Interpreting Words, Interpreting Worlds

Author(s): John Gibson

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Autumn, 2006), pp.
439-450
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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 JOHN GIBSON

Interpreting Words, Interpreting Worlds

Words, Words, Words. II. THE PROBLEM OF LITERARY COGNITIVISM

-Hamlet

Before beginning, I should give a sense of wh

take the problem to be. The idea of learning f
I. INTRODUCTION literature-we might call this the thesis of liter
cognitivism-evidently asks us to show that li
ary works
It is a curious feature of recent philosophy of can
lit-be treated as attempting to te
something
erature that the so-called learning from about the way our world is; that is
literature
debate has been carried out almost show
exclusively
that partin
of the project of many, though c
terms of the problem of fiction, that tainly not prob-
is, as the all, literary works is to articulate an
lem of how works of literary fiction, sightbringing
into some as fairly specific aspect of human
they do imagined worlds to view, could perience and circumstance. If literary works
possibly
be an important source of knowledge not about
do at least
our this, it would be very difficul
world. It is curious not because this seems like state precisely what a certain literary work sta
the wrong place to discuss the problem of howto weshow us about reality, and thus we would f
might learn from literature-of course it is not. It
ourselves hard-pressed to explain just what it is
think we can learn from them.
is rather that virtually nothing has been said about
this matter in an area of aesthetics one would think Yet such a claim, even so mildly put, appears
just as natural a place to address it: the theory of to sit uncomfortably with a collection of reflec-
interpretation. After all, the theory of interpreta- tions that cast doubt on the idea of literature as
tion is concerned with issues of textual meaning genuinely capable of showing or telling us some-
and about-ness, and the question of whether we thing about the world. To rehearse a now famil-
can learn from literature would seem at least par- iar argument, in works of literary fiction we find
tially to be a question of whether literary works none of the rational constraints that are commonly
can "mean" something of cognitive consequence taken to be essential to explaining how a form
or be "about" reality in any epistemologically in- of discourse can make knowledge-claims: claims
teresting sense. Discussions of the cognitive value that are genuine candidates for epistemological
of literature and the nature of interpretation are scrutiny.2 Unlike scientific or philosophical writ-
two of the liveliest in current aesthetics, and it is ing, in most works of imaginative literature we find
striking, indeed odd, that there has been no explicit no structure of argumentation, no marshalling of
attempt to build a bridge between the two.' It is the evidence, no attempts at justification, no giving
prospect of fruitfully uniting these two discussions of reasons-nothing to give epistemological sup-
that I shall explore in this article. I hope to show port to whatever it is we think the literary work
that if we approach the problem of learning from is trying to reveal about our world. But without
literature by way of a theory of interpretation, we any of this, we appear to lose the idea that liter-
can find a novel respect in which the literary work ature is (or can be) attempting to (or be able to)
of art can be a source not only of aesthetic value show us something about the world-at least in
but also of significant cognitive value. such a way that this act of showing might result
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64:4 Fall 2006

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440 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

in a state of knowing. Put productive of their cognitive value.

differently, for Rather, I shall
those
urge an "externalist"
features of a work of fiction that appear approach andto arguebe
that at-
we
tempting to cast light on can locate the relevant
reality, westructure
will we do not find in
ultimately
literary works in our interpretive
find them to be in all epistemologically relevant encountersre-
with
these works.
spects ungrounded and unsupported and so hardly
a source of anything that merits the title of knowl-
edge. Add to this that the content of works of
imaginative literature is III.
characteristically
CRITICAL AND LINGUISTIC MEANING
fictive,
speaking about invented worlds rather than the
real one, and it becomesAt first glance, an externalist
exponentially more approach
dif-will h
ficult to comprehend what seemit promising
might foreven
the development
mean to of an acc
treat literature as having of literature's
genuine cognitive value. If aspi-
cognitive we give up th
rations. Or so the reasoning temptgoes.
to ground literary cognitivism on a pi
Few philosophers take of this
literaryto bethemselves
works something as trying, simply
worth lamenting, as though to tellit
us something
reveals about
onethe ofworld, how will a
liter-
ature's secret shames. It is not that literature sees ory of interpretation help us here? For on a
its labor as one of attempting to offer knowledge common conception, interpretation concerns
of the world yet is somehow constitutionally in-cisely this: the activity of bringing to light what
capable of fulfilling its task; the upshot is oftenerary work is trying to say. Indeed, according t
thought to be that we would do well to regard liter- entrenched view, literature is primarily a me
ature as engaged in other, more properly aesthetic through which a writer conveys a meaning, m
pursuits, at any rate something other than the pur- a claim, urges a point, says something. Is no
suit of knowledge and like sorts of cognitive illumi- issue for the interpreter simply to grasp the m
nation.3 That is, these reflections are taken to bring ing a literary work is attempting to convey? An
home the fact that literature itself does not invite we part with this idea, as the approach I will
us to take what we might call a "cognitive stance" claims that in a crucial respect we should, to
toward its content: literature simply does not de- extent are we still talking about interpretatio
sire to be read for worldly knowledge-for it has In one sense, it is obvious that interpreta
none to offer-and it does nothing to encourage does concern what a literary work "says" o
such an activity. tempts to "convey" in a straightforward lin
Although one may (and most certainly would) tic sense. For example, we often must enga
take issue with one or another of the claims made disambiguation in the presence of semantic
in the above reflections, I shall grant here, if just licities such as vague descriptions, unintelli
for the sake of argument, the basic point they sentences, misused or misprinted words, an
jointly urge: we find nothing in literary works that like. Consider the oft-cited example of "ten
is in any relevant sense a source of extra-literary accidentally becoming "tinder" upon the pr
knowledge. This is in effect what these reflections ing of Hart Crane's poem "Thy Nazarene
and arguments challenge, the idea that we might Tinder Eyes," or that as one moves between
be able to locate some property internal to liter- various folios and quartos, Hamlet's "oh that
ary works that is itself generative of literature's too too sullied flesh would melt" becomes "solid
supposed cognitive value, as might be the case flesh" and "sallied flesh." Surely much of what
with philosophical and scientific texts, by virtue of we must do when reading works such as James
their explicit argumentative or evidentiary struc- Joyce's Finnegans Wake or William Faulkner's The
ture. We can accept that there is no such internal Sound and the Fury is attempt to give sense to the
property, as I shall argue, because we turn out not almost endless semantic convulsions of their lan-
to need one to make sense of the thesis of liter- guage. Interpretation in these cases is a matter of
ary cognitivism. Thus, contrary to a long-standing settling the sense of the language of a text, of as-
way of approaching the problem-call it the signing a determine meaning to some ambiguous
"internalist" approach-I wish to show that we do or linguistically curious feature of it. This is an ac-
not need to see works of literary fiction as contain- tivity virtually all literary works call upon at one
ing within them some device or structure (a mode point or another, and I nowhere here want to deny
of claiming, showing, arguing, and so forth) that is this. Since this concerns the attempt to render clear

