Department of Sociology, Humboldt State University

AN ANALYSIS OF MAX WEBER'S THEORY OF ETHNICITY

Author(s): Maurice Jackson
Source: Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, Vol. 10, No. 1, Race & Ethnic Relations:
Cross-Cultural Perspectives (FALL/WINTER 1982/83), pp. 4-18
Published by: Department of Sociology, Humboldt State University
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4

AN ANALYSIS OF MAX WEBER'S

THEORY OF ETHNICITY

Maurice Jackson
Department of Sociology
University of California, Riverside

ABSTRACT

Max Weber's theory of ethnicity is analyzed by means of a paradigm.

It shows the comprehensive nature of his theory and offers some sug
gestions for research relative to the theory. The paradigm can be used
to evaluate other theories in race and ethnicity specifically and
sociology generally.

INTRODUCTION

Max Weber is well known for his general theory of social action
specific theories of stratification, organizations, authority, power, and r
Yet far less is known about his treatment of ethnicity. Fortunately, it is
to gather a framework for interpreting his theory of ethnicity from a
translated works (Weber, 1946; 1947; 1949; 19&; 1971; 1973; and
secondary sources (Mannesse, 1967) and (Hechter, 1976). This pap
heavily on these sources.
This study is an analysis of the Weberian theory of ethnicity in terms
cerns that an adequate theory of race and ethnicity must address. Th
divided into those matters that 1) relate to racial and ethnic groups,
their relationships to other groups, and 3) provide directions foF fur
nent research. 1) With regard to the study of groups, first of all, it is n
to define racial and ethnic groups and, secondly, distinguish them f
groups. Third, the origin and bases of the groups must be explaine
the theory of race and ethnic groups must be related to an explicit
systematic theory of social behavior, in this case social action. Fifth, the
should explain how the groups engage in action.
2) Race and ethnic relations address a different set of concerns. F
theory should specify the nature of the relationships. Second, it mu

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 5

the persistence of the relationships. Third, it must account for the way they
change.
3) The theory should provide directives for research pertaining to it.
These theoretical concerns of Weber can serve as guidelines for the develop
ment of theories of race and ethnic relations. At the same time, they can serve
as criteria for evaluating current theories. For example, the popular theories in
race and ethnic relations do not relate to explicit general theories of human ac
tion. This, then, is an area that requires much attention if our knowledge of
these groups is to be enhanced significantly.

RACE AND ETHNIC GROUPS

Definitions of Ethnicity

Despite some efforts at ethnic theory-building, the many different

definitions of ethnicity and ethnic groups point to the need for theory,
as research, to determine their significance. It is useful to examine th
tions of ethnicity in order to place Weber's definition in some pers
More importantly, the definition of ethnicity should have implication
rest of the theory which, as will be seen later, is true of Weber's the
Weber defined ethnicity, as the belief of social actors in common
based on racial and cultural differences, among other factors. Ethnici
includes both race and ethnicity as currently understood. He thought
tant to define ethnic groups, as simple observation reveals, as groups
who identify themselves in terms of whom they believe their ancest
whether they act on that basis or not. The term "ethnic" is intended to d
such facts. So, an ethnic group is not a spontaneously developed com
or a group with a specific geographical location, but a group of peo
believe they have ancestors in common from the past. An ethnic gro
not identical with people who are actually related, a kin group, but w
kin or not, who believe they are related in the sense of a presumed
past.
A number of other concepts stress this past orientation: ethnicity as pre
sumed common origin, Greeley (1974), and Mitzman (1970); common descent,
real or imaginary, Meister (1974); ancestry, Burkey (1978) and DeVos (1975);
European origin, Weed (1973); ethnic heritage, Rose (1976); and cultural
heritage, Mindell (1976).
Contrasting with this set of definitions are those which have a present orien
tation: for example, ethnicity as ascription, Barth (1969); Burkey (1978);

