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AS(NZS)5100 -2017: DERAILED TRAIN COLLISIONS - LEADING SAFETY

PROVISIONS IN BRIDGE DESIGN TO PREVENT DISASTERS

Conference Paper · April 2017

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AS(NZS)5100 -2017: DERAILED TRAIN COLLISIONS - LEADING SAFETY PROVISIONS IN

BRIDGE DESIGN TO PREVENT DISASTERS

Frank Rapattoni1, John Dauth2, Joe Muscat3, Peter Prasad4

1
Technical Executive – Bridges, WSP Parsons Brinckerhoff
2
Structures Engineering Manager, Metro Trains Melbourne
3
Principal Engineer Bridges, Sydney Trains
4
National Bridges & Structures Engineer, ARTC

Abstract: Safety in design provisions to prevent high loss of life and bridge collapse resulting from train
derailments for both rail underbridges and overpasses have been subject to much debate in the recent
past. Whilst these events are rare they can happen for a variety of reasons and can result in major
disasters which are not acceptable, especially in today’s risk-averse environment and in the light of
current knowledge. The BD90 Standards Australia Committee which reviewed AS5100 Bridge Design
Standard considered world’s best practice and the possible precautions that can be taken to avoid major
disasters. The new provisions are considered to be the world’s most advanced and challenging safety in
design guidelines with the overriding focus on satisfying the intent of the provisions even for the more
complex bridge designs. This paper discusses the new provisions and how to implement them to ensure
that rail travel is safer, in line with the “Safe System” paradigm, Australian model Work Health and Safety
Act (WHS Act) and Rail Safety National Law.

Keywords: Train derailment, Safety in design, Safe System, railway underbridge, railway overpass, Risk
analysis, Australian Bridge Design Standards, bridge collapse, catastrophe, SFAIRP,

1. Introduction

The new AS/NZS5100-2017 Bridge Design Standard contains new provision to safeguard against train
derailments. The key provisions in the superseded AS5100–2004 (1) have been essentially retained but
enhanced and clarified. New provisions have been added to include:

• protection of overhead truss and trough underbridges.

• protection of retaining wall abutments.
• pier protection for non-frangible piers.
• deflection walls to prevent collision with main bridge supports.
• derailment kerb for underbridges.

The new provisions are considered to be among the world’s most advanced and challenging safety in
design guidelines with the overriding focus on satisfying the intent of the provisions even for the more
complex bridge designs.

This paper discusses the new provisions and how to implement them to ensure that rail travel is safer, in
line with the Australian model Work Health and Safety Act (WHS Act) (2), Rail Safety National Law (3), the
National Regulations (4), the SFAIRP Guideline (5), the “Safe System” philosophy (6) and Rail
Corporation (7) guidelines.

Possible future provisions and design concepts are also discussed to further enhance safety for trains by
reducing the residual risks still remaining after implementation of the new provisions.

2. Background

This paper complements and follows the publication of four previous papers on this subject by Rapattoni
et al (8), (9), (10) and (11), with updated information.

The provisions constitute the consensus of Railway and Road Authorities represented on Standards
Australia BD90 Committee, the engineers on the Committee representing industry, engineering
Consultants and respondents to the Drafts of AS5100.1 and AS5100.2 issued for Public comments prior
to publication of the Standard.

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Safety in design provisions to prevent high loss of life and bridge collapse resulting from train derailments
for both rail underbridges and overpasses have been subject to much debate in the recent past. Whilst
these events are rare they can happen for a variety of reasons and can result in major disasters which are
not acceptable, especially in today’s risk-averse environment and in the light of current knowledge. The
disasters at Granville (Australia), and Eschede (Germany), discussed in (8) and (9) are two examples
which demonstrate the possible consequences of such events with high loss of lives, disruption of
services and costly damages. These events are clearly “not socially acceptable” in today’s world.

Avoidance or elimination of train derailments would, of course, be the ideal scenario. This could be
achieved by ensuring that the rail vehicles, rail tracks and active prevention systems could be designed
and maintained to a fail-proof standard with a faultless operation system. However, the reality is that we
still do not have this situation and derailments are still occurring and effective engineering controls or
provisions are required to ensure that consequences of derailment are not catastrophic.