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 Gibson Interpreting Words, Interpreting Worlds 441

to the concept
the language of a literary work, I shall call of understanding-of
this sort making sense
of meaning "linguistic meaning" of something-and
and the problem here is that it is
the interpre-
notinterpretation."
tive activity it is tied to "linguistic quite the language of the text that the inter-
Yet a problem arises when we
preterrealize that better. We can imag-
is trying to understand
we are talking about something ine,more interest-
for example, a literary work so simply and
ing, and much more philosophically challenging,
clearly written (and likely dull for these reasons)
that (1) it requires no linguistic
when we speak of meaning in literary-critical con- interpretation
texts. When we ask about the "meaning"
and (2) an interpreter of
finds a
it rich in critical mean-
ing. So critical
literary work we do not usually have in mind interpretation
wordseems not to be a
or sentence meaning. We ask whatspecies
the of linguistic
text means,
interpretation, for it is an ac-
what sense we can attribute to the
tivityliterary
that can be engaged
object when the latter is not.
itself rather than to its constitutive sentences. Thus what we want to know is: What exactly is
this sort of meaning, what generates it, of what is
In this case we are speaking of a variety of meaning
that stands over and above the express meaningit of
descriptive, if not the linguistic meaning of the
literary work?
the language of the text. Think of the habit of treat-
ing William Shakespeare's The Tempest as partlyThere may be a temptation here to go deeper
"about" the survival, or destruction (dependinginto
on the philosophy of language in search of more
one's reading), of reason and culture when con-refined senses of conveyed meaning with which
fronted with savagery, though what Shakespeare to explain critical meaning. For example, one
might be inclined to look toward a notion of im-
in fact wrote speaks instead of a certain Prospero,
a stranded Milanese scholar and aristocrat, andplied or indirect meaning: meaning that is con-
Caliban, a monster he enslaves. Consider when we
veyed through, but that cannot be identified with,
say of Herman Melville's Bartleby the Scrivenerthe express or "surface" meaning of a piece of
that Bartleby's refusals "mean" something aboutlanguage. There are two frameworks in which I
can imagine one trying to develop this line of
estrangement as a condition of modern life, while
all Bartleby ever actually says is "I would pre-
thought, applying, with some adjustments, either
fer not." Think of when we claim that Samuel (1) a version of intentionalism, namely, the idea
Coleridge's Kubla Khan offers an insight into that literary meaning is to be identified with a
the nature of poetic inspiration, despite the fact
conception of a real or postulated (hypotheti-
that when we examine the language of this poem cal) author's intended meaning; or (2) a version
we just find talk of pleasure domes and seething
of conventionalism, namely, the idea that literary
chasms. For reasons that will become clearer be- meaning is determined by public linguistic conven-
low, I shall call this sort of meaning "critical" andtions (as opposed to authorial intentions), broadly
the activity it concerns "critical interpretation."construed.5 Conventionalism and intentionalism
This is the sort of meaning and interpretive ac-are standard positions in contemporary theories
tivity I am concerned with here (and that I shall of interpretation-indeed, they often are treated
ultimately use to develop a theory of literary cog-as marking the two poles of possible positions one
nitivism).4 may assume in the debate-and each has its own
Now since literary works are, as the saying goes, way of being helpful. My doubt here only concerns
"pieces of language," an interpreter is clearly talk- their suitability for illuminating critical meaning.
ing about a linguistic object when articulating crit- Let me offer a few words as to why.
ical meanings of this variety. However, they are an A conventionalist in the theory of interpreta-
odd sort of meaning, for they are not descriptive tion might argue something like the following. We
of any feature of the language of these works, cer- know, for example, that the sentence "you needn't
tainly not of anything these works in any literal come in tomorrow" implies or, in Gricean terms,
sense say. There is a clear dependence of critical implicates the proposition "you are fired" when
meaning on the language of a literary work, for uttered in certain contexts, even though this mean-
the interpreter offers a critical interpretation as ing cannot be tethered to the semantic value of
a way of understanding a literary work, and he or the sentence in fact uttered. What typically hap-
she would not, presumably, understand a work this pens in cases like this is that we have knowledge
way if its language were other than it is. However, of relevant linguistic conventions (that have refer-
the concept of interpretation is intimately linked ence to the conditions under which an utterance

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442 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

