Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

1995, Vol. 68, No. 5, 885-891

Depression Research Methodologies in the Journal ofPersonality

and Social Psychology: A Reply
Gifford Weary, John A. Edwards, and Jill A. Jacobson
Ohio State University

H. Tennen, J. A. Hall, and G. Affleck (1995) argued in their critique of depression research pub-
lished in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP) that investigators have failed to
comply with several methodological recommendations often cited in the depression literature. They
recommended resetting minimum criteria for publication of depression research in JPSP. In this
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article, it is asserted that Tennen and his colleagues did not consider a number of critical issues
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

surrounding this set of methodological criteria. It is also contended that insufficient data are available
to require strict adherence to several of the criteria. In light of the complexities surrounding Tennen
et al.'s methodological criteria, it is concluded that JPSFs editors, reviewers, and readers would do
better to evaluate studies on a case-by-case basis.

For the past two decades, there has been an enormous
amount of theoretical and empirical attention directed toward
the antecedents, manifestations, and consequences of depres-
sion. Much of this work evolved from or examined various as-
pects of the cognitive theories of depression (e.g., Abramson,
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Alloy, Kelly, Mineka, & Clements,
1990; Beck, 1976). As these theories began to incorporate the
psychological constructs of causal attributions, self-schemata,
and self-focused attentional styles, and particularly as they be-
gan to focus on the role of others in the formation or activation
of such cognitive processes and structures, depression increas-
ingly became a major focus of inquiry for many social and per-
sonality psychologists. This was, of course, a natural develop-
ment; social and personality psychologists had much to say
about how others affect the various cognitive processes postu-
lated to be important to the etiology, maintenance, and ex-
acerbation of depression.
There was, however, at least one additional reason why the
phenomenon of depression captured the attention of social and
personality researchers and theorists. For such individuals, de-
pression was important, not because of its status as a clinical
syndrome, but because it represented an important individual
difference variable. Examination of it permitted theoretical and
empirical consideration of the social psychological conse-
quences of more intense and chronic affective states, more neg-
ative self-representations, and more intense and chronic levels
of motivation than typically produced or assessed in social psy-
chology laboratory settings and with unselected college student
samples. Indeed, research using depression in this way has
Gifford Weary, John A. Edwards, and Jill A. Jacobson, Department
of Psychology, Ohio State University.
We would like to thank Katherine Gannon, Bill von Hippel, and Bob
Arkin for their helpful comments on a draft of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Gifford Weary, Department of Psychology, 142 Townshend Hall, Ohio
State University, 1885 Neil Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210. Electronic
mail may sent via the Internet to gweary@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu.
885
proven helpful in elucidating a variety of basic social cognitive
processes (Weary & Edwards, 1994).
Still, during the same period of time, critiques of this work
and of much of the depression research published in clinical
psychology journals began to appear (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983;
Gotlib, 1984; Hammen, 1980; Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Ham-
men, & Ingram, 1987). Most of these critiques focused on two
related issues. Thefirstwas whether college students who scored
high on self-report inventories of depressive symptoms could
be used as analogues for diagnosable clinical depression. The
second issue concerned the assessment of depression: whether
assessments should be made at multiple points, whether self-
report inventories or structured interviews were more appro-
priate, and whether the method of assessment had adequate dis-
criminant validity.
These critiques were indeed influential despite the fact that
they often relied on very little evidence to support their major
points (Coyne, 1994; Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 1993).
Psychological researchers using college students and relying on
self-report inventories often were discouraged, if not prohib-
ited, from submitting their work to certain journals. Unfortu-
nately, this blanket condemnation of such research occurred
regardless of whether the focus of inquiry was diagnosable de-
pression. Gradually, editors, reviewers, and researchers alike be-
gan to question some of the assumptions made in these early
critiques, and data that qualified several of the criticisms began
to appear. The result, we believe, has been a more circumspect
analysis by editors and reviewers of each piece of research and
an improvement in the overall quality of editorial decisions and
published work.
So, it was with some dismay that we viewed Tennen et al.'s
(1995) critique of the editorial practices of the Journal ofPer-
sonality and Social Psychology (JPSP) with respect to the pub-
lication of depression research. Their main thesis was that in-
vestigators publishing in the premier journal in the field have
failed to comply with Kendall et al.'s (1987) recommended
standards for assessing depression. They argued further that, as
a result, "researchers' understanding of depressive phenomena,
 886 G. WEARY, J. EDWARDS, AND J. JACOBSON
as reflected in both current theoretical conceptions of depres-
sion and modes of treatment, may be compromised" (Tennen
et al, 1995 p. 871). Tennen et al. concluded that new minimum
methodological criteria should be set for depression research
published in JPSP.