The Committee considered world’s best practice, UIC Code (12), AREMA (13), latest international projects
and the possible precautions that can be taken to avoid major disasters.

The Australian model Work Health and Safety Act (WHS Act) and Rail Safety National Law provided the
framework for the development of the provisions which are intended to ensure safety So Far As Is
Reasonably Practicable (SFAIRP) as outlined by the publications and legislation.

The “Safe System” philosophy, embraced by the Australian Road Authorities, complement the aim of the
above publications.

3. New provisions in AS5100.1-2017

The following are the new provisions in AS5100.1-2017. Key changes from AS5100-2004 are noted in
bold.
15.3 Collision from rail traffic
15.3.1 General
The intent of the provisions of this Clause (15.3) is to:

(a) avoid collapse of structures over rail due to impact from derailed trains; and

(b) reduce the severity of impacts with structures to reduce the probability of injury to
occupants of derailed trains.
The prescriptive provisions in this Standard shall be considered as minimum requirements.
Design solutions shall comply with the intent of this Standard and shall also:

(i) consider design options to prevent or limit derailments that would impact the structure,
such as rail geometry, clearances, location of switching points and crossings as well as
track/train type;

(ii) adopt, so far as is reasonably practicable, bridging options that avoid potential collisions
with a derailed train or that are least vulnerable to impact;

(iii) refer to technical papers and data dealing with past incidents in order to predict the likely
impact scenarios from a derailed train, and consider those scenarios; and

(iv) consider derailment as a safety in design issue, and consider the effect of a derailment
treating the bridge as a whole system, including both superstructure and substructure.

The key message is that the intent of the provisions must be satisfied. Aside from simple
bridging arrangements, the more complex arrangements must be considered from first principles if
the prescriptive provisions prove to be inadequate.

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15.3.2 Protection of supports for structures over rail

Unless approved otherwise by the relevant authorities, structures over rail shall have a clear span
between abutments.
Where the relevant authorities approve piers between abutments, and the nearest face of the pier is closer
than 10 m from the centre-line of existing or proposed tracks, provision for impact from a derailed train
shall be in accordance with Clauses 15.3.3 to 15.3.9.
Where the nearest pier face is between 10 m and 20 m from the centre-line of existing or proposed tracks,
a risk assessment, to the approval of the relevant authorities, shall be carried out to determine the
requirements for protection of supports and the loading shall be in accordance with Clause 11.4.2.4 of
AS 5100.2.
For road or pedestrian bridges over rail, where the nearest face of the pier is within 10m from the centre-
line of existing or proposed tracks, the pier shall be a frangible pier in accordance with Clause 15.3.3, or
if a frangible pier is not reasonably practicable then the pier shall meet the requirements of Clause
15.3.4.
Rail bridges shall not be supported on frangible piers.
A risk assessment that includes the risks associated with the use of any pier type and superstructure
articulation shall be undertaken. The risk assessment methodology shall be acceptable to all
relevant authorities.

Apart from the writing format, these provisions remain essentially unchanged from AS5100.1-2004 except
for the requirement that frangible piers must not be used for rail bridges because, if supports are
removed or damaged significantly with the bridge seemingly still in working order (albeit with a high
deflection), a train may still use it but it could be at risk of derailment, for a lightly loaded train, or cause the
complete collapse of the longer span caused by the removal of the supports.

A risk assessment is also required when using frangible piers to assess the implications of this system.

Fig. 1 in Appendix A depicts the above provisions.

15.3.3 Frangible piers
A frangible pier is a pier designed to be removed in the event of its being impacted by a derailed
train so that damage to the train and the bridge, and harm to its occupants, are minimized. The
bridge superstructure shall not collapse onto the train in the event of the removal of a frangible
pier.
A risk assessment shall be undertaken in accordance with Clause 15.3.2 by the relevant authorities
to determine—

(a) the design loads for the frangible pier;

(b) the failure mode of the frangible pier;

(c) the acceptable post-impact deformation limits for the bridge superstructure; and

(d) the acceptable post-impact condition of the bridge with a view to its rehabilitation.