is made), which in turnintentions

build (or theaintentions
bridge a competent
between audi-
the express and implied meanings
ence would attribute to him, and of the
so forth) sen-
might be
tence uttered. Thus therequired to settle whether who
philosopher Hamlet's embrace
flesh should
be readof
a conventionalist theory as "sullied" or "sallied."6 I would also migh
interpretation
think that
claim that critical meaning considerations ofin
functions an actual
much or postu-
th
same way. Meaning oflatedthe critical
author's intentions mayvariety is a not
at times offer con-
straint on of
part of the surface meaning the range
theoflanguage
critical meanings ofwe th
can
text. Rather, there areattribute to a work, andlinguistic
appropriate this in turn can help
con- us
ventions in place suchunderstand
thatwhat the to do when we find ourselves
language of the
confrontedconvey
literary work can indirectly with conflicting critical interpretations
them. In short,
(simply put, we
critical meanings are implied disqualify those that cannot rea-
propositions.
Here is the problem. sonably
There is not,
be attributed nor of
to a conception would
what an
one expect there to be,author
anymay linguistic
have meant by his or her work). But
convention
that unites the language of
note that thisThe
tells us Tempest
nothing about howwith
critical a
claim about the survival of themselves
meanings culture, nor onewhat
are generated-about tha
weds the descriptions prods
of theXanadu
interpreter to found in this
offer them up-and Kublis
Khan with a proposition about
our question. the
Rather, nature
it helps of
us understand whatpo
we shouldplausible
etic creation. It is entirely do with critical meanings
to think once gener-
that
ated and found to
specific sentence or utterance be in conflict.
types can Thus bear
it sheds a con
no light
ventional link to specific on what occasions
implied the activity of critical
propositions, but
it is quite impossible to see how
interpretation itself, onan entire
just what work
the interpreter
has composed
of imaginative fiction, identified when he or she
ofattributes a critical
thousands o
sentences, could ever meaning
come to a to
text. bear such a link.
It would be an extraordinary accomplishment
Should intentionalists wish to make a stronger i
a culture could developclaim such complex
and argue that conven-
it is a consideration of au-
tions, and one can only wonder
thorial how critical
intentions that occasions it would
interpre- g
tation in
about instructing readers (rather than merely
their acting as a constraint
application. Crit
ical meanings are too on
sui thosegeneris, too inclined
we already find ourselves occasional
to at-
tribute to an artwork),
to think they can be explained with they court nonsense and
reference t
general linguistic conventions.
literary barbarism. For it is the text that occasions
Of course, once a critical tradition
critical interpretation, and toarises
fall afoul ofaround
this fact
a certain literary work, is, as Monroe
that Beardsleycan
work would come
have it, to to
forget
bear
a conventional link to thata certain critical
the object of interpretive scrutinymeaning
is an art-
work and not
say as marking a culturally something beyond it.7 way
entrenched Accordingly,
of in
it will be
terpreting it (for instance, of no use
the to argue that
habit, critical meaning,
common since
though not
the mid-twentieth century, manifest in the
though notlanguage of the text,
before it, o
reading Othello as in part a meditation
forges its initial link to the text by wayon race)
of a con-
But the question we are ception of an authorial is,
pursuing intention
whatthat thegets
text be thi
readinstance?
process afoot in the first a certain way-a species
What of indirect
are mean-
critics
identifying when theying in this sense-for
claim to have we have no way of explain-
discovered a
ingin
certain critical meaning how athisliterary
conception might be made present
work? It can
to interpreters
not be convention all the way such down,that it could
for call their
it critical
is very
unlikely that there are linguistic
activity conventions
in to service. Presumably, interpreters do at
critics' disposal to guide not offer theat
them critical
this meaning in the example
initial stage of of
critical discovery. And The Tempest
this isbecause
the they have somewe
stage independent
want t
notion that Shakespeare
understand: What are critics describing might have meant thisthey
when
with
claim to have uncovered ahis work, quite apart
certain from anything
critical they ac-
meaning
if not something the text tually encounter
actually in Shakespeare's
says? creation. It must
Intentionalism is a bit trickier. I would think be something in the work; otherwise, it would not
that some version of intentionalism is true of occur to the interpreters to state it.8 Now it may
be, as so-called neo-Wittgensteinians like to point
what I am calling linguistic interpretation. To give
but one example, a conception of Shakespeare's out, that authorial intentions are embedded in the

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Gibson Interpreting Words, Interpreting Worlds 443

nicative
language of the text, and thus that contexts to have
to describe theimportant consequences
text will at times be by default to for
describe these
a theory of literaryin-
interpretation.
tentions.9 But as we have seen, it does
There not seem
are many to
well-known ways of accounting
for
be the language of the text we are this world-generating
describing when capacity of literary
engaged in critical interpretation, language,
and almost all of which link it to a cer-
so consid-
erations of its language will hardly seem apt
tain imaginative forConsider, for example,
activity.
helping us understand what prompts critical
popular varieties in-
of make-believe, simulation, and
terpretation. Thus the question still possible-world
stands:theories
What of fiction, to name but a
occasions critical meaning, whatfew. doesTheseittheories tend to begin their account
describe,
what is its object? of our engagement with literature by emphasizing
not primarily or especially the meaning the lan-
guage of a text tries to convey, but the imaginings
IV. WORDS AND WORLDS it prescribes. Though the two are inseparable-an
imagining is prescribed by the language of a text,
There still may be an urge to continuethat mining
is, by itsthe
meaning in a straightforward linguis-
philosophy of language in search of ever more re-
tic sense-this switch in emphasis is important, for
fined senses of linguistic meaning, more complex
it reveals the uniqueness of our way of encounter-
intentionalist or conventionalist models of indirect ing language in literary contexts. Literature dis-
communication. One might expect such moves, engages language from its standard function of
given the extent to which so much of aesthetics referring to and representing the real world and in-
tends to concentrate on the linguistic dimension stead places it in a certain imaginative space. This
of interpretation. What I want to suggest, how- act is transformative: without it the language of
ever, is that we do not need more linguistic cate- a literary work is idle, nonreferential, a represen-
gories and distinctions to understand this. We need tation of literally nothing at all. Representations
more properly aesthetic ones. That is, we need an require objects, for without them there is nothing
account of how literary works engage the imagi- to be represented. Literary works generate these
nation and, in so doing, help bring about a unique objects and the fictional worlds they inhabit in
object of appreciation, an object to which we sim- tandem with the reader, by presenting their lan-
ply have no access if we take a purely linguistic guage as in effect a recipe for the imagination. It
stance toward a literary work. is through this that a text that would otherwise re-
What I have in mind is the following. It is true main a continuous string of empty representations
that when we look within a literary work we find is given substance: that it is united with something
only, as Bernard Harrison puts it, "a tissue of for it to be about, to speak of, to describe.
words," but this tissue of words does something ex- This imaginative act that opens up to view the
traordinary when placed in the context of a literary fictional world of a work makes possible a form of
work: it holds in place the texture of a world.'1 It is literary experience and appreciation to which we
not an actual world, needless to say. It is what we have no access if we take a purely linguistic stance
commonly refer to as a "fictional world."" That toward a literary work. We might recall Bertrand
literary works project fictional worlds is hardly Russell's infamous claim that statements descrip-
news. It has been a fixture of discussions about art tive of Hamlet are "all false because there was
in analytic aesthetics at least since Nelson Good- no such man," which is an excellent example of
man's Ways of World Making.12 What is rather as- the poverty of talk about literature when carried
tonishing is that this feature of the literary work from a purely semantic perspective.14 Literature's
of art is virtually never mentioned in current invocation of the imagination puts us into contact
work on interpretation.13 This, as one might put with something over and above, as it were, Sinn. It
it, world-generating capacity of literary language gives us a world, and to this extent a unique object
is not shared in common with language in stan- of appreciative and interpretive scrutiny. If this is
dard linguistic contexts. A hallmark of ordinary so, it suggests that this imaginative activity brings
speech is the use of language to describe the world; with it a distinct region of appreciation and inter-
a hallmark of literature is the use of language to pretive investigation, in the form of the world a
create one. One would expect this difference be- literary work brings to view. This is a region that
tween language in literary and standard commu- is made available to appreciation only when we