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6

Despres (1975), and Hoetnik (1975); emerging, Yancey et al. (1976); belonging
and pride, Glazer and Moynihan (1975); felt consciousness of kind, Bell (1974);
self identification, Enloe (1973); feelings of belonging, Woods (1956); sense of
identification, Davis (1978); sense of peoplehood, Gordon (1964); self
ascription, Barth (1969); and sentiments based on culture, Hechter (1974).
A final few definitions combine past and present emphasis: belonging
together by virtue of common descent, Francis (1976); identification and sense
of history, Parsons (1975); perceived alike by self and others because of
common ancestry—real or imaginary, Shibutani and Kwan (1965); shared
history and physical traits, Nie et al. (1974) associations; identification with
common origins, Haller (1973); and descent by birth formed by structure of ex
change of marriage, goods and services, and messages between groups, Keyes
(1976).
According to Weber (1968), what is important in ethnicity is the belief in, and
not the fact of, common descent. After all, commonality of descent is impossi
ble to determine, precisely, because parents, grandparents and other ancestors
have different lines of descent and also because people of the same descent may
identify themselves differently. These difficulties have not deterred people from
deciding who are their most important ancestors. For instance, in the United
States there are simple rules for making the decisions about one's ancestors,
e.g. the father's line of descent is given priority over that of the mother while
any amount of black blood is thought to make one black. These social defini
tions, then, become matters of social belief. While they do not solve the dif
ficult problem posed by the fact that immediate lines of descent are dual, and
that more distant lines of descent are multiple, they provide rules to follow.
This brings us to another major feature of ethnic groups. Weber asserted that
they are not groups in the strict sense of the word and they are not com
munities, which means that they are not composed of individuals engaged in
social action or social interaction. Ethnicity is a presumed identity among ac
tors which represents a potential for group formation, communal relations, and
social action. Put another way, Weber thought ethnicity, belief in common des
cent, represents categories of individuals not individuals or groups in action. To
the extent that ethnicity is a potential, it can be reactivated time and time again,
if certain conditions prevail. Modern sociologists, following Weber, would be
more involved in trying to determine the conditions under which ethnicity does
or does not transform into action, rather than in debating whether ethnicity is
new and emergent, or persistent and enduring.

Ethnic Groups and Similar Groups

In defining any phenomenon it is useful to distinguish it from similar

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phenomena. Weber classified ethnic groups, along with households, kinship

groups, religious groups, and political groups, as relatively universal groups
(Weber, 1968). Yet he asserted that ethnic groups are not kinship groups since
members of the former believe in common descent while those of the latter
believe they belong together.
Even more instructive is his comparison of ethnic groups and nations since he
thought the two to be more similar than ethnic groups and the other groups
mentioned above. For Weber, the concept of nation tends to overlap with that
of ethnicity in that whatever is felt to be common in nations is thought to derive
from common descent. Yet, people who consider themselves to be of the same
nation may not be completely related by common descent, and differences of
nationality may exist among groups related by common descent.
In Weber's view a nation is more than an ethnic group in a way, in that a na
tion requires loyalty from its members in confrontations with other groups.
This powerful political community of people also may "share a common
language or religion, or common customs, or political memories..." (Weber,
1968:398).

Bases and Origins of Ethnicity

According to Weber (1968), ethnicity is based on physical types or customs or

both, or memories or colonization or migration. His understanding was that
race and customs, or culture, are equally important in generating the belief in
common ethnicity. This is not to underplay the significance of race, but to say
that any difference can be used as the source of beliefs. In the United States,
race is determined by ancestry. Blacks, for instance, are defined in terms of the
color of skin, and other physical characteristics, which are seen as indicating
the existence of a black ancestor or ancestors. Sociologists, on the other hand,
consider race to be important for social reasions, not physical ones.
Although Weber defined race in terms of inheritance of physical traits, as ex
pected, he stressed subjective meanings and beliefs. He concluded that it is not
important whether racial differences are seen as based on biological heredity or
cultural tradition. Even an emphasis on blood relationship does not necessarily
derive from actual kinship. It is also not important whether racial differences
are based on biology or culture, insofar as relationships between ethnic groups
are concerned. Almost any similarity or contrast can lead to affinity or dis
affinity that attracts or repulses members of different ethnic groups. Between
groups, race is one of the factors of closure, social attraction and repulsion.
These aspects of race, Weber argued, might be measured by determining

