:RUNVKHHW&RYHU3DJH

Company: Raffineria di Gela

Location:
Facility: Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC
PHA Method: What-If
PHA Type: Initial

Process:

File Description:

Date:

Process Description:

Chemicals:

Purpose:

Scope:

Objectives:

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Raffineria di Gela 1 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (1) 27/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (1) 7.3.1. Dewaxing the CDHydro Naphtha Splitter Catalyst
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04502
5210-GD-B-04503
5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04506
5210-GD-B-04507
5210-GD-B-04508
5210-GD-B-04509
5210-GD-B-04523
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1. Discharge line from P201A/B 6"- 1.1. Start-up fluid sent to the CDHDS 1.1. Ensure that CDHDS Unit is O2 - SP
5210-P31 to filters MS-201 A/B not Unit free and ready to start-up during
properly isolated CDHydro Catalyst Dewaxing/
Reduction operations and include in
the procedure.

1.2. Include in the procedure the SP

closure of valves upstream MS-201
A/B

2. Low pressure in P-201A/B suction 2.1. Pumps P-201A/B fail to start 2.1. Verify the lowest pressure of the RAGE
start-up fluid circuit from OSBL

2.2. Verify the NPSH of P-201 A/B SP

3. Valve downstream P-201A/B to 3.1. Start-up fluid sent to slop 3.1. FI 189 3.1. Add double block and bleed in SP
slop open during start-up fluid loading discharge line from P-201A/B to slop
3.2. Uncomplete dewaxing (6"-5210-P33) upstream existing
check valve

4. Hand valves on drain lines open 4.1. Start-up fluid sent to Drain KO 4.1. Hand valve at V-212 inlet 4.1. Include in the Dewaxing SP
Drum V-212 procedure to verify the closure of all
manual valves on drain lines to V-212

4.2. When Dewaxing operations are SP

completed, ensure that startup fluid is
drained from V-102 through 3"-5210-
CD8 line to V-212 instead of 2"-
5210-SW1 line to SWS;

5. FV 109 on HP steam to CDHydro 5.1. Possible damage to E-103 5.1. Include in the procedure to SP
Steam Reboiler E-103 open before... tubes due to thermal stress ensure that E-103 stem side is ...
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Raffineria di Gela 2 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (1) 27/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (1) 7.3.1. Dewaxing the CDHydro Naphtha Splitter Catalyst
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04502
5210-GD-B-04503
5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04506
5210-GD-B-04507
5210-GD-B-04508
5210-GD-B-04509
5210-GD-B-04523
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
...start-up fluid entrance 5.1. Possible damage to E-103 ...properly isolated before start-up
tubes due to thermal stress (cont.) fluid entrance

6. Hand valves on condensate line 6.1. Loss of start-up fluid heating; 6.1. Highlight in the procedure the SP
from CDHydro Steam Reboiler E-103 pressure increase in E-103 tube side opening of hand valves on
closed when FV 109 opens condensate line from CDHydro Steam
Reboiler E-103

7. Hand valves on CW line to the 7.1. Loss of start-up fluid vapors

CDHydro Vent Cooler E-101 closed condensation in E-101; more flow of
HC vapors to Refinery Recovery Gas
Unit (Corr. 101).No relevant
consequences

8. CDHydro Recycle Gas Compressor 8.1. N2 and HC vapors sent to K- 8.1. K-101 not in service 8.1. Add in the procedure the closure SP
K-101 not properly isolated 101 suction of 2 hand valves on K-101 suction
8.2. Hand valves on K-101 suction upstream and downstream FT115

8.2. Add in the procedure the closure SP

of the blind on K-101 suction line 6"-
5210-P52 downstream FT115

9. TIC 106 fails opening FV109 (HP 9.1. Start-up fluid overheating in 9.1. T Indications in CDHydro column 9.1. Verify the CDHydro Catalyst CDTech
Steam) CDHydro column C-101; possible integrity in case of T in column rises
damage of the CDHydro Catalyst 9.2. FIC 109 gives indication due to FV109 fully open (P&ID SP
5210-GD-B-04502 and 04503)

10. Dewaxing is not completed
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10.1. CDHydro catalyst reduction is
not effective with possible permanent
and adverse changes in the catalyst
activity, in case of exposure to FCC
naphtha
10.1. Dewaxing Operating Procedure 10.1. Define the methodology to CDTech
verify complete Dewaxing Operation
(i. e. sampling)
10.2. Verify adverse consequences ... CDTech
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Raffineria di Gela 3 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (1) 27/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (1) 7.3.1. Dewaxing the CDHydro Naphtha Splitter Catalyst
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04502
5210-GD-B-04503
5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04506
5210-GD-B-04507
5210-GD-B-04508
5210-GD-B-04509
5210-GD-B-04523
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
10. Dewaxing is not completed (cont.) 10.1. CDHydro catalyst reduction is 10.1. Dewaxing Operating Procedure ...to CDHydro Catalyst in case of
not effective with possible permanent (cont.) improper Dewaxing
and adverse changes in the catalyst
activity, in case of exposure to FCC
naphtha (cont.)

