5

Are Epistemic Virtues a Kind of Skill?

Sarah Wright

5.1 INTRODUCTION: TWO CONCEPTS OF

SKI LL—AB I LI TY A N D T E CH N Ê

In this chapter, I will focus on two conceptions of skill that are the most relevant to virtue
epistemology. First, we have skills as abilities. Abilities are dispositions that allow a person
to succeed reliably in achieving a particular aim. The aim of an ability makes it distinct from
other abilities, marked linguistically by saying it is an ability to do a particular thing. The
ability conception of skill focuses on the output of a person’s dispositions without being
committed to those dispositions having a specific underlying structure. Two people who can
achieve the same aim in different ways will be counted as having the same ability; the person
who types and the person who writes by hand both demonstrate the ability to write a letter.
Second, we have skills as technê, which is translated from the Greek as art, craft, or skill.
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes technê from the mere production of desired
ends, by noting that technê requires an understanding of the underlying structure (or logos)
of a craft: “A man will be proficient in grammar then, only when he has done something
grammatical and done it grammatically: and this means doing it in accordance with the
grammatical knowledge in himself” (NE.1105a23-25).
Since the technê conception of skill is the one at play in ancient debates about virtue and
skill, it will be relevant to any approach in virtue epistemology that takes inspiration from
historical virtue ethics.1
While the definition of technê requires the practitioner to understand the logos of the activity,
it does not require that the practitioner be able to reliably succeed in producing the ends of the
craft. To speak of technê in this way would eliminate the category of stochastic technê, a category
used by the Stoics to cover arts that cannot be counted on to successfully achieve their aims.2
Medicine is an example; even the most skilled doctor who understands the workings of the
human body in great detail may consistently fail to bring her patients back to health. Some suffer
from conditions that are too far progressed, others suffer from incurable disease. Not requiring
reliable success from technê allows us to say that this doctor is skilled and that she possesses the
technê of medicine. Within the terminology specified here, if we wish to require reliability in a
particular skill, we may insist that it be both an ability and a technê.

58
 ARE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES A KIND OF SKILL? 59

5. 2 VI R TUE R E LIA BILIS M

The very idea of taking a virtue-centered approach to epistemology was introduced by Ernest
Sosa (1980) to diagnose the dialectic between the two most prominent theories of epistemic
justification at the time, coherentism and foundationalism. Sosa argues that both sides share
the assumption that only states with propositional content can serve as the justifiers for our
beliefs. Sosa introduces intellectual virtues to move beyond this assumption. Rather than
looking for further beliefs or evidence to serve as justification, we should allow the virtues of
the believer to serve as a source of justification. Sosa’s early characterization of intellectual
virtue is as a “disposition to believe correctly” (1991: 140). This can lead us to a general char-
acterization of virtue reliabilism, which focuses on the output of our cognitive dispositions,
evaluating each to be a virtue if and only if it reliably produces true beliefs.
John Greco’s motivation for developing his own “agent reliabilism” is as a response to
skeptical worries. Greco (2000) diagnoses the gap between our evidence and states of the
world as a persistent source of skeptical worries. In the face of this Cartesian external world
skepticism, Greco points out that any attempt to provide arguments bridging this gap would
be stymied by Humean skepticism about induction. However, possession of “stable and reli-
able dispositions that make up one’s cognitive character” (2000: 177) provides a desired
connection between our evidence and the external world. Thus, Greco introduces reliabilist
intellectual virtues to avoid skepticism.