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8

whether sexual relationships between groups are preferred or rare, are perma
nent or temporary and whether intermarriage does or does not occur. What
makes physical similarity or contrast important is that it is recognized as
important.
In the United States, in the early 1900s, Weber observed that Indians had
greater esteem than blacks. He reasoned that it was not due to the greater
cultural achievement of Indians or to less physical differences, or less physical
repulsion to them. The great numbers of mUlattoes was evidence to him that
repulsion due to physical characteristics could not be true. As an example, the
major reason for the lesser esteem of blacks, he concluded, was that they had
been slaves and were disliked because of "the feudal contempt" held by white
Americans for the hard physical labor performed by slaves (Weber, 1946).
Weber also felt that a variety of customs had generated the feeling of com
mon descent. Among these are: shared political memories, a persistent attach
ment to old cult-communities, the continuing strength of kinship ties and other
groups (shared by old and new communities), and other enduring relationships
with a continuing emotional basis (Weber, 1978:365).
Weber was of the opinion that any small and minor differences in customs
(language, religion, clothing, housing and so on) could become the bases of
ethnicity. As a matter of fact, he pointed out that what matters in the develop
ment of ethnicity is "precisely those things which may appear to be of only
minor social importance" (Weber, 1978:366).
Common and shared customs are not more important than different customs
in creating ethnicity. For instance, he claimed that shared language and ritual,
based on shared religion, played an exceptional part in "creating feelings of
ethnic affinity" (Weber, 1978:366). Despite these hypotheses, he also argued
that marked differences in dialect and religion do not rule out feelings of com
mon ethnicity. In fact, he concluded that striking differences in economic life
also play a part in creating feelings of ethnic identity.
On a final point, Weber spoke directly about the tenacity of ethnicity and its
relative independence from factors which produce it. While he felt that among
communities it is primarily the political communities which inspire the belief in
ethnic identity, the latter may survive the downfall of the community.

Ethnicity and the Theory of Social Action

Since ethnicity is a potential for social action, it can be transformed into

social action. Hence, it is important to describe the theory of social action brief
ly in order to understand the result of this transformation. It is also important

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 9

to understand social action theory, as it is Weber's principal theory.

Weber defined social action as behavior with subjective meaning attached;
which means that in studying social action the point of view of the social actor
must be taken into account by the sociologist. Subjective meaning refers to
social meaning while objective meaning is that sought by sociologists. Social ac
tion, further, is action which is meaningfully oriented to the behavior of other
actors, not to the non-actor environment. However, not every contact is
social—only the contacts invested with meaning by the actor are social. This is
just the beginning of a very complex notion, since social action is not always
open to view. It may be hidden and difficult to observe. Finally, social action
can be characterized by acts of failure as well as success.
Weber defined social action in such a way that some theories in contem
porary sociology such as those which emphasize adjustment and reaction would
be excluded. This is true because social action is not necessarily action influ
enced by the behavior of others. Therefore, it is not reaction. It is the actor, not
others who attach the subjective meaning to behavior. So, Weber turned away
from the approach which emphasizes the way in which external factors affect
individuals so that they are merely responsive and therefore, may be concep
tualized as the end-product of these factors. Many facts from other people
impinge upon the actor who acts in relation to those to which he or she assigns
meaning. Social action is a dynamic perspective in which the typical actor
oriented to other actors can determine, in part, the character of the social world
to which he/she is oriented and within which he/she acts. In turn, other actors
and he/she are oriented in dynamic action toward each other in terms of the
behaviors to which they have assigned subjective meaning. The sociologist may
be aware of many influences beyond the awareness of the actor, but none is im
portant until the actor attaches meaning to it. Further, the action takes place
without full consciousness of the actor. The meaning is the social reality. Ac
tion, however, may be causally determined by the action of others, but not
meaningfully. This point can be illustrated by the thesis of the Protestant ethic
and the spirit of capitalism. Both concepts involve meaningful social action,
but they are causally not meaningfully related.
Also, social action is not the imitation of the actions of others. If it were, it
would not be meaningfully oriented to the actor(s) being imitated.
Social action furthermore, does not necessarily refer to similar behavior on
the part of many people. Similar behavior lacks the meaningful orientation to
the behavior of others to the extent that individuals act similarly because of
common needs (in modern terms perhaps common stimuli).
Most generally, Weber saw the action of an actor being more important than
interaction or exchange in explaining social phenomena because the latter two

