6 Epistemic Value and Virtues

Frank Hofmann

The nature of knowledge is an old topic in philosophy. Recently, interest

in questions about epistemic normativity has increased and, in particular,
in the question of the value of knowledge. Compared to true belief that is
not knowledge, knowledge seems to be better—not just practically but epis-
temically. Or so many think. And, of course, Plato discussed this question
of the additional value of knowledge in his dialogue Menon—which gave
it the name, ‘the Menon problem.’ The question is part and parcel of the
problem of the nature of knowledge. A satisfactory account of knowledge
must describe the nature of knowledge in such a way that questions about
its surplus value are answered, too. Or, as John Greco puts it: “The project
is to understand what knowledge is, and providing an account of epistemic
normativity is an important part of that project” (Greco 2010, 5).
Virtue epistemologists like John Greco and Ernest Sosa belong to what
is known as ‘reliabilist virtue epistemology.’ (Here I will neglect the other
branch of virtue epistemology, known as ‘responsibilist virtue epistemology’
represented by Linda Zagzebski and Abrol Fairweather. So in the follow-
ing, I will always refer to the reliabilist branch when speaking of ‘virtue
epistemology.’) They conceive of knowledge as a special structure involv-
ing the exercise of epistemic virtues. This is exactly meant to address the
normativity question as well. What accounts for the value of knowledge
is the fact that epistemic virtue is involved in a special way. What exactly
is this special way? Greco and Sosa label it in very similar terms: ‘success
from virtue’ (Greco) and ‘accurate because adroit’ (Sosa) are the slogans.
The common core idea is easily identified: True belief is reached because
of the exercise of an epistemic virtue (competence). One major point has to
be emphasized from the very beginning. It is not only, or not primarily the
existence of the relevant belief that is explained by the exercise of the virtue,
but its epistemic success, its truth. The virtue accounts for, or explains, the
truth of the belief—that’s what distinguishes knowledge from Gettier cases
of mere justified true belief.
So virtue epistemology promises to provide a unified, comprehensive
account of knowledge and epistemic normativity in general. This is reason
enough to take a closer look at how exactly the surplus value of knowledge
120 Frank Hofmann
is supposed to be explained in terms of epistemic virtues. This is what I do
in this chapter. In the second section, I present a reconstruction of the basic
argument—the master argument, indeed—concerning the surplus value of
knowledge. Then, in the third section, I investigate into what a virtue is,
both in general and in the epistemic case. I present five accounts of virtue
and critically discuss which one might be viable for the virtue-theoretical
account of knowledge. The conclusion will be that (only) the fifth one—the
refined dispositionalist account, based on an idea of J. J. Thomson’s—can
subserve these purposes. According to this account, in a nutshell, a virtue is
a disposition to form beliefs in such a way that it is epistemically good that
the subject has it. Initially, this account can indeed satisfy the most impor-
tant desiderata (whereas the other four accounts cannot). In the last and
fourth section I pose three critical questions for the resulting account and
discuss two of them to some extent. The conclusion will be that there is still
something missing in the virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativ-
ity: a good explanation of the surplus value of knowledge is still lacking. I
submit that this explanatory question has not yet been answered satisfacto-
rily. Furthermore, concerning the bearer of value, the surplus value must be
located in the entire structure of knowledge, and not just in the belief state.
So maybe the initial intuition that knowledge has surplus value cannot be
captured in an unqualified, unmodified way. But in my view this may not be
that much of a problem.

GRECO’S MASTER ARGUMENT

Virtue epistemologists such as Ernest Sosa and John Greco propose an account
of the surplus value of knowledge that is both comprehensive and elegant,
thus providing an answer to Plato’s Menon problem. In a nutshell, the account
is simply that knowledge is ‘success from virtue’ and has value as such. When-
ever one reaches success by the exercise of a virtue, one establishes a value
over and above the value of the success. The way in which the success has been
reached is relevant and makes a difference to the evaluation. This is generally
the case—not just for the doxastic case of true belief and knowledge. In the
theory of knowledge, we consider truth as success in belief formation.1 And
therein we acquire knowledge as the case of true belief from epistemic virtue.
But there are many other cases of ‘surplus value’ outside the theory of knowl-
edge. In the arts and sports, for example, we can also reach a certain kind of
success by exercising virtues or skills. The skilled archer—to take Ernest Sosa’s
favorite example—hits the target because of his or her skill. The lay archer,
lacking the relevant skill, only hits it accidentally. In all cases of success from
virtue, we are dealing with a corresponding surplus value. So hitting the target
by skill—in virtue of virtue—is better than hitting it accidentally.
In the following I present and discuss in detail the account offered by
John Greco in his book Achieving Knowledge. I focus on his version as it
 Epistemic Value and Virtues 121
is particularly succinct and clear and brings out the crucial ingredients in
a transparent way. But I assume that the account is essentially the same in
Sosa’s work, at least as far as the account of the surplus value is concerned.2
And the problems and questions I point out are generic ones and not just
problems for Greco’s version.
Plato’s Menon problem can be taken as the following problem of surplus
value:

(M) Why is knowledge better than (mere) true belief that is not knowledge?

(To speak of ‘mere true belief’ here means that the belief is not knowledge—
it may be justified or not. Therefore, one can simply drop the ‘mere’ in (M).)
We want to understand the value that knowledge has in comparison to true
belief that is not knowledge. This is by definition the surplus value of knowl-
edge. (One can compare knowledge to other states, such as justified true
belief or rational belief. This yields analogous problems. But here we shall
focus on the comparison to true belief that is not knowledge.)3
Greco (2010) states a master argument that is meant to establish the
surplus value of knowledge. He does not present it explicitly in the form
of numbered premises and conclusion. Rather, he presents it informally in
two sections, one at the beginning of the book and one in the chapter on the
value of knowledge. Here are the two passages.

The central thesis of this book is that knowledge is a kind of success

from ability. Let us suppose, with Aristotle, that the intellectual virtues
are abilities. Then knowledge is a kind of success from virtue. This is a
thesis about what knowledge is. [ . . . ] The thesis, then, is that knowl-
edge is an instance of a more general normative phenomenon—that
of success through ability (or success through excellence, or success
through virtue). (Greco 2010, 3)

[K]nowledge is a kind of success from ability, and in general success

from ability is both intrinsically valuable and constitutive of human
flourishing, which is also intrinsically valuable. [ . . . ] Therefore, knowl-
edge has value over and above the practical value of true belief. (Greco
2010, 99)

I offer the following reconstruction of Greco’s argument:

(1) Knowledge is success (truth) from ability.

(2) The relevant ability is a virtue.

Thus,

(3) Knowledge is success (truth) from virtue.

122 Frank Hofmann
(4) In general, success from virtue has surplus value in comparison to
success that is not success from virtue.