5.2.1 Virtue Reliabilism and Ability

Reliabilist intellectual virtues are closely related to abilities. Abilities are reliable processes,
but their reliability need not be further justified. Technê, on the other hand, doesn’t stop the
regress of reason-giving. The possessor of a technê needs to be in a position to understand
the logos of a domain, and this requirement of further understanding or knowledge runs the
risk of re-starting the regress of justification or re-igniting skeptical worries.
We can also see that Sosa and Greco consider the intellectual virtues to be abilities in the
language that they now use. Greco (2009, 2010) focuses on abilities, characterizing knowl-
edge as a special case of success through ability. Sosa (2007) has recently given what he calls
the AAA account of knowledge on which knowledge is apt belief—belief that is accurate
because it manifests the believer’s competence (is adroit). This shift in terminology shows
that neither sees a gap between virtues and abilities; hence there is little need to give an argu-
ment that virtue reliabilism views virtues as a kind of skill.
What we can argue for are some ways in which the ability model of virtue is beneficial to
virtue reliabilism. First, abilities are poised to satisfy Sosa and Greco’s original motivations
for developing virtue reliabilism. Abilities are dispositions to reliably succeed in reaching
their aim; when that aim is true belief, they reliably produce true belief. As noted above, the
ability conception of skills does not require that the possessor knows or even believes that
those abilities are reliable. Thus, abilities can stop the regress of reason-giving. They also fit
the answer to the skeptical worries that Greco wants to address; they connect the agent to the
world in a non-reflective way.
Second, a focus on abilities can help to explain the value of knowledge by subsuming knowl-
edge under the more general category of success through ability. Greco notes that such suc-
cesses are often recognized as being more valuable than accidental satisfaction of the same
goal.3 A skilled player’s successful shot is more highly valued than an equally well-placed shot
through beginner’s luck; the first is a credit to the skilled player, whereas the second doesn’t
reflect any evaluation of the novice. Greco uses this general feature of success through ability
to explain the value of knowledge over true belief, justified belief, or even justified true belief.4
60 SARAH WRIGHT

Third, since virtues are required for knowledge on virtue reliabilist accounts of knowl-
edge, it is important that the requirements for virtues not be too demanding. Abilities are
less demanding than technê, in the sense that they do not require a reflective aspect. Still,
abilities require reliable success in reaching their ends. If intellectual virtues must reliably
lead to true beliefs, one might wonder if there are any such virtues. From his earliest work on
virtue epistemology, Sosa has been careful to remind us that we should not expect too much
of any virtue. They must be reliable only relative to a particular normal environment. Even
the best eyesight cannot produce true beliefs in the dark, and even the best eyesight can be
deceived through colored lights or special effects (1991: 140).
This restriction on conditions and environments is strengthened and supported by the
analogy to abilities, which are also limited to environments and conditions. The example of
ability that Sosa often uses is that of archery. We expect a skilled archer to be able to reliably
hit the target in a range of normal archery conditions (2007: 84). But we do not expect her
to be able to hit the target in a hurricane. Greco also points out that even the most robust
abilities are restricted. Derek Jeter has the ability to hit a baseball. He is a skilled hitter, even
though he does not have the ability to hit pitches thrown in the dark (2010: 77). These exam-
ples of abilities in general make it plausible that virtues, like abilities, must be relativized to
a set of normal conditions. Such a restriction makes it far more likely that there are abilities
that meet the reliabilists’ requirement for intellectual virtues, and hence that there is knowl-
edge through the exercise of those abilities.

5.2.2 Virtue Reliabilism and Technê

Though both Sosa and Greco focus on abilities, their accounts can allow a place for technê as
another kind of skill that may be possessed by the virtuous person. Sosa’s account goes further
and recognizes something like technê as providing us higher forms of knowledge. While apt
belief is sufficient for animal knowledge, Sosa clearly recognizes the desirability of other higher
forms of knowledge that make a place for the kind of reflection supported by technê. In more
recent work, Sosa considers what is required for reflective knowledge, requiring that in addition
to animal knowledge, “under the light of reflection one must be able to defend the reliability of
one’s sources” (2009: 139). This requirement leads us in the direction of technê; if one under-
stands the logos behind one’s skillful action, then one is better poised to defend one’s reliability.
Most recently, Sosa has further explored an even higher-level of knowledge—knowing
full well. He suggests that knowing full well requires knowing with full aptness, where a fully
apt performance requires that “its first-order aptness derives sufficiently from the agent’s
assessment, albeit implicitly, of his chance of success” (2011: 11). Technê can serve as a basis
for the assessment element of fully apt performances. While virtue reliabilists are clearly
most focused on skills as abilities, it is still consistent with this picture to make room for
higher levels of intellectual virtue that require a kind of technê.

