In re Max Shoop for Admission to Practice Law

41 Phil. 213, November 29, 1920

Nature: Qualifications to Practice Law.

SC Ruling:Thus, the supporting papers filed by the applicant in this case showing to the satisfaction of the
court his qualifications as an attorney-at-law, his petition is hereby granted and he is admitted to the
practice of law in the Philippine Islands.

Legal doctrine: New York State Rule for the qualifications of Practicing Law.

Facts:

This is an application to the court by Max Shoop for admission to practice law in the Philippines Islands
wherein the applicant has been admitted to practice, and has practiced for more than five years in the
highest court of the State of New York.

With the rule cited by the court, the following are required for compliance for the admission of the
applicant:

1. Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced five years as a member of the bar in the
highest law court in any other state or territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia.
2. Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced five years in another country whose
jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Common Law.

Issue:

Whether Max Shoop is qualified to practice law in the Philippines.

Ruling:

Yes. Max Shoop is qualified to practice law in the Philippines.

Because under decision is based upon the interpretation of the New York rule:

(1) The Philippine Islands is an unorganized territory of the United States, under a civil government
established by the Congress.

(2) In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its
decision in cases not covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories and
precedents of Anglo- American cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances where the
remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases where
such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions.

(3) The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the English Common Law in its present day form of
Anglo-American Common Law to an almost exclusive extent.
(4) By virtue of the foregoing, the New York rule, given a reasonable interpretation, permits conferring
privileges on attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands similar to those privileges accorded
by the rule of this court.

In the case at bar, considering the fact the Max Shoop covered under the New York state Rule and allowed
to practice law for being satisfactorily completed the requirements under the said rule and during this time
the Philippines is under the Anglo-American Common Law which law is also applied in the Philippine
Jurisdiction.

Thus, the supporting papers filed by the applicant in this case showing to the satisfaction of the court his
qualifications as an attorney-at-law, his petition is hereby granted and he is admitted to the practice of
law in the Philippine Islands.
Government vs Springer

G.R. No. L-26979, April 1, 1927

Nature:Quo warranto proceeding.

SC Ruling: The court in conclusion declares both acts to be unconstitutional and void, and such judgment
shall result in removing the defendants from their offices as directors in the NCC.

Legal doctrine: Doctrine of separation of powers.

Facts:

The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as
amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that "The voting power of all such stock (in the
National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in
a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives."

The NCC is a corporation organized and existing by virtue of the aforementioned acts of the
Philippine Legislature. On November 9, 1926, the Government-General promulgated E.O. No. 37, which
divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that
the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government. A
copy of the said EO was then furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.

Thereafter, on December 6, 1926, despite such EO, and against the objection of the Government-
General, proceeded to elect 5 individuals, as the board of directors of the NCC, by Senate President and
the House speaker, as recognized to be the majority members of the voting committee by the chair.
Hence, this case at bar.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec. 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by Sec. 2 of Act No. 2822, is valid.

Ruling:

No. Both acts used are invalid.

Section 22 of the Organic Act, states that: "That all executive functions of the government must be
directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and
control of the Governor-General."The administrative domination of a governmentally organized and
controlled corporation is clearly not a duty germane to the law-makingpower.

In addition, the court takes note of the Administrative Code, which provides the following: "In
addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-General shall have such specific powers and
duties as are expressly conferred or imposed onhim by law and also, in particular, the powers and duties
set forth," including the special powers and duties "(a) To nominate and appointofficials, conformably to
law, to positions in the service of the Government of the Philippine Islands xxx.”

The court deduced that the power of appointment in the Philippines appertains, with minor
exceptions, to the executive department; that membership in the voting committee in question is an
office or executive function; that the National Coal Company and similar corporations are
instrumentalities of the Government; that the duty to look after government agencies and government
property belongs to the executive department; that the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature
on the voting committee constitutes an invasion by the Legislative Department of the privileges of the
Executive Department.

The interests of the Philippines will be best served by strict adherence to the basic principles of
constitutional government.
Municipality of San Juan, MM vs. CA, et. al.

G.R. No. 125183, September 29,1997

Nature: A petition for review on certiorari

SC Ruling: The decision of the CA is set aside, and the public respondent, DENR is permanently enjoined
from enforcing Proclamation No. 164

Legal doctrine: Doctrine of separation of powers

Facts:

On February 17, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal
Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the Municipality
of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Then on October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987, former President
Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716, which states: “ xxx by
excluding from its operation the parcels of land not being utilized for government center site purposes but
actually occupied for residential purposes and declaring the land so excluded, together with other parcels
of land not covered by Proclamation No. 1716 but nevertheless occupied for residential purposes xxx”.

Issue:

Whether or not Proclamation No. 164 is valid

Ruling:

No. The aforementioned proclamation is invalid

Under Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise
legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution.

Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due
exercise of legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act
of legislation, said proclamation may ONLY be amended by an equally valid act of legislation. In the case
at bar, Proclamation No. 164, amending the former, was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative
power was already solely on Congress.

. Because this unauthorized act by the then president constitutes a direct derogation of the most
basic principle in the separation of powers between the three branches of government enshrined in our
Constitution, we cannot simply close our eyes and rely upon the principle of the presumption of validity of
a law.