Sufficient structural redundancy shall be designed into the bridge to ensure that its superstructure, when
loaded in accordance with Clause 11.1 of AS 5100.2 and with the frangible pier removed, does not deform
in excess of the limits set by the relevant authorities

This new clause defines and clarifies design criteria for frangible piers to ensure that the potential
consequences of such a system in a crash are not more hazardous than alternative systems. The live
loading requirements remain unchanged.

15.3.4 Piers other than frangible piers

Piers shall be designed for the collision loads specified in Clause 11.4.2.3 or Clause 11.4.2.4 of AS
5100.2, and shall comply with the geometric requirements of this Clause.

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Piers shall be protected from head-on impact from derailed trains by deflection walls unless approved
otherwise by the relevant authorities.
The pier shall provide a continuous concrete wall aligned parallel to the adjacent tracks. The
continuous concrete wall shall—
(a) have a minimum height of—

(i) 3.6 m above adjacent rail level when the nearest face of the pier is less than or equal to 4 m
from the centre-line of the rail track; or

(ii) 2.0 m above adjacent rail level when the nearest face of the pier is greater than 4 m from
the centre-line of the rail track.

(b) have a minimum thickness of 800 mm;

(c) have a minimum length of 4 m;

(d) extend a minimum of 2 m longitudinally beyond any column rising above the top of the wall;

(e) extend a minimum of 1.2 m below ground level;

(f) extend a minimum of 150 mm laterally, on the track side, beyond the face of any column
rising above the top of the wall;

(g) have a smooth face with no snagging points; and

(h) have rounded ends.

This clause clarifies the geometric wall pier details, replacing the “heavy pier” as defined in AS5100-2004.
The design collision longitudinal load in AS5100.2 has been increased to from 3000kN to 4000kN.

The geometric changes are designed to enhance the robustness of the pier with a more forgiving shape to
minimise the impact on the train and occupants.

Fig. 2 in Appendix A depicts the above provisions.

15.3.5 Abutments
Abutments beyond 20 m from the centre-line of the nearest track need not be designed for derailment
collision protection unless required otherwise by the relevant authorities.
Abutments located beyond 10 m and within 20 m from the centre-line of the nearest track shall be risk
assessed for derailment collision protection requirements, subject to the approval of the relevant
authorities, and shall be designed for the collision loads specified in Clause 11.4.2.4 of AS 5100.2.
Abutments located within 10 m from the centre-line of the nearest existing or future track shall be
designed for the collision loads specified in Clause 11.4.2.3 of AS 5100.2. Unless otherwise approved by
the relevant authorities. These abutment walls, including reinforced soil structure abutments, shall
have a minimum thickness of 800 mm for a minimum height of—

(a) 3.6 m above adjacent rail level when the nearest face of the pier is less than or equal to 4 m
from the centre-line of the rail track; or

(b) 2.0 m above adjacent rail level when the nearest face of the pier is greater than 4 m from the
centre-line of the rail track.
The wall face of retaining abutments shall be smooth with no snagging points.
The superstructure at a reinforced soil structure abutment shall be supported on columns or piles
that are located within the reinforced soil mass behind the facing of the abutment .

Provisions for retaining abutment walls have been clarified and amended to include Reinforced Soil
Structures (aka Mechanically Stabilised Walls (MSE)). This was deemed to be required because of the
relative fragility of precast panels when subjected to collision by the design impact loads. Protection by
appropriate barriers may be an acceptable alternative.
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It is noted, although not specifically stated in the Standard, that:

• the above provisions preclude the use of wingwalls perpendicular to the tracks unless protected by a
deflection wall.
• provisions for spill-through abutments are not included in this Standard. These are subject to a risk
assessment to the approval of the relevant authorities. Typically, no protection is provided for these
abutments.

Fig. 3 in Appendix A depicts the above provisions.