5. 3 VI R TUE R ES P ON S IBILIS M

In contrast to virtue reliabilism, virtue responsibilism focuses on the analogies and connec-
tions between the moral and intellectual virtues. While virtue responsibilism has been artic-
ulated in many different ways, each version shares the defining mark of responsibilism—a
focus on developed traits of intellectual character that in some way reflect on the evaluation
 ARE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES A KIND OF SKILL? 61

of the person possessing them. Examples of the virtues recognized by responsibilists include
open-mindedness,5 intellectual courage,6 and intellectual humility.7

5.3.1 Virtue Responsibilism and Ability: Are Abilities

Sufficient for Intellectual Virtue?
Abilities, conceived of as reliable dispositions, don’t clearly satisfy the model of the intellectual
virtues as robust character traits of the believer and as those which reflect on the evaluation of the
believer as a person. Some reliable dispositions will simply be faculties, like good eyesight or good
memory. While both of these faculties do help their possessor come to have more true beliefs,
those who have poor vision or poor memory because of some physical defect are not evaluated
as worse people for those disabilities.8 On the other hand, being forgetful through inattention is a
pattern of behavior that reveals someone’s character trait of being disinterested in a subject or of
being inattentive in general. It is the use of abilities, not the abilities themselves, that reflect on our
personal worth. Thus, possession of an ability is not sufficient for intellectual virtue.
Some responsibilists go further and argue that abilities cannot explain the value of knowl-
edge. This argument centers on the source of value of abilities; they seem to be valuable when
they achieve good ends, but not when they achieve bad ends. Thus abilities have only instru-
mental value. The so-called “value problem” or “swamping problem” aims to shows us that
the value of intellectually virtuous belief cannot be instrumentally derived from the value of
truth.9 If intellectual virtues are only valuable as a means to true belief, they cannot add to
the value of a true belief. Zagzebski uses espresso as an analogy. If the only thing you value is
a good espresso, once you have a good espresso in your hand it does not matter whether the
machine that produced it did so reliably or unreliably—means to an end can add no further
value once one has achieved the end. Similarly, responsibilists have argued that intellectual
virtues, when understood as abilities, cannot add value to the true beliefs they produce.

5.3.2 Virtue Responsibilism and Ability: Are Abilities

Necessary for Intellectual Virtue?
Even if responsibilists reject the claim that abilities are sufficient for intellectual virtues, this leaves
open the question of whether intellectual virtues might still require abilities as a necessary compo-
nent. Zagzebski stands out among responsibilists in requiring that virtues (both moral and intel-
lectual) must reliably succeed in reaching their aim. Yet, Zagzebski’s responsibilism does not hold
that ability is sufficient for virtue. Zagzebski’s virtues, moral and epistemic, require both what she
calls a success component (corresponding to ability) and a motivational component. So, she would
reject the idea that virtue is simply an ability, even if ability is required.
Why does Zagzebski require a success component in her intellectual virtues? One reason is
that, like Sosa and Greco, her goal is to give a definition of knowledge in terms of the intellectual
virtues. Zagzebski’s definition of knowledge does not require the knower to actually possess the
relevant intellectual ability, but only to believe as the intellectually virtuous person would believe.
Still, if the intellectual virtues did not reliably succeed in producing true belief, we might worry
that any true belief produced by them, or by those believing similarly, would be too lucky to count
as knowledge. Zagzebski’s definition of knowledge requires that one reaches true belief because
one believes as the intellectually virtuous person would. If the intellectual virtues did not require
ability, success in reaching the truth might not meet this “because of” requirement. So Zagzebski’s
intellectual virtues must require ability to play their desired role in her definition of knowledge.
62 SARAH WRIGHT