Thus,

(5) Knowledge has surplus value in comparison to true belief that is not
knowledge.

Some comments are in order. First, premise (1) is understood as meaning

that knowledge and only knowledge is success (truth) from ability. When-
ever one has true belief from ability, one has knowledge. So there is no
possibility of there being a case of true belief that is success from ability but
not knowledge. Though premise (1), understood in this way, is not obvious
by far, I will not question it in this chapter.
Second, it is presupposed by the argument that the relevant success con-
sists in truth. In the present context, this is not controversial, so I will not
say anything more about it here. And it is presupposed that true belief has
a certain value. (Greco calls it a “practical value” in the second passage
quoted above, but this is optional and not essential to the argument. One
might just as well maintain that true belief has epistemic value, or that it
has both practical and epistemic value.) Which value knowledge has is, of
course, a different matter.
Third, premise (2) is needed. It might seem trivial, but it is not. Premise
(2) bridges the gap between the abilities mentioned in premise (1) and the
general principle stated in premise (4). This is exactly the strategy of Greco.
He wants to subsume knowledge under a general principle about surplus
value. And in order to do so, he needs premise (2). So we must ask whether
it is indeed true that the abilities one exercises when forming beliefs that
are knowledge are really of the appropriate kind—whether they are really
virtues. I will discuss this issue in extenso in the next section. The relevant
virtues are, plausibly, epistemic virtues. We can grant this much. But the
question is whether the relevant abilities that give rise to knowledge are,
according to (1), really (epistemic) virtues.
If we replaced—and thus simplified—the argument to the effect that
premise (4) is modified into

(4’) In general, success from ability has surplus value in comparison to

success that is not success from ability.

and omitted premise (2), we would have to face the difficulty that this prem-
ise (4’) is not plausible. Only for success from virtue might it be the case that
surplus value is established, but not for success from ability (which need not
be virtue).
The point possibly becomes clearer if we explicitly disambiguate talk of
‘abilities.’ One might speak of ‘abilities’ and mean virtues. This is not what
 Epistemic Value and Virtues 123
can be presupposed in premise (1). The understanding of ‘ability,’ which we
can uncontroversially assume in the first premise, is simply something like
‘disposition’ (‘dispositional structure’) or ‘source.’ We can uncontroversially
assume that in the case of knowledge, true belief was reached by (the exer-
cising of) dispositions or sources (even though this is not obvious either).
But whether these dispositions or sources count as virtues—abilities in this
normative, stronger sense—is exactly one of the nontrivial and interesting
questions.4
Please note that it is not enough to assume that (epistemic or intellectual)
virtues are abilities (as Greco notes in the first passage quoted above). The
other direction is needed: The relevant abilities are virtues. In general, it does
not seem true to say that any ability is a virtue. There are many plausible
candidates for abilities that are not virtues, inside and outside of epistemol-
ogy. Take, for example, the ability to torture babies, or the ability to be
pedantic, or the ability to remember everything, or the ability to ignore all
evidence and/or counterevidence. These and many other cases of abilities are
either not clearly virtues or clearly not virtues at all. So it seems undeniable
that an ability need not be a virtue.5 Its being a virtue is nontrivial. And this
is as it should be, since being a virtue is supposed to help establish some sur-
plus value—as premise (4) says. This poses the question of why we should
think that the abilities relevant in the case of forming beliefs that are knowl-
edge are virtues. This is a crucial question for Greco’s master argument. And
of course a lot depends on what is meant by ‘virtue’ here. What is the force
of calling an ability a ‘virtue’? This is the reason I investigate virtues in the
next section extensively.
Fourth, premise (4) is meant to be a general principle. I will not question
it here.6 Whether it is true is, of course, an important question. (I will come
back to this point in the last section.) For the sake of argument, I will pro-
ceed on the assumption that premise (4) is indeed true.7
Fifth, a rather substantial question concerning the entire argument is the
question of what the ‘because’ or ‘from’ means, in formulations like ‘success
from virtue.’ Both Greco and Sosa hold that this ‘because’ indicates some-
thing like salient explanation. The success is supposed to be explained by the
exercise of the virtue. Consequently, it is ‘attributable’ to the virtue. Greco
calls the explanation “causal explanation,” but presumably he assumes a
rather wide understanding of ‘causal.’8
Now, one might find what it means to explain the truth of a belief not
entirely clear. In one sense, a rather constitutive sense, the corresponding
fact may be said to explain the truth of a belief—assuming a certain realistic
understanding of truth. This cannot be the relevant sense for the purposes
of the master argument, however. Rather, the explanation must be a causal
explanation, at least in a wide sense of ‘causal.’ It is an explanation of why
a true belief (with a specific content) has been formed. And the explanation
is supposed to cover precisely this aspect of the belief: its being true rather
than untrue.9 Both Greco and Sosa emphasize this point, and rightly so.
124 Frank Hofmann
The virtue is supposed to account for, or explain, why a true belief has been
reached.
This raises various other questions. Is this kind of explanation supposed to
be contrastive, and if so, what are the relevant contrasts? What exactly does it
take for something to be a cause of success in this sense? How much does such
an explanation presuppose a certain background? To what extent is it contex-
tual?10 But I will not elaborate on them in the following. I shall proceed on the
assumption that a viable understanding of ‘causal explanation’ can be worked
out. If not, the entire approach is doomed to failure from the very beginning.
We can summarize the argument in the following way: Knowledge is the
result of exercising abilities that are virtues, and in the case of knowledge,
the truth of the resulting belief is due to the exercising of the relevant virtue.
This is the general structure of success from virtue. And since success from
virtue has value over and above the value of the success (truth), knowledge
exhibits a value over and above the value of true belief. This is the sought
for surplus value of knowledge.
One final remark: Following the lead of Geach, Foot, and Thomson, one
could object against Greco’s argument as outlined above on the ground that
it assumes that there is something like being good (or having value, or more
value than something). One could hold that there is no such thing, but only
something like being good in way so-and-so (or being better in way so-and-
so). So one might reject the argument as resting on a false conception of
value. I will not go into this kind of objection here. I am just noting before
putting it to one side. It would require too much of an investigation into the
nature of value to be pursued here. And the issue is, of course, one of the big
and highly controversial ones.11 So I will grant to the defender of the argu-
ment that this kind of objection can be dealt with, and my criticism will not
rely on this objection or anything similar.