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Raffineria di Gela 4 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (1) 27/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (2) 7.3.2. Reduce CDHydro Naphtha Splitter Catalyst
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04503
5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04506
5210-GD-B-04507
5210-GD-B-04508
5210-GD-B-04509
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1. Fresh H2 line (2"-5210-HG2) to V- 1.1. V-101 overpressure 1.1. PSV 101 1.1. Include in the CDHydro reducing SP
101 is open procedure the closure of PV 101 B on
H2 inlet to V-101

2. Level on CDHydro column C-101 2.1. Possible loss of level in C-101 2.1. Clarify the function of CDHydro CDTech
sump not automatically controlled sump sump level control LIC 103 during
(step 3) reduction procedure (step 3, 7.3.2)

3. Loss of Reflux Stream during H2
injection
3.1. Loss of cooling in CDHydro
column C-101; T increase due to
Catalyst reduction reaction
exothermicity
3.1. TAHH 114 A/B/C 3.1. Verify TAHH 114 and 115 CDTech
activation with H2 shutdown, during
3.2. TAHH 115 A/B/C CDHydro catalyst reduction
3.2. Verify the need of C-101 CDTech
depressurization (trough HIC 101) in
case of high T interlock action

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Raffineria di Gela 5 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (2) 28/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (3) 7.3.3. CDHDS Catalyst Drying
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04510
5210-GD-B-04511
5210-GD-B-04512
5210-GD-B-04514
5210-GD-B-04515
5210-GD-B-04516
5210-GD-B-04517
5210-GD-B-04518
5210-GD-B-04522
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1. XV102 on 8"-5210-P13 from C-101 1.1. CDHydro Unit not properly 1.1. Isolation valves on XV102 1.1. Add in the procedure to verify the SP
to P-201 suction open isolated. Start-up fluid entering closure and isolation of XV102
CDHydro Unit ready to start normal
operation 1.2. Relocate isolation valve SP
downstream XV102 to upstream tie-in
start-up line 4"-5210-P30

2. Valve downstream P-201A/B to 2.1. Start-up fluid sent to slop 2.1. FI 189 2.1. Add double block and bleed in SP
slop open during Dewaxing initial discharge line from P-201A/B to (6"-
steps 2.2. Incomplete dewaxing 5210-P33) upstream existing check
valve

3. Hand valves on drain lines open 3.1. Start-up fluid sent to Drain KO 3.1. Hand valve at V-212 inlet 3.1. Include in the Dewaxing SP
Drum V-212 procedure to verify the closure of all
manual valves on drain lines to V-212

4. FV124 on 8"-5210-P74 discharge 4.1. Start-up fluid sent to naphtha 4.1. FIC 124 gives indication 4.1. Add in the procedure to verify SP
line to Naphtha Stabiliser C-203 open Stabilizer C-203 the closure of FV124 (on P202A/B
4.2. LIC 113 gives indication discharge line to naphtha stabiliser C-
203)

5. Hand valve on P-202 A/B 5.1. Startup fluid sent to V-202 5.1. Add in the procedure to verify the SP
discharge line 10"-5210-P77 to EA- (CDHDS cold Separator) through EA- closure of hand valves on shutdown
203 open 203 instead of C-201; possible loss of line 10"-5210-P77 from P-202 A/B to
level in C-201 EA-203

6. Hand valve on P-202 A/B discharge 6.1. Startup fluid sent to CDHDS 6.1. Add in the procedure to verify the SP
line 8"-5210-P76 to E-202 openverso Steam/Bottom Exchangers E-202 closure of hand valves on E-202 shell
E-202 shell side; possible E-202 damage side for proper isolation
(tube side) do to thermal stress
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Raffineria di Gela 6 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (2) 28/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (3) 7.3.3. CDHDS Catalyst Drying
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04510
5210-GD-B-04511
5210-GD-B-04512
5210-GD-B-04514
5210-GD-B-04515
5210-GD-B-04516
5210-GD-B-04517
5210-GD-B-04518
5210-GD-B-04522
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
7. Loss of water supply to CDHDS 7.1. Possible damage to E-216 (tube 7.1. Ensure line-up of BFW line and SP
Steam Generator E-216 side) due to thermal stress steam line on E-216 before CDHDS
Catalyst Drying. Ensure BFW flow to
E-216 during Catalyst Drying
operations

8. LIC 113 fails (on CDHDS column 8.1. Possible loss of level and P-202 8.1. LALL 114 A/B/C 8.1. Verify LALL 114 A/B/C activation SP
sump) (step 4) A/B cavitation during CDHDS Catalyst Drying
8.2. FALL 125 A/B/C operations

9. K-201 recycle Gas Compressor not 9.1. Star-up fluid vapors sent to K-201 9.1. K-201 not in operation 9.1. Add in the procedure the isolation
properly isolated suction of Recycle Gas Compressor K-201 by
closing of hand valve and blind on K-
201 suction line

10. Free water in F-201 tubes before 10.1. Possible water vaporization 10.1. Furnace Drying operation 10.1. Clarify the need to perform CDTech
furnace firing inside F-201 tubes furnace drying: a) before start-up
operation; b)during start-up operation;
c) otherwise

11. Filters MS-202 A/B plugged 11.1. No flow into C-201 through C- 11.1. PDI 134 11.1. Verify PDAH 134 is activated on SP
201 reflux line. Possible loss of level filters MS-202 during CDHDS Catalyst
in C-201 Drying operations

12. HC vapors present in V-202 12.1. Possible presence of 12.1. Verify the possibility to perform CDTech
connected to atmosphere before N2 flammable/explosive mixture N2 pressurization before start-up fluid
pressurization entrance in CDHDS column C-201

12.2. Alternatively, evaluate the CDTech

possibility to collect to blow down...
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Raffineria di Gela 7 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (2) 28/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (3) 7.3.3. CDHDS Catalyst Drying
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04510
5210-GD-B-04511
5210-GD-B-04512
5210-GD-B-04514
5210-GD-B-04515
5210-GD-B-04516
5210-GD-B-04517
5210-GD-B-04518
5210-GD-B-04522
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
12. HC vapors present in V-202 12.1. Possible presence of ...through PV141 vapors from V-202,
connected to atmosphere before N2 flammable/explosive mixture (cont.) V-203, C-204 and V-204
pressurization (cont.)