But note that other responsibilists are either not interested in or are skeptical of the possi-
bility of giving a definition of knowledge in terms of intellectual virtue. Lorraine Code (1987)
has argued against the possibility of giving a definition of knowledge on the grounds that there
are too many variations between potential knowers and their circumstances to expect a single
unified account of knowledge. Rather than looking for a definition, she turns to the virtue of
epistemic responsibility to provide us with advice about how to conduct ourselves in inquiry.
In a narrower rejection of Zagzebski’s view, Jason Baehr (2011) argues that her conditions are
neither necessary nor sufficient to cover all knowledge. Since Baehr recognizes Zagzebski’s defi-
nition as the best developed responsibilist alternative, he concludes that there is little hope for
defining knowledge in terms of intellectual virtue. Roberts and Wood (2007) follow both Baehr
in criticizing Zagzebski’s definition and Code in questioning whether there is enough unity
between instances of knowledge to support a single unifying definition.
Any responsibilist who does not take on the definitional project won’t have Zagzebki’s reasons
for thinking that intellectual virtues require ability. Furthermore, they face arguments against
that requirement. James Montmarquet (1993) argues that ability is not necessary for intellectual
virtue, by asking us to consider the history of science and the many scientists who seem to be
exemplars of intellectual virtue; they exhibit intellectual courage and open-mindedness. But, as
science has progressed, we have learned just how incorrect their groundbreaking beliefs were. Yet
this does not lead us to think less of them. Montmarquet thinks these scientists were intellectually
virtuous even if they were not reliable in generating true scientific beliefs; as a result, we should
not require ability as a necessary condition on the possession of intellectual virtue.10

5.3.3 Virtue Responsibilism and Technê

Turning from the ability conception of skills to the technê conception, we see that there is a
prima facie reason to think that intellectual virtues, when understood on a model of ancient
Greek moral virtues, either require or are identical to technê. For there was a near con-
sensus among authors from this period that virtues were a kind of technê. Paul Bloomfield
(2000) illustrates this with an example from the Gorgias in which Plato argues that virtues,
like technê, require understanding of an underlying logos; Plato contrasts this with having
a “knack” for bringing about a result. Flattery, he says, is not a technê, because it lacks any
underlying structure or principles; it is simply an ability to bring about pleasure in the per-
son being flattered.11 Julia Annas (1995b), in explaining the widespread ancient belief that
virtue is a technê, points out that while our modern conception of “craft” might be limited to
craft-fairs and the like, we should recognize technê as encompassing a wide range of skilled
productive actives. Annas also argues that we should not think of sports as our central case of
technê because an ability at sports may not reflect an understanding of any underlying logos
for the sport. Rather, we should think of examples like those Plato gives of weavers, farmers,
doctors, trainers, or nutritionists.
Both Bloomfield (2000) and Annas (1995b, 2003) highlight that Aristotle is unique among
ancient Greek philosophers in rejecting the claim that virtues are a kind of technê. Zagzebski
(1996) models her intellectual virtues on Aristotelian moral virtues. As a result, they inherit
the distinctive feature of distinguishing virtues and technê. Before considering Zagzebski’s
argument, let us turn first to its roots in Aristotle.12

5.3.4 Aristotle on Why Virtue Is Not a Technê

We have already seen that for Aristotle, technê requires knowledge of the underlying struc-
ture (or logos) of craft in question. Aristotle also holds that virtuous acts require knowledge,
but in addition they have two further conditions:
 ARE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES A KIND OF SKILL? 63

[I]n the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and
choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and
unchangeable character. These are not reckoned in as conditions of the possession of
the arts, except the bare knowledge.
(NE.1105a31–1105b2)

We can illustrate this with a simple technê like housebuilding. A house-builder’s use of his
knowledge can be motivated by a desire to earn money, not a love of architecture. Further,
his choice may not come from a firm character trait. Even a house-builder who will after-
wards change professions may be able to successfully build a house.
However, in the case of virtue, our motivations and character matter. Aristotle’s model
of choice does not include just any voluntary action; it might be better to characterize it as
deliberative choice or reasoned choice. So when we chose an action we must have a reason
for that choice; this means that we can always then ask, “For the sake of what or whom did
you choose this act?” If choice is always for some reason, that reason can be identified as the
motivation behind the choice. We see this focus on motivation in the modern arguments
against virtue being a technê.