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444 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

add to whatever linguistic stance

so in a way we
triumphing over take
her. This illustratestoward
a more
a literary work this imaginative
general truth. Only byone.
acknowledging the sources of our
We can now begin tobeing,
say something
acknowledging positive
our unsavoury historical heritage,
about the nature of critical
can we haveinterpretation. It If
the power to free ourselves from them. con-
we are to sever ourselves from
cerns, especially, the investigation ofthe amaternal
world. body andThe
first thing to see is that
moveworlds and
beyond it, it can only be what we
by recognizing find
our own
in them-characters, relationships, actions, events,
continuing dependence on it.15
among other things-have a sort of meaning and
Cleanth Brooks,
about-ness, but of a markedly in his classic interpretation
different sort from of
words and sentences. The Faulkner's The Sound and The Fury,
institutional begins by
oppression
claiming that
of a minority is about racism; thethe work
factoffersofa "progression
love mightfrom
murkiness
mean that at the end of the day to increasing
we are enlightenment" as it "dra-
nevertheless
capable of decent relationships. Or who
matizes for us with compelling urgencyknows?
a situation
we have comemeaning
The point is that to explain to accept almost as and
our own."16 This
about-
urgency,
ness in these cases, we do not he argues,
try resides in its presentation of
to identify a alin-
guistic entity such as acertain picture of modern circumstance.
proposition or statement
that is given expression in these features of our
world. Worlds, unlike words, do
The decay of the notcanbear
Compsons be viewed,meaning
however,
not merely
in this way, nor need they in with reference toto
order the Southern past but to
be meaning-
the contemporary
ful. This is because when applied scene.
to It isthe
tempting to read it as a
structure
of a world, of a practice, of
parable human
of the disintegration ofcircumstance,
modern man. Individuals
meaning and about-ness noarelonger sustained
in common by familial and cultural
usage unity are
tied
to a notion not of signification but
alienated and lost in private significance,
worlds. One thinks here not
not meaning in a linguistic
merely of sense but
Caddy, homeless, import
the sexual in an
adventuress adrift
explanatory sense. in the world, or of Quentin, out of touch with reality
and moving inevitably
This is what critical meaning to his death, butthan
is. Rather also and even
di-
rected at the recovery of linguistic
primarily of Jason, for whom meaning,
the break-up means thecrit-
ical interpretation marksactivea process
rejection of claims andof articulating
responsibilities, and with
it, a senseand
patterns of salience, value, of liberation.
significance in the
worlds literary works bring to view. That is, critical
interpretation marks theThe critical activity inof
moment Eagleton's
our caseengage-
is a mat-
ment with the world of ter ofthe
placing work,
Lily's relation and it has
to her painting and as
its goal the attempt to bringits subject in
to a broader
light context of human
what we activ-
find
of consequence in this world. If
ity, namely, the this
struggle is so,
to overcome whatwewe findcan
admit, for example, that ugly and shameful in
Bartleby theourselves without denyinglit-
Scrivener
erally says nothing about who wemodern
in fact are. According to Eagleton, the textand
alienation,
yet, for all that, it is not is in part about
quite silentthis struggle.
on the In Brooks's example, It
matter.
speaks about it not because the Compson family holds in
it offers aplace
worda picture to
of thethis
effect, but because it offersworld inawhich
world the pursuit
to of the personal
this leads
effect. It
necessarily
is part of the critic's task to estrangement
to devise an from others, even as,
interpretive
framework that can render one might explicit the
add, a retreat to the public meaning,
(family, com-
the significance, of human munity) is rather
life asbleakly revealed to be just in
configured a more
the
world Melville created for us. complex form of isolation. This is part of what
Let me offer two examples of critical interpreta- Brooks takes the text to mean. That is, each work
tion to help give shape to my point. Consider Terry is read as registering-though differently and per-
Eagleton, who finds in Virginia Woolf's To the haps incompatibly-certain visions of our relation
Lighthouse a vision of a common human struggle. to ourselves and to others, and thus of something
about our way in the world.
The point for Lily is to distance herself from the image of Note that we will find none of this given mention
Mrs Ramsey to the point where she can freely acknowl- in To the Lighthouse or The Sound and the Fury.
edge its influence. Her art allows her to do both, drawing Indeed, if literary interpretation is thought to be
the image of Mrs Ramsey closer yet "placing" her, and tied only to an attempt to render clear the meaning

