new opportunities for small-scale interactive communication
and for investigating their communicative potential in a range of different set-
tings. Although again, and inevitably, economic and technological forces mean
that development of these media will move faster in some parts of the world than
others, it will not inevitably be the West that leads the way.
The availability of alternative normative perspectives is also a reminder that
there are different routes towards formulating an agenda of research issues than
that which has dominated communication research until now. In the nature of
scientific disciplines, there is a strong conservative tendency, since new research
is usually contextualized within existing literature. The wish to publish in exist-
ing international journals (thus mainly Western in this case) reinforces this trend.
This privileges earlier and dominant paradigms and makes it difficult to launch
research in new directions. It is easier to escape from the confines of old prob-
lem definitions than it is to escape from existing methodologies, and this free-
dom could be more widely used. With problems chosen from non-Western con-
texts, the way is open for new hypotheses, new concepts and, ultimately, the pos-
sibility of new theory.
8. What is to be done?
The picture of communication and media theory and research may not be as
gloomy as I have rendered here. Firstly, the story of media, of theory and of hu-
man society does not stand still, and we are now confronted with new issues of
communication media, technology and information, many of which pose the same
challenges for societies across the globe. Secondly, the body of available theory
may not be as inadequate as my discussion has suggested and, as I have indicat-
ed, a number of alternative paths have been opened up that have simply not been
adequately explored. Thirdly, there is an ever-widening range of input, in cultur-
al terms, into the enterprise of media theory, including that of many ‘non-West-
ern’ scholars, and there is a wider range of actual media experience to draw upon
than was the case in what might be called the formative stages.
However, that is not to underestimate the task. The task for the future is not to
achieve a body of “unbiased” theory, since this is not humanly possible or even
desirable. But we need to construct theory that is not vitiated by its (inevitable)
cultural and value bias and not simply a branch of ideology. More importantly,
we need to embrace a diversity of (better) theories to cope with the increasingly
complex interactions between the seeming imperatives of communication tech-
nology and the many different cultural situations and value systems. Most im-
portantly of all, proceeding from the assumption of the cultural diversity of com-
munication theory and practice, we must begin to learn from and interact with
media and communication practice from other cultures, which is just what this
book sets out to do.
References
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Christians, C. and M. Traber (eds.)
1997 Communication Ethics and Universal Values. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Pub-
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Ferguson, M.
1992 The mythology of globalization. European Journal of Communication 7, 69–
93.
Galtung, J. and M. Ruge
1965 The structure of foreign news. Journal of Peace Research 1, 64–90.
Innis, H.
1951 The Bias of Communication. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
32 Denis McQuail
Lerner, D. et al.
1958 The Passing of Traditional Society. New York: Free Press.
McBride, S. et al.
1980 Many Voices, One World: Report by the International Commission for the
Study of Communication Problems. Paris: UNESCO; London: Kogan Page.
McLuhan, M.
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McQuail, D.
1992 Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest. London
and Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
2000 Mass Communication Theory. 4th edition. London: Sage Publications.
McQuail, D. (ed.)
2002 Reader in Mass Communication Theory. London: Sage Publications.
Mills, C. W.
1955 The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rogers, E. M. and P. Shoemaker

1973 Communication of Innovations. New York: Free Press.
Siebert, F., T. Peterson, and W. Schramm

1956 Four Theories of the Press. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Weber, M.
1904/1985 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. [Trans. P. A. Talcotta].
London: Unwin.
Chapter 3
Towards multiculturalism in discourse studies
Shi-xu and Robert Maier
The issue of culture, including that of ethnocentrism, has been raised for quite
some time in social science. A range of disciplines has sought to reflect critically
on their cultural origins, ethnocentric tendencies as well as universalizing con-
structions of “acts” and “truths” of their disciplines (e.g. Bloor 1976; Clifford
1986; Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Mulkay 1979; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Shweder and
LeVine 1984; Woolgar 1988). As a result, new cultural initiatives (sometimes
called “a cultural turn”) have been taken to redress intellectual Eurocentrism,
racism and cultural imperialism more generally (e.g. Eagleton 1983, 1991; Ger-
gen 1999; Giroux 1992; Hall 1996a, 1996b; Simons and Billig 1994).
In the scholarship of discourse or linguistic communication, this reflexive con-
sciousness has seemed rather slow in awakening. The field of language studies is
still largely shrouded in what Taylor (1999) has called ‘aculturalism’. By this no-
tion, we refer especially to the views held of both the subject matter and the pro-
fessional practice itself. Thus, on the one hand, language and communication, or
discourse, are supposed to function universally and to be objectively describable.
Let us call it the universalist view. Consistent with this concept of discourse itself,
on the other hand, the academic metadiscourse about it – i.e. its notions, method-
ologies, research practices and so on – is thought to proceed from universal rea-
son and evidence, at least potentially so, and to describe or explain its object ac-
curately, at least possibly so. We shall call this the representationalist view.
In this chapter, we want to argue that discourse, including scientific, metadis-
course, is thoroughly cultural. That is, culture is not external but central to indi-
vidual and social life. Because a prevailing part of individual, social and hence
cultural life is discourse, the latter may be said to be culture par excellence. Cul-
ture penetrates and saturates discourse, popular and professional alike. So dis-
course should be seen as a form of cultural production and constituent part, or
embodiment, of culture. We shall discuss and define what we mean by “culture”
and “cultural” in the next section.
Proceeding from the cultural perspective, we shall suggest that discourse is
neither universally organized nor objectively given. Rather, it should be seen as
a set of divergent, competing and dynamic patterns of constructing and acting
upon reality through linguistic and contextual means. In this sense, language and
34 Shi-xu and Robert Maier
communication can be called cultural discourses. Cultural discourses are in a

way parallel to the “games” of the later Wittgenstein (1968). In this light, for ex-
ample, discourses from non-Western, non-White and Third-World countries and
communities are different from Western discourses, in terms of, for example, po-
sitions of power, historical and cultural context, issues and concerns, intellectual
traditions on discourse research, and so on.
Following this cultural perspective, scientific, academic, professional discourse
is subject to the same kind of power relationship as ordinary, everyday discourse.
It is a culturally infiltrated process and product, too. Consequently, the discourse
of science, knowledge and truth is not neutral, disinterested and transparent. Giv-
en the cultural nature of scholarly discourse, we shall propose in this chapter, in
addition, that discourse research become culturally-politically engaged and re-
sponsive to changes and requirements of the broad cultural context. In this re-
gard, we shall outline an explicit form of cultural politics or cultural-political
strategies: namely, research objectives on the one hand and corresponding meth-
odological tactics on the other.
Taking a cultural turn in language, communication and discourse studies like
this does not of course imply that all current projects must be abandoned or re-
placed. What we wish to highlight here is that the cultural nature of discourse,
including professional discourse, is still largely obscured and that consequent-
ly especially non-Western voices, data, perspectives and methods are treated as
the “different”, “Other” and therefore negligible phenomena. So what we want
to emphasize through our deliberations here is that there is an urgent need to ex-
plore cultural forms of language, communication and discourse studies and fur-
ther to develop multicultural approaches to local and global discourses of cul-
tural struggle.
In the following, we shall first critically examine the aculturalist discourse in
the discipline. Then, we shall articulate a cultural account of discourse. Finally,
we shall suggest some cultural political strategies for discourse research.
1. The universalization of language research

It may be argued that many of the current frameworks of language, communica-
tion and discourse and corresponding methods of analysis tend to present them-
selves, implicitly or explicitly, as the “objective”, “correct” and so “universal”
ways of understanding and researching. Thus, basic concepts, categories and as-
sumptions are often offered as natural, methods as ubiquitously applicable, data
as objective and findings as replicable between researchers. At least, such qual-
ities are possible ideals. Further, consistence with such practices, empirical re-
search proceeds from one or the other preferred mode of analysis as a matter of
course, as the expected norm or the “standard” starting point. In addition, many
forms of language and communication analysis have remained largely preoccu-
pied with their conventional, perennial aims and concerns – underlying or ab-
stract rules, structures and processes – and continue to make ever more “valid”
and more “reliable” descriptions and explanations.
Underlying such practices, as may be pointed out, is a deeply rooted and wide-
spread discourse that leaves the constitution of knowledge and critical self-under-
standing out of the question. Here, on the one hand, the object of enquiry – be it
language, discourse or communication (mediated or otherwise) – is assumed to
be given and, moreover, reducible to abstract, stable, universal categories, struc-
tures, processes, rules, etc. These theoretical perspectives are of course not meant
as reflecting merely the structures, categories, levels and rules of the English lan-
guage or of some Western ways of speaking, but rather true of all human lin-
guistic, discursive or communicative phenomena. For instance, in the theory of
Universal Grammar, human language is isolated as a minimum set of universal
categories and rules. In Functional Grammar, much the same way, language is as-
sumed to consist in an unconscious code or system of structures and functions. In
cross-cultural semantics, although cultural linguistic differences are recognized,
the meanings of languages are usually accounted for in terms of universal con-
cepts. And yet these “universal” concepts are themselves constructed through a
particular language, usually English (Shi-xu 2000b). In Speech Act Theory, too,
language is conceived of as types of action realized by appropriate types of sen-
tence under idealized sets of conditions of speech (e.g. promise, threat, question).
In Discourse Analysis, too, text or talk is often analyzed into levels, structures
and processes (e.g. “particle”, “cohesion”, “argument structure”, “narrative struc-
ture”, “macro speech act”). The list can go on.
On the other hand, consistent with this objectivist discourse is a more covert
discourse about scientific knowledge making itself. In this discourse, scientific ac-
tivity is portrayed as somehow mirroring reality. It proceeds from universal reason
and natural evidence; its discursive description is a transparent, neutral vehicle
in which knowledge and facts are contained. Professional, academic, scholarly or
scientific thought and talk can and are supposed to be dispassionate, objective and
independent of history and culture. They are therefore themselves unproblematic
for, perhaps even irrelevant to, language and communication inquiry.
If we pause and reflect where the practitioners’ concepts and theories come
from, how their methods are derived, or whose data they are analyzing – and how
they are marketed globally – then, we shall realize, however, that the universal-
ist discourse is misleading at best. It has been shown that the current dominant
theories of language and communication can be traced to a set of distinct West-
ern-European values and desires, ideas and discourses (McQuail this volume).
The notion of “human language” in modern Western linguistics is infiltrated by
preferred metaphors (Shi-xu 2000a). The idea of language as neutral representa-

tion is constructed by the powerful elite to serve particular ideological purposes
(Shi-xu and Wilson 2001). Western theoretical and applied linguistics has been
trying to isolate “language” from historical and cultural context, with a view to
achieving a universal science, but their technological innovations of succession
and duration, spatial structure of tree diagrams and so on, reflect only Western
perspectives (Barron, Bruce and Nunan 2002).
Attempts such as these are rather marginalized and there remain many aspects
unexplored, however. There has been little systematic investigation into the re-
lationship between cultures on the one hand, and the ideas and activities in lin-
guistics, discourse analysis or media communication studies on the other. In this
chapter, therefore, we shall try to show that one of the central, possible causes or
conditions for the universalizing discourse is a peculiar notion of “culture”.
Historically, the notion of culture is associated with the times of European im-
perialist expansion and colonization; then it was used to refer to the exotic, alien
and barbarian. Since then, it has evolved through numerous lines of thoughts
and discourses, including those of Anglo-Saxon anthropology, literary criticism
and cross-cultural psychology (Williams 1976: 87–93; see also Bauman 1973;
Sarangi 1995). But generally speaking, culture has been categorized in Western
language studies according to language, place and time (e.g. Blum-Kulka et al.
1989; Hofstede 1980). In this view, “Irish culture”, “Dutch culture” or “ancient
Chinese culture”, for example, would be determined and defined according to the
language that is spoken, the geographic location and the time frame that the cul-
ture in question can be associated with.
There are a number of interrelated properties assumed here that need to be
made explicit. Firstly, it is objective in that it is a given, such that it can be objec-
tively defined and described. It is recognizable in, for example, human percep-
tions, patterns of behavior, symbols, values and artistic expressions (and even sci-
entific facts as in a post-positivist perspective). Given this essentialistic notion,
it would be possible to compare (and contrast for that matter) “Irish culture”, for
example, with other such cultures. By the same token, culture could be transmit-
ted and unlearned through upbringing and education (e.g. “high culture”). Sec-
ondly, consistent with the essentialist assumption, culture is also thought to be
originary in that it has a pure, primordial form and content originating in some
space and some time. According to this version, there would be some such thing
as “pure” Irish culture that is distinct and “uncontaminated” by other cultures.
Because of this unique quality, culture is externally distinct and so can be easily
distinguished from other cultures. Thirdly, culture is considered as homogeneous
in that it is a property shared by all its members. As such it shapes the behavior
of the individual but is not affected by it. In this sense, culture is extra-psycho-
logical or secondary to psychology: it is outside the individual and, therefore, be-
yond individual control. In this view, all “Irish” people for example would be the
same kind of beings and expected to do the same kinds of things. Last but by no
means least, culture is treated as negatively opposed to rationality, evidence and
science and, therefore, as something to be overcome or transcended through the
latter. Thus culture is seen as derived from local conditions, historical traditions
and, for some at least, specific human languages. They are a drawback or error:
they prevent individuals and societies from seeing the inevitable “true” and the
“natural”, hindering communication and understanding, and worse still, retard-
ing modernity and globalization (a special but different case here, however, is
the notion of culture as a higher form of aesthetic creation). However, such dif-
ficulties can and will be eliminated, or at least reduced, when, with the inevita-
ble, ultimate enlightenment of scientific progress, cultural idiosyncrasies are de-
tected and defeated (Taylor 1999; see Shweder and LeVine 1984 for a contrast of
the Enlightenment and Romantic views of culture). It is not surprising, then, that
Western professional, academic, scholarly, scientific thoughts and texts are often
presented as, implicitly or explicitly, dispassionate, neutral, objective and there-
fore universal, at least more or less so (think of Universal Grammar, Cross-cul-
tural Linguistics, Communication Theory, Discourse Analysis, etc.). They are
capable of transcending cultures. The two perspectives in modern Western lin-
guistics, which Montgomery (1995: 224–225) calls “universalist” and “relativ-
ist” positions, are, too, manifestations of this acultural discourse. The universal-
ist view holds that mankind has the same basic mental concepts which determine
that their particular languages will represent the world in basically the same way.
The relativist position, in contrast, holds that individual languages that constrain
worldviews represent the world more or less the same or slightly differently. Ei-
ther variant presupposes that culture can be isolated and excluded.
It is a paradox that, while certain quarters in society and social movements
outside the academia recognize cultural diversity as worth promoting, profes-
sional, academic and scholarly circles in language and communication continue
to make rigorous attempts to exclude cultural elements.
2. Discourse as culturally saturated
It seems to us that critical insights from cultural studies can provide a useful start-
ing point for building a culturally relevant and politically engaged approach to
language, communication and discourse. Here culture is understood as particular
ways, habits, patterns, or traditions of thinking and feeling, speaking and acting,
understanding and evaluating – ways of constructing life – which are associat-
ed with particular groups of people and in particular historical time (Hall 1996;
Williams 1976). In this sense, culture penetrates and permeates all individuals
and social life. Individuals and groups interact with cultural patterns (e.g. norms
and values) of ideas and practices in their everyday affairs and also reproduce
them (e.g. recurring ideas and practices).
We must add here that cultural patterns of individual, communal and insti-
tutional life have a subjective, personal dimension in that they are perceived,
(re)produced and drawn upon by individuals and groups, adults and children (e.g.
I think of and describe Irish people’s attitudes towards people of a different reli-
gious background). Thus, culture and the person are interconnected (Sapir 1949).
Following from this, further, culture as patterns of constructing life is itself a con-
struction; there can be any number of constructions. Cultures, as different and
diversified ways of seeing, understanding, evaluating and acting upon the world
are not objectively given. And there can be any number of constructions.
Cultural patterns are not merely “different” from each other. Viewed from a
left-wing, Marxist tradition, culture is characterized by social division and asym-
metry of power (see also Barker 1999; Johnson 1996). Culture is a site of strug-
gle par excellence. In other words, the different ways of cultural life are not in
harmony but tension, both within and without. Where cultural differences are
perceived, they are not understood in the cultural-other’s perspective (and can-
not be!), but often from one’s own and often as deviations, deficiencies, and so,
sources of trouble. More specifically, cultures are sites of power struggle and to
study culture is to study cultural domination, exploitation and exclusion as well
as resistance.
Culture is not passive or fixed but has the self-critical consciousness to change
and change for the “better” at that. That is, on the one hand, human cultures have
a profound historical sense to seek continuously to change the status quo by aban-
doning the old ways of thinking and doing things and creating new ones. This
sensibility of historical destination I call the rational motivation (see also Gid-
dens 1984; cf. Habermas 1984). On the other hand, more importantly, the crite-
rion for new creations or changes lies in the cultures’ capacity to identify the new
values with respect to their own traditions (Taylor 1999). In other words, they are
able to make, and do make, distinctions between “good” and “bad”, “right” and
“wrong”, “true” and “false” and such like, based on their own history. Thus, for
example, “common freedom” might be chosen as such a candidate from within
the Western tradition; indeed, it might be said that that has been at the heart of
Western forms of feminism, anti-racism and anti-capitalism. This does not mean
that there will be no setbacks in cultural development, but at least it is a hopeful
view of human cultures.
Finally, and very importantly, culture is embodied in concrete social semiot-
ic – especially discursive – practices. For, cultural patterns of constructing and
acting upon reality are accomplished and constituted primarily through situat-
ed linguistic texts. Linguistic communication or discourse is the most pervasive
and quintessential part of such practice. Other symbolic activities, such as art,
music and sport, are also important part of the life of society, but their meaning,
value and emotional charge would be overshadowed if no discourse were mobi-
lized to describe, explain, sustain, promote, sensationalize and coordinate them.
Similarly, it would be hard to imagine how science, religion, education or other
such symbolic activities can proceed and succeed without discourses to embody,
maintain and execute them. Conventional and new media, too, which now liter-
ally inundate people’s lives, would lose their functionality without discourses to
partake of them. Indeed, people spend most of their daily, and hourly, life, read-
ing, writing, speaking or listening to each other. As McQuail (2000: 93) puts it,
“Perhaps the most general and essential attribute of culture is communication,
since cultures could not develop, survive, extend and generally succeed without
communication.” Similarly, Duranti and Goodwin (1992: 2–3) have expressed
the centrality of discourse in the organization of culture vociferously when they
say, “[I]t would be blatantly absurd to propose that one could provide a compre-
hensive analysis of human social organization without paying close attention to
the details of how human beings employ language to build the social and cultur-
al worlds that they inhabit.” Culture can then be seen as inhabiting especially a
discursive space. From another perspective, discourse is the pervasive mode, and
medium, in and through which human cultures are maintained and developed.
To study culture, then, is to study discourse.
Despite its “linguistic turn” or the (re)discovery of textuality, cultural studies
has, however, been less than explicit in its analysis of discourse, even less about
creating and promoting new forms of discourses. In particular, there has been
little systematic and explicit study of how culture may be discursively constitut-
ed (Barker and Galasinski 2001: 1, 21, 62). Although a lot of attempts have been
made from various intellectual traditions contemplating the discursive constitu-
tive nature of culture (e.g. Bakhtin 1981; Blommaert and Verschueren 1998; Cas-
sirer 1944; Duranti 1997; Geertz 1973; Gumperz 1982; Kluver 2000; Lutz 1988;
Vološinov 1986; Wittgenstein 1968), a more specific and explicit formulation in
terms of discourse remains to be made.
3. Cultural-political strategies for discourse research
3.1. The cultural nature of scientific discourse
Now that we have a new account of culture and a cultural account of discourse,
we want to reconsider the nature of discourse research with special reference to
its aims and methods. We shall do this by first re-examining the ways that cul-
ture and scientific discourse are related and then suggesting new ways of dis-
course research.
Scientific discourse is not free from individual, social and, hence, cultural life.
On the one hand, scientific constructions are intermeshed with cultural history,
assumptions, interests as well as personal preferences. They are therefore particu-
lar ways of seeing, describing, explaining and acting upon the world (Berger and
Luckmann 1966; Pearce 1995; Stewart 1995). As such they are not in symmetri-
cal relation of power with one another, but, rather, contested from both within and
without. Indeed, it can be argued and shown that current paradigms in language,
discourse and communication research are largely Western in origin and/or in
orientation. On the other hand, culturally oriented discourses of science, knowl-
edge and truth have cultural consequences as well. When the Western scientific
discourse – its worldviews, theories, methods, questions, data and conclusions –
dominate the international academic world, non-Western intellectual discours-
es – their concerns and their voices – become excluded, silenced or discredited.
Theorists and practitioners of language, communication and discourse studies do
have a cultural responsibility then and should take it up.
In the remainder of the chapter, we shall accordingly suggest a form of cul-
tural politics for discourse research. On the one hand, we propose that discourse
research pursue two interrelated aims. First, it should facilitate cultural co-exis-
tence. This aim can involve enhancing harmony or solidarity between cultures.
Second, it should help with mutual benefit between different cultures. That means
that discourse research should not benefit one culture at the expense of anoth-
er, but should seek to assist in common cultural progress. To accomplish these
goals, on the other hand, we suggest two broad types of research tactics: 1) the
deconstructive method: undermining the discourses that researchers perceive to
be detrimental to those cultural groups that are already underprivileged, mar-
ginalized, excluded or otherwise subjugated, especially on basis of race, gender
and class, and 2) the transformative method: helping promote new discourses in
the interests of those groups just mentioned.
3.2. Cultural-political strategies for discourse research
While we believe that research strategies, whether or not directed at cultural pol-
itics, are not fixed but should continue to expand, we would like to suggest three
broad types below. The first one would be to identify those past or existing dis-
courses that, from the point of view of the researcher and ideally also of the cul-
tural groups of people involved, are instrumental to cultural coexistence, harmo-
ny and prosperity. Not all discourses are culturally domineering and repressive.
Even from within imperialist cultures there are politically active individuals and
groups and, hence, their discourses that oppose the very order of cultural domi-
nation, repression and exclusion. Such discourses do not just emerge and existed
in history as well. Therefore, an important strategy is to rediscover and describe
them, so that they can be emulated, expanded or even reconstructed in order to
reach the intended cultural political objectives.
The second broad type of strategies we propose here is to undermine or decon-
struct discourses of cultural discrimination and prejudice. To some it may seem
that any discourse can be “interesting” and worth studying, but in our view, dis-
course researchers can usefully focus on discourses that reproduce sociocultural
problems. One may think of discourses surrounding such pressing issues as race,
ethnicity, gender, and ultimately issues of cultural power. In this respect, to those
of us who see the division and conflict between (especially American) West and
the Rest, between the majority and minorities, between the rich and poor, be-
tween different genders, it would be crucially important to study the ways that
powerful groups construct – if at all – less powerful ones. Such discourses of the
“cultural Other” so to speak can be found in various discursive forms, as in the
media, fiction, politics and everyday conversations. In examining the discourse
of the powerful, further, we may pay attention to how the powerful negate, dis-
credit, deny, marginalize, exclude or simply silence the powerless. In relation to
that, one may also try to identify what discourses or voices are absent, repressed
or discriminated against. In this case, it would be equally important to highlight
which groups’ discourses or perspectives are being excluded or ignored. In so
doing, researchers prioritize their tasks and concentrate themselves on the more
urgent issues of contemporary culture.
A related procedure of cultural discourse research here may be to uncover the
verbal (textual and contextual) structures and processes whereby cultural domina-
tion, exploitation or exclusion are realized. Discourses of cultural power are not
merely “meanings” that may be expressed by just any form; nor are they always
direct, obvious and indisputable. Moreover, such discourses are often rendered
“natural”, “to be taken-for-granted” or as if there were not there. An effective tac-
tic in uncovering culturally harmful meanings is to shed light on the strategies
through which those meanings become possible. Such meanings often result from
subtle management of contextual knowledge, assumptions, inferences, and the
like, on the one hand, and verbal or rhetorical ploys on the other. One can, for in-
stance, look into the ways that in the media groups of people are dominated, ex-
cluded, marginalized, etc. and the ways that the thus oppressed people are then
further problematized. One special area where this method can be particularly
useful is the problem of monopoly of truths in academic as well as everyday life.
What is important in this case then is to illuminate how the authority of objectiv-
ity/truth is established; how “objectivity” is achieved, who is monopolizing the
truth, for what purposes and with what consequences. All in all, it is vitally im-
portant for researchers to identify, characterize and highlight the concrete forms
and the specific circumstances whereby those discourses take shape, even if this
may mean they have to do so in a tentative and suggestive manner.
Still another related strategy of cultural discourse research that we want to
advocate is to directly confront and challenge those discourses of cultural domi-
nation, discrimination and exclusion by interrogating and subverting them. The
interrogation and subversion here may take the form of disclosing the realities
that the discourses of cultural domination fail to describe or smooth over, high-
lighting their purposes and consequences, drawing attention to alternative forms
of description and action. A most effective way of interrogation and subversion
perhaps is to make explicit the self-contradictory, other-contradictory or incon-
sistent ways of formulating reality and experience. The latter, as may be pointed
out, can occur either between one’s own versions, or between socially and cul-
turally differential versions, for example, those between the underprivileged and
the powerful. They can also occur between different levels of discourse, for ex-
ample, between explicit statements and underlying assumptions.
To deconstruct discourses of cultural hegemony – to render them invalid and
undesirable – is basic to our cultural politics. But it is insufficient and incom-
plete; cultural freedom and prosperity will not automatically come about from
the deconstruction of those discourses. New forms of discourses need to be cre-
ated and warranted. Discourse research should become a catalyst in this process.
It should help create what Bhabha (1994: 57) suggests as “modes of political and
cultural agency that are commensurate with historical conjunctures where popu-
lations are culturally diverse, racially and ethnically divided – the objects of so-
cial, racial, and sexual discrimination.”
Thus, the third broad type of methodological strategy is cultural reconstruc-
tion or transformation. That is, discourse research offers new and more helpful
versions of reality and ways of acting upon it. In this sense, our approach has a
higher expectation of discourse practitioners. Such creative and argumentative
attempts will of course require the power of imagination on the part of research-
ers and educationalists. But it can draw on prior studies, either of a deconstruc-
tive kind, as sketched above, or of an investigative one in which members’ own
experiences are collected. At a more basic level, this step will have to depend on
prior studies to a greater or lesser extent, as indicated above. Here it will be use-
ful to broaden one’s perspectives as much as possible. To this end, researchers
can try to solicit information from different people and from different contexts.
This strategy can also be put to another use. Culture can be considered as a form
of creative and self-reflexive discourse, as argued earlier. It would then be inter-
esting to examine the unnoticed ways that situated texts are interconnected and,
for that matter, discontinued in order to understand the conditions of possibility,
continuity and ruptures of cultural development and so to reveal or highlight the
agency, and hope, of human cultural progress. Whereas the first method of de-
construction has its focus on the existing versions of events or ways of speaking,
reconstruction is forward-looking: it explores new ways of speaking and thereby
new experience (see also Shi-xu 2001).
An investigative and so preparatory strategy is to look into the views and ex-
periences of the cultural Other. Here researchers can use various ethnographic
methods in order to gain insights into the lifeworld of those cultural groups and
communities whose cause researchers wish to advance. For instance, researchers
can find ways to understand the opinions and wishes of non-Western, non-White
and Third-World immigrants or sojourners about their intercultural experience.
A more directly interventionalist strategy is to proffer constructions, or types
of discourse, of cultural realities and consciousness that are different from ex-
isting ones and, therefore, will change the status quo and bring about new ac-
tion and relationship, either in the scientific community or in sections of soci-
ety at large. Such new kinds of discourse may include new concepts, new per-
spectives, and new bases or arguments for creating new or alternative versions
or concepts or ways of speaking of one’s own cultures and others’. For, chang-
ing ways of speaking and writing is to change people’s ways of doing things and
hence ways of living.
A variation of this strategy would be to advocate those discourses that favor
equal cultural dialogue and genuine intercultural communication as those found
by using the first type of strategies. Such promotional discourses may, for ex-
ample, spell out the needs and benefits of equal communication between differ-
ent cultures. As certain discourses are dominant; certain others are absent or re-
pressed. And yet human cultures are becoming increasingly inter-linked. From
the present political stance, it is imperative for the dominant culture to reach out
to listen to its “others”, whose discourses have been discredited, distorted or dis-
missed. Even from a practical point of view, the latter’s discourses may contain
not merely dissenting or different opinions, but also fresh perspectives that can
enrich one’s own culture.
In addition to constructing new concepts, new versions of reality, new ways
of speaking, etc., as ways of creating new discourse, there is another area where
discourse researchers can contribute toward a new and better society. Namely,
they can try to devise ways to enhance human communication between groups
of various backgrounds and traditions, or, in the words of Geertz (1973: 14), “the
enlargement of the universe of human discourse”. For example, they can create
contexts for such contact and communication. In this regard, they can show the
fluidity, diversity and variation of “cultural”, “national”, “ethnic” boundaries and
categories.
For instance, we can help with highlighting the needs, creating the conditions
and formulating commonly acceptable rules for intercultural communication and
interaction. They can encourage such intercultural contact and relation to take
place at not only everyday level but also between scientific disciplines. As argued
earlier, discourse is culturally organized as different ways of seeing, evaluating
and speaking about reality. Further, these different discourses are characterized
by domination, repression, prejudice and exclusion. We can then try to identify
the reasons for intercultural contact and to facilitate it by locating discursive re-
sources and working with cultural members to negotiate common rules of en-
gagement and common goals.
The late-modern world is saturated with capitalist, colonial, racist, sexist, sec-
tarian and other oppressive kinds of discourse. And yet this does not mean that
this cannot be changed; in fact, they are constantly under moral pressures that
develop in particular societies, for example in the form of subversive or decon-
structive discourse I advocated in the previous section. However, changing the
(discourse) status quo can be difficult because, for instance, it may be against
one’s immediate interests. Here, discourse researchers can play an active role by
formulating and advocating a moral motivation or willpower among members of
society to construct nonrepressive and shared discourses. This can be carried out,
for example, in the context of education and training.
4. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have tried to rationalize and justify a cultural turn in the aca-
demic disciplines of language, discourse and media communication and further-
more, drawing upon the critical developments from both Cultural Studies and
certain quarters of language scholarship, outlined a likely version of a culturalist
project in the field. To this end, we first critiqued aculturalism in language, dis-
course and communication theory and research by accessing the inadequacies
of their notion of culture and the scholarly and social consequences of scientific
aculturalism. With the help of Cultural Studies’ notion of culture, we argued that
scientific discourse is cultural through and through. In particular, we pointed out
that current theory and research in language, discourse and media communica-
tion are still too West-oriented in terms of their assumptions, practices and the
marginalization of non-Western data and perspectives.
Accordingly, we proposed that a more self-reflexive, culturalist program in
language, discourse and media communication define itself in terms of an ex-
plicit political goal: to achieve co-existence and freedom for all human cultures.
Furthermore, we suggested relevant research strategies, which are deconstructive
and transformative, respectively. These are designed not only to resist tendencies
of theoretical imperialism and empirical ethnocentrism within Western scholar-
ship on language, discourse and communication and so to transform it for the
new era of a globalized world, but also to directly engage with the contemporary
realities of cultural domination, prejudice and exclusion. The criterion for judg-
ing these ways of speaking is whether and to what extent they are helpful to the
cultural group who discourse researchers feel has already been disadvantaged,
and are potentially acceptable to the cultural groups involved.
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Chapter 4
Beyond differences in cultural values and modes of
communication
Jan Servaes
1. Modernization and cultural diversity

The relationship between culture and communication has often been discussed
in terms of convergence. Both the so-called modernization and dependency par-
adigms, for obviously quite opposite reasons (see Servaes 1999), start from the
assumption that, as societies develop, they will lose their separate identities and
cultural differences and tend to converge towards one common type of society.
Here industrialization and urbanization are considered as the main causes of the
historical movement from diversity towards conformity, towards one global vil-
lage. Further, this global village is characterized by a secular culture and decline
of religion, considerable geographic and social mobility, the predominance of the
nuclear family, and a high division of labor, with growing levels of formal edu-
cation, economies based on industry or “knowledge”.
However, in my opinion, the above picture reflects an abstract and idealized
image of a fully modern society. For example, Suntaree Komin (1988) found, in
the case of Thailand, that certain so-called “traditional” superstitious behaviors
like “fortune-telling” and “lucky numbers” are practiced more among Bangkoki-
ans than among farmers. Similarly, when discussing globalization and modern-
ization, new approaches in anthropology and cultural studies often come to the
conclusion that modernization does not necessarily change cultural values. Mod-
ernization and culture can walk parallel, not simply convergent, paths. “Since ev-
ery culture is a more or less integrated system of cultural goods, realizing a more
or less integrated value system, change in every culture must in the last analy-
sis reflect change in the value system” (Alisjahbana 1974: 223). Consequently
there result more, not less, diversities of cultures and hence value systems. In-
deed, new research findings, derived from anthropological and cultural studies,
suggest that the above “convergence” assumptions and claims are highly ques-
tionable (e.g. Friedman 1994; Hall and Du Gay 1996; Hannerz 1987, 1996; Mar-
cus and Fischer 1986).
In this contribution, I shall consider the problem of diversity of human culture
50 Jan Servaes
and communication in the new context of globalization. The central proposal I

want to make is that diverse cultures must negotiate continuously for a common
set of norms or rules of intercultural communication in order for the human cul-
tural communities to survive. To that end, I shall first try to make sense of the
differences in thinking, value system and modes of communication between the
East/Asia and West/Europe, with reference to two particular cases – human rights
and Thai culture. From here will emerge the question of how to deal with cultur-
al and communicative differences and conflicts, especially in the face of human
suffering, environmental disaster and global risks of various kinds. In opposition
to cultural relativism, I shall suggest that commonly acceptable ethics and rules
for intercultural communication and interaction, as well as the imagination of
a future global community, be created through continuous intercultural critique
and negotiation. This also means that, as a cultural turn in language and com-
munication research, we researchers should not only pay attention to discourses
of cultural “others”, but also interact with perspectives, methods and standards
of evaluation from these cultures (see Shi-xu, Chapter 1).
2. A dynamic perspective on culture

This implies a dynamic perspective on culture that finds a good expression in
a historical analysis. Edward Said’s (1985) captivating overview of the way in
which Asian societies and philosophies throughout the ages were perceived by
the West starts from the thesis: “That the essential aspects of modern Oriental-
ist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be un-
derstood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but
as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, re-disposed, and re-
formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, mod-
ernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism.
In the form of new texts and ideas, the East was accommodated to these struc-
tures” (Said 1985: 122). Therefore, academics and the people they study “con-
struct stylized images of the occident and orient in the context of complex so-
cial, political, and economic conflicts and relationships. ... these stylized images
are not inert products. Rather, they have social, political, and economic uses of
their own, for they shape people’s perceptions, justify policies, and so influence
people’s actions” (Carrier 1995: 11).
In other words, Europeans look at Asian values with Western eyes, while
Asians view Western values with Asian eyes. Being an outsider is partly an ad-
vantage, partly a disadvantage, when investigating the values of others. As Levi-
Strauss (1969) rightly stated, “It is from inside that we can apprehend the rup-
tures but from outside that some effects of coherence appear.” While the insider
Beyond differences in cultural values and communication 51
has access to the details, the outsider has to rely on limited first-hand experience
and secondary sources. However, the horizon can be wider with a more distant
view.
3. Value dimensions
Let us look at a general definition of values: “the moral principles and beliefs
or accepted standards of a person or social group” (Collins English Dictionary
1991). This definition is very broad, encompassing not only virtues and ideals,
but also convictions and models followed individually or collectively. One of the
scholars who have been trying to find value patterns in different cultures is Geert
Hofstede (1980, 1991, 1995). He surveyed over a hundred thousand workers in
multinational organizations in more than fifty countries, and identified four val-
ue dimensions that are influenced and modified by culture: (a) individualism-
collectivism, (b) uncertainty avoidance, (c) power distance and (d) masculini-
ty and femininity. (In earlier work he also added the time orientation and activ-
ity orientation.) His theory of cultural variability attempts to assess the range in
which countries differ in cultural values on a continuum.
Though his categorization is obviously more detailed and sophisticated than
those of others (e.g. Kluckhohn and Kluckhohn 1960; Hall and Hall 1990), his
work has also been criticized on methodological and theoretical grounds (see Gu-
dykunst 1994; Samovar and Porter 1998; Shadid 1998). Gudykunst (1994: 40),
for instance, claims that the individualism-collectivism dimension is more impor-
tant than the other dimensions, especially when one wants to understand cross-
cultural behavioral differences.
An essential difference between Western and Asian society is the position of
the individual, and, consequently, the conception of Self. The Self is composed
of both individual and group identifications. The individual and group compo-
nents are complements in a “whole” Self rather than dialectical opposites. What
gets stressed in each culture differs, but this doesn’t suggest an either/or choice.
While Western culture is characterized by a strong individualistic self-image, in
the Asian context, group consciousness plays a much bigger part. Clifford Geertz
(1973), for instance, in his influential essay on Bali, describes how Balinese act
as if persons were impersonal sets of roles, in which all individuality and emo-
tional volatility are systematically repressed.
That notion of Self is quite different from the one described by Sigmund Freud.
Freud (1951) demonstrated that one can trace out systematic interrelationships be-
tween conscious understandings of social relations, unconscious dynamics, and
the ways ambiguous, flexible symbols are turned into almost deterministic pat-
terns of cultural logic. Therefore, Westerners are I-orientated: “Their behavior is
52 Jan Servaes
largely determined by their perception of self, a concept we define as the identity,

personality or individualism of a given person as distinct from all other people.
For them, the self is a unifying concept. It provides a perspective in thinking, a
direction for activity, a source of motivation, a locus in decision-making and a
limit to group involvement” (Stewart 1972: 75).
Asians, on the other hand, are We-orientated. They get their identity from the
position they hold in the group. According to Geertz’ (1973) study, the Balinese
tried to establish smooth and formal interpersonal relationships, in which the pre-
sentation of the Self is affectionless and determined by the social group. A typi-
cal example is the Asian way of addressing people. A Westerner writes first his
Christian name, then his surname, followed by street, town, and country. Asians
typically do it the other way around. When one asks a Hindu for his identity, he
will give you his caste and his village as well as his name. There is a Sanskrit for-
mula which starts with lineage, family, house and ends with one’s personal name.
In this presentational formula, the empirical self comes last.
In other words, Asians are submerged, so to speak, in the group and find them-
selves lost and powerless as individuals when the link with the group is taken
away or does not exist: “The predominant value is congeniality in social interac-
tions based on relations among individuals rather than on the individual himself.
A network of obligations among members of a group is the point of reference, not
the self. In Oriental cultures, people’s behavior is directed first to maintaining af-
filiation in groups and congenial social relations. Goals which could be person-
ally rewarding to the individual are only of secondary importance” (Klopt and
Park 1982: 30). Only after the Asian knows someone’s status, age, sex and so on
(these are often the first questions which are asked of a foreigner and are regard-
ed as “indiscreet” by a Westerner), he or she will be capable of communicating,
of addressing the conversation partner in the “appropriate” cultural way.
Another questionable conclusion on the basis of Hofstede’s work concerns the
assumption that the found differences between societies could also explain the
behavior of individual members from these societies. With regard to the West-
ern and Asian concept of “Self ”, for instance, Frank Johnson (1985) summarizes
the problems inherent in attempting systematic comparisons between “East” and
“West”. False antitheses and monolithic comparisons can easily slip into clichéd
generalizations and overstatements of the obvious. He therefore cautions: “First,
generalizations stressing differences between East and West gloss over the diver-
sity within both Eastern and Western traditions themselves – over different eras,
among different cultures, and as these traditions are differentially experienced
by individuals. Second, such comparisons between East and West necessarily set
aside civilizations and nations whose traditions have not been recorded in a man-
ner permitting equivalent representation” (Johnson 1985: 91–92).
The most important point, however, concerns the implicit argument in Hof-
stede’s work that one could speak of regional or (sub)continental clusters of cul-
tures, such as the Asian or European cultures. If one would go across the Eu-
ropean and Asian countries from Hofstede’s survey (1995), one would see that
some Western European countries on the one hand and Asian countries on the
other hand would differ considerably internally as well as externally on some of
the researched value dimensions. Therefore, the most rational conclusion should
be that one has to be extremely careful when speaking about Asian or Europe-
an cultures. In the patterning of their social existence, people continually make
principally unconscious choices that are directed by the applicable intracultur-
al values and options. Social reality can then be seen as a reality constituted and
cultivated on the basis of particular values, a reality in which the value system
and the social system are completely interwoven and imbued with the activity
of each other.
4. Ways of thinking
Hajime Nakamura (1985) starts from a similar observation. Though he claims
that research into the cultural contributions of various nations as seen from the
viewpoint of their interrelationship is necessary, he advocates the hypothesis that
“there is no such thing as a single fundamental principle which determines the
characteristic ways of thinking of a people. Various factors, related in manifold
ways, each exerting its influence, enter into the ways of thinking of a people. If
we deal with the question of the existential basis which brings about differenc-
es of ways of thinking, we see no way left for us to take the standpoint of plural-
ism” (Nakamura 1985: 37). Nevertheless, after a comprehensive overview of all
the distinct positions, he agrees that “there are some characteristic differences in
the ways of thinking of East Asian nations. In the second place, with regard to
all people, there is a certain logical and human connection among these charac-
teristics” (Nakamura 1985: 38). Together with others (e.g. Cauquelin, Lim and
Mayer-König 1998; Weggel 1989), he makes distinctions on the basis of ontolog-
ical and epistemological considerations. Therefore, one could contrast the Asian
way of thinking with the European way of thinking.
Oskar Weggel (1989: 38) sees holism as the key to understanding Asians. This
holistic attitude is expressed both in ways of thinking and behaving and in the
structure of society. Everything is seen as interconnected, overlapping, insepa-
rable, every part is held together by every other part or aspect. The three basic
principles of Buddhism, such as “Anijjang” (everything is perpetually changing),
“Dukhkang” (life is full of suffering) and “Anatta” (everything is relative; cer-
tainty does not exist), differ greatly from the static, optimistic and “ideal-utopi-
an” principles on which the Western way of thinking is built.
54 Jan Servaes
On the other hand, the European way of thinking is typically Cartesian. In

the Cartesian approach we take the reality, the object of study, apart, or isolate a
part of it, in order to analyze and define it, assuming that it is the whole and the
reality. John Walsh (1973: 82) summarizes the differences as follows: “One of
the basic differences between Eastern and Western cultures is that the Eastern
are dominated by the concept of harmony; the Western by power. In the East, it
is said, knowledge is for the sake of living in better and closer harmony with na-
ture and man; in the West, knowledge is for the sake of controlling peace and or-
der is a prime value; in the West, achieving the things that power makes possible
is considered by many as a primary goal.” One of the important implications is
an absolutist position (either/or, good or bad) in the West but a more relative po-
sition (good and bad, yin and yang) in the East.
The task for a researcher then is to reveal these distinctive structures of mean-
ing. In other words, in the study of concrete examples of cultural identity, one
must be attentive to the following aspects: (a) the characteristics and dimensions
of the cultural reference framework (i.e. the world view, the ethos, and their sym-
bolic representation); (b) the interaction and interrelation with the environment
of power and interests; and (c) the “ideological apparatuses” by which the cul-
tural reference framework is produced and through which it is at the same time
disseminated.
Basic questions here include: How do people construe and interpret their own
“Weltanschauung”? How do they explain their world in terms of (wo)mankind,
(wo)man to (wo)man relationships, (wo)man to nature and (wo)man to the su-
pernatural relationships? And what are the formats, contents and institutions in
which such worldviews and value systems are symbolically represented?
Cultures derive an “identity” from the fact that a common worldview and ethos
are active in the network of institutions or apparatuses of which they consist. This
“identity” differs from culture to culture. As the needs and values that various
communities develop in divergent situations and environments are not the same,
the various cultures also manifest varying “identities”. Far from being a top-down
phenomenon only, foreign mass media and cultural influences interact with local
networks in what can be termed a coerseductive (for coercion/seduction) way. Far
from being passive recipients, audiences are actively involved in the construc-
tion of meaning around the media messages they consume. Consequently, such
messages may have different effects and meanings in different cultural settings.
Consequently, honor, power, love and fear are defined and enacted through cul-
tural forms that may differ widely from one culture to another.
This implies that cultural identity can work both in positive-liberating as well
as negative-repressive ways. Cultural identity interpreted in a positive-liberating
way may, among other aspects, imply a positive orientation toward historical val-
ues, norms and institutions, the resistance to excessive external influence, the re-
jection of values, institutions and forms that destroy social cohesion, and the ad-
aptation of forms of production so that they favor the specificity of human and
local social development. On the other hand, a negative-dominating interpreta-
tion of cultural identity may include the use of so-called traditional values and
norms, or arguments emphasizing the cultural “uniqueness” to legitimize mar-
ginalization or the existing status quo.
5. Modes of communication
Let me attempt to point out a few characteristics of what can be called a Europe-
an versus an Asian mode of communication. Such an attempt, however, cannot
be undertaken without an explicit warning: as has been argued above, to bring
European and Asian culture face-to-face is not only ambitious, but also can give
a very simplistic impression. These risks are particularly high in condensed ver-
sions of cross-cultural comparison, such as this text. Therefore, both modes of
communication should be perceived as ideal-typical examples of which the ex-
tremes are underlined in order to accentuate the typicality of each mode of com-
munication.
While outlining the European mode of communication, I have the Anglo-Sax-
on culture, to which I belong, in mind as the framework of reference. My appre-
ciation of the defined Asian mode of communication is based upon experiences
in their cultures where Confucian and Buddhist influences play a major part. In
each culture, I have been trying to search for the archetypes rather than for the
formal and often officially propagated manifestations of a culture. More than in
the West and because of the Western influences, one can observe in Asia a pro-
nounced difference between the so-called “written” and “unwritten” culture (Hsi-
ung 1985; Terwiel 1984).
In many Asian languages there is a distinction made between so-called lev-
els of speech according to age, social status and patterns of social interaction.
One has to use particular titles and forms of addressing when one approaches a
younger or elder, a higher or lower ranked person. This kind of hierarchical lan-
guage use has gradually disappeared in the West.
In different cultures the same words or concepts can have different connotative,
contextual or figurative meanings and evoke idiomatic or metaphoric expressions.
The word fat, for instance, has a positive connotation in most Asian societies, as
it indexes the person’s well-being and wealth. In the West, however, the word is
mainly interpreted in a negative way. O-Young Lee (1967) concludes that Asian
languages have developed on the basis of auditive interpretation (listening) and
emotion (pathos) and take into account the so-called “aura” of things. Because of
this, Asian languages are more colorful and poetic than Indo-European languag-
56 Jan Servaes
es which are based on visual ascertainment (seeing) and rationality (logos): “A

culture of the eye is intellectual, rational, theoretical and active, while a culture
of the ear is emotional, sensitive, intuitive and passive” (Lee 1967: 43).
In comparing “Eastern and Western” orientations of the use of language, Kim
(1985: 405) postulates that the Western mode is largely a “direct, explicit, verbal
realm, relying heavily on logical and rational perception, thinking, and articula-
tion”. Thunberg et al. (1982: 145) apply this concept to the development of pro-
fessional style, whose “manner of expression or style often seems unnecessari-
ly complicated and abstract, and particularly bureaucratic prose tends to follow
formal codes far removed from daily usage”. This contrasts with the orientation
of the East where “the primary source of interpersonal understanding is the un-
written and often unspoken norms, values and ritualized mannerisms relevant
to a particular interpersonal context” (Kim 1985: 405). To relate this to India as
well as alternate views of communication: “According to the Indian view, the re-
alization of truth is facilitated neither by language nor by logic and rationality.
It is only intuition that will ensure the achievement of this objective. To know is
to be; to know is to become aware of the artificial categorization imposed on the
world by language and logic. It is only through an intuitive process that man [and
woman] will be able to lift himself [or herself] out of the illusory world which,
indeed, according to the Indian viewpoint, is the aim of communication. There-
fore, if the Western models of communication are ratiocination-oriented models,
the Indian one is intuition-oriented” (Dissanayake 1988: 30).
Social relation patterns are differently perceived and outwardly shown. So-
cial stratification exists, of course, in the East as well as in the West. But where it
is not accentuated in the West – moreover, in interpersonal communication one
often attempts to construct an (often feigned) horizontal and equal relationship
– hierarchic relations still exist and are explicitly emphasized in the East. Ap-
pearances such as clothes and etiquette play a major role. The Confucian ethic,
for instance, attaches a lot of importance to tradition and etiquette. One individ-
ual is not equal to another; one is always of a higher or lower rank or status. This
ranking applies to every social form or organization, either family, enterprise or
school. In China, this performance of rank is called li and involves the ability
to value the position one has to take up in each specific relationship pattern and
consequentially to be able to follow the right ritual.
Even in more formal relations and modernistic institutions such as politics,
commerce or industry, these patterns of communication are still carried on. Asians
feel themselves, less than Westerners, drawn by political programs; they follow
charismatic leaders with whom they can identify emotionally. In business mat-
ters as well, Asians follow a hierarchic, time-consuming and indirect pattern of
communication, in which immediate friends or “group members” act as inter-
mediaries. Don McCreary and Robert Blanchfield (1986) analyzed the patterns
of discourse in negotiations between Japanese and U.S. companies. They ar-

rived at the conclusion that the negotiation is complicated and dependent upon
several constructs unique to the homogeneous Japanese people and culture and
that three constructs are particularly crucial: amae (a social hierarchy of depen-
dency relationships), haragei (a culturally based set of paralinguistic cues cou-
pled with superficially misleading verbal arguments with multiple semantic read-
ings) and the pragmatics of formal negotiation which concerns special patterns
of discourse in regard to speaking versus writing, colloquial versus formal lan-
guage, responsibility in decision making and translation/interpretation difficul-
ties. They conclude that: “Phatic communication, the communication and build-
up of personal trust, must be included from negotiating day one. Conversation,
seemingly about nothing of consequence, that is, family backgrounds, likes and
dislikes, and employment history, tests the foreign negotiator’s trustworthiness,
how much respect and credibility is due him, and how much he is committed to
a long-term outlook” (McCreary 1986: 156). Because of this difference, less im-
portance is attached to a number of values which in the Western world are con-
sidered very important, such as the equality of men and women or democracy. On
the other hand, other values and norms, such as respect for one’s elders or loyalty
to the group, are given a more important place in the East. Therefore, some ar-
gue that the Western concept of parliamentary democracy is incompatible with
a Hindu society, while others claim that Marxism is more closely related to Bud-
dhism than to Western liberal principles. François Perroux (1983: 121), howev-
er, doubts the relevance of this sort of comparison and puts forward a so-called
“Weberian” and “anti-Weberian” model: “At most and at best, Weber’s model is
a sociological construct of little real benefit even in the investigation of cultures
that differ from our own. What do we gain by labeling an Oriental or African
culture as ‘charismatic’ or ‘traditional’ when it stems from a living faith?” And
he adds that the new and “another” development movement in the North and the
South, “if it is not to lead to the world’s going up in flames, must at least adopt a
line of research, a guiding principle and, basing itself on the anti-Weber model, a
course of slow, patient and cumulative advance” (Perroux 1983: 12). Similar ar-
guments are put forward by Roland Robertson (1992) and Bryan Turner (1994),
who examine the recent debate about orientalism in relation to postmodernism
and the process of globalization.
Further, the Asian mode of communication is indirect and implicit, the West-
ern direct and explicit. In Asian communication processes, a lot is supposed and
implicitly said. Westerners insist on making very explicit arrangements and have
almost no ear for non-verbal forms of expression. Therefore, Westerners use lan-
guage in an instrumental way and emphasize herewith the exchange of ideas and
thoughts. The more emotionally involved and poetical Asian is less direct. In an
instrumental pattern of communication, one defends one’s opinion in an assertive
58 Jan Servaes
way. Westerners attempt to convince their listeners by way of rational, Aristote-

lian argumentation (in his Rhetoric, however, Aristotle is open to the idea that
not only rational, but also merely plausible and emotional types of argumenta-
tion are to be included within the available means of proof). The “end product”,
the message is the most important part of the communication process. The com-
munication is considered a success if the public has understood the “message”.
Whether or not the public agrees to the underlying viewpoint in the message is
for a Western communicator of second importance.
While Westerners start a conversation with a definite goal (i.e. they want to
state or obtain something material or immaterial), for Asians the emotional ex-
change, the being together, the pleasure of communicating are equally important.
In interpersonal communication, Asians will try to assess the feelings and state
of mind of those present. They do not want to bring the harmony of the group
into danger and thus will give their opinion in an indirect way. Not the product,
or the message, but the process is of importance. Hence, those are also the total-
ly different perceptions with regard to work and leisure time. In the West, they
are regarded as two separate aspects of life; but not so in the East. So the Asian
mode of communication can be labeled rather as defensive and situational. The
conversation is often abruptly stopped, or the subject changed without any ob-
vious reason, as soon as the speaker feels that his/her listener does not totally
agree with his point of view or that his feelings might have been hurt. Asians at-
tempt to reach a total or holistic communication. If this is not possible, they pre-
fer no communication to the Western compromise of partial or Cartesian com-
munication.
Where the Western mode of communication concentrates on the encoding of
issues, and is, as such, sender- or communicator-orientated, the Asian mode of
communication attaches more attention to the decoding problems of messages
and is, as such, receiver- or public-orientated. Whereas the Westerner does ac-
tively look for the truth and is convinced that this can be achieved on the basis of
a logical argumentation, the Asian accepts that the truth will be revealed when
s/he is ready for it, or, in other words, when enough knowledge and insight has
been accumulated. The attitude is passive; data collection and argumentation –
two essential elements in a Western mode of communication – are often miss-
ing. On the other hand, the action orientation of Westerners dictates their atti-
tude with regards to nature and technology, they want to command and control
these, while Asians try to achieve a harmonious relationship with both. There-
fore, in more general terms, the vision on intuition, rationalism, and empiricism
is in both modes of communication totally different.
6. Modernization and tradition