We believe for several reasons that Tennen et al.'s (1995) ar-
ticle requires further comment. We believe that Tennen and his
colleagues have overlooked a number of critical issues sur-
rounding their set of methodological rules. Moreover, we argue
that the data necessary to require strict adherence to some of
these rules are not yet available. Finally, although their argu-
ments manifestly have to do with who is studied in depression
research and how the results are to be interpreted (Coyne,
1994), we fear that the ultimate, albeit unintended, result of
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adoption of the minimum publication criteria outlined by Ten-
nen et al. may well be a determination of who is allowed to do
depression research. Although some might welcome the forti-
fication of subdisciplinary boundaries, we are not among them
and do not feel that such will benefit the ultimate understanding
of basic social cognitive processes related to various dysphoric
and depressive phenomena.
For convenience, we organize our reply around the method-
ological transgressions of which Tennen et al. (1995) feel
JPSFs depression researchers are particularly guilty. We try to
address why personality and social psychology researchers have
seemingly ignored the methodological requirements first out-
lined by Kendall et al. (1987). In so doing, we hope to provide
perhaps a more complete, albeit a more complex, picture of the
methodological issues in this area of research than that por-
trayed by Tennen et al.
Multiple Assessment Periods
Kendall et al. (1987) originally proposed that "in most cases,
subjects should be assessed [with a depression inventory] dur-
ing at least two time periods: once at initial selection and once
immediately preceding the experiment (if they are indeed
different)" (p. 291). They went on to point out that such a
methodological practice addresses both the symptom stability
over time (a requirement of most nosological classifications)
and status at the time of experimental procedures. Noting that
there is indeed reason to suspect the stability of scores on the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and other self-report inven-
tories (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988; Bumberry, Oliver, & Mc-
Clure, 1978; Deardorff & Funabiki, 1985; Hammen, 1980;
Hatzenbuehler, Parpal, & Matthews, 1983; Zimmerman,
1986), Tennen and his coauthors (1995) proposed a multiple
assessment period requirement and, in some cases, a require-
ment for multiple assessment periods with multiple assessments
within each period.
Although the latter recommendation strikes us as excessive
in many instances, we believe that multiple assessment periods
generally are a good idea in that they increase one's confidence
about the symptom, syndromal, or nosological status of re-
search participants. We do, however, want to make two points
about Tennen et al.'s (1995) call for multiple assessment periods
as a requirement for publication.
In their recommendations regarding use of the BDI, Kendall
and his colleagues (1987) made an additional point that often
gets lost in discussions of multiple assessment periods. They
noted that syndromal depression does not require that the
symptoms be present for a specified period of time; conse-
quently, if one is interested solely in syndromal depression, then
a singular assessment period—in which both depression inven-
tory scores and the dependent variables are measured—would
be acceptable. Tennen et al. apparently disagreed with this as
they criticized 14 of the 20 studies in JPSP that used such a
singular assessment period. However, to the degree that the au-
thors of these 14 studies were interested in specific symptoms
associated with depression or with syndromal depression, their
methodology would seem satisfactory when viewed from the
perspective of Kendall and his associates' complete discussion
of this issue.
Second, Tennen et al. (1995) and others (Kendall et al., 1987;
Sacco, 1981) have argued that to fulfill the multiple assessment
recommendation, "depression should be measured at multiple
periods prior [italics added] to any experimental manipulation "
(Tennen et al., 1995, p. 871). Research indicates that for some
studies greater internal validity actually would result from ad-
ministering the assessment instrument after the experimental
manipulation and measurement of the dependent variables
(Bargh, 1989; Mark, Sinclair, & Wellens, 1991; Perlmuter,
Noblin, & Hakami, 1983). More specifically, in some studies,
completing a depression inventory or interview prior to an ex-
perimental manipulation may serve as a mood induction task
or a prime. Either of these could provide an alternative explana-
tion to the effects of the independent variables under examina-
tion. Of course, it also is possible that experimental manipula-
tions may affect depression scores. Indeed, the order in which
the assessment instrument and the manipulation are adminis-
tered may account for discrepantfindingsin the depression re-
search literature (Perlmuter et al., 1983). Counterbalancing the
order of depression instruments and experimental manipula-
tions would seem, then, to be a good general practice. Still, eval-
uating studies on a case-by-case basis with respect to this meth-
odological issue would seem to be necessary.