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 Gibson Interpreting Words, Interpreting Worlds 445

we find in many
of text, and if this, in turn, is conceived as a deconstructive
largely or neopragmatist
accounts of interpretation).
linguistic enterprise, critical interpretations of this I hope that what I have
sort are bound to seem gratuitous, said here makes it sense-
perhaps clear that I endorse no such
less, for these texts literally say nothing
thing. of the
Critical interpretation has a standard exter-
nal to itself,
sort. Vindicating this sort of critical in the form
discourse re- of the world of the text.
Whento
quires situating it not in the search engaged
render in critical
clearinterpretation we make
the linguistic act of literary worksense
butofin this world;
the we do not construct it. Again,
strug-
gle to articulate the significance the
ofworld
its ofimaginative
a work is generated by the language of
act. What critical passages suchthe astext,
Eagleton's andexplicit the constitution
and so rendering
Brooks's bring to light is that theofobject
a fictional
ofworld is largely a matter of linguistic
appreci-
interpretation.17
ation and interpretive scrutiny extends beyond Thus the
we have a point of contact
with the work
language that runs through the literary literary of
work,
art.and an attendant form of
That is, they show us that through our imaginative
interpretation, that is external to, independent of,
involvement with these works,the
we giveofourselves
activity critical interpretation. This offers us
access to a broader range of meaning and which
a standard against thus to check critical interpre-
tations
a richer appreciation of Woolf's andthemselves, to determine whether what the
Faulkner's
creations. What the critic's voice
critic provides here
says is genuinely responsive to and so illumi-
is witness to this further regionnative
of literary
of his or hermean-
object of scrutiny. The activity
ing, to the capacity of literatureofto
articulating
be about critical
much meaning is not-to borrow
more than what we find stated on the
a phrase printed
from John McDowell-a sort of "friction-
page. less spinning in a void" in which nothing constrains
Meaning of this sort is critical not only in the what the reader can say about the text except the
sense that it marks a prominent way literary crit- power of his or her imagination.'8 We have other
ics speak in their interpretive activities; it is crit- forms of interpretive access to literary works that,
ical in the more interesting sense that it requires in turn, function to place rational limits on critical
the voice of the interpreter-the critic's voice- discourse.
to be made manifest. Critical interpretation is a Before concluding this section it is worth re-
matter of putting to words what we find of signifi- marking that the picture of critical interpretation
cance in the world of a work, of rendering discur- I have outlined suggests that our appreciation of
sively the import of what we witness imaginatively. literary works is much more firmly in line with
However, this is still compatible with the notion of our appreciation of the other arts than is often
literary communication, that the reader is captur- noticed-something we will fail to see if we ap-
ing (rather than simply fabricating) meaning when proach literary interpretation from a purely lin-
engaged in critical interpretation. Acknowledging guistic standpoint. In most of the arts, we often
this requires seeing that literary works offer mean- must use our imagination to see what an artwork
ing in a unique way by using as the vehicle of com- wants us to see. Our ability to see a well-known ac-
munication a world rather than a string of words. tor as a certain character in a film requires an act
Again, there is a clear dependence of the former of imaginative transformation; otherwise, when
on the latter, but the meanings we locate in the viewing A Street Car Named Desire (Elia Kazan,
imaginative space created by a text cannot be re- 1951) we would witness only Marlon Brando and
duced to meanings found in its linguistic space, and never Stanley Kowalski. Or think of our ability to
thus there is dependence without identity between see a particular motion of the human body in a bal-
these two sorts of meaning. let as the movement of a swan; a stage-set in the
What would be dangerous to the idea of inter- theatre as a caf6 in the East Village; an odd con-
pretation as a rational enterprise-that is, as an ac- figuration of cubes in a painting as a mother em-
tivity that is cognitively responsive to its object- bracing her child. None of these viewings would be
would be a picture of critical interpretation that possible without the aid of the imagination. They
suggests that the critic constructs the world of a are all distilled through an act of the imagination
work in the very act of interpreting it. This is a in a way our everyday viewings of nonartistic real-
consequence that often follows from theories of ity very likely are not. In most of the arts we must
interpretation that give pride of place to the role of in some way imaginatively transform the material
the reader in the generation of literary meaning (as we are presented with if we are to encounter the

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446 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

world of the work. In literature, it is

which readers imbue the works
literary language
with wo
significance.
that runs through the text that the That is, the forging of ais
imagination literary
to
transform; in the visual resentation
arts, it of isreality
commonly
is tied to this
a activity
per- of
ceived object. This is enough toin
ing fictions keep the
a critical boundary
context that specifie
between literature and they
the visual
are about or arts intact,
mean something but
of "real"
the difference between quence
the sort (and for ofthe imaginative
remainder of this article, en-
I speak of representation
visioning required by literature and theI use other it in the sense
arts
it here).
is a matter of degree, not kind. Critical interpreta-
Without thisappreciation
tion, and the form of artistic act of critical articulation, theto
pas- which
it is linked, would thus sage
seemfrom literature
to tobe
life remains
fairly a mere poten-
uniform
tial in the
across the arts, a form of literary work. In critical interpretation
interpretation they have
in common. we enlarge, we enrich, the scope of literary expe-
rience, indeed of the literary work itself. We do
V. INTERPRETATION AND THE INVESTING OF FICTION so by casting fictional characters and the worlds
WITH LIFE they inhabit, not as real, but as continuous with-
of a piece with-human reality. This is what we
To use the terminology introduced in thesee in the examples
first sec- of Eagleton on Woolf, Brooks
on Faulkner,
tion, it is common to take an internalist approach in the claims that Bartleby shows
us something
to the question of how literature relates to life,about modern alienation, Prospero
about culture
attempting to answer it by trying to locate and reason, and Xanadu the nature
liter-
of inspiration.
ature's cognitive value solely within the literary That is, we see in these examples
work of art. Among other things, an approach ofof articulating critical meaning re-
that the activity
this sort often results in a very awkward
veals a attempt
process of investing fiction with life. There
is nothing con-
to claim that literary works, though evidently philosophically suspicious in saying that
tent to speak about fictions, must also,literature speaks about fictions yet can represent
in some
round-about way, be talking about reality.
reality,The idea
at least if we explain this not in terms of lit-
of critical interpretation shows us howerature's
we mightmagical ability to speak about two things
avoid such an approach, for it bringsat to
once-it
lightdoes anot have this-but rather by re-
way of understanding the role that the marking on how the conversation that exists be-
critic-the
interpreter-plays in effecting the passage from
tween literary works and our interpretive practices
literature to life. The theory of criticalcan itself be the source of the connection between
interpreta-
tion outlined here allows us to accept,fiction should and we
reality.
be so inclined, even a strong thesis of The fictional-
passage from literature to life does not oc-
ity of literary works, namely, that they cur saysolely
nothingwithin the text (or at least we need not
insist that
about reality. It also shows us that a literary work it does if we are to give sense to the
can be about much more than what it idea that literature can be revelatory of reality).
explicitly
says, and so that even if we embrace a It is in part
strong the- a product of a stance we take toward
sis of the fictionality of literature, thereastill
text,remain
a critical stance that complements rather
than
possibilities for claiming that literature conflicts
can offer with whatever "fictive stance" we

an engagement with extra-textual reality.also assume toward literary content."19 Indeed, we