Let us move to a specific Asian case, Thailand. There, modernization and west-
ernization have strengthened the animistic concept of power rather than weak-
ened it. Unemployment, economic and political crises have made life for the ma-
jority of the Thai even less attractive, so the need for worldly and spiritual protec-
tion saints has increased proportionally, just as the struggle for status and prestige
under the growing westernized middle classes has increased. Whereas one used
to fight with traditional power means, the power of money is undermining many
traditional relationship patterns. The impersonal and uncontrollable money is
ever present and even throws a shadow on certain khun (“goodness”) relation-
ship patterns. So it is not surprising that corruption and the misuse of power are
on the rise: “The prevalence of bureaucratic corruption stems from the systems
of self-remuneration in the traditional bureaucracy. Officials were expected to
remunerate themselves by taking a cut from revenues they collected and extract-
ing fees for services performed. In the transition to a modern form of bureaucra-
cy, these practices were never erased. Meanwhile the systems for imposing mor-
al and conventional limits on the extent of such self-remuneration have tended
to decay ... The rise of corruption as an issue was more a function of increasing
competition for political power and corruption revenues between the old power-
holders in the military and civilian bureaucracy and the new challengers in ci-
vilian politics, particularly those with a business background” (Phongpaichit and
Priryarangsan 1994: 173).
In the hierarchically-structured Thai society in which form and performance
play a major role, the individual is regularly confronted with situations that cause
heavy psycho-social stress. As Thai rationalize these psychosocial problems in
an animistic and fatalistic way, as the work of a bad spirit, they therefore do not
seem to be able to address these tensions. The only way to solve such a problem
is, in their opinion, to get rid of the bad spirit by eliminating it (or its personifi-
cation) combined with the propensity to suppress anger, frustrations and so on,
until it literally bursts. Whenever this happens, the outcome is usually very ex-
treme and this, for instance, is one of the explanations for the fact that Thailand
has one of the highest crime rates in the world.
As more people fall by the wayside in this power struggle, the longing for a
“safe” life in the inner-group increases. On the political front, this tendency has
given rise to the revival of conservative and nationalistic ideas. On the personal
level, it leads to the strengthening of Brahminical and spiritual practices. Pub-
lic life is organized on the basis of friend circles with an influential leader on the
top, that is the so-called patronage system (Chaloemtiarana 1983). The Thai do
not follow political programs or abstract ideas but follow leaders and charismatic
figures on the basis of the “right or wrong, my group”-principle. Minister Chal-
60 Jan Servaes
erm Yoobumrung, who was in charge of the Mass Communication Authority of

Thailand, used TV stations to fight against newspapers which dared to criticize
his policies and to promote his political party.
The majority of the military coups and political fractions are explicable through
this perspective as well. John Girling (1981, 1984), who applied the Gramscian
hegemony principle to Thai society, came to the conclusion that the production
basis is integrated in and determined by the culture-ideological superstructure of
the civil society: “The result, in Thai terms, is the ‘bureaucratic policy’, or what
Gramsci calls ‘transformism’: a ruling class that grows ever more extensive by
absorbing elements from other social groups who then operate within the estab-
lished framework” (Girling 1984: 445). He decides that in these circumstances
there is little chance for social change. From a culturalistic perspective, this view
is confirmed by Amunam Rajadhon (1968: 29): “The social system, habits and
customs as seen in modern times are superficial modifications of the fundamen-
tals and in a comparative degree only.”
Generally speaking, the Thai social system is essentially a society where self-
centeredness and interpersonal relationships are of utmost importance. Even
though the Thai self-image is often described as individualistic, we prefer to
term it a weak rather than a strong personality. This is also the opinion of Hans
Ten Brummelhuis (1984): “The individual’s preoccupation is not so much with
self-realization and autonomy as with the adaptation to the social or cosmologi-
cal environment. If a notion of Thai individualism is to have any specific mean-
ing it is in designating that particular mode of retreat, avoidance and distrust,
which colors so many forms of behavior and social relationships” (Brummelhuis
1984: 44–45). Seksan Prasertkul (1989: 64) is more critical: “Our national traits,
which I think are very strong, are: firstly, Thais do not like serious matters; they
like to crack jokes and talk about sensational matters, especially dirty ‘under the
belt’-matters. Secondly, they are egotist. [...] If matters are not relevant to their
own lives, they will not take them into account.”
Referring to the Thai Value Study (Komin 1988), Komin (1988, 1991) iden-
tified nine value clusters according to their significant positions in the Thai val-
ue system, namely, (1) ego-orientation (which is the root value underlying vari-
ous other key values, such as “face-saving”, “kreng-jai”), (2) grateful relation-
ship orientation (“bun-khun”, reciprocity of kindness, “a-ka-tan-yu”), (3) social
smoothing relationship orientation (caring, pleasant, polite), (4) flexibility and
adjustment orientation (situation-orientedness), (5) religio-psychical orientation
(karma, superstition), (6) education and competence orientation (form is more
important than substance), (7) interdependence orientation (peaceful coexistence
of ethnic, religious groups), (8) achievement-task orientation (achievement is the
least important value among Thai, it connotes social rather than task achieve-
ment), and (9) fun-pleasure orientation (fun loving is both a means and an end in
itself). “These are the major value orientations registered in the cognitive world of
the Thai, and serve as criteria for guiding behavior, or as the blueprint that helps
to make decisions at the behavioral levels” (Komin 1988: 172). She argues that
these value orientations have to be taken into consideration in any development
program as they often prove to be stumbling blocks to social change.
7. Cultural relativism, cultural diversity and human rights

Those who advocate universality of human rights assert that human rights must
be the same everywhere. This is contested by those who believe that human rights
are relative to a particular history and culture. In Asia, the debate on the univer-
sality of human rights is normally known as the debate on “Asian values”, be-
cause governments of several Asian countries have put forward the argument that
there exists an “Asian concept of human rights”.
The relativist conception of human rights proposed by the Asian governments
is reflected in the Bangkok Declaration adopted at the Asian regional prepara-
tory meeting for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in April 1993.
The declaration states that, “[w]hile human rights are universal in nature, they
must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of inter-
national norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and region-
al peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds” (cited
in Ravindran 1998: 51).
However, the Vienna Declaration, adopted by consensus by the World Con-
ference, confirmed the universality of human rights and rejected the notion of
cultural relativism. The Declaration, in paragraph 1, reaffirms the solemn com-
mitment of all States to fulfill their obligations to promote universal respect for
and observance and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all. It stressed that “the universal nature of these rights and freedoms is be-
yond question”. The problem of national and regional peculiarities is referred to
in paragraph 5 of the Declaration which provides:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated
[...] While the significance of national and regional particularities and various his-
torical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty
of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote
and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The mention of particularities and various historical, cultural and religious back-
grounds is sometimes interpreted as a sort of escape clause, as an argument for not
[yet] complying with human rights standards (Bomert and Genugten 1995: 44).
This understanding of paragraph 5 does not take into account the last part of the
62 Jan Servaes
formulation which underlines that States are duty-bound, regardless of their po-
litical, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights.
In line with this formulation, cultural specificities should be taken into account in
the promotion and protection of human rights, therefore they should rather help
to determine the most effective modalities and ways and means to overcome dif-
ficulties in the implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This
is important not only for the debate concerning the universality of human rights,
but also in a more general context for international relations. Rejecting cultural
relativism and recognizing at the same time the significance of cultural specific-
ities, the Vienna Conference intensified the discussion concerning relations be-
tween cultural values and human rights. This has been, in particular, articulated
in the debate concerning the so-called “Asian values”.
Are Asian values such as respect for tradition and the elderly, strong fami-
ly ties and communitarianism, emphasis on duties and responsibilities, compat-
ible with human rights? The answer can be only positive. There is no contradic-
tion between them. If so, what are then those specific elements of Western hu-
man rights tradition which, from an Asian point of view, should not be a part of
the universal concept of human rights? The West is accused of eccentric individ-
ualism, consumerism, drug addiction and violent crimes. However, neither hu-
man rights nor democracy may be blamed or are responsible for these ills, re-
sulting from excessive liberalism and the erosive forces of the market economy
and industrialization.
Based on this relativist theory, some governments have argued that the cultur-
al contract between individuals and the state is fundamentally different in Asia.
The assumption is that Asian societies stress the interests of the community and
Western societies stress the importance of the individual. Ravindran (1998) ob-
serves that the argument supporting community rights against individual rights,
in practice, is used against communities by denying them their rights. While
Asian states stress the importance of community values, they fail to respect the
freedom of expression and organization that invigorates community life. “Asian
governments incorrectly conflate state and community. Consequently, they im-
pose severe restrictions on the social and political activities of citizen groups on
the pretext that these groups pose a threat to the state” (Ravindran 1998: 51).
Therefore, Yash Ghai (1995) argues that the debate on universalism would be
sterile and repetitious if no effort is made to understand the conditions that gen-
erate challenges for universalism. He points at the following paradox: those Asian
governments contesting universality are precisely those having strong links with
global capitalism. Ghai concludes that these Asian leaders debate universality to
undermine the importance of human rights in the eyes of their own people and
not the West.
Tommy Koh (1999), the executive director of the Asia-Europe Foundation,
takes another position. He asks himself why the West reacts in such a negative
way when Asians profess their belief in Asian values and finds three possible rea-
sons: (a) the West does not accept Asia as an equal: “Most people in the West,
including its intellectuals, still regard Asia and Asians as inferior”. A detailed
analysis of fifteen Western newspapers and weeklies on Asia in general and the
Hong Kong take-over in particular confirm this statement (see Ramanathan and
Servaes 1997); (b) a potential challenge to Western hegemony; (c) giving Asian
values a bad name: “Some of East Asia’s political leaders have given Asian val-
ues a bad name by seeking to justify their abuses of power and the inequities of
their societies in the name of Asian values. For example, corruption, collusion
and nepotism should be condemned by all Asians. They have nothing to do with
Asian values. To put it more accurately, they have everything to do with bad Asian
values but nothing with good Asian values. This leads me to my point that it is
essential to distinguish between good Asian values and bad Asian values. Not
all Asian values are good values, just as not all Western values are good values.
There are good Asian values and bad Asian values, just as there are good West-
ern values and bad Western values” (Koh 1999: 10). I cannot say it better.
Therefore, the existence of cultural differences should not lead to the rejec-
tion of any part of universal human rights. They cannot justify the rejection or
non-observance of such fundamental principles like the principle of equality be-
tween women and men. Traditional practices which contradict human rights of
women and children have to be changed. “Nevertheless, all cultures can contrib-
ute to the general discussion concerning the human rights concept. The estab-
lishment of a proper balance between rights and responsibilities, between indi-
vidual rights and their collective dimension, between individuals and groups, is
far from being achieved, not only in the Asian region but also in Western societ-
ies. It is not accidental that in recent years, such attention is given to the prepa-
ration of various declarations of human duties or responsibilities and the elabo-
ration of a global ethics which are seen not as a rejection but as a reinforcement
of universal human rights” (Symonides 2000).
8. Cultural respect and cultural dialogue

Let me conclude this contribution by considering how we may go beyond differ-
ences and initiate culturally-mutual respect and dialogue. Although this concerns
intercultural communication in general, what is said below should apply not less
but more to the scientific, professional, scholarly, elite community. I want to be-
gin with a quote from the Report of the World Commission on Culture and De-
velopment, chaired by the former UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuél-
lar and sponsored by the UNESCO: “There is evolving in our time a global civ-
64 Jan Servaes
ic culture, a culture which contains further elements to be incorporated in a new

global ethics. The idea of human rights, the principle of democratic legitima-
cy, public accountability, and the emerging ethos of evidence and proof are the
prime candidates for consideration ... Today, the idea of human rights, though still
challenged by recalcitrant governments, is a firmly entrenched standard of polit-
ical conduct and will have to be a corner-stone of any global ethics” (De Cuél-
lar 1995: 36–37).
The acceptance of the very idea that persons belonging to one culture should
not judge the policies and values of other cultures, that any system of common
values cannot and does not exist, indeed undermines the very basis of the inter-
national community and the “human family”. They cannot function without the
existence of standards allowing them to judge what is right or wrong, what is good
or bad. The World Commission on Culture and Development in its report, Our
Creative Diversity, points out that the logical and ethical difficulty about relativ-
ism is that it must also endorse absolutism and dogmatism. Cognitive relativism
is nonsense, moral relativism is tragic (De Cuéllar 1995: 55). An assertion of ab-
solute standards is a condition sine qua non of reasoned discourse concerning a
code of conduct or behavior.
Contrary to cultural relativism, cultural diversity and plurality of cultures have
to be seen as positive factor leading to intercultural dialogue. In the contempo-
rary world, cultures are not isolated. They interact and influence each other. The
intercultural dynamics is set in motion by the contemporary processes of global-
ization which lead, not without tension, to the emergence, consolidation or refor-
mulation of specific cultural and ethical values common to the various cultural
areas. Any culture in relation and comparison with other cultures may find its
own idiosyncrasies and peculiarities, its strong and its weak points. The report
argues that development divorced from its human or cultural context is growth
without a soul. This means that culture cannot ultimately be reduced to a subsid-
iary position as a mere advocator of economic growth. It goes on by arguing that
“governments cannot determine a people’s culture: indeed, they are partly de-
termined by it” (De Cuéllar 1995: 15). The basic principle should be “the foster-
ing of respect for all cultures whose values are tolerant of others. Respect goes
beyond tolerance and implies a positive attitude to other people and a rejoicing
in their culture. Social peace is necessary for human development; in turn it re-
quires that differences between cultures be regarded not as something alien and
unacceptable or hateful, but as experiments in ways of living together that con-
tain valuable lessons and information for all” (De Cuéllar 1995: 25).
8.1. Cultural freedom
More is at stake here than attitudes. It is also a question of power. I wish to stress
this especially in view of the recent events in Kosovo, Israel or New York. Poli-
cymakers cannot legislate respect, nor can they coerce people to behave respect-
fully. But they can enshrine cultural freedom as one of the pillars on which the
state is founded.
Cultural freedom is rather special. It differs from other forms of freedom in a
number of ways. First, most freedoms refer to the individual. Cultural freedom,
in contrast, is a collective freedom. It is the condition for individual freedom to
flourish. Second, cultural freedom, properly interpreted, is a guarantee of free-
dom as a whole. It protects not only the collectivity but also the rights of every
individual within it. Thirdly, cultural freedom, by protecting alternative ways of
living, encourages creativity, experimentation and diversity, and helps preserve
the very essentials of human development. Finally, freedom is central to culture,
in particular, the freedom to decide what we have reason to value and what lives
we have reason to seek. “One of the most basic needs is to be left free to define
our own basic needs” (De Cuéllar 1995: 26).
8.2. Participatory action
Another action-oriented dimension of cultural localization is, for instance, the

activities of civil society groups and grassroots social movements concerned with
cultural and ethnic issues. It is these activities that try to counterbalance global
cultural flows and express concern with local cultural identity. Here, the first con-
cern is also with localization and not with globalization. When scholars talk about
global grassroots social movements, they often only refer to two areas in which
these movements have global tendencies: the environment and human rights.
It is in these areas that we face common, global risks and in these cases there
are no “others”. But with culture there are others. Moreover, we are not even sure
that our anxiety shared with others can produce the experience of, to say it with
Tomlinson (1994: 63), a global “we”. The global warming and the rising of the
sea level is, for instance, catastrophic for many Pacific Islands because they will
literally lose their land. But in this case, there is still no global “we”. So, even
without the problem of ethnic diversity, fundamental religious differences and
cultural variety, we have great difficulty in creating a global “we”.
66 Jan Servaes
8.3. Global ethics
Therefore, the Pérez de Cuéllar Commission argues that there is an urgent need
for a global ethics which starts from a global-cultural perspective. The Commis-
sion suggests that the following principal ideas should form the core of a new
global ethics: (a) human rights and responsibilities; (b) democracy and the ele-
ments of civil society; (c) the protection of minorities; (d) commitment to peace-
ful conflict resolution and fair negotiation; and (e) equity within and between
generations. The report observes that many elements of a global ethics are now
still absent from global governance. Moreover, Robertson and Merrills (1989:
259) point out that “there is a crucial distinction between legal rights and moral
rights”. The principal ideas on which such global ethics need to be built should
be carefully examined and discussed.
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Part 2. The discursive dominance of the West
Chapter 5
Reporting the Hong Kong transition:
A comparative analysis of news coverage in Europe
and Asia
Jan Servaes and Sankaran Ramanathan
1. Introduction
The process of communication is sometimes likened to a two-sided mirror, where-
in both sides of an issue can be viewed. More often than not, however, communi-
cation is mostly one-sided, like the special-effect mirror, which results in images
that contain distortions, inaccuracies and stereotyping. These images that audi-
ences receive affect their perceptions, attitudes and behavior. In fact, despite the
increasing flow of intercultural communication, there are still serious misunder-
standings and misperceptions among the peoples of the world. Hence, the “glob-
al village” seems to suffer from intra-village communication difficulties and ob-
stacles (Kato 1977). What are possible causes of the problems, especially in the
case of Western media representations of the non-Western Other?
In this contribution, we present and discuss findings from our research proj-
ect entitled Asia Reporting Europe and Europe Reporting Asia: A Study of News
Coverage (1997). The study was commissioned by the Asia-Europe Foundation
(ASEF). Through quantitative and qualitative studies of 30 some newspapers
and magazines, 15 in Asia and 15 in Europe respectively, published between 27
June and 6 July 1997, we try to determine how many and what kind of Europe-
an events were reported in Asia, and, conversely, how many and what kind of
Asian events were reported in Europe. It will be seen that, despite the increased
international travel, hypermedia, and above all the so-called globalization, there
are alarming imbalances in cross-cultural communication and representation be-
tween Europe and Asia. The major quantitative finding is that reporting of Asian
events by the European media is significantly less than that of European events
by the Asian counterpart. Of the 3725 news items studied, 1563 are European
events reported in the Asian media, 1413 items are stories about the Hong Kong
handover reported in the Asian media, whereas only 749 items are Asian events
reported in the European counterpart. This latter figure is all the more striking
when it reveals that almost half of those articles relate to the largely internation-
74 Jan Servaes and Sankaran Ramanathan
al, historic event of the Hong Kong handover. Qualitatively, they find that cover-
age of Europe in the Asian press is more extensive than that of Asia in the Euro-
pean counterpart. Whereas European publications obtain more than half of their
stories from their own sources/correspondents, Asian publications rely heavily
on Western news agencies. While Asian publications tend to be more balanced in
their reporting of European events, there are more instances of negative reports
about Asian events in the European publications, the majority of which emanate
from their own correspondents. Moreover, the handover of Hong Kong is cov-
ered by European publications from a nationalistic and to some extent ethnocen-
tric perspective. In contrast, few or no examples of a comprehensive Asian per-
spective are found in the European media.
2. Some theoretical considerations

The basic premise in this study is that the production of news discourse is influ-
enced generally by the political, economic and cultural system as well as by the
actual situation in which the production and transmission of information takes
place. Firstly, news cannot be considered purely as a series of facts or a window
through which we look at the external world: “Rather it is a cultural product and
the accounts and description of the world which it gives are produced from within
a specific interpretative framework” (Glasgow University Media Group 1980: 3).
Secondly, news is an organizational product, generated by routine occupational
practices in an institutional setting with specific performance demands as well
as limits of time and resources. These organizational and institutional factors
also shape the structure in which news is being produced (Brown, 1995). Third-
ly, news is manufactured by journalists who – often unconsciously – select and
interpret a number of facts, based on an “unclear vision of society”. Hence Gold-
ing and Middleton (1982: 112) state that “we should never forget that news pro-
duction, like all other social activities, involves real people doing real jobs about
which they are able to reflect and over whose content they have considerable au-
tonomy.” Our task as sociologists or communication researchers is to discover
and to explain the limitations of that autonomy.
3. Studies on image-creating
Writing in 1983, Will Teichert et al. found that images of Germany as portrayed
by foreign media affected people’s perceptions of that country. Starting from the
MacBride Report (1981), statements about the inadequate reporting on the Third
World, preferences for negatively-assessed events and dependency of Third World
Reporting the Hong Kong transition 75
countries on international news agencies, the authors undertook a one-week study

of reporting in Germany about Malaysia, Mexico and Kenya. Finding that such
reporting was inadequate and unbalanced, they suggested the need for media to
be more responsible when reporting about foreign countries.
Hidetoshi Kato (1977) found that the images held of the United States dif-
fered from one country to another, depending on the historical and international
context. He discussed reports of the images of America in Japan, Korea, Malay-
sia and the Philippines. Despite the rapid growth of technological developments
affecting mass communication in the 1970s and 1980s, Kato felt that the global
village still suffered from intracultural communication difficulties. He stressed
the need for, and greater role of, institutions devoted to the objective of bridging
the gap between different cultures.
Sankaran Ramanathan (1987) found that leading American newspapers and
magazines generally portrayed negative images of Malaya/Malaysia over a for-
ty-year period (1946–1986). The quantum of reporting was small, it was inad-
equate, further there were many examples of bias, distortions, inaccuracies and
stereotyping in the reports studied. Discussing policy implications for Malaysia’s
foreign press relations, he recommended rejection of the “do nothing” and “nega-
tive action” policies in favor of a proactive press relations policy.
Studying the images of Africa in major U.S. news and opinion magazines, Pratt
(1980) found that these magazines gave low reportage/coverage of African news
and events. Of those events covered, there was a preponderance of conflict-type
news and reports about dissident groups. He concluded that the miniscule cov-
erage of the content coupled with the emphasis on violence and negative events,
portrayed the continent negatively.
4. Studies of news production

A number of studies postulate that news may be perceived as the result of com-
bined action based on institutionally-determined and collectively-made choices
under the current economic, political and cultural interest constellations (further
elaborated upon in Servaes and Tonnaer 1991).
News production has a lot in common with other social practices that are car-
ried out on a routine basis in a formalized institutional context. It is at this point
that the concept of professionalization comes into play. On the one hand, journal-
ists and media workers in general use a specific paradigm of reality to cover re-
cent events in the world. On the other hand, professionalism also provides news-
makers with a set of “implicit” practices of production routines. In other words,
professionalism offers journalists “a legitimate (and legitimating) way of seeing
the world as well as practical frameworks which stipulate how to assemble sto-
ries to report on perceived happenings” (Dahlgren 1984: 6).
The news production process is believed to contribute to the societal ideation
process. By that, we mean the manner in which not only the rational or cogni-
tive, but also the irrational or intuitive elements of knowledge, ideas and infor-
mation are passed on. In this case, ideation is not only to be seen as a distribu-
tion of specific facts or events, but rather as a generalized angle of vision on so-
cial reality with strong affective and subjective components.
Thus, Davis and Walton (1983), in their analysis of the “Aldo Moro Story”,
found that the visual and verbal content of the news about the death of the mur-
dered Italian Christian-democrat more distinctly stated how the media contrib-
uted to the preservation of an ideological consensus rather than via a study of
the “events” which constitute the news: “There is a universally assumed consen-
sus (in Western media) within which, with some cross-cultural variation, com-
plex causes and impact of armed opposition and revolutionary violence are re-
duced by the inferential frameworks of ‘law and (dis)order’, the ‘violent society’,
the threat to democracy, and international terror, to a simple picture of a tempo-
rary and unprovoked outbreak of irrational violence in an otherwise ordered and
peaceful society” (Davis and Walton 1983: 48). An analysis of the internation-
al news coverage about the assassination of Lebanese president-elect Beshir Ge-
mayel arrives at the same kind of observations (Van Dijk 1984).
One classic study on the “implicit news structure rules” was published in 1965
by Johann Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge of the Peace Research Institute in
Oslo. Their study on “The structure of foreign news” (1965) analyzed how the
Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises of the early 1960s had been reported in four news-
papers in the Norwegian capital. They found that the vast majority of “spot news”
items originated from a very limited number of international news agencies. They
also identified a dozen factors that seemed to mark an event as newsworthy:
(1) the time-span needed for an event to unfold itself and acquire meaning;
(2) the scale and intensity of an event (both in absolute and in relative terms);
(3) the clarity of an event;
(4) the meaningfulness (meaning both ‘cultural proximity’ and relevance);
(5) the consonance;
(6) unexpectedness;
(7) continuity;
(8) composition (balance) of the available news.
These eight news values were considered to be of a general or “universal” nature.

Four additional news values were culture-specific: (9) elite nations and (10) elite
persons; (11) personification and (12) negativity in the news.
Galtung and Ruge formulated a number of hypotheses concerning the interre-

lationships of these news values. The hypotheses of selection (“the more events
satisfy the criteria mentioned, the more likely that they will be registered as
news”), of distortion (“Once a news item has been selected what makes it news-
worthy according to the factors will be accentuated”), and of replication (“both
the process of selection and the process of distortion will take place at all steps
in the chain from event to reader”) have been tested by several researchers since
(for an elaboration and overview, see Boone and Servaes 1982; McQuail 1994;
Mowlana 1997).
Other studies have found that the impact of news may well lie beyond the ra-
tionalistic dimension and may well be of a subjective dimension from a rather
ideological or mythical nature. According to Roland Barthes (cited in Joseph
Campbell 1988: 10), “A myth has a double function: it points out and it notifies,
it makes us understand something and it imposes it on us”. Campbell adds: “A
dream is a personal myth; a myth is the public dream of a society”. Myths are
generally expressed through the narrative form of storytelling. Myths are human
phenomena (creations of the human mind and spirit); at the same time they are
cultural phenomena (they effectively organize the way we, as a group, view por-
tions of our world).
Some scholars see the invasion of Grenada in February 1982 as a period where-
in myths are strongly emphasized (see Servaes and Drijvers 1986; Servaes 1991).
The handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China seems to provide another op-
portunity for such an approach.
What precedes here seems to justify the thesis that “news is a myth-maker”.
Dahlgren (1984) suggests that the mythic domain of (TV-)news performs four
basic operations on a regular basis:
1. It establishes and cements the social order as part of our cognition.

2. It legitimates and celebrates the basic and dominant structures, functions
and leadership of the social order.
3. It serves to explain and interpret that which transpires which is of relevance
for the social order.
4. For the viewer or media consumers in general, the mythic domain evokes
identification and loyalty to the social order.
These observations should not lead to the conclusion that the mythic domain de-
nies or camouflages social tensions. On the contrary, tensions are brought out
and are part of the social order’s dynamics. “The point is, however, that they are
rendered safe for the social order as a whole: the boundaries and limits of the is-
sues, their significance, the stakes involved, the array of perceived and reason-
able options, etc. are presented, interpreted and (usually) resolved such that the
contours of the social order remains intact” (Dahlgren 1984: 77).
This review of relevant studies testifies that the area of news selection and
production has been investigated by communication scholars in all parts of the
world. They constitute much of the theoretical framework upon which this study
is based. These and other studies of African and Latin American media point to
the universality of the need for media to remember their role in affecting per-
ceptions of, and attitudes to, people living in faraway places who practice dif-
ferent cultures.
We must also mention the broader issue of whether the media can be guided
and told what to report and what not to report. The Western journalistic tradition
(as exemplified in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) holds that the
press must be absolutely free. Whereas Asian leaders such as Malaysian Prime
Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad have repeatedly called for the press to be more
responsible, not only in reporting about national affairs but also in reporting
about foreign countries. Thus, there is a bipolar division with regard to freedom
of the press, with one end representing the libertarian philosophy and the other,
the authoritarian philosophy.
5. Reporting the handover – quantitative analysis

A four-month study of 30 newspapers/magazines, 15 each in Asia and Europe,
was undertaken in 1997 to determine how much (quantity) and what kind (qual-
ity) of European events were reported in Asian newspapers/magazines and how
much and what kind of Asian events were reported in European newspapers/mag-
azines within a specified time period (27 June–6 July 1997).
The Asian news publications selected were: Asahi Shimbun, Asian Wall Street
Journal, Asiaweek (Asian Edition), Bangkok Post, People’s Daily (China), Far
Eastern Economic Review, Jakarta Post (Indonesia), Dawn (Pakistan), New
Straits Times (Malaysia), Newsweek (Asian edition), Philippine Daily Inquirer,
South China Morning Post (HK), Straits Times (Singapore), Times of India and
Time (Asian Edition).
The European media selected were: International Herald Tribune (Intl. Edi-
tion, Paris), The Guardian (London), The Times (London), Le Monde (Paris),
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt), Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Zurich), El
Pais (Madrid), Volkskrant (Amsterdam), De Morgen (Brussels), Time (Eur. Edi-
tion), Newsweek (Eur. Edition), The Economist (London), The European (Lon-
don), Der Spiegel (Hamburg) and Knack (Brussels).
The main objective of the study was to determine how much reporting of Asian
events there was in fifteen selected European newspapers/magazines, and how
much reporting of European events there was in fifteen selected Asian newspa-
pers/magazines. For both European and Asian media, the majority of publica-
tions selected were in English. However, we also included publications in Ger-

man, French, Spanish, Dutch, Mandarin and Japanese.
The study was also designed to find out how the handover of Hong Kong from
Britain to China in July 1997 was reported in the Asian and European media.
The outlining of a new study methodology has to be based upon an interdis-
ciplinary approach. A fundamental problem, however, is “how to combine a va-
riety of methodologies in the same research design so that these mutually rein-
force and complement each other” (White 1985: 23). That is precisely what we
accomplished by combining normally separately used research methodologies,
namely, the quantitative and qualitative content analysis.
Based on the quantitatively standardized, international inventory and encod-
ing agreements which will give us an idea about the “content” and “organiza-
tional structure” of Asia/Europe reporting, we had to build on these findings in
our own research design.
Hence, a three-stage content analysis technique was utilized. In the first stage,
we translated and compiled news reports, inclusive of listing, classification and
determination of typology. The typology utilized was the standard typology used
for content analysis studies (Schramm and Atwood 1981). Stage 2 comprised data
entry and statistical analysis, using the Statistical Package for the Social Scienc-
es (SPSS) program. In Stage 3, we undertook an in-depth analysis, including a
qualitative analysis. At this stage, specific news items were selected, and head-
lines and content were read again to determine the direction of the stories. Di-
rection here is determined with regard to whether a story is positive, negative or
neutral, based upon the reading of headlines and text and interpretation of pho-
tographs/illustrations (if any). In all cases, there had to be agreement between
two researchers vis-à-vis direction of stories.
The study initially set out to select categories and analyze stories about Europe
appearing in the selected Asian publications, and stories about Asia appearing in
the selected European publications. Since the time period chosen coincided with
the handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China, we also included all stories
about the handover appearing in both sets of publications.
Thus, the total number of stories studied was:
Asia reporting Europe – 1565 Stories

Europe reporting Asia – 749 Stories
Hong Kong handover stories in Asian publications – 1411 Stories
Total – 3725 Stories
Therefore, the basic finding is that Asian publications have greater coverage of
European events, as compared to the coverage of Asian events by European pub-
lications.
Looking more closely, it can be observed that the total number of stories for
the South China Morning Post was 699 items, this included both coverage of
European events as well as a large number of stories on the Hong Kong hando-
ver. This was expected, as the newspaper is based in Hong Kong. Newspapers in
neighboring countries (Bangkok Post – 410 items, Straits Times – 377 items and
Jakarta Post – 307 items) also had considerable coverage of both the handover
as well as European events.
The newspapers which had the least coverage were the People’s Daily (44
items) and Asahi Shimbun (116 items). In the case of the People’s Daily, it can
be postulated that low coverage of Hong Kong may have been in line with the of-
ficial policy of treating the handover as a low-key event.
The International Herald Tribune led the European-based publications in cov-
erage of Asia (85 items). It was followed by The Times, Le Monde (66 items),
Neue Zürcher Zeitung (62 items), Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung (54 items)
and El Pais (56 items). Discounting the handover stories, it can be said that the
coverage by European publications of Asian events was minimal.
These figures support one of the common hypotheses of many international
comparative studies, namely that one can still speak of a historically rooted news
dependency relationship between Europe (the former “center”) and Asia (the for-
mer “periphery”) (see, e.g., Golding and Harris 1997).
Asian publications carried a significant amount of sports/recreation stories
(609 stories, or 39.0%) about Europe. The primary focus was on the Wimble-
don tennis championship, wherein Pete Sampras and Martina Hingis emerged
as champions. The second most important category was “Economy/Business/
Labor/Finance” (218 stories, or 13.9%), followed by “political stories” (154 sto-
ries, or 9.9%) and “international relations” (138, or 8.8%) stories. The least men-
tioned categories of news were religion (7 stories) and extraordinary/strange/bi-
zarre (8 stories).
With regard to Europe reporting Asia, there were 141 stories (18.8%) in the
“Economy/Business/Labor/Finance” category. The most prominent events were
effects of the Hong Kong handover, the declining value of the Thai baht and its
implications for Asia, Europe and the rest of the world. The second most impor-
tant category was “political stories”, and the third was “international relations”.
The majority of Hong Kong handover stories were of the political category
(640 stories, or 38.4%). This was to be expected. The next category was “inter-
national relations” (301 stories, or 18.1%), and here the emphasis was on the fu-
ture of China-Taiwan relations, the future of Portuguese Macaw and the impli-
cations of the handover for the rest of Asia.
In other words, our findings show that the Hong Kong handover was covered
by each European newspaper from a nationalistic and to some extent also “ethno-
centric” perspective. Almost half of the articles give a description of the handover.
A second general conclusion is that the broad political framework in which the
newspapers covered the conflict is a dependency axis. This dependency axis has
two major components: firstly, stories that assess the changes which may occur
on a geo-strategic and political-economic level; secondly, the “domino-effect” of
the handover on other neighboring countries and regions (especially Taiwan).
Almost exclusively, the Hong Kong handover stories were assessing the con-
sequences of this dependency axis from a Western (including U.S.) or European
perspective in general or a nation-specific perspective for those countries with
historical, political or economic interests in Hong Kong. In most instances, Eu-
ropean newspapers which, as shown in the quantitative analysis, have a strong
interest in the region, such as the IHT and The Economist, leave the Asian per-
spective under-illuminated. Few or no examples of an Asian perspective have
been found in stories about the handover.
The British newspapers’ coverage deserves a special mention, for it reflect-
ed the British colonial perspective. The majority of the articles referred (some-
what nostalgically) to the British colonial past and covered the events related to
the handover from the perspective of the major British players involved (Gover-
nor Patten, Prince Charles etc.). The tone of the articles was “pessimistic” as re-
gards the future of Hong Kong on the one hand, and “romantic” regarding the
colonial past on the other hand.
The United Kingdom was by far the most frequently mentioned in the Asian
publications (646 stories, or 41.3%). This was due primarily to the reportage of
the Wimbledon tennis tournament, financial/economic stories emanating from
London.
The second European country mentioned was France (148 stories, or 9.5%)
mostly in connection with motor racing and French reaction to the European
Union and NATO talks.
The third European country was Russia (111 stories, or 7.1%), mostly with re-
gard to political stories, (e.g. Yeltsin sacks minister, appoints daughter as advis-
er) and the crash at the MIR station. The fourth European country was Germany
(103 stories, or 6.6%), mostly with regard to financial/economic stories, German
reaction to NATO talks and to European Union proposals.
Hong Kong was the state most frequently mentioned in the European publi-
cations (188 times, or 25.1%). This was followed by China (119 times, or 15.9%)
and Hong Kong related stories emanating from the UK or mentioning the UK
(112 times, or 15.0%). The UK felt closest to Hong Kong for historical, politi-
cal and economic reasons. Asian countries mentioned were Japan (52 times, or
6.9%), Thailand, India and Cambodia (21 times, or 2.8% each).
London was the city from which the most number of stories (383 stories, or
24.5%) were filed in the Asian publications. This was followed by Wimbledon
(191 stories, or 12.2%), Paris (122 stories, or 7.8%) and Moscow (88 stories, or
5.6%). With regard to Europe reporting Asia, the largest number was datelined
Hong Kong (276 stories, or 36.8%), with the second being London (again, these
were stories about the handover; 100 stories, or 13.4%) and the third being To-
kyo (52 stories, or 6.9%).
Reuters was the main source for Asian publications which reported on Eu-
ropean events (604 stories, or 38.6%). The second most important source was
Agence France Presse (384 stories, or 24.6%), the third was the Asian publica-
tions’ own correspondents stationed in European countries (164 stories, 10.5%)
and the fourth was Associated Press (140 stories, 9.0%). The number of stories
emanating from Asian news agencies such as Bernama, Jiji Press, Kyodo, Press
Trust of India, United News of India and Xinhua was relatively small.
The publications’ own correspondents accounted for nearly two-thirds of all
Asian stories (466 stories, or 62.2%). The European publications studied de-
ployed their own correspondents stationed in Asia to cover the handover and re-
lated events such as U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s visit to Vietnam
and Prince Charles’ visit to the Philippines.
The physical presence of these correspondents in Asia can be considered as
ordinary. We assume that European publications’ coverage of Asian events would
be far less if not for the Hong Kong handover and allied stories.
With regard to international news agencies, Reuters again emerged as the
main source of news (88 stories, 11.7%), followed by Associated Press (45 sto-
ries, 6.0%), New York Times News Service (26 stories, 3.5%) and Agence France
Press (22 stories, 2.9%).
This study therefore shows that the dependence of Asian publications on in-
ternational news agencies as the prime sources of news, a phenomenon noticed
in the 1970s and 1980s, is still prevalent in the 1990s.
European personalities most often mentioned in Asian publications were Rus-
sian President Boris Yeltsin (33 times, or 2.1%), tennis players Martina Hingis
(32 times, or 2.0%), Boris Becker (31 times, or 2.0%), Pete Sampras (28 times,
or 1.8%) and Monica Seles (28 times, or 1.8%). Apart from these, former Alba-
nian President Sali Berisha (26 times, or 1.7%) and British Prime Minister Tony
Blair (25 times, or 1.6%) were also mentioned in the Asian publications.
With regard to Asian personalities mentioned in European publications, for-
mer Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten (38 stories, or 5.1%), Chinese President
Jiang Zemin (35 stories, or 4.7%) and Hong Kong’s administrator Tung Chee
Hwa (28 stories, or 3.7%) were the most frequently mentioned personalities, al-
most exclusively in handover stories. Prince Charles received a significant num-
ber of mentions also in connection with the handover and his visit to the Philip-
pines (20 stories, or 2.7%).
Besides the coverage given to the handover (which peaked on 30 June and 1
July), there were 18 other Asian stories on the front pages of European publica-
tions. With regard to Asian publications, there were 24 front-page stories about
European events. Therefore, it can be stated that in terms of treatment, Asian pub-
lications gave more prominence to European events when compared to promi-
nence given by European publications to Asian events.
Taking into consideration the scripts of various languages studied, the size
of stories was measured in square centimeters, as this would provide a uniform
measurement. In analyzing the size of stories, we divided it into four categories
as follows: fillers – 100 sq. cm and less; small stories – between 101 to 500 sq.
cm; major stories – between 501 to 1000 sq. cm; and in-depth stories – 1001 sq.
cm and more. This study shows that for both Asia and Europe, the largest num-
ber was small stories (1238 stories out of 2312, or 54%). However, when we com-
pare both categories of stories, it can be seen that stories about Europe published
in Asian publications were longer.
To summarize, the main finding of the quantitative study was that reporting/
coverage of Asian events by European media was less than reporting/coverage
of European events by Asian media. Of the 3725 news items studied, 1563 were
European events reported in Asian media, 1413 items were stories about the Hong
Kong handover reported in Asian media, and only 749 items were Asian events
(including stories of the Hong Kong handover) reported in the European media.
Other findings of the study were:
– The United Kingdom was the country most frequently mentioned in Asian
publications, followed by France, Russia and Germany. Regions and coun-
tries most frequently mentioned in European publications were Hong Kong,
China, Japan, Thailand, India and Cambodia.
– While European publications obtained more than half of their stories from
their own sources/correspondents, Asian publications still rely heavily on
international news agencies, particularly Reuters.
– London was the only city from which the most number of stories were filed
for Asian publications, followed by Wimbledon, Paris and Moscow. For Eu-
ropean publications, Hong Kong, London and Tokyo were the cities from
which the most number of stories emanated.
– Stories about the Hong Kong handover dominated the front pages of publi-
cations studied.
– There were few illustrations/cartoons supporting European stories in Asian
publication. Cartoons/illustrations in European publications were mostly
political and about the handover.
– While Asian publications generally tended to be neutral in their reporting
of European events, there were more instances of negative reports about
Asian events in European publications.
– Wimbledon tennis players such as Hingis, Becker and Sampras were the
European personalities mentioned most often in Asian publications. The

most frequently mentioned political figures were Russian President Boris
Yeltsin, former Albanian President Sali Berisha and British Prime Minis-
ter Tony Blair. Asian personalities featured most often in European publi-
cations were former Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten, Chinese President
Jiang Zemin, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa and Prince
Charles.
– Asian publications concentrated on sports/recreation stories from Europe.
These were followed by economic/business/finance stories and internation-
al relations. European publications concentrated on economic/business/fi-
nance stories followed by political stories and international relations.
The hypothesis that the interest which the press attached to Hong Kong would be
dependent on the proximity or involvement regarding the former British colony
was found to be correct. Proximity is not only a geographical criterion, but can
also be assessed in tandem with political, economic, cultural and social factors.
Our findings show that the handover of Hong Kong was covered by Europe-
an publications from a nationalistic and to some extent “ethnocentric” perspec-
tive. Almost half of the articles gave a description of the handover. Asian me-
dia coverage of Hong Kong was extensive in newspapers operating in countries
with close proximity to Hong Kong, especially Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia
and Indonesia.
Contrarily, few or no examples of a comprehensive Asian perspective have
been found in the European media studied.
6. Qualitative analysis
The qualitative analysis involved selection of specific news items, an in-depth
reading of headlines and text. The main purpose was to determine their direc-
tion – positive, negative or neutral. At this stage, fillers and short news stories
were excluded, as they were basically factual reports. We concentrated on the
longer news stories, editorials and in-depth articles.
For this purpose, the researchers zeroed in on the Hong Kong handover stories.
As expected, Asian media gave considerable coverage to this event, with the South
China Morning Post leading the way, followed by newspapers from neighboring
countries such as Bangkok Post, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Jakarta Post, Straits
Times and the New Straits Times. This finding is consistent with the “proximity
value” of news, that is, the closer the scene of a news event is to the place of pub-
lication, the greater is its news value. In the case of Hong Kong-UK relations, we
must also recognize that there is a cultural/historical proximity.
With regard to European media, while reporting of this event by The Times
was neutral/positive, The Guardian concentrated on less positive aspects, in-
cluding British officials’ unhappiness at the handover, Hong Kong’s sex trade,
and negative predictions about the economic future of Hong Kong under Chi-
na’s administration. Other European publications highlighted the arrival of PLA
troops, bleak future for Hong Kong dissidents and even a call for Gibraltar to be
returned to Spain (in El Pais newspaper). Deeper analysis of articles in El Pais
revealed that while the slant of the handover stories was positive towards China,
there were reservations about maintenance of democracy, future financial status
of Hong Kong and the fate of the dissidents.
Negative Asian stories published in European media were the Japanese pay-
off scandals, political instability in India, accidents/disaster in Pakistan and the
unstable political situation in Cambodia. There were also a significant number
of commentaries and opinion pieces about the unstable Indian and Cambodian
political situations.
With regard to European stories published in Asian media, the majority was
positive or neutral such as sports stories and economic/business stories. Among
the stories that can be categorized as negative were the MIR crash and failed
NATO talks. Nevertheless, many Asian publications published these as straight
news reports that were credited to one or more of the international news agen-
cies. These stories were usually carried in the inside pages devoted to world/in-
ternational news.
Overall, the study found that there was less reporting of Asia in Europe than of
Europe in Asia. While the reporting of Europe by Asia was more positive, prom-
inence in the reporting of Asia by Europe was given to “negative” news and hu-
man right stories. Also “political” issues dominated the news category.
The handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China was given considerable
coverage by both Asian and European newspapers/magazines in general. How-
ever, the kind of coverage and the perspective taken differed considerably from
newspaper to newspaper, and from country to country.
In summary, therefore, the following statements can be made:
(1) Coverage of Asia reporting Europe was greater and more extensive than Eu-
rope reporting Asia.
(2) While European publications obtained more than half their stories from
their own sources/correspondents, Asian publications still rely heavily on
international news agencies, particularly Reuters.
(3) While Asian publications generally tended to be neutral in their reporting
of European events, there were more instances of negative reports about
Asian events in European publications.
The study found that reporting of Asian events by European publications was
less than reporting of European events by Asian publications. Further, coverage
of European events by Asian publications was more extensive and accompanied
more often by illustrations as compared with coverage of Asian events by Euro-
pean media. As was to be expected, the Hong Kong handover was covered more
extensively by Asian publications, especially those from Hong Kong itself and
the neighboring countries.
The qualitative analysis revealed that there were instances of negative Asian
stories published in European media, the majority of which emanated from their
own correspondents. By contrast, in Asian publications, which relied heavily on
the international news agencies, stories about Europe were largely neutral.
Earlier in this chapter, we had alluded to differing perceptions about what
makes news and what are the news values that editors and reporters look for. As
the general dictum states, “No news is good news”. This has been interpreted to
mean that news by its very definition is negative in nature. Herein lies the justifi-
cation propounded by most journalists for doing what they do. We feel that while
such perceptions may help journalists to justify what they do (or do not do), jour-
nalists still have a duty to present fair and accurate reports of the day’s events in
a meaningful context, as recommended by the British Hutchins Commission on
the Press more that 50 years ago. Our study shows that the Hong Kong hando-
ver was not presented in a fair and meaningful context, particularly by the Eu-
ropean media studied.
Another dimension of the discussion is whether news is a commodity to be
bought and sold to the highest bidder. As our study substantiates, stories about
Wimbledon (including sexy pictures of women players), Prince Charles’ exploits,
political instability in India and Cambodia, Hong Kong’s sex trade and its un-
certain future, and other such stories seem to be what the media of both regions
want. While the Hong Kong handover was adequately reported and highlighted
in the media coverage in both Asia and Europe prior to the event itself, the cov-
erage tapered off dramatically very soon after 1 July 1997. Four years later, it has
become part of contemporary history and may soon be relegated to the realms
of ancient history.
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Chapter 6
The contest over Hong Kong:
Revealing the power practices of the Western media
Shi-xu and Manfred Kienpointner
1. Introduction
To take a radical cultural turn in the West-dominated language and communica-
tion studies can assume many different forms, as the rest of the book will demon-
strate. In the present chapter, we want to suggest that the discipline of discourse
studies can and should take a cultural-critical approach by studying how the
West itself represents and acts upon non-Western “others”. For, such an approach
may not only highlight and undermine everyday ethnocentric practice and preju-
dice of Western discourse as a whole, but also, at both a theoretical and empiri-
cal level, draw attention to the Western discourse of the Other, beyond perennial
western discourses of self-identity or whatever its other concerns. Further, such
work is complimentary to the understanding of non-Western discourse, which is
the central concern of this book and the object of enquiry of Part 3. Western and
non-Western discourses are dialectically defined – primarily through the notion
of cultural power (Chapter 1).
As a contribution to this cultural-critical move in discourse studies, we shall
take up the Western media discourse on Hong Kong’s transition in 1997. In par-
ticular we shall identify some discursive patterns of cultural domination in the
respect of cross-cultural representations and relations. For purposes of generality
about the Western media discourse, we have based our research on data selected
from newspapers and magazines published in the UK, the Netherlands, Austria,
Germany, Australia and America.
A largely qualitative analysis, this study will highlight two main discursive
patterns in the media. Firstly, the Western media take Hong Kong’s identity as
an object of Western warnings or threats and as such also an object of Western
wishes or desires. For instance, when the Western media apparently “ask ques-
tions” about Hong Kong’s future, they do not simply give an answer. Instead,
they issue warnings or threats, implying what the future of Hong Kong ought to
be like. Secondly, the Western media categorize and define the identity for Hong
Kong, instead of letting Hong Kong speak, and then use the descriptions as rhe-
90 Shi-xu and Manfred Kienpointner
torical and ideological strategies to constrain the action of Hong Kong and, in
that connection, of China. In this sense, it may be said that the Western media
determine the nature of Hong Kong in order to suit their own desires and objec-
tives. For example, the Western media attribute Hong Kong’s economic success
almost exclusively to British colonial rule, in contrast to the competing and un-
desirable accounts by Hong Kong and China themselves.
It should be pointed out that our choice and arrangement of data material
and research methods are motivated by our cultural-political approach. One of
its central methodological strategies is to expose recurring culturally repressive
discourses in order to raise awareness for cultural equality (see also Chapter 1).
Therefore, our data analysis is designed, not to be representative, but to be reveal-
ing. In this way, hopefully more detailed and critical attention will be paid to the
sorts of discourse in question and others (see also Chow 1992, 1993; Flowerdew
and Scollon 1997; Knight and Nakano 1999).
2. Discourse, argumentation and the media
2.1. Forms of argumentation as acts of power
In the analysis of constructions of and actions upon Hong Kong, we assume

that activities of injunction, threat and identity description can be accomplished
through the form of argumentation. Therefore, an account of argumentation is
in order. In our view, argumentation is that dimension and mode of discourse in
which an argument is offered in support of a (potentially) controversial claim
(Shi-xu 1997: Chapter 2; Kienpointner 1983, 1996). A claim can be a statement
of fact or a call for action; argument can be a set of reasons for that claim. Our
definition of argumentation above is similar to that of Van Eemeren et al. (1996:
5), though they seem to put more emphasis on the rationality of argumentation,
“Argumentation is a verbal and social activity of reasoning aimed at increasing
(or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or
reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or
refute) the standpoint before a rational judge.” Argumentation is rational, but, to
us, only within the context of the argumentation in question and critique of it must
therefore be based on that specific context. This leads to our next point.
Our argumentative analysis is not just aimed at disclosing the discursive com-
plexities and dynamics, but motivated by the political concern to come with a
possibly helpful critique as an additional tool aimed at the same political ends
as well. So the critical, evaluative thrust of argumentation studies might be use-
fully employed to accomplish the same methodological orientation alluded to in
the forgoing section. For, “[t]he general objective of the study of argumentation”,
as Van Eemeren et al. point out (1996: 22), “is to develop criteria for determin-
ing the validity of argumentation in view of its points of departure and presen-
tational layout and to implement the application of these criteria in the produc-
tion, analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse.” Thus, we shall specif-
ically apply the notion of argumentative scheme to the argumentative discourse
in question, drawing on the rich literature on argument schemes (e.g. Perelman-
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971; Schellens 1985; Kienpointner 1992; Walton 1996; Gren-
nan 1997). “Argumentative schemes (or structures, norms)” are relationships be-
tween claims and arguments that are widely but roughly shared in a cultural-lin-
guistic community. As minimal elements of a prototypical argument scheme we
distinguish warrant, ground and conclusion (cf. Toulmin 1958), to which some-
times further elements are added, for example, premises which deal with poten-
tial “rebuttals”.
2.2. Mass media as intercultural communication
It may be observed that media discourse in the form of editorials, comment arti-
cles, background stories or political speeches, for example, is not simply descrip-
tive or a merely running commentary on what has happened. Rather, it is argu-
mentative in nature. That is, it is normally designed to persuade, to undermine
alternative, undesirable versions of reality, to change the perceptions of individ-
uals, groups or institutions, and to advocate a particular course of action. More-
over, such media discourse can have an extraordinary role to play in the construc-
tion and transformation of culture (e.g. Bauman and Sherzer 1996; Billig 1995;
Carbaugh 1988; Grodin and Lindlof 1996; Thompson 1995: Chapters 4 and 7).
For, media discourse is a quintessential site and mode in which collective, cul-
tural ways of thinking and feeling, speaking and acting, explaining and evaluat-
ing are formed, maintained, changed and, above all, contested.
It appears that media communication theory has not paid sufficient attention
to the contemporary mass media as transnational and cross-cultural (but see
McQuail 2000). That is, it has a dimension, and capacity to act as a culture to,
or upon, national and cultural Others and this intercultural quality is becoming
increasingly salient and dynamic with the expansion of the new media and pro-
cesses of globalization. Mediated communication nowadays, for example, Tony
Blair’s speech on the Euro or George W. Bush’s talk of “the axis of evil”, is not
just intracultural, but intended, and received, transnationally and cross-cultur-
ally. Here it may be noted, too, that there are many mechanisms whereby such
intercultural communication can be accomplished. Not only can “we” mediate
“our” news actors in “our” media, but also “we” can mediate the Other’s actors
in “our” media and “our” news actors can be mediated in the Other’s media and
so on. Everyday media discourse such as these instances can be a powerful form
of intercultural communication and have significant consequences on human cul-
tural development as a whole. In this study, accordingly, the Western journalistic
communication will be seen from the perspective of its intercultural framing.
3. The contested cultural space

