1. Calalang vs Williams (G.R. No.

47800, December 2, 1940)

Facts: The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30
am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a
period of one year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was
subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police.
Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality.

Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringes
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice

Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards
any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither communism,
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated.

FOR RECIT PURPOSES:

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director
of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of
theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications.
The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the
rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and
pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but
of the riding public as well.

Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare
lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of
the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should
not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

2. Natalia Realty and Estate Developer and Investor Corp. vs DAR (GR No. 103302, August 12,
1993)

Facts:

Natalia (Natalia Realty, Inc.) is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an area of
120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares and 2.7080 hectares or a total of 125.0078 hectares, which
are covered by TCT No. 31527. Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 setaside 20,312 hectares of
land as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in themetropolis which were
designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia properties are situated within the
areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. Since private landowners were allowed to develop
their properties into low-cost housing subdivisions with the reservation, petitioner EDIC (as
developer of Natalia) applied for and was granted preliminary approval and location clearances
by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Natalia thereafter became Antipolo Hills
Subdivision. On June 15 1988, R.A. 6657 went to effect. Respondent issued a Notice of Coverage
on the undeveloped portions of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia and EDIC immediately
registered its objection to the notice of coverage and requested the cancellation of the Notice of
Coverage.Natalia and EDIC both argued that the properties ceased to be agricultural lands when
they were included in the areas reserved by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 for the townsite
reservation. DAR then contended that the permits granted were not valid and binding since they
did not comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), and that there was no valid conversion
of the properties.

Issue:

Whether or not lands not classified for agricultural use, as approved by theHousing
and Land Use Regulatory Board and its agencies prior to June 15, 1988 arecovered by R.A. 6657.

Ruling:

No, Sec. 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. Agricultural land is referred to as
land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forestry, residential,
commercial or industrial land. Thus, the underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision cannot be considered as agricultural lands for this land was intended for residential
use. They ceased to be agricultural land by virtue of the Presidential Proclamation No. 1637

3. Luz Farms vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform (GR No. 86889, December 4, 1990)

Facts:

On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which includes,
among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that it
would be adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the
said law. Hence, it prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned
sections of the law provies, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in
livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree farming.
That the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than 5% of
the total investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but
not the principal factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it should not be
included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands”.

Issue:

Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for including in its definition of
“Agriculture” the livestock and poultyr industry?

Ruling:

The Court held YES.

Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the word
“agriculture”, it showed that the framers never intended to include livestock and poultry industry
in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government.

Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reasin why they used the term “farmworkers”
rather than “agricultural workers” in the said law is because “agricultural workers” includes the
livestock and poultry industry, hence, since they do not intend to include the latter, they used
“farmworkers” to have distinction.

Hence, there is merit on the petitioner’s argument that the product-sharing plan applied to
“corporate farms” in the contested provisions is unreasonable for being consficatory and
violative of the due process of law.

4. DAR vs Delia T. Sutton et.al (GR No. 162070, October 19, 2005)

FACTS:

The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been
devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then
existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell
(VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect.

In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to
withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
MARO inspected respondents’ land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and
breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the
CARL.

DAR ignored their request

DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural
lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded
from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed
the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio.

DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for
exemption from the coverage of CARL. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend
that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising.
Their motion was denied.

Office of the President affirmed the order of DAR

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s.
1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the land reform program of the government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for
owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional.

HELD:

Assailed AO is unconstitutional.

In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.
The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform
and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of
the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising.

5. Republic vs Salvador N. Lopez Agri Business Corp. (GR No. 178895, January 10, 2011)

FACTS:

Two properties of Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp. (SNLABC) were placed under the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law CARL). SNLABC sought exemption of their
properties, arguing that due to the ruling in the Luz Farms case, land devoted to livestock is
outside the coverage of the CARL. Upon ocular inspection, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) found that one of the parcels of land, the Lopez land, were exempt from CARL coverage.
The other parcel, the Limot land, was not exempt. SNLABC appealed the finding with the
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. The DAR, however, ruled that both Lopez and Limot
lands were subject to the CARL. SNLABC appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
rendered the assailed decision. The CA affirmed the findings of the MARO, that the Lopez land
was exclusively used for livestock. The MARO found that the Lopez lands were used for grazing,
and that such was its purpose even before the Luz Farms ruling. It was sufficiently established by
testimonies of the people thereabouts. Despite the presence of coconut trees in the Lopez lands,
it is still used primarily for raising livestock. There are also structures meant for such a purpose.
The Limot lands, on the other hand, were used both for coconut and rubber plantations. The
MARO found that it was only used as an extension of grazing land, inconsistently at best. Both
the DAR and SNLABC appealed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Lopez and Limot Lands are under the coverage of CARL

