Kuroda vs Jalandoni

G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and

Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period
covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by
the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded
and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the
Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" — comes before this
Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from
participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to
permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.

ISSUES:      

1) WON EO 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our
constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is
not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law,
national and international
2. WON the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the
Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and
Robert Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their
appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are
not qualified to practice law in the Philippines
3. Whether or not Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution. United
State not being a party in interest in the case.

Held:

1. No. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule
and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of
the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and
constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that — The Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
2. No. In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal
governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It
has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of
such military commission is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said
executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be
attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court.
In facts it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military
personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the
vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation
should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any
relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State
Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least
that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.

3. US is a party in interest. It is of common knowledge that the United State and its people
have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands
charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic
that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its
government to a military tribunal of our country. The Military Commission having been
convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under
the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody, this
Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission.
 Yamashita vs Styer

G.R. No. L-129  December 19, 1945

Facts:

Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th army group of the
Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his surrender became a prisoner of war of
the United States of America but was later removed from such status and placed in
confinement as an accused war criminal charged before an American Military Commission
constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer, Commanding General of the United
States Army Forces, Western Pacific.

Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, he asks that he be reinstated
to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military Commission be prohibited
from further trying him. He questions, among others, the jurisdiction of said Military
Commission.

Issue/s:

1. Should the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted in this case?

2. Was the Military Commission validly constituted by respondent, therefore having

jurisdiction over the war crimes?

Ruling:

1. NO. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is not sought. It
seeks no discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his former
status as a prisoner of war, to be interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the
degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in
character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts. Prohibition cannot issue against one not
made party respondent. Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen.
Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and
although it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these
case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even if the
commission be joined as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford (pp. 50,
61, ante), “. . . an attempt of our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States
Army before such period (state of war) expires, would be considered as a violation of this
country’s faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and uphold.”

2. YES. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint and
convene a military commission. This is upon the theory that since the power to create a
military commission is an aspect of waging war, military commanders have that power
unless expressly withdrawn from them.

By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the United States has
explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have
jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the laws of war in appropriate cases.
 BOROVSKY vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
GR No. L-4362 (1951)
FACTS:
Victor Borovsky, petitioner, claiming to be a stateless man, was arrested by the
Commission of Immigration for being an undesirable alien and was to be deported. For two
years, he has been in detention while the government still has not found any country that
would take him. This is his second petition for the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Borovsky’s detention for an unreasonable length of time may justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
HELD:
YES. Under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum even if they are
"stateless." It is no less true however that foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no
criminal charges have been formally made or judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be
kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law
and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine
citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its immigration laws may be
detained as long as the Government is unable to deport him, is beside the point. Therefore,
the writ of habeas corpus will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner
from custody subject to terms.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. JUDGE LANTION
GR No. 139465, January 18, 2000
FACTS:

The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request from
the United States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD
No. 1609 prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who have committed a crime
in a foreign country. Jimenez requested for copies of the request and that he be given ample
time to comment on said request. The petitioners denied the request pursuant to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government
under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

HELD:

NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the
doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with a
situation where there is a conflict between a rule of the international law and the
constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the provisions so as to give
effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld. The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or
imply the primacy of international law over the municipal law in the municipal sphere. In
states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, both statutes and treaties may
be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss
of property or employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the
extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily
comprehensible.

Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request
and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence. 
 ICHONG vs HERNANDEZ
101 Phil. 1155
May 31, 1957

FACTS:
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, attacks the
constitutionality of the RA 1180, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3)
the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4)
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation
or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5,
Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 1180 violates International Treaties and Obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines.

HELD:
No, The law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The United Nations
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the
Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947
guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other Country". But the nationals of China are not discriminated against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But
even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260),
and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State
(Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).