15.3.6 Deflection walls
The purpose of a deflection wall is to prevent a head-on impact with a primary structural element
including pier or abutment for structures above rail, or end of a through truss, arch or through
girder for rail bridges.
Deflection walls shall be designed for the collision loads specified in Clause 11.4.2.3 or Clause
11.4.3 of AS5100.2.
NOTE: This is in addition to the requirement for the pier or abutment to be designed for the
same collision loads.
The design shall ensure that the collision loads applied to the deflection wall are not transferred to
the primary structural element.
The deflection wall shall be designed as a continuous concrete wall.
The minimum height of the deflection wall shall be 2.0 m above rail, or not less than the top of the
uppermost primary structural element, whichever is lower.
The deflection wall shall have a minimum thickness of 500 mm. The wall face shall be smooth with
no snagging points, including at a transition from deflection wall to a primary structural element.
The design of the transition shall allow for the lateral movement of the deflection wall due to the
collision loads.
The approach end of the deflection wall shall be rounded.
Unless approved otherwise by the relevant authorities, deflection walls shall be provided in the
following locations:

(a) On the approach to a retained abutment, through truss, through arch or through girder in
order to protect a derailed train from head-on impact with the abutment and wing wall,
truss, arch or through girder. The angle between an abutment wall or deflection wall and
the rail tracks shall not exceed 20 degrees. The deflection wall may also be incorporated as
the abutment wing wall.

(b) On the approach to a pier other than a frangible pier. The deflection wall shall be aligned
with the pier, extending the pier towards an approaching train.
The length of the deflection wall shall be determined from a risk assessment or as specified by the
relevant authorities.
This new clause represents a major change to enhance protection against head-on collisions.
For piers supporting overhead bridges the intent is to:
• deflect a train derailed on the approaches to the pier.
• provide a point of impact away from the pier end.
• provide some impact energy dissipation before impacting the pier wall.
For abutments, the intent is to:
• deflect a train derailed on the approaches to the abutment to prevent impact with wingwalls or
embankment.
• protect the abutment wall, if required.
• reduce the severity of the impact with an alignment essentially parallel with the rail tracks.
For through truss, arch or through girder for rail bridges the intent is to:
• protect the primary supporting members which failure may lead to a complete bridge collapse and
• reduce the severity of the impact with an alignment essentially parallel with the rail tracks.
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Fig. 4 in Appendix A depicts the above provisions.

4. New provisions in AS5100.2-2017

The following are the new provisions in AS5100.2-2017. Key changes from AS5100.2-2004 are noted in
bold.
11.4 Collision load from rail traffic
11.4.1 General
This Clause applies to all structures above and within 20 m adjacent to rail tracks, such as—

(a) rail bridges;

(b) road bridges;

(c) pedestrian, cyclist path and maintenance bridges;

(d) deflection walls and crash walls;

(e) air space developments;

(f) external developments; and

(g) similar structures in underground railways. This

Clause does not apply to—
(i) structures that only support signals, overhead wiring, lighting or communications equipment;

(ii) gang sheds adjacent to tracks;

(iii) waiting rooms and ticket offices on platforms.

In addition to the design requirements specified herein, any other design requirements of the relevant
rail authority shall be satisfied.
A load factor of 1.0 for the ultimate limit state shall be used.
The loads mentioned herein shall not be reduced when the design rail traffic load is less than
300LA.
For light rail, all collision loads shall be the same as for 300LA loads.
The collision loads by light rail traffic may be considered too high in some cases with relatively
much lighter rail cars. At this stage, given the range of loads for what is defined as light rail traffic, it
was considered prudent to adopt the same impact loads used for 300LA. It is considered that these
provisions may be varied with the approval of the relevant authorities.
11.4.2 Collision loads on support elements
11.4.2.1 General
For the purpose of this Clause, support elements are piers, columns, abutments and walls which provide
vertical supports to overhead and adjacent structures. It also includes deflection and crash walls to protect
bridges and support elements for developments adjacent to or over a railway line.
11.4.2.2 Frangible pier
The design loads for a frangible pier shall be determined from a risk assessment undertaken in
accordance with AS 5100.1.
11.4.2.3 Support within 10 m of track centre-line
Unless specified otherwise by the rail authority, supports located within 10 m of the centre- line of the rail
track, which do not comply with the redundancy requirements of AS 5100.1, shall be designed to resist the
following minimum collision loads, applied simultaneously:

(a) 4000 kN parallel to rails.