In the following cultural move to critique Western media practices regarding the
non-Western Other, we shall try to characterize two interrelated patterns of ar-
gumentation, as indicated earlier. To that end, we provide textual analysis of two
groups of examples. In making sense of these, the contexts in which they are em-
bedded obviously have an important role to play, which we shall make explicit
where necessary. Since, however, the historical context of Hong Kong has been
given ample description in previous chapters, we shall no longer dwell on it.
3.1. Threatening the cultural Other
In this section, we want to draw attention to a regular way in which the Western
media have spoken of the future of Hong Kong and China’s role in it. Reading
through Western media publications prior to and during Hong Kong’s transition,
one cannot fail to notice that one of the central questions, and concerns, raised is
over the future shape of Hong Kong and over China’s part in it. This is easily un-
derstandable. The West, as the rest of the world, has a stake in it. What is strik-
ing however is that the “answers” that the Western media furnish are rarely pre-
dictive, or explanatory. Rather, they are imperative in nature. That is, frequent-
ly, they declare, explicitly or indirectly, what the future of Hong Kong ought to
be like and what China must and must not do. Consequently, they turn a cultural
Other’s future into an object of the West’s own desire and dictatorship.
More specifically, various Western media actors use the speech acts of threat,
warning or command, sometimes coupled with promise of reward, in speaking
of the future of Hong Kong and of China’s behavior. Often it is said to the effect,
“let Hong Kong remain Hong Kong or else we will ...”. In such cases, they invoke
(American-) Western power, Hong Kong and China’s own “self-interest”, the dire
“consequences” if “they” (fail to) do such and such, and so on and so forth. How-
ever, such “self-interest” and “consequences” are also inextricably linked with the
West’s own norms and perspectives. What Hong Kong should become and what
China is allowed to do and obliged to do with regard to Hong Kong are therefore
also premised on Western wishes, Western plans and, above all, Western rules.
These cross-cultural argumentative media practices can then be seen as perform-
ing acts of patronizing and intimidation. Seen from another perspective, the fu-
ture identity of Hong Kong has less to do with the West’s genuine interest in Hong
Kong’s possible cultural development than to do with the West’s own self-interest
and desire to regiment the cultural Other’s behavior accordingly.
Let us look at a few examples to see how such coercive mediation of the fu-
ture identity of Hong Kong is exercised in various Western media.
Example [1]
[...] the most fascinating question is not how China will change Hong Kong but
how Hong Kong will change China – and the world.
Human rights in Hong Kong are already emerging as another focal point for Chi-
na-American relations, and any kind of crackdown in the territory could trigger a
serious downward spiral in relations between Washington and Beijing. “Big change
is coming – to whom and how?” International Herald Tribune, 01/07/97
In this example from the American newspaper, apparently, an inquisitive ques-

tion is raised – what Hong Kong will turn into after its return to China; N.B. “the
most fascinating question”. And yet, far from being a cultural development to be
speculated about or predicted, Hong Kong’s future is already being fashioned by
external desires and concerns. First, it is pointed out to China that human rights
in Hong Kong have already emerged as an issue. The paper alerts China, too,
that this is becoming central to its relation with the United States. Further, it is-
sues a more stern warning to the Chinese government’s leaders (N.B. “Beijing
and Washington”): they may be given a punishment of “a serious downward spi-
ral in relations between Washington and Beijing ‘if they dare to attempt’ any
kind of crackdown in the territory”. Of course one of the basic premises under-
lying these statements regarding the Sino-American relations is that China needs
a good relationship with the U.S. Thus, it may not be an exaggeration to say that
“Big change is coming – to whom and how?” (the title of the article) is a local
cultural development for the American media, and the American Administration
whose interest it represents, to prescribe and engineer.
Example [2]
This is why all the rhetoric about Hong Kong’s future has a far larger purpose; it
is really about China’s future.
[...]
Will the Hong Kong handover advance or retard US-China relations? It depends
upon two factors. First, China must ensure that “one country, two systems” works,
which means honoring the Basic Law it has endorsed to secure Hong Kong’s
guarantees.
[...]
But if “one country, two systems” has this design tension, it contains its reward.
[...] Once China shows the concept works in practice, then it has the perfect ar-
gument to put the incorporation of Taiwan on the agenda. “Whose values will
prevail?” The Australian, 02/07/97
This Australian text at the historic time would be expected to be in the same “nat-
ural” context of questioning about what Hong Kong will become. However, the
question posed here is a preformulated and designed one: it is linked specifically
with the “make or break” of the Sino-American relations (“advance or retard”);
in addition, it is concerned with “[w]hose values prevail?” More importantly, the
answer given to it is not a prediction or description, but an injunction to China.
It is an injunction because it tells China what it must do (“must ensure”); it is an
injunction also because it specifies or stipulates for China (the meaning of) what
it must do (”which means”). Although this imperative is issued by different (viz.
Australian) media, they reflect the same concern or desire: namely, China does
what the media require.
Hong Kong’s future identity (in that connection what China must [not] do to
it) is not only an object of discursive coercion, but it may be an object for Ameri-
can-Western reward as well, if certain conditions are met. Thus, in this text, what
China will do and what Hong Kong will be are not just a matter for threatening
and warning, but are placed in a moral order which the media, and the West-
ern interests they represent, set for them as well. Here it may be recalled that it
is widely understood that China needs a good relationship with Washington, not
least with regard to the issue of Taiwan.
In the following two Austrian examples, the course of future is laid out force-
fully for the Chinese government and Hong Kong by stressing the “internation-
al” norm as well as “their own interest”:
Example [3]
Ein Satz sollte unauslöschlich in das Gedächtnis der Beijinger Führung sowie in
das von Tung Chee-hwa, des Regierungschefs der chinesischen Sonderverwal-
tungszone Hong Kong, eingeschrieben sein: Die Augen der Welt sind auf Hong
Kong gerichtet [...]. Beijing sollte schon im eigenen Interesse Hong Kong Hong
Kong sein lassen. Nicht nur, weil es die vielzitierte Gans ist, die goldene Eier legt.
China wird doch, sollte man hoffen dürfen, auf die Tilgung der einen Schmach
nicht eine neue folgen lassen: die Zerstörung des wiedererlangten Territoriums.
(One sentence should be irreversibly engraved on the memory of both Beijing’s
leaders and Tung Chee-hwa, the chief executive of the Chinese Special Admin-
istrative Region of Hong Kong: The eyes of the world are directed at Hong Kong
[...]. In its own interest, Beijing should let Hong Kong remain Hong Kong. Not
just because it is the much-quoted goose which lays golden eggs, but also be-
cause, after the elimination of one humiliation, China will not let a new one fol-
low (at least, we may hope so): the destruction of the regained territory.) “Ein
Land, zwei Systeme (One country, two systems)”, DER STANDARD [An Aus-
trian newspaper], 01/07/97
Example [4]
Machte Peking das Vertrauen in die Finanz- und Handelsmetropole zunichte,
gingen ihm unschätzbare wirtschaftliche Möglichkeiten verloren. Damit würde
aber auch das Vertrauen des Auslandes in Chinas Politik der Öffnung schwer er-
schüttert. (If Beijing destroyed the confidence in the financial and commercial
metropolis [Hong Kong], then it would lose invaluable financial opportunities.
At the same time, the confidence abroad in China’s policy of opening would be
seriously shaken) Helmut L. Müller: “Hong Kong wird zum Testfall (Hong Kong
will be a testcase)”, SALZBURGER NACHRICHTEN [An Austrian newspa-
per], 28/06/97
Like the previous two texts, these two are also concerned, implicitly, with the
question of the future of Hong Kong, with special reference to the role of Chi-
na in the process. Just as in the previous examples, the future development of
Hong Kong is woven into the argumentative discourse. Especially the text in Ex-
ample [3] strongly reminds China and Hong Kong (leaders) that they should re-
member the rule and expectation of “the world”: N.B. “should be irreversibly en-
graved on the memory” and “the eyes of the world are directed at Hong Kong”.
Formulated in this way, this reminder also sends an explicit injunction and warn-
ing: the “the world” – the Big Brother – is watching and you should never for-
get it. (In this text, the threat comes from a broader agent – “the world”, instead
of “Washington”.)
In addition, slightly different from the external “reward” argument in Exam-
ple [2], the “self-interest” strategy is used in these two texts: that is, the argumen-
tative discourse appeals to the China’s “own stake” in Hong Kong. The two texts
analyze for China its stake into two kinds: one positive (“the much-quoted goose
which lays golden eggs”) and one negative (“let a new one [humiliation] follow
[...]: the destruction of the regained territory”; “lose invaluable financial oppor-
tunities” and “the confidence abroad in China’s policy of opening would be se-
riously shaken”). However, it might be pointed out that what China is persuaded
to do here dovetails precisely with what “the world” requires, namely, “let Hong
Kong remain Hong Kong”, or in other words, keeping the status quo. A similar
restrictive kind of way of prescribing the cultural Other’s future may be seen in
the next Dutch example:
Example [5]
Succes van Hongkongs experiment zal blijken uit degrag locale grootheden. (The
success of Hong Kong’s experiment is yet to be seen from the behavior of the lo-
cal figures.) De Volkskrant, 02/07/97
Here the statement strategically links the Other’s preferred future outcome of
Hong Kong’s transition to the “behavior” of one particular group of people. By
the same act, it excludes other factors. In this way, it places the responsibility, and
possible blame, on the named group of people.
3.2. Speaking for the Other
If the kind of discourse characterized above attempts to engineer the future of

a cultural Other through warning, threat and patronization, then there is anoth-
er kind of domineering discourse in the Western media that categorizes and de-
fines the cultural Other’s present and past in an authoritarian, ahistorical and de-
rogative way. Such discourse is often premised on some authoritarian and “true”
knowledge, some Western standpoint, or some negative “facts”. In this perspec-
tive, the categorizations and characterizations of cultural Other are part of the
rhetorical strategies to suit the West’s own desires and perspectives (Shi-xu 1996).
Consequently, an asymmetrical cultural relationship emerges: the cultural Other
is silenced, dismissed and belittled, thereby the West’s knowledge, authority and
thus superiority are maintained.
The issue here is, of course, not that of definition and categorization. A cul-
ture perhaps always needs to categorize and define its own reality and others.
Rather, what we take issue with is the manner – the certainty, the authority, the
disdain – in which a culture speaks of the Other and, consistent with it, the lack
of willingness to construct with the Other the realities in question. Such a criti-
cal attempt is all the more useful in the contemporary context of decolonization:
if the West has always spoken for and instead of its Other in the past, alternative,
new voices are harder to suppress in the future.
To have a concrete idea of what certainty, what authority and what disdain
have continued to be at work and how in the Western media, let us look at some
examples. We shall begin with how the former British Governor of Hong Kong
determines the past cause of success of Hong Kong (Example [6]) and how he
defines its present state (Example [7]):
Example [6]
I get thrown back again and again to a wonderful quotation of de Tocqueville, in
which he said if you want to know why a country or a city is rich and prosper-
ous don’t look at its forests, don’t look at its harbours, don’t look at other national
resources, look at its laws. Does it have laws which encourage people and help
people to thrive and excel? And that’s precisely what Hong Kong has had. “We
did a pretty good job”, [interview with Christopher Patten] Newsweek Special
Issue, 05/07/97
It should be noted that in the background of this argument there were many dif-
ferent kinds of explanations of Hong Kong’s success, especially China’s and Hong
Kong’s among them. It may be observed in this text that plausible causal candi-
dates for Hong Kong’s success are ruled out one by one (N.B. the alliteration of
don’ts) and the one singled out is highlighted as a result. The negations here ef-
fectively invoke but undermine alternative accounts, potential or real. The con-
struction of auto-question-and-answer (“Does it have laws which encourage ...
to excel? And that’s precisely what Hong Kong has had”), which might be in-
terpreted as the output of a rhetorical strategy which renders the premises of an
argument more evident (a figure called “subiectio” in ancient rhetoric, Quintil-
ianus 1953: 9.2.14f.), has a similar effect. More importantly, the recourse to the
authority of de Tocqueville most effectively warrants the preferred explanation.
In this perspective, it becomes clear that it is the laws established by the British
government that caused the actions that led to Hong Kong’s success, though such
an understanding would be based on the presupposed knowledge about the role
of the British administration in the laws. It may be argued, therefore, that the re-
ality of how Hong Kong has achieved economical success is associated with an
argumentative and sociocultural motive, viz. excluding alternative claims of the
causes and thereby glorifying British colonial rule (“its laws”). This may also be
evidenced by Patten’s quotation in the title.
It is in this context of seeing Hong Kong’s success as the result of British rule
that Patten categorizes and defines the current Hong Kong:
Example [7]
Christopher Patten: [...] It [Hong Kong ...] is a very international city. And I think
that anything which detracts from that in the future would be very damaging.
“We did a pretty good job”, Newsweek Special Issue, 05/07/97
In this instance, the former Governor of Hong Kong categorizes Hong Kong in
a particular way (i.e. “very international”), against possible others. (Here it may
be added that Patten talks about this also in the context of his daughters hav-
ing many international friends there.) Further, he defines that particular qual-
ity of Hong Kong as valuable and something that Hong Kong and China must
keep. That this definition is also presented as a warning is marked by calling
other kinds of identity as negative (note “very damaging”). Thus, this authori-
tarian way of characterizing Hong Kong as “very international”, in the context
of its return to China, not only ignores or excludes a possible alternative, native
perspective, but also, with the warning, has the effect of restraining the cultural
Other’s sphere of action.
A similar Other-denying way of defining the Other’s situation may be seen in
the following German text:
Example [8]
Martin Lee kann jedoch einen überzeugenderen Trumpf ausspielen, für den es
kein Gegenargument gibt: „Hong Kong verdankt seinen ungeheuren Erfolg al-
lein seinen Freiheiten“. (Martin Lee, however, can play a more convincing trump
card, against which there is no counter argument: “Hong Kong owes its huge suc-
cess exclusively to its political liberties”.) Gabriele Venzky: “Recht muss Recht
bleiben (The law’s the law)”, ZEIT Punkte 3 (1997), p. 77.
Here the newspaper article’s author defines an argument about Hong Kong as ex-
clusive and overwhelming (note “a more convincing trump card, against which
there is no counter argument”). Importantly, it should be realized that in the
background of the German author’s favored argument, there have been numer-
ous very different and even contrary arguments, from Hong Kong, from China
and elsewhere. Such universalist and repressive practice constitutes again a re-
lationship of domination, or specifically what might be called that of “the West
speaks for its Other”.
Example [9]
At dawn today, China stamped its authority on its new possession, when 4,000
troops backed by armored cars and helicopters crossed into the territory. [...]
[...]
At the formal handover ceremony, Prince Charles bequeathed Britain’s last big
overseas domain to Jiang Zemin, a former trainee at the Stalin Auto Works in
Moscow and now head of the world’s last major, albeit zealously capitalist, Com-
munist Party.
[...]
The substitute legislature immediately began its first formal session, ready to pass
an omnibus law activating a string of legislation, including curbs on protests and
the funding of political parties, which had been approved before the handover.
“Last hurrah and empire that covered a quarter of the globe closes down”, The
Guardian, 01/07/97
There are several features worth noting here. For one thing, the Guardian arti-
cle still refuses to recognize the historical fact of British aggression and coloni-
zation (“new possession”, “Prince Charles bequeathed Britain’s last big overseas
domain”). For another, it selects potentially negative aspects to define situations

(“4,000 troops backed by armored cars and helicopters”, “a former trainee at the
Stalin Auto Works in Moscow”, “legislation, including curbs on protests and the
funding of political parties”). Furthermore, it creates incongruity, contradictions
or even ludicrousness in the Other (“China stamped its authority on its new pos-
session, when 4,000 troops backed by armored cars and helicopters crossed into
the territory”, “Prince Charles bequeathed Britain’s last big overseas domain to
Jiang Zemin, a former trainee at the Stalin Auto Works in Moscow and now head
of the world’s last major, albeit zealously capitalist, Communist Party”, “The sub-
stitute legislature immediately began its first formal session, ready to pass an om-
nibus law activating a string of legislation, including curbs on protests and the
funding of political parties”).
Undermining the Other can be achieved through even more subtle ways. From
the same article and from the same Western media position, a local native is cho-
sen here to make a desired negative characterization of the Other:
Example [10]
“Why must we pay such a price to be Chinese?” asked Martin Lee, leader of the
Democratic Party.
“We are proud to be Chinese, more proud than ever before. But why is it that
our leaders in China will not give us more democracy, but take away the mod-
est democracy we have fought so hard to win from the British government.”, The
Guardian, 01/07/97
4. Conclusion
We began this study with the observation that a cultural turn to discourse also re-
quires a look at one’s own cultural discourse of the Other. A critical self-reflection
is particularly relevant to Western culture and communication research in par-
ticular because it has historically and continues to speak ethnocentrically of the
Other (Said 1978, 1993). In this case, it will be interesting to examine how acts
and relations of domination are reproduced, especially in the now cross-cultural-
ly oriented media discourse. Further, we suggest that while the role of discourse
in the construction of culture(s) is now well recognized in cultural, media, lin-
guistic and communication studies, the detailed discursive complexities and dy-
namics of cultural (re)production, remain to be explored. So in an “inward” look
such as this, we should pay attention to the strategic ways through which cross-
cultural repression is achieved. Finally, since repressive discourse is contentious,
we surmised that argumentation would be an important device in the definition,
maintenance and transformation of cultures. Thus, it will be useful to investigate

how argumentation operates in the process.
Accordingly, we highlight two interrelated patterns of Western media dis-
course on the transition of Hong Kong. Firstly, we showed that the future iden-
tity of Hong Kong has been subjected to argumentatively organized, threaten-
ing acts of Western media discourse. Thereby, we revealed that the future con-
duct and development of Hong Kong and China are inextricably bound up with
the wishes and desires of the powerful Western media (and the institutions they
represent). Secondly, we showed that the Western media have categorized and
characterized the situations and facts of Hong Kong in ways that suit Western
interests and in the process also restricted the cultural Other’s own freedom of
thinking and speaking, or specifically, possibly their own ways defining and char-
acterizing themselves.
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Chapter 7
Hong Kong’s press freedom:
A comparative sociology of Western and Hong
Kong’s views
Junhao Hong
1. Introduction
The historic return of Hong Kong to China in July 1997 has been one of the fo-
cal points in the international media. This is partly because the event has a great
deal to do with not just the Asian-Pacific region, but also the rest of the world.
Economically, Hong Kong is one of the world’s most important trade and finan-
cial centers; politically, Hong Kong’s future is a showcase to Taiwan, which is in
a very complicated and uncertain process of reunification with mainland China;
and culturally, Hong Kong is the media and culture production center in Asia, as
well as one of the world’s major media and culture exporters.
Since Hong Kong returned to China in 1997, much attention – from both in-
side and outside Hong Kong – has been paid to the situation of Hong Kong’s press
freedom. For many years, press freedom has been seen as one of the cornerstones
of Hong Kong’s capitalist society and its democratic system. In particular, it has
been regarded as crucial to Hong Kong’s economic prosperity and political sta-
bility, as well as a vital part of the lives of millions of people in Hong Kong. It
has also been feared, however, that, after its return to China, Hong Kong would
no longer have press freedom. Thus, one intriguing question would be what hap-
pens to Hong Kong’s press freedom after Hong Kong’s transition.
Indeed, press freedom is a crucial issue in any society. For one thing, the de-
gree of press freedom reflects the sociopolitical framework that a media system is
embedded, for example, an authoritarian system, a totalitarian system, a libertar-
ian or democratic system. As Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) state, a me-
dia system is a mirror of a social system and political structure: the press always
takes on the form and coloration of the social system and the political structure
within which it operates. Thus, the situation of Hong Kong’s press freedom is one
of the most important and useful indices to measure the situation of Hong Kong’s
social system and political structure after its handover. For another, in any soci-
ety, regardless of its social system and political structure, media and communi-
104 Junhao Hong
cation issues are never merely professional and institutional matters; they always
manifest, overtly or covertly, political, ideological, social, cultural and econom-
ic desires and concerns. Therefore, a study of the views of a society’s freedoms,
especially that of the press, as in the present case of Hong Kong’s press freedom,
may shed light on what a society is like and what it will aspire to become.
An even more fundamental issue here is how press freedom is defined, and
whose and what criteria are used to determine the degree of press freedom. There
are two, apparently contradictory aspects to this issue. On the one hand, the dif-
ferences in social structures, political systems and ideologies are often manifest-
ed in their views, or discourses, of press freedom. On the other hand, these very
discourses can also be managed in such a way that they conceal those structural
and ideological differences. Further – a crucial point to emphasize here – the dif-
ferences in the views of press freedom may result in divergence in the implemen-
tation of press freedom, with regard to, for example, what kind of press freedom
would be allowed and to what extent the press can enjoy freedom.
Before and after Hong Kong’s return to China, Western countries have been
using their own perspectives and criteria in evaluating press freedom issues in
Hong Kong. The views of the people of Hong Kong, a population of seven mil-
lion, on the other hand, are largely neglected or ignored in the Western media.
More crucially, the very notion of press freedom is a Western historical product.
One may thus ask: Is the Western model of press freedom the only correct one?
Should that be used for the case of Hong Kong? For what purposes and with what
consequences? Shouldn’t the issue of press freedom be judged by the people of
Hong Kong and of China as well? And how should it be evaluated anyway?
Based on primary sources obtained through my several research trips to Hong
Kong before, during and after the island’s turnover to China, I shall first exam-
ine the situation of Hong Kong’s press freedom since its return to China in 1997.
Then, I shall compare the Western discourse of press freedom in Hong Kong and
Hong Kong’s own view of the situation. Finally, I shall try to account for the dif-
ferences between these views and explore the implications of these for cultural
studies and discourse studies. In the process, it will be shown that the Western
view of Hong Kong’s press freedom does not necessarily reflect the experience of
the Hong Kong people. In fact, it will be seen that the Western countries' strong
criticism of Hong Kong’s press freedom since 1997 has reflected clear attributes
of a Western hegemony: using Western models and standards for other countries
as the “universal” standards.
Hong Kong’s press freedom 105
2. Media and communication in Hong Kong

It is true that before Hong Kong was turned over to China, Hong Kong and Chi-
na used two different approaches to media, communication, culture, and almost
all political, economic, and cultural issues. But it is also true that after Hong
Kong returned to China, Hong Kong and China are still using two different ap-
proaches to many issues, especially politics and ideology related issues, includ-
ing press freedom.
In China and Hong Kong, media and communication play two different roles.
Their different media and communication policies, purposes, functions, and op-
erations are derived from or/and are accustomed to their own social systems, po-
litical structures and ideological frameworks (Chen and Chaudhary 1995). While
China follows the Marxist-Leninist concept of integration of press and govern-
ment, media and communication in Hong Kong represent a democratic or free
market model: media institutions do not belong to any political party or govern-
ment, but are regarded basically as enterprises; media and cultural products are
considered mainly as commodities, not ideologies; media and cultural activities
are generally motivated by economic purposes rather than political or ideologi-
cal purposes.
Historically, Hong Kong is one of the birthplaces of the modern Chinese mass
media and communication. In the past several decades, due to the abundance of
advertising revenue and purchasing power, Hong Kong has developed a vibrant
media and communication industry and has become a major regional center for
the world’s news and entertainment products (Mu 1987). Consequently, Hong
Kong has been a free-market stronghold, where media and communication or-
ganizations generate content in search of profits, and where the media and cul-
tural industry is highly free in the international arena. Press in Hong Kong is
among the freest in Asia, and its media and communication are the second fre-
est, only after Japan’s. For instance, a poll on eleven Asian countries’ media and
communication about censorship, quality and access to foreign materials shows
that Hong Kong is ranked the best, followed by those of the Philippines, Japan,
Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan.1
Because of the differences between Hong Kong and China, Hong Kong’s take-
over by China could mean a new challenge to press freedom on the island.2 There-
fore, whether or not Hong Kong’s press freedom will be maintained has been a
major concern among the journalists as well as the public in Hong Kong. With-
out a free press, a society is in trouble. As Patten asked, “How can a society claim
to be free if it is not possible to tell freely what is going on in that society? It is
through freedom of the press that so many of the other attributes of a free society
take on life and meaning,” because “all these freedoms interrelate; damage one
and you harm another; uphold one, and you reinforce the rest” (pp. 43–44).3
106 Junhao Hong
Therefore, the majority people in Hong Kong were afraid that Hong Kong’s
free media and communication system may be crushed by the communist media
system and consequently “the press in Hong Kong may be in danger”.4 According
to a public survey conducted one year before Hong Kong’s return to China, among
the twelve most serious concerns after 1997, the majority people in Hong Kong
pointed to press freedom, which topped corruption, inflation, and other issues.5
They believed that “China will present the press with many challenges to remain
free”.6 Also, most journalists in Hong Kong were very concerned with the “possi-
bly shriveled press freedom”.7 Even the World Journalists Association was worried
that after China’s takeover of Hong Kong press freedom in Hong Kong would be
reduced.8 Press freedom in Hong Kong has thus become an issue of worldwide
attention and carries much more implications than many other things.
With the knowledge of this, long before Hong Kong’s return to China, Chi-
nese officials started reassuring the Hong Kong residents about a few concerns
in an effort to ease fears over the future of Hong Kong.9 Among the concerns,
China was very well aware of the importance of Hong Kong’s press freedom to
the society’s political stability and economic prosperity. Therefore, on many oc-
casions the Chinese Communist Party’s topmost leaders pledged that China will
enact a specific law for Hong Kong and that the law will insert some articles to
protect press freedom and to keep the press independent from the central gov-
ernment’s interference.
As early as in 1994, Chinese President Jiang Zemin promised the owners of
Hong Kong’s six largest newspapers and magazines that China will firmly im-
plement Deng Xiaoping-set “One Country, Two Systems” policy and will keep
the press in Hong Kong free and independent after 1997.10 At a conference on
Hong Kong’s journalism in 1995, Zhang Junsheng, Vice Director of Xinhua News
Agency Hong Kong Branch, the representative of the central government in Hong
Kong before 1997, gave a speech in which he said that after Hong Kong’s return
to China, “Hong Kong’s press freedom will be protected by the specially estab-
lished Basic Law for Hong Kong, and Hong Kong’s press freedom after 1997
will only be increased, not decreased”.11 Just before the takeover, Zheng Jian-
zheng, Minister of Information Office of China’s State Council, once again told
reporters that after 1997, Hong Kong will be guaranteed “a full press freedom”
by the Basic Law.12 The central government also explicitly told Hong Kong’s me-
dia that “after 1997 the central government will not practice censorship for Hong
Kong’s media”.
Moreover, pledge of press freedom in Hong Kong by the Chinese authorities
is documented in the Basic Law, which was drafted by representatives from all
parts across China and passed by the National People’s Congress in 1990 and
put into effect as of 1 July 1997. This special law was a product of China’s “One
Country, Two Systems” principle for Hong Kong and that principle was enshrined
in The Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, the main document under which
Hong Kong is to revert to China. The Basic Law is intended to be the “consti-
tution” for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), the offi-
cial name for Hong Kong after 1997. In the Basic Law, Article 27 is specifical-
ly about press freedom, which reads: “Hong Kong residents shall have freedom
of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly,
of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and join
trade unions, and to strike”.13
Under these pledges, since Hong Kong returned to China, Hong Kong has con-
tinued to enjoy freedom of speech and of the press, and the press has remained
free and so far so good, because “no journalist has been arrested, no media and
communication organization has been shut down, and democratic activists have
been demonstrating”.14 China has been claiming that the press in Hong Kong af-
ter 1997 has been enjoying as much political freedom as they did before 1997.
3. The Western view of Hong Kong’s press freedom

From the very beginning, Western countries were using a Western-styled view
and discourse for press freedom in Hong Kong. Although their view is based on
the Western experience and is defined with Western concepts, it has always been
used as a universal model and the only correct model to judge all the countries in
the world. Therefore, despite the fact that press freedom in Hong Kong is pledged
by the Chinese communist authorities and documented in various laws and acts,
the West has often expressed its concerns with Hong Kong’s press freedom after
China’s takeover. In its view, the situation of Hong Kong’s press freedom after
1997 has been deteriorating and they have attributed this to covert or overt inter-
ference from the Chinese communist authorities.
Among the West’s various criticisms of Hong Kong’s press freedom after 1997,
the biggest one is that Hong Kong’s press freedom has changed from an approach
commonly used by Western countries to an approach defined by the Chinese com-
munist leaders. They argued that the Chinese approach to press freedom means
a limited, conditioned, and managed press freedom, or, a press freedom under
the guidelines, or the interference or control, of the Communist Party and gov-
ernment. In other words, in the view of Western countries, Hong Kong’s press
freedom after the handover is no longer the same press freedom as that which
prevailed before the handover. First, unlike before, even constitutionally, current
press freedom is under many restrictions. Second, press freedom is not in the
hands of the press, but in the hands of the Communist Party and the central gov-
ernment. When domestic and international political situations require press free-
dom, the Chinese Communist Party gives freedom to the press; when domestic
108 Junhao Hong
and international political situations do not, the Communist Party takes it away
from the press. In the view of the West, therefore, it is the Communist Party and
the central government that owns press freedom and decides when and whether
or not to give freedom to Hong Kong’s press.
Some Western critics further argued that, although the Basic Law guarantees
Hong Kong press freedom one the one hand, it also limits the freedom on the
other (Schidlovsky 1996). While Article 27 of the Basic Law provides the press
freedom, Article 23 sets restrictions to press freedom, for Article 23 stipulates:
“The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to
prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central
People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political orga-
nizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to pro-
hibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with
foreign political organizations or bodies”.15
To Western countries, Article 23 has little to do with press freedom; instead,
it has opened the door to press restrictions and given Hong Kong’s current pro-
Beijing government broad power to curb free expression (Cohen, 1997). Accord-
ing to a UPI report, Article 23 actually gives pause to every journalist in Hong
Kong, regardless of nationality, for, the article does not, nevertheless, delineate
what constitutes “political activities”.16 That means that China’s communist lead-
ership has a broader power in interpretation.
Particularly, Western observers used two events to support their criticisms.
One, in an interview with the influential Asian Wall Street Journal on 16 Octo-
ber 1996, Qian Qichen, China’s Vice Premier in charge of foreign affairs, con-
firmed that future commemorations of the Tiananmen killings would be banned
in Hong Kong, as would “personal attacks on the Chinese leaders”, however
defined.17 Qian later again stressed that press freedom “should not include and
does not protect rumor-making and personal attacks”, emphasizing that anti-Chi-
nese leader slogans such as “Down with Deng Xiaoping” will be illegal in Hong
Kong after 1997.18 Two, Lu Ping, Director of the Hong Kong Affairs Office of
China’s central government at that time, also warned the Hong Kong press that
“it’s all right if reporters objectively report, but if they advocate, it’s an act; it
has nothing to do with freedom of the press”.19 As some Western reports com-
mented, these discourses of press freedom were not only vague but also arbi-
trary – there were so many questions unanswered. What is personal attack and
what is criticism? And, what is objective report and what is advocacy? The an-
swers to these questions can only be open-ended, and only the Communist Par-
ty leadership and the central government have a final say. They concluded that
these remarks and discourse of press freedom made by Qian and Lu greatly in-
creased the “growing sense of unease” among the people in Hong Kong as well
as journalists and news organizations across the world, reeling from a series of
body punches delivered by senior Beijing officials over the future of press free-
dom (Sung 1997).
4. The view of the people in Hong Kong
Both before and after Hong Kong’s return to China, press freedom has always
been an important issue among the people in Hong Kong. Given the fact that Hong
Kong has recently gained democracy, this concern is not surprising. Also, given
the fact that Hong Kong is the only Chinese society in which “leftists, neutral-
ists, and rightists are almost evenly distributed”,20 it is very natural, too, that the
views of Hong Kong’s people and media organizations regarding press freedom
in Hong Kong since 1997 have been varied.
Indeed, it is true that there are still some people and media organizations in
Hong Kong who are still very concerned with Hong Kong’s press freedom after
the island’s takeover by China. For instance, in the view of K. Liu (1997), Vice
Chair of the Hong Kong Journalists Association, on the surface, the press free-
dom in Hong Kong looks like “business as usual,” but in reality, “if one listens
and looks carefully enough, one can definitely sense a lot of undercurrents.” Also,
in the view of M. Cheung (1998), a former Director of Broadcasting, Radio Tele-
vision Hong Kong, media and communication in Hong Kong after 1997 are rel-
atively free and “only relatively free,” because both the authorities in China and
Hong Kong “have shown more restraint than expected”. For example, when Qian
Qichen talked about Hong Kong’s textbooks, he stressed that Hong Kong school
books that do not conform with China’s principles should be revised, though Qian
gave no details of which textbooks would have to be changed or in what way they
contradicted the Basic Law. Despite Qian’s statement that “both the Sino-Brit-
ain Joint Declaration and the Basic Law guarantee Hong Kong’s autonomy in
educational matters after 1997”, willingly or unwillingly, Hong Kong’s textbook
publishing firms had to take Qian’s words seriously and many books were “care-
fully revised”. Another example is that until today critical reports about the four
“Ts” – the topmost Chinese leaders, the Taiwan issue, the Tibet issue, and the Ti-
ananmen Square Movement issue – are still taboos for most Hong Kong media
organizations (Cheung 1998).
According to these people, the central government has been slowly eroding
freedom in Hong Kong, including the island’s press freedom. Subtle and invisible
changes as well as open actions towards Hong Kong’s press freedom have been
taken either directly or indirectly by the central authorities since 1997. Moreover,
“there are a host of subtle changes evident only to the most experienced China
hand.”21 According to Mann, the common theme in the press is that the Chinese
110 Junhao Hong
leadership, long accustomed to press coverage that supports its own policies, now
is also seeking to rein in Hong Kong’s free-wheeling journalism.22
However, most people and media organizations in Hong Kong are not so critical
or pessimistic about Hong Kong’s press freedom after its return to China. On the
contrary, while some people and media organizations are critical of Hong Kong’s
press freedom since the 1997 transition, the majority people and media organiza-
tions hold a generally positive, or approving, view. A survey about the “health sit-
uation” of Hong Kong’s press freedom and the society conducted in the summer
of 2001 found that four years after Hong Kong’s return to China, on a one to ten
scale where ten means the highest, the public’s opinion of the degree of freedom
and the credibility of Hong Kong’s press is 6.54. This finding is very important,
because, according to a similar survey which was conducted in 1997, the public’s
opinion towards the freedom degree and the believable degree of Hong Kong’s
press was 6.44 (So and Chan 2001). The difference between these two numbers
is not mathematically significant, but it is critically meaningful.
First, the finding in 2001 means that in the view of the majority people the
“health situation” of Hong Kong’s society in general and press freedom in par-
ticular after the 1997 transition has not been deteriorating or eroding. And sec-
ond, moreover, the improved rating on the scale actually demonstrates that the
overall situation of Hong Kong’s society and press freedom in 2001 is even better
than that before the 1997 transition. More importantly, based on the surveyors’
interview with the media practitioners in Hong Kong, although many reporters
did have some concerns, worries, and fears about the future of press freedom in
Hong Kong around the time of the 1997 transition, and some of them may still
have some uncertainties for the future, for the past several years they felt at least
“things didn’t get worse or probably even slightly get better” (So and Chan 2001).
Especially, in the view of Hong Kong’s media practitioners, they were afraid that
the Chinese communist regime would bit by bit take away freedom from Hong
Kong’s press after Hong Kong became part of China, but surprisingly, the cen-
tral authorities have behaved “very tolerantly” towards Hong Kong’s press and
“kept their pledges” of press freedom in Hong Kong (So and Chan 2001). Even the
Hong Kong government-owned Radio Hong Kong has always been very critical
of the new government in Hong Kong established with the transition.23 Therefore,
although it is not predictive of the future of Hong Kong’s press freedom, so far,
in the view of the majority people and most media organizations in Hong Kong,
press freedom on the island has been “healthy” and in general has not received
negative effects by the 1997 transition (So 2001). Moreover, according to an in-
terview with W. Chan, Political Editor of Apple Daily, the representative “right
wing” newspaper in Hong Kong and the only Hong Kong newspaper that has been
forbidden by the Chinese central authorities to come to China for political news
coverage and to be circulated in China due to its strong advocating position for
“democracy, freedom, and human rights”, the situation of press freedom in Hong
Kong in general and for the newspaper itself after 1997 has been much better than
it was expected.24 In the view of W. Chan, press in Hong Kong is still enjoying the
same freedom as it did before 1997 and “no deterioration has been felt”.
One more interesting finding of the above-mentioned survey is that the so-
cial status of Hong Kong media practitioners has been declining (Chan and So
2002).25 Many people now are dissatisfied with the performance of Hong Kong’s
media, saying that there is too much sensational stuff in the media and the mo-
rality and self-discipline of the media has been declining. These phenomena have
been attributed mainly to the pervasive influence of the Western model of the
media (Chan and So 2002).
Hong Kong’s continuing press freedom after 1997 is not an isolated social phe-
nomenon. The results of the survey about Hong Kong’s press freedom are matched
by the findings of a recent survey about the public’s opinion of Hong Kong’s new
government and new governor. According to this survey conducted in January
2002, the public’s confidence indexes of Hong Kong’s new governor and new
government have all reached the highest since 1997, with the index of the new
government being 92.3% and the index of the new governor being 105.3%. Giv-
en this, not surprisingly, the new governor was the only candidate for the second
election held in February 2002 and won a second term as the governor of Hong
Kong. Moreover, even the public’s confidence index of Hong Kong’s future po-
litical prospect has also shown a steady increase. Compared to the number one
year ago, the index has increased by 9.2%.26 In fact, the public’s confidence in
Hong Kong’s press freedom, Hong Kong’s new government, new governor and
future political prospects are interrelated and interactive. Thus, it might be said
that the more confident the public of Hong Kong is in the new government, new
governor and future political prospect, the more they are in Hong Kong’s press
freedom and vice versa.
5. Critical reflections on different views of press freedom

In the above, we saw that, from the point of view of mainland China, there have
been continued freedoms in Hong Kong, including that of speech and press, since
Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997. One of the primary motives for the Chi-
nese central authorities to allow Hong Kong to keep press freedom, even though
it might be a Chinese-styled one, is to help secure Hong Kong’s political loyalty
to the Communist Party and the central government. More specifically speaking,
it may be suggested that four factors may have contributed to a continued press
freedom in Hong Kong after China’s takeover.
First, the Chinese communist leaders are bound to the “One Country, Two
112 Junhao Hong
Systems” policy and the Basic Law, both of which were set by China’s late par-
amount leader Deng Xiaoping, which warrant Hong Kong continued freedoms,
including press freedom. Second, the international community has pressured
China to implement its specially designed policy on Hong Kong. Before and af-
ter Hong Kong’s handover, state leaders of many countries asked Chinese leaders
to keep their pledges about Hong Kong’s political freedom and economic pros-
perity, saying that “after Hong Kong’s handover, China not only needs to respect
Hong Kong people’s economic freedom, but also needs to respect Hong Kong
people’s political freedom, including juridical freedom, press freedom, and other
civil rights,” emphasizing that these were promises made by China in the 1984
Sino-British Declaration and that was “an international agreement”.27 Third, the
central government wanted to exchange press freedom for Hong Kong’s political
stability and economic prosperity, the central government’s popularity in Hong
Kong, and Hong Kong people’s loyalty to the Communist Party and the central
government. And fourth, China has intended to use Hong Kong’s handover as a
showcase to Taiwan. The continued press freedom in Hong Kong has been pre-
sented as a good example of the Communist Party’s sincerity about “One Coun-
try, Two Systems”.
Western countries, on the other hand, have been critical of the situation of
Hong Kong’s press freedom and have strongly criticized China’s handling of Hong
Kong’s press freedom since 1997. One of their central arguments has been that the
present press freedom in Hong Kong is no longer the same as that before Hong
Kong’s handover. Now press freedom in Hong Kong is something that is given
and owned by the central authorities and does not belong to Hong Kong’s press.
In their view, press freedom should belong to and should be owned by the press,
and it should not be given to the press by the authorities as their mercy.
Although Western countries have often attempted to act as a proxy for Hong
Kong, as when criticizing China for its handling of Hong Kong’s press freedom,
the view of the public and most media organizations in Hong Kong towards press
freedom is quite different from that of the West. In fact, people in Hong Kong have
their own standards, choices, preferences and judgments. In the view of Q. Chan,
President of Hong Kong Newspapers Evaluation Committee, for example, the
press in Hong Kong should make efforts to balance freedom of the press and re-
sponsibility of the press; the West-advocated absolute press freedom may not be a
good choice for Hong Kong.28 Chan further points out that true press freedom will
never be without responsibility, and no press can be said to be a truly free press if
it is to be responsible; the society should have some mechanisms to supervise the
press, check the power of the press, avoid the abuse of press freedom, and make
sure that the public’s interests be ahead of the interests of the press. Recent sur-
vey results have clearly shown that, to Western countries’ surprise, Chan’s view
is widely shared by the majority of people in Hong Kong. Moreover, some peo-
ple in Hong Kong have questioned Western-styled press freedom, calling it “the
freedom of few social elites, economic riches, and people in power”.29 The im-
plications of these survey results and the criticism from the people in Hong Kong
ought to make Western countries to reconsider their position.
Based on these newly selected readings, let me attempt a few critical observa-
tions, with special reference to the current project of reading cultural others.
First, it may be noted that, through reading the cultural Other comparative-
ly, it becomes clear that even the basic notions and hence the referents, as in the
current case of the constitution of “press freedom”, can be different. These dif-
ferences not just reflect culturally different interests or concerns, but also have
important implications for reading the cultural Other. They point to the need to
read the Other; and they also render questionable the values that “we” invoke in
making sense of the Other. This leads to my next point.
Secondly, the normative judgments made without regard to those by the Oth-
er’s own can be not only misleading but also repressive in effect. For, different
assumptions and values are used, and erasure or marginalization of other per-
spectives universalizes one‘s own ethnocentric standpoint. In the present case,
the Western criticism, on the one side, has reflected a hegemonic tendency: it uses
Western models, approaches, and ideologies as the “authentic” and “universal”
standards. On the other side, Hong Kong and China attach, in fact, different and
new values to their notion of press freedom, for example, social responsibility
and the interest of the public over and above that of the press.
In the present particular case, thirdly, the Western critics who impose their
own standards in evaluating Hong Kong’s press freedom express an imperialist
desire. Their argument that Hong Kong’s press freedom is no longer the same as
before is essentially an ahistorical reading regarding the “Other” and an expres-
sion against change. As I explained at the outset, press freedom is not an isolated
phenomenon, but embedded in social, political, cultural and institutional settings.
When Hong Kong returns to China as a new historical condition, press freedom
will reorient itself inevitably.
6. Epilogue
Even though sharp differences between Hong Kong and China unavoidably ex-
ist, according to an interview with X. Yu (journalism professor and chairman of
journalism department, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, and a lead-
ing researcher on the press of Hong Kong), most people and press organizations
in Hong Kong are satisfied with the present situation of press freedom and are
optimistic about the future of press freedom in Hong Kong. They believe that
Hong Kong will continue to be the center for free speech for the Chinese media
114 Junhao Hong
and the center for political and international exchanges between China, Taiwan
and overseas Chinese communities, for this is one of the foundations for Hong
Kong’s prosperity, democracy, human rights and rule of law.
Notes
1. W. Liu and D. Yin, Asian Media Poll Puts Hong Kong on Top in Media Quality,
Mainland Near Bottom. China News Digest, 14 June 1998.
2. C. Henderson et al. A new era in Hong Kong could mean a new challenge to the
freedom of the press. CNN Newsroom Worldview, 29 April 1998.
3. C. Patten, Standing up for press freedom. Media Asia. 1994, 21(1), 43–44.
4. Wang, J. One hundred days after the transition. China Times, 18 April 1997, p.
11.
5. Z. Tan, The gloomy prospect of Hong Kong’s press freedom. China Times, 28 Jan.
1997, p. 10.
6. Will Hong Kong’s Press Remain Free? – Here’s What To Watch For. American
Journalism Review, Sep. 1997, Vol. 19, No. 7, p. 16.
7. Y. Liu, The freedom of press. World Journal, 1996, 20, A18.
8. Z. Tan, Poll shows the majority people in Hong Kong are concerned with the fu-
ture of the freedom of the press. China Times, 28 Oct. 1997, p. 12.
9. F. Wu and D. Yin, Beijing eases over the future of Hong Kong after handover. Chi-
na News Digest, 4 April 1997.
10. Jiang Meets Hong Kong Media Tycoons. People’s Daily, 31 March 1994, p.3.
11. Hong Kong’s Press Freedom Will Be Protected by the Basic Law. People’s Daily,
29 Nov. 1995, p.5.
12. State Council Stresses Hong Kong’s Press Freedom After 1997. American Liberty
Times, 5 April 1997, p. 25.
13. The Basic Law (1997), Beijing: People’s Publishing House.
14. K. Liu, Hong Kong Press Wears Gag. Windsor Star, 4 Oct. 1997, p. A9.
15. The Basic Law (1997), Beijing: People’s Publishing House.
16. Hong Kong Press Chilled by Self-Censorship. UPI, 24 June 1997.
17. Qian Qichen On Hong Kong’s Press Freedom, China Times, 4 Nov. 1996, p. 11.
18. G. Xie and D. Jia, Anti-Chinese leader slogans Illegal in Hong Kong after July 1.
China News Digest, 26 Feb. 1997.
19. Lu Talks about Hong Kong’s Media Practice. China Times, 28 Dec. 1996, p. 12.
20. C. So and J. Chan, The believable degree of Hong Kong’s media obviously come
back. Ming Bao, 15 Nov. 2001, C16.
21. C. Ligible, Hong Kong after the Handover. Metro Connections, 16 Nov. – 6 Dec.
2000, p. 8.
22. J. Mann, Chinese slowly eroding freedom in Hong Kong. Los Angeles Times, 12
Nov. 2000, p. H-5.
23. C. So, The ecology of Hong Kong’s media in 2001. Media Perspective, 4–6 August
2001.
24. W. Chan, Interview with W. Y. Chan, Political Editor of Apple Daily, Apple Daily,
28 January 2002.
25. J. Chan and C. So, The social status of Hong Kong’s media practitioners declines.
Ming Bao, 3 January 2002, B15.
26. Governor’s Confidence Index Sharply Increased. Ming Bao, 18 January 2002,
A10.
27. W. Wang, Clinton pressures China to maintain Hong Kong’s political freedom.
Central News Agency, 21 April 1997.
28. Q. Chan, Try to Balance Freedom of the Press and Responsibility of the Press. Ming
Bao, 26 January 2002, B12.
29. S. Cavallini, Watchful calm in Hong Kong. IPI Report, Oct. –Nov. 1997, 25.
References
Chen, C. and G. Chaudhary

1995 Asia and the Pacific. In J. Merrill (ed.), Global Journalism. 3rd ed. New York:
Longman.
Cheung, M.
1998 Hong Kong and the media: One year after the handover. Paper presented at
the International Symposium “Hong Kong: One Year After Transition,” July
6–8, Vienna, Austria.
Cohen, E.
1997 Hong Kong: The future of press freedom. Columbia Journalism Review, May–
June, 22–26.
Mu, Z.
1987 Mass media in Hong Kong. Publishing Information 262, 3.
Schidlovsky, J.
1996 Grim prospects for Hong Kong. Media Studies Journal 10(4), 45–52.
Siebert, F., T. Peterson and W. Schramm
1956 Four Theories of the Press. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Part 3. Complexity, diversity and Otherness of
non-Western discourse
Chapter 8
Unfamiliar voices from the Other:
Exploring forms of Otherness in the media
discourses of China and Hong Kong
Shi-xu
1. Introduction
In the last three chapters, we saw that the Western discourse on Hong Kong’s de-
colonization systematically repressed China’s and Hong Kong’s voices, as part of
the continued imperialist processes and tendencies. On the one hand, it often sub-
jected Hong Kong and China to warnings, threats and injunctions. On the other
hand, it kept silence about certain issues, or offered contrary views about other
issues. In this chapter, I want to make a cultural turn towards the cultural “Oth-
er” and highlight some of the mainland China and Hong Kong’s discourses or
voices on the “same” or similar issues that have been marginalized in the West-
ern media. My purpose will be twofold. On the one hand, I want to show how
incommensurably different the Other’s discourse is from the relevant Western
counterpart. This will effectively help deconstruct the Western truths and cen-
trality. And this will have theoretical implications, too: non-Western discourses,
including their particular concerns, hopes and circumstances cannot be encaged
or restrained within a “universal”, “integrated” or whatever other imperialist mas-
ter narratives. On the other hand, I want to reveal that that very particularity of
non-Western discourse, or in this case the Chinese discourse, does not, howev-
er, consist in some consistency or identity of linguistic structures and functions,
but some kind of family resemblances and even divergences (see also Wu 1999,
2001; Wu and Hui 2001).
Such discourse of difference cannot, in my view (Chapter 1), be understood
merely from a nationalistic point of view (cf. Lee et al. 2002). Rather, it should
be seen from a historical and cultural point of view. This means in particular that
non-Western discourse be considered from the standpoint of its embedding in the
broader international order of historically-derived colonialism and cultural impe-
rialism (Fanon 1967: Chapter 4; Young 2001). It will be particularly interesting
then to examine how the apparently “Chinese” and “Hong Kong” texts operate in
the broader cultural-power network and exert their forms of cultural Otherness.
120 Shi-xu
The new discourse of difference may obviously take many forms, but I shall
confine the present research to a few areas. Thus, I shall try to classify and char-
acterize the various texts in terms of particular topics, themes and actions con-
structed therein and with special reference to the textual and contextual means
employed to realize them.
In the analytic process, for example, I shall pay close attention to how China
and Hong Kong’s discourses put up a postcolonial, anti-imperialist stance on the
one hand, and voice China and Hong Kong’s sentiments, concerns and aspirations
on the other. At the same time, I shall try to tease out how the Chinese and Hong
Kong’s texts diverge from each other within the broad sweep of “non-Western
discourse”. Because these new discourses (as will be seen later) differ from the
relevant Western discourse in significant ways and constitute unfamiliar voices,
their study can prove instructive to the Western (scholarly) community.
2. Methodological preliminaries
The general methodological principles for the current volume have been spelled
out in Chapter 1. Here I will only mention a few more particular procedures rel-
evant to the task in this chapter. To start with, it may be asserted that the aim of
this study is not to achieve accurate or representative description of China and
Hong Kong’s discourses. Rather, it mainly attempts to draw attention to, highlight
and so tendentiously rearticulate some elements and properties of these discours-
es, especially those that have been marginalized or excluded by the West media.
Therefore, the approach to data and analysis will be qualitative in orientation.
Guided by this methodological orientation, I have adhered to two particular
criteria of data collection. One is that the texts to be taken up must have been
generally ignored or dismissed in the Western media. Another is that they must
be different in terms of the version of events or nature of action from the relevant
Western discourse. In either case, furthermore, the data must reflect a recurrent
discourse (i.e. not represented by singular or incidental texts) in the mainstream
Hong Kong and Chinese media. The media material I have chosen to study ap-
peared between May and July 1997 (see Primary Sources)*.
It should be noted that in this study, I have avoided direct and obvious products
of political parties as I am concerned with public media discourse. In that con-
nection, it may be mentioned that Hong Kong’s media are more diversified than
the Chinese media, which are largely state-controlled (Lee 1994; Hong this vol-
ume). Not infrequently there have been texts in negative terms and perspectives
vis-à-vis China (e.g. Apple Daily and the Hong Kong Economic Journal). There
is no point for me, however, to repeat or reflect those voices critical or skeptical
of China and the reunification with it, since the Western media have already pre-
Exploring forms of Otherness in the media 121
eminently rehearsed them, and because my purpose is to show to the Western

(academic) readership some discourses of Hong Kong and China that are unfa-
miliar to and repressed in the Western discourse community.
The importance of the historical background – the long centuries of brutal
British colonialism lying behind the current analytical focus – cannot be over-
emphasized. This has unfortunately often been overlooked or smoothed over, as
I pointed out in Chapter 1, which recurs in various nationalist analyses of the dis-
courses on Hong Kong’s transition, that is, where discourses from Hong Kong,
China, Britain, etc., are posited as simply driven by individual national/local ide-
ologies. Since the general outline of the historical background has already been
furnished in Chapter 1, I will not, however, repeat it here. In the remainder of this
section, I will just make a couple of methodological points regarding the inter-
pretation of the discourses in question.
The first point is about the in-between-the-East-and-West cultural approach I
want to take here. Contemporary culture, including discourse, is history-specific
and contested. Monocultural reading becomes necessarily ethnocentric. There-
fore, knowledge about the relevant cultures and histories and ethnographic expe-
rience in the local people are particularly important for genuinely intercultural
communication (Shi-xu 2001). Also, in reading non-Western discourse as I shall
attempt here, tension often arises between “master”, “elite” or “general” method-
ologies and local perspectives, concerns and issues. “General” and “local” per-
spectives need therefore be integrated as closely as possible. I come from China
but have been living literally in between Western and Eastern cultures for the past
fifteen years. This diasporic, intercultural, in-between-cultural and multilingual
experience has oriented, and motivated, me towards a pluralist and cultural-po-
litical understanding of language and communication, which I shall adopt here.
A particular dimension of this in-between-cultural approach may be empha-
sized here. It takes the historical context seriously. In the specific instance of the
China and Hong Kong’s discourses, this means that I must read the data histori-
cally, especially in terms of the long and continued colonial process initiated by
the European and Japanese aggression (see Chapter 1). Thus, for example, when
they express cultural and national pride on the return of Hong Kong, and when
they talk about their interrelations, we should understand such moves as a product
of the colonial and anti-imperialist history. Ignoring this past may easily mislead
one to conclusions of “chauvinism”, “extremist nationalism” and so on, as has fre-
quently occurred in Western complicit-postcolonial accounts of Hong Kong and
China’s discourses (cf. Chow 1992).
In order to reduce the obvious tension between dealing with large bodies of
discursive data and coming up with concrete details, I have decided to offer two
kinds of analyses, one “general” and one “specific”. Thus I shall first provide an
overview of a discourse in question in terms of the topic and the proposition(s)
122 Shi-xu
about it. Then to illustrate such a discourse, I shall examine a couple of concrete
texts with special reference to the textual and contextual devices that contribute
to the construction of the discourse being studied. (The bold used in the sample
texts highlights the formal properties of the discourse under discussion).
The English translation of the Chinese examples examined below is mine.
Here I have tried to render the translation as literal as possible – partly to reflect
the differences in ways of thinking and speaking across the languages and cul-
tures. It should be cautioned that some of the English translations carry different
meanings in the Chinese language: for example, “the Chinese nation”, “patrio-
tism”, “the motherland” carry positive cultural values in this historical context
of decolonization and the reunion of China and Hong Kong.
3. Forms of Otherness
3.1. How did the return of Hong Kong become possible?
Reading between the Western discourse and that of China and Hong Kong on the
question of the decolonization and return of Hong Kong, one would find the most
conspicuous and incommensurable difference is perhaps in the treatment of the
question of why and how the return of Hong Kong became possible at the time it
did. The British and the Western media as a whole are nearly completely reticent
about it. By frequent reference to the 99-year lease, which expires on 30 June 1997,
they make the inference available that the British government is “handing over”
Hong Kong at the time according to a historical document. The very persistent
use of the term “handover” is a case in point. In contrast, the Chinese and Hong
Kong’s media insist that the latter’s decolonization and return to China are the re-
sults of oppositional, anti-colonial efforts by China and Hong Kong. The broader
contrast here reflects and reveals, more importantly, not a nationalistic difference,
but rather the underlying cultural power competition and resistance.
In the Hong Kong media, there is a size- In the Chinese media, there is an elab-
able consensus that Hong Kong should orate discourse on what makes the re-
be decolonized from British rule and turn of Hong Kong to China possible.
that Hong Kong should be returned to It stresses that all the previous Chinese
China. There are expressions of con- governments rejected the unfair trea-
cern over the manner and aftermath of ties signed between Britain and the
the return, which is sometimes offered Qing government and that they tried,
as the reason for ensuring a smooth though in vain, to reclaim Hong Kong
transfer. But on the inevitability of the from the imperial Britain. More signif-
return, it is generally understood that icantly perhaps, it suggests that, at the
colonial society is a backward form of start of the long drawn-out negotiations

existence and therefore must be left be- in the early 1980s, the British govern-
hind and that many people do want to ment continued to refuse to relinquish
shake off the humiliation from the co- the territories obtained from those un-
lonial past. Moreover, it is frequently fair treaties. Eventually, because of her
suggested, albeit sometimes implicitly, increased political and economic vital-
that the reason for the return of Hong ity and newly gained international po-
Kong to China is that Hong Kong peo- sition, China succeeds in reclaiming
ple are basically Chinese and the return all the lost territories of Hong Kong
can inject new vitality into both China from the British colonizer. A variety of
and Hong Kong. Thus, for example, the rhetorical means, as well as large me-
author in an article analyzing the ele- dia space, is devoted to how and why
ments and forces opposing the reunifi- the return of Hong Kong becomes pos-
cation offers the following account: sible on 1 July 1997.
Example [1] Example [2]