Multiple Assessment Methods
The call for multiple assessment methods of psychological
constructs is not new, nor is it unique to depression research. It
was originally suggested by Campbell and Fiske (1959) as a way
to counteract method-specific error variance. The increasing
popularity of latent variable models (Lilienfeld et al., 1994;
Loehlin, 1992) has drawn much renewed attention to these is-
sues. As such data analytic techniques become more widely
used by personality and social psychology researchers, and as
the importance of the latent construct-manifest indicator dis-
tinction becomes more widely appreciated by psychopatholo-
gists (Lilienfeld et al., 1994), we strongly suspect that there will
be a corresponding increase in the use of multiple depression
assessment methods in JPSP and in clinical and psychiatric
journals.
Tennen et al., (1995) however, went beyond the call for
multiple assessment methods. They argued for the adoption
of the structured or semistructured interview as the "gold
standard" by which other depression assessment methods
should be evaluated and suggested further that the use of
 JPSP DEPRESSION RESEARCH: A REPLY
semistructured interviews makes use of the less desirable
(from their point of view) self-report inventories superflu-
ous. This suggestion seems strange to us, given Tennen et al.'s
statements about the need for multiple assessment methods.
Nevertheless, other writers also have called for depression re-
searchers to abandon self-report methods in favor of in-
terview techniques (e.g., Coyne, 1994).
As Tennen et al. (1995) pointed out, depression researchers
publishing in JPSP appear to have been reluctant to switch to
structured and semistructured interviews.1 A discussion about
why this is so seems warranted. We argue that many researchers
find such calls to be premature in that they gloss over a number
of unresolved issues that social and personality researchers and
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others find important.
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The superiority of structured interviews is generally supported
on one of three grounds. Although Tennen et al. (1995) did not
discuss all of these, other authors (e.g., Coyne, 1994) have, and we
believe these reasons, as a group, deserve comment.
One reason often given for using structured interviews is that
they allow for the use of probes and clinical judgment in assess-
ment. This allows researchers to make sure that the respondent
understands the questions and to probe for signs of symptoms
of which the respondent may not be aware. However, such free-
dom to probe for and interpret diagnostic signs also constitutes
a weakness of these methods. Personality and social psycholo-
gists have over the years identified a variety of interviewer (e.g.,
Rosenthal, 1966) and social judgment (e.g., Markus & Zajonc,
1985) biases that can affect interview methods, and Salovey and
Turk (1991) recently have cataloged these as they apply to clin-
ical interviews. Furthermore, the interpersonal nature of an in-
terview itself can elicit certain interviewer biases (e.g., self-ful-
filling prophecies: Merton, 1948;Snyder&Swann, 1978; expec-
tancies created by gender or race: Word, Zanna, & Cooper,
1974; Zanna & Pack, 1975). The moreflexibilityinterviewers
have, the greater the likelihood that such biases will influence
the interview process.
There is some evidence that the currently available structured
interviews used for diagnosis of mental disorders are vulnerable
to such biases. Williams et al. (1992), in explaining lower-than-
expected reliability for the Structured Clinical Interview for the
DSM-III-R (SCID; Spitzer, Wiliams, Gibbon, & First, 1992),
reported that the diagnoses of interviewers using the SCID were
"vulnerable to the subjects telling different stories to each in-
terviewer" (p. 634) and that this was "almost always" (p. 636)
due to differences in the amount of probing done by interview-
ers. The amount and type of probing can easily be influenced
by such factors as interviewer expectancies (Temerlin, 1968)
and confirmation biases (Snyder, 1981). Heavily structured in-
terviews like the Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS; Robins,
Helzer, Croughan, & RatclifF, 1981) are somewhat less vulner-
able to such biases but also have fewer of the advantages associ-
ated with interview techniques. The essential problem is not
that the available structured interviews are necessarily critically
flawed, but that very little evidence has been collected regarding
potential problems with them. This makes it extremely difficult
for researchers to make informed judgments about their use.
To be sure, there are reliability data for the major structured
interviews. Unfortunately, much of this research is methodolog-
icallyflawed,and even the better studies reveal diverging and,
887
in many cases, not especially encouraging estimates of various
forms of reliability (for a review, see Costello, 1993). For in-
stance, both the DIS, which is recommended by Tennen et al.