ACCOUNTS OF VIRTUE

What is a virtue? We need to say something about virtues in order to assess

the master argument. So in this section I present and discuss five different
accounts of virtue. The result will be that there is indeed a viable conception
of virtue to which the proponent of the argument can appeal. This will be
the fifth account to be described below, the ‘refined dispositionalist concep-
tion,’ as I call it.
But before entering into the discussion of different conceptions of virtue,
one further point must be addressed. It concerns the scope of our discussion
of virtue. What is at stake is not only knowledge, but also (epistemic) justi-
fication.12 And it is one of the aims of virtue epistemologists like Sosa and
Greco to give a virtue-theoretic account not only of knowledge, but also of
justification. Virtues are meant to explain the nature (and value) not only of
knowledge, but also of justification.
 Epistemic Value and Virtues 125
That this is intended by Greco can be clearly seen from his treatment of
Gettier cases. There, we are confronted with cases of beliefs that are suc-
cessful (true) and the outcome of exercising an epistemic virtue, but they are
merely justified (true) beliefs and not knowledge. Exercising the epistemic
virtue accounts for justification, even though only success from virtue gives
rise to knowledge; a case of success and virtue (without success from vir-
tue) merely amounts to justified true belief (without knowledge).13 Similarly,
Sosa wants to account for justification in terms of ‘adroitness’ or compe-
tence. A justified belief is the result of exercising an epistemic competence.
And if it is accurate because it is adroit—if it is ‘apt,’ as Sosa calls it, then it is
knowledge. Aptness is exactly what is missing in Gettier cases, even though
adroitness is present.14 The basic idea is likely the same in Greco and Sosa.
Gettier cases do not involve the kind of relation between virtue and success
that is present in cases of knowledge. Please note that this implies that the
Gettier phenomenon extends far beyond the epistemic case of justified true
belief that is not knowledge. There are indeed many practical Gettier cases.15
Thus it is of crucial importance whether a certain conception of virtue
is capable of providing an account with this broad scope, comprising both
knowledge and justification. Justification and knowledge differ in at least
one important respect, as both Greco and Sosa assume (and we can fol-
low them here): knowledge entails truth, but justification does not. This is
important, since truth is the relevant success. We will see in due course that
this can give rise to serious problems for certain conceptions of virtue. For
the moment, the important thing to keep in mind is that we are looking for
a uniform account of virtue that can figure in an account of the nature and
value of both knowledge and justification.
In the following, I present five different accounts of virtue: the simple
dispositionalist account, the intentional agency account, the teleofunctional
agency account, the teleofunctional account, and the refined dispositionalist
account.
Let us begin with the first account, the simple dispositionalist account of
virtue. It is based on the rather simple idea that a virtue is an ability to per-
form good acts. For example, the virtue of justice consists in the disposition
to perform just acts. And an epistemic virtue simply consists in a disposition
to form true beliefs.
This can easily be elaborated by adding some more details. Standardly,
dispositions have normal (appropriate) conditions, a stimulus, and a mani-
festation.16 The manifestation has been specified in the examples given: just
acts, true beliefs. The stimulus and the normal conditions have not been
specified. But we have them in mind implicitly. Of course, an epistemic virtue
does not consist in a disposition to form true beliefs under any possible cir-
cumstances. We think of such a disposition as restricted to certain—possibly
quite narrow—conditions, the ‘normal conditions’ (or ‘manifestation condi-
tions’) associated with the disposition. This is generally the case, so it is no
surprise to see it in the case of epistemic virtues as well.17
126 Frank Hofmann
So we can summarize the form of an epistemic virtue as follows: An
epistemic virtue is a disposition to form true beliefs (the manifestation)
under normal conditions N given stimulus S. (We have not said anything
interesting about the stimulus yet. But it does not seem relevant to what
follows.)18
Even though the proposal looks promising, it faces an insurmountable
problem. For, in a nutshell, virtuous acts need not be successful. One can
exercise a virtue and thereby produce a manifestation, but the manifesta-
tion need not have the goodness feature relevant for this virtue. This is true
of virtues in general, and it also holds for epistemic virtues. For example,
one may manifest one’s virtue of justice in a certain action, but the action
need not be just. This sounds a little odd. But the oddness is simply due to a
certain ambiguity of the expression ‘just act.’ By ‘just act’ one can mean any
manifestation of the virtue of justice. But one can also mean an action with
the relevant goodness feature. Assume, for the sake of argument, that the
relevant goodness feature is something like an action that gives others what
one owes them. The two features then can come apart: being a manifesta-
tion of the virtue of justice and being an action that gives to others what one
owes to them. It is similar in the case of epistemic virtues. The manifestation
of an epistemic virtue is a belief that is epistemically good in some sense. It
is an epistemically justified (or rational) belief. But it need not be true, since
justification does not entail truth. The manifestations of epistemic virtues
need not be true, and therefore we cannot rely on the simple idea that an
epistemic virtue is a disposition to acquire true beliefs.19
To repeat the point: Epistemic virtues can be manifested in beliefs that
are false, even in normal conditions. This much is intuitively true. And it is
an assumption that is needed in order to account for justification in terms
of virtues. It is intended by the virtue epistemologist that epistemic virtues
account for justification, as noted above. Justified beliefs are virtuously
formed beliefs. And so the relevant virtue can be exercised and manifested
without the resulting belief being true. Since the virtue account is supposed
to account for both knowledge and justification, the simple dispositionalist
analysis of virtue is precluded. We will have to look for something else.
Later I will propose a refined dispositionalist account (as the fifth and
last account). But before doing, so it will be helpful to consider some other
accounts that draw on various ideas that are also frequently mentioned,
such as agency and teleofunctions. Discussing these accounts will help to
sort out which ideas can do real work for the virtue epistemologist in respect
of solving the surplus value problem. (These ideas may also be useful for
other tasks and for dealing with other problems, of course.)
The next two accounts rely on the idea of agency. The second account is
the intentional agency account of virtue, and the third account is the teleo-
functional agency account.
According to the intentional agency account, a virtue is a character trait
of good will, or good intention. The virtuous person has good intentions,
 Epistemic Value and Virtues 127
good motivation. So an epistemically virtuous person has the intention to
form and have true beliefs. The right epistemic motivation is what matters.
Again, the virtuous act need not be good in the relevant sense. To have
the right intention does not guarantee that one gets what one intends. One
can have virtuous beliefs that are false. So these will be justified beliefs that
are false. So far, so good.
I will give rather short shrift to this account, since I believe that it faces a
basic and decisive problem: It is too subjectivist. The entire burden is sup-
posed to be carried by the subjective motivation to reach true belief. But
epistemic normativity is not subjective in this way. It is much more objec-
tive since it requires the world to cooperate (and possibly in various ways).
For knowledge, this is quite obvious. But even in order to acquire justified
beliefs, we need something more objective than mere ‘good’ intention. For
example, the subject has to use some process or method that is to some
extent reliable. Or the subject has to rely on real, genuine evidence (some-
thing that really speaks in favor of the truth of the relevant belief—and not
just from the subject’s point of view). Perceptual knowledge provides a case
at hand. For perceptual knowledge, intending to form true beliefs is beside
the point. It is not even nearly sufficient (even given truth). And it is arguably
also not necessary.