⒣ᶃᓁᓏᬒ㈜㊗ᓁᓏ塓ỗᔌᒓ⊗㿄 ᓀᔌ噟ᒆᾯ >ಸ@ ⢗ᶃ⯅┢ᾠㆧ ┊ᒫ㮹
ᖠ웜ᩓ⒣ᄽᩓ㈜ᬒ巤㈜ᓥⲵ㵾◙䡰㞼㴊 Ⲕ웍怟㒵䡰ᩪᕫⷫⲵᒳᶃ弌ᶥᒓ᩵ᢌ᣸
᪔⸢ᄾ>ಸ@怟㒵㴊㈜㊗ᶶᨌ᩸⓼巤−៮ 㴊ᒆ坮ᢌ웍ᒓ⤅刪䥷⒣ᶃᓁᓏ◀ᤦ䕟ᒳ
ᒔ㉓ᗙ䞷䁁웍ᵦ㇪ⶲ唱Ɐ⑸ṑᒑ㉓ᗙ㴊 ᶃ㴊ᒏᒰᒓ⓹䇏ⷧ䔬웜[…ᒳᶃ] 㿄ᖠ㮥
仆㐸ᬒ❋➕䕙ᄾ[…]៱ᧇ⓺ᕩ᪔ⶥ웍ᒳ ᔭᤡ䭲᥉ᩗ⋛웍䖂᪎ᶃᤡⳄ䫝ἤ◀ᶃ峋
ᶃ⮿巯▆⯄웍怟㒵䕕㏔ᤡ塕⣯⋛䡹᧔᧝ ᶶᗓⱫ㵐⩖慞>ಸ@ ᓀ怟㒵㴊开᢯ᵤ◘
ᶶᧀ웍怟㒵嚖㇫伱᪾䔹៫㉓ᗙᄾ噟䁓ᨌ ᢡ嚦ᔌ♋倇⚭ⷧᕼᄾᓀᔌ噟ᒆᾯ웍ᒳᶃ
᩸ᩞᦜ웍ᠹ巤ᖁᗛ怟㒵⯅㍁ᕀ㣯⢜⯅ ⯅┢>…@ᓀ偩ᠹ怟㒵웍㘹屮웍᩶㔄屴弞웍
០⣆䞃⮿ᩞ⢜⑬᩹ᄾ坳⊗⽦웛ᒓᓀᓁ偈 ⶆ䕎∤㨶㿜ᶃ㴊−៮䕥ᒆ웍⩖ᘡᔌᒆⷧ
➕⟅嗲䂁㴊ᨌ᩸㇫ᖖ웍ᅆⲔ⤫ᅇ웍⓺ 㨶∤᩵仒㴊嚚䕕 >…@⢗ᕲ⵺ᤦ㑷ᣁᶶ
ⶎⱫ (Imperialism and colonial- ᗙᖠᢶ웍㌧ⶏᒳᶃ៷ᔭ០㴊弌⊂웍㌧ⶏ
ism have re-constructed many societ- 㿜ᶃ㴊Ⱬ㵐◀ᾭ웍㌧ⶏ⮿巯▆⯄㴊ᖥᾭ
ies; anti-imperialism, anti-colonial- ⢖⊷웍㌧ⶏⰶᒳᶃᒏᕩ弌⊂ᕀ㴊ᒓ⡎ᤰ
ism and de-colonialization then are a ᤡ웍㣿ᢱⲵ㌧ⶏ圙⊕⓹▀剄ⶏᒳᶃ㣿䣸
rather natural result. [...] Hong Kong’s 㿄ᖠᓁᓏ㪌剀㴊⦍▛웍⊷ᒓ᩵䞃ⶏᕐ
colonial history has not been complete- ᾯ㴊怟㒵ᵤ◘ᄾ噟⊷ⲵᒆ㴄ᾠ⓺ᨌ᩸
ly separated from her mother’s body, ᠟ᒑ㴊┊塓䕙剀ᄾᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ㿄剀웛
so the mother’s blood and emotional ᒳ᧔㊗ⱕ㴊㴄⓺㵡ᔑᄾ⓺ⶎⱫ
bond have long been implanted in her (For this day [...] our country’s gov-
own body. [...] In the second half of the ernment has repeatedly solemnly de-
80’s, with China’s reforms and open- clared that Hong Kong has been an in-
ing-door, Hong Kong’s economic forc- extricable part of the Chinese territo-
es spread to South China and gradu- ry since ancient times, that it does not
ally Hong Kong has become merged recognize the three unequal treaties
into the mother’s body. Such histori- that the British imperialists imposed
124 Shi-xu
cal processes are not something that on China [...] it had achieved greater
any Hong Kong’s politician or polit- productivity, strengthened the overall
ical party can resist or reorientate. national capability and raised its inter-
Guo Shaotang, Subjective conscious- national status. [...] These created the
ness cannot block the march of histo- necessary condition for the smooth re-
ry, Ming Bao, 30/06/97) turn of Hong Kong. For this day, the
Chinese government [...] provided a
First of all, it may be suggested that practical and feasible solution to the
this part of the article can be read as problems of Hong Kong, Macao and
an account for Hong Kong’s reunifica- Taiwan and, ultimately, to the prob-
tion with China as a whole. There are lem of the motherland’s reunification.
indirect and explicit dimensions to this [...] we realize more deeply than ever
accounting activity. The explicit verbal before that, without the leadership of
indications can be seen from such tex- the Chinese Communist Party, without
tual expressions of causal relations as the motherland’s thriving and consoli-
ಥ ⲵ (...) 㴊᪔⸢ (is a ... result) dation, without the great achievements
ಥ ᵦ㇪ (so) of reform and opening-up, without the
ಥ ᠹ巤ಸ⣆䞃⮿ᩞ⢜⑬᩹ (not some- persevering of New China’s third-gen-
thing that ... can resist or re-orien- eration leadership, especially without
tate) the guidance of Deng Xiaoping’s the-
ory of building-socialism-with-Chi-
There are hence three sub-accounts nese-characteristics, Hong Kong’s re-
identifiable in this text. turn today would not have been pos-
At the implicit level, the current sible. This is the solemn conclusion
text can be read as an act of explain- inscribed by a century’s Chinese his-
ing Hong Kong’s transition as well. For, tory. Editorial: A century’s exhilarat-
as should be pointed out, this text is ing event of the Chinese nation, Peo-
embedded, on the one hand, in the cur- ple’s Daily, 01/07/97)
rent article that purports to answer the
questions of how Hong Kong’s return A little contextual information sur-
comes about and why the opposition rounding the text may be provided at
to it did not succeed, and on the oth- the outset of the analysis. That is, pre-
er hand, in the general, broader con- ceding the current fragment is a theme
text of Hong Kong’s public (media) dis- relevant to the understanding of this ex-
course in which why Hong Kong’s re- ample. Namely, the old, weak and poor
turn to China is taking place is very China tried but failed to re-gain Hong
much a topic of debate. In addition, the Kong from the colonizer. Effectively
title of the article itself is a sort of an- this serves as a piece of “negative” ev-
swer (in terms of history) to the back- idence for the proposition being advo-
ground question of why Hong Kong is cated in the text – Hong Kong’s return
returning to China. These contextual would not have been possible without
clues confirm that the text in question the leadership of the Chinese Commu-
offers an account of why the return of nist Party and hence its achievements
Hong Kong is inevitable and actually (N.B. the last sentence).
taking place. The text proper then displays a
Having determined the nature of host of causes for Hong Kong’s re-
the overall text presented here, sec- turn. These can be distinguished into
ondly, we may now move onto observ- different types. The formal distinc-
ing the “micro” structures of the sev- tions of these constructed causes may
eral accounts making up the text in be recognized from a set of different
question. Here two levels of causes to form(ulation)s:
Hong Kong’s reunification with China
can be identified, one direct and one – The construction of the objective
indirect. Specifically, in each of the of an action, ᓀᔌ噟ᒆᾯ… (for this
three pairs of complex sentences offer- day ...)
ing accounts, the former part describes – The construction of the necessary
a cause and the latter part the result. condition of a change or effect, …
To put this schematically, where “→” ᓀ怟㒵㴊开᢯ᵤ◘ᢡ嚦ᔌ♋倇⚭ⷧ
stands for “causes” or “gives rise to”: ᕼ(... created the necessary condi-
tion for the smooth return of Hong
– Creation of many new societies by Kong)
imperialism and colonialism → – The construction of the possibili-
anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism ty for a change or effect, …⩖ᘡᔌ
and de-colonization → the return of ᒆⷧ㨶∤᩵仒㴊嚚䕕 (... provided a
Hong Kong to China practical and feasible solution)
– Failure of colonialism to separate – Exclusion of other possible caus-
Hong Kong from her mother’s body al relationships, ㌧ⶏಸ⊷ᒓ᩵䞃ಸ
→ continued blood and emotional (without ... it would not have been
bond with the mother → the return possible)
of Hong Kong to China
– Spreading of Hong Kong’s econom- In addition, it may be noted that the
ic forces to South China → merge of text also expresses a strong certainty
Hong Kong into the mother’s body → regarding its construction of the caus-
the return of Hong Kong to China al relationship. This may be seen espe-
cially in the last part of the text where
Thirdly, what is particularly important the assertiveness is made through a va-
to highlight here is the three kinds of riety of forms: 1) the construction of
immediate causes of Hong Kong’s re- deep reflection (“⵺ᤦ㑷ᣁᶶᗙᖠᢶ /
union with China because they direct- realize more deeply”, which strength-
ly and effectively challenge the back- ens its truthfulness); 2) the double-
ground Western discourse. Let me ex- negative conditional conjunction (“㌧
plain. One of the causes here is the ⶏಸ⊷ᒓ᩵䞃ⶏಸ / without ... it would
126 Shi-xu
movements of “ᩓ⒣ᄽᩓ㈜ᬒ巤㈜” not have been possible”, which negates

(anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism all other possible causal relationships);
and de-colonization); another is “㉓ᗙ and finally 3) the construction of con-
㴊仆㐸ᬒ❋➕䕙” (the mother’s emo- clusiveness in terms of history (“噟⊷
tional and blood bond) and still an- ⲵᒆ㴄ᾠ⓺ᨌ᩸᠟ᒑ㴊┊塓䕙剀/This is
other the actual connections with Chi- the solemn conclusion inscribed by a
na already formed: “怟㒵嚖㇫伱᪾䔹៫ century’s Chinese history”, which con-
㉓ᗙ” (gradually Hong Kong has be- solidates the truthfulness of an asser-
come merged into the mother’s body). tion).
While these causal explanations par- A number of kinds of causes of the
tially overlap with those offered in the return of Hong Kong may be teased out
Chinese media, they run counter to the here. Thus, a first kind of cause is the
Western notions that Britain is honor- anti-colonial struggle that the series of
ing a historical ‘agreement’ with China Chinese governments have engaged
and that Hong Kong is a separate en- in. Another is the recent Chinese eco-
tity and identity from China. nomic and political achievements and
Finally, it may be stressed that these enhanced international status. Above
causal accounts of Hong Kong’s re- all, it seems that the text identifies the
turn are not merely descriptive, nar- Chinese Communist Party’s leadership
rative and, for that matter, explanato- and especially Deng Xiaoping as the
ry regarding the return of Hong Kong. most important causal factor to Hong
Rather, they are argumentatively mo- Kong’s decolonization and return to
tivated and rhetorically oriented. That China (e.g. 圙⊕⓹▀剄ⶏᒳᶃ㣿䣸㿄ᖠ
is, this piece of accounting discourse ᓁᓏ㪌剀㴊⦍▛, the guidance of Deng
refutes the implicit Western discourse Xiaoping’s theory of building-social-
referred above and offers a differ- ism-with-Chinese-characteristics).
ent version of events and, at the same Thus, although these are to some ex-
time, constitutes an attempt to per- tent different from the causes the Hong
suade doubters of HK’s reunification Kong media discourse draws attention
with China that this is inevitable. The to, they, as a whole and like the Hong
characterization of the causal link in Kong discourse, oppose the common
terms of certainty and inevitability in assumptions made in the Western me-
the last sentence is a clear indication of dia by not only rejecting colonialism,
the rhetorical and persuasive nature of but also attributing the historical event
the account. to the side of the Chinese.
3.2. What does the return mean to Hong Kong, China and the world?
A second, very much suppressed theme in the Western media discourse regards
the question of the meaning or significance of Hong Kong’s return. As suggested
in the preceding chapters as well as earlier in this chapter, while there is occa-
sional mention in the Western media of Hong Kong’s “handover” as signifying the
end of one of the last British overseas possessions, it is predominantly concerned
with the “uncertainty” of the “political” and “economic” future of Hong Kong.
That means that it is essentially more interested in what the “handover” means
to the former empire itself and the Western world as a whole, rather than in what
it means to the peoples of Hong Kong, of China and of the rest of the world, es-
pecially as far as the world colonial history is concerned. The Hong Kong and
Chinese media, in contrast, are overtly and eminently elaborate about the vari-
ous symbolic meanings, that is, beyond the “inherent” meanings of the geopo-
litical transition. In particular, as may be pointed out here, they construct the re-
turn, including the ceremony thereof, as signifying the triumph of the local and
international struggle against colonialism. At this juncture, it may be suggested,
too, that, after all, if the media saw prior rational reasons for Hong Kong to re-
turn to China, as we witnessed above, then it might be natural that they also saw
special, symbolic significance when the return does occur.
A number of relevant symbolic meanings and their forms may be highlight-
ed here. Firstly, the prevailing term of reference for the historical event as used
in the Hong Kong’s and Chinese media sources is “ᵤ◘” (“return”) or less fre-
quently “⮼ᵤ” (“take back”), as opposed to the British/American Western “han-
dover”. (I have already pointed out that, in the West[ern media], the event is for-
mulated as handover and that “handover” does not connote any ownership and,
therefore, denies the basic fact of colonial history.) Secondly, there is a cluster of
interrelated verbal expressions of “joy”, “national pride”, “new beginning”, “new
opportunities” and “human justice” in the wake of the decolonization of Hong
Kong (though in the Hong Kong media sometimes mixed with trepidation). These
motifs are consistent with the finding above of the central theme that Hong Kong
should be returned to China, but contrasts with the Western discourse that regu-
larly voices concerns over China’s role in Hong Kong’s future. Thirdly and more
importantly, there is a prominent assertion in the data under study that the return
of Hong Kong to China marks, paradoxically, Hong Kong’s self-government for
the first time in the entire history of China and Hong Kong (N.B. the democrat-
ic reforms did not occur until after the Sino-British negotiations had started). In
that connection, it should be noted that the historical change is also interpreted
as signifying the beginning of the reunification of Greater China. Let us look at
some concrete details.
128 Shi-xu
Example [3] Example [4]

ᕐᾯ ⲵ 怟㒵 ⰶ䔰៉㴊▆⁑ᄾᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗怟㒵ᵤ◘웍⺍♝㷆ᒳᶃᕀ㊗嵰㎝ᔌ怟㒵
៷ᬒᶃ怟㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ㴊剤㮥웍⺍♝㷆伱ᘻ᧦㴊㴄⓺ᶃ䛁웍▆ᢡᔌ怟㒵ᬒ㿜ᶃ
ᒜ㯒ᒐⶆ㨶ᕩᦜ㴊ᒆᒰᒳᶃᕀ㿄ᖠ䞷䁁 ᠋ᶶ៷᪒ᩗ⋛㴊ⰶ䔰៉웜⺍♝㷆⢗ᕲᶮ
㈜㊗䕥㍁웍ᵤ◘㉓ᗙ웍ᓀⶏᧇᔒᕅᕀᩩ −⢖㿜ᶃ䕥ᒆᾭᒠ㴊囙呵ᒐ噎ᢀᔌ塓倇
㴊㿜ᶃᶮᕐ᪔㴊㨶ᕩᦜᩗ⋛ ㍮៫ⰶ㴊 ᒆ㇫웍⺍♝㷆ᒳᶃᕀ㊗ᓀᒜ㯒ᬒ⓹ᄽᩗ⋛
᤮ᤡ웍ᓥᓀᒢ倅Ⰽᦜᔪ㏇⣙▆ᔌⰶ㴊䄀 ᒔ噡㇫ᔑᒠᗢᢀᔌⰶ㴊厧㦴ᄾ㋥㎃㊗웛
屺ᄾ㿄剀웛ᒪᢼ┚ⶏᢌⶏ᪎웍㒵ᕀ剫ᒓ᧗ ᶮ怜垃᪊㯒┌㿣怟㒵ᵤ◘㿜ᶃᾭᖠᒐ㴊
ᒓᔨᄾ ᅆⲔ⤫ᅇ웍⓺ⶎⱫ(Today is ᅆⰍ㋍⤫ᅇ웍⓺ⶎⱫ (The
券剣ᄾ
the beginning of a new era for Hong return of Hong Kong signifies that we
Kong. The founding of the PRC Hong Chinese people have snow-washed
Kong Special Administrative Region the hundred-old national humiliation
marks the de-colonization of the most from Hong Kong’s occupation and that
modernized Chinese community in the we have ushered in a new era for the
world and her return to the motherland. joint development of Hong Kong and
Further, it injects new vitality into the the mother country. It also signifies
modernization drive by the mother- that we have made an important stride
land with a population of 1.2 billion in the course of national reunification.
people and opens up a new space for And it signifies that the Chinese peo-
East-West exchanges. Editorial: Two- ple have made new contributions to
systems should feature both separa- the cause for peace, development and
tion and integration, Hong Kong peo- progress of the world. Jiang Zemin:
ple should be neither humble nor arro- Speech to all walks of life in the capi-
gant. Ming Bao, 01/07/97) tal’s commemoration of Hong Kong’s
return. Wen Hui Bao, 02/07/97)
It may be noticed that in this fragment,
the return of Hong Kong and its cere- First of all it should be noted that this
mony are not described as what those speech is made by the top Chinese
words or the events that they represent leader Jiang Zemin and published in
would conventionally mean. Rather, a one of the major broad-sheet news-
variety of symbolic, often metaphoric, papers in Mainland China. Its impact
meanings of the whole event are pro- on China and the Chinese diaspora is
jected. Thus for example, “today” is therefore paramount.
assigned such meanings as 1) the be- Four broad themes of the symbol-
ginning of a new era, 2) historic free- ic meanings of Hong Kong’s return
dom from colonial rule, 3) return to may be identified here. These mean-
the mother’s embrace, 4) new vitali- ings are manifested in the four clausal
ty being injected in the mother coun- structures (“that ...”) represented in the
try’s modernization drive and 5) open- text. But it is the set of special devic-
ing up of new ground for East-West es that renders those meanings “sym-
exchanges. Very few of these appear bolic”. One of them is the use of the
in the Western media discourse, and lexical item “signify”; it introduces a

those that do appear at all do so only different or new meaning of a topic of
marginally. interest. Note that the term is repeat-
The construction of symbolic ed three times – a typical grammati-
meaning is facilitated by one of two cal construction in Chinese that gives
ways, one explicit and the other im- rhythm and emphasis.
plicit. The explicit form of producing Another is the epithet “new”; it
symbolic meanings is the verbal mark- gives further symbolic meaning to
er of “⺍♝㷆” (mark or symbolize or Hong Kong’s return. This is used
signal). This directly and manifestly twice, by the way.
produces an unconventional meaning In addition, the use of metaphors
of a given topical object, in the present makes the return of Hong Kong sym-
case, the return of Hong Kong to Chi- bolic, too. It is multiple in number as
na on 1 July 1997. Similar, comparable well.
Chinese words in this context would be Thus, firstly, Hong Kong’s return
“ᕩ仮” or “勧☇”. The other, more im- is constructed as snow-washing (met-
plicit form of expressions is metaphor. aphor) a hundred-year national humili-
That is, the topical object is rendered ation. Second, it is portrayed as usher-
something else than what it is conven- ing in a new (new-epithet) era (meta-
tionally understood to be. This is done phor) for the joint development between
through either the link verb “to be” as China and Hong Kong (not to say the
in “ⲵಸⰶ䔰៉㴊▆⁑ (is ... the begin- metaphor of mother and daughter im-
ning of a new era) ” or action verbs as plicit in the phrase). Third, it is con-
in “㍮៫ⰶ㴊᤮ᤡ (inject new vitality)” sidered as a new stride (metaphor) to-
and “⣙▆ᔌⰶ㴊䄀屺 (open up a new wards national unification. Finally, it is
space)”. In addition, the epithet “ⰶ” assigned the meaning of new (epithet)
(new) helps to assign a new meaning contributions made to the world peace,
to a topical object as well, by qualify- development and progress. These “un-
ing its property or effect as different, familiar” meanings give great scope
as in the case of “ⰶ䔰៉ (the new era)” and depth of significance to the return
and “ⰶ㴊䄀屺 (a new space)”. Again, of Hong Kong, unseen in the Western
new meanings and new themes such media.
as these are virtually absent from the
counterpart Western media.
130 Shi-xu
3.3. How are Hong Kong, China and the world related?
Earlier I suggested that the Western popular and scholarly discourse regarding
Hong Kong tended to emphasize the uniqueness of Hong Kong, hence its inde-
pendent identity, through the rhetoric of either “hybridity” or “colonial blend”
(see also Chapters 1 and 6). I also argued that this discourse used the “unique-
ness” as a strategy to de-link Hong Kong from China in particular. Consistent
with this discourse was also the recurring notion that Hong Kong is taken over
by another “colonizer”, China (see, for example, Chow 1992).
What is usually ignored or, rather, suppressed in the Western discourse, how-
ever, is the possibility of relations of Hong Kong with China and the wider world.
It is therefore important to highlight here the prominent discourses in the Hong
Kong and Chinese media that formulate relations of Hong Kong. The relations
are of various types, contrary to the Western discourse as well as the discourse
in Hong Kong that opposes reunification. From the postcolonial, multicultural
framework of discourse I outlined earlier, it would be realized that these new dis-
courses (re)articulate and maintain relations of Hong Kong with China and the
rest of the world, beyond “identity” and separatism. Let us compare these two
subdiscourses of relation-building.
There is a variety of ways in which In the Chinese media discourse on the

Hong Kong media does relation- links between Hong Kong and China,
building work. It contains various ar- there is not only a recurrent motif of
guments for linkages that range from connections, but also an active strate-
historical, cultural, economic, and gy to reproduce and maintain relations.
geographic to developmental aspects. One textual pattern found in the data is
Thus, for example, the bond between the construction of linkage in terms of
Hong Kong and China is rendered the shared historical experiences of (a)
through such notions as returning to foreign domination, (b) painful separa-
the motherland, compatriots, interre- tion and (c) continuous struggle to re-
lations in trade and commerce, blood, gain sovereignty. For example, it is re-
language, culture and geography. The peatedly said in the media that China
use of metaphors, too, plays a promi- has governed Hong Kong since antiq-
nent part in reproducing the bond. For uity, and that Hong Kong became sepa-
example, Hong Kong is regularly por- rated from China only because of Brit-
trayed as a “bridge” between China ish imperialist aggression as well as
and the rest of the world, a “window” other countries’ repression on the one
to the world, close “neighbors”, “fron- side and the weakness and corruption
tier-and-hinterland” and “root-and- of the Qing government on the other
growth”, etc. side. At the same time, it is often stated
Example [5] that the Chinese people and the previ-

怟㒵ᒓᕋ⢖ᓀ及ⶲᓁᓏᒜ㯒噡ᠡᒳᶃ ous and present governments have nev-
ᾭ峌⒈᷀㴊៎惷웍ᓥ⢖ᓀᒳᶃᾭ峌ᒔᶃ er accepted the unjust treaties severing
峋㿄ᖠᅈ⨫嗮ᅉ㴊▛⊂䚋ᄾ>ಸ@噍ᩁᧇ Hong Kong and China, nor have they
ᾠ⓺웍怟㒵㴊᢯㵐Ɐ⊷▆⁑᪒ᒳᶃᾭ峌 stopped trying to reclaim Hong Kong.
专᪎ᶮᒆ叽ᔌ웍ᓣᒉᓑ᪔怟㒵㴊ᩗ⋛ᣓ Further, the historical connections be-
嚚⵺䁁ᒓ▆ᒳᶃᾭᔑᒠᄽᾭ䝒⳵ᄾ>ಸ@ᶮ tween China and Hong Kong are, in
ⶰⷫ㴊ⰶᒜ䔰ᒳ웍ᒜ㯒⊌⵺嶆倇ᒳᶃ웍 turn, rendered through the shared so-
ᒳᶃᓥ⵺嶆倇ᒜ㯒ᄾ怟㒵ᗢᓀᒳᶃᒔᒜ cial, moral and psychological experi-
㯒ⶆ塓倇㴊ᔪ㋍㜿웍ⱨᖠᩞ☝⵺ᤦᒳ ence. Thus, a variety of psychological
ᶃᦜ웍᪒ⱼᓥᩞ☝ᶃ峋ᦜᬒᬒᾠ៉ᦜᄾ bonds are invoked: for example, emo-
䆚宑웛怟㒵ⲵᒳᶃᒔᒜ㯒㴊ᔪ㋍㜿웍ᅆᔠ tion and memory between the Chinese
㎸᫮ᢐᅇ웍⓺ⶎⱫⶎⱫ (Hong and Hong Kong compatriots. Similarly,
Kong has become not only the capital- future relations are rendered through
ist world’s pioneer into mainland Chi- the expression of political and institu-
na’s market, but also mainland Chi- tional support, cooperation and the ra-
na’s guide for “joining tracks with” tionalization of these forces. For exam-
the international community. [...] In ple, an eminent way of relating to Hong
the past over ten years, Hong Kong’s Kong in this regard is the elaboration
interests have begun to emerge with of the judicial notion of “one-country-
those of Mainland China. After ’97, two-systems”. It should be mentioned
Hong Kong’s prospects will become here, too, that the use of metaphor plays
even more inseparable from the broad- an important role in forming and main-
er background and the greater cause of taining links between China and Hong
China. [...] In the new millennium, the Kong: the mother-child relationship, a
world will need China more and Chi- bridge between China and the rest of
na will also need the rest of the world the world, a window for exchange be-
more. Hong Kong, as China’s most im- tween the two, etc. Look at the follow-
portant meeting point with the world, ing example for an illustration of the
will become not only more Chinese, discourse of connections.
but also more international and more
pluralistic. Bi Feng: Hong Kong is the Example [6]
meeting point between China and the ᒳᶃ᠋ᶶ┅岚㴊䕕㏔䟿ᶶ웍ⲵ怟㒵䕕㏔
world. Asia Weekly, 02–08/06/97) ⥙⋛㴊⑮ᾭ㴊䄀屺웍᠋ᶶ᛫┽㴊䕕㏔ἤ
尅웍䕟怟㒵䕕㏔⒬ⷫᔌᒶᨠ㴊᢯㵐웍᠋
Here connections and interconnections ᶶ≿怟㒵ᒓⰳἤ尅㴊⤛及웍⑸䕕⢖ᓀ䂹
are made between Hong Kong, China ∠ᄽᩗ⋛怟㒵䕕㏔㴊塓倇ᤡ塕ᄾ᪒ⱼ웍
and the rest of the world through multi- 怟㒵ᗢᓀᔠᾰᶶᧀᓉ䡹ᒜ㯒ᒐ㴊厾ⲙᄽ
ple levels of textual structures. A most 塗专ᄽ䢰噖ᄽⱋ㒾ᄽᙧ⛵ᒳ♉웍ᗢᓀᒆᒰ
obvious type is the lexicogrammatical 嚠᪗ᒜ㯒䕕㏔㴊䄝ᩩᄽ⻫⼇ᬒ䈧囙웍≿
constructions such as “᪒ಸ专᪎ᶮᒆ叽 ᔔᤦ♱᠋ᶶ㴊㨶ᕩᦜ▀剄ᓥᩗ⦫ᔌᒓ
132 Shi-xu
ᔌ (merge with)”, “䁁ᒓ▆ (inseparable ᩵ⶅᕩ㴊塓倇ᗢ㮮ᄾ䥕ᦝ웉削剀웊웛Ⲕᾯ

from)” and “ᔪ㋍㜿 (meeting point)”. ᅆ᧐ⶎ劎ᅇ웍(Mainland
⵺䘔 ᄾ
A second connecting device is what China, the vast economic hinterland,
might be called a “reversed-reciprocal provides a huge space for Hong Kong’s
clause”: in this case, “X 嶆倇 (need) Y, economic expansion. The mainland’s
Y ᓥಸ嶆倇 (also need) X”. This fea- healthy economic growth brings enor-
ture connects two agents through a mous profits to Hong Kong’s economy.
mutual action expressed by the textu- The mainland’s increasing investment
al structure. Still another type is the sein Hong Kong has become an impor-
mantic construction of a functional re- tant force in the stabilization and de-
lationship between two entities. Thus, velopment of Hong Kong’s economy.
Hong Kong is portrayed as serving the At the same time, Hong Kong is a cen-
functions of “及ⶲᓁᓏᒜ㯒噡ᠡᒳᶃᾭ ter of trade, finance, transport, tour-
峌⒈᷀㴊៎惷 (the capitalist world’s pi- ism and information in the Asia-Pa-
oneer into mainland China’s market)” cific region as well as the world; it is
and of “ᒳᶃᾭ峌ᒔᶃ峋㿄ᖠಪ⨫嗮ಫ㴊 China’s window, bridge and conduit
▛⊂䚋 (mainland China’s guide for to the world economy. These capaci-
‘joining tracks with’ the international ties have played an irreplaceable part
community)” for China. In this way, in the mainland’s drive for modern-
not only is Hong Kong linked to China ization. Su Bei (commentary): Tomor-
but, because of the constructed bridg- row will be more beautiful. Bi-Month-
ing function for two other entities, it is ly, 97 (13))
linked to the rest of the world. Final-
ly, semantically assigning the property In this text, the interconnections be-
of one entity to another also provides a tween China, Hong Kong and the rest
link. Here a future link is created be- of the world are created through sev-
tween Hong Kong, China and the rest eral levels of textual properties. First-
of the world by predicting Hong Kong ly, a semantics of economical benefits
to assume characteristics of China and of one entity for the other is created
of the rest of the world: “ᩞ☝⵺ᤦᒳᶃ through descriptions of economical
ᦜ (become more Chinese)” and “ᩞ☝ advantages which China brings to
ᶃ峋ᦜᬒᬒᾠ៉ᦜ (become more inter- Hong Kong on the one hand, and de-
national and diversified)”. scriptions of the economical links that
Noteworthy in these intercon- Hong Kong offers to China as well as
nections is that Hong Kong is given the rest of the world on the other. In
a dominant position therein. For ex- this way a functional relationship is
ample, Hong Kong is not merely one generated. Secondly, particular lexi-
of the two parties in a given relation- cal-metaphorical constructions that
ship, but also “៎惷 (pioneer)”, “▛⊂䚋 project different forms of linkage are
(guide)” and “ᒳᶃᒔᒜ㯒ⶆ塓倇㴊ᔪ㋍ presented (e.g. “ᒳ♉ (center)”, “⻫⼇
㜿 (the most important meeting point (bridge)” and “䄝ᩩ (window)” and “䈧
between China and the world)”. Such 囙 (conduit)”. They, too, serve to repro-
constructions assign a much stronger duce relationships and, moreover, are
agency and centrality to Hong Kong, effective devices because they are ev-
vis-à-vis China and the world, than the eryday usages and therefore readily ac-
Western media discourse would accord cepted. Finally, a macrostructure or su-
it. Nevertheless, it may also be noted prasentential structure marked through
that China’s “ᾭᔑᒠᄽᾭ䝒⳵ (great- “᪒ⱼ (at the same time)” links up two
er cause and broader background)” strings of clauses that construct recip-
is acknowledged as the basis of Hong rocal events: X relates to Y in a, b, c
Kong’s position. Thus, the mutual im- ways; at the same time (᪒ⱼ) Y re-
portance also constitutes a form of relates to X in o, p, q ways. As a result,
lationship. a higher level of interrelations is built
between China and Hong Kong.
3.4. How did Hong Kong’s success come about?
Still another incompatible and incommensurable form of China and Hong Kong
discourse is their explanations of Hong Kong’s success. China and Hong Kong’s
media provide accounts of the success of Hong Kong that are categorically dif-
ferent from those either implicit or verbalized in the Western media. Generally
speaking, they are far more multifaceted and wide-ranging, unlike the Western
account which attributes the success almost entirely to British colonial rule. Re-
call, for contrast, Patten’s argumentative explanation (quoted above); it is typi-
cal of the Western discourse which exalts British rule but rarely pays attention to
Hong Kong people’s own role and China’s consistent historical relationship with
Hong Kong and its recent economic support for Hong Kong.
There is another, perhaps more important, dimension to China and Hong
Kong’s account. From a common, but necessarily restricted, national-linguistic
point of view, the “variability” between this Chinese discourse and the Western
discourse would be interpreted as reflecting linguistic and ideological “differenc-
es”. However, when the broader but historically-specific contexts behind the dis-
courses is taken into consideration, which I argued for in Chapter 1 and at the out-
set of this chapter, then we shall see that the Chinese discourse has to do with the
anti-colonial reclaiming of cultural agency and identity. We shall realize, too, that
whereas the British Western media continues to defend colonial history by hark-
ing back to the colonial administration, China and Hong Kong’s media, through
alternative explanations, effectively resist colonial discourse as a whole.
134 Shi-xu
Hong Kong’s media generally explic- Especially China’s media and its me-
itly emphasizes the role of the Hong dia actors consistently offer diverse
Kong people themselves. In the ac- causes to Hong Kong’s economic de-
counts undermining China’s role, how- velopment and success. The fullest ac-
ever, there is a good measure of account I have found in the data is the
knowledgement of Western, especially speech in the English language news-
British, influence in terms of adminis- paper South China Morning Post by
tration and law. Nevertheless, it should China’s president, Jiang Zemin. Frag-
be mentioned that there is a back- ments of this are cited below:
ground story in the media that coun-
ters that view. Namely, Hong Kong’s Example [8]
economic rise did not begin until in the Hong Kong’s success today is, in the
final decades of Britain’s one and half final analysis, the work of the Hong
centuries’ rule (since the 1970s). Hong Kong compatriots. [...] Hong Kong’s
Kong was more backward than Shang- success today is inseparable from
hai until 50 years ago and its economic China’s development and the support
growth parallels with the economic re- of the people from the mainland. [...]
form and open door policy in China. Hong Kong’s success today is also at-
tributable to a number of other factors.
Example [7] Its advantageous geographical loca-
[怟㒵] ⢖ᤥ㴊ᨥᵦ웍ⶏᕀ剺ᓁ倇ⲵ䥷ᶃ tion, its free port policy of complete
ᕀ㍁㪌☝◙웍᧺ⱦ㍛偩塐䥷ᶃᕀᶮᅈ㿜 openness, its well-developed legal sys-
∼ᅉᓀᗛ⪤☝⓼ᒓ⚔ᓎ⺽웜ᓥⶏᕀ刪ᓀ tem and highly efficient team of civ-
怟㒵ᕀ㣿ᢱⶏⶲᔑ웍ᗌ怟㒵ᕀᒓ噍ⲵ⋋ il servants, and its effective econom-
ᗕᶮ圩ᷝᶶⰿ㴊ᒳᶃᕀ웍ᓀᗛᒳᶃᕀᒆⱬ ic management and civic administra-
䂁㊗怟㒵⊷᪒៼ᕜᶶⰿ㴊ᒳᶃᕀᾭᒓ㵾 tion, have all facilitated Hong Kong’s
᪒᫨" […]怟㒵ᕀ㴊⢖ᤥ䕕愒ᶮᔔᕜᕲ economic development. [...] “A shining
ᰊᔔ⤐ᒢ倅ⰿⰍⲔᬒᯌᒠ᢯㵐专᪎叽 page in the annals of the Chinese na-
ⷫ웍◨ᒆ䁓ᅈ巤惺巤惲ᅉ㴊㣿㈐䕕䪫㨵 tion” [speech by Jiang Zemin], South
Ἁᬒ㿄ᖠⰍᦜ웍ᘅ怟㒵ᶮ噍ᩁ᧐ᒰᒜ China Morning Post, 02/07/97
䔰ᒳ䞃ᾥ⤙ᗕᒜ㯒㉕ᒆᒰⰶᩗ⋛ⷀᖠ
ᬒ㗴㏇ᄾ䆚宑웛怟㒵ⲵᒳᶃᒔᒜ㯒㴊ᔪ Here a number of attributions are made
㋍㜿웍ᅆᔠ㎸᫮ᢐᅇ웍⓺ⶎⱫⶎ that involve not only particular agents
Ⱬ (Some people say that the reason – the Hong Kong people, but also to sit-
for [Hong Kong’s] success lies in the uational factors – the development and
efficient management by the British, support of the mainland Chinese peo-
but that cannot explain why the Brit- ple as well as a range of other items.
ish have not done so well in the coun- This “personal” and “situational” dis-
try of the “origin”. Some other people tinction of the causal explanations of-
think that the people of Hong Kong are fered here (Shi-xu 1999) gives clear in-
particularly capable. But Hong Kong dication that the speech/speaker rec-
people are merely Chinese who happen ognizes the Hong Kong people as the
to live in that place. Why do they be- chief force behind Hong Kong’s suc-
come so different as soon as they emi- cess. From a lexical and grammati-
grate to Hong Kong? [...] The real rea- cal point of view, it may be seen that,
son why Hong Kong people are suc- somewhat differently, three types of
cessful is that they can integrate the causes of Hong Kong’s success, de-
civilizations of the East and West fined in different kinds of force and
with commercial interests, creating a hence different kinds of strength, are
unique management milieu and cul- presented. The relevant linguistic fea-
ture that are “neither a donkey nor a tures here include (a) the sequencing
horse”. Consequently, they are able to of the attributions made, (b) the em-
seize every new opportunity and trend phatic expression, “in the final analy-
for development in the world. Bi Feng: sis”, (c) “inseparable from”, and (d) the
Hong Kong is the meeting point be-
“qualified” expressions such as “oth-
tween China and the world. Asia Week-
er (factors)” “also attributable to ...”
ly, 02–08/06/97)
and “facilitated”. These expressions
define and determine the different na-
From the textual, thematic perspec- tures of the causes to Hong Kong’s suc-
tive, this text is argumentatively or- cess. Thus, firstly, the Hong Kong peo-
ganized. It first rejects two kinds of ple’s role is the “root” and the most
explanation of Hong Kong’s success important cause of the success. Sec-
and then puts forward a third, differ- ondly, mainland China’s development
ent explanation. The initial refutation
and support are closely related to Hong
is done through a set of devices. One
Kong’s success but of secondary im-
is the pair of contrastive structures
portance. The third place, as it were,
that undermine opinions by pointing
is given to a number of other factors.
at what they fail to account for: “ⶏ
Then, a number of “other” factors are
ᕀ剺ಸ웍᧺ⱦ㍛偩塐ಸ (some people
say ... but cannot explain ...)”; “ᓥⶏᕀ external but not necessary conditions
刪ᓀಸ웍ᗌಸᒓ噍ಸ (some other people of Hong Kong’s success.
think ..., but x is/does merely y)”. An- It should be noticed that this ac-
other is the rhetorical question: “ᓀᗛಸ count of Hong Kong’s economic de-
ᒓಸ᫨ (Why ... not ...?)”, which as- velopment and success not only dis-
sumes an answer contrary to the one tinguishes different kinds of forces
implicit in the proposition in question. behind them (a case, by the way, that
These textual strategies serve effec- defies the simple division between the
tively to refute the background West- personal and situational attributions as
ern notion that Hong Kong’s success commonly assumed in attribution the-
is owing to British rule alone and the ory), but also offers a wide range of
lesser discourse in Hong Kong that it factors behind them and the widest at
is due to the special ability of the peo- that in the data examined. It is thus a
136 Shi-xu
ple of Hong Kong, respectively. These more comprehensive and more inclu-
arguments provide the foundation and sive account.
scope for the subsequent standpoint This account contrasts with the
that the text is going to introduce. British and Western discourse in fun-
The latter part of the text offers a damental ways: in the latter, the cause
new threefold, interrelated explanation: is largely singular and marked as main-
(1) the Hong Kong people are good at ly British, whereas the role of the Hong
combining the Eastern and Western Kong people is hardly mentioned.
civilizations as well as their commer- Thus, Jiang Zemin’s speech here not
cial interests, (2) they have been able only redescribes history and returns
to create an in-between, “third” kind of the full credit to the Hong Kong peo-
business environment and culture and ple, but also indirectly challenges the
(3) Hong Kong has been able to grasp biased Western discourse and rejects
every new trend and opportunity for its colonialist attitudes.
development in the past half of a centu-
ry. These explanations form an oppo-
sition to existing attributions of Hong
Kong’s success, reclaiming and high-
lighting Hong Kong people’s agency
and creativity.
4. Conclusion
In turning to culturally-marginalized discourses, I have identified and character-
ized a number of new and different patterns in the China and Hong Kong’s media
on the issue of the latter’s historic transition. In order to illustrate their details, I
have also analyzed some sample texts and highlighted their textual properties and
contextual functions. My emphasis has been on the various forms of Otherness of
these Chinese discourses as a whole, as opposed to the Western discourse in the
background, but I have also indicated their internal nuances and complexities.
Firstly, from a cultural perspective, beyond national relativism, I showed that
China and Hong Kong’s media display forms of Otherness unseen in the West-
ern media. Other than the taken-for-granted and recurrent notions of China as the
“repressive Other” or Hong Kong as the “unique Other” in the Western media,
China and Hong Kong’s media projected new meanings, introduced new narra-
tives, built up new relations between Hong Kong and China as well as the rest of
the world, and proffered new explanations. These unfamiliar discourses contra-
dict and refute some of the most prevalent notions in the Western media, albeit
often implicitly and indirectly, and bring into sharper relief the myth of the im-
perial truths and the reality of cultural plurality of discourses.
Secondly, I showed that the “Other”, Chinese discourses represented here con-
sist not so much in formal linguistic differences as in the social actions of anti-co-
lonial resistance that they perform. That is, they contradict, refute or undermine
the existing relevant Western discourse. This action dimension, as it may be not-
ed, too, constitutes the broader cultural-discursive order or relationship between
the West and its non-Western Other. In other words, the present analysis reartic-
ulates what the Western discourse has ignored, marginalized or dismissed.
In addition, I revealed the diversity and complexity of the non-Western, post-
colonial Chinese discourse. Although China and Hong Kong’s discourses on the
latter’s transition share important concerns (e.g. symbolic significance of the re-
turn of Hong Kong and the causes of Hong Kong’s return) and perform recipro-
cal actions (e.g. relationship [re]building), it is also true that differences between
China and Hong Kong’s media discourses exist. In the recuperative work of re-
building relations between Hong Kong, China and the rest of the world, for ex-
ample, the Hong Kong discourse seems to take a more assertive stance and pres-
ents Hong Kong as the major player in the relationship, whereas the Chinese dis-
course tends to emphasize its support for Hong Kong, the notion of Hong Kong
as a bridge between China and the world and the economically complementary
relationship between China and Hong Kong.
Note
* I would like to thank Lee Cherleng for providing me with some of the data for this
research.
Primary sources
ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ (People’s Daily), ᅆⰍ㋍⤫ᅇ (Wen Hui Bao), ᅆ᧐ⶎ劎ᅇ(Bi-Month-
ly), China Today, South China Morning Post, ᅆⲔặᅇ (Ming Bao), Asiaweek,
ᅆᔤ㎸᫮ᢐᅇ (Asia Weekly), ᅆⰍᦵặᅇ(Wen Hui Bao).
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2001 ╩᫐儤䉍䏖け㴊Ⓘ倕䢍刐㯶 [Linguistic conventionalization in advertise-
ments]. In Y. P. Dong and C. M. Wang (eds.),ᅆᒳᶑ㴊儤傆⇾㺚䃼䢍⡏㮮ᅇ
[Linguistics in China: Theoretical Explorations and Applications]. Shang-
hai: Shanghai Foreign Language Publishing House, 516–535.
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register variation?: Case studies of variation between Hong Kong and inland
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2001 Postcolonialism: A historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Chapter 9
Media and metaphor:
Exploring the rhetoric in China’s and Hong Kong’s
public discourses on Hong Kong and China
Lee Cher-Leng
The return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 is a historic event to Hong Kong, Chi-
na, as well as the rest of the world. And yet the meaning of the whole event has
been represented variously in the international media. In this contribution, we
want to take up media discourses from the Hong Kong and China’s press on Hong
Kong’s transition. Our aim is to document and examine how Chinese and Hong
Kong media discourses have represented China, Hong Kong and their relations.
In the study presented below, we show how metaphors are used to construct iden-
tities and relations, and how they are used differently in China and Hong Kong’s
media discourses, respectively, with special reference to the relevant cultural cir-
cumstances and ideological preferences. Through such an exercise, we hope not
only to amplify the “local” cultural voices, that is, the voices of the people them-
selves, against the backdrop of the dominant Western media discourses on Hong
Kong and China, but also to identify the complexity and plurality of voices with-
in China and Hong Kong’s media discourses.
Plowing through the leading newspapers in China and Hong Kong (see below),
we have found that there are five dominant sets of metaphors: 1) The Homecom-
ing metaphors referring to the handover (which include Embrace of the Father-
land, Coming Home to a Big Family, the Mother-Child Metaphor); 2) the Mas-
ter metaphor referring to Hong Kong’s identity (which includes the metaphors of
Own Master, the True Master and Controlling Own Destiny); 3) the Bridge met-
aphor referring to Hong Kong’s position (including the Bridge, Window, Chan-
nel, Door and Floodgate); 4) the Backing metaphor referring to China’s role; and
5) metaphors of relationship between Hong Kong and China (which include the
metaphors of Shoot and Root, the Lips-Teeth and the Flesh and Blood).
1. Metaphors in political discourse

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life,
not just in language, but also in thought and action. This view is in contrast to
140 Lee Cher-Leng
the general understanding of metaphor as a device of the poetic imagination,

characteristic of language alone or a matter of words rather than thought or ac-
tion. In other words, metaphors are not merely poetical or rhetorical embellish-
ments, but are a part of everyday speech that affects the ways in which we per-
ceive, think and act. Lakoff (1996) further argues that our ordinary conceptual
system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphori-
cal in nature. In his later work, he further stresses that metaphors not only help
people make sense of complex situations, but also help them describe, prescribe
and evaluate behavior.
Metaphors are used to transfer one set of abstract, unknown or emotional ex-
periences into a more concrete, familiar and material set of experiences. As such,
time is seen as a commodity and love as a journey. In his work on the metaphors
used on the Gulf War, Lakoff (1992) shows how “war” is conceptualized and ar-
ticulated in terms of a “game” in which one talks about “making a right move”
or “making a wrong move”. In stressing the importance and hence the power of
metaphor in political discourse, Lakoff (1992: 26) says, “Reality exists. So does
the unconscious system of metaphors that we use without awareness to compre-
hend reality. What metaphor does limits what we notice, highlights what we do
see and provides part of the inferential structure through which we reason. Be-
cause of the pervasiveness of metaphor in thought, we cannot always stick to dis-
cussions of reality in purely literal terms. There is no way to avoid metaphorical
thought, especially in complex matters like foreign policy ... metaphors backed
up by bombs that can kill.”
Similarly, Chilton and Schaffner (1997: 44) pointed out that “[a] crucial con-
ceptual and semantic mechanism in the production of political meanings is met-
aphor. It is important to note that metaphors are not merely one-off ‘rhetorical
flourishes’ but cognitive devices for forming and communicating conceptualiza-
tion of reality.” Metaphors are useful pragmatic devices through which politi-
cians convey their ideologies, arouse emotions, and manipulate thoughts (Kitis
and Milapides 1997; Lee 1992; Wei 2000). These metaphors allow the politicians
to highlight as well as hide a variety of meanings and inferences. In his discus-
sion on metaphors in politics, Wilson (1990: 104) says that “[m]etaphors and
metaphorical language have a central role to play in political communication. In
general, metaphors can assist in the explanation of complex political arguments
by reducing such arguments to a metaphorical form. They may be employed for
connotative or emotional purposes in arousing emotions and reinforcing partic-
ular perspectives, and they can be used to elicit absurd images, which can then
be employed for the purposes of ridiculing one’s opponent.”
As said earlier, metaphors are tools in the hands of politicians to paint the
picture they would like their audience to see. As an example of how metaphors
are used to shape the perception of Hong Kong after the handover, and how the
Rhetoric in China’s and Hong Kong’s public discourses 141
same metaphor can be used by different parties to achieve their own goals, we
shall cite the metaphor of a ship employed by Tung Chee Hwa, Chief Executive
of HKSAR (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region), in contrast with that
by Li Yi, Chief Editor of Nineties. Tung Chee Hwa says that from now on, Hong
Kong will be like a ship sailing into its bright future. Li Yi, on the other hand,
says that Hong Kong is like a ship sailing towards a volcano island, where volca-
noes are not dead but alive. When the volcano erupts, the freedom and prosper-
ity will all be burnt away. This contrasting difference between the two ways in
which the same metaphor is used explains how the same metaphor may be used
as a vehicle for conflicting arguments.
Text 1
怟㒵ⰶⱼᕩ㴊⑮嗴웍㇪ᣁᶮ㿜ᶃ⊐塓怟㒵ᕀᄽ㵾ᙧ怟㒵ᕀᄽ㢷⤪怟㒵ᕀ㴊ⱳⱫ嘏Ⲧ
ᒑ웍㕧⚆ᙧ♉웍᧍宠᪵䢰웍᪗㷆⦵៺ᒳ᧔웍㿜ᶃ䕥ᒆ㴊∕ᖥ㵴⺍ᓞ彔ῑ噡ᄾ
웉ᒆᓣᓣᒉ⓺ᒉⶎᒆⱫᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃ怟㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ䆲ᒆᖁ仒⯅尅∞䫩▀᧔ᶮ怟
㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ⢖䅑ᩐ㣿ᧀ⯅┢∩儙⊷䛒ᕰ▕ᒐ㴊券剣ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
With the bright rays of respect, trust, love from the land of the forefathers, Hong
Kong – a large ship in a new era – will sail with full confidence towards the goal
of rejuvenation and national reunification.
(Speech made by Tung Chee Hwa, the first Chief Executive of HKSAR, at the
ceremony for the inauguration of the HKSAR and the swearing-in of the HKSAR
government on 1 July 1997. People’s Daily, 2 July 1997) 1
Text 2
怟㒵㉚ᒆ䣞䢿웍㇩惼᪗ᒆᒰ㛱⋷⌡웍ᓣᒉ⓺⊷ᖠᢶ噟ᒰ⌡ᒐᔌಸ㏁㛱⋷ᕓⶰ⢖ᓀ㈁
㛱⋷웍∉ᕓ㞼崕ⱼⶏ᩵䞃㢌ᩗ䚒᧷ᩐ㛱⋷ᒑ⋋㊗㴊㮥ᬃᄽ䡰㮷ᄽ厨ᔭᄽ⊐ᒫᄾ
웉ⷔ⚧ᅆᓣᧇ⓺ᕩᅇ⓺ⶎ웊
Hong Kong is like a ship sailing towards a volcanic island, and 1997 is the year
it reaches the island ... The live volcanoes are not dead yet; they can erupt any
time and endanger the lives, freedom, properties, and dignity of the residents liv-
ing at the foot of the mountain.
(Li Yi Nineties July 1997)
2. The data
In our selection of data, we have used Chinese texts mostly produced by the poli-
ticians and news actors themselves, as reported in the press. In addition, we have
also included, where relevant, comments in editorials. The main sources of data
for this paper are shown in Table 1.
142 Lee Cher-Leng
Table 1. Main sources of data for this paper
No. of articles No. of articles containing the

Sources
surveyed metaphors discussed
1. People’s Daily
PRC 69 24
(21/6–12/7,1997)
2. Ming Pao Hong
49 15
(26/6–2/7,1997) Kong
3. Wen Wei Po Hong