(1995), and the SCID, hailed as the "state of the art in diagnos-
tic research tools" by Coyne (1994, p. 31), have shown unsat-
isfactory agreement (all kappas <.7O; see Cohen, 1960, for rec-
ommendations regarding acceptable kappa level) between the
diagnoses of different interviewers for the same participants,
both over all disorders and specifically for mood disorders
(Williams etal., 1992).
A second rationale often given for preferring structured in-
terviews over self-report questionnaires is that such interviews
can overcome various biases or inadequacies on the part of re-
spondents. A variety of biases affecting questionnaire responses
have been identified (e.g., social desirability: A. L. Edwards,
1957; acquiescence and naysaying: Couch & Keniston, 1960;
deviation: Berg, 1967). Some of these, such as social desirability
(Tanaka-Matsumi & Kameoka, 1986), have particular rele-
vance for depression questionnaires. However, it should be
noted that the extent to which the available structured in-
terviews are themselves immune to these biases is not clear. The
voluminous data on biases elicited by questionnaires at least
allow researchers to make informed judgments and to take steps
to neutralize relevant biases (e.g., by stressing the anonymity of
participants' responses to reduce social desirability concerns).
Also, it may be that the set of response biases that have been
identified do not really form a systematic confound for self-re-
port measures of psychopathology but rather simply act as ran-
dom error (Gove, McCorkel, Fain, & Hughes, 1976).
A final argument used to support the contention that in-
terview methods are superior to questionnaire methods is the
ability of such interviews to generate precise diagnoses that cor-
respond to psychiatric diagnostic schemes such as the Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). This is
essentially a question of construct validity (i.e., do the criteria
measure the appropriate theoretical construct; Blashfield &
Livesley, 1991).
Although there has been much discussion about the construct
validity of self-report depression questionnaires (e.g., Coyne,
1994; Depue & Monroe, 1978; Gotlib, 1984), this issue has been
essentially ignored with regard to psychiatric criteria that guide
most structured interviews (Carson, 1991). This is because the
current (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and
previous (DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987)
diagnostic systems are intentionally designed to be atheoretical
(Nelson-Gray, 1991). Although there is certainly some loose the-
ory implicit in the DSM (Blashfield & Livesley, 1991; Carson,
1991; Millon, 1991), the lack of an explicit theory to make sense
of the symptom constellations makes it difficult, if not impossible,
to test the construct validity of diagnoses. Not surprisingly, little
research has been done on this problem (Blashfield & Livesley,
1991; Carson, 1991). Validation methods based on determining
that symptoms are unique to a category (descriptive validity;
Spitzer & Williams, 1980) or assessing the extent to which diag-
nostic criteria correspond to expert judgment (a form of criterion
' It also should be noted that clinical practitioners have similarly been
reluctant to adopt structured and semistructured interviews for diagno-
sis of patients (Howard, Lueger, & Kolden, 1994).
 888 G. WEARY, J. EDWARDS, AND J. JACOBSON
validity; Spitzer & Williams, 1988) are not substitutes for con-
struct validity. As Morey (1991) pointed out, such schemes run
"the risk of elaborating a collection of concepts with little essential
meaning" (p. 291).
For researchers whose work is guided by theory (as are most of
the researchers publishing in JPSP), construct validity is a critical
issue. Most researchers want measures that correspond to the
types of theoretical constructs in which they are interested, and it
is often unclear that diagnostic criteria underlying current struc-
tured interviews do this. It is better, in such an instance, to adopt a
well-researched instrument with a research history related to one's
theory (i.e., an instrument with some evidence of construct
validity). For many researchers interested in phenomena associ-
ated with cognitive theories of depression (e.g., Alloy & Ahrens,
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1987; Alloy & Clements, 1992; Bargh & Tota, 1988; Dobson &
Breiter, 1983), that instrument has been the BDI (Beck, 1967).
We do not mean to claim that the BDI and other self-report ques-
tionnaires are perfect, but rather that they have strengths that may
be important for many research endeavors.