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(b) 1500 kN normal to rails.

The loads specified in Items (a) and (b) shall be applied horizontally at 2 m above rail level distributed
over a length of 2.0 m by 0.5 m.
NOTE: These loads do not represent a head on collision. Head on collision loads can be significantly
higher and are outside of the scope of this Standard.
 
The main change is the increase of the impact load parallel to the rails from 3000kN to 4000kN. This is in
line with AREMA (13).

11.4.2.4 Support elements located between 10 and 20 m from track centre-line.

Where supports are located between 10 m and 20 m from the centre-line of the rail track, a risk analysis
shall be carried out and approved by the relevant rail authority, which shall determine the required level of
protection. If the level of redundancy does not meet the redundancy requirements of AS 5100.1, support
elements shall be designed to resist a collision load of 1500 kN, acting at any angle in the horizontal plane
directed towards the support from the adjacent track centre-line, applied at 2 m above the ground level
adjacent to the support.
NOTE: Some rail authorities permit relaxation of this loading where platforms, under certain
conditions, provide protection to the columns.
11.4.3 Bridge and structural components within 10 m of the centre-line of the rail track
Any part of any structure specified in Clause 10.4.1, including the superstructure, within 10 m
horizontally and 5 m vertically of the centre-line of the nearest rail track, shall be designed to resist a
minimum collision load of 500 kN. The collision load shall be applied in any direction and at any height,
directed towards the component from the adjacent track centre-line, except downwards. Above 5 m and up
to 10 m vertically above the rail track level, this collision load shall vary linearly from 500 kN at 5 m to
zero at 10 m. When applied vertically upwards, the force shall be distributed over an area of one square
metre, to allow for roof crushing of the rail vehicle.
Platforms shall not be assumed to provide protection to permit reduction of this collision load.
This collision load shall not be applied in conjunction with the loads specified in Clause 11.4.2.
For underground rail and air space developments, these loads shall be multiplied by a factor of three and
there shall be no reduction for vertical height up to 10 m. When applied vertically upwards, this collision
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load shall be distributed over an area of 2 m .

Fig. 4 and in Appendix A depicts the above provisions.

11.4.4 Through-type rail bridge superstructures

11.4.4.1 General
This Clause applies to the principal structural elements of through-type superstructures that extend
vertically above the level of the rail track that they are supporting. This includes through-girders
(flanges and webs), through trusses (top chord, verticals and diagonals) and through-arches (arch
chords and hangers). These elements are usually in close proximity to the rail line.
11.4.4.2 Collision loads within the bridge
Unless otherwise approved by the rail authority, the bridge shall be designed for collision loads from
a derailed train anywhere within the bridge.
A barrier extending not less than 2.0 m above rail, or to the top of the uppermost primary structural
element, whichever is the lower, shall be provided unless the bridge superstructure is designed to
resist the collision load defined in Clause 11.4.3 and there is no possibility of a vehicle snagging (i.e.
if the primary structural elements provide a smooth and solid impact surface).
The barrier shall be designed to resist the collision load defined in Clause 11.4.3 and shall provide a
smooth and solid impact surface such that there is no possibility of a vehicle snagging.
Primary structural elements higher than 2.0 m above the rail tracks shall be designed for the
collision load defined in Clause 11.4.3.

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Alternatively the collision load to be resisted by the primary structural elements and/or the barrier
may be determined from a dynamic collision analysis, approved by the relevant authority, which
takes into consideration design track speed and geometry, design load with representative rolling
stock characteristics (centre of mass and distribution, stiffness of components, etc.), bridge and
barrier stiffnesses.