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explanations are based implicitly upon actors who are partners to the inter
action or exchange. If so, it is necessary to be explicit about the character of
each partner, especially if the interaction or exchange is not reciprocal.
Therefore, the sociological analyst is logically forced into a dissection of the ac
tion of the individual actor, which, again, is the Weberian unit of study. The
transition into psychology which is possible here is avoided by the development
of typical action and actors, through the construction of ideal types. This
makes the individual case an instance of a type rather than a unique
phenomenon.
Weber also distinguished between rational social action (wertrational and
zweckrational) and irrational social action (affectual and traditional). One type
of rational action, wertrational action, refers to an orientation to an absolute
value which involves the conscious formulation of the values and planned at
tempts to realize that value. Zweckrational action is an orientation which
employs appropriate means to an end, which have been consciously weighed
against others. Affectual and traditional action are irrational. Affective action
stresses an orientation based on emotional impulses. Finally, traditional social
action, the most important for the purposes of this paper, is an orientation
based on habituation and settled custom.
Many scholars have stressed Weber's great concern with rationality.
However, he was quite clearly interested in both rational and irrational social
action. For instance, he said:

"This (sociological) increase in clarity...can be achieved most com

pletely in the case of rational concepts and laws...But the sociologist
seeks also to comprehend such irrational phenomena as mysticism,
prophecy, inspiration and emotional states..." Weber, 1978; 23).

His characterization of the rationalization and bureaucratization of the '

Western world, among other things, evidenced his interest in rational social ac
tion. Yet, his studies of irrational social action cannot take second place to this.
Among these studies are those involving the Protestant ethic (the irrational base
of the rational capitalistic spirit), the world's great religions, charismatic and
traditional authority, status groups, and parties.
Ethnicity has implications for irrational social action, particularly the tradi
tional orientation. This means, simply, that when ethnicity is changed into
social action it will tend to be irrational and traditional. It is evident that Weber
thought the irrationality of ethnicity was derived from the difficulty posed by
its multiple origins and the great importance that often is granted to small, or
insignificant, differences.

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The importance of this theory of social action for other components of

Weber's theory is not widely recognized. Both his theories of types of authority
and orders of stratification rest clearly on types of social action. Traditional
authority and the status order are based on traditional action. Here, we witness
the consistency in the theory of ethnicity between the definition of ethnicity and
those of traditional order and authority and with the status order. All of these
aspects of the theory emphasize the past.
To complete this discussion, it must be noted that both rational authority
and the class order rest on rational action. Charismatic authority and the party
order follow from charismatic action. These correspondences will be treated in
more detail at the appropriate place.

Translation of Ethnicity into Social Action

In discussing the way in which ethnicity becomes social action, Weber

claimed, first of all, that ethnic groups engage in communal social action rather
than associative social action. Communal social action is based on feelings of
belongingness. In contrast, associative social action is characterized by rational
interests. Weber did, however, posit an important relationship between
ethnicity and interests in his statement that

"a comprehensive societalization (focus on interests) integrates the

ethnically divided communities into specific political and communal
actions" (Weber, 1946:189).

Hence, for example, as certain activities such as hostilities with another society
become a matter of concern to the entire society, ethnic distinctions between
groups become suspended as the entire society engages in political and
communal action.
Weber did say that it is difficult to determine, in the individual case, what in
fluence specific ethnic factors have on the formation of communities. (Weber,
1968) Further, the content of communal action on an ethnic basis is indefinite
or, put another way, belief in common descent, when it is transformed into
social action, results in substantively indefinite communal action.
Not only this, but ethnically conditioned action is very complex

..."the notion of 'ethnically' determined social action subsumes

phenomena that rigorous sociological analyses...would have to
distinguish carefully: the actual subjectivity of those customs condi
tioned by heredity and those determined by tradition; the differential

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12

impact of varying content of custom; the influence of common

language, religion, and political action, past and present upon the for
mation of custom; the extent to which such factors create attraction
and repulsion, and especially the belief in affinity or disaffinity of
blood; the consequences of this belief for social action in general, and
specifically for action on the basis of shared custom or blood rela
tions, for diverse sexual relations, etc." (Weber, 1968:394).

