Psychology: Science or profession?

Some conceptual reflections about the role of psychologists from an interbehaviorial

perspective

ABSTRACT

Having a coherent and clear definition of its field of study is of utmost importance for the

constitution of a discipline, as it is the definition what establishes the limits of the practice.

Therefore, this paper offers a logical analysis of the definition of psychology, particularly

addressing the typical distinction of psychology as a science or as a profession, identifying

the possible errors, inconsistencies, and ethical and educational implications of each

alternative, regarding the regulation and training of professional psychologists. The

conclusion states that the only possibility of having a clear definition of the discipline is to

categorize psychology as a basic science. Furthermore, and in order to define the concept,

the results of this analysis are discussed based on a distinction between descriptive and

prescriptive strategies.

Keywords: categorical definition, science, profession, practice, psychologist role, field

delimitation
 Introduction

Contemporary psychology can be seen as a diverse and heterogeneous field of

professional action. This means that psychologists are professionals who are engaged in a

variety of jobs, which are usually classified as branches or as applied diversifications of a

basic science (i.e. psychology), revolving around social issues or specific areas of

intervention. In this sense, we could state that there is a “family resemblance”

(Wittgenstein, 1949) among these jobs, or even between these jobs and jobs from other

disciplines. In other words, psychology is a field that includes many different practices that

are described as “different ways of doing psychology”, rather than a single discipline that is

defined both extrinsically and intrinsically; that is to say, distinguishable from other

disciplines and knowledge, and distinguishable within its own types or fields (cf. Ribes-

Iñesta, 2004; Ribes, 2010; 2018).

Despite this diversity, it seems relevant to suggest a reflection on the elements that

are defining to the field, particularly, those that are considered socially relevant, such as

legal regulations and ethical considerations on the practice of psychology, and even

elements pertaining the design of academic psychology programs. Evidently, any changes,

extensions or precisions in the conformation of the field of psychology and its limits would

necessarily imply some institutional reforms (i.e., educational, legal), which in turn would

affect the professional practice of psychologists.

Therefore, this paper aims at offering a critical review of the professional field of

psychology, based on the criteria that establishes its extrinsic or categorical limits. That is,

we will examine the definition of psychology, describing especially the type of job

specified by this definition and the characteristics that distinguish psychology from other
professions (i. e. extrinsic delimitation), rather than the formal limits of some of the

professional fields in psychology (i.e., intrinsic delimitation).

1. Categorical delimitation: What is the essence of Psychology?

According to Ribes (2006), categories, that are conceptualized as sets of

conventional criteria, make it possible to recognize what is relevant and what is not relevant

to say and do about concepts (c.f. Pérez- Almonacid, Rangel & Hernández, 2015). In this

context, conducting a categorical analysis implies examining the uses of a particular

concept, based on the genre that has been attributed to it, and determining what is and is not

coherent to do and say about that concept. Authors like Ryle (1949) pointed out that using a

concept belonging to some category as if it belonged to another one could come about as a

categorial error; an example of this would be the case of someone referring to the “average

citizen’s household,” or if we suppose that someday we could find the concept of

“pedestrian” while drinking coffee or walking down the street.

Undertaking a categorial analysis of the concept of psychology requires reviewing

its logic level, that is, analyzing the type of entity to which the term refers to; thus,

determining how the concept should be used, makes it possible to specify what would make

sense to expect from the psychological practice on the basis of that categorization. Of

course, the first step in that sense is to analyze the kind of trade psychology is.

In this sense, it is very common to describe psychology in two apparently different

ways: as a science and as a profession. This issue is deeply rooted within the origins of

psychology, as what is understood as the “profession” of psychology is older than the

formal establishment of psychology as a science (Freedheim & Weiner, 2003). For

example, Weiten (2010) defines psychology as “the science that studies behavior and the
physiological and cognitive processes that underlie it, and the profession that applies the

accumulated knowledge of this science to practical problems” (p. 19). Same definitions are

usually found in textbooks that offer a broad overview of the discipline of psychology to

beginners in the field.