In any case, reliabilist virtue epistemologists like Greco and Sosa will
agree.20 And their perspective on virtues is what I am primarily interested
in here. Perhaps a responsibilist version of virtue epistemology can build on
the idea of intentional agency. But I will not pursue this line of theorizing
any further here. We can conclude that what makes a justified belief valu-
able is not its being produced from good epistemic motivation. This would
be too subjective, at least for any kind of reliabilist. Similarly, what makes
knowledge especially valuable is not its being the product of good epistemic
motivation.21
Let us next consider an agency account with a different understanding of
the nature and role of agency: the teleofunctional agency account.
According to this account, we need agency, but agency is not to be con-
ceived of in terms of intentions or the will. Rather, it is to be understood in
terms of functions or, more precisely, teleofunctions. In a nutshell, whenever
a system has a function, in the sense of a goal or a job (and not in the causal-
dispositional sense), this is what makes its activities actions. The virtuous
action then is an action done on the basis of a virtuous system of the subject
having the function of producing activities with a certain success. And an
epistemically virtuous (doxastic) system is one with the function of produc-
ing true beliefs (plus, maybe, a sufficient degree of reliability in fulfilling its
function). Not just any old disposition counts as a virtue; a virtue requires a
function (and maybe reliability).
Again, a virtue in this sense need not bring about the relevant aim. It has
the function of producing true belief, but it may fail and produce false belief
instead. This, then, will be justified false belief.
128 Frank Hofmann
This teleofunctional agency account has to face at least two serious prob-
lems. First, the relevant goal need not be a goal of the person. It need not
be a personal goal. And, therefore, the virtue need not be a personal virtue.
Instead, it might be just a goal of a subpersonal system within the agent.
Perhaps, it is the goal of a certain perceptual cognitive system to produce
true perceptual beliefs. But this is not a personal goal—at least, not yet. So
the account seemingly somehow violates the intuition often appealed to by
virtue epistemologist that the knower deserves credit for his or her achieve-
ment. Intuitively, in cases of knowledge, the credit goes to the person. But
strictly speaking, all we are allowed to say is that the relevant subpersonal
system has performed well in producing its goal (true belief). In other words,
knowledge will not count as an achievement of the person—at least not
always. Second, it seems that talk of agency here is beside the point. It is
quite a bit of a stretch to speak of agency here at all. But even if we allow
for such a stretching of the notion of agency, it seems that all the relevant
work is done by the teleofunctions—whether we are speaking of agency or
not. What matters is simply teleofunction (or teleofunction plus reliability).
The potential to fulfill one’s function is what makes a disposition good, a
‘virtue.’ So we have to conclude that it would be advisable to drop talk of
agency altogether, and instead develop a teleofunctional account of virtue,
without any appeal to agency.
Now let us consider the fourth account, the teleofunctional account of
virtue (without agency). The basic idea is clear enough: Virtues are systems
with the potential of fulfilling their teleofunction. A cognitive system with
the function of producing true belief is (epistemically) virtuous whenever it
performs sufficiently reliably (in normal conditions). We can compare such
a system with the system of wishful thinking. Suppose there is such a system
of wishful thinking. It has the function of producing comfortable belief—not
true belief, so it need not be epistemically virtuous. Only a system with the
function of producing true belief can be epistemically virtuous. So the addi-
tional, surplus value lies in the function fulfillment.
The account, however, faces a decisive objection. It cannot explain false
justified belief, since fulfillment of function requires truth. If the function
is the function of producing true belief, then we do not have function ful-
fillment whenever false belief is generated. If we claimed that the result of
exercising a virtue always has a certain value—because of being virtuously
produced—this would be entirely mysterious. The function is not fulfilled in
the case of a false belief generated by a reliable system with the function of
producing true belief. Why should this be of any value? From the teleofunc-
tional perspective, the only thing that matters, and can give rise to value, is
function fulfillment. If there is no function fulfillment, there is no value.22
Concluding from our discussion of the last three accounts—the two
agency accounts and the teleofunctional account—we can say the follow-
ing: Neither agency nor function fulfillment can give rise to the value of
knowledge and justification in a comprehensive way. Of course, it does not
 Epistemic Value and Virtues 129
follow that there is no agency or no teleofunction. And it does not follow
that a full account of knowledge and/or justification requires an appeal to
agency or teleofunctions. But they cannot do the crucial work in an account
of the value of knowledge and justification. For such an account, we will
have to look for something else.
We can already venture a guess. It must be reliability that is ultimately
the source of value, even if functions and agency are involved. Somehow,
perhaps embedded in or accompanied by functions and agency, reliability of
belief formation must account for the relevant value—unsurprisingly, in a
way, since we are considering reliabilist virtue epistemology.
This idea is exactly what leads to the fifth and final account of virtue, the
refined dispositionalist account, as I would like to call it. According to this
account, we start from the basic intuition that reliable dispositions can give
rise to values. But the dispositions do not themselves have truth as a consti-
tutive component built into their manifestations. Rather, the manifestations
are simply certain beliefs—the beliefs that the subject has the disposition to
form under certain circumstances. Truth comes in by a different route.
To sketch how truth enters into the picture, I draw on an idea of J. J.
Thomson’s.23 But I do not stick precisely to what Thomson says about vir-
tues. Rather, I make free use of some of it, and try to put it into a viable
conception of epistemic virtues that could do the job virtue epistemologists
like Greco and Sosa want it to do. In addition, Thomson does not discuss
the case of epistemic virtues explicitly (or, at least, not to my knowledge). So
I draw on her ideas, extrapolating from them, and try to shape a conception
of epistemic virtues in line with them.24
According to a Thomsonian account of virtues, a virtue is, roughly speak-
ing, a disposition of a subject S, which is such that it is good (for x) that S
has it. It is good that the subject has this disposition—that is what makes it
a virtue. We can specify for whom it is good. In some cases, it is good for
the subject herself. This might be so in the case of virtues of prudentiality. In
other cases, it is rather good ‘for us.’25 These might be called ‘social virtues.’
Regardless, a virtue is a disposition that it is good to have.
More precisely, we can state what a virtue is in the following way: Con-
sider a disposition D to perform F-ish acts. Now if it good for us if a subject,
S, possesses D, then D is a social virtue (of S). And if it is good for S if S
possesses D, then D is an individual virtue (of S). In the special case of an
epistemic virtue, the disposition D is a doxastic disposition, a disposition to
form a certain belief with the content that p. (So F-ish acts are acts of form-
ing the belief that p.) What makes such a doxastic disposition D an epistemic
virtue (of S), then, is the fact that it is epistemically good (for us or for S)
that S possesses it.
We have two independent dimensions: on the one hand, the kind of
value—moral value or epistemic value, et cetera; and on the other hand,
for whom it is good—for the subject herself or for a larger group, for ‘us.’
Epistemic virtues always concern the epistemic value of truth.26 But they can
130 Frank Hofmann
be either social or individual epistemic virtues, depending on for whom it is
(epistemically) good that the relevant subject has the relevant doxastic dispo-
sition. For example, intellectual honesty might be a social epistemic virtue.
This will be so if it is epistemically good for us if people are intellectually
honest. And this might actually be the case, at least in many circumstances.
For, being intellectually honest might further the production of true beliefs