Without the critic, and without the reader
can findmore
examples of literary works calling on us to
assume
generally, there may be little sense to the a stance
idea that of this sort. There was an interest-
literature represents reality, for without the critic's the history of the novel, one that
ing tradition in
voice we find a work that seems to speakseems to have vanished when modernism stepped
about
onto the scene.
fictions alone, thus representing, if anything, the It was the practice of prefacing a
imaginary rather than the real. But oncenovel we
with look
a request, simply put, to take the fiction
seriously.
toward the practice of criticism, we find To give two well-known examples, in an
that there
author's
is a harmless way of speaking of literature note Fyodor Dostoevsky says the follow-
as repre-
sentational, as offering visions of life. ing about his "Notes from the Underground":
Literature's
ability to represent reality need not consist in some
Bothrather,
mimetic act performed solely by the text; the author it
of these Notes and the Notes themselves

can be understood to have reference to are,

theofways
course,infictitious. Nevertheless, such persons as

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 Gibson Interpreting Words, Interpreting Worlds 447

tend may,
the author of these memoirs not only to speak about
but fictions-we will not be able
must,
to take these authors
exist in our society, if we take into consideration at their word. But if we are
the cir-
cumstances which led to the formation of to
willing our society.
treat them, andIt
our literary culture more
has been my wish to show the publicgenerally, as voicing
a character of an implicit invitation to read
the
our world
recent past more clearly than is usually into works of fiction, we will have no dif-
shown.20
ficulty doing this. It is common, these days at least,
And as Charles Dickens writes in his that
to claim preface
works ofto literary fiction carry with
Oliver Twist: them an implicit request to treat their language
as prescribing imaginings.23 What these examples
It is useless to discuss whether the conduct and charac- bring to light is that we have reason to see our
ter of the girl seems natural or unnatural, probable or literary practices as issuing a complementary re-
improbable, right or wrong. IT IS TRUE ... It is em- quest: we are called on to assume a critical stance
that allows life to be blown into these works, a
phatically God's truth, for it is the truth. It involves the
best and worst shades of our common nature; much of
stance that in turn permits these literary works to
reach a further, and intended, destination: a point
its ugliest hues, and some of its most beautiful; it is a con-
of contact with our world.
tradiction, an anomaly, an apparent impossibility, but it
is a truth.21 The connection between fiction and reality is
external insofar as it requires the presence of
We can find similar requests by Daniel Defoe, something external to the literary work to be made
Henry Fielding, and Samuel Richardson- virtu- manifest, namely, our critical activities. But this is
ally all the first great English novelists.22 All of not to say that it remains severed from literary
them suffered from a certain anxiety, namely, a content, that it marks a way of speaking about
fear that the fictionality of their texts would lead something other than what we witness when we
them to be read as frivolous entertainment. Thus look between the covers of a novel. It is better un-
they found it necessary to ask their public to seederstood as a way of filling out literary content,
in their works something the crude reader mightof imbuing it with this general worldly relevance
miss: this engagement with reality that is not givenand thus completing the representation of reality
explicit statement in the language of their literary
a work wishes to put on offer. Again, critical in-
creations. terpretation marks a way of articulating what the
Though the tradition of calling for seriousness world of a work means. In this respect, the critical
of appreciation is now extinct, unless we are be-meanings we attribute to literary works become
bound up with our understanding of the content
holden to a very silly theory, we will not think that
this is because we have come to learn that litera- of these works, of what they are about. Thus the
ture is after all just play. The reason the tradition
connection between fiction and reality achieved in
died is likely that we, as a culture, have learned to
our critical activities never remains wholly exter-
take the novel seriously, that whereas there was nal to the work.
once a question about whether fictions could of-
fer only diversion, we have learned to read aright. VI. CRITICAL INTERPRETATION AND

What these authors are denying is the appropri- LITERARY COGNITIVISM

ateness of a merely fictive stance, a stance that

cuts our experience of literary content off fromI think that one virtue of the preceding argume
anything other than an appreciation of creaturesis that they open up a number of possibilities f
of pure fantasy. Notice how clear these authors giving sense to the thesis of literary cognitivis
are in what they want us to take seriously, how This critical process of investing fiction with l
precise their plea is: that we allow their worksis an activity sufficiently broad to make the id
to show us something about ourselves, our cul-
that there is just one sort of cognitive value
can attribute to literature appear rather nai
tural reality; indeed, "more clearly than is usually
shown." Since we can now see that the range of litera
If we take an absurdly narrow view of about-ness extends beyond the fictive and into
literature-a purely internalist stance that casts lit-real, I would imagine that the clever aesthetic
erary works as having commerce exclusively with could siphon any number of ways of accounti
the fantastic and the unreal simply because theyfor literature's cognitive value from the theory

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448 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