Having given Weber's treatment of racial and ethnic groups, we now turn to
his answers to the three momentous questions that have formed the core in
terest of this area of study. What is the basic relationship between racial and
ethnic minority groups and the majority group? Why do these relationships
persist? Can the relationships be changed? If so, how does change occur?

RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

Nature of Race and Ethnic Relations

Part of understanding racial and ethnic minority groups involves their rela
tionship to dominant groups in the society. Weber saw ethnic groups as specia
once within the status order of society, often having a caste relationship wit
more powerful groups. The status order, and the class and party orders are
components of the stratification system, the distribution of power within
society.
By way of understanding the caste relationship it is necessary to discuss status
groups within the status order. The fates of members of these groups are deter
mined by a specific, positive or negative social estimation of honor (Weber
1947:187). The social honor is expressed in the expectation that a specific style
of life can be found among everyone who aspires to the same social circle. This
contrasts with classes whose members have common economic interests in
goods and opportunities, and parties whose members seek social power.
Although ethnic groups are also found within the status order they differ
from status groups in normally not being communities. There is, however, a
similarity. Ethnic group members also have a sense of honor which is based on
a belief in their own excellence. Not only that but as long as ethnic relations are
horizontal each ethnic group can "consider its own status as the highest"
(Weber, 1946:189). Understanding this view would have alerted modern
sociologists to the fact that members of American racial and ethnic groups
possess dignified views of themselves. Otherwise how could blacks, for

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 13

example, have remained motivated, and, often, very highly motivated despite
living in very difficult situations.
The relationship of status groups is one in which more powerful groups usurp
or monopolize status honor. When monopolization becomes more or less com
plete, the ethnic group becomes a caste, the usual form of ethnic community.
At this point, the sanctioning of ethnic group members by disapproval is re
placed by legal sanctioning enforced by a staff of people. Status distinctions,
Weber said, become guaranteed by rituals or religious sanctions as well as by
conventions and laws. All physical contact with a member of a caste seen as in
ferior is considered a matter of ritual impurity by the 'superior' caste which
must be cleansed by a religious act. (Weber 1947:188-189)
In short, castes tend to occur only where there are underlying ethnic dif
ferences. The members of these ethnic communities, which Eire closed to out
siders, believe in blood relationships and exclude exogamous marriages and
social intercourse.
Yet ethnic segregation is not the same as status segregation transformed into
a caste. Ethnically segregated groups co-exist in a state of mutual repulsion and
disdain. Yet each considers its honor the highest. The caste structure results in
subordination of one group and a greater sense of honor in the privileged
group. However, even this does not mean an absence of social honor among
negatively privileged groups. Only the bases differ.
By including ethnic groups within the status order, Weber implied that
monopolization of honor and styles of life occurs before economic exploita
tion. He did not assume as proponents of contact theory do that subordination
of racial and ethnic minority groups follows competition over scarce resources.
Instead, social degradation and humiliation of groups of independent people
with honor occur first. Following this, the groups are subordinated, making
economic exploitation and political oppression possible.

Persistence of Race and Ethnic Relations

The most important question, variously phrased, in the study of race and
ethnicity has been and is: how are the relationships between racial and ethnic
minorities and the majority group maintained? Why are minorities subor
dinate? Different? Why can they not be like other people? Various answers
have been given to this question ranging from responsible minority
characteristics such as intelligence, personality, and family life to responsible
majority characteristics such as prejudice, authoritarianism, racism, self pro
tection, capitalism, and colonial orientations. Weber's answer, derived from