in one’s peers. Examples of individual epistemic virtues might be reliable dis-
positions to form perceptual beliefs on the basis of perceptual experiences.
In this way, we can classify epistemic virtues quite elegantly and plausibly.
Much of (traditional) epistemology can be seen as concerned with indi-
vidual epistemic virtues rather than social epistemic virtues. I am concerned
with individual knowledge here, too. But we can keep in mind that there is
room in our conceptual space for the possibility of social epistemic virtues.27
As to the bearers of dispositions, here we can restrict ourselves to indi-
vidual subjects. In principle, one could consider groups or institutions also
as bearers. One could do so if one were willing to attribute beliefs or suitable
states with intentional content to such groups or institutions. I am reluctant
about such attributions and such social bearers of belief-like states, so I
therefore restrict myself to individual subjects in the following.28
Relying on this way of carving things up, we can see that again the vir-
tuous act need not be good in the sense of actualizing the relevant goal. A
belief that is the outcome or manifestation of an epistemic virtue need not
be true. As a virtuous act—and by this we mean no more and no less than
the manifestation of an epistemic virtue—it need not be true. For the virtue
epistemologist the plausible thing to say is that it is a justified belief. The
virtuously formed beliefs are the justified beliefs. This fits in nicely with the
idea that knowledge entails justification. And so the virtue epistemologist
can say three things that cohere very well with one another. First, virtuously
formed beliefs are justified beliefs. Second, knowledge is virtuously formed
belief that is true because it is formed virtuously. Third, knowledge entails
justification. In this way, the account begins to provide a comprehensive
picture of both knowledge and justification in terms of epistemic virtues.
Gettier cases can then be treated quite elegantly. They are cases of virtu-
ous beliefs that are true, but not true because of virtue. They are cases of
success—true beliefs—but not ‘success from virtue.’ They are adroit and
accurate, but not accurate because they are adroit, as Sosa puts it. The com-
mon idea is clear enough. The relevant explanation of the success is not
provided by exercising an epistemic virtue, as in cases of knowledge.
Let us take up another issue that we have not yet said much about: the
conditions to which dispositions are relative. Sometimes these conditions are
called ‘normal conditions’ and sometimes they are called ‘manifestation con-
ditions.’ It is common to think of disposition as relative to conditions in the
following sense: A disposition is always a disposition to generate a certain
manifestation in certain conditions. A disposition to walk under conditions
of gravity on Earth is one thing; a disposition to walk under conditions of
 Epistemic Value and Virtues 131
gravity on the moon is quite another. The disposition to break when struck
under conditions of room temperature is one thing; the disposition to break
when struck under conditions of low temperatures close to absolute zero
is another, and so on. There are many, many dispositions, each of which is
relative to certain conditions. (And which disposition we talk about when
we just speak of ‘fragility,’ for example, is a matter of the context of the
utterance.)
Furthermore, a disposition standardly has a stimulus (or trigger), which
activates the disposition. In cases of perceptual beliefs, we can take the
relevant perceptual experience as the stimulus. Having the perceptual expe-
rience activates the disposition to form the corresponding perceptual belief.
For example, if Daniel looks at the red tomato which is lying in front of him
on the kitchen table, and conditions are normal, then he undergoes a certain
perceptual experience (‘as of a red tomato’), and this perceptual experience
serves as a stimulus, that is, it activates his disposition to form the belief that
there is a red tomato in front of him. Will this doxastic disposition be an
epistemic virtue? This is the question that we have to discuss now.
In general, whether a doxastic disposition counts as an epistemic virtue
is determined by whether it is epistemically good for the subject to have it.
This, in turn, seems to depend on two things: (i) the reliability of the disposi-
tion, and (ii) the probability of being in the manifestation conditions of the
disposition.
The reliability of the disposition is the probability of the truth of its mani-
festation. Given the manifestation conditions and the stimulus, there is a
certain probability that the generated belief (the manifestation) is true. If
this probability is high or high enough, the disposition is reliable.29 But intui-
tively, whether it is good to have such a reliable disposition also depends
on the probability of the subject being in manifestation conditions. If the
manifestation conditions are extremely unlikely—like, for example, condi-
tions of being guided by helping angels, to take an extreme case—then it is
of no epistemic use to have the disposition. It is not epistemically good to
have a reliable disposition to form beliefs under extremely unlikely condi-
tions. Only if it is sufficiently likely that one has manifestation conditions is
it epistemically good to have the relevant disposition.
If conditions (i) and (ii) are met, it seems that we can say that having
such a disposition is a good thing for the sake of truth; it has epistemic
value. Furthermore, we can say all of this compatibly with holding truth
monism. According to truth monism, there is exactly one final epistemic
value, namely, true belief. We can accept both the foregoing conception of
epistemic virtues and truth monism. I take that to be a virtue of this concep-
tion of epistemic virtues.30
In sum, the refined dispositionalist account of epistemic virtues à la
Thomson is capable of providing a uniform account of justification and
knowledge, and it can articulate clearly what makes a doxastic disposition an
epistemic virtue. It relies on a standard, general conception of dispositions.
132 Frank Hofmann
And it is compatible with truth monism and does not require appeal to
teleofunctions or agency (but is compatible with them). It seems to have all
the virtues we might want.31
Relying on this conception of epistemic virtues, we can now go back to the
assessment of our master argument. How does it fare under this framework?
Let us start by considering cases of perceptual knowledge. In these cases,
the relevant perceptual belief is formed on the basis of perceptual experi-
ences. And we can assume that the subject has a doxastic disposition whose
manifestation is the perceptual belief. In other words, the subject forms the
perceptual belief that p on the basis of her perceptual experience e and by
manifesting her doxastic disposition (to form the belief that p on the basis
of e). Assume that this takes place under the manifestation conditions of
the disposition and the disposition is reliable under these conditions, that
is, the disposition is a virtue. Suppose that the resulting belief that p is true.
Then it seems natural to say that the success is explainable by reference to
the reliable doxastic disposition—the virtue. (It need not be the case that the
exercise of the virtue guarantees the truth of the belief.)32 What explains the
success in belief formation is the virtue exercised under the obtaining condi-
tions. So we can speak of ‘success from virtue.’
More generally, it seems that the same kind of picture arises for other,
nonperceptual epistemic virtues. If a belief is formed by exercising a vir-
tue (under its manifestation conditions) and if it is true, the success can be
explained quite naturally by reference to the virtue. We can speak of ‘success
from virtue.’ Since virtues need not be perfect, a belief formed on the basis of
a virtue (under its manifestation conditions) can be false. This will then be a
justified (false) belief. The Gettier cases are maybe a bit more complicated.
A justified true belief that is not knowledge is a belief formed by exercising
a virtue. But it is formed under conditions that are not appropriate, that
is, that do not belong to the manifestation conditions of the relevant vir-
tue—for, if it were formed under manifestation conditions, we would have
no reason not to explain the truth by reference to the virtue. So we have to
say that Gettier cases are cases in which the conditions do not belong to the
relevant manifestation conditions.
So far, so good. I will not try to criticize the account on these points. Let
us concede to the virtue epistemologist that so far a plausible analysis of the
two kinds of cases of justified belief and the case of knowledge can be given.
We still have to see if there is no reason to be dissatisfied with the account.