interpretation developed worlds-our

here. everyday
That emotional, moral, social, of
is, instead
leading us to a specificand similar practicesto
response and experiences-we
the thesis find of
literary cognitivism, thethat in literature
theory ofthese already known
critical regions of
interpre-
tation I have here sketched offers a foundation for reality tend to suggest deeper layers of meaning
approaching the issue itself, one on which we can and hint at broader patterns of about-ness and sig-
build an array of responses to the ways in which nificance. When placed in the context of a literary
literature can be in the business of offering worldly work, these regions of our world commonly say,
illumination. as Umberto Eco puts it, "I mean more"-more,
With this in mind, in the remaining few para- at any rate, than we had once thought.24 Accord-
graphs I outline one way of using this theory of ingly, critics, if they are to conquer this complex-
critical interpretation to respond to the thesis of ity, must struggle to give voice to these more pro-
literary cognitivism. It will, I warn, make no refer- found reserves of meaning and about-ness litera-
ence to the acquisition of so-called propositional ture reveals our characteristically human practices
knowledge, which is the sort of cognitive value of- to store.
ten thought to be at stake here. Rather, what I want So here is the question I think we must ask if
to suggest is that critical interpretation plays a role we are to address the thesis of literary cognitivism:
in what we might call the articulation of culture, What is the value of having a textual tradition that
which I take to be quite different from proffering presents such complex representations of life, and
standard sorts of knowledge. By calling on us to of having a critical practice that struggles to articu-
ascribe meaning to the range of human activities late their meaning? That is, what does a culture ac-
and experiences a novel brings to critical attention, quire in respect to its ability to give meaning, sense,
literature plays an important role in the expansion to its world in virtue of this activity? To answer
and refinement of our understanding of social and these questions, simply consider the value-and
cultural reality. We may not get truths, properly here I mean cognitive value-of a practice that in-
so called, from this, but we get something just as
volves us in the process of expanding our capacity
important from the worldly point of view: the be-to speak about human reality, of producing richer
possibilities for investing it with meaning and sig-
stowal of sense, of meaning, upon those regions of
human circumstance that literature invites us to nificance. I think the response we should want to
explore. Let me explain. give is that the conversation that exists between
Recall that one power we habitually ascribeliterary works and our critical practices is one of
to literary works in nonphilosophical contexts-- the mechanisms by which a culture articulates a
a power the argument of the last section permitssense of its world, and thus that literary works and
us to invoke-is its capacity to bring life to view
our critical traditions are mutually implicated in a
in all its varied complexity. That is, we find practice
a that itself bears cognitive value. To confer
complexity of vision, a finely textured presenta- meaning on something is to make it available to
tion of human activity and circumstance. In this thought: it is to create sense, and thus understand-
respect, the process of giving sense to literary ing, where there once was none. If our literary-
content requires working through representations critical practices have a role to play in fleshing out
our sense of human culture-of the meaning, of
that call on us to explore life at a level of detail
and precision that our less dramatic encounters the significance, of various human practices and
with our world rarely afford. Since the represen- experiences-it would seem that they also have
tations we are put in touch with in literary expe-a rather important role to play in the expansion
rience are typically so complex, so rich in detailand refinement of our understanding of our shared
and texture, they very often have the air of nov- world.

elty: we see in them something not quite seen be- It is occasionally important to recall that, at least
fore. This is not to say that whenever we come once upon a time, we were rather dumb animals,
upon a literary representation, we see a form of without much of substance to say about the na-
human activity or experience hitherto unknown ture of our world. Literary works in tandem with
our critical practices represent a culture's search
to us. This is surely too strong. Rather, our sense
of the complexity of these representations residesfor-to borrow a phrase from Richard Eldridge-
largely in the fact that as much as we might rec- "expressive freedom."25 That is, they represent
ognize familiar aspects of human life in literary our struggle to find ever more adequate ways of

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 Gibson Interpreting Words, Interpreting Worlds 449

use world
rendering explicit what we take our the termto
'knowledge'
be. Byto describe this achieve-
ment,
presenting to us visions of life on this should
which we not be understood to lessen the
build
more refined understandings of achievement
our way itself.26
in the
world, literature functions to expand the bound-
aries of what we can say aboutJOHN our world and
GIBSON
our particular ways of finding ourselves
Department ofin it. It
Philosophy
is an activity, in short, that has University
a valuable role to
of Louisville
play in the evolution of our expressive
Louisville, KYaccess
40292 to
reality.
On this picture, our critical encounters with lit- INTERNET: john.gibson@louisville.edu
erature do not offer truth, at least not in the stan-
dard philosophical sense of the term. It would
seem to be the philosopher's rather than the lit- 1. The work of Eileen John can be read as an implicit
exception to this claim. Her work is marked by an interest
erary critic's business (or perhaps interest) to in showing that of those works of fiction that put on offer
explore literary representations of life and ask a form of philosophical or conceptual knowledge, the mo-
whether they are also true, whether our world is ment of cognitive acquisition "is apt to occur primarily in our
really like that. The cognitive value of our literary- responses to the work-such works call for the reader or au-
dience to be philosophers." Eileen John, "Reading Fiction
critical practices resides not in the deliverance of
and Conceptual Knowledge: Philosophical Thought in Lit-
truth, but in the production and attempt to give erary Context," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
sense to these visions themselves. We might call 56 (1998): 331-348; quote from p. 331. I take it that locating
the sort of knowledge our critical practices gives the mechanism of cognitive acquisition in our responses to
a work of fiction-rather than in some feature of the text
us "humanistic" knowledge: knowledge of how we
itself-is tantamount to situating it in our interpretive activ-
give meaning to various regions of human circum-
ities. In a few respects, this article can be read as an attempt
stance. This is not thereby to assign a worrisomely to explore how we might develop John's claim explicitly in
inferior status to these representations. Indeed, terms of a theory of interpretation.
this activity enjoys a certain priority to the search 2. For some of the more influential recitals of the argu-
ments canvassed here, see Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Cog-
for truth, at least, and perhaps only, in this respect:
nitive Triviality of Art," The British Journal of Aesthetics
before we can query the truth of a representation 32 (1992): 191-200; Gordon Graham, "Learning from Art,"
of our way in the world, we must first have the The British Journal of Aesthetics 35 (1995): 26-37; T. J. Dif-
representation itself. That is, what makes possible fey, "What Can We Learn from Art?" Australasian Jour-
the search for truth is a prior cultural accomplish- nal of Philosophy 73 (1995): 204-211; Peter Lamarque and
Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction and Literature (Oxford:
ment: the construction of varying ways of taking
Clarendon, 1994). I developed a more sustained account of
our world to be.
the problem than I offer here in "Between Truth and Trivial-
Should we wish to be true to philosophical us- ity," The British Journal ofAesthetics 43 (2003): 224-237, and
age, we might opt not to call this knowledge at all, in Fiction and the Weave of Life (Oxford University Press,
forthcoming).
for it is knowledge that is not linked to "truth"
3. Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen's Truth, Fic-
or knowledge of the way our world really is. In tion, and Literature is still the classic statement of this view.
this respect, it is a decidedly nonphilosophical 4. With "critical meaning" I introduce a term of art, and I
sort of knowledge. Perhaps one will want to call intend it to refer only to the sort of critical activity I describe
the sort of cognitive achievement I am linking to here. I use it as a broad concept that is intended to range over
many of the varieties of meaning that we attribute to literary
critical achievements "understanding" instead of
works that cannot be identified with the linguistic meaning
"knowledge," or some such thinned-down cogni- of the works. Also, it might strike one as more natural to
tive term. This is fine, though it is perhaps to give call this thematic meaning, but I have opted against this.
too much authority to standard philosophical us- Thematic meaning (and, I imagine, many cases of symbolic
and metaphorical meaning) can at times be an instance of
age. For if we want to show that we can treat our
critical meaning-it will depend on the example-but it is
critical encounters with literature as having cog- too narrow a concept to capture what I am after, though
nitive value, it should be enough to show that there are obvious similarities.
they engage us in the activity of trying to artic- 5. For a clear and helpful overview of conventional-
ulate an understanding of our way in the world. ism and intentionalism in the theory of interpretation, see
Robert Stecker, "Interpretation," in The Routledge Com-
After all, this is what we commonly call the pur-
panion to Aesthetics, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver
suit of knowledge. But I do not wish to take a Lopes (London: Routledge, 1999). For an excellent critical
stand here, except to say that if we decide not to discussion of intentionalism, see Daniel O. Nathan, "Art,