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14

his translated works, is remarkable in that it runs counter to the long estab
lished tradition in sociology and other social sciences, based on literally
thousands of studies. While the typical explanations tend to be negative
Weber's is positive.
He reasoned that social order exists because members of the order grant it
legitimacy, see it as moral, just, and right. In his view, there are two types of
order based on different authority structures, which relate back to social ac
tion. These are rational and traditional orders that are characterized by rational
and traditional authority and action respectively. Authority is the probability
that commands will be obeyed by followers because they believe that the com
mands are legitimate. Traditional authority is characterized by a belief in the
legitimacy of customs and traditions; rational authority by a belief in the
legitimacy of rules.
Ethnicity, an irrational phenomenon, typically is found in traditional orders.
Yet it can occur within a rational order to the extent the order is experiencing a
breakdown of social relationships and a high degree of social mobility.
So, race and ethnic relations, part of the order of society, are maintained
because the followers of the traditional authority structure believe they are
legitimate not because of deficiencies within either minority or majority groups.
The relationships have endured a sufficiently long time so that they are typically
believed to be right.
These relationships can also be maintained in a rational organized system to
the extent there is a high degree of social and geographical mobility. Again the
relationships are thought to be legitimate the way they are.'

Race and Ethnic Relations and Social Change

If race and ethnic relations are considered to be legitimate, how is it possible

for them to be changed? Typical answers range from change in either the ma
jority groups or selected members or in the minority groups.
Weber's answer is different in assuming that the traditional order or a type of
rational order in which ethnicity is typically found changes. Only an authority
thought to be above legitimate orders can bring fundamental change about.
This authority is charismatic authority. This type of authority is that in which
persons thought to be exemplary are granted legitimacy to give orders which are
typically obeyed. (Weber, 1947)
Charismatic authority Weber considered to be revolutionary and opposed to
all routine orders like traditional and rational. It cannot remain stable, and,
hence, becomes transformed into either traditional or rational order through a

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 15

process of routinization. Ethnicity, typically part of traditional authority struc

tures, may disappear if charismatic authority becomes routinized into rational
authority. On the other hand, charismatic authority may be routinized into
traditional order in which case ethnicity may be highlighted.

RESEARCH DIRECTIVES

Finally, a theory of race and ethnic relations must give direction to

of research necessary to elaborate it more fully, to test it, and, gene
develop knowledge about them. Perhaps, the most fitting way to intr
research directives that follow from Weber's theory is to quote
specification of research that needs to be undertaken. He claimed it is
to

"distinguish carefully: the actual subjective effect of those customs

conditioned by heredity and those determined by tradition; the dif
ferential impact of the varying content of culture; the influence of
common language, religion, and political action, past and present,
upon the formations of customs; the extent to which such factors
create attraction and repulsion, and especially the belief in affinity
and disaffinity of blood; the consequences of this belief for social ac
tion in general; and specifically for action on the basis of shared
custom or blood relationship, and for diverse sexual relations, etc.
(Weber, 1968:394).

In addition, this analysis of the Weberian theory of ethnicity sug

number of important research leads that need to be investigated:

1) the characterization of ethnic groups from the viewpoint of m

group members as well as those of members of the dominant group,
2) the actor's world of meanings and beliefs,
3) the social meanings and beliefs as they indicate social action, and
plications for social relations and social order,
4) the conditions under which people turn to the past rather than the p
for orientation,
5) the advantages and disadvantages of characterizing ethnicity as
tial,
6) the conditions under which ethnicity is transformed into social action,
7) ethnicity as promoting irrational, traditional social action rather than ra
tional social action,

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16

8) the characterization of ethnically determined social action from the point

of view of minority social actors as well as majority ones,
9) the aspects and basis of ethnic honor,
10) the degree of change in the monopolization of social power and honor
and accompanying consequences,
11) the relationship of ethnic groups to other groups in the different orders
of society, class and party,
12) and the ebb and flow of ethnic groups.

CONCLUSION

The analysis employed in this paper demonstrates the compreh

character of Weber's theory of ethnicity, even though it can be develope
fully. The approach can be useful in evaluating other theories of ra
ethnicity as well as other sociological theories. Such comparisons will
the strengths and weaknesses of the various theories and by so doing
the state of theoretical knowledge.

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