SOME QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

In this section I present three critical questions for the master argument
and its virtue-theoretical framework. These are the truth question, the
explanatory question, and the location question. I do not discuss the truth
question, but simply put it on record. But I do discuss the second and the
 Epistemic Value and Virtues 133
third questions to some degree. The result will be that these two questions
point to certain shortcomings or limitations of the virtue-theoretical account
as presented so far. Something is still missing in the account, namely, a con-
vincing explanation of why knowledge has surplus value. And the virtue
epistemologist might have to correct or modify the initial intuition of sur-
plus value in a certain way. It is not clear whether this is a serious problem,
but it is worth mentioning it and keeping it in mind.
For a start, three questions can be asked about the account presented so
far. The first and major question concerns the truth of the general premise (4).

(4) In general, success from virtue has surplus value in comparison to

success that is not success from virtue.

Are we to accept this claim merely on the basis of direct intuition? Are there
any independent reasons for accepting it? These are of course salient ques-
tions, and a lot would have to be said to arrive at a reasonable judgment.
But I do not have the space to enter into this investigation here. I can only
note that there is a big question. It concerns the truth of premise (4). So let
us call it the ‘truth question.’ In the following I do not elaborate on this truth
question, but for the sake of argument concede to the virtue epistemologist
that it can be answered positively. Instead, I will focus on two other critical
questions.
For the sake of argument, let us suppose that the general principle of sur-
plus value from virtue, as expressed by (4), is true. Then a second question
immediately arises, namely, the explanatory question: What is the explana-
tion of the surplus value at hand? In thesis (4) we have a statement of the
existence of the surplus value, on a general level. But a (true) existence state-
ment is not an explanation. In itself, claim (4) does not explain how the
surplus value arises, or of what it is constituted. Somehow it does not seem
entirely clear why there is such a surplus value. On intuition, it calls out for
an explanation. So what is the explanation? This is the explanatory question.
In my view, the virtue epistemologist has not yet given any such explana-
tion. An explanatory account is still missing. It might be true that all success
from virtue generates, or is, a surplus value. But why? How can the explana-
tion of success by reference to virtue give rise to, or constitute, an additional
value? This question has yet to be answered.
One may say that the original question, Menon’s problem, has been
answered by the master argument. An answer has been given to the ques-
tion of why knowledge is better than true belief that is not knowledge. But
the question has only been shifted to the general level. What we would really
like to know is why success from virtue is better than success that is not suc-
cess from virtue. It is the same question, only on a more general level. And
this is exactly where a further explanation seems to be required.
And it seems difficult to provide such an explanation. If a true belief
was formed by exercising a virtue (under its manifestation conditions), we
134 Frank Hofmann
can explain the success by reference to the virtue. This is an explanation of
the truth of the belief. But it is not an answer to the question of why there
is an additional value over and above the value of truth. Or are we sup-
posed to think that exercising a virtue successfully (under its manifestation
conditions) is obviously something so valuable that no further explanation
is needed? That does not seem plausible to me at all. After all, if a virtue
is exercised in a Gettier case, there is no such surplus value, and the suc-
cess is not attributable to the agent’s exercising a virtue. But why does this
attributability of success to the exercising of virtue make a difference to the
existence of a certain value? This is not at all clear to me, and I suspect that
there is a big problem here. I would like to conclude, therefore, that the
virtue-theoretical account still owes us an explanation of the surplus value,
and that it is hard to see how such an explanation could be given. (Please
remember that all of this has been argued on the assumption that the truth
question has been answered positively.) In any case, it is definitely true that
the master argument in itself does not provide such an explanation, since it
‘merely’ establishes the existence of the surplus value.
A further, third question arises. This is the ‘location question,’ as I call it.
This question addresses the aspect of bearership. In a nutshell, the question
is: What exactly is it that has, or possesses, the surplus value? Several candi-
dates might come into mind. A first candidate is the belief that is the result
of exercising virtue and is the piece of knowledge. This is the mental state. At
least one further candidate comes to mind, however. This is the entire struc-
ture or process of forming the belief by exercising the virtue. One may hold
different views about what ontological kind or category this entity belongs
to. This, however, is not the real problem that I wish to discuss. For the sake
of argument, I simply assume that, ontologically speaking, it is a structure,
that is, a complex entity comprising both the exercising of the virtue and the
result: the belief state. The real problem is to decide whether it is the belief
state that has the surplus value or the structure—whatever ontological view
one might hold about what kind or category of entity to which the structure
belongs. My claim here is that the structure is the far better candidate than
the belief.33
One might wonder about the significance of the location question. Why
is it important to decide what exactly the surplus value has? Indeed, the
question is important, since we have to make up our minds about whether
the basic, initial intuition concerning surplus value has really been respected.
The intuition, as standardly stated, locates the surplus value within the belief
that is knowledge. It is usually articulated by saying something like ‘know-
ing is better than merely truly believing.’ So the intuition seems to locate the
surplus value within the belief that is knowledge—in contrast to the belief
that is not knowledge. But now it turns out—as I argue—that according to
the virtue-theoretic account, it is not the state of knowledge that possesses
the surplus value but the entire structure. To me, this sounds like a certain
limitation of the virtue-theoretic account. Only in a qualified sense can it
 Epistemic Value and Virtues 135
preserve the initial intuition about surplus value. It has to be reformulated
or reinterpreted in a certain way, in order for it to be captured. The initial
intuition is not captured fully.
Perhaps this is a big problem, perhaps not. This is not so clear. But in any
case, it is important to notice that there is a certain divergence between the
initial intuition and what can be reproduced or captured by the theoretical
account. Sometimes, intuitions can be modified in certain ways without any
serious harm. But sometimes such a modification can be taken as an indica-
tion of ultimate failure. It is not easy to decide which one of the alternatives
is realized in our case. And I will not say anything more about it now. Here
the point is, rather, to put the question on the agenda and to make clear that
the virtue epistemologist is not immediately in a favorable position.
Now, why is it that virtue epistemology and the master argument attri-
bute the surplus value to the entire structure and not to the outcome belief
state? Expressions such as ‘performance’ or ‘belief acquisition’ might mean
the resulting state or the entire structure. The term ‘success from virtue’ is
equally ambiguous. It might be taken as referring to the state that is success-
ful and successful because of virtue. But it can also be taken as referring to the
entire structure of virtuously forming the belief in such a way that a success
results because of virtue. Then it refers to the success-from-virtue. (Let us
take this technical term, ‘success-from-virtue,’ to refer to the structure.) Once
we recognize this ambiguity, however, it seems rather clear that the second
reading is the right one. What has surplus value, according to the general
surplus value principle (4), is the success-from-virtue, the entire structure, the
performance as a whole process—and not merely the outcome state.
If this is not yet entirely clear intuitively, the following consideration could
be added. According to the virtue-theoretic account, what distinguishes
knowledge from mere justified true belief, as it occurs in Gettier cases, is
the fact that the success is explained by the virtuous performance. So it is a
relation between the generating activity and a feature of the resulting belief
state (its truth), which is crucial for knowledge. Therefore, the crucial dif-
ference is a difference between the two structures—the structure of virtuous
act plus true result (Gettier case) and the structure of true result because of
virtuous act (knowledge). This ‘because of’ relation is always the crucial
ingredient with which the surplus value correlates, both in the epistemic case
and in other, nonepistemic cases. But then it is overwhelmingly plausible, if
not mandatory, to think that it is (primarily) the knowledge structure that
has the relevant surplus value.
We could, of course, hold that the resulting state has surplus value in
a secondary, derived sense. But then it could only have such a secondary,
derived value in virtue of the entire structure’s having a primary, nonderived
surplus value. In other words, the result is better because, and only because,
it is part of a structure having surplus value. So this does not provide us with
a way around the assumption that the structure has the surplus value in a
primary, nonderived sense.
136 Frank Hofmann
NOTES