13. Vapor line from V-202 to E-204 13.1. Start-up fluid vapors sent to 13.1. Add in the procedure to verify SP
shell side open Naphtha Stabilizer C-203 and Gas the closure of hand valves on E-204
Amine Absorber C-204 shell side for proper isolation

14. FV 131 on V-201 outlet line to C- 14.1. Start-up fluid sent to C-203 14.1. Add in the procedure to verify SP
203 open 10"-5210-P109 the closure and isolation of valve
FV131 on V201 outlet line to C-203

15. T in CDHDS column C-201 rises 15.1. Possible catalyst deactivation 15.1. TI 147 A/B/C 15.1. Verify TAHH 147 A/B/C SP
over 150°C activation that carry out ESD L01 with
a set point of 155°C during CDHDS
Catalyst Drying

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Raffineria di Gela 8 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (2) 28/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (4) 7.3.4. Sulfide CDHDS Catalyst
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04510
5210-GD-B-04511
5210-GD-B-04512
5210-GD-B-04514
5210-GD-B-04515
5210-GD-B-04516
5210-GD-B-04517
5210-GD-B-04539
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1. Recycle Gas Compressor K-201 1.1. Status fluid vapors sent to K-201 1.1. K-201 is not in operation 1.1. Add in the procedure the isolation SP
A/B not properly isolated A/B of Recycle Gas Compressor K-201
A/B by closing hand valve and blind
on K-201 suction line

2. DMDS concentration in CDHDS 2.1. Uncontrolled T increase in 2.1. Local flow control in DMDS 2.1. Relocate SC154 from FV124 to SP
column greater than 1% CDHDS column injection package suction / discharge of P-202 A/B

2.2. T Indication in CDHDS column 2.2. Add in the procedure to verify the SP
DMDS content by means of periodic
sampling (through SC-154)

2.3. Verify the methodology and CDTech

parameters to analyse DMDS content
on CDHDS bottom line (through SC-
154)

2.4. Provide 6"tie-in from line 6"-P81 SP

upstream HV103 for CDHDS unit
deinventory

2.5. Add in the Sulfiding procedure SP

the need for star-up fluid drainage
and feed of fresh start-up fluid in
case of DMDS content greater than
1%

2.6. Set design pressure of EA-204 SP

A/B according to P-202 A/B shut off
pressure

3. Presence of HC/DMDS vapors in 3.1. Release of toxic / flammable 3.1. Evaluate the possibility of CDTech
V-202 connected to atmosphere vapors to atmosphere from V-202... controlling V-204 Pressure through ...
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Raffineria di Gela 9 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (2) 28/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (4) 7.3.4. Sulfide CDHDS Catalyst
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04510
5210-GD-B-04511
5210-GD-B-04512
5210-GD-B-04514
5210-GD-B-04515
5210-GD-B-04516
5210-GD-B-04517
5210-GD-B-04539
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
3. Presence of HC/DMDS vapors in ...vent ...PV141 closing atmospheric vent
V-202 connected to atmosphere
(cont.)

4. High T in catalytic beds during 4.1. Re-set TAHH 147 A/B/C from SP
Sulfiding operation 155°C to normal operating conditions

5. Washed gas (low MW) to blow 5.1. Very low P in Refinery blowdown 5.1. Add 6" line downstream PV141 SP
down recovery gas compressors suction to Refinery Recover Gas System (corr
102) and close 6"-BD70 to V-213

5.2. Add in the procedure the closure SP

and isolation of FV139 valve on vapor
line from Amine Absorber Column C-
204 to Refinery Recovery (corr 102)

6. Loss of DMDS injection during 6.1. Possible reduction of catalyst 6.1. Local flow indication of DMDS 6.1. Provide manned DMDS RAGE
Sulfiding operations metal oxides injection unloading operation (Rage operators)

6.2. Possibility of manual H2

shutdown in column

7. Loss of H2 flow during Sulfiding 7.1. Loss of catalyst sulfidation; 7.1. FI 123 7.1. Verify FAL 123 and FAL 186 are SP
operations DMDS content increase with active during Sulfiding operations;
consequent T increase due to 7.2. FI 186 setting the value at start-up
exothermic reaction conditions

8. Wrong procedure during 8.1. Toxic gas in atmosphere 8.1. Provide Sample connection in SP
H2Ssampling from atmospheric vent (Refinery sampling procedures do not PV141 (vapor line from V-204) for
in V-202 foresee utilisation of H2S Draeger H2S sampling during Sulfiding
samples) operations

8.2. Remove from sulfiding... SP

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Raffineria di Gela 10 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (2) 28/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (4) 7.3.4. Sulfide CDHDS Catalyst
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04510
5210-GD-B-04511
5210-GD-B-04512
5210-GD-B-04514
5210-GD-B-04515
5210-GD-B-04516
5210-GD-B-04517
5210-GD-B-04539
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
8. Wrong procedure during 8.1. Toxic gas in atmosphere ...procedure the gas washing in
H2Ssampling from atmospheric vent (Refinery sampling procedures do not Amine Absorber column, to allow the
in V-202 (cont.) foresee utilisation of H2S Draeger check of the H2S breakthrough from
samples) (cont.) SC in PV141 on vapor line from V-
204. The acid off gas will be sent to
recovery and afterwashing refinery
plant.

9. DMDS and H2 flow are not 9.1. Possible catalyst reduction 9.1. Underline in the procedure the SP
reduced simultaneously need to perform simultaneously the
flow of H2 and DMDS

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Raffineria di Gela
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC
Session: (3) 29/10/2003
System: (5) 7.4 Initial Startup Procedure
Drawings:
WHAT IF...
1. Nitrogen pressure in CDHDS
column C-201 is lower than 7
Kg/cm2g
2. CDHydro column C-101 initial
start-up is performed with diesel
3. Initial off-spec products cannot be
deinventoried
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CONSEQUENCES
1.1. To be verified by CDTECH
2.1. Steady reflux in C-101 cannot
be established
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11 of 14
Revision: 0
SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1.1. Verify the possibility to perform CDTech
the initial startup of CDHDS column
C-201 with N2 pressure at 5 Kg/cm2
g
2.1. Verify the possibility to de- CDTech
inventory the CDHydro Unit after
dewaxing and reduction operations
and subsequently feed olefinic
naphtha from FCC to allow a steady
reflux in CDHydro column (see
enclosed propsed procedure 7.4.3)
3.1. Add a new 6" line from P202 SP/CDTec
A/B discharge line 6"-P81 upstream h
HV103 in order to allow deinventory of
CDHDS Unit (see enclosed proposed
procedure 7.4.4)