28 16
(23/6–8/7, 1997) Kong
4. Mr. Tung’s speeches

22 14
(17/4–20/12, 1997)
5. Zhao and Zhang ed.
221 33
(1997)
Under the discussion of each set of metaphors, the similarities and differences of
the same metaphor used by the various parties, namely, the Chinese government,
the Hong Kong government and Hong Kong press will be examined. The data
shows that the Chinese government has only one united voice. In Hong Kong,
the situation is quite different: there is the Hong Kong government, followed by
the voice of different parties, and the voice represented by the different newspa-
pers. For the purpose of this study, we will concentrate on contrasting the meta-
phors used by the Chinese government and those by the Hong Kong government.
When relevant, we will show the third voice represented by the press in general.
Since the information on the historical background of the return of Hong Kong
to China provided in the Introduction of the volume is already sufficient for the
current analysis, I will not go into that any more (see also Lau 1997; Lo 1997;
Zhao and Zhang 1997).
3. The “handover”
One dominant motif in China and Hong Kong’s discourses over the latter’s re-
turn is, naturally, the “handover”. Over this there is a prominent set of metaphors
that expresses such notions as embrace of the fatherland, coming home to a big
family and the mother and child reunion. Rhetorically, these metaphors appeal to
the emotions involved in returning home after long separation. At the same time,
they reflect the colonial times of forced national separation. There are, however,
internal differences in the use of these metaphors between the Chinese govern-
ment, the Hong Kong government and the Hong Kong press use which we want
to treat in some detail.
3.1. Embrace of the fatherland
The metaphor of being back in the embrace of the fatherland is most frequently
used in the Chinese media. The Chinese government has the highest number of
usage (see Table 2). The Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, for example, refers to
the Hong Kong people as compatriots who have finally returned to the embrace
of the fatherland (Text 3). In his congratulatory address, similarly, Premier Li
Peng describes the return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty as coming back into the
embrace of the fatherland (Text 4).
Text 3
⢗᪗ᵤᢶ㿜ᶃ⚆⤷㴊៳㴄ᾠᒍ怟㒵᪒䝤웍仮㿀ᔸᢍ屴᚟ᬒ䣵㿣⟅웂ᄾ
웉ᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃᓁ⒳㋥㎃㊗ᶮ⓺ⶎⱫᒳ䥷ᒪᶃ⯅┢ᓄ仒㴊怟㒵ᔪ⨫ᕰ▕ᒐ
㴊券剣ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
I wish to extend cordial greetings and best wishes to more than 6 million Hong
Kong compatriots who have now returned to the embrace of the fatherland.
(Speech made by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, at the ceremony for the hando-
ver of Hong Kong on 1 July 1997. People’s Daily, 2 July 1997)
Text 4
⢗⩖刴웛
ᓀ怟㒵ᵤᢶ㿜ᶃ㴊⚆⤷ᬒ尅ⶥ䓇䧩䂹∠웍
ಸ
⓸ⷵ웂
웉ᶃᤧ峨⛁㪌ⷔ擕ᶮ┌㿣怟㒵ᵤ◘⥡☋ᖠᒐ㴊券剣ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
Now, I would like to propose a toast: To the return of Hong Kong to the embrace
of the fatherland and to its long-term prosperity and stability ...
(Speech made by Li Peng, Premier of China’s State Council, at a reception cele-
brating the Hong Kong’s return to China. People’s Daily, 2 July 1997)
It may be noted, moreover, that the “embrace of the fatherland” is often coupled
with the theme that Hong Kong had suffered much hardship under British rule,
being “half colonial” and “half conservative” by nature, “living under the nose
of others”, being “second class citizens” and the notion that China itself had been
bullied, abused, and shamed by imperialism.
Text 5
ᨌ⋃㌭⻗㴊怟㒵웍䕎ᔔᵤᢶᔌᖥᾭ㿜ᶃ㴊⚆⤷웂
144 Lee Cher-Leng
Hong Kong, which has gone through countless vicissitudes, has finally returned
to the embrace of the fatherland.
(Speech made by Li Peng, Premier of China’s State Council, at a reception cel-
ebrating the return of Hong Kong to the land of the forefathers. People’s Daily,
2 July 1997)
Text 6
怟㒵ᨌ䕕㴄⓺㌭⻗䕎ᔔᵤᢶ㿜ᶃ㴊⚆⤷ᄾ
웉嬷៼㪡ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
Hong Kong, after more than one hundred years of vicissitudes, has finally re-
turned to the embrace of the fatherland.
(Qian Qichen, People’s Daily, 18 June 1997)
Text 7
⢗ᕲ㿜ᶃ図ᩝ⒣ᶃᓁᓏᢝ◀㇀ᡒ⓼嚖㇫㌬ᓀ᧐㈜㊗ᶶ᧐⊇▀㿄ᖠಸ怟㒵ᕔ㇪⫌䞷
ᩝ䥷ᶃ㈜㊗䕥㍁㴊⋎嘷ᶶᗓ䚒ᵤᢶ㿜ᶃ㴊⚆⤷ಸᒓ᠓ⲵ≊ᕀ䉷ᒑ㴊ᅈᔒ䇏៲㊗ᅉ䚒
⢖ᓀ䡰⑷ᶃ∼㴊ᓁᕀᄾ
웉ᒳ៷ᒳᾴ⯅㍁⋆Ⓘ⁚ᄽ៮ᶃ⯅᧕ᓁ⒳ⷔ㫤㨵⓺ⶎⱫᶮ᪒㒵㘹ᶶᧀ⯅᧕⁚
᫞┭劎ⱼ㴊券剣웊
Our land of the forefathers had been bullied and humiliated by imperial power
and had fallen into the half-colonial, half-feudal situation gradually ... Hong Kong
now has shaken off the shame of being ruled by British colonials and come back to
the embrace of the fatherland ... Hong Kong people are no longer “Second Class
Citizens” living under the other’s roof, but the true masters of our own country.
(Speech made by Li Ruihuan, Chairman of the National Political Consultative
Conference and the standing member of the Political Bureau of the Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party, when he had a discussion with Hong
Kong and Macao representatives on 13 March 1995.)
Although pro-Chinese Hong Kong leaders have also used the metaphor of re-
turning to the embrace of the fatherland, the difference is that there is no criti-
cism of the British rule.
Text 8
ⱼᕩ㴊⑮嗴㕠㕠᪗ᣓ웍ᨌ᩸䚁▆ⰶ㴊ᒆ廻웍怟㒵ᵤ◘㿜ᶃ㴊⚆⤷ᄾ
웉怟㒵⑫ᖠ䛚᪎ᖠⷔ㎃㒁ᅆⰍ㋍⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
As the wheel of time rolls forward, history has turned a new page: Hong Kong
has returned to the embrace of land of the forefathers.
(Lei Jaak-tim, member of Hong Kong Trade Unions Association, Wen Wei Po,
30 June 1997)
Text 9
ᒆᓣᓣᒉ⓺ᒉⶎᒆⱫ᧹⊌ⷫᒺ웍怟㒵ᵤᢶ㿜ᶃ㴊⚆⤷⦍Ⱬ᩵☋웍៮ᶃᕀ㊗ⱦᒓㆨㆩ料
䢤ಸ
웉怟㒵㣿ᧀ䇿⁚ᖠ⁚᫞䪭䮠ᔗᅆⰍ㋍⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
As the 1st@@0kof July 1997 approaches, Hong Kong’s return to the embrace of
the land of the forefathers is just around corner ... all people of our nation are in
great jubilation.
(Siu Wai-wan, member of the Preparatory Committee of HKSAR, Wen Wei Po,
29 June 1997)
3.2. Coming home to the big family
Another related, extended metaphor that tugs at the strings of the heart of the
Hong Kong people is that of the “same big family” metaphor. At the handover
ceremony, Jiang said,
Text 10
⢗ᕩ仮ᒳᾴᕀ㊗⯅┢ᬒ៮ᶃ᪊ⱕᕀ㊗ಸ᪗ᵤᢶ㿜ᶃᾭ∼┳㴊៳㴄ᾠᒍ怟㒵᪒䝤웍仮
㿀ᔸᢍ㴊屴᚟웂
웉ᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃᓁ⒳㋥㎃㊗ᶮᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃ怟㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ⢖䅑┌៾ᒐ㴊券剣
ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
On behalf of the central government and people of all ethnic groups, [...] I would
like to extend a warm welcome to the 6 million Hong Kong compatriots who have
returned to the big family of the land of the forefathers.
(Speech made by Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the ceremony for the Hando-
The subtle difference in the use of this metaphor is seen in Mr. Tung carefully
stressing on a family reunion, which implies that all parties are equal, rather than
returning to the family, which implies that Hong Kong is the child returning to
the family. In Text 11, Mr. Tung uses a somewhat more neutral phrase, “stepping
into the warmth of home”, again showing that there is no hierarchical difference
and, in Text 12, a family reunion after 156 years of separation.
Text 11
怟㒵웍䕕ᨌᔌᒆ㴄ᔚᧇ៳⓺㴊㖱㖱尅呵웍䕎ᔔ塓ⰶ呮噡㿜ᶃ㒯ⴜ㴊∼屮ᄾ
웉ᒆᓣᓣᒉ⓺ᒉⶎᒆⱫᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃ怟㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ䆲ᒆᖁ仒⯅尅∞䫩▀᧔ᶮ怟
㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ⢖䅑ᩐ㣿ᧀ⯅┢∩儙⊷䛒ᕰ▕ᒐ㴊券剣ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
After 156 years of long journey, Hong Kong has finally stepped into the warmth
of home.
146 Lee Cher-Leng
ceremony for the inauguration of the HKSAR and the swearing-in of the HK-
SAR government on 1 July 1997. People’s Daily, 2 July 1997)
Text 12
怟㒵ᒔᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃᶮᢌ▆ᒆ㴄ᔚᧇ៳⓺᪔ᵨ䛠웍噟ⲵ៮㪉᧔ᕀ垃➥ᢶㆨㆩᄽᰢ
✬ᬒ䡰勰㴊Ⱬ⇖ᄾ
웉㣿ᧀ仒⯅尅∞ᔔ慞䇏⯟䜸弌⊂ᕀᶃ峋剀ᷡⳠ∺䡺嘤⓺ⶎⱫ웊
It was a joyful and proud day for all Chinese in the world when Hong Kong re-
united with People’s Republic of China after a separation of 156 years.
(Speech delivered by Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa at a banquet for Interna-
tional Forums of Higher Education Leaders on 3 July 1997)
Some important spokesmen in the Hong Kong society also used the phrase “be-
come a family”, in which there is again no hierarchical difference (as compared
to saying that one party is “returning” to the big family).
Text 13
ⱨ㞼ᵤ◘᪔ᾭ∼⊷ⲵᒆ∼ᕀᄾ
웉㣿ᧀ仒⯅ᖠ刴⢖᫞ⷮ孇⼇ᅆⰍ㋍⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
After returning (to the mainland) we shall become a family.
(Speech made by Mr. Yang Ti-liang, member of the Executive Council of HK-
SAR. Wen Wei Po, 28 June 1997)
3.3. The mother-child reunion
One would have thought that the mother-child metaphor would be a most com-
monly used one to describe the return where Hong Kong is like a child returning
to her mother – China. However, this metaphor is seldom used among the Chi-
nese and Hong Kong leaders. The reason could be that this metaphor immediate-
ly shows a clear hierarchy and therefore should be avoided: China is the mother
and Hong Kong is the child. For in the common-sense understanding, the moth-
er is superior to the child and the “mother” image could also mean “control” and
“authority” instead of “love” and “warmth”.
In Text 14, we find just a rare example where, in addition to the metaphor of
“returning to the embrace of the fatherland”, a comparison of Hong Kong is made
with a long-lost child returning to the mother.
Text 14
ᗢᓀᒆᒰ㮥㏁ᶮ怟㒵㴊ᒳᶃᕀ웍䞃ᾥⶏ⓾㵴㷿怟㒵⫌䞷ᒆ㴄ᾠ⓺㴊䥷ᶃ㈜㊗䕥㍁웍ᵤ
ᢶ㿜ᶃ㴊⚆⤷웍⢗ᕔ♉┛塒➥ᢶ慞៺ᬒ䡰勰ᄾ噟䁓♉❋웍⊷᝕ᾷ⯩㴊⇯⇖ᵤᢶᓋᢱ㴊
㉓ᔸ唱ⱇ웍㒯怮ᬒ⓾䀕ᓑ❋嵄ᕫ傆仮ᄾ
웉剅៮ᶃᕀᾭⒾ⁚ᖠ⁚᫞ⶄ∰⼙ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
As a Chinese living in Hong Kong, it is my great honor to witness Hong Kong’s
return to the land of the forefathers. I feel so happy and proud of it. Like a long-
lost child who has finally come back to his mother, my feelings of warmth and
happiness are just beyond words.
(Speech made by Jang Hin-ji, a member of the Standing Committee of the Nation-
al People’s Congress, when interviewed by the People’s Daily on 25 July 1997)
Interestingly, this metaphor is commonly picked up and used by the ordinary

people in a somewhat sarcastic manner, as may be seen in the next two extracts
(Texts 15 and 16). In Text 15, on the forum page, it is commented that Hong Kong
people, from school children to adults, are made to perform a celebration of the
handover. For example, school children are made to act out the play of young swal-
lows returning to their nest over and over again in different assemblies. There are
decorated floats with singers singing the handover songs, celebrating the coming
handover, which weave through streets and alleys. The metaphor used here hints
that the act of returning to the mother’s nest is not something natural but some-
thing that is artificial and construed for show.
Text 15
៉⶝ᧀ⊕⇬㮥倇嗴㯰ᶮᧀ᠋᪊ᖠẈ⣴ᓹ㡛◘⑨웍ᵤ◘䤷嗬ᶮⲀ偘ᠽ㖦㴊ᕀ䘪ᩐ♻
♻ⶏ嘤㴊㏇㏰㋏ᒳ宩料ᰭᾯᶶ叶噍ᄽᧇ⯶᪓㏇ᾭ᪎᮷ᅈᕩᕩⱫᾢ㶂ᵤ◘ᅉ㴊ᅆᵤ◘
弈ᅇᄾ
웉ᅆⲔ⤫¨剀ᷡᅇ⼇ᒜ䧩⓺ⶎⱫ웊
The primary students in Yuen Long district are to act out a play with the theme
of “baby swallows returning to their nests” in turns in every hall of their district;
while the festooned vehicles parade noisily through the indifferent crowds and
murmuring tramps. And dozens of celebrities chorused “Song of Returning: Day
and night, generations by generations we look forward to returning.”
(Leung Sai-yung, Ming Po [Forum page], 23 June 1997)
Text 16
唱嘿㴊ⶑᩑᓀ┌㿣塓嚨ᾷ⯩ᾠ⓺㴊ᔸ㉓웍ᒆⱯ∏⨘ᔌᾠ䁓㒵▕㴊ᰢ┌㏁᤮웛⣙㣒ᄽ᪉
䡰᤯徖ᄽ᮷᧧⥏2.ಸ
웉᪺ᙐ嵊웉怟㒵ᾭ⇬㿄ᖠ⇬䎁券⒎웊ᅆⲔ⤫¨剀ᷡᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
In order to celebrate the reunion with long-lost mother, my friends have arranged
in advance all kinds of Hong-Kong-style festival activities, such as playing cards,
eating buffets and singing karaoke ...
(Ng Jun-hung, a lecturer at the Department of Sociology, Hong Kong University.
Ming Po [Forum page], 29 June 1997)
148 Lee Cher-Leng
In an attempt to summarize Hong Kong’s political history and its conflicting re-
lationship with China, a journalist said that (Text 17) “Hong Kong’s colonial his-
tory has never been detached from that of land of the forefathers. The mother’s
blood is buried in it. Ironically, Hong Kong’s social facade is filled with feelings
of anti-communism and anti-mother ... Hong Kong has been absorbed into the
land of the forefathers gradually.”
(Gwok Siu-tong Ming Po (Forum page), 30 June 1997)
Text 17
怟㒵㴊㈜㊗ᶶᨌ᩸⓼巤−៮ᒔ㉓ᗙ䞷䁁웍ᵦ㇪ⶲ唱Ɐ⑸ṑᒑ㉓ᗙ㴊仆㐸ᬒ❋⚆ᄾᗌ
怟㒵㴊ᕀⰍ巨匒᧺ᩎⲵ់㕧ᩓ៷ᩓ㉓㴊❋➕䕙ᄾಸ怟㒵嚖㇫伱䔹៫㉓ᗙᄾ
웉坳⊗⽦ᅆⲔ⤫剀ᷡᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
In another Forum page of the Ming Po (Text 18), it says that people talk about
the handover as a wandering child returning home, while in actual fact, what is
happening is, as the government officials would say: It is China regaining au-
thority over Hong Kong.
Text 18
怟㒵㨶ᶮ䈝ⲵᵤ◘웍ᾭ∼垃剺ᵤ◘ᄾ ᅈ㒾⇖ᅉᵤᓧ웍◘塒噞ᓧ웍ᒆ㜿ᒓ実ᄾ噟ᩰⲵᒆ䢲
ᕀ㴊剺㍛웍䚒∞ⰿ㇩▕㴊剺㍛웍ⲵᒳᶃ≿怟㒵ᅈ⛨ᾓ仒ᘅᓁⷉᅉᄾ
웉䗝⇠ᅆⲔ⤫¨剀ᷡᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
Hong Kong has finally returned, and everyone says so. There is nothing wrong
with the expression “home coming for the wandering child”. However, it is an
expression used by ordinary people. The formal and official version is that Chi-
na “resumes the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong”.
(Loh Foo Ming Po [Forum page], 30 June 1997)
Table 2 summarizes the discussion in this section.
Table 2. Metaphors of “handover as homecoming” used by Chinese and Hong Kong

leaders and the Hong Kong press
Embrace of the Family/home Mother-child

fatherland
China 21 2 1
Hong Kong (Tung) – 1 –
Hong Kong media
3 1 4
other than Tung
From the data, we have found that although both the Chinese and the Hong Kong
leaders use similar metaphors, there are subtle differences. The metaphors used
by Tung are those that avoid the difference between one party being the major
one while the other being the minor. Instead, the metaphors he uses slants to-
wards both parties being equal. “Embrace of the fatherland” is the most popu-
lar metaphor among the Chinese leaders. It has however, from our sources, not
been used by Tung. This could be due to the jargon being very typically that of
the mainland Chinese expression. As for the “family” metaphor, China says that
Hong Kong is returning to a big family, while Tung says that Hong Kong and
China belong to one big family; Tung also says that Hong Kong finally stepped
into the warmth of home, and that the handover is indeed a “reunion” – an impor-
tant, happy event for the Chinese family during the eve of Chinese New Year. A
reunion focuses on the togetherness of a family without indications of hierarchy
within the family. Ironically, it is the non-official reports that used the “mother-
child” metaphor, although it is mainly used in a sarcastic way.
4. Hong Kong’s identity

The most commonly used metaphor by both the Chinese and the Hong Kong lead-
ers to refer to Hong Kong’s identity after the handover is the metaphor of the mas-
ter of the house. Hong Kong had been under British rule for the past 156 years,
with Hong Kong people carrying the British passport and using British money.
At the time of the handover, the leaders of China and Hong Kong use the master
metaphor to convince the Hong Kong people that they are finally their own mas-
ters, able to direct and control their own destiny. This is obviously said to make
the Hong Kong people feel good that they will never have to subject to foreign
(i.e. British) rule any more, that they are finally independent. When the master
metaphor is used, nothing is mentioned that now Hong Kong is part of China. It
is often said that metaphors can be half-truths rather than whole truths, yet they
serve the means of convincing the audience that things are getting better, that the
handover will benefit the Hong Kong people.
There are three variations to this metaphor, namely, “own master”, “true master”
and “control one’s own destiny”. Both the Chinese and Hong Kong leaders used
the “own master” metaphor, but only the Chinese leaders used the “true mas-
ter” metaphor whereas the Hong Kong leaders the metaphor of “control one’s
own destiny”.
4.1. The own master metaphor
The metaphor of “own master” is prominent in the speeches of Chinese President,

Jiang Zemin (hereafter Jiang), Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, and the
150 Lee Cher-Leng
governor of Hong Kong, Tung Chee Hwa (hereafter, Tung) as well as the speeches
of other important officials in Hong Kong. In a conference with Hong Kong and
Macaw representatives on 28 February 1997, Jiang emphasizes that, for the first
time in history, the Hong Kong people will be their own masters:
Text 19
᠓噍ᒆ㴄ᾯ웍怟㒵⊷倇ᵤ◘㿜ᶃ웍៳㴄ᒍ怟㒵᪒䝤⊷倇仒ᘅ䡰⑷◙∼ᗢᓁ㴊㊗ᓁ
ⷉ᢯ಸ噟ⲵ怟㒵᪒䝤ᨌ᩸ᒐ䆲ᒆㆧ㶥㇩仒ᘅ◙∼ᗢᓁ㴊㊗ᓁⷉᄾ
After a hundred days, Hong Kong will return to her land of the forefathers and
six million Hong Kong people will be able to exercise the rights of being their
own masters ... It is for the first time in the history that Hong Kong compatriots
are entitled to such democratic rights.
At the closing ceremony of the second plenary meeting of the preparatory com-
mittee of the HKSAR on 25 March 1997, Qian Qichen stressed that only after
the colonial rule and its return to China, can Hong Kong truly be her own mas-
ter and truly democratic. Here he is obviously contrasting Hong Kong as a Brit-
ish colony and a decolonized Hong Kong after the return:
Text 20
ᩰⶏ◙㈜㊗ᶶ䕥㍁䕙ⷥ웍怟㒵ᵤ◘㿜ᶃ웍⦏㟭ᅈᒆᶃᒪᢼᅉ㴊ⰿ嬎⢖䅑ᔌ怟㒵㣿ᢱ仒
⯅ᧀ웍∤仒ᅈ㒵ᕀ㍁㒵ᅉᄽ
ᅈ慞┬䡰㍁ᅉᓑ᪔웍┅ᾭ㒵ᕀ◙∼ᗢᔌᓁ웍噟⣓劎☝ᒐ㶥㇩
㴊㊗ᓁᄾ
To Hong Kong people, real democracy means that they can be their own mas-
ters. This will be achieved only after colonial rule ends and Hong Kong returns
to land of the forefathers. At that time, the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region will be established on the basis of the “One Country, Two Systems” prin-
ciple and “Hong Kong will be administered by Hong Kong People” with a high
degree of autonomy.
During his address at the competition for the best news writing and best photos
held by Hong Kong Newspaper Association on 17 April 1997, Mr. Tung said that
soon they would be their “own masters”:
Text 21
⯶ᧇᾯ᪔⢗ᕲ⊷䡰⑷◙∼ᗢᓁಸ
In a couple of months’ time, we will be our own masters ...
And:
Text 22
㮷ᔔᨌ᩸㴊ᨥᵦ웍怟㒵ᕀᕔⷫ㌧ⶏ◙∼ᗢᓁ웍䡰⑷䈧㪌䡰⑷㴊ⷀᖠᄾᒓ噍웍怟㒵ᵤ
◘ᓑ᪔웍❋ᠻ⊷⢰㞼ᒓ᪒ᔌᄾ
Due to historical reasons, Hong Kong people never had a chance to be their own
masters and to manage their own affairs. But things will be totally different af-
ter Hong Kong’s return to China.
Similarly, soon after the handover, a spokesman for the Wen Wei Po, Ms. Choi
So-yuk, said on 7 July 1997 that history has never permitted Hong Kong to be her
own master, but after the handover, life will be very different for Hong Kong.
4.2. The true master
In using the master metaphor, the Chinese politicians take a step further and say
that Hong Kong people are their own true masters. They do so presumably because
they want to highlight the difference from Hong Kong’s colonial times. During
the ceremony of the handover, Jiang said that Hong Kong will be her own “true
master”. Li Peng reiterated it on the following day. For example,
Text 23
怟㒵᪒䝤ᕔ㇪⢖ᓀ怟㒵㴊㶥㇩ᓁᕀ怟㒵㴊ᩗ⋛ᕔ㇪噡៫ᒆᒰ⎳ⰶ㴊ⱼᕩᄾ
웉ᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃᓁ⒳㋥㎃㊗ᶮ⓺ⶎⱫᒳ䥷ᒪᶃ⯅┢ᓄ仒㴊怟㒵ᔪ⨫ᕰ
▕ᒐ㴊券剣ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
... from now on, Hong Kong compatriots have become true masters of this Chi-
nese land and that Hong Kong has now entered a new era of development.
(Speech made by Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the ceremony for the hando-
Text 24
崕㷆怟㒵㴊ᵤ◘웍怟㒵᪒䝤⑸䕕⢖ᓀ噟㣍ᶥᶶ㴊㶥㇩ᓁᕀᄾ
With the Hong Kong’s return to China, Hong Kong compatriots have become the
true masters of this land.
2 July 1997)
4.3. Control of own destiny
In contrast, Hong Kong politicians do not use the “true master” metaphor, as
mentioned above. This indicates that the Hong Kong leaders do not feel comfort-
152 Lee Cher-Leng
able using this metaphor since, in actual fact, Hong Kong is now part of China.
At the swearing-in ceremony on 1 July 1997 and on a celebration two days af-
ter, Mr. Tung said that Hong Kong people will be able to control their own des-
tiny. Herein lies the subtle difference between Hong Kong being the “true mas-
ter” and Hong Kong being able to “control her own destiny”. The former meta-
phor puts things in very absolute terms, that others are not “true” masters except
Hong Kong herself, whereas the latter takes a step back to say that she can now
have the ability to control her own destiny (thus metaphorically extending the
ability to control concrete objects to abstract entities like “destiny”). This is seen
in Texts 25 and 26.
Text 25
ᒆᒰᶃ∼ᬒ㊗ⱕⶆ᩵去㴊ⲵ웍䞃ᾥ⨒⩧䡰⑷㴊ᬃ噖ಸ怟㒵ᕀᶮᨌ᩸ᒐ䆲ᒆㆧᕫⲔ㻴
㴊唱ᖃᓁ∶䡰⑷㴊ᬃ噖ᄾ
웉ᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃ怟㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ䆲ᒆᖁ仒⯅尅∞䫩▀᧔ᶮ怟㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ⢖䅑ᩐ
㣿ᧀ⯅┢∩儙ᕰ▕ᒐ㴊券剣ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
It is most precious that a people can grasp its own destiny. For the first time in
history, we, the people of Hong Kong, will shape our own destiny.
ceremony for the inauguration of the HKSAR and the swearing-in of the HK-
SAR government. People’s Daily, 1 July 1997)
Text 26
怟㒵ⶏ᩸ᕫⷫ䆲ᒆㆧ㮷⢗ᕲ䡰⑷ⷫ䈧㍁웍⢗ᕲ䕎ᔔ᩵ᕫ⨒⩧䡰⑷㴊ᬃ噖웍ᓀⶲ唱㴊ᠹ
∠ᬒ噟ᔡᠹ∠ᔭ㮥㴊䕙⸢厥៼៮厩ᄾ
웉仒⯅尅∞䫩▀᧔ᶮᅈᶃ峋䧥䪉叀怟㋥ᅉ䡺嘤⓺ⶎⱫ웊
For the first time in history, Hong Kong is administered by the Hong Kong peo-
ple. We have finally been able to control our own destiny and be responsible for
our own decisions and the corresponding consequences.
(Speech by Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa at “International Gathering to Cel-
ebrate Hong Kong’s return” on 3 July 1997)
Table 3 summarizes the findings in this section.
Table 3. The “master” metaphor used by Chinese and Hong Kong leaders
Own master True master Own destiny
China 18 6 1
Hong Kong 6 6
From this table, we can notice that although both Hong Kong and Chinese lead-
ers use “own master” to describe Hong Kong’s position, China goes a step fur-
ther to say that Hong Kong is the “true master”. Obviously, it is not easy to decide
who is the “true” master, since Hong Kong is still under China’s rule. Thus, it is
no surprise that Hong Kong should steer clear from such metaphors and instead
stress more on being able to “control her own destiny”.
5. Hong Kong’s strategic roles

The Chinese politicians emphasize the strategic location of Hong Kong with re-
gard to China, using metaphors such as the bridge, the window, the channel and
a door that opens or connects China to the world or to the West. Hong Kong is
said to be an important connection in trade, finance, shipping, culture, etc., for
China and the rest of the world. These metaphors are used to show Hong Kong
people that China values Hong Kong and will assure them all of political stabil-
ity to ensure prosperity in Hong Kong.
5.1. The bridge metaphor
Hong Kong is said to be the bridge for economic and cultural exchanges between
China and the world. This metaphor is the most popular one used by Chinese po-
litical leaders such as Jiang Zeming, Li Peng, Lu Ping and Qian Qichen. Some
examples are given below:
Text 27
怟㒵ᗢᓀ⢗ᶃ᪒ᒜ㯒᪊ᶃ噡仒䕕㏔ᄽ䁗⤆ᄽⰍᦜᔪ㏇㴊塓倇⻫⼇䚒䨽☝⑮ᾭ㴊᢯㵐ᄾ
ᕐ᪔崕㷆㿜ᶃ㨶ᕩᦜ▀剄㴊ᒓⰳ⨮噡웍怟㒵ᒔ᠋ᶶ㴊䕕㏔䛚䎁⊌⵺ᓀ≌ᢍ웍៼⻫⼇
ᗢ㮮⊌⵺ᓀἤ◀웍ᕔ䚒ᓀ怟㒵䕕㏔ἤ尅⩖ᘡⰶ㴊⵺ᾭ㴊᤮ᤡᄾ
웉ᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃᓁ⒳㋥㎃㊗ᶮᒳᶃᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃ怟㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ⢖䅑┌៾ᒐ㴊券剣
ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
Hong Kong, as an important bridge linking China and the rest of the world in
economic, scientific, technological and cultural exchanges, has benefited from it
immensely. With the continuous advance of China’s modernization drive, Hong
Kong’s economic link with the mainland will become even closer and its role as
a bridge will be increasingly enhanced. This in turn will give a stronger impetus
to Hong Kong’s economic growth.
(Speech by Chinese president Jiang Zemin at the ceremony marking the estab-
lishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region [HKSAR] of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. People’s Daily, 2 July 1997)
Text 28
ᒳᶃ᠋ᶶᷠ⦇⮿巯▆⯄⯅䇜웍ᶃ㊗䕕㏔⦇䕳ᄽ♱⧽ᄽ᛫┽ᩗ⋛웍ᓀ怟㒵䕕㏔ᩗ⋛⩖ᘡ
ᔌⶏᤡ㴊⮵⦇ᄾ怟㒵噡ᒆ㇫ᩗ⦫噤⨫᠋ᶶᒔᶃ∼䕕㏔㴊⻫⼇ᬒ䕃⒬ᗢ㮮웍ⶏ᢯ᔔ㿜ᶃ
㴊㨶ᕩᦜ▀剄ᄾ
154 Lee Cher-Leng
웉ᶃᤧ峨⛁㪌ⷔ擕⓺ⶎⱫᶮ┌㿣怟㒵ᵤ弄⥡☋ᖠᒐ㴊券剣ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ
⓺ⶎⱫ웊
The sustained, rapid and sound development of national economy in the main-
land areas as a result of the reform and opening policy has provided the economy
of Hong Kong with strong support. An enhanced role of Hong Kong as a bridge
and linkage between the mainland economy and the international economy will
facilitate the modernization drive of the mainland.
(Speech by Li Peng, premier of China’s State Council, at a reception celebrating
the return of Hong Kong to the land of the forefathers on 1 July 1997. People’s
Daily, 2 July 1997)
The bridge metaphor was also used widely by Hong Kong politicians and entre-
preneurs:
Text 29
怟㒵ᘣ㞼ⲵᒆᒰ∏៮㴊ⱋ㒾䝢ᶶ웜㿄ᖠᘣ㞼▆⯄웜䕕㏔ᘣ㞼䭲᥉웍呥ᕫᣓ㌧ⶏᢌᢱᄾ᪊
ᗓ᩵ᕫᔸ㷂㶑ᢶᅈᒆᶃᒪᢼᅉ㴊⸊⚣☝ᢶ䫃∤ᄽ怟㒵ⲵᒳᶃᒔᒜ㯒᪊ᶶᔘ嚠㴊⻫⼇웍怟
㒵ᶮ噟ⰿ巨⣆⥋◙㴊偘䣸Ⱬ㵐塓倇웍⢗㑷ᙧ怟㒵ᖠ䕭䕳䭲᥉ᩗ⋛웍᠓ᢡⰶ慞ᄾ
웉厨⯅᩾᩾尅ⶄ䧱ⷉ⓺ⶎⱫᶮ䆲ᵡ⋐ᔠᾰᶶᧀ⊅峯ᾭᖠ▆ⓛ៾㿂㴊䡺嘤៮Ⰽ웊
As before, Hong Kong is still a safe tourist spot; it still has an open society and
its economy stays prosperous. You can see that the idea of “one country, two sys-
tems” has been materialized. Hong Kong is the bridge linking China and all parts
of the world. As such a role becomes increasingly important, I believe Hong Kong
should enjoy continual development and improvement.
(Speech by Mr. Donald Tsang, Financial Secretary of the Hong Kong Govern-
ment, at the Fourth Asia-Pacific Life Insurance Conference on 22 August 1997)
5.2. The window on the world

Hong Kong is said to be the “window” through which China gets to see the world.
The window metaphor is used by both the Chinese (Texts 30 and 31) and the Hong
Kong political leaders (Texts 32 and 33).
Text 30
怟㒵ⲵ᠋ᶶ嚠᪗ᒜ㯒㴊ᒆᒰ䄝ᩩ
웉ᶃᤧ峨⛁㪌ⷔ擕⓺ⶎⱫᶮἮ倅᭫剅屴ⱼ㴊劎剣웊
Hong Kong is China’s window facing the outside world.
(Comments made by Li Peng, Premier of China’s State Council, on 7 October
1995 during his visit to Mexico.)
Text 31
怟㒵ᗢᓀ巨᪗倅ⰿ㴊䄝ᩩᬒ▛⊂倅ⰿ噡៫ᒳᶃ⒈᷀㴊⻫⼇ᄾ
웉ᶃᤧ峨㒵㘹ᤤ៲∪ᓁᖁ指⓹⓺ⶎⱫᶮ怟㒵ᔚᾭᯌᖠᓄ仒㴊᧎徖ᖠᒐ㴊㖚剺웊
Hong Kong, as a window facing the West and a bridge leading the West into Chi-
na’s market ...
(Speech made by Director of the Office of Hong Kong and Macaw Affairs, the
State Council of the PRC, Lu Ping, on 6 May 1994)
Text 32
⢗ᕲ㴊怟㒵⊌ᖠⲵᒆᒰᒳᾜᔪ㏇㴊䄝ᩩ
웉ᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃ怟㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ怜ᖁ仒⯅尅∞䫩▀᧔ᶮᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃ怟㒵㣿ᢱ
仒⯅ᧀ⢖䅑┌៾ᾭᖠᒐ䇏券剣⓺ⶎⱫ웊
Our Hong Kong will be ... a window for exchanges between China and the rest
of the world;
(Speech delivered by Tung Chee Hwa, the first Chief Executive of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region [HKSAR], at a grand celebration party marking
the establishment of the HKSAR on 1 July 1997)
Text 33
⤐怟㒵ᗢᓀᙉ噡᠋ᶶ㨶ᕩᦜ㴊䄝ᩩᄾ
웉㣿ᧀ仒⯅ᖠ刴⢖᫞ⷮ孇⼇ᅆⰍ㋍⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
Make Hong Kong a window and let it play an important role in the moderniza-
tion drive of mainland.
(Speech by Yang Ti-liang, a member of the Executive Meeting of HKSAR. Wen
Wei Po, 28 June 1997)
5.3. The channel for exchange
This metaphor is only found in the speeches of Chinese political leaders such as
Qian Qichen and Zhou Nan (Texts 34 and 35).
Text 34
ᒳᶃ嶆倇怟㒵䕭䕳ᗢᓀ⮿巯▆⯄㴊䄝ᩩᬒ嚠☆ᒜ㯒厾ⲙ㴊㒦囙ᄾ
웉ᶃᤧ峨ᣵ⛁㪌ᄽᾜᔪ坮尅嬷៼㪡⓺ⶎⱫᶮ䥷ᶃ㴍∼ᶃ峋ᔑᤧ㺚䃼⣆ᩗ仮
弞ᓀᅆᒳᶃ㴊ᩗ⋛ᒔᒳ䥷៹䎁ᅇ㴊㖚剺웊S
China needs Hong Kong to continue its role as a window for her reform and open-
ing to the outside world and as a channel leading China to the world trades.
(Speech entitled “China’s Development and Sino-British relations” given by Qian
Qichen, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of PRC in British Royal Internation-
al Institute on 3 October 1995)
Text 35
ᶮⶰⷫ㴊⌇ⶎᒳ웍ᒓ剀ᗢᓀ⤛及㴊ᓁ偘噞ⲵᗢᓀᒳᕑ㴊㒦囙웍怟㒵㴊䓇䧩ᶮ☎ᾭ
䂑┬ᒐ☝㵐ᔔᒳᶃ᠋ᶶᄾ
156 Lee Cher-Leng
웉ⰶ᧔㿄怟㒵ᢌ㿄㿄尅᫮᧝⓺ⶎⱫᢀ⒳怟㒵䈧㪌ᒙᒠ᧕ᖠ᫮⓺Ⳡ∺ⱼ
ᩗ仮㴊ᅆᙣ⦇怟㒵䕕㏔ᗙᢼ㴊塓倇⚭ᅇ㴊㖚剺웊
In the future, Hong Kong, either as a main investor or as a channel-like middle-
man, will to a great extent thrive on the close tie with the mainland China.
(Speech entitled “The Importance to Maintain Hong Kong’s Economic System”
delivered by Zhou Nan, Director of Xin Hua News Agency, Hong Kong Branch,
on 16 November 1994 at an anniversary banquet of the Hong Kong Management
Professional Association)
5.4. The floodgate
Hong Kong political leaders use the metaphor of floodgate to assure Hong Kong
people that they will be the first to benefit when China prospers in a few de-
cades.
Text 36
ᶮ⯶ᧇ⓺᪔웍◙ᒳᶃ♋㞼⢖ᓀ៮ᒜ㯒ⶆᾭ㴊䕕㏔ᗙ䎁ⱼ웍⊌ᖠ⒬ⷫⱦ䃽㴊ⷀᖠಸ
㌧ⶏᕆᓎᶶⰿ㉚怟㒵⵺嚈᪎ᗢᓀ噡៫ᒳᶃ㴊䡰㞼屾ᩩᄾ
웉仒⯅尅∞䫩▀᧔⓺ⶎⱫᶮᅈᶃ峋䧥䪉叀怟㋥ᅉⳠ∺ᒐ䡺嘤웊
In a couple of decades, as China becomes the biggest economic system in the
world, unlimited opportunities will come ... there is no place more suitable than
Hong Kong to be a natural floodgate of China.
(Speech by Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa at “International Gathering to Cel-
ebrate Hong Kong’s Return” on 3 July 1997)
A summary of the use of these metaphors of “structure” are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. The “structure” metaphor used by only the Chinese and Hong Kong leaders
Bridge Window Floodgate Channel Door

China 13 11 – 4 1
Hong Kong 3 2 1 – 4
The table above shows that “structural” metaphors, such as “bridge”, “windows”,
“channels” and “doors”, are commonly used by the Chinese and Hong Kong po-
litical leaders to show that Hong Kong is geographically very strategic and has
great financial value to China. These metaphors assure the Hong Kong people
that since Hong Kong is of great value, China will definitely continue to ensure
its prosperity; Hong Kong is constructed as important to the financial and inter-
national well being of China.
6. China’s role: Backing behind Hong Kong

Chinese leaders and some members of the Hong Kong government use the back-
ing metaphor to assure Hong Kong that China will always be behind them and
support them. Tung, however, does not use this metaphor again to avoid show-
ing that China is more powerful than Hong Kong or any hierarchical difference.
Texts 37 and 38 show the use of the metaphor by the director of a Chinese news
agency and Li Peng himself.
Text 37
ᒳᶃ᠋ᶶ䄇彤㦡噡㴊ᩗ⋛ᬒⱫ㵐◀ᾭ웍⢖ᓀ怟㒵⦇䕳䓇䧩䂹∠㴊◀ᾭ᪔㶄웍怟㒵
ᒔᶃ∼ᣓ嚚⛵⛵㵾៹ᄾ
웉ⰶ᧔㿄怟㒵ᢌ㿄㿄尅᫮᧝⓺ⶎⱫᶮ怟㒵ᖠ⋛ᒳ♉ᓄ仒㴊ⰶⲫ埘ᖠᒐ
ᩗ仮㴊券剣웊
China enjoys a rapid development and becomes increasingly powerful and is a
strong backing for Hong Kong, while Hong Kong is connected to the nation’s fu-
ture as closely as in the same breath.
(Speech delivered by Zhou Nan, Director of Xin Hua News Agency, Hong Kong
Branch, at a New Year’s Party held at the Hong Kong Exhibition Center on 17
February 1997)
Text 38
ⶏ◀ᾭ㴊㿜ᶃᗢ᪔㶄웍怟㒵ᶮᶃ峋㏁᤮ᒳ㴊ᶶᗓ⊌噡ᒆ㇫☝ᢶᤦ◀ᄾ
With the powerful backing of the land of the forefathers, Hong Kong will enjoy
a stronger status in international activities.
2 July 1997)
Text 39 shows the use of the metaphor by a Hong Kong politician, but not by
Tung. The “backing” implies protection. If Tung says that China is a backing for
Hong Kong, he would be seen as suggesting that China “protects” Hong Kong,
and to say so would be taken as implying that Hong Kong is lesser than China.
To avoid defining a hierarchical relationship between Hong Kong and China,
Tung avoids the metaphor.
Text 39
ⶏ㿜ᶃᗢ◀ᾭ᪔㶄웍怟㒵䞃ᾥᙣ⦇尅ⶥ㴊䓇䧩ᬒ䂹∠ᄾ
웉怟㒵㣿ᧀᒺ䅑ᖠᓁ⒳䦉☖ᓃ㍶ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
With the land of the forefathers as a powerful backing, Hong Kong is able to
maintain a long-term prosperity and stability.
158 Lee Cher-Leng
(Rita Fan, President of Provisional Legislative Council. People’s Daily, 26 June

1997)
Text 40
㌧ⶏ◀ᾭ㴊㿜ᶃᗢ᪔㶄웍ᖁᗛᾜᔪ∞ᓥⱦ㍛ⶏ⣆ᗢᓀᄾ
웉ᣓᒳᶃ愁䛚᪎ᶃᾭᘅᄽ⸝ᢟ☖㨊⇟ᡒ巘ᅆⰍ㋍⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
Without a land of the forefathers as a powerful backing, no diplomat will be able
to attempt and accomplish anything.
(Ling Qing, the former Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, grandson of
Lin Zexu, a national hero known for his attempts to fight against British invasion
in 1890s. Wen Wei Po, 30 June 1997)
Table 5 summarizes the use of the “backing” metaphor.
Table 5. The “backing” metaphor used by Chinese leaders and Hong Kong spokesmen
Backing
China 12
Hong Kong (Tung) –
Hong Kong (spokesmen other than Tung) 1
7. The relation between Hong Kong and China

Some metaphors are used to show the closeness between China and Hong Kong
in a non-hierarchical manner, for example, they are of the “same root”, they are
as close as “lips and teeth” and they are “connected by flesh and blood”.
7.1. Shoot and root
In Text 41, Mr. Tung said that he was proud of Hong Kong’s new identity in return-
ing to her “roots”. The plant metaphor allows Tung to mean the same relationship
as that of the part returning to the whole without showing the hierarchy between
that of a child and a mother. In Text 42, Tung also uses the root metaphor to stress
mutual respect and mutual progress rather than one leading the other.
Text 41
⢗ᕲ≿ᵤ◘᪔㴊ⰶ唱ᖃᩐᒳᶃ⺿㔖➥ᢶ䡰勰ᄾ
웉怟㒵⤫ᒠ៲ᖠⶆᗹⰶ岁᠟ᗢᩐᶄ㣍㉚叡怟㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ仒⯅尅∞䫩▀᧔䡺嘤
⓺ⶎⱫ웊
We are proud of our new identity after the return and our Chinese roots.
(Speech delivered by Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa at a Best News Writing
and Pictures Competition held by the Hong Kong Newspaper Association on 17
April 1997)
Text 42
怟㒵ⲵᒳᶃᒓ᩵ᢌ䁁㴊ᒆ坮ᢌ웍᪒㮥᪒⺿웍៷䧩៷㵐ಸ嚠噍ᔘ㵾⊐塓㴊Ẁ㻆웍⢗
ᕲ⣓᩵⓼䜯᪗ᣓᄾ
웉仒⯅尅∞䫩▀᧔ᶮᅈᶃ峋䧥䪉叀怟㋥ᅉ䡺嘤⓺ⶎⱫ웊
Hong Kong is an indispensable part of China and we share the same birth and
same roots ... On the basis of the mutual respects, we can move forward togeth-
er, shoulder to shoulder.
(Speech made by Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa at an “International Gather-
ing to Celebrate Hong Kong’s return” on 3 July 1997)
7.2. Lips and teeth
Tung also uses the lips-and-teeth metaphor to show that the relationship between
China and Hong Kong is one of mutual interdependence, not one depending on
the other. This is seen in Text 43 and Text 44.
Text 43
怟㒵ᒓ᧛ᩰᶮ䕕㏔ᒐᒔ᠋ᶶᮍ昅㵾ᘣ웍ᶮ仆䖞ᒐ웍ᶮⰍᦜᒐ웍⢗ᕲᬒ᠋ᶶ㴊᪒䝤
ⲵᒆ䞏㵾⤅ಸ⢗⒒ⶡ怟㒵⒈㊗䞃⤷᪒⺿᪒♉㴊䍄㿤웍⫀⣑ᓀ怟㒵៷劷ⰶ䅦ᄾ
웉ᅈ噎噡ᵤ◘ⶎᅉ䫩▀᧔䇚屴ᖠ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
Hong Kong is not only economically interdependent with mainland like lips and
teeth, but also shares the same heritage and culture with the mainland compatri-
ots ... I hope Hong Kong citizens understand and treasure such relationship, and
work together for the new future of Hong Kong.
(Comments made by Tung Chee Hwa in a dialogue titled “Stepping towards the
Month of Returning” on 2 June 1997)
Text 44
怟㒵ᬒ┅ᒢ㶇㴊៹䎁ⲵᅈᮍ昅㵾ᘣᅉ㴊웍⢗㵾ᙧ⊌ⷫᶮẀ▀ⰿ巨ᓥⶏ☎ᾠ៼ᕜ
䕕㏔弌ṥⰿ巨㴊᪎ᗢᄾ
웉䫩▀᧔ᶮ制䚋⥡☋ᖠᒐ㴊ᩗ傆ᅆⰍ㋍⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
The relationship between Hong Kong and Guangdong Province is like that of
lips and teeth. I believe in the future there will be cooperation in many econom-
ic fields, especially in infrastructure.
(Comments made by Tung Chee Hwa at a news conference Wen Wei Po, 3 July
1997)
160 Lee Cher-Leng
7.3. Flesh and blood
This flesh-and-blood metaphor is an idiom in mainland Chinese culture referring

to the closeness of blood relationship. It is only used among the Chinese leaders
and not those in Hong Kong because, arguably, it would be considered too crude
of a cliché for Hong Kong culture.
Text 45
怟㒵䴃㞼伱尅ⶥ᪒㿜ᶃ᣸䁁▆ⷫ웍ᗌ㿜ᶃᕀ㊗ᒔ怟㒵᪒䝤仆䜏㵾噤㴊㊗ⱕᓑ❋
⁑䕎㌧ⶏ伱᣸ⰳᄾ
웉웉ᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃᓁ⒳㋥㎃㊗ᶮᒳ᧔ᕀ㊗៷ᬒᶃ怟㒵㣿ᢱ仒⯅ᧀ⢖䅑┌៾ᒐ
㴊券剣ᅆᕀ㊗Ⱬ⤫ᅇ⓺ⶎⱫ웊
Notwithstanding the prolonged separation, the flesh-and-blood bond between the
people on the mainland and Hong Kong compatriots had never been severed.
(Speech by Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the ceremony marking the estab-
lishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Re-
public of China. People’s Daily, 2 July 1997)
Table 6 summarizes the findings in this section.
Table 6. Metaphors to show interdependence
Flesh and blood Root and shoot Lips and teeth

China 1 2 1
Hong Kong (Tung) – 8 2
Hong Kong 2 1 1
From the table, we understand that Tung clearly prefers the metaphors of “root
and shoot” and “lips and teeth” relationship over the “flesh and blood” relation-
ship. This is apparently because the root-shoot and lips-teeth relationships show
the interdependence of Hong Kong and China without necessarily showing dif-
ference in hierarchy and authority.
8. Conclusion
In this study, we looked at a range of largely political media discourses found
in Hong Kong and China, respectively, and focused on how they both represent
Hong Kong’s historic transition through the use of metaphors. In particular, we
examined how politicians as well as other news actors metaphorically formulat-
ed Chinese identity, Hong Kong’s identity and their interrelationship. Through

this analysis, we identified a number of dominant, metaphorically-mediated dis-
courses of identities and relationships: 1) the handover as a homecoming event; 2)
Hong Kong as her own master; 3) Hong Kong’s strategic position as a bridge be-
tween China and the rest of the world; 4) China’s role as a backing behind Hong
Kong; and 5) the relationship between China and Hong Kong as that of flesh and
blood, root and shoot and lips and teeth.
Through comparative analysis of this broad sweep of metaphorical discourses,
we found that there is a variety of differences between Chinese and Hong Kong
politicians, between the Chinese and Hong Kong press and between the leaders
and the media. Let me give a summary account of these differences.
First, it may be noted that, in the current case of Hong Kong and Chinese me-
dia discourses, metaphor, as a poetic, rhetorical form of discourse is not periph-
eral but central to the construction of identity and relationships. That is, the use
of metaphors is a predominant means of constructing identities and relationships
in the discourses under study. To that extent, those metaphors constitute the pro-
jected identities and relationships.
Second, Hong Kong and China’s media discourses share some of the meta-
phorical forms. Where they do, they effectively reciprocate and thereby identify
with each other and mutually reconnect the two Chinese speaking communities.
For example, both discourses draw on the metaphors of bridge, window, channel,
door and floodgate to characterize Hong Kong’s strategic position as a useful con-
nection between China and the rest of the world. These metaphors imply benefits
to both communities and they do not convey relations of domination.
Third, it may also be observed that there are also subtle differences, in terms
of both metaphorical forms (e.g. words and idioms) and contextual use. These oc-
cur sometimes because of different local conventions and sometimes because of
different political motives. For example, in seeing the handover as a homecoming
event, Chinese media prefer the metaphor of “embrace of the fatherland”, while
Hong Kong leaders prefer to use the “big family” metaphor. This shows that Chi-
nese media take the stance that Hong Kong’s handover is returning Hong Kong to
where she originally belongs, whereas Hong Kong leaders’ “big family” stresses
the reunion of family members instead of one belonging to the other. Also, in the
use of the metaphor constructing Hong Kong’s identity as being her own master,
Chinese media prefer to stress that Hong Kong is her “true master”, while Hong
Kong leaders state that Hong Kong can now control her own destiny. The ver-
sion of Chinese media not only alludes to the repression of British colonial rule,
but also reaffirms Chinese commitment to Hong Kong’s freedom. From the per-
spective of Hong Kong, it is not totally free, however. Hence the leaders can only
say that Hong Kong can control her own destiny.
162 Lee Cher-Leng
Finally, it can be argued that, generally, the metaphors found dominant in the
Hong Kong and China press construct a shared identity between Hong Kong and
China and a mutually beneficial relationship and serve effectively to mobilize
feelings of reunification. This image of relationship is largely absent from the
Western media. For example, on the relationship between Hong Kong and Chi-
na, the Chinese press tends to choose metaphors that are rooted in Chinese con-
ventions, for example, “flesh and blood”, whereas the Hong Kong media usually
use “shoot and root” and “lips and teeth”. But on the whole, they all serve to pro-
duce a close and firm identification.
Note
1. Only the official speeches by Chinese and Hong Kong political leaders are translat-
ed in People’s Daily. Most of the English translations in this paper are my own.
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Chapter 10
Voices of missing identity:
A study of contemporary Hong Kong literary
writings
Kwok-kan Tam
1. Introduction
The political, economic and cultural development of Hong Kong in the last quar-
ter of the past century has presented a theoretical problem to all critics and politi-
cians. All existing discourses of colonialism and postcolonialism are concerned
about a colony which faces the rise of nationalism after it has gained indepen-
dence. In the case of Hong Kong, the problem is not a future of independence af-
ter its decolonization from the British colonial center. But rather, it is a merger
with China, an Oriental power in experiment with the transition from a planned
economy to a market economy and to a culture of globalization. China’s plan has
been to include Hong Kong in its practical politics of a Greater China of “one
country, two systems”, which is intended to put an end to the political split of the
country. In contrast to all other postcolonial societies, Hong Kong has neither
a precolonial past, a postcolonial future, according to postcolonial theory. The
anomaly of Hong Kong is marked by a double absence of a past and a future, but
exists only in its present.
Hong Kong presents an anomaly, a counterargument against all existing the-
ories of colonialism.1 When Britain as a colonizer ruled Hong Kong before 1997,
Hong Kong had already become a financial and cultural center in the region of
East and Southeast Asia. This fact alone serves as a marker of Hong Kong in its
development beyond the control of the British colonial empire. Thus the theories
of colonialism that hinge on relations of a center-periphery power structure do not
apply to Hong Kong. In fact, Hong Kong had become a postcolonial entity caught
in the political and economic tug-of-war between Britain and China. The causes
behind such an anomalous development of Hong Kong are many. The riots in
1967 shook the foundation of the century-old British rule. Beginning in the 1970s,
the “old British pillars” in the financial structure, particularly Hong Kong Bank
and Jardine and Swire, found their positions threatened by the newly risen local
Chinese tycoons. Since the 1980s when China opened its doors, Hong Kong has
166 Kwok-kan Tam
expanded beyond its geographical territory into China and, thus, become part of
the expanding Chinese economy. In the two decades before its reversion to Chi-
nese sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong remained a British colony more in name
than in fact. Put another way, Hong Kong was colonial in political structure, but
postcolonial in economy and in many other aspects of social life.
What is of interest to political scientists and cultural critics is the anoma-
lous identity of Hong Kong people which is negotiated in discourses of the pub-
lic sphere. In Habermas’ theory (1984, 1987), the public sphere is a social insti-
tution, which makes possible the negotiation of power and opinions between the
ruling class and the ruled. The public sphere serves as the rudimentary form of
modern democracy. In Hong Kong, as well as in many other Asian societies, the
theater and journalistic literary writings have been functioning as political do-
mains in the public sphere, in the sense that they circulate in society in distinct
forms of ideology which have powerful discursive effects in shaping the subject.
Hong Kong shares with many other Southeast Asian societies in its quest for a
postcolonial identity. Theories of postcoloniality derived from the experience of
Southeast Asia, Africa and the Caribbean have postulated nationalism as the new
identity after independence. Hong Kong, however, is faced with reunification with
China, from which it was forcibly separated by a colonial power.
Following the 1997 return of Hong Kong to China, many Hong Kong people,
who previously considered themselves as passengers on a “bridge” (an image that
Homi Bhabha [1994: 5] has created for the rootless and “unhomed” people), have
now decided to stay on the bridge, rather than to go either ends. In the contem-
porary journalistic literary writings of Hong Kong, there is the representation of
the dilemmas, uncertainties, disillusionment, and the feeling of frustration among
the Hong Kong people in the 1970–1990s, which can be analyzed as discourses
of cultural anomaly. In this unique situation, the people of Hong Kong are forced
to redefine and reconstruct themselves.
2. Hong Kong literature