1.1 Science and profession or science or profession

First of all, we will develop this issue of conceiving psychology as both a science

and a profession. This statement can be interpreted in two different ways: one conjunctive

and the other disjunctive. In the conjunctive way, psychology would be both a science and

a profession; that is to say, a scientific profession or a professional science. Thus, the

definition comprises two complementary dimensions of the concept: one referring to the

defining practice (science) and the other regarding the social and academic recognition of

this practice (profession). However, agreeing with this definition implies also accepting that

the role of the psychologists is primarily that of a scientist, demanding all other jobs not

fulfilling this condition to be excluded from the field of psychological practice.

On the other hand, the second meaning of the definition, the disjunctive one, would

require assuming psychology either as a science or as a profession; although in this case,

there could be a false dichotomy or a contradiction, as it will be explained in the following

paragraphs:

To begging with, the etymological definition of the term profession refers to the

action of professing, which in turn is related to defending ideas, doctrines and, therefore,

knowledge. This definition has subsequently evolved into another one, which emphasizes

the knowledge that is professed as equivalent to a practice. The discussion about which is

the essential criteria to define a profession is beyond the scope of this paper, but a strong

argument has been made in favour of taking the knowledge as the crucial element that
serves to distinguish any practice from a professional practice (); in this sense, the kind of

knowledge professions operate with, that is, the scientific knowledge, above any other

criteria (for example values, social commitment, ethical guidance or certifications)

demarcates the limits of what can and cannot be called a profession (Brante, 2011). Taking

this into account, both psychology in particular and science in general would meet the

criteria to be categorized as professions. Physics, chemistry, or biology are not only

sciences, but also professions. There are professional physicists, chemists or biologists,

whose social task, no matter how little “famous” it might be, differs from the applications

or the formal teaching of the knowledge they produce within their practice; moreover, these

tasks would rather be delegated to other professions, such as teaching, engineering, or

medicine. Therefore, it is clear that the distinction between science and profession does not

apply to psychology (or to any other recognized science for that matter), as even in its

categorization as a science, psychology would be a “professional job”; thus, creating a false

dichotomy, since scientific and professional are not excluding attributes.

Secondly, assuming that psychology cannot be a science and a profession at the

same time represents a violation of the logical principle of “non-contradiction”. This

principle states that it is impossible for A to be B and not to be B at the same time; in the

case of the definition of psychology, it would be a fallacy to describe psychology as a

science, but at the same time implicitly denying it is a science because it is a profession. In

other words, by assuming the disjunctive meaning of the concept of psychology, it is

implicitly accepted that the terms science and profession designate different practices; thus,

psychology would be a science and yet, at the same time, it would not be a science. If this

were the case, both the definition and the practice of the psychological discipline would be,

at the very least, unintelligible.

 However, there is a third possible interpretation for the disjunctive meaning of the

concept: we could accept that the term is used with two different meanings depending on

the context of use (as what happens with the word bat); which would lead us to a case of

homonymy and not of contradiction. However, in this case, the term “psychology” would

simultaneously designate two different jobs, which could eventually create a fallacy of

ambiguity and lead to categorial errors (cf. Ryle, 1949): without clarity about the definition

of each of the roles (scientist and professional), the terms could be used interchangeably, as

if they meant the same, and this would constitute a categorial error, since a term belonging

to one category would be used as if it belonged to a different category.

For example, if we were to assume that the concept of psychology refers to a

science in one of its meanings, psychologists would be the people who scientifically study

psychological processes or phenomena. Conversely, if psychology were a profession,

psychologists would be the people who could oversee a variety of trades, such as

recruitment, vocational orientation, or assessment the truthfulness of a child’s testimony.

Therefore, the fallacy of ambiguity and categorial error would result from categorizing

those jobs performed by professional psychologists (recruitment, vocational orientation,

assessment of the truthfulness of a child’s testimony) as examples of the scientific study of

psychological processes, on the basis that they are performed by a psychologist.

In this context, it seems that the best alternative is to accept the conjunctive

definition of psychology (meaning that psychology is a scientific profession), as it avoids

possible problems such as false dichotomy, contradiction or ambiguity. However, the

definitions that separate the profession from the science, as the one discussed above and

many others (cf. Freedheim & Weiner, 2003) seem to support the disjunctive meaning.