Raffineria di Gela
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC
Session: (4) 30/10/2003
System: (6) 8.1.1. Short Term Shutdown
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04503
5210-GD-B-04510
WHAT IF...
1. Naphtha Stabilizer C-203 feed lines 1.1. V-201, V-202, V-203 bottoms
from V-201, V-202 and V-203 open
2. FV131 on outlet line from V-201
closed and isolated
3. FV136 on outlet line from V-202 to
C-203 closed and isolated
4. No flow in CDHDS feed
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CONSEQUENCES
cannot be sent to CDHDS column
2.1. Possible loss of level in V-201
due to loss of automatic level control
3.1. Possible loss of level in V-202
due to loss of automatic level control
4.1. T control in CDHDS column by
TIC133 cannot be performed
4.2. Sampling of CDHDS feed
cannot be performed (step 12)
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12 of 14
Revision: 0
SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1.1. Add in the Short Term Procedure SP
the closure of valves on feed lines to
Naphtha Stabilizer C-203 (i.e.: FV131
from V-201 and hand valve on 6"-
P126 line from V-202 and V-203)
2.1. Switch automatic level control SP
in V-201 from FV131 (line to C-203) to
FV132 (P-203 A/B discharge line to C-
201) during Short Term Shutdown
operation
3.1. Relocate the emergency cool SP
down liquid line 6"-5210-P113 from
upstream FV136 to downstream
FV136 and switch the blind into open
position also during normal operation
4.1. Switch off FFIC 124 control SP
before Short Term Shutdown
operation
4.2. Verify the possibility to run the CDTech
CDHydro/CDHDS Unit in total recycle
mode (see enclosed proposed
procedure 8.1.1)
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Raffineria di Gela 13 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (5) 31/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (7) 8.1.2. Long Term Shutdown
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04502
5210-GD-B-04503
5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04506
5210-GD-B-04507
5210-GD-B-04508
5210-GD-B-04509
5210-GD-B-04523
5210-GD-B-04510
5210-GD-B-04511
5210-GD-B-04512
5210-GD-B-04514
5210-GD-B-04515
5210-GD-B-04516
5210-GD-B-04517
5210-GD-B-04518
5210-GD-B-04522
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1. Naphtha contained in Reflux Drum 1.1. CDHDS catalyst gumming up due 1.1. Possibility to send CDHydro 1.1. Explain why high olefins content CDTech
V-102 and CDHydro column C-101 to olefins content in naphtha coming column bottom to slop is expected when the plant has been
sump sent to CDHDS column C-201 from C-101 running in total recycle mode (Ref.
during Long Term Shutdown Note in step 8 page 8.5)
operation
1.2. Verify if OSBL flow is referred to CDTech
the line to slop from P-201 A/B
discharge

2. Loss of DMDS injection during 2.1. Possible catalyst de-sulfidation 2.1. Verify when DMDS injection stop CDTech
CDHDS column cold recirculation is required during CDHDS column
cold recirculation

2.2. Verify the need to stop make up CDTech

H2 injection in Reboiler Furnace F-
201 and CDHDS feed/CDHDS Ovhd
Exchanger E-201 in case of loss of
DMDS injection

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Raffineria di Gela 14 of 14
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (5) 31/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (8) 8.2 Emergency Shutdown
Drawings:
Subsystem: (1) 8.2.2 Loss of Fresh Hydrogen
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1. Slop line 6"-5210-P33 on P-201 1.1. CDHydro column deinventory 1.1. Remove the blind on slop line 6"- SP
A/B discharge closed cannot be performed during 5210-P33 on P-201 A/B discharge
Emergency Shutdown and add a new hand valve

2. Unit depressurization not carried 2.1. Unit quick cooling, under 150°C, 2.1. Verify the need of CDTECH
out in case of total H2 failure for more is not ensured CDHydro/CDHDS Units
than 1 hour depressurization in case of total fresh
H2 failure; otherwise verify the
attached procedure feasibility (see
atteched propose procedure 8.2.2.)

Session: (1) 27/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (8) 8.2 Emergency Shutdown
Drawings:
Subsystem: (2) 8.2.8 Fuel Gas Failure
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1. Plant Depressurization not carried 1.1. Unit quick cooling under 150°C 1.1. In the CDTECH Procedure steps CDTECH
out in case of fuel gas failure not ensured from 6 to 10 are missing. Clarify

1.2. Step 6: the compressor K-201 CDTECH

should be already tripped due to low
pressure in suction. Clarify

1.3. Verify the need of unit CDTECH

depressurization in case of fuel gas
failure. Otherwise verify the attached
propose procedure 8.1.1 feasibility

Session: (1) 27/10/2003 Revision: 0

System: (8) 8.2 Emergency Shutdown
Drawings:
Subsystem: (3) 8.2.3 Instrument Air Failure
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1. CDHDS pressure cannot be 1.1. Total unit depressurization 1.1. Add in the procedure to close and SP
controlled isolate HV102, PV141 and PV139 in
case of instrument air failure in order
to allow the pressure control manually
(these valves are "Fail Open").
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System 1: 7.3.1. Dewaxing the CDHydro Naphtha Splitter Catalyst 1
System 2: 7.3.2. Reduce CDHydro Naphtha Splitter Catalyst 4
System 3: 7.3.3. CDHDS Catalyst Drying 5
System 4: 7.3.4. Sulfide CDHDS Catalyst 8
System 5: 7.4 Initial Startup Procedure 11
System 6: 8.1.1. Short Term Shutdown 12
System 7: 8.1.2. Long Term Shutdown 13
System 8: 8.2 Emergency Shutdown 14
Subsystem 1: 8.2.2 Loss of Fresh Hydrogen 14
Subsystem 2: 8.2.8 Fuel Gas Failure 14
Subsystem 3: 8.2.3 Instrument Air Failure 14