11.4.4.3 Protection against head-on collision with the end of the through-girder, arch or truss
Unless otherwise approved by the rail authority, the ends of the girder, arch or truss shall be
protected against head-on collision as specified in this Clause.
A deflection wall or barrier shall be provided in front of the end of the girder, arch or truss, to
protect it from head-on collision. This barrier may be an independent concrete wall or integral with
the approach slab, or a steel post and rail barrier and shall be designed as per Clause 11.4.4.2.

The above new clauses have been included to ensure protection for bridges vulnerable to impact
loads which could cause the complete collapse of the bridge.
11.5.4 Derailment kerbs
Where the relevant authority requires a kerb to be provided to keep derailed bogies tracking parallel
to and in close proximity to the rails, the following provisions shall apply.
The kerb height shall extend 200 mm above the height of the adjacent running rail. Kerbs shall be
located as near as practicable to the adjacent running rail.
The kerb shall extend for the full length of the bridge, including approach transition slabs, without
snagging points.
Kerbs shall be designed for a horizontal load of 300 kN distributed over a 1 m length, acting at the
top of the kerb, perpendicular to the centre-line of the track.
An ultimate load factor of 1.0 shall be used.
 
The provision of derailment kerbs for underbridges to prevent a derailed train from falling off the bridge is
relatively new in the international scene. Practices vary from providing a wider bridge or to providing a
kerb up to 200mm higher than the top of the adjacent rail.

Derailment statistics indicate that the probability of a train falling a bridge would be extremely small, even
for long bridges, however it can happen and it has happened in the past due to a variety of reasons. The
above provision was considered to be the minimum that should be adopted to cater for a relatively minor
derailments. It is noted that the derailment kerb may not necessarily contain a derailed train travelling at
operating speed depending on the behavior of the derailed wagons or carriages .

If additional containment is required by the Rail Authority, Hirsch et al (14) may provide appropriate
information to develop effective barriers.

5. Discussion

Rail travel is one of the safest forms of transport and the probability of train derailments is very low
especially within the small length of most bridges which are the subject of the provisions. However, whilst
these events are rare they can happen for a variety of reasons and can result in major disasters which are
not acceptable, especially in today’s risk-averse environment and in the light of current knowledge. In
brief:
• The new provisions are aimed at providing unprecedented safety in the event of derailments at or
near bridges, considered to be so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP), in line with new
legislation.
• The implementation of the model Work Health and Safety Act (WHS Act) which requires a risk-based
approach to ensuring safe outcomes during implementation of projects (or Safety in Design), the
adoption of the Safe System (or Vision Zero) approach to road safety by State Road Authorities in the
design of road infrastructure and Rail Safety National Law create a paradigm shift which will impact on
the engineering profession as well as other designers and clients, including Government Authorities,

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making decisions about design choices. This was a major consideration in the development of the
provisions.
• The biggest challenge for any project is in achieving a consensus of all stakeholders about what
represents SFAIRP in any given situation.
• Risk assessment will be an essential part of the design process however there is little guidance in
Australia about what would be an acceptable probability of a potentially disastrous event involving
many casualties, in the light of the new legislation. In the case of an actual fatal event, it could be
argued legally that that the design is inadequate, with the proof being that an injury has occurred.
• To quote Robinson et al (15): “ The point of the SFAIRP approach is to demonstrate, that provided
something is not prohibitively dangerous that it ought not to be done at all, that all reasonable
precautions are in place for foreseeable critical hazards. Essentially, arguing over degrees of rareness
for high consequence outcomes prevent is simply indefensible, post-event”.

6. Conclusions

In conclusion:

• The revised AS5100- 2017 Bridge Design Standard contains new provisions to prevent high loss of
life and bridge collapse resulting from train derailments for both rail underbridges and overpasses.
Whilst these events are rare, they can happen for a variety of reasons and can result in major
disasters which are not acceptable, especially in today’s risk-averse environment and in the light of
current knowledge and legislation.