They establish a difference between psychology as a science and psychology as a

profession, making an explicit distinction between two roles or jobs; one referring to

scientific investigation and the other one to the application of the knowledge derived from

that research. Even more so, it could be argued that the statement emphasizes the

application of knowledge as the ultimate use or purpose of psychology. This is congruent

with the findings made by Lilienfeld (2012) where psychology students identify the role of

psychologists more with a practical endeavor than with a scientific practice, what could be

partly explained by the public bias towards practical knowledge, and by the notion that

science must be useful in order to be relevant, a tendency that Rusell (1973) describes as a

zeitgeist that favors the short-term benefits of knowledge.

Finally, it is not entirely clear what is understood by the "application" of the

accumulated knowledge of psychological science, and more importantly, what science

would be applied by psychologists, given that it could not be psychology, since this term

would refer to the application of scientific knowledge and not to the science itself.

2. Basic science, applied science, technology, and technique

Given the analysis above, we concluded that the distinction or disjunction between

science and profession is not a convenient starting point in the characterization of

psychology, bringing up the question: Can we reframe this issue while avoiding the

aforementioned logical problems? One solution could be to clarify the different types of

social assignments related to scientific disciplines (cf. Pepper, 1970; Ribes, 2018).

In this regard, Peña-Correal (2009; 2018) offers an interesting distinction among the

tasks that are related to basic science, applied science and technology. This classification is

not subject to the “science-profession dichotomy”. Peña-Crreal defines basic science as the

effort, within a discipline, to produce systematic, abstract, and generalizable knowledge

about a particular fragment of reality: a basic scientist performs explanatory research about
abstract processes. On the other hand, applied science refers to the use of concepts,

categories, and theories of basic science to interpret events in human life, or even to

produce useful knowledge for solving socially relevant issues. In this sense, the research of

an applied scientist is oriented to specific social topics or technology development.

Finally, technology is characterized by producing knowledge for the construction

and use of natural or artificial devices that contribute to the transformation of the

environment in favor of humanity (cf. p. 302). In this sense, technology can be related to

(or even overlapped with) applied science, in those cases where the knowledge that has

been produced is guided by scientific knowledge. However, this relationship between

science and technology is not necessary, since not all technological knowledge has to

derive from or be an application of scientific knowledge; instead, technological knowledge

may parallel or intersect with scientific practice, rather than being a product stemmed from

it.

With this in mind, in the case of psychology, basic science would be responsible for

producing abstract knowledge about “strictly psychological processes” (cf. Ribes & López,

1985; Peña-Correal, 2018) and applied science would be in charge of the production of

“connective knowledge” between basic science concepts and particular cases or

phenomena. This “connective knowledge” could subsequently be used to solve socially

relevant issues. In addition, the technological practice of psychology would focus on the

development of techniques to measure, evaluate or intervene in fields such as health,

education, organizations, etc. Therefore, a psychologist in a technological role would either

evaluate the effectiveness or pertinence of these techniques and procedures, or would

measure different traits or skills for the purpose of developing interventions on social

issues.
 However, there could also be another possibility, which is that of a purely technical

practice: a job that is characterized by the use of techniques, without the production of

knowledge about the practice itself or about the phenomena of the discipline, as well as

without conceptual considerations about these techniques or their investigation. That way,

technicians would differ from technologists in that their job would not necessarily imply

the development of relevant knowledge within the field of the profession; on the contrary,

the technical work would only require skill in the use of this knowledge. According to this

reasoning, a good psychological technician would review, select, and correctly implement

procedures for evaluation and intervention in social contexts, such as those mentioned

above (health, work, education, etc.).