5.3.5 Modern Theorists on Why Virtue Is Not a Skill

Zagzebski argues that virtues cannot be skills based on a number of arguments collected from the
literature.13 Zagzebski first looks at Philippa Foot and Gilbert Meilaender’s contention that skills
can be unexercised capacities. Zagzebski notes that one can be a skilled hockey player or skilled
speaker of Japanese, yet choose not to engage in those activities. But the virtues seem not to be like
this. Opting not to exercise a virtue in relevant circumstances is evidence that the person does not
really have the virtue in question. This relevant difference between skills and virtues is taken by
Zagzebski (1996: 107) as evidence that we should distinguish between them.
Second, Zagzebski considers an argument from Sarah Broadie, who follows Aristotle in
noting that we evaluate the output of skills differently than we evaluate the output of a vir-
tue. With respect to a skill, so long as a person produces the result that we looking for (e.g.,
a grammatical sentence), we tend to be satisfied without looking further to see if it was the
result of a skill (e.g., following the rules of grammar).14 Broadie notes, “The lack of skill
implies no defect in what he has done on this occasion” (1991: 83). This attitude is not
reflected in our evaluation of apparently virtuous actions; we evaluate right action from vir-
tue as more valuable than right action in one who lacks the virtue. Zagzebski highlights this
as another systematic difference between skills and virtues.
Zagzebski (1996: 116) finally notes that there is a difference between the value of the
exercise of skill and the value of the exercise of virtues. Virtues are valuable in themselves;
whenever they are exercised the resultant action is good. Skills, on the other hand, can be
used for good or bad purposes. The skill of speaking Japanese can be used to speak honestly
or to mislead others. In order to evaluate the goodness or badness of the particular exercise
of a skill, we must look at the results. Thus the value of a skill is instrumental, not intrinsic
as the value of the virtues is. Zagzebski concludes from these three arguments that we must
distinguish between virtues and skills. Her foundational role in responsibilist virtue episte-
mology has led to a widespread acceptance of the skill/virtue distinction.

5.3.6 Virtue as a Kind of Technê: The Skill of Living

Annas has argued in response to Zagzebski that virtues are best understood as a particular
kind of skill:
64 SARAH WRIGHT

[T]he thesis that virtue is a skill is a claim that virtue is one kind of skill, and thus
that the idea of skill is central in helping us to understand what virtue is. Against this
claim, pointing out obvious differences between virtues and skills is ineffective.
(2003: 17)