In today’s Hong Kong, 98 percent of the population are Chinese and Cantonese
speaking, so most of the writers write in Chinese, though some prefer to write in
English. In the tradition of Chinese literary writings in Hong Kong, most writ-
ers prefer to call themselves “Chinese writers” rather than “Hong Kong writers”,
as their writings are not limited to the portrayal of life in Hong Kong, and the
themes they deal with are often about some transcendent issues that are shared
by the Chinese either on the mainland, or in Hong Kong. English writers in Hong
Kong also seldom label themselves as “Hong Kong writers”, for the themes they
write about have much in common with Southeast Asian literature, particularly
A study of contemporary Hong Kong literary writings 167
on the cultural issues of East-West encounters. In the 1970s, in many literary and
popular magazines as well as in Chinese newspapers published in Hong Kong,
there were debates on whether there is Hong Kong literature and, if there is, how
it should be defined. The general opinion at that time was that Hong Kong liter-
ature was a misnomer, in the sense that Hong Kong literature should be consid-
ered as part of Chinese literature, as it was written in Chinese, and it is almost
impossible to define who was qualified to be called a Hong Kong writer. How-
ever, since the 1980s, there is a growing tendency for writers, Chinese or Eng-
lish, in Hong Kong to call themselves “Hong Kong writers”. This is a tendency
that shows a growing consciousness of Hong Kong identity. At the same time,
the rise of localism in Taiwan and on the mainland forces the Hong Kong peo-
ple, especially the younger generation, to rethink who they are, if they are not the
same as mainlanders or Taiwanese. The 1997 handover of sovereignty is an im-
mediate issue that put in front of the Hong Kong people the question of how they
should redefine themselves in relation to China. And hence, in the literary writ-
ings, newspaper essays, dramatic productions and public debates in Hong Kong
since the second half of the 1980s, there are voices that show a belated postcolo-
nial space in which the subaltern speaks. The texts that I examine below are all
originally in Chinese.
3. Hong Kong: The anomaly of (post)coloniality

Hong Kong’s unique case as an anomaly of (post)coloniality can be seen in the
following description from the 1997 issue of the London Review of Books:
One of Hong Kong’s most profound problems is also one of its greatest achieve-
ments. This anomalous place, this old margin between East and West, has in the
last decade acquired a cultural and artistic life of its own. In the ritual exchange
of flags and empires, this extraordinary fact may be overlooked. And it is all the
easier to overlook because Hong Kong’s culture has emerged in the absence of all
the things that are supposed to make cultures happen.
It doesn’t have much of a history – 155 years at most – and what it has is largely
invisible: the city is in a state of relentless flux, its historic buildings torn down,
its street-scapes altered, so that no accumulation of resonances is possible. Even
the map of the physical territory is utterly unstable: small islands have been an-
nexed to the larger one by filling in the harbor; frantic reclamation has remolded
the shape of surrounding seas. (O’Toole 1997: 18)
In many novels published in recent years, the general image used to describe
Hong Kong is that of either a floating city, or a crazy city.2 Such an image is il-
luminating not only in its reflection of the geopolitical reality of Hong Kong, but
also in its function as a discourse to describe how Hong Kong people reconstruct
168 Kwok-kan Tam
themselves. In actual truth, Hong Kong does not build its culture by accumulation
and does not rely on tradition. It is a place where everything floats and nothing
seems to have been built on solid ground. The phenomenon that people in Hong
Kong have to continually talk about their identity is a reflection of an attempt to
search for and forge new identities that can reassure themselves of their relation
to the new realities in Hong Kong. In this sense, what is important does not lie
in what identity the Hong Kong people have, but in the process of questing for
new identities. For the Hong Kong people identities are not something fixed, but
something that appears, disappears and reappears.
In his memoirs essay, “Ji dao chunqiu guangying zhong” [Films in My Youth,
1995], Gu Cangwu, the noted Hong Kong poet and journalist, has the following
observation about the youth in the 1960s:
For us people growing up in a “floating city,” we were born with a sense of anxi-
ety and uncertainty. . . . We were worried about the Cultural Revolution that oc-
curred in China. The 1967 Riot was only a small-scale re-enactment of the Cul-
tural Revolution, yet many people were so frightened that they fled Hong Kong.
The people of the “floating city” were brought back to face history squarely for
the first time since the 1950s. For our generation, we also for the first time seri-
ously thought about our identity and our situation as Hong Kong Chinese. In the
journals we edited, we began to explore issues of our Chinese identity and orga-
nized many seminars in the style of the “Free University.” But the more we ex-
plored, the more we felt puzzled.3 (Gu 1995: 59)
The image of a floating life and a floating identity marks the discourse that Hong
Kong people in the 1960s used to construct themselves in relation to their Chi-
nese identity. It reflects the lack of confidence among the Hong Kong Chinese,
not only in China, but also in themselves.
4. Hong Kong Chinese: Discourses of a floating self in a floating

city
For the people living in a floating city, identity is not just a matter of cultural pol-
itics, but also an issue of personal anchorage, cultural root, self-positioning and
self-assurance. In contemporary Hong Kong writings, there is a similar quest of
identity that seeks its roots in Chinese civilization. In the play, Long qing hua bu
kai [An unresolved China complex 1997] by Mo Xi (Mok Hei), there is the ex-
pression of strong sentiments toward China as a source of root in identity:
Ah-Gun: No matter how many times I have to go to China, I must find out where
my hometown is. (Mo 1999: 140)
The disillusionment with China urged many Hong Kong writers to look back to
Hong Kong and seek their identity in the immediate present of the reality. Hong
Kong in the late 1970s was marked by its rapid and large-scale sociocultural de-
velopment, with the Mass Transit Railway (MTR) 4 being built as a signpost of
urban transformation from a “floating city” to a highly modernized society be-
yond the imagination of colonialism:
What Hong Kong most powerfully suggests is that it is no longer possible to de-
fine a culture by the presence or absence of any or all of these markings. For the
first time anywhere a vibrant culture has emerged almost entirely from within the
elements of mass consumerism. The vast bulk of Hong Kong’s population may
have come from China bringing language, lore and learning with it. But what is
going back to China is patently not what was extracted. It is something else alto-
gether – an identity forged through popular culture. (O’Toole 1997: 18)
In the midst of this urban transformation was the rise of consumerism and pop-
ular culture, which is a sign of the emergence of many Asian cities as regional
beyond the cultural boundaries of colonialism. In his critique of Hong Kong, Gu
Cangwu has the following to say in his poem “Taiping Shan shang, Taiping Shan
xia” [Over Victoria Peak]:
Oh!
Is this the city in which I have lived
For thirty years?
Were it not that someone mentioned:
We should thank Emperor Dao Guang5
I would have forgotten:
This harbor
Has a name
The British Queen
Victoria – Victory!
The weight of a hundred years’ history

Crushes on my long-numbed brain
Thunder clapping
My stubborn illness that was healed a long time ago
Is made to re-surge
In the pain:
I see that on an island and on a peninsula
Numerous
Golden poles
have been forced in
Between golden poles
Underneath the golden poles
170 Kwok-kan Tam
Spilling blood
The harbour
Dyed fishy red6
(Gu 1980b: 68–70)
5. An alternative identity: Images of China as the homeland

In their quest for identity, Hong Kong writers began in the 1950s and 1960s with
seeing themselves as a “floating cloud” (Gu 1988: 371), drifting between China the
homeland and the open world outside China. Instead of living self-deceptively in
the past about the great Chinese cultural tradition, many Hong Kong writers are
awakened to the fact that they have to live in the present and seek their identity
in the future. This transformation originates from the inner change in the writers,
to whom identity change is a matter of change in subjectivity. The grand socialist
dream in China of the 1970s, unfortunately, turned out to be a myth.
While what puzzled many writers was the confusion of identity among the
Hong Kong people in the 1960s and early 1970s, in 1997 when Hong Kong was
ready to be reverted back to China, there was still this unresolved puzzlement
of identity. This is evidenced in the play, Wu ren di dai [No man’s land 1997] by
Zhan Ruiwen (Tsim Sui Man) and Deng Shurong (Tang Shu Wing), in which two
prisoners assume the role of clowns and perform in an absurdist manner to make
fun of both the mainland Chinese and Taiwanese identities. Yet to the two clowns,
who are supposed to be representations of Hong Kong people, identity cannot be
a choice between mainland China and Taiwan, and in the process of constructing
a separate identity, they can only choose the “Diaoyu Islands” as their symbol –
the symbol of a place forsaken by both mainland China and Taiwan:
J: Everyone has his own world, which is like a ball that rolls here and there and
bounces up and down, but it cannot exist by itself apart from us. When we don’t
move, the world also does not move, but once it moves, we have to move with it.
In case we are not careful, the world may fall down and we cannot get hold of it.
We may think of changing the world, but it is no longer the world that we origi-
nally live in. Even though we may still pretend that the world is the original world
we live in, it nevertheless is not the same. Sometimes the world that we play with
may also not be the world that we belong to. Where then is the world that we live
in? Who is the master of our world? (Zhan and Deng 1999: 96)
The world here that the clown “J ” talks about is of course the location that the
Hong Kong people associate with in their construction of their identity. This ex-
istentialist view of an absurd world, in which one is not one’s own master, ful-
ly expresses the sense of helplessness in Hong Kong people’s uncertainty about
their identity and their future.
A look at Hong Kong drama presented in the year 1997 will also show that
there is the quest for a postcolonial identity, as distinguished from that of main-
land China and Taiwan. In the play, Fei ba! Lin liu niao, fei ba! [Archaeological
bird 1997] by Chen Bingzhao (Chan Ping Chiu), there is the description of Hong
Kong in its quest for a postcolonial identity, which is not the colonial British, nor
is it Chinese (mainland and Taiwan), but distinctively Hong Kong:
D: The songs of the Che7 people attracted many, many more boats to this sea-
port. But when more and more people came to this place, the Che people sudden-
ly disappeared with reasons unknown. It is like deleting a file in the computer,
and no one knows what happened.
E: The whereabouts of the Che people has become a riddle since. Some peo-
ple say they had gone to the sea; but the fishermen’s descendants think otherwise
and say that the Che people could not have been their ancestors: it should be that
the fishermen had relocated themselves on the land and then later on they became
the Che people. (Chen 1999: 210)
By tracing the origin of the Hong Kong people as descendants from the Che clan,
which had been deleted from the collective memory of the Chinese in record-
ed history, the play attempts to redefine Hong Kong people as distinct from the
mainland Chinese or Taiwanese. The redefinition of Hong Kong people can thus
be seen as an effort in constructing a new Hong Kong subjectivity. Yet, in the
midst of the process of redefinition, there is a tone of sadness and helplessness in
the face of China’s takeover in 1997:
Father: ....
Da . . .da . . . da . . . da . . . da . . . da! Listen, this is the sound of burial. Let the
gigantic wheels of the bulldozer rush toward us. Let them run over your ances-
tors, smash your homes and crush all empty memories.
Time is up. A great monument is going to be set up on our dead bodies.
Time is up. What are you digging here?
Time is up, except for my body, what have you excavated? (Chen 1999: 164)
6. A search for the missing links in Hong Kong identity

In the recent thirty years of Hong Kong’s history from the 1960s to the 1990s,
there has been the persistent quest for identity shown in journalistic literary writ-
ings. The disillusionment with the political reality in China has led to an awak-
ening among many Hong Kong writers that their future lies exactly in their im-
mediate present. History is both remembered history and reality in the contem-
porary Hong Kong journalistic literary writings. In studying cultural critiques
and journalistic literary writings produced in Hong Kong in 1997, one can have a
172 Kwok-kan Tam
more thorough perspective on the complex interplay not only of politics, but also
of cultures between the East and the West, the colonizer and the colonized, the
Rightist and the Leftist, and the colonial and the postcolonial in the emergence
of a Hong Kong identity since the mid-1980s. The writers’ search for identity is
actually a process of decolonization, in which the poet finds dissatisfaction with
the British Hong Kong, the old exploitative colonizer. This pattern of identity quest
has a strong personal tone in many Hong Kong writers, but it can also be seen as a
general pattern in Hong Kong people’s collective search for identity. In the Hong
Kong play, Archaeological Bird, such a pattern of identity quest at the levels of
Personal-National-Cultural can also be discerned. Through the process of archae-
ological excavation, the play attempts to show the complex relations among per-
sonal identity, location, family history, ethnicity and nation. In the scene, “Fam-
ily Heredity: My Tail”, which parodies the history lesson typical of Hong Kong
education, there is an exercise in the form of “filling in the blanks”:
I’m in my ________, I’m about ________ tall, and quite ________ built, but I have
rather ________ shoulders.
I have _______ hair. My eyes are ________ . I’ve got a rather ________ face, with
a _______ chin, a _______ nose. I have _______ lips, and I usually have a _____
expression. My face changes a lot when I ________. I have a ______ forehead: I
like to think it looks ________.
I have a Chinese tail, the most special thing on my body that I’ve got from the
Chinese heritage. (Chen 1999: 247)
The “blanks” that need to be filled in are the missing links between personal iden-
tity and ethnicity in contemporary Hong Kong. The linkage with Chinese heri-
tage is seen in the play as a “tail”, which not only appears to be redundant, but
also makes Hong Kong people feel uneasy about themselves. In another scene, “A
Game of the Tail”, the quest for identity is parodied in the style of an absurd play
as a game of children chasing after their tails (Chen 1999: 244). In this sense, the
quest for identity in the 1960–1990s generation of Hong Kong people is seen as
a sad, futile game. The use of English in this section of the play has the effect of
lamenting not only the lack of a native language, but also ridiculing the reliance
on English, the language borrowed from the colonial master, in the construction
of identity. It points out the reality of Hong Kong people’s being situated, linguis-
tically and culturally, in between the Chinese and English languages.
In many Hong Kong writers’ search for identity, there is also a shift of per-
spective from seeing the self as the “unhomed” drifting in the floating city of a
colonial Hong Kong to considering the self as the “homely” living in the local
bridging culture of a postcolonial Hong Kong (see Bhabha 1994: 5–18). When
Hong Kong is considered as “home” and when “the boundary becomes the place
from which something begins its presencing” (Bhabha 1994: 5), Hong Kong
writers have found their own position in the emergence of a Hong Kong identi-
ty which, according to Homi Bhabha, is a bridge that “gathers as a passage that
crosses” (Bhabha 1994: 5). In the history of Hong Kong, the city has also been
represented as a bridge between the East and the West. Now this is a bridge that
gathers, and not just crosses. That is, Hong Kong has also become a place to form
an identity of its own.
7. The discourse of postcolonial Hong Kong voices
The depiction of Hong Kong as a location on which Hong Kong identity can be
constructed is also found in the play, Archaeological Bird, which affirms that
Hong Kong is a place with an identity. The play ends with an ambivalent voice
between optimism and pessimism:
Voice Over:
. . . About our future, we need not have any fear!
. . . Do not give birth to children! Do not buy any property!
. . . After the return of sovereignty, we will then become masters of this land!
. . . Daughter, be careful with your boyfriends. Now Hong Kong people have be-
come Chinese people!
. . . In this circle, so long as you remain nice, you will become famous!
. . . If we do not want to have any burden, let’s not to have!
. . . Do not give up so soon. Give more time to other people, and also give more
time to ourselves!
. . . Mum, do not listen to Dad for everything. If you find anything incorrect, you
have to raise objection!
. . . Do it well, I will support you!
. . . We have to create Hong Kong here and now! 8 (Chen 1999: 270)
Discourse does not just represent the social reality reflected in people’s mind; it
serves more importantly an instrumental function in shaping ideologies. As Teun
A. Van Dijk has pointed out,
Within the framework of a multidisciplinary project on discourse and ideology, a

new conception of ideology is being developed in which ideologies are conceived
of as the basis of the social representations shared by (the members of) a group.
The social position, interests and other vital properties of a group, and its rela-
tions to other groups, are thus socio-cognitively represented in such a way that
the ideologies shared by its members may monitor the social representations un-
derlying discourse and other social practices. (Van Dijk 1996: 7)
174 Kwok-kan Tam
Viewed from such a perspective, the images of Hong Kong around the 1997 issue
are reflective of a discourse that attempts to monitor the social representations, in
which process the most obvious is the desire to reconstruct the subject. Ideology
is thus also a matter of discursive formation. In the study of identity, what is in-
teresting is how identity as a psychological process can be discussed in terms of
discourse. Ian Parker has offered his view in this respect, as he says,
The object that a discourse refers to may have an independent reality outside dis-
course, but is given another reality by discourse. An example of such an object
is the subject who speaks, writes, hears or reads the texts discourses inhabit. . .
a subject, a sense of self, is a location constructed within the expressive sphere
which finds its voice through the cluster of attributes and responsibilities assigned
to it as a variety of object. (Parker 1992: 9)
8. Conclusion
Through the construction of a discourse on the 1997 issue, the writers discussed
in this chapter, be they poets or dramatists, have actually voiced their desire to
reconstruct the Hong Kong people as subjects caught in the envisioning of a post-
coloniality that is threatened in its very lack of a sense of subjecthood. This lack
of a subjecthood results from language mix that points at the in-betweenness of
contemporary Hong Kong identity. The year 1997 marks the end of a colonial
Hong Kong, but it is not just a discourse about the social reality of Hong Kong.
What marks the changes in Hong Kong has a long lasting effect upon the nostal-
gic memory of its people in their identity construction.
In Western theories, postcoloniality entails two concepts, as well as two so-
ciopolitical conditions, which are complimentary to each other. The first concept,
which describes postcoloniality as a historical development of a society after co-
lonialism, is temporal in its definition. The second concept, which considers post-
coloniality as the emergence of new cultural spaces beyond the confines of colo-
nialism, is spatial in its theoretical orientation. The case of Hong Kong presents
an example that counter-argues that postcolonial cultural spaces can emerge even
in a colonial society prior to its return to China in the year 1997. The labelling of
Hong Kong as an anomaly of postcoloniality thus addresses the cultural devel-
opment of a modern society beyond its colonial space. Yet, this cultural space is
not a space of certainty; nor is it a space that can be defined in any single tradi-
tion of the West or the East. It is not entirely Chinese, nor is it entirely Western.
It is something that is forever re-imagining itself in its disappearance and recon-
struction. In Homi Bhabha’s terms, the postcoloniality of Hong Kong lies exact-
ly in its in-betweenness of cultural anomaly. This cultural in-betweenness in the
case of Hong Kong has been vividly represented as voices of “missing”.
From a Marxist point of view, the complexity of the emergence of postcolonial

cultural spaces in Hong Kong prior to the year 1997 can also be attributed to the
Hong Kong’s peculiar position as a “neighbor” of China that juxtaposes a high-
ly capitalist colonized city with an anti-colonial big power. In Lenin’s State and
Revolution, written in the beginning of the twentieth century, there was already
the prediction that historical exceptions in the form of anomaly might occur in a
small capitalist state, which had been subjected to the influence and pressure of
a big socialist country as neighbor. There have been alternative political voices in
Hong Kong throughout its history of colonization, due not only to the influence
of traditional Chinese values among its inhabitants, but also to the rise of local
economic and political forces that counter the colonizers. However, the alterna-
tive voices that can be found in Hong Kong in the 1980–1990s are not the same
as those that can be found in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The pre-
vious voices are those that yearn for a return to the Chinese tradition, as well as
to China, the motherland, while the voices around the year 1997 are those that
show the puzzlement of identity, loss, nostalgia and uncertainty.
Notes
1. Rey Chow has characterized Hong Kong as an anomaly of postcoloniality in her
various discussions of Hong Kong, for example, see Chow (1992).
2. For example, Xi Xi’s novel Fou cheng zhi yi [Floating city].
3. All translations are mine, except otherwise stated.
4. MTR stands for the Mass Transit Railway, the first phase of which was built in
1977–1979.
5. During Emperor Dao Guang’s reign in the Qing dynasty of China, Hong Kong was
ceded to Britain.
6. English in the original.
7. “Che” is the name of a local clan in Hong Kong, which is supposed to be the ear-
liest Chinese settlement.
8. The last sentence in the quote is given in English in the original.
References
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1994 The Location of Culture. London/New York: Routledge.
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gang huaju 1997 [Voice of Hong Kong: Drama 1997]. Hong Kong: Interna-
tional Association of Theatre Critics, 218–270.
176 Kwok-kan Tam
Chow, R.
aspora 2 (2), 151–170.
O’Toole, F.
1997 A singular territory. London Review of Books 3 July 1997, 18–19.
Gu, C.-w.
1980 Taiping Shan shang, Taiping Shan xia [Over victoria peak]. In C.-w. Gu Tong
lian [Bronze lotus]. Hong Kong: Suye Press, 68–70.
1988 Yimu yishi [Wood and stones]. Hong Kong: Joint Publishing.
1995 Ji dao chunqiu guangying zhong [Films in my youth]. In C.-w. Gu Beiwanglu
[Memorandum]. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 58–60.
Habermas, J.
1984 The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization
of Society. (Trans. T. McCarthy.) Boston: Beacon Press.
1987 The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. II: Lifeword and System: A Cri-
tique of Functionalist Reason. (Trans. T. McCarthy.) Oxford: Polity Press.
Mo, X. [Mok Hei]
1999 Long qing hua bu kai [An unresolved China complex]. In K.-k. Tam (ed.)
Xianggang de shengyin: Xianggang huaju 1997 [Voice of Hong Kong: Drama
1997]. Hong Kong: International Association of Theatre Critics, 104–217.
Parker, I.
1992 Discourse Dynamics. London: Routledge.
Van Dijk, T. A.
1996 Discourse, opinions and ideologies. In C. Schaffner and H. Kelly-Holmes
(eds.), Discourse and Ideologies. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 36–52.
Zhan, R.-w. (Tsim Sui Man) and S.-r. Deng (Tang Shu Wing)
1999 Wu ren di dai [No man’s land]. In K.-k. Tam (ed.), Xianggang de shengyin:
Xianggang huaju 1997 [Voice of Hong Kong: Drama 1997]. Hong Kong: In-
ternational Association of Theatre Critics, 74–102.
Chapter 11
Identity and interactive hypermedia:
A discourse analysis of web diaries
Hong Cheng and Guofang Wan
1. World Wide Web: A new communication channel

In the present chapter, we want to study the Hong Kong diaspora’s attempt to
use the new media for overcoming the predominant Western discourse about the
handover of Hong Kong and at the same time for changing the usually asym-
metric conditions of mass media communication. Moreover, we shall discuss
the chances, limits and constraints which became manifest during the realiza-
tion of this attempt.
Since the mid-1990s, the world has once again witnessed how technologies
change human beings’ lives. As a fastest-growing segment on the Internet and
a major force in computer-mediated communication (Cavanaugh 1998; Dizard
1997; Harris 1996; Jones 1997, 1998; Laver 1996;1 Niekamp 1996; Reddick and
King 1997; Wu 1999), the World Wide Web has provided anyone – organization
and individual alike – who has “a computer, modem, phone line, and ‘access pro-
vider’ ” (Johnson 1995: 20) with an entirely new channel of communication.
Among the organizations that have jumped online were traditional news me-
dia. Thanks to the Web, “the phrase ‘mass communication’ takes on a whole new
meaning” for the first time in history (Cavanaugh 1998: 3). Instead of the tradi-
tional one-way communication of publishing to the masses, the Web “mediates
human interaction better than any other medium” (Levy 1996: 27).2
In addition to their coverage of happenings with conventional journalistic
genres such as hard news and feature stories on a daily – or even an hourly – ba-
sis, many news organizations have mobilized their resources to provide extensive
coverage of important international news on the Web. On 30 June and 1 July 1997,
news Web sites3 from 62 percent of the countries or territories that used English
as an operational language covered Hong Kong’s return to China; 56 percent of
these countries or territories had all of their English-language news sites cover-
ing this event. And 44 percent of the countries or territories that had their Eng-
lish-language news sites covering Hong Kong’s handover offered the coverage
on the front page of their sites, which does not need any further click on a news
178 Hong Cheng and Guofang Wan
site to see the news and naturally indicates the priority a news item is given on
the site (Cheng 2000).
In the meantime, many news Web sites experimented with new techniques in
their coverage. Almost a quarter of the countries that had English-language news
sites in mid-1997 had at least one site offering a special project on Hong Kong’s
handover (Cheng 2000). Sites with such a special project carried far more infor-
mation on Hong Kong than the sites without such a project.
In this chapter, we shall focus on some dozens of diaries contributed by twen-
ty individuals from Hong Kong to the U.S.-based Public Broadcasting Service’s
Web site < http://www.pbs.com > during a six-month period before and after the
handover. Our purpose is not only to provide a discursive perspective on the con-
struction of identity by the local people themselves amidst global media attention,
but also to explore the intricate and dynamic interconnections between identity
development and Internet mediation.
2. “Hong Kong ’97: Lives in Transition”

“Hong Kong ’97: Lives in Transition” < http://www.pbs.org/pov/hongkong/ >
is the title of a special online project created and hosted by the Public Broad-
casting Service, still accessible on the Web today – more than four years af-
ter Hong Kong’s handover. PBS, headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia of the
United States, is a private, nonprofit corporation whose members are 347 pub-
lic television stations across the country. PBS claims that it “uses the power of
noncommercial television, the Internet and other media to enrich the lives of all
Americans through quality programs and education services that inform, inspire
and delight.” Serving nearly 100 million people each week, PBS is available to
99 percent of U.S. homes with televisions and to an increasing number of dig-
ital multimedia households (“About PBS” 2001).4 PBS’s featuring of “Lives in
Transition” when Hong Kong’s handover took place was in line with its mission
since this special online project could help inform its audience of a major world
event via an innovative use of the Internet. As stated clearly on PBS’s home page,
“Lives in Transition is about human-sized perspectives on Hong Kong’s histo-
ry and transition” < http://www.pbs.org/cgi-bin/pov/hongkong/discuss/discuss.
cgi >. Brian Clark, the project’s producer, further explained why PBS launched
this special Web section:
The Hong Kong handover was such a complex issue that we knew the tradition-
al media would give only “news attention” (which meant heavy on the formal
speeches and declarations with few, if any, glimpses of the effect on the people).
. . . [W]hile news was reflected in the diaries, we envisioned the effort much more
as “real-time” documentary for the Web. (Clark 2000: 2) 5
As a cyber-forum for Web users, “Lives in Transition” began publishing diary

entries on 30 April 1997. If one clicks on “By Date” in this special project, the
seventy-one archived diaries will be listed in chronological order; if one clicks
on “By Contributor,” the twenty participating diarists will be listed alphabetical-
ly, with a one-paragraph biography for each of them and a photograph for four of
them shown on the Web page. A diarist’s name is clickable, too, which leads to
all entries contributed by the individual. From all walks of life, the diarists were
men and women believed to be representative of those who live in Hong Kong.
Hilary Klotz, the PBS project’s associate producer, found most of the diarists
during a two-week trip to Hong Kong in April 1997.
We were trying to find a wide variety of people to represent a broad spectrum of

Hong Kong society – students, artists, business people, scholars, working-class
people, and Chinese and non-Chinese residents. I had some contacts in Hong
Kong before the trip and got referrals that way. Then once in Hong Kong, I found
people via referrals and also through organizations like Hong Kong Journalists
Association. So, I met all these people, introduced the project and asked them to
volunteer to write diaries. Afterwards, when I returned to the U.S., we had a pro-
duction meeting and selected participants. Again, we were looking for diversity
and hoping to get people who would commit to writing regular installments over
a period of four months. (Klotz 2000: 1) 6
Some of the diarists chose to contribute under pseudonyms for fear of reprisals.
Once the project got rolling, a few Web users joined on after sending e-mail to the
PBS production team. One of them even wrote the most frequent entries (Clark
2000; Klotz 2000).
The diarists could not post their entries directly on the Web. They first sent
their entries via e-mail, fax or, occasionally, regular mail to the PBS team, who
then posted for them because some of them did not have Web access at that time.
For those diarists who only spoke Cantonese, a graduate student at the Chinese
University of Hong Kong translated their entries into English. Again, PBS “want-
ed to make sure we had both English and non-English speakers – as well as [the]
young, old, wealthy, non-wealthy, etc.” (Klotz 2000: 1).
When PBS stopped actively publishing diaries to its site in late 1997 (remem-
ber, the Internet population was relatively small then), the number of the Web
users who had visited this special project was already more than 250,000. These
visitors were virtually from all of over the world (Clark 2000).
Although “Lives in Transition” was not solely designed by PBS to collect
Hong Kong citizens’ views on their identities, it provided an ideal and unique
venue for us to examine such identities, which had, in fact, no shortage of ex-
pression there.
3. Hong Kong people’s quest for identities

Identity defining in a postcolonial territory always involves “ideological battles”
(Gibson 1995: 73). The “sense of an ending, of the completion of one period of
history and the emergence of another, is ... hard to maintain in any simple or un-
problematic fashion” (Childs and Williams 1997: 1).
The recent transition in Hong Kong has been very complex, subtle and pro-
found because “the real transition is about identity and not sovereignty” (Wong
1999: 182). The identity of Hong Kong people is more complex than that of peo-
ple in many other places of the world. “Vis-à-vis foreigners, Hong Kong people
are of course Chinese, but vis-à-vis the Chinese from the mainland or Taiwan,
they seem to have the imprints of the West” (Chow 1992: 155).
Compared with the people in most other former colonies, there are two major
differences when Hong Kong people define their identities. For one thing, there
was “the passion for decolonization in the 1960s and 70s” since the citizens in
those former colonial territories “believed that there was no higher good than self-
government” (Campbell 1997: 253). But for Hong Kong, the decolonization was
not a voluntary choice of its citizens; instead, it was a decision made by its former
colonizer and its motherland. The other difference is that most former colonies
became independent nation states after decolonization, so they could – at least in
theory – determine their own fates. But for Hong Kong, its sovereignty was trans-
ferred from one country to another. With these two differences, the identity defin-
ing in Hong Kong is more complicated, more controversial, and, naturally, more
pressing than that for most other former colonies. Since the early 1990s, when
Hong Kong’s return to China had become imminent, people in Hong Kong have
been discussing their identities “with increasing fervor” (Ho 1998: 39).
In fact, the identity issue in Hong Kong could be traced back to 1842 when
this territory was taken over as part of the ratification of the Treaty of Nanking
by the British, who wanted a trading port with China. From then on, Hong Kong
became “a bridge between the East and West, with no existence of its own ex-
cept as a convenient passage between these two cultures” (Ibid.). Natural disas-
ters, economic crises, and political unrest in China forced many of its citizens
to move to the British colony. So, in the first half of the twentieth century, Hong
Kong also became “a center for refugees who had no engagement with the city”
(Ibid.). They worked hard and tried to make as much money as possible in order
to immigrate to other places or return to China once the situation there improved.
In this sense, “Hong Kong was only a railway station, with many romances but
no marriages” (Ibid.).
Before communists took over China in 1949 ensued another massive flow of
refugees, who psychologically and culturally still linked with China, although
they had made Hong Kong their home. The first baby boom in the 1950s gave birth
to “a truly ‘Hong Kong’ generation” (Ibid.), brought up in a British colony with

no direct contact with China. To this generation, China became a distant entity.
No colonial power wants its colonists to have a strong sense of local identities.
Over the years, the British government nurtured Hong Kong people with neither
a Hong Kong nor a Chinese identity, encouraging them “to live in an ambigu-
ous cultural state” (Ibid.). It was not until 1984 when Britain agreed to return
Hong Kong to China in 1997 as a special administrative region of China, a need
for identity became apparent. When the British government refused to grant the
right of abode in the United Kingdom to Hong Kong citizens, it was made clear
that Hong Kong people were not British, either. To many people in Hong Kong,
the territory “remained a transcultural political entity that was neither Chinese
nor British, neither Eastern nor Western” (Ibid. 40).
After the 1989 Tiananmen incident in China, Hong Kong people became more
anxious. Many of them emigrated. For those who could not or did not want to
leave, the need for establishing an identity – something they could hold on to – in-
creased. For example, the Hong Kong Arts Center, an independent arts organiza-
tion with no government subsidies, engaged itself in “the identification and defi-
nition of Hong Kong’s cultural identity by examining its visual culture” (Ibid.).
Since Hong Kong’s handover to China in 1997, it has become increasing-
ly apparent that identity discussions in Hong Kong are polarizing into two ex-
tremes. On the one hand, the Chinese government has worked hard to enlist the
people’s patriotism; on the other hand, “the sense of Hong Kong-ness has never
been stronger” (Ibid. 42).
In short, “[t]he history of Hong Kong predisposes one to a kind of ‘border’ or
‘parasite’ practice – an identification with ‘Chinese culture’ but a distantiation
form the Chinese Communist regime; a resistance against colonialism but an un-
willingness to see the community’s prosperity disrupted” (Chow 1993: 22). In
other words, “Hong Kong citizens themselves remain fascinatingly contradicto-
ry in their diasporic consciousness” (Ibid. 23).
As a self-concept, identity is nebulous and multidimensional, occurring, among
others, in two major types: cultural and social. Often referred to as one’s sense of
belonging to a particular culture or ethnic group, cultural identity involves learn-
ing about and accepting the language, tradition, religion, aesthetics, and thinking
patterns of a culture. Parallel to cultural identity, social identity is shaped by the
characteristics and concerns common to the members of a social group or seg-
ment. The types of social groups or segments with which people identify vary
broadly and may include perceived similarities such as age, gender, profession,
ideology, social class and common interests (Lustig and Koester 2000).
Both cultural and social identities “are negotiated, co-created, reinforced, and
challenged through communication” (Collier 2000: 23). As Hall (1994) point-
ed out,
Instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new

cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a “pro-
duction” which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted with-
in, not outside, representation. (Hall 1994: 392)
As a major purpose of this study is to examine how Hong Kong people looked at
themselves before and after the historic handover, the term identity is operation-
alized primarily as the way the Hong Kong diarists looked at China regarding, in
particular, its culture, social and economic systems, and the sovereignty transfer.
When they admitted their cultural associations with China, they would be regard-
ed as identifying with their “motherland” culturally. In the meantime, their atti-
tudes toward the social, political differences and the different levels of economic
development between Hong Kong and the mainland will be used as an indicator
of their willingness or unwillingness to identify with China socially.
4. Discourse analysis and ideology

Seeing textual analysis not only as a method of research but also as “an autono-
mous endeavor toward the construction of a sound theory of media discourse”
(Van Dijk 1983: 20), discourse analysis “provides us with rather powerful, while
subtle and precise, insights to pinpoint the everyday manifestations and displays
of social problems in communication and interaction” (Van Dijk 1985: 7).
Among the goals of discourse analysis is to find out the “underlying ideolo-
gies” of media discourse. In other words, “[t]hrough more explicit linguistic dis-
course analysis ... such work attempts to uncover implied meanings that repre-
sent ideological positions” (Van Dijk 1983: 27). To achieve this goal, discourse
analysis may be focused on what Van Dijk (1983) called “global coherence” that
pertains to large parts of the discourse and “is usually described in terms of such
notions as ‘topic’ or ‘theme’ ... accounted for theoretically in terms of so-called
‘semantic macrostructures’ ” (Van Dijk 1983: 25), which is “derived from the in-
formation, represented in the respective propositions expressed by the text, of
the discourse as a whole” (Van Dijk 1983: 33–34). “Theme is an important ele-
ment for building cohesion. It is a major means by which information is struc-
tured in text: It signals what is ‘given’ and what is ‘new’ information, what is
prominent, and what the clause is about” (Stillar 1998: 17). As Van Dijk (1983)
further elaborated,
... a fragment of a discourse or a whole discourse is considered to be globally co-

herent if a topic (represented by a macroproposition) can be derived from such a
fragment. Note that part of the meaningfulness criterion for discourse is not only
that (sequences of) sentences have meaning, but also that they are “about” some-
thing; they refer to (real or imagined) facts and to components of facts, such as
objects, persons, properties, actions, or events. (1983: 25–26)
In this chapter, we chose to focus on the cultural and social identities-related the-
matic topics that emerged from the diaries posted on PBS’s website by various
individuals in Hong Kong during the historic transition. To identify such themat-
ic topics, we treated each diary as a complete discourse, paying particular atten-
tion to its explicit linguistic features while uncovering its implied meanings with
the help of contextual information. Through an examination of how these dia-
rists associated with or detached from China culturally and socially, we hope to
add to the literature of how ideology influences one’s cultural and social identi-
ties, and how language, culture, and ideology interact with one another in a par-
ticular context like Hong Kong’s handover.
5. Cultural and social identities revealed in PBS web diaries

In regard to cultural and social identities in Hong Kong, we found three themes
that had emerged from the seventy-one diaries posted on PBS’s website from 30
April through 10 October 1997. Some diarists were willing to identify with China
both culturally and socially. Even if they did not give any indication of their cul-
tural identities, they could still identify with China socially. Some diarists iden-
tified with China only culturally but not socially. Some diarists identified with
China neither culturally nor socially. In a similar vein, they chose to focus on or
to search for a pure Hong Kong identity. (Sometimes diarists also modified their
attitude during this period of contributions: see for examples [2], [7], [11] below
by Einna; June/July/September 1997).
5.1. Both culturally and socially identified with China
In this section, we selected and analyzed a few diary excerpts that indicated the
diarists’ willingness to identify with China culturally and socially.
[1] In my case, my father and I had very little to do with the Brits. In fact, we didn’t
distinguish between the Brits and other Westerners: I used the words “Brits,”
“Westerners,” “gweilos,” etc., interchangeably right into adulthood. My life
was firmly rooted in the Chinese and Cantonese folk culture of food, of the
yearly cycles of festivals and worships, of Chinese medical remedies (my fa-
ther worked in a wholesale shop dealing with Chinese herbs), of the stories
and legends my mother relayed to me . . . I also read the newspapers my father
brought home, often fighting with my brother for the inside pages, which were
full of reminiscences of life back in China, as well as forlorn poems and serial
knight-errant stories. In a nutshell, the greater part of my life seemed to have
gone on as if there had been no Brits in town. (Cat-Lover, 6 May 1997) 7
Using narration of her personal experience as a communication strategy, this di-

arist distinctly identified with the Chinese culture, which as she mentioned, in-
cludes food, customs, herb medicines, legends and literature. On the contrary, the
diarist clearly expressed her indifference about the British ruling. Since her fam-
ily life and her personal life had little to do with the British directly, the greater
part of her life could go on after the handover “as if there had been no Brits in
town”. To express such indifference and dislike for the British, the diarist even
resorted to some highly derogatory words like “Brits” and “gweilos” in her writ-
ing. This diary suggests that one’s personal experience with the British could, to
a large extent, determine one’s attitude toward the colonial ruling and the han-
dover. As Wong (1999) noted, “family experiences contribute to political values
and identity formation” (1999: 188).
[2] At present, nearly 30 percent of the capital flowing into Hong Kong is from
mainland China. Many mainland investors and capitalists have established their
companies here, issuing stocks and shares in Hong Kong. This kind of develop-
ment will strengthen the economy of the territory. It also demonstrated that Chi-
na understands the importance of Hong Kong as a center of international trade;
to damage the strategic importance of Hong Kong’s status in the world econo-
my is not in China’s interest. Subsequently, Chinese interference in the politi-
cal administration of Hong Kong has decreased over these last two months. It
seems that their attitude toward Hong Kong is getting more liberal. They have
started to “act more, say less.” This is really a good phenomenon ....
As for me, my capital is invested in the Hong Kong property market, where
the picture is currently quite rosy. Just since May, property values have in-
creased up to five percent. Speculation abounds that the price will continue to
rise through October. By that time, according to my plans, I will have sold some
of my properties. (Seek the opportunity!)
I have confidence that when the leaders of the central government in Bei-
jing turn their attention to Shanghai, the future will be quite positive. Shanghai
people are generally pretty open-minded, and are willing to accept the ways
of newcomers that superior to their own. I think they will be able to grasp the
essence of the existing philosophy of management in Hong Kong and use our
model to catch up with the world. (Einna, 1 June 1997) 8
Although this diarist did not give any emphasis on her cultural identity in this
piece, she socially identified with the Chinese government’s Hong Kong policy.
Using a mix of reasoning and personal account as her communication strategy, the
diarist expressed her optimism about the handover with little reservation. When
she was reasoning, she selected such facts as the capital flow from China and the
open-mindedness of the Shanghai people to support her argument. One thing is
also obvious from this excerpt that the diarist’s positive view toward the Chinese
government’s Hong Kong policy was based on the personal economic gains she
had obtained in the new sociocultural ecology during the territory’s transition.
[3] Today, I am living and working in Hong Kong, enjoying every minute of it.
The new SAR [Special Administrative Region] government is doing a pretty
good job, and most people in Hong Kong are pretty happy with how things
are turning out. Yes, there will always be opposition, but that is inevitable.
Hopefully, the prosperity and peace in Hong Kong will continue, and gradu-
ally a system will evolve that everybody likes. (Chu, 10 October 1997) 9
Although the diarist did not mention anything related to Chinese culture here,
his writing was permeated with positiveness about the new Hong Kong govern-
ment, which represents Beijing’s policy toward this returned land. He was satis-
fied with what the Chinese government had done in Hong Kong. This diary ex-
cerpt is another example that when one is willing to identify with China social-
ly, one would be positive about the transition in Hong Kong.
5.2. Culturally but not socially identified with China
Studies have documented that “in the ethno-cultural sense, there was a strong
sense of identification with Chinese nation” by many Hong Kong citizens (Lau
1997: 9). But “as far as the People’s Republic of China and the socialist Chinese
government were concerned,” many Hong Kong citizens’ feelings “were at best
mixed, and at worst negative” (Ibid. 12). The following diary excerpts showed
how some diarists identified with the Chinese culture but not with the Chinese
society.
[4] I have mixed feelings about China taking over again. On the one hand, as a
Chinese person, I should be proud that my “mother country,” so to speak, is
regaining control of something that is rightfully hers. I also have some faith
that China will be sensible enough to leave the freedom and autonomy of Hong
Kong’s people alone. On the other hand, I fear that the plays for power going
on right now between locals, Chinese leaders, and a few remaining figures of
British authority may contribute to a possible downfall of our flourishing col-
ony. (Wong, 9 May 1997) 10
The cultural identity as Chinese and the social detachment from China are both
explicitly indicated in this diary. By calling himself “a Chinese” and China his
“mother country,” and by saying he is “proud of ” China’s reclaiming its sover-
eignty, the diarist clearly indicated his Chinese identity. In the meantime, by us-
ing the words “sorry to see the British go” and “so to speak”, and the phrase “our
flourishing colony”, he also indicated that he was socially more attached to the
British than to the Chinese system. This diary excerpt is an example that discrep-
ancy between one’s cultural and social identities could give rise to one’s mixed
feelings about Hong Kong’s handover.
[5] It can be said without doubt that the British government transformed Hong
Kong from a primitive place into a bright and well-known city. Invariably, ev-
eryone hopes the success can and will continue. The British government has
given us the largest degree of freedom we have ever known, both in our com-
munity and in trade. Under the British, the rights of the Hong Kong people
have been respected. I do hope China will use the British system as a blue-
print for rectifying the weaknesses in her own plan. (Lau, 15 May 1997) 11
Although the diarist did not deal with cultural identity directly here, his use of
the word “her” when referring to China suggested his emotional attachment to
his mother country. Meanwhile, his nostalgia for the British social system and
his reservation about the Chinese social system were fully expressed by his hope
that “China will use the British system as a blueprint for rectifying the weak-
nesses in her own plan.”
[6] For myself, the end of the colonial rule is certainly great. Even though Hong
Kong has been ruled by Britain [for] more than 150 years[,] I have strong feel-
ings of connection to my motherland. When my family and I were watching
the Olympic Games, we concerned ourselves with the performance of Chi-
na’s teams and were proud of their victories. Few Hong Kong people, I be-
lieve, would deny their Chinese identities. In this sense, we are eager to see
the reunification. But there are doubts as well. (Kwok, June 27 1997) 12
This diarist’s Chinese cultural identity was so self-explanatory in his writing.

The example of watching the Olympic Games was very forceful because it is a
typical situation in which one would distinctively and forcefully express one’s
cultural identity. “But there are doubts as well.” What doubts? Doubts concern-
ing the social impact of the sovereignty transfer on Hong Kong. Since the diarist
could not identify with China socially, his enthusiasm about the reunification of
the two parts of China was expressed with reservation.
[7] As a Chinese, I ought to be happy about the reunification of Hong Kong with
mainland China. However, my happiness has yet to sweep away my paradox-
ical feelings about the future of Hong Kong. Why? Because just a few de-
cades ago, the Chinese government was very conservative and stubborn. In
1949, China had just broken with a feudalistic dynasty to become a real uni-
fied modern nation. But it wasn’t until the 1980s that she opened herself up.
The Chinese government is still developing advanced technologies while
learning from the West a more democratic political system. However, Hong Kong
has already been fully developed as a civilian and capitalistic society for quite
some time. Our political system is now mature enough for greater democratiza-
tion. Between these two places, China and Hong Kong, there exists a gap left to
be bridged between two political and economic systems. We are worried whether
our reinstated sovereign will or can catch up with us, and whether she will per-
mit a greater pace of democratization. Or will it be the case that Hong Kong will
need to step backwards for a little while and wait until our motherland is ready
for greater political change? I really don’t know. (Einna, 10 July 1997) 13
In this diary, the author expressed her social detachment from China frankly while
admitting her Chinese cultural identity candidly. Her detachment came from her
pessimistic view about China, which was seemingly based on an analysis of the
discrepancies in social and economic situations between mainland China and
Hong Kong. Through a brief review of Chinese modern history, the diarist com-
pared the mainland with Hong Kong one aspect at a time. This diary excerpt is a
perfect example to support the theory that a major reason for many Hong Kong
citizens’ hesitation about reunification with China is that they “had commonly
regarded our motherland as backward and oppressive” (Ho 1998: 40).
Here, the use of a “why” question has demonstrated an important difference
between writing a Web diary and writing a traditional diary. A traditional diary’s
reader is usually the diarist, whereas a Web diary is apparently written for oth-
ers – most likely, for other Web surfers. When admitting that her happiness has
yet to sweep away her “paradoxical feelings about the future of Hong Kong”, this
diarist had predicted that her readers would ask her why, so she raised the ques-
tion for them in her writing and then answered it clearly by herself.
5.3. Neither culturally nor socially identified with China
The diaries analyzed in this section showed how some diarists identified with
China neither culturally nor socially, or how they focused on a pure Hong Kong
identity. As Chow (1992) once argued, citizens in a postcolonial city like Hong
Kong need “a third space between the colonizer and the dominant native culture,
a space that cannot simply be collapsed into the latter even as resistance to the
former remains foremost” (1992: 158).
[8] Suddenly I was gripped by the feeling of how quickly 1997 was approach-
ing. I then took note of the changes I expected to happen in our daily life af-
ter June 30, 1997, when governance of my hometown would be assumed by
China. (Chi, 6 June 1997) 14
This excerpt indicates that the diarist identified with China neither culturally nor
socially. Her unwillingness to identify with the Chinese culture was revealed by
the adverbial clause, “... when governance of my hometown would be assumed
by China”. Here, “China” sounded like a foreign country while Hong Kong was
called “my hometown”. The diarist’s social detachment from China was also ev-
ident. The verb “grip” used to describe her feelings about the handover strong-
ly revealed that.
[9] At this very instant, the neon red digits on a clock in the heart of Beijing are
flashing away audaciously, counting down to the second exactly how much
time is left until the historic handover takes place. When I went to Beijing
this summer, I was chilled to the bone as I stared at these incessantly blink-
ing numbers, and realized there was only one year left. Now there is a mere
month left, according to the “handover clock” installed at the local Regent
Hotel, and I just can’t bring myself to believe July 1 is approaching so quick-
ly .... (Wong, 23 June 1997) 15
Although the diarist did not give any indication about her cultural identity here,
it was clear that she had no social attachment with Beijing. “Audaciously” and
“chilled to the bone” were two expressions that set the tone for this diary – its
16-year-old author did not like the handover at all. This diary excerpt is a typical
example that “the Hong Kong-born generations were hesitant about the reunifi-
cation” (Ho 1998: 40).
[10] In our Wednesday morning assembly, the flag of China was raised on the
roof of my school for the first time. At that moment, my emotions were in-
deed mixed. The principal declared that as Chinese, we should revel in the
moment.
Nevertheless, some of my classmates were criticizing the Chinese gov-
ernment, saying that a gloomy period was coming. They feel that the [poli-
cies] of the Chinese government are ambiguous and hypocritical, and diffi-
cult for people to follow. The idea of being a Chinese was not so honorable,
some of them said. Some were even unwilling to sing the national song ....
They are passive. (Lau, 16 July 1997) 16
Through description and narration, this diarist showed us how some Hong Kong
high school students had experienced difficulty in identifying with China either
culturally or socially. Here, China’s national flag and national anthem were used
to symbolize China, both culturally and socially. The “mixed feelings” aroused
by the national flag and the students’ reluctance to sing the national anthem fully
indicated that they had an emotional resistance toward China. Even though they
admitted that they were Chinese, they did not like their Chinese cultural identity
because “being a Chinese was not so honorable” to them.
[11] Now, however, we live under the reign of a Chinese-style government. Chi-
nese rulers are accustomed to a system in which political power is central-
ized. They tend to resist democracy. I am afraid that democrats will find their
fight for a dominant role in the current Hong Kong polity a difficult one.
Needless to say, Hong Kong should and can sustain her status as an in-
ternational economic center. However, I am very worried about whether she
will be able to preserve the principle of Rule of Law. Before the handover,
the Privy Council of Great Britain acted as our Court of Final Appeal, set-
ting controversial and complicated legal problems. Soon the People’s Con-
gress will replace the Privy Council, and will enjoy the “divine” right to in-
terpret our constitution.
In my view, the People’s Congress is not a proper and legitimate legal in-
stitution. You know, almost none of the members in the Congress possess[es]
a legal degree. For such an ancient society, China hardly has a mature le-
gal concept. Therefore the Congress is, no doubt, going to commit mistakes
when it operates as the supreme body for handling legal issues. (Einna, 18
September 1997) 17
This diarist not only had strong detachment from China socially, but also ex-
pressed great reluctance to identify with it culturally. Her social detachment was
clearly shown from her forceful argument about the unlikeliness of a rule of law
in Hong Kong after the handover because to her, the Chinese rulers do not have
a strong sense of law and a legal heritage. She used the fact that “almost none of
the members in the [Chinese] Congress possess[es] a legal degree” to reinforce
her argument.
The diarist’s unwillingness to identify with China culturally was revealed by
her diction. While she selected such affective possessive pronouns as “her” and
“our” when referring to Hong Kong, she simply used such phrases as “a Chinese-
style government” and “Chinese rulers” in her description of China. It sounds
as if the people in Hong Kong were not Chinese (it is true that some of them are
not), and the diarist even “forgot” that she was originally from mainland Chi-
na herself.
[12] During the handover period I heard a number of speeches and soundbites in
which Hong Kong was described as a place where “East meets West”. My
personal view is that this is an empty cliché that reduced the territory to a
passive and neutral site where forces from elsewhere come into contact. It
wrongly treated local culture as merely the sum of given Chinese and West-
ern components, and thus serves to blind us to that which is unique in the
art or way of life of Hong Kong. In the handover ceremony itself, only Man-
darin Chinese and English were used. The local Hong Kong dialect, Can-
tonese, was not used even to announce to guests when they could sit down.
One of the biggest events of the handover period was the performance
of a specially commissioned piece of music by composer Tan Dun. It was
played during the July 1st firework display. I find it significant that a main-
land Chinese composer who lives in the West was chosen, rather than a lo-
cal Hong Kong composer. I’m not a musical expert, but the impression I’ve
gotten from reviews and other comments is that Tan Dun’s piece had a kind
of “East meets West” theme, mixing aspects of Western classical musical
form with things Chinese. (Clarke, 4 August 1997) 18
This excerpt showed the diarist’s very strong Hong Kong identity by doing three
things. First, such an identity was indicated in the diarist’s unhappiness about
seeing Hong Kong “reduced ... to a passive and neutral site” for external pow-
ers to interact and dominate, and the Hong Kong locals were blinded to what “is
unique in the art or way of life of Hong Kong”. Second, the diarist criticized the
widely used but rarely questioned “cliché” that Hong Kong is a place where “East
meets West”. The diarist’s unconventional view added much weight to his argu-
ment. Third, the diarist used language and music, two important and typical cul-
tural artifacts, to illustrate and reinforce his argument.
6. Identity, interaction and Internet

In this contribution, we examined how Hong Kong people searched for their cul-
tural and social identities during the transitional period. As a complex and press-
ing sociocultural issue in this former British crown colony, such identities were
created, argued, and transformed in the seventy or so diaries posted on PBS’s
Web site. From the above analysis of these diary discourses, we noticed that Hong
Kong people had more disagreement than consensus on how they would relate
with Chinese culture and Chinese society. As a long-term and dynamic process,
the search for new cultural and social identities in the post-handover Hong Kong
is most likely to be continued in the twenty-first century.
Cultural and social identities are “important at some historical moments when
a people (or an individual ...) needs to strengthen and protect itself from becom-
ing overwhelmed. However, an obsession with defining a singularly distinctive
culture can be devastating, at least in the case of Hong Kong” (Ho 1998: 43). To
many people in Hong Kong, the territory’s success was “built on its ability to ac-
commodate, absorb, adopt, manipulate, and transform anything that can help re-
solve our problems and enrich our life” (Ibid.). So, the rootlessness of Hong Kong
is believed to have given birth to “an open, accommodative culture” (Ibid.), and
“the collective sense of ambivalence, unease, anguish and insecurity” in identity
is “very much part and parcel of the Hong Kong way of life” (Wong 1999: 199),
all essential to the survival as well as success of this longtime trading port and
former refugee center. As Chow (1992) pointed out, in Hong Kong, there exists “a
kind of lack of nationality, a nationalessness, that is at once the city’s past coloni-
ality, present uncertainty, and (one hopes) future openness” (Chow 1992: 167).
The diversified ways in which the diarists under study identified with or de-
tached themselves from China culturally and socially have to do with their at-
titudes toward Hong Kong’s handover. It was not difficult to see that they were
more often than not willing to identify with Chinese culture but reluctant to iden-
tify with Chinese society.
In addition to pinpointing the cultural and social identities-related ideological
themes embedded in these Web diaries, this study has also observed intercon-
nections between Hong Kong people’s quest for identity and Internet mediation.
In these Web diaries, two such interconnections were evident. First, the Internet
has extended the traditional diary writing from an intrapersonal communication
mode to a many-to-many mass communication mode. As a channel for intraper-
sonal communication, traditional diaries are mainly written for self-expression
and self-reflection and are usually read by the diarists themselves. Studies on tra-
ditional diaries have documented that “the form involved in the personal diary
or journal intime concentrates on the life of the individual rather than on large-
scale events in the outside world” (Field 1989: 144).
As a new genre for many-to-many mass communication, however, Web dia-
ries could – in theory at least – be posted by multiple diarists and read by numer-
ous Web users anytime. The interactivity of this new mass communication genre
led to a reader-centered writing style in the diaries posted on the PBS Web site,
with the writer-centered style in traditional diary writing being avoided. For in-
stance, the diarists often raised and then answered questions that they anticipat-
ed from their readers. What was more, when expressing feelings and views on
Hong Kong’s handover and seeking for identities, they tended to convince their
readers and evoke the readers’ empathy by resorting to personal experiences or
reasoning. Such writing techniques are not always necessary in writer-centered
traditional diaries.
Meanwhile, the Web’s interactivity feature gave the Hong Kong Web diarists
numerous opportunities and great convenience for two-way communication, in-

stead of the one-way communication that dominates traditional mass media. In
“Hong Kong ’97: Lives in Transition”, a message board called “Share Your Opin-
ion” was provided at the end of each entry. Those who wanted to respond to a
diarist and to reach the general Web public may do so by a simple click to open
the message board. In this board, they may choose to post their comments under
the existing topics or to create a new discussion thread. Currently, ninety such
opinion topics have been listed in the message board, which carries several hun-
dreds of opinion items posted by the Web users who visited this special project
on Hong Kong’s handover < http://www.pbs.org/cgi-bin/pov/hongkong/discuss/
discuss.cgi >.
On the other hand, however, some factors may have limited the interconnec-
tions between Hong Kong citizens’ identity search and the Internet mediation.
For one thing, many audience members in the world, including some of the dia-
rists for this PBS special project, did not have Web access and/or did not speak
English. So, the many-to-many mass communication via Web diaries could not
be fully practiced. For another, even those who had Web access and had no lan-
guage barrier were still unable to provide their insight on the PBS website direct-
ly because they had to go through the PBS production team to have their diaries
posted. Such a “gate-keeping” practice may not have given enough public space
to Hong Kong citizens for a more diversified and more dynamic cyber-quest for
identities. Admittedly, the PBS team’s deliberate selection may have already iden-
tified a much more diversified and representative group of diarists than passively
waiting for any Web users to post diaries.
In sum, the dozens of Web diary discourses analyzed in this chapter revealed
significant influences ideology exerted on Hong Kong people’s searches for cul-
tural and social identities, which in turn determined their attitudes toward Hong
Kong’s handover. Such influences and determination occurred in dynamic and
multifaceted interactions of language, culture and ideology. These Web diaries
also displayed how interconnections between Web users and online mediation
could encourage and facilitate mass audience’s participation in civic lives and in
dealing with social and cultural issues. In the meantime, however, the Web di-
aries still had limited accessibility to general Web users because of the limited
Web access and the language barrier that some Web users had experienced, to-
gether with PBS’s “gate-keeping” on diary posting. In other words, these Web
diaries, as a new communication genre, may have empowered the mass audience
who had access to this innovative Web project while widening the knowledge gap
between those who had and who did not have such access.
Notes
1. Laver, R., 1996, Custom-tailored news. Maclean’s (29 April), 50.
2. Levy, S., 1996, The year of the Internet. Newsweek (1 January), 27.
3. In this chapter, a news site is defined as one on the World Wide Web that features
news coverage. The site can be run by a news organization such as a newspaper or
a television station; it can also be run by a non-news organization such as a com-
pany or a government department.
4. “About PBS: Welcome.” Online Available: http://www.pbs.org/insidepbs/index.
html. 31 August 2001.
5. Clark, B., 20 March 2000, An e-mail interview with ‘Hong Kong ’97: Lives in
Transition’ producer.
6. Klotz, H., 16 March 2000, An e-mail Interview with “Hong Kong ’97: Lives in
Transition” associate producer.
7. Cat-Lover, 6 May 1997, Here and there, part 1. Diaries. Online Available: http://
www.pbs.org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Cat_Lover/5-6-97.shtml. 31 August 2001.
8. Einna June 1997, Seek the Opportunity! Diaries. Online Available: http://www.
pbs.org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Einna/6-1-97.shtml. 31 August 2001.
9. Chu, J. 10 October 1997, Happy to be Home Once Again. Diaries. Online Avail-
able: http://www.pbs.org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Chu/10-10-97.shtml. 31 August
2001.
10. Wong, N. 9 May 1997, Distancing of communities. Diaries. Online Available: http://
www.pbs.org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Wong/5-9-97.shtml. 31 August 2001.
11. Lau, J. 15 May 1997, Can Success Continue? Diaries. Online Available: http://
www.pbs.org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Lau/5-15-97.shtml. 31 August 2001.
12. Kwok, G., 27 June 1997, There Are Doubts. Diaries. Online Available: http://www.
pbs.org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Kwok/6-27-97.shtml. 31 August 2001.
13. Einna 10 July 1997, Pearl of China. Diaries. Online, Available: http://www.pbs.
org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Einna/7-10-97.shtml. 31 August 2001.
14. Chi, N., 6 June 1997, Society changing. Diaries. Online Available: http://www.pbs.
org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Chi/6-6-97.shtml. 31 August 2001.
15. Wong, N., 23 June 1997, July 1st Is approaching so quickly. . . . Diaries. Online
Available: http://www.pbs.org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Wong/6-23-97.shtml. 31 Au-
gust 2001.
16. Wong, N., 23 June 1997, July 1st@@0kIs approaching so quickly. . . . Diaries. On-
line Available: http://www.pbs.org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Wong/6-23-97.shtml. 31
August 2001.
17. Einna, 18 September 1997, Difficult Fight for Democrats. Diaries. Online Avail-
able: http://www.pbs.org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Einna/9-18-97.shtml. 13 August
2001.
18. Clarke, D., 4 August 1997, Hong Kong Is more than a place where ‘East meets West’.
Diaries. Online Available: http://www.pbs.org/pov/hongkong/diaries/Clarke/8-4-
97.shtml. 31 August 2001.
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Chapter 12
Narrating Hong Kong history:
A critical study of mainland China’s historical
discourse from a Hong Kong perspective
Lawrence Wang-chi Wong
1. Why Hong Kong history?