2.1 How many roles do psychologists play?

At this point in our analysis, the question about the distinctive role of psychologists

could be resolved in three possible ways: the first one is to assert that psychology is

singular, in other words, that only one of the roles explained above could be the one that

characterizes the discipline of psychology. The second is to assert plurality, meaning that

psychologists would simultaneously play many roles; and finally, the third option is to

affirm integrity; in this view psychologists would embody all the roles at the same time

during their practice. These three possibilities will be examined in depth below:

The first alternative posits that psychology could only be characterized as one of the

four roles: a basic science, an applied science, a technological endeavor or a technical

practice. If we assume that psychology is a basic science, we are underlining the fact that its

main task is the production of abstract knowledge about a fragment of reality (i.e., the

psyche). In this sense, the defining nature and scope of psychology would be that of a

discipline, and it would be distinguished from other basic sciences by its own irreducible
theoretical object. Thus, assuming that psychology is a basic science, and therefore a

discipline, would imply excluding the extensions, applications, or non-scientific uses of

psychological knowledge as defining instances of the work of psychology, since all other

work, different from that of the basic science (production of abstract knowledge), would

not qualify as part of the psychological occupation.

Meanwhile, suggesting that psychology is an applied science would rise a sort of

inconsistency, because, on the one hand, there is no clear reference as to which science is

being applied and, on the other hand, it would not specify which basic science could take

over the empirical universe that is currently encompassed by ‘basic psychology”. The third

scenario, defining psychology as a technological endeavor, implies not only confronting the

same inconsistency explained above, but also the problem of distinguishing psychology

from other disciplines or areas of knowledge that have the same task (developing

techniques for measurement, evaluation or intervention in social contexts), for example,

pedagogy, human resources management, social work, etc. These same difficulties rise in

the final scenario, defining psychology as a technical practice: there is no obvious science

that can take on the study of the phenomena currently undertaken by psychology, and there

would be no clear definition of the field, because many other disciplines focus their work

on solving practical problems within different social contexts.

The other two alternatives, assuming either the plurality or the integrity of

psychology, could solve some of the problems explained above, as for example the

inconsistency of the role, but also, they would make extremely difficult, if not impossible,

to delimitate the field of the discipline. In the first case, if psychologists were assumed to

play any of the four roles, this would entail the logical and practical problems of

contradiction and ambiguity explained above. In the second case, if we were to propose that
psychologists must perform all four roles, we would need to establish whether these roles

are played simultaneously or in an articulated manner. If we were to say that the four roles

are played simultaneously, then we would have to define some criteria by which to identify

all four endeavors as psychology. Whereas if we support the idea that the four roles are

articulated, we would need to establish the types of issue topics that can be addresed this

way (especially considering that the problems addressed by basic science are not of the

same type as those addressed by applied science, nor are technological or technical

practices); moreover, in both cases we would also need to address the issue of how realistic

it is to require from psychologists to perform four different jobs, and how many

professional psychologists are currently doing this.

In brief, as illustrated in Figure 1, it would be almost impossible to perform a

categorical analysis of the formal definition of the role of psychologists, since this

definition entails profound logical and practical difficulties. Based on the previous analysis,

we can conclude that the only logical alternative to avoid these problems is to assume that

psychology is a science (professional science), but a basic one, which in turn rises other

difficulties of course, as it requires restructuring the field of the discipline.

Figure 1. Analysis of the categorial alternatives for the formal definition of the role of

psychologists.
 3. Ethical implications and training difficulties arising from definitional problems

The blurring of the boundaries of psychology due to its categorial ambiguity

generates a series of implications in terms of ethical and training issues that should be

considered and reflected upon. It is clear that the regulation and training of professionals in
each of the different roles reviewed above requires different normativity and different

professional profiles.

In the first place, the scientific practice (basic or applied) requires ethical regulation

to make axiological assessments that serve the purpose of establishing research objectives

(Rescher 1999). These assessments would follow questions such as: What should be

investigated? Why should a particular phenomenon be investigated? What is the

importance of studying it? In this context, the criteria for selecting theories should also be

defined, and should include standards of coherence, consistency and rigor of the theory,

which entails an axiological component as well, because the selected theory will set the

course of the investigation, not only in terms of its validity, but also in terms of the moral

values of the scientist. For example, according to Merton (1977), the basic scientist should

be governed by four principles: universalism (commitment to objectivity), communality

(willingness to share knowledge), disinterestedness and organized skepticism.