1. Or, perhaps, we take the double-faced aim of reaching truth and avoiding
falsity as success.
2. Cf. Sosa (2007). One major difference between Sosa and Greco is that Greco
explicitly accepts a contextualist dimension that Sosa does not endorse,
namely the contextualist dimension of causal explanation. (Cf. Greco [2010,
ch. 7].) This difference, however, does not matter to the basic idea of how
to explain knowledge’s surplus value. Another difference is that Sosa distin-
guishes between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and the for-
mula ‘accurate because adroit’ only applies to animal knowledge directly.
(Cf., for example, Sosa [2007, 24]). I will not be concerned with reflective
knowledge here, only with knowledge.
3. Cf. Greco (2010, ch. 6), in which Greco distinguishes various surplus value
questions.
4. Greco might use the term ‘ability’ sometimes or even always in this stronger
sense. His official account of abilities makes abilities the stronger, virtuous
dispositions or sources. (Cf. Greco [2010, 77].)
5. And this is so not only in the sense of its being not a moral virtue, as the case
of the ability to ignore all (counter)evidence shows. To be able to ignore all
(counter)evidence is not an epistemic virtue, even though it is an epistemic
ability.
6. I suppose that it is meant as a kind of pro tanto principle. Success from vir-
tue is better than success that is not success from virtue (that is, ‘lucky suc-
cess’)—leaving aside other aspects that may contribute further values. So we
deal with at least two values: (a) the value of the success, and (b) the surplus
value of success from virtue.
7. A question concerning the exact content of premise (4) is: What does the
qualification ‘in general’ mean? Does it mean strict universality (without
exceptions), or does it mean ‘It is the rule’ (allowing for exceptions)? I will
not discuss this question here. I will simply assume that whatever the exact
meaning is, the premise is supposed to cover at least much more than just
the case of epistemic virtues and, thus, has a certain kind of generality. My
arguments will not depend on any stronger reading than that.
8. Cf. Sosa (2007, 95–97), for example; cf. Greco (2010, 71), for example.
9. Cf. Sosa (2007, 95–96); cf. Greco (2010, 75), for example, in which Greco
states that the relevant kind of causal explanation is “poorly and only par-
tially understood.”
10. As already mentioned, Greco explicitly endorses the contextuality of the rel-
evant kind of causal explanation that he has in mind.
11. Superficially, the answer to the objection might be: The relevant value is an
epistemic value (not a pragmatic or moral one). But this provokes the further
question: What is this: an ‘epistemic’ value? And here we land ourselves with
rather grave problems.
12. In the following, I will always be concerned with epistemic justification and
speak of ‘justification’ simply.
13. Cf., for example, Greco (2010, 99 f).
14. Cf. Sosa (2007, 42 f). Sosa adds that aptness, accuracy, and adroitness are
matters of degree. Cf. Sosa (2007, 22); Sosa (2010, fn. 1).
15. Sosa explicitly says so: “The Gettier phenomenon thus generalizes beyond
the case of belief. A performance of whatever sort is gettiered if it is both
accurate and adroit without being apt” (Sosa 2010, 467). Sosa, however,
also states that in some Gettier cases the subject has knowledge, or ‘animal
 Epistemic Value and Virtues 137
knowledge,’ as he calls it: “In some Gettier cases the protagonist lacks reflec-
tive knowledge but has animal knowledge” (Sosa 2010, 474). This would
complicate things significantly. And I take this statement to be rather unfor-
tunate. What Sosa seems to mean is that in some alleged Gettier cases—like
the case of Barney in Goldman’s fake barn country—the subject has (ani-
mal) knowledge, but they are not really Gettier cases. I will proceed on the
assumption that this is the correct, charitable interpretation.
16. Cf., for example, Bird (2007, ch. 2); Mumford (1998).
17. One can partition the manifestation conditions in various ways. One can,
for example, distinguish between rather standing and fleeting conditions or
factors. This is what Greco does by partitioning the manifestation conditions
into ‘conditions’ and ‘environments.’ (Cf. Greco [2010, 77].) Or one can dis-
tinguish between rather internal and external conditions. This is what Sosa
does by talking of ‘conditions’ and ‘situations.’ (Cf. Sosa [2010, 465].) For the
following it will not matter which partitioning one favors, if any. In addition,
Sosa introduces the ‘seat’ of the skill, calling it ‘constitution’ (cf. Sosa 2010,
465). It is not so clear whether this is harmless and unproblematic. Talking of
a ‘constitution’ very much sounds like introducing a distinction between the
disposition and its realizer or basis. Whether all dispositions have such a basis
is controversial. Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson (1982) have claimed so. But
other philosophers, like Jennifer McKitrick (2003), for example, have argued
against this claim. I want to leave it open, and therefore I will avoid speaking
of anything like the ‘basis’ or ‘constitution’ of a disposition—but just speak
of the disposition. No more seems necessary (here).
18. Sosa writes, “Competences are dispositions of an agent to perform well”
(2010, 465). He also speaks of “competences to perform in favored ways”
and of “perform[ing] well” (2010, 466–467). This can be read as an articu-
lation of the simple dispositionalist account. But maybe Sosa would prefer
to embrace the fifth account, described below: the refined dispositionalist
account. The issue is unclear, since Sosa states nowhere what exactly the
manifestation of the relevant dispositions is. ‘Performing well’ in the doxas-
tic case sounds like an indication of true belief. Concerning Greco, it is also
unclear what he takes to be the exact manifestation of epistemic virtues. His
general characterization of abilities leaves it open, since it is not specified
what the “result R” is referring to, in the doxastic case (Greco 2010, 77).
But it does often sound as if he has true belief in mind. If so, he counts as a
proponent of the simple dispositionalist account. What else could having a
“high rate of success in achieving R” mean (Greco 2010, 77)?
19. One might try to develop a notion of justification that does entail truth. But
this is not what Greco nor Sosa want. They accept that justification does not