On 1 July 1996, a new program was shown on the official television channel
of the People’s Republic of China, the CCTV, entitled The Hundred Years of
Hong Kong (Xianggang bainianᅆ怟㒵㴄⓺ᅇ) (hereafter abbreviated as Hundred
Years). This one and a half minute program appeared every day as a countdown
for the return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China on 1 July 1997; it was one of
the many mainland Chinese narratives on Hong Kong that appeared in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. Just the CCTV alone had three other programs on Hong
Kong.1 Among them, The Vicissitudes of Hong Kong (Xianggang cangsang ᅆ怟
㒵㕊⻗ᅇ) (hereafter abbreviated as Vicissitudes2) was highly similar to Hundred
Years, but it appeared to be more authoritative, as it bore the inscription of Jiang
Zimin, plus a team of “advisors” like Qian Qichen (妨៼㪡), Wang Hanbin (㨑㖨
Ⱂ), Ji Pengfei (⁲揲彡), Hu Sheng (䝧䓯), An Zijie (∏⇖ᕑ), Huo Yingdong (嶓䥷
ⷷ), Lu Ping (懵⓹), Zhou Nan (᫮᧝) and Li Hou (ⷔ☒), all prominent political
figures in China and Hong Kong. Although both programs were not meant to be
a “history” of Hong Kong in a strict or conventional sense, they attempted to tell
its past. For wider circulation, they were subsequently made into VCDs for sale
and the transcripts of their narration (jieshuoci 偩儰僤) were published in book
form (CCTV 1997a, 1997b, 1997c).
There are some conventional histories of Hong Kong written by distinguished
mainland Chinese historians. The editors of Nineteenth Century Hong Kong (Shi-
jiu shiji de Xianggangᅆᧇᓣᒜ䎆㴊怟㒵ᅇ (hereafter abbreviated as Nineteenth
Century) (Yu and Liu 1994) and Twentieth Century Hong Kong (Ershi shiji de
Xianggang ᅆᔒᧇᒜ䎆㴊怟㒵ᅇ (hereafter abbreviated as Twentieth Century) (Yu
and Liu 1995), Yu Shengwu (ᗟ䓯㇬), Liu Shuyong (ᤏ䶆㊾) and Liu Cunkuan (ᤏ
⇞≲), as well as most of the contributors, are all from the Research Institute for
Modern History at the Beijing Social Sciences Academy. Liu Shuyong also wrote
a History of Hong Kong (Xianggang de lishi ᅆ怟㒵㴊ㇽ᩸ᅇ) (Liu 1996). It is sig-
198 Lawrence Wang-chi Wong
nificant because it was translated into English and published by the Foreign Lan-
guages Press as An Outline History of Hong Kong (Liu 1997), probably the only
English version of Hong Kong history published “officially” in mainland China.
Jin Yingxi on the Past and Present of Hong Kong (Jin Yingxi Xianggang jinxitan
ᅆ塗⡏㠟怟㒵ᕐⲚ免ᅇ), a posthumous collection of articles on Hong Kong histo-
ries of Jin, who received his undergraduate education in the British colony, is a
serious academic work (Jin 1996). So is Qi Pengfei’s (旐揲彡) Sunrise and Sun-
set: 156 Years (1841–1997) of the Hong Kong Question (Richu riluo: Xianggang
wenti yibai wushiliu nian ᅆⱫᢀⱫ䫃웛怟㒵ᯕ廒ᒆ㴄ᔚᧇ៳⓺ᅇ) (Qi 1997), as both
were written in a serious attitude and abound with historical materials. There are,
of course, some less academic works that are targeted at general readers. Appar-
ently, the history of the last colony of Britain in the Far East has all of a sudden
become an attractive topic for mainland historians.
But one question may be asked: why is it that before the appearance of these
books, which, as said, were roughly published all during the same period in the
second half of the 1990s, there had not been a major work by Chinese historians
on Hong Kong history?
Generally speaking, people consider A. J. Eitel’s Europe in China: The Histo-
ry of Hong Kong from the Beginning to the Year 1882 (Eitel 1895), published in
1895, about half a century after the formal establishment of the Colony, the first
important Hong Kong history to appear. Of German origin, Eitel was a natural-
ized British citizen and became, in some eyes, “more British than the British”
(Jin 1996: 8). Hence it is not surprising that his work has been criticized as heav-
ily colonialist (Fok 1995: 21–22). Nevertheless, following his example and quot-
ing extensively his work, other European historians continued to write on Hong
Kong history throughout the twentieth century. G. R. Sayer’s Hong Kong: Birth,
Adolescence and Coming of Age (1841–1862) (Sayer 1937), as well as Endacott’s
several works, such as A History of Hong Kong (Endacott 1973) and Government
and People in Hong Kong, 1841–1962 (Endacott 1964), are well known. A more
recent book on Hong Kong history is Frank Welsh’s A Borrowed Place: The His-
tory of Hong Kong (Welsh 1993), first published in 1993 and revised in 1997 as
A History of Hong Kong (Welsh 1997) to include a new chapter on the final years
of the colonial days. The general comment, basically a fair one, on these books
is that they write too much on the British and too little on the Chinese residents
in Hong Kong (Jin 1996: 16; Fok 1995: 22).
While Hong Kong histories written by westerners are not lacking, we have not
been able to find comparable works in Chinese for a long period of time. Tradi-
tionally, Hong Kong was in such a peripheral position, geographically and cultur-
ally, to mainland China that the Chinese had little interest in its affairs. In fact,
before it was ceded to the British, no one in China ever paid any attention to the
barren island, which was inhibited by mainly the Tanka (䵑∼), a fishing tribe
Narrating Hong Kong history 199
which had long been discriminated against and despised (cf. Chen 1946). When
the Chinese emperor had to inquire about the position of Hong Kong when the
British demanded cessation, his ministers gave confusing replies (cf. Ma 1998 I:
43–45). Then upon becoming a colony of the “barbarians” in 1842, Hong Kong
acquired a “double peripheral” status: the peripheral of the peripheral (Lee 1995:
76). Well until the 1940s, mainland Chinese writers, if they ever would write on
Hong Kong, would take an extremely critical and negative view (cf. Lo 1983).
We cannot expect that mainland historians would be interested in writing a Hong
Kong history.
But then what about the historians in Hong Kong? It looks inappropriate that
local scholars have no interest in their own history. Yet a paragraph from a re-
port prepared by The Committee on Chinese Studies appointed by the Governor
in 1952 for the purpose of reviewing secondary and primary school textbooks
on Chinese literature and history clearly reveals the difficult position that local
scholars faced in writing a Hong Kong history in the colonial days:
In the Manchu Dynasty, the Chinese people, being under a foreign regime, were
not patriotic. Also, due to lack of political training and enthusiasm, they were like
“a mass of loose sand”. Since the founding of the Republic, Chinese politicians
have striven hard to unite the nation by appealing to the people’s patriotism, nar-
row nationalism and racialism. One handy short-cut to this end is to stir up ha-
tred for foreign countries, and History textbooks have been looked upon as a very
convenient tool to serve this purpose. This explains why History textbooks pub-
lished in China usually contain anti-foreign allusions, comments and propagan-
da, and are, therefore, not quite suitable for use in Hong Kong. There is indeed
an urgent need to produce History textbooks with an unbiased and local outlook
which will aim to promote international goodwill and understanding rather than
hatred and misunderstanding. ... Objectivity in treatment is, of course, to be strict-
ly observed, especially in connection with such topics as the Boxer Uprising and
the so-called Opium War. (Education Department 1953: 31)
If the Chinese “Opium War” and the “Boxer Uprising” against foreign aggres-
sors were sensitive issues to the colonial government, we could not expect any
bold attempt to report and analyze the British colonial rule in Hong Kong from a
Chinese or local perspective. Hence, although Xu Dishan (傷ᶶ⋷), a prominent
modern writer and scholar who came to head the Department of Chinese at the
University of Hong Kong in 1935, showed some interest in Hong Kong archaeol-
ogy and wrote a couple of articles on the process of the cessation of Hong Kong,
he was extremely cautious not to offend the British authorities.3 His colleague in
the department, Luo Xianglin (䘋怟⸝), was even more tactful. A distinguished
historian who definitely had a very keen interest in local issues, he chose to study
and write on the early history (qiandaishi ᣓᕩ᩸) of Hong Kong, that is, the his-
tory of Hong Kong before the arrival of the British (Luo 1959).4 This is certain-
ly a wise decision, as a serious scholar like him would certainly make findings
and analyses that would cause embarrassment to the colonial government. This
might in turn put him into unnecessary troubles. It is therefore not surprising to
find that, for a long time, Hong Kong history has not been included into the pri-
mary and secondary school syllabi, and that the students in Hong Kong know
very little about its past.
Under this circumstance, solid studies of Hong Kong history should be most
welcome. The authors of Vicissitudes write in the preface:
At the moment when Hong Kong is returning to the mother country, publish-
ing the narration transcript of The Vicissitudes of Hong Kong can help readers
to understand more precisely and comprehensively the origin of and the solution
to the Hong Kong question. This bears important practical significance. (CCTV
1997b and 1997c: 2–3)
Obviously, the key issue was the 1997 return of Hong Kong. When Hong Kong
was going to be returned to mainland China, there was a need to know more about
it. This is understandable, as it is such an important issue in contemporary Chi-
nese history and politics. From this we know why all of a sudden there were so
many histories of Hong Kong by mainland Chinese historians and it further ex-
plains why, after 1997, again all of a sudden, there was not any more such narra-
tion of Hong Kong histories. But there are other questions. In what ways was the
narration of Hong Kong histories related to the 1997 issue? What is the meaning
of bearing “important practical significance”? Why should they think knowing
more about the Hong Kong question bears “important practical significance”?
To answer these queries, an essay by one of the editors of Twentieth Century,
Liu Cunkuan, entitled “The Return of Hong Kong and Cultural Identity” (Xiang-
gang huigui yu wenhua rentongᅄ怟㒵 ᵤ ㇾ䢍 Ⰽ ᦜ 儓 ᪒ᅅ) is enlightening. He
brought up the issue of “return of the heart” (renxin huiguiᕀ ♉ ᵤㇾ):
We must soberly see that the return of sovereignty is only the first step of Hong
Kong’s return to China, though it is a major step. After China has resumed sov-
ereignty in the Hong Kong district, there are many issues awaiting to be solved.
Since the British have adopted a colonial rule in Hong Kong for over one and a
half century, and because of various other reasons, we cannot deny that there ex-
ists a question of return of the heart. (Liu 1998: 216)
To him, this question of “return of the heart” was more complicated and impor-
tant than the question of return of sovereignty. If it was not handled well, the pros-
perity and stability of Hong Kong and even the “grand venture of national unifi-
cation” would be seriously affected. This was because, he admitted, there were
many who were not eager for or even against the return of Hong Kong to China.
This was a frank and even bold statement from a mainland historian, at a time
when others were busy hailing the great historical event.5 The method he suggest-
ed to win the hearts of the people of Hong Kong was to establish a cultural iden-
tity for them, that was, to teach them to identify themselves with the culture and
history of their motherland. To achieve this aim, a good history lesson of Hong
Kong was needed, one that would help to, on the one hand, break Hong Kong’s
tie with the British, and on the other, build up a better link with Chinese histo-
ry and culture. The following paragraph explains clearly what was meant by the
authors of the Hundred Years when they emphasized the “practical significance”
of narrating Hong Kong history:
In this program [Hundred Years of Hong Kong], we will introduce to you the ori-
gin of the Hong Kong issue and the process of solving it. We will introduce to you
the flesh-and-blood relationship between Hong Kong and the mainland, so that we
can understand better the history of Hong Kong, understand better Hong Kong at
present, and understand better the “Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region of the People’s Republic of China”. (CCTV 1997a: 1–2)
No doubt, the narration of Hong Kong history is not directed to the past, but to
the present and even to the future, because telling the past story of Hong Kong
serves the purpose of educating people to have a better understanding of not only
old Hong Kong, but also Hong Kong at present and in future, because the Basic
Law will rule Hong Kong in the years to come. Another historian was even more
straightforward by relating the study of Hong Kong history to contemporary pol-
itics of the Communist Party:
We demand a thorough grasp of the guidelines and policy of the [Chinese Com-
munist] Party Center on Hong Kong. We must re-learn and have a new under-
standing of the situation of Hong Kong. Here, a study of Hong Kong history is of
prime importance. (Jin 1996: 17)
In the following sections, we will see what kind of a Hong Kong history has been
presented by mainland Chinese historians with the purpose of making history to
serve the present and the future. In the process, we will also examine the strate-
gies adopted to serve such a purpose.
2. Cutting the British tie

Liu Cunkuan, in his essay on “return of the heart”, argues that the British Hong
Kong government, in its colonial rule of over one hundred and fifty years, effec-
tively carried out a colonial policy, propagated colonialism and spread colonial
culture. By prioritizing western ways of living, highlighting the importance of the
English language and western culture, as well as giving prominent positions to
few “westernized”, “high-class” Chinese, the British successfully created a sense

of belonging to colonial rule among many people in Hong Kong. This should be
corrected, he asserts, by first cutting the British tie (Liu 1998: 217). A careful
look into the histories of Hong Kong published by mainland Chinese scholars
will see that they have adopted various ways to achieve this goal.
Before we go to the more obvious ones, a subtle way to diminish the British
influence, which may easily be overlooked and yet is adopted in almost all Hong
Kong histories, is the omission of over thirty years of Hong Kong history. Inter-
estingly, the CCTV has chosen the title Hundred Years of Hong Kong for its pro-
gram, despite the fact that Hong Kong has been under British colonial rule for 155
years, from its formal cessation in 1842 until its return in 1997. It could not have
been just a rough figure, as a total of fifty-five years, over one third of the entire
Hong Kong colonial period, has been taken away. More importantly, in their nar-
ration, as well as in almost all other histories, the thirty years between the 1950s
and the 1980s vanish almost completely. For example, Hundred Years ends its
first part at the section called “The PLA arrived at the Shenzhen River” in 1949
(CCTV 1997a: 120–121). But what follows is a section entitled “The Economy
of Contemporary Hong Kong”, which starts right at the mid-1980s. Similar situa-
tion can also be found even in those that claim to be a “complete history” (嚠᩸),
such as Liu Shuyong’s A Brief History of Hong Kong (ᅆ䊧Ⲕ怟㒵᩸ᅇ) (Liu 1998:
375). Liu first makes a chronological presentation of Hong Kong’s history from
the beginning until the Anti-Japanese War and the “Failure of the Young Plan”,
which happened in 1946. However, the next three chapters are: “Development
in Industrialization and the Appearance of Social Conflicts”, “Rapid Economic
Growth and Social Progress” and lastly, “The Joint Declaration between China
and Britain and the Basic Law”. One wonders why he should not go on to present
in a chronological manner the rest of the colonial history of Hong Kong.
There are, of course, practical reasons for this. As the relationship between
Hong Kong and the mainland has been so close, it is natural that any detailed
narration of the Hong Kong history after 1949 will easily be related to the history
of the PRC. However, there are often sensitive issues that should not be touched
upon lightly. The disappearance in Hong Kong histories of the 1989 Tian’anmen
Incident in Beijing, which sparked off several mass demonstrations of over a mil-
lion people in Hong Kong and a migration boom in the early 1990s, is under-
standable.
Another important historical event is the 1967 riot in Hong Kong, the largest
and most violent social disturbance in Hong Kong history. It started in April 1967
and lasted until December. According to the official figures, fifty-one were killed,
almost one hundred wounded, and 5,000 arrested (Young 1994: 143). While its
importance cannot be dismissed, it cannot be found in Hong Kong histories pub-
lished by mainland Chinese scholars.6 The only explanation we can find for this
is that the incident was closely related to contemporary politics in the mainland.
As the riot was started by the extremists who were influenced by the ultra-leftist
Party line during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese historians find it difficult to
comment on the issue because there is not yet a final and definitive evaluation of
the Cultural Revolution in the mainland.
A similar example is the Diaoyutai movement in Hong Kong, which started
in the early 1970s and went on till the turn of the century. Nationalistic as it is,
it has not been dealt with in the Hong Kong histories because the Chinese gov-
ernment does not seem to support such strong actions against the Japanese occu-
pation of the islands. If the history of Hong Kong is presented chronologically,
there would not be a way to avoid these incidents. This shows very clearly that
the writing of Hong Kong history is not aimed at providing a better and more
comprehensive knowledge of what have happened in the past, or else these im-
portant and far-reaching events should not have been deliberately omitted. The
omissions reveal the interferences of writing a local history when it is narrated
within the grand discourse of the nation. Practical considerations aside, the ma-
jor reason for eliminating the thirty odd years after 1949 is that it will probably
help to break the British tie.
We will leave for the moment the argument of whether or not Hong Kong was
a barren island without any value before the arrival of the British. But no doubt,
Hong Kong has turned into one of the major international commercial and fi-
nancial centers in the world under the British rule. Great progress was made in
the 1960s and after. For example, the number of factories in Hong Kong in Sep-
tember 1981 was 46,729, with a total 0.95 million employees. Compared to the
figures of 1951, there was a growth of 25 times and 8.6 times respectively (Jin
1996: 39–40). Further, there was also a growth of over 20 times in income per
capita: in 1951, it was HK$ 1,117 while in 1979, it stood at HK$ 21,816 (Rao
1997: 378, 392). There are, of course, various reasons for the economic success
of Hong Kong during this period. But the British rule there, with wise political,
financial and economic policies, is undoubtedly one of them. Unfortunately, on
the Chinese side, there was not much to be boasted of. Ever since the closing of
the Hong Kong Chinese borders in 1951, plus a closed-door policy of the Chinese
government between the 1950s and 1970s, they could make little contribution to
the growth of Hong Kong’s economy. Hence, mainland Chinese historians face
a dilemma. On the one hand, they cannot attribute Hong Kong’s success to the
Chinese rule. On the other, they do not want to give credit to the British. Skip-
ping the issue altogether is probably the best way out.
More significantly, the 1960s and 1970s saw a gradual development of a local
identity in Hong Kong, one that, to the disappointment of mainland historians,
does not associate with the mainland Chinese regime. Ever since the establish-
ment of a British colonial rule, Hong Kong has become a refuge for the Chinese
at times of chaos in the mainland. But for a long period of time, most of them had
no intention of staying in Hong Kong for good. When the situation in the main-
land improved, they moved back to their native places. Under this circumstance,
there was no way to build a Hong Kong identity.
However, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 brought
an unprecedented huge number of refugees to Hong Kong. Within the first six
months of 1950, over 0.7 million arrived at the British colony (Young 1994: 131).
Unlike previous refugee influxes, they could not return easily this time. First, they
were against the Communist regime and could not go home as long as it was still
there, especially given that the situation in the mainland in the 1950s and 1960s
was chaotic. Second, as said earlier, the Hong Kong-Chinese border was closed
on 16 June 1951. As a result, they had to stay in Hong Kong, no matter how re-
luctant they were. These people, with their roots and their past in the mainland,
might not be able to identify themselves with the British rule. But the next gen-
eration, those who were born in Hong Kong or were brought to Hong Kong dur-
ing infancy and came of age in the 1960s and 1970s tended to take Hong Kong
as their home. This explains why a Hong Kong identity began to emerge during
this period.
In Hong Kong, unlike Taiwan, there has never been any call for independence.
However, it does not mean that the people there do not develop any special identi-
ty. A hundred and fifty-five years of British rule and an overwhelming majority of
Chinese population is a combination that cannot be found elsewhere in the world.
It is therefore not surprising to see that people of Hong Kong take themselves as
a unique group. According to one study done in 1985, 59.5% of the interviewees,
in a choice between “I am a Chinese” and “I am a Hongkongese”, picked the lat-
ter (Lau and Kuan 1988). This is not a small proportion. Unfortunately, to some
mainland historians, this statistic shows unmistakably that people in Hong Kong
have no affiliation to China and lack a cultural identity with the motherland. As
Hong Kong identity grew some time in the 1960s and 1970s, there is every rea-
son to delete the period so that the origin of the identity can be eliminated.
However, this is but a passive tactic. In order to break the tie between the peo-
ple of Hong Kong and the British rule, something more positive has to be done.
One effective strategy is to take a nationalistic approach to denounce altogether
the British occupation of Hong Kong as illegal.
To many, the colony of Hong Kong was born out of a war between Britain
and China in 1840; China was defeated and forced to sign the Treaty of Nan-
jing, which ceded the island of Hong Kong to the British. But there are different
views on the nature of the war. On the Chinese side, the immediate cause of the
war was the Chinese ban on the illegal opium trade. The British, in great demand
of Chinese tea, imported opium into China from India to offset its trade deficit.
China, attempting to save the people and the economy, put a ban on the trade
and in the process, the British, eager to protect the great trade benefit, started the
war. Hence, the Chinese call it the “Opium War”. But from the viewpoint of the
British, opium trade was not the main concern. It was rather because the British
merchants were so badly treated in China that a war was needed to force China
to make improvements and open her markets. Thus, western historians, like Ei-
tel and Welsh, insist that it is wrong to call it the “Opium War” (Eitel 1895: 28;
Welsh 1997: xi). They prefer to call it the “First Anglo-Chinese War”. It is not
the purpose of this paper to ascertain the causes of the war, though one should
ask the question whether it was right to start a war in the first place.
What I want to briefly analyze here is the way mainland Chinese historians
narrate the war. Expectedly, they would concentrate on the opium issue, accus-
ing the British for importing into China, just for economic reasons, a drug that is
now banned all over the world. This, of course, holds truth and is appealing. But
they mention nothing else. Not a single word can be found in those histories of
Hong Kong on the trading and living conditions of the foreigners in Guangzhou
at that time. This is in great contrast even to many of the histories on early mod-
ern China published in the mainland, which, though emphasizing the opium is-
sue, usually agree that one cause of the war was the mistreatment of westerners
imposed by the Qing government and local bureaucrats. I am not at all suggest-
ing that the British were right to resort to force if they were not well treated. But
what should be pointed out is the mainland Chinese historians, in their narration
of Hong Kong history, attempt to make sure that, when people read their works,
they would blame the British for all the evil deeds.
3. Re-establishing the Chinese link

By all means, it is not enough to cultivate a cultural identity with China simply
by condemning the British rule. More importantly, they should aim at building a
strong link between the people in Hong Kong and their motherland, so that the
Chinese would wish to return. This might appear to be a relatively easy task, as,
after all, “blood is thicker than water”. However, a close reading of their narra-
tive strategy may lead to interesting observations.
Firstly, almost all histories published by mainland historians start their narra-
tion at the New Stone Age five to six thousand years ago. By comparing the ar-
cheological findings in Hong Kong and in China, they establish a statement that
“since ancient time, the culture of Hong Kong has been an inseparable part of
the Chinese cultural system” (CCTV 1997a: 5); and from this, an even more im-
portant statement is formulated: “Hong Kong has been an inalienable part of the
territory of China since ancient times” (Liu 1996:1).7
Interestingly, the following sentences are found at the beginning of the Basic
Laws of Hong Kong: “Hong Kong has been part of the territory of China since
ancient times. ... The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is an inalienable
part of the People’s Republic of China” (http://info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext).
The two are so similar that one wonders if these statements are derived from
geography, history or politics.
However, what is the point of putting so much effort in asserting a fact no one
denies, namely, that Hong Kong has long been a part of China? To us, a more sig-
nificant issue is: given that Hong Kong has all along been an inalienable part of
China, what role has been played by China in Hong Kong history?
One difference between western and Chinese historians towards Hong Kong
history lies in its “origin”. In the narration of Western historians, “the history of
Hong Kong really begins with the coming of the British in 1841” (Endacott 1973:
4). Before this, to them, Hong Kong was a barren island, with a sparse popula-
tion and little value. Clearly, this is a tactic often employed in colonialist histor-
ical discourses. By asserting that the colony was uninhabited and useless, they
attempt to justify their aggressive act and illegal occupation and exploitation (cf.
Green and Troup 1999: 278). This is rebuked by the Chinese historians. By cit-
ing the first population count made by the British in May 1841, which stated that
Hong Kong then had a population of 7,450, they want to prove that Hong Kong
was prosperous before the arrival of the British. We are not going to argue the
accuracy of the population figures, nor shall we judge if a population of seven
thousand would make a place prosperous. But what we want to point out is: in
all mainland Chinese discourse of Hong Kong history, despite the fact that they
start at the New Stone Age, the part that covers the period before the arrival of
the British is extremely brief. On the other hand, they usually go into great detail
about what happened after the British arrival. This is highly ironic as it would
only fortify the British historians’ assertion that Hong Kong’s history begins af-
ter their arrival. Of course, one may argue that materials on Hong Kong before
the nineteenth century are scarce, and it may be difficult to write a detailed his-
tory. But if this is the truth, then again, the British assertion should be accepted.
So this argument is not employed by mainland historians. What is more, we have
earlier pointed out that Luo Xianglin has, with his students, written up a whole
book on the pre-British period of Hong Kong history.
4. A brief conclusion
In the above sections, I have briefly dealt with the major strategies adopted by
mainland historians in their narration of Hong Kong history. The main problems
they face lie in the constraints from the grand narratives of the Chinese history.
With a clearly set political agenda, they cannot take a more “objective” stance.
Hence, very often they have to avoid some sensitive issues or twist historical ma-
terials to suit their purpose. Despite great efforts by some historians to dig into
and consult first-hand materials, many of their arguments are unconvincing and
self-contradicting.
While we are not suggesting that only the local people can write a good Hong
Kong history, we sincerely hope that the “real” Hong Kong voice can be heard
and that there can be some works free of imperialistic or colonialist discourses,
no matter where they come from. Some scholars are trying hard, and we have
seen some very different works to achieve this (Chan 1994; Law 1999; Wang
1997; Chan 1999; Ngo 1999; Tsai 2001). Hopefully, there will be more new Hong
Kong histories soon.
Notes
1. They are The Vicissitudes of Hong Kong, A Hundred Questions on Hong Kong
(Xianggang baiti ᅆ怟㒵㴄廒ᅇ) (CCTV 1997d) and The Story of Hong Kong
(Xianggang de gushiᅆ怟㒵㴊⯋ᔑᅇ). Cf. Zhongyang 1998: 52–53.
2. It bears an English title of its own: The Stories of Hong Kong. But obviously it does
not correspond with the Chinese title at all. For this reason, I intend to give a more
faithful translation of the title of the program in this paper.
3. For example, he attributed the cause of the Second Anglo-Chinese War to the anti-
British sentiment of the Chinese in Guangzhou (Xu 1941: 194–195); and as one
critic points out, he never used such terms as “imperialism” or “invasion” in his
essay (cf. Jin 1996: 193).
4. As far as I am aware, before Luo Xianglin, there was not such a term as “Xiang-
gang qiandai shi”. It was his book Hong Kong and Its External Communication
Before 1842: A Early History of Hong Kong (Luo 1959) that defines the scope of
the “early history” of Hong Kong.
5. The ex-chief of Xinhuashe (Xinhua News Agency) Xu Jiatun (傷∼⋵) has earlier
said something similar in his memoir: “Returning only the land but not the heart
is not a complete return”. To him, “it is relatively easy to have the land returned,
but the return of the heart in Hong Kong is very difficult” (Xu 1993: 93–94). But
because he was then in defunct and self-exile, after the 1989 Tian’anmen Incident,
such assertion could easily be dismissed as venomously intended.
6. The two only exceptions are Yuan Bangjian’s (៉圬▀) A Hong Kong History
(Xianggang shilun ᅆ怟㒵᩸兜ᅇ) (Yuan 1987) and Liu Shuyong’s A Brief History
of Hong Kong (Liu 1998).
7. Similar sentences can be found in almost all Hong Kong histories published in
the mainland. Cf., CCTV 1997b: 1; Jin 1997: 5; Qi 1997: 2; He 1994:1; Wang
1996: 1.
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Chapter 13
A nascent paradigm for non-Western discourse
studies: An epilogue
Narcisa Paredes-Canilao
This volume has explored data, concepts, analytical methods and theories that
carry immense implications for cultural, linguistic, literary and communication
studies. Other fields are implicated, too, which have lately realized the constitu-
tive powers of language and as a result have taken a linguistic turn.1 The linguistic
turn is inspired in a sense by Wittgenstein’s notion that “the limits of my language
means the limits of my world”; 2 the textual turn by the more unsettling insight of
Derrida that there is nothing outside of texts (Il n’y a pas de “hors texte”).3
This book has not only developed and employed a paradigm critical of Western
discourse, but provided directions for a nascent paradigm for analyzing and priv-
ileging non-Western discourses as well. “Nascent” here is used in its two senses
as newly born and more aptly in its use in chemistry as newly liberated from a
compound. Thus, the word evokes Alberoni’s “nascent state” – as the formation
of newer groups in the wake of the disintegration of the center. This systemic ten-
dency where “disorder in a larger social field provokes an attempt to create inter-
personal unities” in the local, regional levels was later used by Jonathan Fried-
man (1994). Friedman notes that “the declining hegemony” of the center logi-
cally leads to the “liberation”, the “free play” of “already extant but suppressed
projects and potential new projects.”4
However, rather than leaving the disintegration of the hegemony to systemic
forces, the present study’s crucial thesis is that the general critique of Western
domination of academic fields and everyday life liberates local knowledge and
methodologies from cultural imperialism. The ultimate goal is to create a new
paradigm inspired by a more inclusive, cohesive, but more heterogeneous and
culturally pluralist politics. Such a political and cultural project could not have
come at a more timely way. For, as Kristeva pointed out more than twenty years
ago, historical events necessitate a different symbolic system:
The present mutations of capitalism, the political and economic reawakening of

ancient civilizations (India, China), have thrown into crisis the symbolic systems
enclosed in which the Western subject, officially defined as a transcendental sub-
ject has for two thousand years lived out its life span. (Kristeva 1986c: 31)
212 Narcisa Paredes-Canilao
The following section will attempt to describe the nascent paradigm that poses
a challenge to the hegemony of the monolithic symbolic system. In the process,
attention is called to certain limitations of the deconstructive turn, however, for
motivated engagements such as espoused in this volume.
1. Discourse and dialogue

The term “paradigm” is employed here to mean a theoretical framework made
up of assumptions, crucial concepts and an accompanying methodology. Further,
reminiscent of critical theory and Kuhn’s injunctions, the concept is conceived
to include the motivations and knowledge interests of the speaking/writing re-
searchers, as suggested by Shi-xu in the introductory chapter.
The volume uses a concept of discourse with an attendant methodology to
critique Western discourse. “Discourse” is engaged not as a neutral term denot-
ing an area or discipline in communication and cultural studies. It is understood
rather as language achieving a meaning only in connection with actual speak-
ing subjects situated in specific contexts. There are three crucial elements in this
definition: 1) language, 2) subject and 3) context. But as will be made evident,
the very meanings of these terms have undergone, and are still undergoing, rev-
olutionary transformations. Not only that, in their manifold evolutions they nec-
essarily imbricate upon each other, making an isolated analysis of each very dif-
ficult indeed. But we can cursorily identify some reconceptualizations of these
terms that were assumed or used in the volume, constituting the conceptual ap-
paratus of discourse analysis. A quick inventory of the primary and secondary
concepts can be given, at the risk of presenting none adequately and doing vio-
lence to all. Exegesis is, thus, not our present concern. The foremost is the prac-
tical goal of outlining a compass of concepts and methodologies for critiquing
Western discourse and privileging non-Western discourses.
1.1. From Cambridge to Paris: Reconceptualizing language
Contemporary language studies from the Anglo-American continent to Europe

have greatly reconfigured the scope and nature of language – from being a hu-
man creation that limits and constructs not only social practices, but also the sub-
ject and the unconscious, to the extreme position that language is everything. The
first step can be traced back to the concept of language-in-use as against language
as a neutral and abstract system. Language-in-use is associated primarily with
Wittgenstein’s view that the meaning of words should be discovered in their con-
crete employment in language games – the actual use of words in specific con-
An epilogue 213
texts, and as spoken by specific speakers (Wittgenstein, 1958). Before this view,
there were other prominent theories of meaning or explanations of what we re-
ally mean when we say “this or that word means ...”. But all these previous the-
ories regarded meaning as some form of entity that could be drawn from a mere
analysis of words, abstracted from language at work, or from daily use. These
words were then brought to the mind of the philosopher, who ended up analyz-
ing “language on a holiday” (Wittgenstein 1958: 19). This is how most, if not
all, of the traditional problems in Western philosophy originated from a linguis-
tic confusion. The urgent problem of philosophers therefore was to analyze and
clarify language in order to determine which problems were genuine and which
ones were only due to language itself. Wittgenstein’s injunction is: “do not look
for the meaning, look for the use.” This shifted language studies from a mere
concern with syntax and semantics (the “saying” of language) to pragmatics (the
“doing” of language).
Meanwhile, in the French scene in the 1960s, structuralism was beginning to
supplant existentialism as the dominant philosophy. Modern structuralism was
founded on Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (Cours de Linguistique
Generale, 1916/1983). For Saussure (1916/1983: 9), the study of linguistic struc-
ture is the primary concern of the linguist. Structure is the key term here. It is
used in its ordinary meaning as a set of interconnecting parts of any complex
thing. More importantly, this structure, which is usually common to all things
or events having the same form (isomorphic), can be rendered logically or math-
ematically and can be used to explain or predict the behavior or changes in the
thing/event.
From a structuralist point of view, a thing or a unit cannot be broken down
into its single elements because the unit is defined not so much by the nature of
the component elements, but by their interrelationships. In the case of language,
its basic structural elements can be identified objectively and general laws can
be derived from them. Structurally, language is a system in which all elements fit
together and in which the value of any one element depends on its simultaneous
coexistence with all the others. Thus, no linguistic item can ever be based ulti-
mately upon anything other than its non-coincidence, difference, or non-similar-
ity with the rest. For example, “dog” has value only because it is different con-
ceptually (in its meaning) and materially (in sound and in spelling) from “cat”.
This is the characteristic of difference. Likewise, there is neither an internal nor
a natural connection between an idea and the sequence of sounds. The word e-
le-phant, for example, is “unmotivated.” It has nothing to do with the looks or an
idea of an elephant. This is the characteristic of arbitrariness. For Saussure, ar-
bitrariness and difference are two correlative properties of the linguistic sign –
they are inseparable (1916/1983: 66–69).
Discontentment with the objectivist approach of structuralism led to poststruc-

turalism. The “post” signals that poststructuralism is both a continuation and a
critique of structuralism. Its critique of structuralism is directed at the possibility
of objective descriptions, particularly the objectivist notion of structure. Structure
is viewed only as a simulacrum (a feigning, a fake resemblance) of linguistics’
object of study. It seems legible as a structure, but it erases the aims of structur-
alism which is to provide objective description (Derrida 1976: 102).
There are many possible ways of understanding the deconstructive or textu-
al turn. We can look at how it radicalized Saussure’s notions of arbitrariness and
difference, the two correlative properties of the linguistic sign. Differance is a
Derridean neologism which plays on two senses of the French verb différer (to
differ). First, it means to differ, to be distinct and to be not the same. Its second
meaning is to delay and to defer. These are the two aspects of difference –differ-
ance as spacing (to differ) and differance as temporcalizing (to defer). Saussure
used only the first meaning, “to differ”, in his notion of difference. The neolo-
gism also plays on the fact that differance and difference are pronounced the same
way in French (dif-feh-rohns) which indicates its immense subversive potentials.
The “a” of differance, is “not heard; it remains silent, secret and discreet like a
tomb.” It is a silence that is not far from signaling the death of the King. Differ-
ance is meant to delay the appearance of the King infinitely. This is the second
radicalization of Saussure by deconstruction: as distinct from difference, differ-
ance points out the irreducibility of temporalizing. The delayed or deferred (tra-
ditionally, the real meaning or referent) will never arrive, because it is seduced to
indulge and tarry in the infinite play of differences (Derrida 1973: 132).
As to arbitrariness, it can occur only because the system of signs is consti-
tuted by the differences between the terms and not by their individual fullness.
The elements of signification are thus functioning not by virtue of the compact
force of their cores or their nuclei, but by the network of oppositions that distin-
guish them and relate them to one another. From this description of arbitrariness
is drawn the consequence that the signified concept is never present in itself. Ev-
ery concept is necessarily and essentially inscribed in a chain or a system, within
which it refers to other concepts by the systematic play of differences. The other
implication of arbitrariness is that these differences, while playing a role in lan-
guage, are themselves effects. They did not fall from the sky “ready made”. This
is deconstruction’s third radicalization of Saussure. Differance in no way implies
that the deferred presence can always be recovered, that it simply amounts to an
investment that only temporarily and without loss delays the presentation of pres-
ence (Derrida 1973: 151). Instead, differance, which is neither a word nor a con-
cept, is a strategic note which indicates the closure of presence, a closure that is
affected in the functioning of traces (Derrida 1973: 31).
“Presence” designates all those traditionally related with fundamentals, prin-
An epilogue 215
ciples, or center, such as essence, existence, substance, subject, truth, transcen-

dentality, consciousness, or conscience, God, man, and so forth (Derrida 1978:
410–411). All these have been mustered by Western culture to justify monopoly
of culture. While the term “trace” is a simulacrum of presence, infinitely dislo-
cating and displacing itself by referring beyond itself. To make this clearer, when
do we say that something is a trace? Something is a trace by virtue of an absence
of what it is a trace of. However, trace is radicalized to mean there never was an
original cause of the trace – effacement belongs to the very structure of the trace
(Derrida 1973: 156).
Because words are significant for their difference from other words, they are
no longer a creation or function of a speaking subject; rather, it is the speaking
subject who has been reduced to a function of language – thus the term “decen-
tered subject”. An individual becomes a subject only as a speaking or writing
subject. He or it becomes a signifying subject only by entering into the system of
differences (Derrida 1973: 146). Likewise, as a signifying subject, it is not self-
present. Even if it is the speaker or author, it cannot dictate on an original or real
meaning of the utterance.
In that connection, language par excellence is not speech but writing where
the author is absent, reduced only to a trace or a simulacrum of presence. With-
out a home of its own, it is always being effaced in each and every reading, which
is itself writing. This is the meaning of the postmodern expression “death of the
author”. Understandably, such a view of the subject or author upsets the “con-
ventional” definition of discourse as “the present, living, conscious representa-
tion of a text within the experience of a person who writes or reads it” (Derri-
da 1976: 161). Discourse as such is denounced in deconstruction as metaphysi-
cal presence: “all concepts hitherto proposed in order to think the articulation
of discourse are caught within the metaphysical closure that I question here ...”
(Derrida 1976: 160).
We are now in a position to understand the meaning of the textual turn or turn
to textuality. Textuality is the condition where there is primacy of texts, in fact
there are only texts. Nothing comes before – no origin, no author, no reality be-
ing re-presented; nothing comes after – no definite interpretation, no goals, no
appearance of that represented. Instead, texts refer back to other texts in an end-
less and unresolved game of hide-and-seek. There was never anyone or anything
who/which went in hiding in the first place. And texts are not supposed to know,
that is why they are absorbed in the game. But texts are not a substantive reality
either. They are so only in so far as they are texts-as-writing. They are in them-
selves arbitrary, invented and reinvented through writing.
1.2. Psychoanalysis and semiotics: Reconceptualizing subject
Recent reconceptualizations of the subject have affected a Copernican revolu-

tion of the most intensive kind. And this time, “Copernican revolution” means
its original sense in Copernicus (the decentering of man), as opposed to Kant’s
appropriation of it (man’s constructive powers to constitute the world). The sub-
ject in discourse, or the individual speaking subject here, is that subjectivity con-
structed in and through language. Thus it is no longer the Cartesian unified self-
deluded entity thinking that there are “clear and distinct” ideas that can serve as
axiomatic foundations of knowledge. Nor is it the transcendental self of Husserl
able to survey itself from above. Rather, it is the Freudian-Lacanian self pulled
from different directions and determinations, erroneously mistaking itself as uni-
tary, self-contained and autonomous.
The radical decentering of the subject was already shown above in decon-
struction’s idea that the subject is construction through text. This notion jives
with the Lacanian view that the subconscious is constructed like a text. Derrida
has in fact already noted a poststructuralist element in Freud, considered histori-
cally significant for interrogating presence in consciousness (Derrida 1973: 149).
First, the Freudian unconscious can be viewed as differance given a metaphysi-
cal name (Derrida 1973: 151). Second, the two different meanings of differance
(to differ and to defer) seem to be tied together in Freud. The production of un-
conscious traces can be interpreted as both a “placing on reserve”, as well as a
differing. The unconscious, like differance also sends out, and delegates, repre-
sentatives or proxies. But there is no chance that the mandating subject “exists”
somewhere, that it is present, or is “itself”. In short, there is little chance that it
will become conscious.
Lacan (1977) theorizes that the unconscious is “structured like a language”.
The seeming unity and autonomy of self is only an illusion created by language.
He demonstrates this in his account of self-construction, which is a linguistic re-
reading of Freud. The process of self-construction can be traced to the use of
language. It is only through entry in language that somebody takes up the posi-
tion of subject. Thus for Lacan, communication is motivated by the desire to fill
in the primordial gap in being. But another implication of this view is that out-
side of discourse there is no self.
A less radical reconceptualization of the subject is however seen in Emile
Benveniste, while an attempt to redeem the subject from deconstruction is found
in Kristeva. Benveniste (1971) considered the most influential thinker in the de-
velopment of a theory of discourse, refers by “discourse” to aspects of language
that achieve determinate meaning only in relation to actual speakers situated in
specific spatial and temporal contexts. His approach to language goes beyond
language as a system or network of differences detached from a subject. He in-
An epilogue 217
troduced the terms, subject of the enonced (the “I” who thinks) and the subject
of the enunciation (the “I” that is constituted as the subject-object of its own re-
flection). In French, these are énonciation referring to the act of making an ut-
terance, and énoncé, the verbal statement made. The enunciating subject and the
subject of enunciation – the “I” who speaks and the “I” who is spoken – should
never be confused with each other. The error of Descartes was the conflation of
the two. In “I think therefore I am,” the first “I” is the “I” who speaks, while the
second “I” is the “I” who is spoken.
Kristeva (1986b) has taken issue with how grammatology unsettles and dis-
turbs logic and the subject of logic, but nevertheless suffers from a fundamental
incapacity to account for the subject. Precisely this is the reason for semiotics’
claim that it “outflanks” deconstruction in its project of inserting agency back
into language, albeit an agency-in-process. Agency or subject-in-process is the
mobile, unfixed, subversive writing subject. It is the subject on trial which re-
presents itself in texts. There is a fundamental difference between, on the one
hand, semiology which only focuses on the static phase of language, positing it
as a homogeneous structure, and semiotics, or semanalysis, on the other, which
studies language as a fundamentally heterogeneous discourse enunciated by a
speaking subject.
1.3. Colonialism, postcolonialism, and neocolonialism: Reconceptualizing

context
The specific sociohistorical context of text and subject has also been expanded
or relocated under the ubiquitous ideology of imperialism. Imperialism in our
time is a theory-cum-practice engulfing cultural, political, economic and social
life (Said 1978). Imperialism which involves settlement of colonies has largely
ended but it thrives and lingers like a virus ever-mutating into various nuanced
forms depending on the host country. Thus, we can only generalize and essen-
tialize varying experiences of colonized peoples at the risk of glossing over sig-
nificant differences. Orientalism is Said’s coinage for that Western style of dom-
inating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient, based on a discur-
sive construction of the Orient, invented by the West itself. Orientalism is thus
a discourse in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault 1972), of discursive practice – a
historically, socially and institutionally specific structure of statements, terms,
categories and beliefs, which constructs its own object of knowledge, under the
guise of discovery. For Foucault, the different disciplines actually construct or
contribute to the construction of their objects of study. Thus, for example, there
are diseases because there is the medical profession, there are neurotics and psy-
chotics because of psychology, there are criminals because of the penal system,
and there are sinners because of confession, etc. These discourses acquire legiti-
mation by projecting themselves as based on truths outside human invention, and
thus are assigned the status of objective knowledge. This Foucauldian concept of
discourse has inspired those in movements (women, identity politics) to refocus
their resistance in the discursive realm.
Hence the necessity of contextualizing discourse analysis in colonialism, post-
colonialism and neocolonialism. Western discourse and China-Hong Kong’s dis-
courses on Hong Kong’s transition are best seen, not only against the broader, he-
gemonic pattern of international communication, but also against a colonial-his-
torical background. The term postcolonial is more elusive and overwhelmingly
dissipated to pin down into a definition. However, the present book’s operation-
alization of the concept indicates a general non-controversial understanding of
postcoloniality, as “that form of social criticism that bears witness to those un-
equal and uneven processes of representation, by which the historical experience
of the once-colonized Third World comes to be framed in the West” (Bhaba in
Mongia 1997: 1). The “post” should signal both a cessation, as well as a contin-
uation. There were changes in personalities, maybe in power structures, but co-
lonialism continues in its effects, particularly discursively. Thus the term refers
to both a periodization, as well as a methodological revisionism. This distinc-
tion allows for a wholesale critique of Western structures of knowledge and pow-
er (Mongia 1997: 2).
1.4. The methodology of discourse analysis
The methodology5 of discourse analysis is necessarily multidisciplinary (from

the different perspectives of different disciplines), as well as interdisciplinary
(from an integrated view of the disciplines). However the book insists that this
multi- or interdisciplinary perspective has to be set against the backdrop of mul-
ticulturalism (Chapter 1). Just to make sure that Western culture universalized
and naturalized as it is today, is not retained as the unexamined cultural back-
drop. Ideally there is a fusion of the three knowledge divisions – humanities, so-
cial sciences and natural sciences – at their respective horizons, where they have
taken the linguistic or textual turn. There is a collaboration of fields – linguistics
with literary studies, communication studies with social and historical studies,
cultural studies with political science.
Hybrid fields and their interactions are encouraged – sociolinguistics with
psycholinguistics, cultural anthropology, political sociology, political economy.
This indicates that texts must not be studied in isolation but in the context of its
functioning in society and culture. Relatedly, there is a move away from unidi-
mensional models of communication towards the recognition of the double life
An epilogue 219
of discourse as text (form) and context. Texts examined are from different genres
– political speeches, magazine articles, web diaries, literature and historical ac-
counts, in different modes – spoken, written, the traditional way or through elec-
tronic media, and in different languages so as to explore subtleties and complex-
ities. Depending on the human interests of research, gender, class, race, ethnic-
ity and other significant axes of difference are also considered.
Above all, discourse analysis is exercised as a motivated and purposive en-
terprise. Discourse analysis is not interested in empirical data, nor in descrip-
tions per se. It does not aim to be representative. Unashamedly, it announces its
knowledge interests and motivations. Its goal obviously is not merely to under-
stand the world, but to change it. These mandates are achieved in many ways: 1)
exposing collusions of power-knowledge, 2) revealing pretensions to truth in the
guise of science or knowledge, 3) returning thought to their historical and libidi-
nal embodiments, and 4) openly acknowledging the values that inspire or affect
knowledge production. The volume followed all these requisites methodologi-
cally. Taking issue with how cultural imperialism perniciously continues, and
in fact has deepened, the editors insist that the present undertaking is a cultur-
al and political intervention. They want to make a difference in a situation gone
desperate, though not hopeless. They see the turn to non-Western discourse as a
“timely” and “effective” strategy, letting non-Western repressed voices speak for
themselves. Notwithstanding their cognizance of and sensitivity to the postmod-
ern-postcolonial thesis, they provide the position from which the marginalized
and silenced might speak (Spivak 1988, 1997). And they skillfully negotiate this
bothersome concept into a discursive practice, by an eclecticism in methodolo-
gies and theoretical frameworks, which are then adapted to Western as well as
non-Western materials.
1.5. Dialogue
An interesting approach of the study is the confrontation of the grand narratives

of Western discourse with a plurality of petits récits or little stories. This is a cru-
cial feature of the critical approach to discourse analysis – resistance of the he-
gemonic monolithic discourse with a plurality and variety of discourses. In place
of the monologue is a heteroglot, so to speak, of a multitude of voices, sociolects,
dialects, registers and styles. Heteroglossia, would be the right word. It is a term
from Bakhtin (1981) referring to the multiplicity of voices interrelated and dia-
loguing in a text. Here, every utterance represents coexistences and/or contradic-
tions between spatial, temporal, cultural, and ideological differences. Each word
is inextricably bound up in the dissemination of its social contexts.
Bakhtin’s emphasis on language as inherently dialogical and as inextricably bound

up in the dissemination of its social contexts makes it a more effective approach
to language than deconstruction. It thus lends itself as a succinct summary and
affirmation of the present volume’s motivated use of discourse and discourse anal-
ysis. Especially instructive and resonant with the volume’s approach is Bakhtin’s
recasting of intertextuality. Seminally indicated already in the structuralist no-
tion of texts interacting and interdependent with other texts, and radicalized by
Derrida in his notion of diffèrance, intertextuality was coined by Kristeva to re-
fer to the disposition of a given text to contain other texts intersecting and neu-
tralizing each other in its site. In this light, Kristeva makes clear that dialogue in
Bakhtin is “not only language assumed by a subject”, but also “a writing where
one reads the other ...”. Kristeva interprets this gesture as connected to Bakhtin’s
having been born in a “revolutionary Russia preoccupied with social problems”.
Bakhtin attempted to go beyond his fellow-formalists through a dynamic theori-
zation accomplished in revolutionary society (Kristeva 1986: 34–61).
The structure and content of the book are conciliatory and dialogical. The very
organization of the book is far from confrontational. It reconstructs what could
have been if not for the “alarmingly huge imbalances” and “cultural repression”
evident in both the quantity and quality of media coverage of Hong Kong’s his-
torical transition.6 Taking our cue from Bakhtin, we can imagine a dialogue on
Hong Kong’s transition with two participants – one, the proponent of a set of ideas
represented by Western media discourses, and the other, the interlocutor repre-
sented by China and Hong Kong’s media discourses. But something is not right
– instead of a dialogue there is a monologue where only the proponent is speak-
ing. The interlocutor is not allowed to talk, nor is her presence shown. However,
despite this curtailment of the other to speak, in fact because of this, the general
sense of the dialogue is recoverable from the deletions, ellipses, or reticence of
the utterances made by the “only one who does speak”. We can actually engage
in a game of filling the gaps or the blanks, so to speak. Why and how? Because
each utterance can be seen as a response to a question, or an attempt to anticipate
and even parry another’s position, which the utterance nonetheless tries hard to
suppress or refuse to say.7
In this project of presenting the other side of Western discourses on Hong
Kong’s transition, the editors have taken the circuitous route of judging “what the
Western discourse community should know, by what they already know”. What
the West already knows is from the one-sided and imbalanced treatment of the
event by Western media. The two principles employed for selecting which Chi-
nese or Hong Kong discourse to privilege – marginality and difference – also re-
veal this dialogical orientation. Marginality was operationalized as discourse ei-
ther absent from or meagerly engaged with or discredited by the corresponding
Western media. On the other hand, difference was operationalized as those ver-
An epilogue 221
sions different from, or opposed to accounts in Western media (Shi-xu, Chap-

ter 1).
To sum up so far, discourse and discourse analysis informed by Bakhtin’s di-
alogism offers an alternative paradigm to the reigning binarism in Western com-
munication and language. This is the first paradigm shift encouraged by the vol-
ume. It is best captured in the provocative improvisation: “I speak and you hear
me, therefore we are” (Ponge in Kristeva 1986a: 45), in place of Descartes’ “I
think, therefore I am”.
2. Uses and limits of deconstruction