On the contrary, ethical considerations for technological and technical endeavors

should be oriented to establish the positive and negative impact that the application of a

theory could have on the contexts (Rescher 1999). Of course, this requires a different

ethical approach, that must be aligned with the multiple contexts in which the application

might take place. In that sense, as exposed by Beltran (1998), these types of exercises are

always inclined to consider external cost-benefit relationships, and since their main

objectives are related to practical benefits, reflections should revolve around the concepts

of beneficence, justice, and impartiality of the interventions. As Ribes (2018) remarks,

every application of knowledge has its own ideology, whether explicit or implicit, and this

ideology favors an agenda, which is why every extension of knowledge from the basic

sciences requires a reflection on these kinds of issues.

 It is also clear that the training and professional profile expected from the different

roles in psychology are extremely different. In fact, some educational systems assume these

distinctions to build their own structure, creating different types of educational institutions,

which offer different types of training and formal requirements for the professional to be

certified; for example, technical institutions, technological schools, or universities, usually

have different characteristics and training times, as well as different expectations about

their own programs.

Therefore, teaching psychologists to practice in the four spheres of professional

practice would require specific programs, strategies, and professional profiles. In the first

case, training psychologists to perform as competent basic scientists would require

programs focused on developing competencies to identify and solve abstract problems

related to a theoretical object of knowledge. In contrast, programs to teach applied

scientists should be oriented towards developing the ability to associate some segments of

the abstract knowledge of the discipline with the knowledge defined by ordinary language

or by other disciplines. On the other hand, programs to train technologists should focus on

teaching the skills that are needed to produce knowledge or technology that is useful for

solving social problems. Finally, training technicians would consist in developing

competencies for the selection and good use of knowledge, in a way that it could help solve

specific issues, whether that knowledge comes from basic science, applied science or

technology.

Discussion and conclusion

This paper offers an analysis of the categorial delimitation of the role of

psychologists, reviewing the problems that rise from this definition, particularly regarding

the type of professional role psychologists should play, concluding that the current
definition of psychology is very problematic because of its vagueness or even because of its

contradictions.

A possible explanation to these problems in the definition of psychology could be

the tendency to defend and assume a descriptive definitional strategy. This strategy consists

of organizing and grouping all the different types of professional performance within a

discipline, in terms of occupation, posing all the alternatives as equally valid (Cf. Pérez-

Almonacid, 2018); in this way, the strategy solves the problem about the definition of

psychology by following the idea that “psychology is what psychologists say it is”; in other

words, in a descriptive strategy, it is assumed that the definition of the discipline should be

based on the characterization of the activities that psychologists perform in different fields.

This strategy forces the concept or definition to be adjusted and even broaden to include all

the different occupations that psychologists may perform, whether or not they have

similarities. As noble as this effort may be, as it avoids idealization, homogenization, and

conceptual hegemony, it also hinders the abstraction of clear defining criteria, precisely

because of that missing common element that could group all practices under the name of

psychology.

An alternative would be to employ a prescriptive strategy, which stablishes clear-cut

criteria for the inclusion and exclusion of elements according to a particular conception of

the discipline (e. g., Ribes, 2010). In this sense, this strategy defends the notion that there

are theoretical criteria for defining the disciplinary field of psychology. Nevertheless, this

approach rises some problems, not only because it is unpalatable, but also because it is

politically incorrect, since it results in the conclusion that many (may be the most) of the

practices currently recognized as psychology should be relocated or excluded from the

field.
 Applying any of these strategies entails some problems of their own, so it is

important to take a position on the matter. If we were to accept the descriptive strategy, it

seems inevitable that psychology would remain vaguely defined, making it difficult to

establish quality criteria for evaluating the practice of psychologists in different areas. On

the other hand, accepting the prescriptive strategy requires establishing criteria for defining

the discipline and, possibly, a structural reform of the profession.

The proposal in this paper is to choose the second alternative, because it seems to be

the only way to avoid confusion or ambiguity, to create professional identity, and to design

training programs and ethical regulations that are suitable for the different practices. This,

in turn, brings other benefits: establishing clear social expectations about the role of the

psychologist, creating diverse programs aimed at teaching specific competencies, according

to particular occupational endeavors, along with regulations specific to each of these

occupations.