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Raffineria di Gela 1 of 13
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (1) 27/10/2003

System: (1) 7.3.1. Dewaxing the CDHydro Naphtha Splitter Catalyst
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04502
5210-GD-B-04503
5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04506
5210-GD-B-04507
5210-GD-B-04508
5210-GD-B-04509
5210-GD-B-04523
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
1. Discharge line from P201A/B 1.1. Start-up fluid sent to the 1.1. Ensure that CDHDS Unit is O2 -free and ready to start-up during CDHydro SP
6"-5210-P31 to filters MS-201 A/B CDHDS Unit Catalyst Dewaxing/ Reduction operations and include in the procedure.
not properly isolated
1.2. Include in the procedure the closure of valves upstream MS-201 A/B SP

2. Low pressure in P-201A/B 2.1. Pumps P-201A/B fail to start 2.1. Verify the lowest pressure of the start-up fluid circuit from OSBL RAGE
suction
2.2. Verify the NPSH of P-201 A/B SP

3. Valve downstream P-201A/B to 3.1. Start-up fluid sent to slop 3.1. Add double block and bleed in discharge line from P-201A/B to slop (6"-5210- SP
slop open during start-up fluid P33) upstream existing check valve
loading 3.2. Uncomplete dewaxing

4. Hand valves on drain lines 4.1. Start-up fluid sent to Drain KO 4.1. Include in the Dewaxing procedure to verify the closure of all manual valves on SP
open Drum V-212 drain lines to V-212

4.2. When Dewaxing operations are completed, ensure that startup fluid is drained SP
from V-102 through 3"-5210-CD8 line to V-212 instead of 2"-5210-SW1 line to
SWS;

5. FV 109 on HP steam to 5.1. Possible damage to E-103 5.1. Include in the procedure to ensure that E-103 stem side is properly isolated SP
CDHydro Steam Reboiler E-103 tubes due to thermal stress before start-up fluid entrance
open before start-up fluid entrance

6. Hand valves on condensate line 6.1. Loss of start-up fluid heating; 6.1. Highlight in the procedure the opening of hand valves on condensate line from SP
from CDHydro Steam Reboiler E- pressure increase in E-103 tube CDHydro Steam Reboiler E-103
103 closed side when FV 109 opens

8. CDHydro Recycle Gas
Compressor K-101 not properly
isolated
3+$:RUNVE\3ULPDWHFK,QF
8.1. N2 and HC vapors sent to 8.1. Add in the procedure the closure of 2 hand valves on K-101 suction upstream SP
K-101 suction and downstream FT115
8.2. Add in the procedure the closure of the blind on K-101 suction line 6"-5210-P52 SP
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Raffineria di Gela 2 of 13
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY

downstream FT115

9. TIC 106 fails opening FV109 9.1. Start-up fluid overheating in 9.1. Verify the CDHydro Catalyst integrity in case of T in column rises due to CDTech
(HP Steam) CDHydro column C-101; possible FV109 fully open (P&ID SP 5210-GD-B-04502 and 04503)
damage of the CDHydro Catalyst

10. Dewaxing is not completed
10.1. CDHydro catalyst reduction 10.1. Define the methodology to verify complete Dewaxing Operation (i. e. CDTech
is not effective with possible sampling)
permanent and adverse changes
in the catalyst activity, in case of 10.2. Verify adverse consequences to CDHydro Catalyst in case of improper CDTech
exposure to FCC naphtha Dewaxing

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Raffineria di Gela 3 of 13
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (1) 27/10/2003

System: (2) 7.3.2. Reduce CDHydro Naphtha Splitter Catalyst
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04503
5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04506
5210-GD-B-04507
5210-GD-B-04508
5210-GD-B-04509
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
1. Fresh H2 line (2"-5210-HG2) to 1.1. V-101 overpressure 1.1. Include in the CDHydro reducing procedure the closure of PV 101 B on H2 inlet SP
V-101 is open to V-101

2. Level on CDHydro column C- 2.1. Possible loss of level in C- 2.1. Clarify the function of CDHydro sump level control LIC 103 during reduction CDTech
101 sump not automatically 101 sump procedure (step 3, 7.3.2)
controlled (step 3)

3. Loss of Reflux Stream during
H2 injection
3.1. Loss of cooling in CDHydro 3.1. Verify TAHH 114 and 115 activation with H2 shutdown, during CDHydro CDTech
column C-101; T increase due to catalyst reduction
Catalyst reduction reaction
exothermicity 3.2. Verify the need of C-101 depressurization (trough HIC 101) in case of high T CDTech
interlock action

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Raffineria di Gela 4 of 13
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (2) 28/10/2003

System: (3) 7.3.3. CDHDS Catalyst Drying
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04510
5210-GD-B-04511
5210-GD-B-04512
5210-GD-B-04514
5210-GD-B-04515
5210-GD-B-04516
5210-GD-B-04517
5210-GD-B-04518
5210-GD-B-04522
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
1. XV102 on 8"-5210-P13 from C- 1.1. CDHydro Unit not properly 1.1. Add in the procedure to verify the closure and isolation of XV102 SP
101 to P-201 suction open isolated. Start-up fluid entering
CDHydro Unit ready to start 1.2. Relocate isolation valve downstream XV102 to upstream tie-in start-up line 4"- SP
normal operation 5210-P30

2. Valve downstream P-201A/B to 2.1. Start-up fluid sent to slop 2.1. Add double block and bleed in discharge line from P-201A/B to (6"-5210-P33) SP
slop open during Dewaxing initial upstream existing check valve
steps 2.2. Incomplete dewaxing

3. Hand valves on drain lines 3.1. Start-up fluid sent to Drain KO 3.1. Include in the Dewaxing procedure to verify the closure of all manual valves on SP
open Drum V-212 drain lines to V-212