This distinction offers the material to provide a response to all of the arguments presented by
Zagzebski, but particularly to the second one developed from Broadie. Perhaps the way that
we assess and evaluate the outcome of some technê does focus on the outcomes alone; there
are times we simply need the product. If I need bread, and I get a well-made loaf, I might
not be concerned with the general bread-making skills of the baker; my concern is with the
product only. But there are other instances when the outcome of a technê is valued both for
its intrinsic properties and for the way it was made. We value a Stradivarius violin because
it has a sweet tone and strong resonance; but we also value it because it was made in the
Stradivarius workshops. Thus, while some skills may be evaluated in a way different from the
evaluation of virtues, others seem to provide a parallel. This is consistent with the idea that
virtues are a particular kind of skill.
In responding to the other arguments, Annas makes use of the Stoic claim that virtues
are the “skills of living.”15 Virtues are a “global expertise in your life” (2003: 19). Since other
skills have more specific goals, they may be unexercised capacities. I may have expertise in
violin playing, but there are many occasions in life which don’t call for music; in those, my
skill will remain a capacity. I may cease to care about playing the violin, but I cannot consist-
ently cease to care about living my life. As a result, the skill of living cannot lie dormant as a
capacity only.
Likewise, specific skills may have a less robust motivational component than virtues. My
motivation to exercise the skill of violin playing may wane over time. There is no reason to
criticize me for the loss of this motivation; other projects of mine may reasonably eclipse that
goal. But the skill of living is different. It is a matter of how I live my whole life, there are no
other projects to compete with it. If I am not motivated by questions of how I ought to live
my life, there is something wrong with my motivational profile. Thus, if we follow Annas
and the Stoics in thinking that virtue is the skill of living, we can accept the noted differences
between specific skills and virtue, while still claiming the virtue is a kind of skill. Another
way to stress the parallel between skills and virtue is to consider people’s life projects. If
someone sets as her goal becoming an expert violin player, she will be motivated to engage
in those practices that develop her expertise (Annas 2003, 2011). If this is really a life goal,
she will not leave her violin playing skill as a mere unexercised capacity.
Finally, the conception of virtue as the skill of living provides an explanation of the fact
that skills may be used for good or bad purposes, while virtues cannot be used for anything
but the good. If virtue is the skill of living, then any exercise of the virtues will be a move
in the direction of a life well lived. Other skills will not come with this guarantee. One may
make use the skill of speaking Japanese for good or bad purposes. But living well, being our
final end, is never bad. So the skill of living is intrinsically good. This feature doesn’t follow
from the structure of skills in general, only from the skill of living’s pre-determined end of
eudaimonia.

5.3.7 Back to Aristotle: The Technê of Living

Recognizing virtues as a kind of skill and in particular as the skill of living provides Annas
with the grounds to reject a principled distinction between virtues and skills. It also provides
us with a way to address the original Aristotelian distinction between virtues and technê.
 ARE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES A KIND OF SKILL? 65

Recall that Aristotle holds that while technê requires knowledge in the agent, virtue further
requires that one chooses the acts for their own sakes, and that these acts come from one’s
firm character. This is a real difference between virtue and technê, when we are considering
specific technê, such as weaving, housebuilding, or medicine. But we can now recognize that
the second and third features will be satisfied by the global technê of living.
Turning to the third of Aristotle’s desired features for virtue, we can ask if the technê of
living requires a “firm and unchangeable character.” We have noted above that this is not
required for specific technê. But the technê of living is not like that. It will be supported by
a trait of character for two reasons. The first is the practical concern of how one can sustain
living well through the course of a life. If living well does not come from a trait of character,
it is likely to be difficult to sustain; the continent person (someone who recognizes what
she ought to do, but has not yet developed the character to desire only what she recognizes
as good) is at greater risk of abandoning the project of living well. But second, even if the
continent person can succeed in acting correctly through the course of her life, her life is still
not as good as that of the person who lives consistently with her character. A life of struggle
against one’s desires is clearly less good than a life full of good actions that flow naturally
from one’s character. Thus, the person with the technê of living must have Aristotle’s third
feature of virtue.
Aristotle’s second feature of virtue is that it leads one to choose virtuous acts for their
own sakes. Specific technê could be practiced for their own sake; one could engage in weav-
ing purely out of love of weaving. But often they are practiced for the sake of some other
good; the desire to have a warm coverlet or to make money through the sale of woven goods.
Turning to the technê of living, we see that it has as its end a good life for the agent. If the
good life or eudaimonia is our final end, the end for the sake of which we choose all other
things, it is unclear how living well could be performed only for some other good. The per-
son with the technê of living will chooses to live well for its own sake; this is the motivation
of the virtuous person. So the technê of living must also satisfy Aristotle’s second feature of
virtue, closing the gap between virtue and the technê of living.