Therefore, from the analysis exposed, we concluded that the best alternative is to

assume psychology as part of the category of basic sciences, as any other alternative would

rise inconsistencies or come to a dead end. Psychology as a basic science would be oriented

towards producing abstract knowledge about psychological phenomena and communicating

this knowledge to other professionals or to the public. Thus, training programs for

psychologists would focus on developing competencies to produce such knowledge, and

the ethical regulation should be the same as for any other basic science. Defining

psychology in these terms would require to categorize of those occupations other that are

not basic science occupations as non-psychological jobs.

In conclusion, what can we say about the role of the psychologist today? What does

psychology mean? According to our analysis, this concept refers simultaneously to

techniques, technologies, applications of a basic science, and the performance of that same

basic science. Evidently, this diversity is not a virtue that makes psychology a particularly

complex discipline, but rather is due to the overlapping of multiple criteria in its definition,

an issue that Wittgenstein (1949) characterized as a profound conceptual confusion. As we

expect to have made clear through our analysis, this confusion is detrimental to the

development of quality standards for both the training and the practice of psychology, since

there are no clear elements that allow for an adequate characterization of our discipline.
References

Beltrán, P. (1998). El problema de los valores éticos en la ciencia básica. Dialnet, 3, 17-40.

Brante, T. (2011). Professions as science based occupations. Professions&Professionalism.

1(1), 4-20.

Freedheim, D. & Weiner, I. (2003). Handbook of psychology. New Jersey, United States:

John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Lilienfeld, S. O. (2012). Public skepticism of psychology: Why many people perceive the

study of human behavior as unscientific. American Psychologist, 67(2), 111-129.

https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023963

Merton, R. K. (1977). La Sociología de la Ciencia., Madrid: Alianza.

Peña-Correal, T. (2009). La formación en investigación en Psicología. Investigación,

formación y prácticas psicológicas, 1-22. México: UNAM FES Iztacala.

Peña-Correal, T. (2018). La psicología, la psicología aplicada y las profesiones

psicológicas. En: Gutiérrez, G (Ed). Teorías en psicología: integración y el futuro

de la disciplina. Bogotá: Manual Moderno.

Pepper, S. C. (1970). World Hypotheses. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520341869

Pérez-Almonacid, R.; Rangel-Cárdenas, M. y Hernández, J. (2015). Verbalización dirigida,

complejidad conceptual y abstracción. International Journal of Psychology and

Psychological Therapy, 15(1), 1-30.

Rescher, N. (1999). Razón y valores en la era científico-tecnológica. Barcelona, España:

Paidós.

Ribes, E. (2000). Las psicologías y la definición de sus objetos de conocimiento. Revista

Mexicana de análisis de la conducta, 26(3), 367-383.

Ribes-Iñesta, E. (2004). ¿Es posible unificar los criterios sobre los que se concibe la

psicología?. Suma Psicológica, 11(1), 9–28.

Ribes, E. (2006). Categorías, conceptos y conducta: reflexiones teóricas. Revista Latina de

Pensamiento y Lenguaje, 15,(1) 5-23.

Ribes, E. (2010). Lenguaje ordinario y lenguaje técnico: un proyecto de currículo

universitario para la psicología. Revista Mexicana de Psicología, 27, 55-64.

Ribes, E. (2018). El estudio científico de la conducta individual: una introducción a la

teoría de la psicología. Manual Moderno.

Ribes, E. & López, F. (1985). Teoría de la conducta: Un análisis de campo y paramétrico.

México: Trillas.

Russell, R. W. (1973). Academic and Applied Psychology: A

Rapprochement. Professional Psychology, 4(2), 232–

237. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0020904

Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Barnes & Noble.

Weiten, W (2010). Psychology: Themes and Variations (11th edition). Boston, United

States: Cengage Learning.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953/1991). Philosophical investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.)

(3rd ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54889e73e4b0a2c1f9891289/t/

564b61a4e4b04eca59c4d232/1447780772744/

Ludwig.Wittgenstein.-.Philosophical.Investigations.pdf