4. FV124 on 8"-5210-P74 4.1. Start-up fluid sent to naphtha 4.1. Add in the procedure to verify the closure of FV124 (on P202A/B discharge SP
discharge line to Naphtha Stabilizer C-203 line to naphtha stabiliser C-203)
Stabiliser C-203 open

5. Hand valve on P-202 A/B 5.1. Startup fluid sent to V-202 5.1. Add in the procedure to verify the closure of hand valves on shutdown line 10"- SP
discharge line 10"-5210-P77 to (CDHDS cold Separator) through 5210-P77 from P-202 A/B to EA-203
EA-203 open EA-203 instead of C-201;
possible loss of level in C-201

6. Hand valve on P-202 A/B 6.1. Startup fluid sent to CDHDS 6.1. Add in the procedure to verify the closure of hand valves on E-202 shell side SP
discharge line 8"-5210-P76 to E- Steam/Bottom Exchangers E-202 for proper isolation
202 openverso E-202 shell side; possible E-202 damage
(tube side) do to thermal stress

7. Loss of water supply to CDHDS 7.1. Possible damage to E-216 7.1. Ensure line-up of BFW line and steam line on E-216 before CDHDS Catalyst SP
Steam Generator E-216 (tube side) due to thermal stress Drying. Ensure BFW flow to E-216 during Catalyst Drying operations

8. LIC 113 fails (on CDHDS 8.1. Possible loss of level and P- 8.1. Verify LALL 114 A/B/C activation during CDHDS Catalyst Drying operations SP
3+$:RUNVE\3ULPDWHFK,QF

Raffineria di Gela
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC
WHAT IF...
column sump) (step 4)
9. K-201 recycle Gas Compressor 9.1. Star-up fluid vapors sent to K- 9.1. Add in the procedure the isolation of Recycle Gas Compressor K-201 by closing
not properly isolated
10. Free water in F-201 tubes
before furnace firing
11. Filters MS-202 A/B plugged
12. HC vapors present in V-202
connected to atmosphere before
N2 pressurization
13. Vapor line from V-202 to E-
204 shell side open
14. FV 131 on V-201 outlet line to 14.1. Start-up fluid sent to C-203
C-203 open 10"-5210-P109
15. T in CDHDS column C-201
rises over 150°C
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5 of 13
CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
202 A/B cavitation
201 suction of hand valve and blind on K-201 suction line
10.1. Possible water vaporization 10.1. Clarify the need to perform furnace drying: a) before start-up operation; CDTech
inside F-201 tubes b)during start-up operation; c) otherwise
11.1. No flow into C-201 through 11.1. Verify PDAH 134 is activated on filters MS-202 during CDHDS Catalyst Drying SP
C-201 reflux line. Possible loss of operations
level in C-201
12.1. Possible presence of 12.1. Verify the possibility to perform N2 pressurization before start-up fluid CDTech
flammable/explosive mixture entrance in CDHDS column C-201
12.2. Alternatively, evaluate the possibility to collect to blow down through PV141 CDTech
vapors from V-202, V-203, C-204 and V-204
13.1. Start-up fluid vapors sent to 13.1. Add in the procedure to verify the closure of hand valves on E-204 shell side SP
Naphtha Stabilizer C-203 and Gas for proper isolation
Amine Absorber C-204
14.1. Add in the procedure to verify the closure and isolation of valve FV131 on SP
V201 outlet line to C-203
15.1. Possible catalyst 15.1. Verify TAHH 147 A/B/C activation that carry out ESD L01 with a set point of SP
deactivation 155°C during CDHDS Catalyst Drying
 $FWLRQ,WHPV
Raffineria di Gela 6 of 13
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (2) 28/10/2003

System: (4) 7.3.4. Sulfide CDHDS Catalyst
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04510
5210-GD-B-04511
5210-GD-B-04512
5210-GD-B-04514
5210-GD-B-04515
5210-GD-B-04516
5210-GD-B-04517
5210-GD-B-04539
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
1. Recycle Gas Compressor K-201 1.1. Status fluid vapors sent to K- 1.1. Add in the procedure the isolation of Recycle Gas Compressor K-201 A/B by SP
A/B not properly isolated 201 A/B closing hand valve and blind on K-201 suction line

2. DMDS concentration in 2.1. Uncontrolled T increase in 2.1. Relocate SC154 from FV124 to suction / discharge of P-202 A/B SP
CDHDS column greater than 1% CDHDS column
2.2. Add in the procedure to verify the DMDS content by means of periodic sampling SP
(through SC-154)

2.3. Verify the methodology and parameters to analyse DMDS content on CDHDS CDTech
bottom line (through SC-154)

2.4. Provide 6"tie-in from line 6"-P81 upstream HV103 for CDHDS unit deinventory SP

2.5. Add in the Sulfiding procedure the need for star-up fluid drainage and feed of SP
fresh start-up fluid in case of DMDS content greater than 1%

2.6. Set design pressure of EA-204 A/B according to P-202 A/B shut off pressure SP

3. Presence of HC/DMDS vapors 3.1. Release of toxic / flammable 3.1. Evaluate the possibility of controlling V-204 Pressure through PV141 closing CDTech
in V-202 connected to atmosphere vapors to atmosphere from V-202 atmospheric vent
vent

4. High T in catalytic beds during 4.1. Re-set TAHH 147 A/B/C from 155°C to normal operating conditions SP
Sulfiding operation

5. Washed gas (low MW) to blow 5.1. Very low P in Refinery
down blowdown recovery gas
compressors suction
5.1. Add 6" line downstream PV141 to Refinery Recover Gas System (corr 102) SP
and close 6"-BD70 to V-213
5.2. Add in the procedure the closure and isolation of FV139 valve on vapor line SP
from Amine Absorber Column C-204 to Refinery Recovery (corr 102)

6. Loss of DMDS injection during 6.1. Possible reduction of catalyst 6.1. Provide manned DMDS unloading operation (Rage operators) RAGE
Sulfiding operations metal oxides
3+$:RUNVE\3ULPDWHFK,QF