• Safety in design provisions to guard against train derailments and their consequences have been the
subject to much debate in the recent past. The BD90 Standards Australia Committee which reviewed
AS5100 Bridge Design Standard considered world’s best practice and the possible precautions that
can be taken to avoid major disasters. The Australian model Work Health and Safety Act (WHS Act),
Rail Safety National Law, the National Regulations, the SFAIRP Guideline, the “Safe System”
philosophy and Rail Corporation guidelines were used as guides in the development of the provisions.

• The changes to the rail collision provisions will increase safety for rail travel and interacting road
infrastructure. The overriding focus is on satisfying the intent of the provisions even for the more
complex bridge designs or interchanges. These reflect today’s community expectations and new
legislative requirements and are considered to be among the world’s most advanced and challenging
Safety in Design guidelines provisions.

• The new provisions however will still have residual risks associated with their implementation which
will require close co-operation and consultation with all stakeholders to establish acceptable limits of
residual risks to satisfy the SFAIRP criteria. Further provisions to minimise risks would be as follows:
• active prevention of derailments, with better rail vehicles design, rail track design improvements,
maintenance and operation.
• rail underbridge designs which can effectively contain derailed trains (eg. trough girders).
• use of high containment barriers for rail underbridges to prevent trains from falling off bridges.
• greater use of clear spans for overhead bridges to negate collisions – AS5100’s first preference.
• greater use of overhead bridges with continuous pier-redundant superstructures with frangible
piers – AS1500’s second preference.
• forgiving railway corridor environments with no major hazards (i.e. points of hard impact) to collide
with in case of derailments.
• collision energy dissipators at the front of deflection walls or other points of hard impact to
minimise the sudden deceleration on rail vehicles upon impact which may lead to passenger
casualties.

7. Acknowledgement

The permission of Standards Australia to copy parts of the AS/NZS 5100-2017 Standard and the support
of WSP Parsons Brinckerhoff to publish this paper are gratefully acknowledged.

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8. References

1. AS 5100 – 2004 Bridge Design Standard, Standards Australia

2. Safe Work Australia , “Australian model Work Health and Safety Act (WHS Act)”
3. Rail Safety National Law (RSNL)
4. Office of the Rail Safety National Regulator (ONRSR), “National Regulations”
5. Office of the Rail Safety National Regulator (ONRSR), “Guideline, Meaning of duty to ensure
safety so far as is reasonably practicable - SFAIRP”, 2016
6. ATC, National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020,
http://www.atcouncil.gov.au/documents/atcnrss.aspx
7. Engineering Standard Structures ASC 310 V2.2 (2010) Rail Corporation
8. Rapattoni, F and Muscat, J, H (2014) “Safety in Design for Railway Bridges – New Provisions in
AS5100-2015” Proceedings of AUSTROADS Ninth Conference, Sydney, September 2014.
9. Rapattoni, F and Grzebieta, R, H (2011) “Railway Bridges – Safety in design for train derailments”
Proceedings of AUSTROADS Seventh Conference, Sydney, September 2011.
10. Rapattoni, F, (2009) “AS 5100 Bridge Design Standard – Focus on Safety for Railway Bridges”
Proceedings of AUSTROADS Sixth Conference, Auckland, May 2009.
11. Rapattoni, F, (2004) "Safety first for Bridges – by design", Proceedings of AUSTROADS Fifth
Conference, Hobart, 2004.
12. UIC Code (2002) “Structures built over railway lines – Construction requirements in the track zone
13. American Railways Engineering Maintenance-of-way Association (AREMA), 2015
14. Hirsch, T,J, Harris, W,J, James, R,W, Lamkin, J, Heping Zang (1989) “Analysis and design of
Metrorail-Railroad barrier system” RR 3780-2 on RP TTI 3780, Texan Transport Institute, Texas
A&M University.
15. Robinson, R, Francis, Gaye, (2014) “SFAIRP vs ALARP” Proceedings of the Conference on
railway excellence, Rail Tranposrt for a Vital Economy, May 2014, Adelaide, Australia

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 Paper: Austroads Bridge Conference 2017 | Melbourne 3-6 April 2017 | hosted by VicRoads

Appe
endix A

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