Can the sub-altern speak? – Gayatri Spivak
The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house – Audre Lourde
The authors in this volume have grappled with very real problems typically en-
countered in projects involving the critical study of language. On the first lev-
el is the problem initially experienced by the precursors of the linguistic turn:
how to critically analyze language through language. Otto Neurath of the Vien-
na Circle compared this difficulty to the dilemma of a sailor who has to rebuild
his boat in the middle of the sea.8 But the dilemma facing the critical linguist and
discourse analyst is even more confounding. Phillipson has warned against this
when he wrote, “many of the basic terms used in analyses of language and im-
perialism are ideologically loaded. They reflect a European way of conceptual-
izing the issues and tend to reinforce Eurocentric myths and stereotypes” (Phil-
lipson 1992: 38).
2.1. Derrida’s intellectual universe
In the field of philosophical liminology, this special difficulty has been termed
immanent critique – the tools used for critique belong to the very institution one
is trying to undermine, as opposed to transcendental critique where the tools and
standards come from a neutral outside. Liminology is an ongoing discourse in
philosophy where prominent Western thinkers such as Hegel, Kierkegaard, Ni-
etzsche, and recently, Heidegger, Rorty and Derrida confront philosophy’s lim-
its, or closure, or its dissolution.9 It has to be within this intellectual background
that Derrida’s grammatology and deconstruction are studied so that one becomes
more circumspect in appropriating them for certain projects. Derrida’s most im-
portant contribution to liminology is his perception that Western metaphysics has
been logocentric from the very beginning. Logocentrism refers to how the Greek
logos (natural light of reason) has determined the development of a metaphysics

of presence or the idea that reason, or any legitimated authority (the philosopher,
the self, Being), is the judge that dictates and fixes meaning and truth while it is
in itself exempt from scrutiny. Logocentrism in Western thought has conceived
of reality as structured by oppositions – logos/mythos, logic/rhetoric, intelligi-
ble/sensible, speech/writing, literal/figurative, culture/nature, reason/emotion,
signification/intuition. These dualistic oppositions are rigid, fixed and hierarchi-
cal – the first term is superior and thus favored at the price of repressing the oth-
er resulting in paradoxes and contradictions.
However, there is no privileged terrain outside of the logos from which to dis-
mantle Presence. The dismantling activity has to be done within, using against
the edifice the instruments or stones available in the house (Derrida 1982). This
is the reason why Derrida has contested the Levinasian project of philosophizing
the Other outside of, and beyond the Greek logos.10 On the part of Levinas, phi-
losophizing the Other outside of the Greek tradition (that is, within the Hebrew
tradition), is necessary for his very urgent project, that the holocaust should not
happen again. For Derrida (1982), “the simple practice of language ceaselessly
reinstates the new terrain of the oldest ground” – hence the need for deconstruc-
tion. Deconstruction is intended to undo hierarchical dualisms, not by a mere act
of reversal, as this would leave them unquestioned and risk reinstating Being as
presence which gave rise to them in the first place. Western philosophy has reached
a closure of its own making and if philosophers are to continue becoming useful
they must engage in a deconstruction of philosophical texts.
This is the “intellectual universe”, which was the site of production of Derrid-
ean textuality. Deconstruction was his response and contribution to philosophi-
cal liminology, it is essentially a limit text – designed not only to explore but to
valorize and glorify limits. His radicalization of structuralism necessarily led to
the death of the subject or the author and to an effacement of a reality represent-
ed in language. In his debates with Levinas he was the antagonist to the possi-
bility of philosophizing outside of the Greek logos. He is suspicious of dualisms,
grand narratives, nostalgia for lost origins, search for truth, for the real, autonomy
and self-presence of the subject, the voice of experience, because all these reek
of the Metaphysics of Presence. The dangers of uncritical appropriation of texts
outside their field of production cannot be over-emphasized. Richard Nice notes:
“... much more besides the value set on the text is at stake when it circulates be-
yond its field of production ... Even the most autonomous work contains implic-
it reference to an intellectual universe ... When these bearings are removed, the
text becomes open to misreading” (in Bourdieu 1977: viii).
Without doubt, Derrida’s “limit ideas” and critique of logocentrism are useful
in postcolonial projects aiming to expose Western imperialism’s having propa-
gated its culture as the privileged one. Especially, it has done this in the guise of
An epilogue 223
universal truth, reason and knowledge, concealing desire for economic suprema-
cy and political power. This is the value of the works of meticulous and rigorous
postcolonial scholars relying on Derrida such as Spivak (1988). However, on the
trail of Derrida, she tends to prohibit too much. In the case of the woman subal-
tern she suggests that even the possibility of collectivity itself is persistently fore-
closed inasmuch as female agency has already been predetermined and manip-
ulated. She is pessimistic about the subaltern studies group’s project to rethink
Indian colonial historiography, from the perspective of the discontinuous chain
of peasant insurgencies during the colonial occupation. As to Ranajit Guha, who
further developed the term subaltern from Gramsci in his politics of the people,
Spivak says, “I cannot entirely endorse this insistence on determinate vigor and
full autonomy, for practical historiographic exigencies will not allow such en-
dorsements to privilege subaltern consciousness” (Spivak 1988: 284). Finally in
response to her question, can the subaltern speak, she declares, “The subaltern
cannot speak. There is no virtue in global laundry lists with ‘woman’ as a pious
item” (Spivak 1988: 308).
Such excessive prohibitions of deconstructionists, to my mind, fail to remem-
ber deconstruction’s limitations in constructive work, such as privileging the
marginalized and letting her speak. Also it is forgetfulness that deconstruction’s
prohibitions are directed at Western-contextualized items. The grand narratives
are rationalism, humanism, liberalism, democracy, development, progress, while
the lost origins are Presence, Being, the Greek logos. Lest we forget, in Eastern
philosophies, returning to the original is an integral part of the common Eastern
cyclical concept that both history and reality operate in cycles (Wing-tsit Chan
1963: 153). Lest we forget, grand narratives, even grander than Greek, in the sense
that they were colossal and cosmic in orientation, were in place in the non-West,
prior to their effacement by colonizers. World philosophies did not unanimously
originate in Greece. It is crucial to remember that India and China already had
philosophies when Greek philosophy was just starting to flourish in 600 B.C.
with the pre-Socratics. But historians of Western philosophy, Frederick Copple-
stone, and Bertrand Russell affirm Hegel’s Eurocentric bias that eastern thought
systems were not truly philosophical because they were pursued with a practical
end in view – liberation from suffering. Both historians claim that knowledge
sought for its own sake, leading to the birth of philosophy and science, was the
distinct contribution of the Greeks.11
The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake led to Western thought’s penchant
for overestimating the value of reason, language and logic (bivalent logic, that
is), at the expense of denying a reality that is plural and dynamically changing.
We find this trend already in Zeno’s arguments, defending the Parmenidean po-
sition that everything is One and permanent. Zeno came up with 40 dialectical
arguments to prove that motion is impossible. Yet, he was able to do this only by
sleight of hand. Motion is impossible because he has so defined motion (motion

must be the movement from one place to another within the same moment) that
it no longer referred to anything. Thus, the impossibility here is not a real im-
possibility but a logical impossibility.12 A similar metatheoretical analysis can be
conducted on declarations like “the subaltern cannot speak”. Is the ‘cannot’ here
perhaps a logical cannot? Perhaps, the subaltern has been so defined that a speak-
ing subaltern would be a contradiction? Is subaltern in fact a logical term in the
Aristotelian square of oppositions? Then if so, its truth is always dependent on
the truth of the superaltern. And it is not real circumstances that make it so, it is
logic. But if all we are talking about is logical impossibility, the good news is, the
only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility (Wittgenstein 1961).
3. A nascent paradigm of analyzing non-Western discourse

From the authors’ dismay with existing, dominant methods of analysis which are
often Anglo-American-Western in origin and orientation, a paradigm for study-
ing non-Western discourse is born. They believe that non-Western discourses
will require new concepts and approaches. Based on their analyses of Chinese
and Hong Kong discourses they have noted some items that might constitute the
differences of non-Western discourses: 1) they reflect patterns, concerns and
forms of life different from those of Western discourse. For instance identity is
not a primary preoccupation. Instead, harmony, relation building or rebuilding
are emphasized; 2) some form of strategic essentialism may be required as a re-
search starting point, in order to valorize and empower the non-Western, non-
white world, vis-à-vis the dominant white Western discourse. This nascent para-
digm, I believe, constitutes the conceptual arsenal and methodologies of strategic
essentialism, non-Western ways of knowing and being-becoming, and a philos-
ophy of language distinctly different from the contemporary views on language
espoused in the West.
3.1. Strategic essentialism
Essentialism is the habit of looking for or imposing a “true” or “inherent nature” in

things, events or persons. It has been eschewed by reformists and political move-
ments as the arch-enemy of change and transformation. However, recently it has
been realized that summary scorn for essentialism is in itself an essentialism.
Furthermore, it can be tactically employed as a consolidating force for women
and marginalized groups as a rallying point, and so the issue is not essentialism
per se, but where and how it is put to use. This is strategic essentialism.
An epilogue 225
Stuart Hall (1997) is an example of a cultural theorist who has argued for a
strategic essentialism that might work for anti-colonial struggles as it has been
effective in fighting colonialism in the past. Hall proposes two ways of thinking
about cultural identity which must be worked out together for a balanced sense
of identity. On one hand, cultural identity can be defined in terms of one shared
culture, a sort of collective “one true self ”, beneath the many other, more su-
perficial or artificially imposed ‘selves’. This type of common identity shared
by people with a common history and ancestry has played a critical role in the
emergence of many of the most important social movements of our time – femi-
nist, anti-colonial and anti-racist. More important, it offers a way of imposing an
imaginary coherence on the experience of dispersal and fragmentation, which
is the history of all enforced diasporas. The second sense of cultural identity is
a product of history. It is made up of critical points of deep and significant dif-
ference which constitute ‘what we really are’, or ‘what we have become’. This
second sense of identity includes the sense constructed by the colonizer and the
sense which through power and manipulations the colonized were made to be-
lieve – the Other. This sense of identity is important to our understanding of the
traumatic character of colonial experience.
Inasmuch as the second type of identity has already been discussed earlier in
connection with orientalism and postcoloniality, we conclude this epilogue with
an identification, no matter how provisional, of what might constitute an exam-
ple of a strategic essentialist base for non-Western discourses. Unearthing or re-
claiming traditional ways of being and knowing as well as valuations of and atti-
tudes to language, not to mention the actual revival of our non-Western languag-
es would be a viable strategy. In each case the reclaimed heritage will vary from
community to community but this is not foreclosing the idea that when we look
and see carefully there might be family resemblances that compose a non-West-
ern discourse distinct from Western discourse. But where there is obviously no
resemblance we ought to respect particular differences. To the present concern of
the book, let us explore how Taoism might serve as a philosophical context from
which the observations and insights on Chinese and Hong Kong discourses might
be interpreted.13 This is without prejudice against the other thought systems in
China or in the non-Western world as a whole. Relatedly, our aim is to show that
the prohibitions of deconstruction should not unduly be universalized.
3.2. Non-Western ways of knowing and being-becoming
In contrast to the Western linear accounts about the universe’s origin and end are
the cyclical cosmologies found in Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism. Likewise in
contrast to the Western logocentric privileging of reason as a mode of knowing,
non-rational modes of knowing – intuition, meditation, actual experience – are

the privileged modes by which the ultimate knowledge is known. Radhakrishnan,
for instance, informs us that while Indian philosophy makes unquestioned and
extensive use of reason, intuition is accepted as the only method through which
the ultimate can be known. Actual experience, rather than mere knowledge of re-
ality is also given high epistemological value (Radhakrishnan and Moore 1957:
xxv). In Taoism there is a practical urgency of knowing the Tao, or tzu jan (self-
so-ness) of things. For not to know the eternal is to act blindly to result in disas-
ter. (Tao Te Ching, poem #16). The incessant cycle of coming to be, waning, and
dissolution of the universe is attributed to the interplay of two opposing princi-
ples the yin-yang. Yin stands for passivity, weakness, darkness, and yang, for ac-
tivity, strength, and brightness. But yin-yang is construed as non-hierarchical and
always dynamic. This insight was drawn not from reason or abstraction, but from
a very close observation of the transformations in nature, the changing of the sea-
sons, day becoming night then day again. Particularly the terms yin and yang re-
fer to the dark and bright side of a mountain which are not fixed but changing,
and relative to the sun’s movement. Each principle or force contains the other in
itself thus whenever one force reaches a plenitude, it soon reverts back to its op-
posite. This is the law of reversal.
Evidently, yin-yang logic is not bivalent consisting only of two values, 1–0 or
true-false, but multivalent and correlational. This difference between yin-yang
logic and Aristotle-based Western logic is clearly demonstrated when we com-
pare the calculus or the truth table with the trigrams and hexagrams from I-Ch-
ing. The categories in the former have fixed meanings defined in an objective,
systematic science, whereas the latter are supposed to be interpreted by a divin-
er in relation to events in the world and in connection with a person’s life. Inci-
dentally, Kristeva believes that yin-yang correlational logic is more effective in
accounting for the operation of poetic language and, in general, the dialogical
and polyphonic character of language (Kristeva 1986a: 40). She further notes
that yin-yang logic is closely related to the Chinese language and its use of ideo-
grams. Aristotelian logic, on the other hand, which is the base of scientific pro-
cedures, is itself an outgrowth of the Greek (Indo-European) sentence, “such a
sentence begins as subject-predicate and grows by identification, determination
and causality”.14
This observation of Kristeva jives with the unsettling revelations of Benveniste
(1971), that the Aristotelian categories posited as universal are in fact categories
of Greek grammar. The reduction of categories of thought to categories of lan-
guage certainly exposes a thought’s pretension to truth and universality. But much
more crucial for Western philosophy’s pretensions to magisterial authority is Ben-
veniste’s insight that the concept “Being”, a close ally of Presence, might have
been the offshoot of the Greek language’s ability to nominalize the verb ‘to be’
An epilogue 227
and the term’s special function as a copula. These capacities of the verb ‘to be’
in the Greek language are not found in other languages.15 With more empirical
studies these theories will eventually be corroborated, but for the moment, they
make the project of reviving non-Western languages more urgent. Such ventures,
so to speak, expose into the open the particular embodiments of Western preten-
sions to truth and universality thus pointing out their limitations.
But going back to non-Western ways of knowing, Taoist metaphysics, logic
and epistemology immediately translate into injunctions that guide the conduct
of human beings (ethics, political and social philosophy). After all that is the
main reason why knowledge of the Tao was sought in the first place – to serve as
a practical guide in life. First, knowing that the universe has a rhythm of its own,
it behooves a person well to know this rhythm and adjust to it, and that no action
runs counter to it. Second, knowing that things eventually become their oppo-
sites, there is no preference of one over the other. On the contrary, there is a para-
doxical privileging of the yin side, the dark, the feminine, passivity, non-being if
only to exaggerate their unappreciated value. Taoist texts, for instance, point out
that cups and rooms are useful only because they are empty. Furthermore, opt-
ing to start with them one invariably arrives at their opposites. Thus if one wants
to be great one has to be small, if strong then one has to be weak, and so forth.
Interestingly, unlike in deconstruction where knowledge of mutually producing
opposites leads to paralysis, in Chinese culture, wu-wei does not mean non-ac-
tion but only that no action contrary to the cosmic forces of nature is initiated.
To those who remain skeptical about Taoism’s capacity for active involvement
and even change, we point to the Art of War of Hsun Tzu, or Mao’s revolutionary
strategies as basically inspired by yin-yang philosophy.16
Regarding self and agency, the observation on the non-preoccupation of Chi-
nese and Hong Kong discourses with identity but rather with harmony might be-
come more understandable when seen against a notion of self in Chinese thought.
It has been observed that the idea of harmony pervades Chinese philosophy. In
Confucianism, harmony with society or with others is the ideal, whereas in Tao-
ism, it is harmony with nature. From Chuang Tzu we learn that: “To be in harmo-
ny with men means human happiness, and to be in harmony with Nature means
the happiness of Nature” (Wing-Tsit Chan 1963: 209). In Eastern systems, the
self is also a logical construct or a logical fiction but this realization is liberatory
rather than problematic. Because it is the self that constrains oneness with Brah-
man and for as long as one thinks s/he is a separate individual self, one is sub-
jected to the karmic cycle of birth and death and rebirth. The Buddha also pin-
pointed the self as the root cause of human suffering. In Taoism, the self impedes
one from harmonious blending, and self-so-ness with the Tao.
The culprits in the creation of an illusory self are the mind, and language. The
mind mistakenly believes that there is a self apart from walking, sleeping, or ex-
periencing sensations or a self separate from the activity of thinking. Also be-
cause there are words like I, me, my name, then they must refer to something. It
is when the mind is forgotten that a person has a sense of wholeness, acts smooth-
ly and effortlessly, and achieves enlightenment. Tao te Ching and the writings
of Chang tzu abound with anecdotes and aphorisms on the virtue of selflessness
and not feeling that important. Perhaps most liberating is that little story about
Chuang tzu who dreamt that he was a butterfly. He got so lost in being a butter-
fly that even when he awoke he couldn’t tell whether he was a butterfly dreaming
he was a man, or a man dreaming he was a butterfly.17 Very similar is the case of
the pre-reflexive centipede which could move smoothly in its self-so-ness, until
it was asked how it could move with so many legs.18
Lest we forget, the self which is the target of decentering in deconstruction is
the Western self – autonomous, separative, non-relational – which is another off-
shoot of Greek logocentrism,19 because this illusory self appears only in the self-
reflexive mode of consciousness, that is, when consciousness makes itself its own
object. But not all selves are constituted in the same way as the humanist self or
the self idealized in the enlightenment, as accounted for in traditional Western
psychoanalysis. Here, self and identity constitution is conceived through Freud-
ian drive theory and Oedipal conflict. According to this account, self and identi-
ty construction develop by means of the realization of otherness or separation of
the individual from environment and relationships. Identity, henceforth, is rein-
forced by gradual and continuing assertion of independence and self-sufficiency
which is further determined by the desire to separate from mother and enter the
Law of the Father. To this narrow and obviously malecentric account of identity
construction, feminist psychoanalysts are offering a different story (Chodorow
1978). Relying on object relations theory they posit that self and identity con-
struction need not be a separative process, but rather that of relation and connec-
tion. Likewise, the Oedipal narrative may be true for some males only (those be-
longing to bourgeois and patriarchal families), and is upset or tipped off-balance
in the identity formation of girls and other boys (those from the working class,
and differently styled families such as the extended family, single-headed house-
holds, women-headed families, same-sex partnerships).
In sum, Taoism, and perhaps, Buddhism and Hinduism, are expressive of dif-
ferent forms of life, and different strategies of being-becoming and knowing. In
general we find forms of life that are biophillic (life-affirming), in harmony with
society and with nature, wholesome concept of the self, preoccupation not with
identity, but on how the individual can achieve harmonious relations with oth-
ers. For these, Taoism has been, and continues to be an invaluable resource for
universal cultural transformation. Lorenzo Simpson (2001) offers some points
of evaluating how a form of life or practice might be adopted for a universal cul-
ture.20 First, the program is particularly edifying to members of society associat-
An epilogue 229
ed primarily or historically with the tradition from which that program emerged
for example, it initiates, enables, and/or sustains processes of self-understanding;
second, the program is edifying and transformative for all members of society,
as are, the wisdom implicit in non-Western religious traditions, or non-Western
assumptions about social life.
But closer home is Mao’s proposal on how to determine whether or not a cul-
tural heritage should be continued. His guideline is: to select the quintessence of
the past and throw away its dregs. The quintessential parts of a heritage are those
that are “democratic, scientific and for the masses”, while the dregs are those that
are “anti-democratic, anti-scientific, and anti-people or aristocratic”.21
Taoism, unlike Western logocentrism is a non-interventionist project. At the
most, it is reflected in one’s personal life and interrelationships with others and
with the environment. It was a way of life from the margins. Fung Yu-lan reports
that it flourished in the province of Ch’u a large state on the southern periphery
of “civilized” China, inhabited by a people largely non-Chinese in origin, and
who were comparatively “lacking in culture” (Fung Yu-lan 1952: 175–176). Its
immense potentials for self-understanding and liberation has made it a recom-
mended method in psychotherapy.22 Its intuitive insights more than two millen-
nia ago have inspired, or coincided with, new paradigms in fields as diverse as
arts, logic, epistemology and quantum physics.23
3.3. Non-Western philosophy of language
As already discussed in the previous section, there are epistemological and meta-
physical reasons why Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism would pose the most hard-
headed resistance to the textual turn. The very first line of the first poem of Lao
Tzu warns: “The Tao that can be told of is not the Eternal Tao.” This indicates
that language, like the mind is seen as a hindrance to knowledge of the Tao. A. C.
Danto comments that the fact that Taoists would rather point to the Tao than talk
about it is a significant indication of a “certain distrust of verbalization.”24 One
of the deepest metaphysical insights of all time is contained in poem #56 of Lao
Tzu: “Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not know.” Thus, we
also find a notion of discourse in the Asian thought systems. Language provides
only a partial account of the whole. It cuts up reality into discrete pieces. Because
just as we cannot play the notes all at once, so too language necessarily divides
reality into segments (Fung Yu-lan 1952: 240). In Lao Tzu (poem #1), the in-
vention of names (language) started the division of reality into the ten thousand
things. But because it presents a false picture of reality, cutting it up into discrete
segments, discourse must be transcended.
A whole attitude towards language is encouraged by this philosophy of lan-
guage. Words are mainly for symbolizing reality and should be treated as just that
–symbols. The best forms of language then are brief, but very suggestive, not ar-
ticulate, attempting to say everything – hence, the preference for metaphors, aph-
orism, koans and haikus. These best perform the allotted job of language which
is to directly point at reality. In fact, the less intelligible they are, the better, be-
cause they aim not to bring us into words but outside of words. This is the ad-
vantage of Chinese ideograms over a writing system of spelled words. The signs
are closer to life in that they are pictures.25
But above all implicit in this view of language is a robust sense of reality that
is the basis of all myticisms. Language just falls apart and is rendered useless in
the face of the ultimate reality. This after all was Wittgenstein’s point in the Trac-
tatus (1961). After laying down what can be said, and can be said clearly, he pro-
ceeds to the mystical which can not be talked about.26 This sense of the mystical
is pursued further in the Philosophical Investigations (1958) where we are en-
couraged to understand things, words, and practices in their natural home which
is their daily use in actual life. Russell, in his introduction to Tractatus complains
that while the book is about what can be said, Wittgenstein somehow manages to
talk about what cannot be said. Anticipating this comment, Wittgenstein propos-
es in the penultimate section of Tractatus a way out of the double bind of criti-
cal linguistics. His words should be taken like a ladder. After one has climbed
up, it should be discarded.
Much earlier than Wittgenstein, less than three millennia ago, Chuang tzu
taught us the proper role of words through a simple lesson from fishing: the pur-
pose of the fish trap is to catch fish – once the fish is caught, the trap is forgot-
ten. The purpose of words is to convey ideas – once the ideas are grasped, the
words are forgotten.27
4. Conclusion: An invitation to jamming

The contributions to the volume are exemplary as both demonstrations and ex-
amples on how to force fissures in the imperialistic closure of the single voice,
thereby effectively jamming its monologue. Jamming here resonates Luce Iriga-
ray’s witty pun on its two senses as blocking on one the hand and improvising on
the other (Irigaray 1985: 78).28 To block is to subvert, to throw a spanner in the
works, to stop or immobilize the machinery in its entire operations. To improvise
is to innovate, to engage in a creative fusing of talents, usually associated with
music. In addition, exemplary as in “exemplary punishment”, the volume effec-
tively serves as warning and deterrent to any cultural imperialistic project that it
will inevitably be “jammed”.
Consider this an invitation to jamming. Similar researches on cultural dis-
An epilogue 231
courses from the periphery are thereby encouraged: 1) voices traumatized, dis-
torted and deformed, displaced voices and diasporic voices; 2) Hindu, Arabic,
African, Latin, South East Asian, East European, Filipino and all the other here-
tofore repressed voices; 3) voices denied mileage on CNN, BBC or Time. Urgent-
ly needed is the irruption of an ensemble of polyphonic, heteroglossic discours-
es so as to block the monopolized communication network. More constructive is
the idea of improvisation after the blocking. Musical improvisation, as in jazz, is
the paragon of creativity and spontaneity. But due to contemporary jazz’s appro-
priation by white artists, we can also summon any musical improvisation from
other cultures that are wont to be practiced in less structured musical genres such
as reggae, Caribbean music, Indian sitar-playing, Chinese music, etc. The main
features of improvisation or jamming which make it an excellent model for mul-
ticultural creativity and harmony are: originality and daring to try out the new,
communal creation without collapsing individual contribution, artful handling
of harmonic dissonance and dialogical call and response (antiphony) which re-
quires attentive listening.29
The privileging of sounds and therefore the sense of hearing in jamming or
improvisation is also significant as it evokes the current philosophical critique of
the dominance of sight – the most violent of the senses – in traditional Western
thought. Echoing the editors’ mantra, only in such an ambience can “the cultural
Self hope to become so open and free as to include the cultural Other”.
Notes
1. The term “linguistic turn” was coined by Gustav Bergmann in Logic and Reality,
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964: 350. The linguistic turn is seen as
the latest of the turns taken by philosophy as a result of the realization that it is not
the world per se, nor ideas as such, but rather words that are the more appropriate
objects of philosophical analysis and reflection. The history of Western philoso-
phy can roughly be viewed in terms of its main concerns at different periods. In
ancient and medieval philosophy it was the way of the world – the first philosophy
then was metaphysics. This was supplanted by the “new way of ideas” during the
modern period so the first philosophy became epistemology. Which, in turn, was
again supplanted with “the new way of words” making philosophy of language the
first philosophy, starting form the second half of the twentieth century. See Michael
H. McCarthy, The Crisis of Philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press,
1990: 1–40, 140–166. The linguistic turn was initially associated only with Ana-
lytic philosophy, but inasmuch as the other major philosophies today – phenome-
nology, hermeneutics, structuralism, poststructuralism, postmodernism and semi-
ology – take language as their primary concern, then we can say that they have all
taken the linguistic turn, while some more radical ones, the textual turn.
2. As will be made clear in my subsequent discussion of Wittgenstein’s legacy in lan-

guage studies, I am citing this Tractarian aphorism not in its narrow appropriation
by positivist-empiricist philosophy, but in an interpretation resonant with the po-
sition signaled in the last line (line 7.0) of the Tractatus – “what we cannot speak
about we must pass over in silence” (1961).
3. This “apparently spectacular declaration” from Derrida has been interpreted to
mean that there is no reality outside of language, which is clearly opposed to real-
ism. Realism is the metaphysical view that there is a reality out there, independent
of our interpretations and representations of it. J. R. Searle in his elaboration of his
own theory of realism, cites Derrida as one example of an anti-realist (in the sense
that for Derrida, there is no truth or reality referred to by words; rather words re-
fer to other words in the network of language). Searle writes: “Derrida, as far as I
can tell, does not have an argument. He simply declares that there is nothing out-
side of texts (Il n’y a pas de “hors texte.” Searle reports, however, that Derrida in
a polemical response to him, “takes it all back” saying that all he wanted to claim
was “the banality” that “everything exists in some context”. See J. R. Searle, The
Construction of Social Reality, London: The Free Press, 1993: 159–60.
4. London: Sage, 1994: 249–253.
5. There is usually a careless interchanging of methods and methodology in some
writings. But as suggested by feminists, methodology signals an approach that has
a whole set of epistemological justifications why knowledge achieved through it is
reliable or valid. In contrast methods are simple techniques. See Barbara Di Bois,
Passionate scholarship: Notes on values, knowing and method. In Theories of Wom-
en’s Studies, Gloria Bowles and Renate Duelli Klein, eds. London and New York:
Routledge, 1989: 105–116.
6. See Chapter 1: Introduction to the volume by Shi Xu.
7. Kathleen Wales (1991: 184) notes how Bakhtin does hint at a possible procedure
for analyzing dialogism in these words from Bakhtin’s ‘Discourse typology in
prose’(1971:189) and Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1973: 197):
Imagine a dialogue between two persons in which the statements of the second per-
son are deleted, but in such a way that the general sense is not disrupted. The sec-
ond speaker’s presence is not shown; his actual words are not given, but the deep
impression of these words has a determining effect on all the utterances made by
the only one who does speak.
8. W.V.O. Quine, Identity, ostension, and hypostasis. In From a Logical Point of View.
New York and Evanston, Harper and Row Publishers, 1953: 78–79.
9. See David Wood, Philosophy at the Limit, London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.
10. The debate between Levinas and Derrida is a celebrated highlight in the history of
contemporary European philosophy. Derrida’s position is contained in “Violence
and metaphysics: An essay on the thought of Emmanuel Levinas.” Levinas’ phi-
losophizing of the Other is perhaps more helpful to projects of privileging the Oth-
er. For Levinas’ position on the debate, see his God and philosophy in The Levinas
Reader, Sean Hand, ed. Basil Blackwell.
11. See Frederick Copplestone, A History of Western Philosophy, Vol. I (1). New York:
Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1946, and Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philos-
ophy. London: Allen and Unwin, 1979.
12. This technique of critiquing Zeno’s paradoxes of motion was employed by Morris
An epilogue 233
Lazerowitz in his article, Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, in The Structure of Meta-

physics, Morris Lazerowitz. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955: 163–180.
13 For this section I rely mostly on my essay, The Taoist concept of freedom, Cogito,
1985. Unless otherwise noted, cited materials from Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu are
found in Wing-tsit Chan, 1963.
14. Spivak complains that Kristeva’s approach is “not only cavalier but also sometimes
condescending towards Chinese culture and society.” In introduction by Toril Moi
to Kristeva’s “About Chinese Women.” (Kristeva 1986: 138).
15. These ideas of Benveniste are the foci of Derrida’s essay, The supplement of copu-
la: Philosophy before linguistics (1982). Derrida definitely disagrees with these in-
sights of Benveniste, and he gives as an example the case of Chinese thought which
invented categories as the Tao, yin and yang, but is able to assimilate concepts from
dialectical materialism or quantum mechanics without the structure of the Chinese
language acting as a constraint (191). I do not think this Derridean objection holds.
First of all, the Chinese language is not as structured and restrictive of thought as
the Greek and English languages. Citations to this will be mentioned later in this
paper. Secondly, the dynamism and multivalence found in either dialectical mate-
rialism (dialectical logic) or quantum mechanics (though rendered mathematical-
ly, its theoretical interpretation has led to insights of indeterminacy of knowledge
and the interrelatedness of things in the universe), are very close to the notions of
the Tao, and yin and yang. The latter Chinese notions, too, are not distinct catego-
ries, but are rather loose terms that refer to otherwise nameless, fluid, “realities”
(Also, see Note 23.)
Likewise, Benveniste’s hypothesis seem applicable on two Filipino languages, Ilo-
kano and Tagalog (better known now as Filipino). The word ay, the counterpart
of ‘to be’ in Filipino has no nominalization; whereas in Ilokano, there is even no
counterpart of ‘to be’. The other insights I derived from an examination of Ilokano,
a native language in Northern Luzon, Philippines, are: Ilokano reflects the every-
day realities of the traditional Ilokano form of life, and a knowledge system that
is empiricist, concrete, sensual and holistic. In addition, not all forms of commu-
nication have become completely verbalized. See my Language, culture, and in-
digenous knowledge: Reflections on Ilokano. In Towards Understanding Peoples
of the Cordillera, Vol. 2. University of the Philippines Baguio: Cordillera Studies
Center, 2001: 186–198.
16. This is most evident in Mao’s “On Contradictions” where he discusses “dialectical
ideas long discussed by Chinese philosophers throughout the ages such as the law
of reversal, the unity of oppositions, and yin-yang principles. See Wing-tsit Chan
(1963: 781).
17. In Wing-tsit Chan (1963: 190).
18. The rhyme about the centipede is as follows:
The centipede was happy, quite
Until a toad in fun
Said, ‘Pray, which leg goes after which?’
This worked his mind to such a pitch.
He lay distracted in a ditch,
Considering how to run.
In Alan Watts, The Way of Zen, England, Penguin Books, 1978: 45. Incidentally,
in Sartre, it is the non-reflexive or pre-reflexive consciousness, ‘absolutely rid of

ego’ that encounters others. In reflexive consciousness, the ego appears, negating
all others because necessarily consciousness perceives things as not itself. Inter-
view with Jean-Paul Sartre, in The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, P.A. Schilpp,
ed., La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1981.
19. I explored this in a paper, Bagi language and other alternative conceptions of self
and identity: Implications for theorizing ethnicity, read during a roundtable discus-
sion on ethnicity, University of the Philippines Baguio, 24–25 May 2002. I iden-
tified certain scenarios in the Philippines that would render the Oedipal narrative
inapplicable, in cases such as the extended family system, the prevalence of fami-
lies headed by fathers because mothers have to earn a living in overseas employ-
ment, and indigenous child-rearing and socialization practices that are more com-
munitarian rather than individualistic.
20. The Unfinished Project: Towards a Postmetaphysical Humanism. New York and
London: Routledge, 2001: 133.
21. From Mao tse Tung, On New Democracy, cited in Wing-tsit Chan (1963: 781).
22. Alan Watts, Psychotherapy East and West. New York: Random House, 1970.
23. Niels Bohr is an example of a quantum physicist who appreciates the parallelisms
between eastern thought, particularly yin-yang logic with the twin principles of
complementarity and indeterminacy of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
theory which he co-formulated with Werner Heisenberg. Very significantly, when
he was knighted for his cultural and intellectual contributions to Danish society,
he chose the t’ai chi tu as a motif for his coat of arms. Mentioned in Fritjof Capra,
The Tao of Physics, Colorado, Shambala Press, 1963: 145–146. A very interesting
selection of the mystical writings of modern physicists to include Eddington, Ein-
stein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Scroedinger, de Broglie, Jeans, Planck and Pauli, is Ken
Wilbur’s Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists,
Boston: Shambala, 2001.
24. Arthur C. Danto. Mysticism and Morality. Basic Books, 1972: 104.
25. Alan Watts, The Way of Zen. Thames and Hudson, 1957: 29.
26. I explored Wittgenstein’s mysticism and its parallels with Eastern mysticisms in
the paper “The meaning of life” in Witgenstein’s Tractatus, read in the internation-
al conference on Language Truth and Reality: Science, Religion, and Philosophy,
Ramkrishna Institute, Calcutta, 1–4 August 2000.
27. See Thomas Merton, The Way of Chuang Tzu. New York: New Directions Publish-
ing Corp., 1965. The complete poetic rendition of Merton is:
The purpose of the fish trap is to catch fish, and when the fish is caught the trap is
forgotten.
The purpose of a rabbit snare is to catch rabbits. When the rabbits are caught, the
snare is forgotten.
The purpose of words is to convey ideas. When the ideas are grasped, the words
are forgotten.
Where can I find a man who has forgotten words? He is the one I would like to talk
to.
28. The descriptions here are drawn from L. Simpson’s Musical interlude: Adorno and
jazz, in his The Unfinished Project, 2001: 42–60. Simpson tries to disprove Ador-
no’s observation that jazz is pseudo-democratic, mechanical, repetitive and static.
An epilogue 235
29. Jamming is one of the strategies recommended by Irigaray to subvert phallogo-

centrism – the collusion between phallus and logos in mastering the world through
discourse. Her statement reads: “... the issue is not one of elaborating a new theory
of which woman would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical
machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a truth and of a
meaning that are excessively univocal” (Irigaray 1985: 78).
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Contributors
Narcisa Paredes-Canilao is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University
of the Philippines Baguio. Her publications include: The Taoist concept of free-
dom, Cogito III (9), 1985; Ecofeminism and the future of science and technology,
St. Louis University Journal, XXVI (1), 1995; Language, culture, and indigenous
knowledge, Daluyan, VII (3), 1996; Integration, counter-discourse, irruption. To-
wards Understanding Peoples of the Cordillera, Vol. 2, UPBaguio: Cordillera
Studies Center, 2001; Ethics in feminist research, Gender-Sensitive and Feminist
Methodologies, Sylvia Guerrero, ed., Quezon City: UP Press, 2002. Her research
interests are philosophy of language, epistemology and gender.
Hong Cheng is Associate Professor at the College of Communication at Ohio

University, U.S.A. His research interests center on cross-social and cross-cultural
studies of mass media, especially advertising. His publications include research
on cultural values reflected in advertising, gender portrayals in advertising, and
the World Wide Web’s coverage of Hong Kong’s handover. He is a co-author of
Media Savvy Students. He received his undergraduate and Master’s degrees in
English and international journalism, respectively, in China, and holds a Ph.D.
degree in mass communications from the Pennsylvania State University, U.S.A.
Junhao Hong received a Ph.D. in Communications from the University of Texas

at Austin, U.S.A. Currently, he is Associate Professor at State University of New
York at Buffalo. His research areas include international communication, inter-
cultural communication, and media and social change, with a focus on Asia. He
has published a book entitled, The Internationalization of China’s Television, and
dozens of book chapters about media, culture and society. His research articles
have appeared in various international journals, including Intercultural Commu-
nication Studies; Media, Culture and Society; Asian Journal of Communication;
Asian Survey and American Review of Chinese Studies.
Manfred Kienpointner is Associate Professor for General and Applied Linguis-

tics, University of Innsbruck, Austria. Currently, he is doing research on rheto-
ric and argumentation, politeness theory and contrastive linguistics. Recent pub-
lications include “Reproduction of Culture through Argumentative Discourse:
Studying the contested Nature of Hong Kong in the International Media” (with
Shi-xu, Pragmatics, 2001, 11(3): 285–307), “Persuasive Paradoxes in Cicero’s
Speeches” (Argumentation, 2003, 17(1): 47–63) and “Sprache und Rationalität”
(In H. Schmidinger and C. Sedmak [eds.], 2004, Vernunft – Kognition – Intelli-
genz. Darmstadt, 71–97).
240 Contributors
Lee Cher Leng received a Ph.D. in linguistics from the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. She is currently Associate Professor at the Department of
Chinese Studies at the National University of Singapore, where she teaches cours-
es in language and culture, discourse analysis, pragmatics, and rhetoric, and so-
ciolinguistics. Her current research interests include pronouns in discourse, met-
aphors, and code-switching. Among her recent publications are “Motivations of
code-switching in multilingual Singapore” published in Journal of Chinese Lin-
guistics, 31(1) (January 2003) and “The implications of mismatched personal pro-
nouns in Chinese”, published in Text, 1999, 19(3), 345–370.
Robert Maier is Professor and Senior Researcher at Utrecht University in the

Netherlands. The general theme of his research is theory of argumentation and
social dynamics. He has analyzed in particular the relevance of identity and of
forms of power-constellations for communication and argumentation (articles in
journals such as in the Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, and in books),
with empirical studies on new forms of racism in Europe (book chapters and
articles in journals), and on forms of exclusion and inclusion in multicultural
schools (published in journals, such as the Revue Française de Pédagogie, and
chapters in books).
Denis McQuail worked in the Television Research Unit at the University of Leeds
before being appointed to the Sociology Department at the University of South-
ampton. In 1977 he was appointed to the Chair of Mass Communication at the
University of Amsterdam, from which he retired emeritus in 1998. He has held
temporary appointments at other universities, including Pennsylvania, Colum-
bia, Harvard and Moscow. He is currently Visiting Professor at the University
of Southampton. His main research interests concerned audience research, me-
dia theory, media policy and political communications. His publications include:
Methuen 1961. Communication as a Social Process. London: Longman, 1975 and
1984. Media Performance. London: Sage, 1992. Mass Communication Theory:
an Introduction. London, Sage, 1983, with new editions 1987, 1993 and 2000.
Audience Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997. Media Accountability and
Freedom of Publication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. “Transatlantic
TV flow” in A. van Hemel (ed.) Trading Culture, Amsterdam, Boekman Foun-
dation, 1996. “The consequences of European cultural policies for cultural diver-
sity” in T. Bennett (ed.) Differing Diversities. Strasbourg, COE 2001.
Sankaran Ramanathan is former Associate Professor, University Teknologi

MARA (Malaysia), and former Head, Special Projects, Asian Media Informa-
tion and Communication Centre, Singapore. Currently, he is Chief Operating Of-
ficer of Media plus Consultants, a regional media consultancy. He has authored/
Contributors 241
edited more than 150 publications, including seven books. He was principal re-
searcher for the “Study on Asia Reporting Europe and Europe Reporting Asia”,
commissioned by the Asia-Europe Foundation and tabled in October 1997. This
study focused on how and to what extent the Hong Kong Handover of July 1997
was reported in fifteen European and fifteen Asian publications.
Jan Servaes received his Ph.D. in 1987 at the Catholic University of Leuven, Bel-
gium. Currently, he is Professor and Chair of the School of Journalism and Com-
munication at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia, and President
of the European Consortium for Communications Research (ECCR). He has
taught International Communication and Development Communication in Bel-
gium (Brussels and Antwerp), the U.S.A. (Cornell), The Netherlands (Nijmegen)
and Thailand (Thammasat, Bangkok). He is also Vice President of the Interna-
tional Association of Media and Communication Research (IAMCR), in charge
of Academic Publications and Research. He has undertaken research, develop-
ment, and advisory work around the world and is known as the author of journal
articles and books on such topics as international and development communica-
tion; ICT and media policies; intercultural communication and language; social
change; and human rights and conflict management.
Shi-xu received his Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam and has been a re-
search fellow at the University of Amsterdam, lecturer at the National Univer-
sity of Singapore, and reader at the University of Ulster, UK. His research inter-
ests include discourse studies, cultural studies, intercultural communication and
cultural psychology. Among his numerous publications are two other books in
English, Cultural Representations and A Cultural Approach to Discourse. He is
the founding Editor-in-Chief of Journal of Multicultural Discourses. Currently
he is Professor and Director of the Institute of Discourse and Cultural Studies,
Zhejiang University, China.
Kwok-kan Tam is Professor in the Department of English at the Chinese Univer-

sity of Hong Kong. He has held fellowships at the University of Illinois at Ur-
bana-Champaign, the East-West Center and ASAHIL. Since 1995, he has been
working on various projects on the politics and culture of globalization. His pub-
lications on language and culture include the books, Shakespeare Global/Local:
The Hong Kong Imaginary in Transcultural Production (co-edited, 2002), Sights
of Contestation: Localism, Globalism and Cultural Production in Asia and the
Pacific (co-edited, 2002), Anglophone Cultures in Southeast Asia (co-edited,
2003), and English and Globalization; Perspectives from Hong Kong and Main-
land China (co-edited, 2005).
242 Contributors
Guofang Wan is Associate Professor of the College of Education at Ohio Uni-

versity, U.S.A. Her research interests center on comparative and cross-cultural
education and media literacy education. She has published journal articles and
presented at national and international conferences in these fields. She is a co-
author of Media Savvy Students. She received a Master’s degree in English from
the Shanghai International Studies University in China, and another Master’s de-
gree in modern British studies from the University of Warwick, UK. She holds
a Ph.D. degree in curriculum and instruction from the Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity, U.S.A.
Lawrence Wang-chi Wong received his Ph.D. from SOAS, University of Lon-
don, in modern Chinese literature. At present, he is Professor at the Department
of Translation, concurrently Director of the Research Institute for the Human-
ities and Director of the Centre for Hong Kong Cultural Studies, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong. He is series editor of Hong Kong Cultural Studies.
Apart from publishing on modern Chinese literature and translation studies, he
has three books on Hong Kong cultural studies, including The Burden of Histo-
ry: On the Hong Kong Histories Published in Mainland China (2000), Histori-
cal Contingencies: A Study of Modern Chinese Literary Histories in Hong Kong
(1997) and (co-author) Hong Kong Un-Imagined: History, Culture and the Fu-
ture (1997). At present, he has a major collaboration project with scholars from
Shanghai and Japan on Asian City Culture.
Index
account, 124–125, 133, 134–137, 185 World Wide Web as, 177–178, 180–182,
argumentation, 90–91 190–192
categorization, 96 epithet, 129

colonialism, 96–100, 121, 165–166, 217–
218
communication theory, 3–5, 21–22, 24–31, Hong Kong, 10–11, 73–74, 78–84, 89–90,
37, 55–58, 74
103–104, 113–114, 142–143, 149–153,
critical, 27–28
165–166, 178–179, 180–182, 197–201
early, 22–23
discourse, 122–136, 168–174, 180–182,
western bias, 25–27, 28–30, 103–104,
183–190
107–109
contrast, 122
cultural studies, 5–7, 21–22, 27–28, 31, 33–
34, 37–39, 49–53, 211–231 journalism, 177
discourse, 3–5, 37–39, 73–74, 90–91, 201– language games, 212–213

207 literature, 166–167
and cultural politics, 39–44, 89–90
and culture, 33–34, 36, 37–39, 49–50,
61–65 marginalization, 9, 119–120, 220
Asian, 51–53, 59–61, 78–86, 166–167 meaning, 127
ethics in, 63–64, 66 media, 23–24
history of, 21–23, 197–201 as intercultural, 91–92
identity as, 168, 170–173, 186 East-West relations, 24–25, 91–92,
image as, 73, 74–75 105–107, 109–111
knowledge of, 35 press, 103–104
news as, 75–78, 100
theory, 21–22
non-Western, 3–7, 55–58, 89–90, 122–
metaphor, 132, 139–141, 161
136
methodology, 7–10, 120–122, 182–183,
of difference, 9, 111–114, 119–120
218–219
political, 139–141
research strategies, 39–44, 221–230 qualitative, 84–86, 89
theory, 3–7, 21–31, 33–39, 165–166, quantitative, 78–84
182–183, 211–217, 219–221 multiculturalism, 33–34, 49–51, 61–66,
TV as, 197 121
universalization, 1–5, 34–37, 119
Western discourse, 5–7, 8–9, 55–58,
73–74, 78–86, 89–90, 92–99, 119– narration, 195–199
120 national relativism, 5–7, 119–120, 136
244 Index
Other, 65, 90–91, 92–99, 113, 122 self, 51–53, 60

discourse of, 119–120, 122–136, 161– social science, 21–22, 33, 39–40
162 structuralism, 213
subject, 216–217
paradigm, 211–212 thinking, 53

postcolonialism, 165–168, 173–174, 217– Asian, 53–55
218 Cartesian, 54
power, 34–37, 39–44, 65, 99–100 Western, 53–55
pragmatics, 140, 142 topic, 183
psychological, 131, 216 tradition, 59–61
modernization, 49–50, 59–61
relativism, 61, 64 value, 51–53, 60, 64, 104, 111–113

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Read the cultural other : forms of otherness in the discourses of

Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek

Part 1. Paradigmatic reorientation

Part 2. The discursive dominance of the West

Part 3. Complexity, diversity and Otherness of non-Western discourse

1. Theorizing non-Western discourse

What constitutes “non-Western discourse”? We shall try to answer this question

3. Hong Kong in international communication and world

4. The organization of the book

Ashcroft, B., G. Grifﬁths and H. Tifﬁn

2. The rise of mass communication and early communication

3. The media and ‘development’ tradition

6. From critical to media cultural theory

to do so. This is not an argument for preferring relativism on matters of human

7. Distinguishing between types of theory

Rogers, E. M. and P. Shoemaker

Siebert, F., T. Peterson, and W. Schramm

Shi-xu and Robert Maier

communication can be called cultural discourses. Cultural discourses are in a

1. The universalization of language research

preferred metaphors (Shi-xu 2000a). The idea of language as neutral representa-

2. Discourse as culturally saturated

3. Cultural-political strategies for discourse research

3.1. The cultural nature of scientiﬁc discourse

3.2. Cultural-political strategies for discourse research

2001 Critical pedagogy and intercultural communication: Creating discourses of

1. Modernization and cultural diversity

and communication in the new context of globalization. The central proposal I

2. A dynamic perspective on culture

largely determined by their perception of self, a concept we deﬁne as the identity,

On the other hand, the European way of thinking is typically Cartesian. In

es which are based on visual ascertainment (seeing) and rationality (logos): “A

of discourse in negotiations between Japanese and U.S. companies. They ar-

way. Westerners attempt to convince their listeners by way of rational, Aristote-

6. Modernization and tradition

erm Yoobumrung, who was in charge of the Mass Communication Authority of

7. Cultural relativism, cultural diversity and human rights

8. Cultural respect and cultural dialogue

ic culture, a culture which contains further elements to be incorporated in a new

8.1. Cultural freedom

8.2. Participatory action

Another action-oriented dimension of cultural localization is, for instance, the

8.3. Global ethics

Jan Servaes and Sankaran Ramanathan

2. Some theoretical considerations

countries on international news agencies, the authors undertook a one-week study

4. Studies of news production

These eight news values were considered to be of a general or “universal” nature.

Galtung and Ruge formulated a number of hypotheses concerning the interre-

1. It establishes and cements the social order as part of our cognition.

5. Reporting the handover – quantitative analysis

tions selected were in English. However, we also included publications in Ger-

Asia reporting Europe – 1565 Stories

European personalities mentioned most often in Asian publications. The

Boone, L. and J. Servaes

Schramm, W. and A. Erwin

Shi-xu and Manfred Kienpointner

2. Discourse, argumentation and the media

2.1. Forms of argumentation as acts of power

In the analysis of constructions of and actions upon Hong Kong, we assume

2.2. Mass media as intercultural communication