Raffineria di Gela
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC
WHAT IF...
7. Loss of H2 flow during Sulfiding 7.1. Loss of catalyst sulfidation;
operations
8. Wrong procedure during
H2Ssampling from atmospheric
vent in V-202
9. DMDS and H2 flow are not
reduced simultaneously
3+$:RUNVE\3ULPDWHFK,QF
CONSEQUENCES
DMDS content increase with
consequent T increase due to
exothermic reaction
8.1. Toxic gas in atmosphere
(Refinery sampling procedures do sampling during Sulfiding operations
not foresee utilisation of H2S
Draeger samples)
9.1. Possible catalyst reduction
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7 of 13
RECOMMENDATIONS BY
7.1. Verify FAL 123 and FAL 186 are active during Sulfiding operations; setting the SP
value at start-up conditions
8.1. Provide Sample connection in PV141 (vapor line from V-204) for H2S SP
8.2. Remove from sulfiding procedure the gas washing in Amine Absorber column, SP
to allow the check of the H2S breakthrough from SC in PV141 on vapor line from V-
204. The acid off gas will be sent to recovery and afterwashing refinery plant.
9.1. Underline in the procedure the need to perform simultaneously the flow of H2 SP
and DMDS
 $FWLRQ,WHPV
Raffineria di Gela 8 of 13
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (3) 29/10/2003

System: (5) 7.4 Initial Startup Procedure
Drawings:
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
1. Nitrogen pressure in CDHDS 1.1. To be verified by CDTECH 1.1. Verify the possibility to perform the initial startup of CDHDS column C-201 with CDTech
column C-201 is lower than 7 N2 pressure at 5 Kg/cm2 g
Kg/cm2g

2. CDHydro column C-101 initial 2.1. Steady reflux in C-101 2.1. Verify the possibility to de-inventory the CDHydro Unit after dewaxing and CDTech
start-up is performed with diesel cannot be established reduction operations and subsequently feed olefinic naphtha from FCC to allow a
steady reflux in CDHydro column (see enclosed propsed procedure 7.4.3)

3. Initial off-spec products cannot 3.1. Add a new 6" line from P202 A/B discharge line 6"-P81 upstream HV103 in SP/CDT
be deinventoried order to allow deinventory of CDHDS Unit (see enclosed proposed procedure 7.4.4) ech

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Raffineria di Gela 9 of 13
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (4) 30/10/2003

System: (6) 8.1.1. Short Term Shutdown
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04503
5210-GD-B-04510
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
1. Naphtha Stabilizer C-203 feed 1.1. V-201, V-202, V-203 bottoms 1.1. Add in the Short Term Procedure the closure of valves on feed lines to SP
lines from V-201, V-202 and V-203 cannot be sent to CDHDS column Naphtha Stabilizer C-203 (i.e.: FV131 from V-201 and hand valve on 6"-P126 line
open from V-202 and V-203)

2. FV131 on outlet line from V-201 2.1. Possible loss of level in V- 2.1. Switch automatic level control in V-201 from FV131 (line to C-203) to FV132 SP
closed and isolated 201 due to loss of automatic level (P-203 A/B discharge line to C-201) during Short Term Shutdown operation
control

3. FV136 on outlet line from V-202 3.1. Possible loss of level in V- 3.1. Relocate the emergency cool down liquid line 6"-5210-P113 from upstream SP
to C-203 closed and isolated 202 due to loss of automatic level FV136 to downstream FV136 and switch the blind into open position also during
control normal operation

4. No flow in CDHDS feed
4.1. T control in CDHDS column
by TIC133 cannot be performed
4.2. Sampling of CDHDS feed
cannot be performed (step 12)
4.1. Switch off FFIC 124 control before Short Term Shutdown operation SP
4.2. Verify the possibility to run the CDHydro/CDHDS Unit in total recycle mode CDTech
(see enclosed proposed procedure 8.1.1)

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Raffineria di Gela 10 of 13
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (5) 31/10/2003

System: (7) 8.1.2. Long Term Shutdown
Drawings: 5210-GD-B-04502
5210-GD-B-04503
5210-GD-B-04504
5210-GD-B-04505
5210-GD-B-04506
5210-GD-B-04507
5210-GD-B-04508
5210-GD-B-04509
5210-GD-B-04523
5210-GD-B-04510
5210-GD-B-04511
5210-GD-B-04512
5210-GD-B-04514
5210-GD-B-04515
5210-GD-B-04516
5210-GD-B-04517
5210-GD-B-04518
5210-GD-B-04522
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
1. Naphtha contained in Reflux 1.1. CDHDS catalyst gumming up 1.1. Explain why high olefins content is expected when the plant has been running in CDTech
Drum V-102 and CDHydro column due to olefins content in naphtha total recycle mode (Ref. Note in step 8 page 8.5)
C-101 sump sent to CDHDS coming from C-101
column C-201 during Long Term 1.2. Verify if OSBL flow is referred to the line to slop from P-201 A/B discharge CDTech
Shutdown operation

2. Loss of DMDS injection during 2.1. Possible catalyst de- 2.1. Verify when DMDS injection stop is required during CDHDS column cold CDTech
CDHDS column cold recirculation sulfidation recirculation

2.2. Verify the need to stop make up H2 injection in Reboiler Furnace F-201 and CDTech
CDHDS feed/CDHDS Ovhd Exchanger E-201 in case of loss of DMDS injection

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Raffineria di Gela 11 of 13
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (5) 31/10/2003

System: (8) 8.2 Emergency Shutdown
Drawings:
Subsystem: (1) 8.2.2 Loss of Fresh Hydrogen
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
1. Slop line 6"-5210-P33 on P-201 1.1. CDHydro column deinventory 1.1. Remove the blind on slop line 6"-5210-P33 on P-201 A/B discharge and add a SP
A/B discharge closed cannot be performed during new hand valve
Emergency Shutdown

2. Unit depressurization not 2.1. Unit quick cooling, under 2.1. Verify the need of CDHydro/CDHDS Units depressurization in case of total CDTEC
carried out in case of total H2 150°C, is not ensured fresh H2 failure; otherwise verify the attached procedure feasibility (see atteched H
failure for more than 1 hour propose procedure 8.2.2.)