Thus, the court has come to a conclusion, that said proclamation is an invalid exercise of legislative
power and is hereby declared null and void.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, et. al. vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, et. al.
G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989

NATURE: A petition was filed by the Marcoses requesting that they be allowed to return to the Philippines.
Such was denied by the President, Corazon Aquino, and now they are seeking for reconsideration.

SC Ruling: DENIED.

LEGAL DOCTRINE: The executive powers of the President are not limited only to those expressly
provided in the Constitution, but also those that are implied which aim to protect and promote the welfare
of the people.

FACTS:

The Supreme Court, in its decision dated September 15, 1989, denied the petition of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present
time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.

ISSUE: Whether or not President Corazon Aquino acted with grave abuse of her discretion in not granting
the petition of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines.

RULING: NO, the President did not act with grave abuse of discretion in not granting the petition.

The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. It cannot be denied that the
President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution.

Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is
to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the
Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had
acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not
enjoin the implementation of this decision.

Therefore, the act of President Aquino of not granting the Marcoses’ petition is in accordance with the
executive powers vested upon her by the Constitution.
In Re Albino Cunanan, et. al.
Resolution March 18, 1954

Nature: Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953
SC Ruling: (1) The petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive
are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per
cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not, thus will be allowed to take their oath on a date set
by the Supreme Court.

Legal Doctrine: Admission to the practice of law- a judicial function.

FACTS:

Under the Rules of Court, a Bar candidate must have a general average of 75 percent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 percent in any of the subjects, to be considered as having passed the bar.
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the
varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, the Supreme Court passed
and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69
per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was
raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and
feeling conscious of having been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of
a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.

Despite the unfavorable view of members of the Court regarding Bill 371, which embodied Senate Bill No.
12, the President allowed the Bill to become a law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

NO, Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional.

According to Section 13, Article 8 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate
rules concerning, among others, practice and the admission to the practice of law. Under settled
jurisprudence, admission to the practice of law is a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court.

Although it is provided in the abovementioned provision in the Constitution that Congress may repeal,
alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, the authority and responsibility over the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain
vested in the Supreme Court.

In the case at bar, the law’s declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar
examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as
was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared
to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an
arbitrary manner. Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
on admission to the Bar.
Thus, R.A. 972 is unconstitutional.
TITLE: LOUIS “”BAROK” C. BIRAOGO vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, GR No. 192935,
December 7, 2010

NATURE: Petition to render Executive Order No. 1 unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

LEGAL DOCTRINE: Judicial Review; requisites

FACTS: The case at hand involves two consolidated cases(special civil action for prohibition, and for
certiorari and prohibition, respectively) which assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010". The PTC, inline
with the pres objective of diminishing corruption, is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by the third-level
public officers and employees, co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommemdation to the President, Congress and
the Ombudsman.

The Petitioners who instituted the first case and the second case are Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a
citizen and taxpayer, and Lagman, Albano, Datumanong, and Fua, as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives, respectively.

Some of the allegations of the herein petitioners are, to wit,

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to
create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the
"Truth Commission."

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the
"Truth Commission" with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under
the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be
indictable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has validly exercised its power of judicial review to render EO No. 1 as
unconstitutional?
RULLING:

Yes. The Supreme Court has validly exercised its power of Judicial Review.

According to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, The Philippine Supreme Court is vested wih
Judicial Power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and or determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government”.

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to
declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the
constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations.

The requisites for a valid exercise of judicial review in the case are present, to wit, (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

EO. 1 is rendered unconstitutional as it is violative of the equal protection clause for selectively targeting
the investigation and prosecution of the previous administration ONLY, which constitutes invalid
classification.
JOSE A. ANGARA vs. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, et. al.
G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1981

NATURE: A petition was filed by Jose A. Angara requesting to dismiss the “Motion to Protest” filed by
Private Respondent Pedro Ynsua to nullify the election of the petitioner as member of National
Assembly and to prohibit and restrain the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of the
protest filed by therespondent.

SC RULING: DENIED.

LEGAL DOCTRINE: The grant of power to Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.

FACTS:
On November 15, 1935, the Petitioner Jose A. Angara was proclaimed to be the member of National
Assembly and took his oath of office. The National Assembly then passed the Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members and declaring the National Assembly in session. The Electoral
Commission adopted its own resolution providing that the filing of election protest must not exceed on
December 9, 1935. However, prior to such date given as the deadline of filing, respondent Pedro Ynsua
filed its Motion to Protest to the election of the petitioner. The petitioner sitting as new member of
National Assembly filed its Motion to dismiss the Protest upholding the resolution issued by the National
Assembly; however, the respondent answered such motion alleging that there is no legal or
constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against election of a member of the
National Assembly after confirmation. On the reply made by the petitioner, the resolution of National
Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests
against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the NationalAssembly.

ISSUE:
Did the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

RULING:
NO. The Electoral Commission did not acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll
the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, no prevent the filing of
a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly.

Under Section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried
with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests
entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where the general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed
in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate
such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.