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 450 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

man's "The Sun

Meaning, and Artist's Meaning," in Also Rises: Incompatible Interpretations."
Contemporary Debates
in Aesthetics and the Philosophy ofArt,
in Krausz, whose influence ed.
on my Matthew Kieran
thinking here I take this
(New York: Blackwell, 2006).
opportunity to acknowledge.
6. For a popular account of a version
14. Betrand of hypothetical
Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth
intentionalism that gives a (New York: Penguin,
central role 1969),
to p. 275.
the notion of an
audience in imputing intentions15. Terrythat
Eagleton, are
The English
in Novel:
turn An Introduction
determi-
native of literary meaning, see
(Oxford Jerrold
University Levinson's
Press, 2005), p. 326. "Inten
16. Cleanth
tions and Interpretation: A Last Brooks, "Man,
Look," Time, and Eternity."
in Intention and In
reprinted in the
terpretation, ed. Gary Iseminger Norton Critical
(Temple Edition of The Sound
University and
Press
1992), and his "Hypotheticalthe Intentionalism:
Fury (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), p.Ob
Statement,
jections, and Replies," in Is 292. There a Single Right Interpre
tation? ed. Michael Krausz 17. (Penn State
It is here at University
the level of Press,
linguistic interpretation that
2002). questions arise concerning whether an interpreter simply
7. See Monroe Beardsley, "The Authority of the Text," recovers the world of a work or always partly constructs it.
in Intention and Interpretation, ed. Iseminger. This is where the problem of relativism begins to appear, and
8. Against this one might protest that there are cases I have neither the space nor the interest to pursue it here.
when the interpreter comes upon a comment in (say) an My only claim is that critical interpretation is not concerned
author's autobiographical notes that suggests a way of crit- with constructing (or recovering) the world of a work, but
ically interpreting a work by this author. This is true, but rather with making sense of the world once constructed (or
these cases are relatively rare. For this reason, it would be recovered).
simply silly to claim that an interpretive activity as central 18. John McDowell, Mind and World (Harvard Univer-
as critical interpretation is always occasioned by some such sity Press, 1998), p. 11.
discovery regarding an author's intentions, as though for ev- 19. See Lamarque and Olsen's discussion of a "fictive
ery plausible critical interpretation we come upon we think stance" in Truth, Fiction, and Literature, pp. 43-46.
that there must be implicit reference to a discovery of this 20. Fyodor Dostoevsky, "Notes from the Underground,"
sort. in The Best Short Stories of Fyodor Dostoevsky, trans. David
9. For the classic statement of this, see Colin Lyas, Magarshack (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), p. 95.
"Wittgensteinian Intentions," in Intention and Interpreta- 21. Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist (New York: Penguin
tion, ed. Iseminger. Classics, 2003), p. 22.
10. Bernard Harrison, "Imagined Worlds and the Real 22. For discussions of this, see Terry Eagleton, The En-
One," in The Literary Wittgenstein, ed. John Gibson and glish Novel: An Introduction.
Wolfgang Huemer (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 93. 23. This is a hallmark of Kendall Walton's influential the-
11. The phrase "fictional world" is used here in a generic ory of make-believe in his Mimesis as Make-Believe.
sense. There are many accounts of the nature of fictional 24. Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Indiana
worlds currently on offer, and I would like to keep my University Press, 1994), p. 27.
account broad enough so that it can sit comfortably with 25. Richard Eldridge, Leading a Human Life: Wittgen-
many of them. For a helpful discussion of various ways stein, Intentionality, and Romanticism (University of
philosophers give sense to the idea of a fictional world, see Chicago Press, 1997). See especially the chapter "Wittgen-
Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Harvard Univer- stein's Writerliness and Its Repressions" for a discussion of
sity Press, 1990), pp. 57-69. this idea.
12. Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indi- 26. I thank Thomas Leddy and Robert Stecker for com-
anapolis: Hackett, 1978). ments on the first draft of this article. A version nearer the
13. I offer as evidence of this claim that in two of the one published here was read at the Kunst und Kognition sym-
most prominent anthologies on interpretation in analytic posium in Erfurt, Germany, in June 2005, and I thank those
in attendance for the lively discussion, especially Richard
aesthetics-Iseminger, ed., Intention and Interpretation and
Krausz, ed., Is There a Single Right Interpretation?-noneEldridge, Catherine Elgin, Wolfgang Huemer, Peter Lamar-
que, and Luca Pocci. A very warm word of appreciation is
of the contributors concern themselves with the fictionality
owed to some of my colleagues at Temple for offering a pa-
(what I call the world-generating capacity) of literary works
tient audience for the ideas developed here. I am especially
and the implications this has for our interpretive encounters
grateful to Susan Feagin, Robert Guay, and Joe Margolis.
with them, with one exception. The exception is Alan Gold-

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