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Raffineria di Gela 12 of 13
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (1) 27/10/2003

System: (8) 8.2 Emergency Shutdown
Drawings:
Subsystem: (2) 8.2.8 Fuel Gas Failure
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
1. Plant Depressurization not 1.1. Unit quick cooling under 1.1. In the CDTECH Procedure steps from 6 to 10 are missing. Clarify CDTEC
carried out in case of fuel gas 150°C not ensured H
failure
1.2. Step 6: the compressor K-201 should be already tripped due to low pressure in CDTEC
suction. Clarify H

1.3. Verify the need of unit depressurization in case of fuel gas failure. Otherwise CDTEC
verify the attached propose procedure 8.1.1 feasibility H

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 $FWLRQ,WHPV
Raffineria di Gela 13 of 13
Impianto di desolforazione Benzine da FCC

Session: (1) 27/10/2003

System: (8) 8.2 Emergency Shutdown
Drawings:
Subsystem: (3) 8.2.3 Instrument Air Failure
WHAT IF... CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
1. CDHDS pressure cannot be 1.1. Total unit depressurization 1.1. Add in the procedure to close and isolate HV102, PV141 and PV139 in case of SP
controlled instrument air failure in order to allow the pressure control manually (these valves
are "Fail Open").

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System 1: 7.3.1. Dewaxing the CDHydro Naphtha Splitter Catalyst 1
System 2: 7.3.2. Reduce CDHydro Naphtha Splitter Catalyst 3
System 3: 7.3.3. CDHDS Catalyst Drying 4
System 4: 7.3.4. Sulfide CDHDS Catalyst 6
System 5: 7.4 Initial Startup Procedure 8
System 6: 8.1.1. Short Term Shutdown 9
System 7: 8.1.2. Long Term Shutdown 10
System 8: 8.2 Emergency Shutdown 11
Subsystem 1: 8.2.2 Loss of Fresh Hydrogen 11
Subsystem 2: 8.2.8 Fuel Gas Failure 12
Subsystem 3: 8.2.3 Instrument Air Failure 13

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CDHydro Initial Start-up condition:

Dewaxing and Reduction operations have been completed, using light diesel as per RAGE
specification. CDHydro C-101 bottom and CDHydro Reflux Drum V-102 will be kept to minimum
levels, having sent start-up diesel to slop.

Pressurize CDHydro column to 4.3kg/cm2g with N2 by means of the N2 line at the column BTM.
Start feeding FCC olefinic naptha from OSBL to CDHydro Feed Drum V-101.
As level in V-101 rises, start feeding olefinic naptha from V-101 to C-101 running P-103 at
minimum flow
As the level in C-101 rises, start P-201 to feed V-102, using the shutdown line to CDHydro
condenser EA-102.
As the level in V-102 rises, start reflux flow to column by P-102.
Stabilize cold reflux in CDHydro column using shutdown line and maintaining feed from FCC.
Open line to slop from P-201 to send out start-up diesel from CDHydro while keeping level in the
column btm.
Slowly start HP Steam to CDHydro Steam Reboiler E-103.
As the column warms up, condensed vapors are collected in the Reflux Drum V-102. When level in
Reflux Drum rises, close shutdown line from P-201.
Once a steady reflux flow is established and sustained, start feeding H2 to CDHydro column at
reduced flow.
Once the level in CDHydro Reflux drum is stable, and a stable temperature profile is established in
the column, establish the normal flow of H2.
Control T in column regulating heat input to the reboiler, until T profile in the column reaches
normal set point.
At this point, the CDHydro Unit is operating in “once through” H2 mode, sending off-spec product
from P-201 to slop.
 -2% 81,7

 

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CDHDS Initial Start-up condition:

Drying and Sulfiding operations have been completed, using light diesel as per RAGE
specification. CDHDS C-201 column is operating on diesel recirculation (as per 7.3.4., step 22),
with continuous flow of H2 and DMDS and kept at about 13.8kg/cm2g and 150°C.
Note 1: DMDS flow shall be kept to a value such that 200 ppm mol. H2S concentration is contained
in column ovhd vapor.

Start sending feed to the CDHDS column from CDHydro btms through P-201 and close slop line.
When CDHDS btm level rises, start sending naptha to slop through the new 6” line, added on the
start-up/shutdown line upstream HV103. (SP dwg. 04511).
Continue sending naptha to slop until depletion of start-up light diesel from CDHDS Unit, while
following CDTech procedure 7.4.4. from step 3 to 6.
Start sending product from CDHDS btms to C-203 and close line to slop.

Note 2: Naphtha Stabilizer column C-203 is pressurized with N2 at 2.3 kg/cm2g by means of N2
stripping line.
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Stop FCC Naphtha Feed to CDHydro Feed Drum V-101

Recycle side draw product into V-101 through 4” by-pass line P233 downstream P-101A/B and
close XV 103 to OSBL (SP dwg. 5210-GD-B-04506).
Recycle stabilised naphtha into V-101 through 6” by-pass line P226 upstream EA-212 and close
HV 154 (SP dwg. 5210-GD-B-04524).
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Total Hydrogen Failure

Stop FCC Naphtha Feed to CDHydro Feed Drum V-101

Reduce firing to F-201 to reach 150°C at furnace outlet (process side). Meanwhile:
Recycle side draw product into V-101 through 4” by-pass line P233 downstream P-101A/B and
close XV 103 to OSBL (SP dwg. 5210-GD-B-04506).
Recycle stabilised naphtha into V-101 through 6” by-pass line P226 upstream EA-212 and close
HV 154 (SP dwg. 5210-GD-B-04524).

The columns P shall be maintained at normal operating levels (depressurization of the

CDHydro/CDHDS Unit will not be done).