HELD:

Both petitions are denied

Civil Law: The DAR argues that the tax declaration of the Lopez lands classify it as agricultural
land. Also, that the SNLABC was incorporated after the implementation of the CARL shows that
there is an attempt to evade CARL coverage. It is, however, doctrine that tax declarations
themselves are not conclusive evidence as to the classification of land. Also, it is the actual usage
of the land, not its classification, which determines its eligibility for CARL. As for the Lopez lands,
it as inherited by the owner of SNLABC as livestock land. Its use has been for raising livestock
even before the incorporation of SNLABC. Hence, the time of incorporation, and the tax
declaration are irrelevant.

As for the Limot lands, it is not enough that such are used as seasonal extensions of grazing land.
The livestock are not regularly situated in the land in question, but are only brought there at
times for grazing. It is land actually devoted to coconut and rubber. Hence, it cannot be
exempted.

6. Republic represented by DAR vs CA and Green City Estate and Development Corporation (GR
No. 139592, October 5, 2000)

Facts:

The five (5) parcels of land in issue with a combined area of 112.0577 hectares situated at
Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Province of Rizal were acquired by private respondent
through purchase on May 26, 1994 from Marcela Borja vda. de Torres. The tax declarations
classified the properties as agricultural. On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR issued a Notice of
Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory acquisition pursuant to Section 7,
Chapter II of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Land Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). Private
respondent filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land from
agrarian reform pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994 and DOJ Opinion No.
44, series of 1990. The DAR Regional Director recommended a denial of the said petition on the
ground that private respondent "failed to substantiate their (sic) allegation that the properties
are indeed in the Municipality's residential and forest conservation zone and that portions of the
properties are not irrigated nor irrigable".

Private respondent filed an Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from CARP coverage, this
time alleging that the property is within the residential and forest conservation zones and
offering a portion of about 15 hectares of land (irrigated riceland) to sell to farmer beneficiaries
or to DAR. On October 19, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the application for
exemption. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was likewise denied.
Appeal was made to the Court of Appeals. The latter in turn created a commission to conduct
ocular inspection and survey. DAR likewise constituted its own team to conduct an inspection
and thereafter objected to the report filed by the commission.

On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the Assailed DAR
Orders and declaring the mountainous and residential portions of the petitioner's land to be
exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Hence, this petition for
review.

Issue:

Whether or not the landholdings subject of this controversy are exempt from CARL coverage?

Held:

There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax
declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax
declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of the land. In fact, DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations,
that must be submitted when applying for exemption from CARP. In Halili vs. Court of Appeals,
we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the Land Regulatory
Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration. The
classification of the Board in said case was more recent than that of the tax declaration and was
based on the present condition of the property and the community thereat.

The commissioner's report on the actual condition of the properties confirms the fact that the
properties are not wholly agricultural. In essence, the report of the commission showed that the
land of private respondent consists of a mountainous area with an average 28 degree slope
containing 66.5 hectares; a level, unirrigated area of 34 hectares of which 5 to 6 hectares are
planted to palay; and a residential area of 8 hectares. The finding that 66.5 hectares of the
112.0577 hectares of land of private respondent have an average slope of 28 degrees provides
another cogent reason to exempt these portions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10 of
the CARL is clear on this point when it provides that "all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope
and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act."

Petitioner DAR and the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) contest the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the subject parcels of land have a mountainous slope on the ground that this
conclusion was allegedly arrived at in a manner not in accord with established surveying
procedures. They also bewail the consideration given by the Court of Appeals to the "slope"
issue since this matter was allegedly never raised before the DAR and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner DAR and the OSG thus claim that laches had already set in. As pointed out earlier, the
crux of the controversy is whether the subject parcels of land in issue are exempt from the
coverage of the CARL. The determination of the classification and physical condition of the lands
is therefore material in the disposition of this case, for which purpose the Court of Appeals
constituted the commission to inspect and survey said properties. Petitioner DAR did not object
to the creation of a team of commissioners when it very well knew that the survey and ocular
inspection would eventually involve the determination of the slope of the subject parcels of
land. It is the protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour. The team of commissioners
appointed by respondent court was composed of persons who were mutually acceptable to the
parties. Thus, in the absence of any irregularity in the survey and inspection of the subject
properties, and none is alleged, the report of the commissioners deserves full faith and credit
and we find no reversible error in the reliance by the appellate court upon said report.

7. Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos vs E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (GR No. 131624,
March 16, 2011)

Facts:

Several parcels of unirrigated land (303.38545 hectares) weresituated at Barangay Langkaan,

Dasmariñas, Cavite. Originallyowned by the MAnila Golf and Country Club, he property
wasaquired by the [herein repondent EMRASON] in 1965 for thepurpose of developing the same
into a residential subdivisionknown as "Traveller's Life Homes". Municipal Council of
Cavite,enacteed Municipal Ordinance No. 1, hereinafter referred to asOrdinance No. 1, entitled
"An Ordinance Providing SubdivisionRegulation and Providing Penalties for Violation
Thereof."E.M. Ramosand Sons, Inc., applied for an authority to convert anddevelopment its
aforementioned 372-hectare property into aresidential subdivision, ataching to the application
detaileddevelopment plans and development proposals from BancomDevelopment Corporation
and San Miguel Corporation. On June15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as
theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect, usheringin a new process of land
classification, acquisition and distribution.Secretary Benjamin Leong sent out the first of four
batches ofnotices of acquisition to EMARSON.EMRASON] filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila, separate petitions to nullify
the firstthree sets of the above notices. Legal Division of DAR rendered adecision declaring as
null and void all the notices of acquisitions. Atthis juncture, the DAR had already prepared
Certificates of LandOwnership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the subject property tofarmer-
beneficiaries. However, on appeal, the writ of preliminaryinjunction issued by the Court of
Appeals enjoined the release ofthe CLOAs The Court of Appeals allowed the intervention of
Buklodbecause -the latter's participation was "not being in any wayprejudicial to the interest of
the original parties, nor will suchintervention change the factual legal complexion of the case."
The Court of Appeals further observed that the subject property hasnever been devoted to any
agricultural activity. thus, CA grantedthe petition.

Issue:

whether or not the subject property is within the coverage of CARP

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held that CARP coverage is limitedto agricultural land. More specifically,
the following lands arecovered by the CARP:(a) All alienable and disposable lands of thepublic
domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.;(b) All lands ofthe public domain in excess of the
specific limits as determined byCongress in the preceding paragraph;(c) All other lands owned
bythe Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and(d) Allprivate lands devoted to or
suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised
thereon.Section3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down the definition of agricultural
land that is subject to CARP to "land devoted toagricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified asmineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."The CARLtook effect on
June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the CARP, thesubject property should have already been
reclassified asresidential prior to said date.furher, LGUs are empowerd to havezonal
classification.

Zoning classification is an exercise by the localgovernment of police power, not the power of
eminent domain. Azoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislationwhich
logically arranges, prescribes, defines, and apportions agiven political subdivision into specific
land uses as present andfuture projection of needs. Since the land was already reclassified
before the CARL tooke effect, it will not therefore be includedunder the coverage of the law.the
SC denied the petition

8. Central Mindanao State University vs DARAB (GR No. 100091, October 22, 1992)
Facts:

Complaint filed by complainants calling themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and
Agricultural Laborers Organization (BUFFALO) against the CMU, before the Department of
Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants, under the CARP.

The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural educational institution owned and run by the state
located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province.

From its beginning, the school was the answer to the crying need for training people in order to
develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and established
the school had a vision as to the future development of that part of the Philippines. On January
16, 1958 the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the late Carlos P. Garcia, "upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and pursuant to the
provisions of Section 53, of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended", issued Proclamation No.
476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a
site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU.

Under the terms of a contract called Addendum To Existing Memorandum of Agreement

Concerning Participation To The CMU-Income Enhancement Program a former employee would
be grouped with an existing selda of his choice and provided one (1) hectare for a lowland rice
project for one (1) calendar year. He would pay the land rental participant's fee of P1,000.00 per
hectare but on a charge-to-crop basis. He would also be subject to the same prohibitions as
those imposed on the CMU employees. It was also expressly provided that no tenant - landlord
relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.

The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project,
the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by
school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.

On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants
and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the
segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and
their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.

Issue:

Whether or not DARAB is correct in ordering the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable,
compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land.

Held:

No. The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land area of the CMU to its
present needs or to a land area presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in
carrying out its present educational program with its present student population and academic
facility -- overlooking the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come.
By the nature of the CMU, which is a school established to promote agriculture and industry, the
need for a vast tract of agricultural land for future programs of expansion is obvious.

9. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform (GR No.
78742, July 14, 1989