entail truth, and so do I in this chapter.
20. According to Sosa, belief formation is a performance “with no more con-
scious or intentional an aim than that of a heartbeat” (Sosa 2007, 23).
21. Epistemic motivation plays an important role for responsibilist virtue epis-
temologists like Zagzebski and Fairweather. Cf., for example, Zagzebski
(1996) and Fairweather (2001). Perhaps, epistemic motivation can account
for something like blamelessness, even for the reliabilist virtue epistemolo-
gist. But blamelessness is not the same as justification or knowledge.
22. An idea of Peter Graham’s may seem to help as reparation. One might dis-
tinguish, following Graham (2012), between two kinds of functioning: func-
tioning normally and fulfilling one’s function. Functioning normally does not
require that the function be fulfilled, according to Graham. But functioning
normally still smacks of a certain kind of fulfillment, since the system is still
138 Frank Hofmann
operating the way it is supposed to operate (that is, ‘normally’). And for
present purposes functioning thus normally also counts as a fulfillment (of a
second function).
23. Cf. Thomson (1997, especially section 3).
24. In particular, I am not relying on Thomson’s distinction between first-order
ways of being good and second-order ways of being good.
25. That is the case about which Thomson speaks mostly. Perhaps she even
assumes that this is always so. Then I shall depart from her account on this
point.
26. This is a nontrivial claim, I admit. Good arguments could be given for it. But
I do not have the space to do so here. I believe, however, that Greco and Sosa
would agree at least for the sake of argument.
27. So perhaps there is room for something like social knowledge. It would have
to be explainable by the exercising of social epistemic virtues. This is work
for the future. Of course, issues of testimony become important here. I think
that Sosa’s treatment of testimony goes in this direction. Cf. Sosa (2007,
93–97).
28. Philip Pettit accepts attributions of belief-like states to groups. Cf. Pettit
(2003).
29. Sosa holds that the probability need not be very high in order to be suffi-
ciently high. He cites skills in sport to support this claim. A skillful batter in
baseball need not have more than a 15 percent chance of hitting, but this is
still good enough for him to count as adroit. Cf. Sosa (2011, 54).
30. One could also hold the alternative view that knowledge has final epistemic
value and thus that there are at least two final epistemic values: knowledge
and truth. This seems to be Greco’s view, since he maintains that “both suc-
cess from ability and human flourishing have ‘final’ value, or value as ends
in themselves, independently of any instrumental value that they might also
have” (Greco 2010, 99). Sosa seems to hold the same view, namely, that
“the value of apt belief is no less epistemically fundamental than that of true
belief” (Sosa 2007, 87 f). The important point, however, is that whether one
accepts truth monism or pluralism about final epistemic values is a further,
independent issue.
31. Greco seems to hold that we have to introduce agency into the picture. Oth-
erwise, he suggests, we cannot deal with certain problems like ‘the problem
of strange and fleeting processes.’ (Cf. Greco [2010, ch. 9].) The relevant
dispositions must be “part of character, and character is constitutive of the
agent“ (ibid, 150). I cannot discuss this claim in detail here, for lack of space.
It seems to me to be an independent claim of Greco’s. And it is problematic
since it does not seem right to say that basic perceptual abilities are ‘part of
character.’ They consist in reliable doxastic dispositions that are not under
voluntary control. It is rather doubtful to me that they involve any interesting
kind of agency. Our ability to question—on reflection—our own perceptual
beliefs (supposing for the moment that we have such an ability) does not
show that exercising the relevant perceptual ability involves an interesting
kind of agency. And, in any case, agency cannot account for the surplus
value, as I have already argued.
32. Things are not so clear exegetically. Sosa holds on to a principle, ‘premise
(C)’ (Sosa 2007, 33), which seems to amount to a certain kind of safety,
namely, safety of the exercise of the relevant virtue. If so, there is still a cer-
tain truth guarantee in his account, even though Sosa rejects ‘outright safety’
(ibid, 26). In another passage he says that the exercise of the competence
must “in appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the
success” of the performance, but all of this is said under the introductory
 Epistemic Value and Virtues 139
term ‘perhaps’ (Sosa 2007, 29). The hedging clause in brackets makes it
sound as though not even basis-relative safety is strictly necessary. And/or it
sounds as if what is guaranteed is only high probability of truth but not truth.
33. Perhaps, the two alternatives are the usual ones that arise whenever one has
the so-called process–product ambiguity.

REFERENCES

Bird, A. 2007, Nature’s Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fairweather, A. 2001, “Epistemic Motivation,” in A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski
(eds.), Virtue Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 63–81.
Graham, P. 2012, “Epistemic Entitlement”, Noûs 46/3: 449–482.
Greco, J. 2010, Achieving Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McKitrick, J. 2003, “The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions”, Phi-
losophy and Phenomenological Research 66/2: 349–369.
Mumford, S. 1998, Dispositions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, P. 2003, “Groups with Minds of Their Own”, in F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing
Metaphysics, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Prior, E., Pargetter, R., and Jackson, F. 1982, “Three Theses about Dispositions”,
American Philosophical Quarterly 19: 251–257.
Sosa, E. 2007, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. I,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
——— 2010, “How Competence Matters in Epistemology”, Philosophical Perspec-
tives 24: 465–475.
——— 2011, Knowing Full Well, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Thomson, J. J. 1997, “The Right and the Good”, The Journal of Philosophy 94/6:
273–298.
Zagzebski, L. 1996, Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.