5.3.8 Can the Technê Model of Moral Virtue Extend to Intellectual Virtue?
The debates about whether virtue is a technê above have focused on a general characteriza-
tion of virtues, based on the moral virtues of the ancient Greeks. This is a result of several
factors. This first is that the relationship between virtues and skills has been more thoroughly
discussed within the field of moral virtue. But the second has to do with Zagzebski’s conten-
tion that the intellectual virtues are to be subsumed under the moral virtues. And, so, if the
moral virtues are not technê, then neither are the intellectual virtues.
So the question arises, do the arguments above that moral virtues are technê extend natu-
rally to a view that intellectual virtues are technê? What if the two kinds of virtues have
different structures? Annas (2003) raises a potential disanalogy between the moral and intel-
lectual virtues which might stand in the way of this extension. Annas notes that knowledge
is a success term; we do not attribute it to failed attempts to believe the truth, but only to
ones that successfully meet all the requirements for knowledge. She also notes that Zagzebski
wants her intellectual virtues to play a central role in her definition of knowledge. As a result,
it is natural to think of intellectual virtues as requiring success. But success in what? Annas
introduces a distinction from Stoic ethics between two types of aims. Our telos is our final
end. Ancient virtue theorists agree that the telos of human life is eudaimonia. Now, within
a good life, a virtuous person will engage in many particular actions, and each of these has
a target or skopos. Through the course of a day, a virtuous person may aim to comfort a
66 SARAH WRIGHT

grieving friend, aid someone in financial need, and defend someone else from a bully. These
skopoi are related to the telos, as they are each appropriate targets of the actions of a virtuous
person. Annas argues that virtue ethics ought to focus on the telos of eudaimonia. Because
success in a particular act can be blocked by moral luck, neither success nor failure in reach-
ing one’s skopoi reflects on the evaluation of one’s character. Our imagined virtuous person
may be unable to comfort an inconsolable friend, she may lack the means to help the needy,
and she may herself be beaten up by the bully. Each of these is a failure to achieve a skopos,
but Annas would argue that none of these failures interferes with her being virtuous or with
her success in living a eudaimonic life. Virtue ethics focuses on success in reaching one’s telos
over success in reaching one’s skopoi.
This focus of virtue ethics might come into conflict with the focus of Zagzebski’s vir-
tue epistemology. She holds that the intellectual virtues have a single shared underlying
motivation—to obtain truth and avoid falsehood (Zagzebski 1996). The particular intel-
lectual virtues are distinguished by their characteristic motivations to achieve this end in
a distinctive way. Since obtaining truth is the end of the intellectual virtues, it seems that
on Zagzebski’s picture we should treat true belief as our intellectual telos. But this breaks
the parallel with moral virtue, since our success in generating true belief can be blocked
by epistemic luck. Our most rigorous inquires might be foiled, and we might be misled by
well-planned deception. As a result, having true belief as our intellectual telos looks very
unlike our moral telos of eudaimonia.
In responding to Annas’ argument, Matt Stichter (2013) suggests this disanalogy is a rea-
son to move away from virtue responsibilism, which looks for the parallel with moral vir-
tues, and instead turn to virtue reliabilism and a focus on abilities. But the defender of virtue
responsibilism might suggest an alternative resolution (Wright 2014). Recognizing that true
belief is susceptible to epistemic luck, we would re-categorize true belief as a skopos. In our
individual inquiries, we aim at the target of truth. And this is as the epistemically virtuous
person would do. But failure to reach the truth, due to bad luck or adverse circumstances,
doesn’t reflect either on one’s epistemic character or on the epistemic evaluation of one’s
life. If truth is only a skopos, what then is the telos? This should be the epistemic analog of
eudaimonia. Berit Brogaard (2014) recommends moving to a virtue epistemology that takes
intellectual flourishing as its focus. Wayne Riggs (2003) reminds us that ancient agreement
on eudaimonia as our final end is grounded in part on eudaimonia being open to complet-
ing interpretations. He suggests that “wisdom” could serve as the placeholder for intellectual
eudaimonia; it can be filled in by competing interpretations of a good epistemic life. These
suggestions demonstrate a way that we could restore the parallel between the moral and
intellectual virtues. While the skopoi of our intellectual virtues, true beliefs, would be subject
to epistemic luck, there might be a telos, parallel to eudaimonia, which we can more securely
succeed in reaching.

5. 4 C O NC LUSI O N AND FURT H E R CON N E CT ION S

In this chapter, I have looked at reliabilist virtue epistemology, the benefits it gains from
considering virtues as abilities, and the room it has for considering virtues as technê. Virtue
responsibilism, on the other hand, looks for a conception of virtues more robust than mere
abilities. But contrary to some arguments in the literature, we have seen that its intellectual
virtues can be recognized as a kind of technê.
My focus here has been on the two conceptions of skills that are most prominent in con-
temporary virtue epistemology, those of ability and technê. I have not considered connections
 ARE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES A KIND OF SKILL? 67

to arguments about the general nature of skill. Matt Stichter (2013) has argued in favor of
Herbert and Stuart Dreyfus’s (1991, 2004) account of skills as a model for the intellectual vir-
tues. As noted above, this model of skills may be more attractive to the virtue reliabilist, who
focuses on abilities. The Dreyfus anti-intellectualist model of skills can be contrasted with
the more intellectualist model of skills developed by Jason Stanley (2011); this model bears a
resemblance to technê, and so may be attractive to the virtue responsibilist. However, Ellen
Fridland (2014) has recently argued that neither of these models adequately accounts for the
role of control that we exercise in our skills. This result may pose a problem for both kinds
of virtue epistemology, insofar as we think that control is required for responsibility. Thus,
the intersection between virtue epistemologies and models of skilled behavior may prove a
fruitful ground for further inquiry.16

(Related Chapters: 1, 2, 3, 39, 40.)

NOTE S

1 This distinction between two types of skills is inspired by the distinction (and potential overlap) that Heather
Battaly makes between two key concepts of virtue in her (2015).
2 Inwood (1986).
3 Sosa’s resent work also emphasizes this same connection between knowledge and other kinds of success.
4 Wayne Riggs (2002) gives a similar argument, noting that when we know we deserve credit for our true belief.
Lackey (2007, 2009) has presented a dilemma for this credit account of knowledge. If the standards for credit are
high, we can find instances of knowledge where the abilities/virtues of the believer seem to play too insignificant
a role in the generation of knowledge for them to be credited with this success; if the standards for credit are
lowered, implausible cases meet the threshold for knowledge.
5 Baehr (2011) and Riggs (2010).
6 Zagzebski (1996) and Baehr (2011).
7 Roberts and Wood (2007) and Whitcomb et al. (2015).
8 Zagzebski particularly notes the non-blameworthiness of disabilities in her (1999).
9 Zagzebski (2000), Riggs (2002), DePaul (2001), and Kvanvig (2003).
10 I also argue that intellectual virtues should not require ability (Wright 2009).
11 This is another reason for those focusing on the ancient Greek model of virtues to reject the idea that virtue is
simply an ability, since an ability as I have defined it here is quite similar to this kind of “knack.”
12 Code (1987), Montmarquet (1993), and Roberts and Wood (2007) all take inspiration from Aristotle.
13 I believe that each of these arguments is best understood as claiming that virtue is not a technê, but Zagzebski
expresses them in terms of virtues being distinct from skills, so I will use that terminology in this section.
14 Aristotle NE.1105a20-8.
15 Annas (2003: 16). This characterization of the Stoic account of virtues is more fully developed in her (1995a).
Bloomfield also notes that “Eudaimonia has a logos, and being virtuous is being an expert in a skill: the skill of
living well” (2000: 26).
16 My thanks to audiences at the Northwestern Pre-APA Epistemology Conference and the 2017 Bled Philosophy
Conference for comments on this chapter. Special thanks for the thoughtful and detailed feedback on earlier
drafts given me by Kathryn Pogin and Heather Battaly.

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