A second strategy used by researchers testing theory is to in-
clude secondary, specific measures of the variable(s) of interest
(e.g., expectations of control loss), in addition to a depression
measure, and show that this variable is related to the index of
depression and mediates the relationship between depression
and the dependent variables (e.g., J. A. Edwards & Weary, 1993;
Yost & Weary, in press). This strategy has the advantage of al-
lowing the investigator to examine the effects of the specific
component, correlate, or consequence of depression in which
he or she is interested. Moreover, when such a strategy is used,
issues about distinctive and overlapping components, corre-
lates, and consequences of various symptom patterns and of di-
agnosable disorders, as well as issues of appropriate pathological
and nonpathological comparison groups, become amenable to
empirical inquiry or they become moot (for similar arguments
on the greater validity and usefulness of studies of specific
symptoms than of studies of diagnostic categories, see Costello,
1993; Persons, Burns, Perloff, & Miranda, 1993).
Construct Validity of the BDI: Categorization of
Research Participants
Without question, the most frequently used self-report mea-
sure of depression in JPSP articles has been the BDI. Tennen et
al. (1995) raised at least two specific issues with respect to the
construct validity of the BDI that we believe warrant further
comment. Thefirsthas to do with the categorization of partici-
pants as depressed, and the second has to do with the lack of
high-end specificity of this and other self-report measures of de-
pression. Let us consider each of these in turn.
Although many researchers view the BDI as a good measure
of syndromal depression (Kendall et al., 1987) and of the sever-
ity of depressive symptomatology (Beck et al., 1988), Tennen
et al. (1995) and others (e.g., Coyne, 1994) have argued other-
wise. These latter investigators have argued that it is entirely
possible for research participants to score above conventional
cutoffs for the BDI on the basis of very different response pat-
terns. This need not be a critical problem, however, as long as
the pattern of symptoms is related in a theory-consistent way to
the core construct of depression (cf. Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).
Moreover, as Tennen et al. noted, symptom heterogeneity is also
an issue for interview measures of depression.
Perhaps of greater concern than symptom heterogeneity is
the possibility that research participants may be categorized as
depressed without endorsing the key symptoms of depressed
mood or loss of interest. To assess how often this might occur,
we analyzed the BDI responses of 536 college students who, dur-
ing the 1993 academic year, were administered the BDI on two
occasions separated by 6 weeks; these students had been asked
to complete the BDI in connection with two different studies
[we] were conducting. From this sample, 98 students scored 10
or above on the BDI on the first administration, and of these
students, 95% endorsed to some degree Item 1 (sad mood),
Item 4 (lack of satisfaction or boredom), or Item 12 (lack of
interest in others). Of these 95% of students initially scoring at
or above 10, 89% still checked one of the three target BDI items
6 weeks later.
Rather than abandonment of the BDI, perhaps a more sensi-
ble recommendation is to exclude from a depressed group peo-
ple who do not endorse one of these items. Clearly, more re-
search on the symptom profiles of BDI respondents is needed
before it can be concluded that scores above the criterion either
(a) reflect more symptom heterogeneity than interview meth-
ods or (b) reflect to a significant degree endorsement of items
not critical to a designation of depression. Our examination of
the BDI respondents led us to believe that although "it is possi-
ble to obtain a score above the cutoff without having any of the
symptoms contributing to a diagnosis of depression" (Coyne,
1994, p. 33), this may be a low-frequency event.
The second construct validity issue is the inability of the BDI
and other self-report instruments to discriminate between de-
pression and measures of other disorders (e.g., Gotlib, 1984),
especially anxiety (e.g., Mendels, Weinstein, & Cochrane,
1972). This lack of discriminant validity may well be the result
of flaws in measures of the other disorders (Gotlib & Cane,
1989) or, more importantly, of construct-relevant comorbidity.
Alloy et al. (1990) and Winokur and Clayton (1967), among
others, discussed the comorbidity between depression and anx-
iety and depression and alcoholism in terms of theoretically
based causal mechanisms. In fact, in accord with the proposals
made by a number of theorists (Clark & Watson, 1991; Katon &
Roy-Byrne, 1991), the new DSM-IVstandards include Mixed
Anxiety-Depressive Disorder as a criteria set for further study.
Whether or not comorbid disorders present a problem for a
particular study of depression is a complex issue (for a more
thorough discussion than we can entertain here, see Garber &
Hollon, 1991; Gotlib & Cane, 1989; Maser & Cloninger, 1990).
Let us consider several possible scenarios to illustrate briefly the
complexity of the issues. If anxiety or some other disorder is
accidentally selected for in addition to depression, and if theo-
retically and empirically that disorder is not related to the spe-
cific depression component, correlate, or consequence of inter-
est, then error variance has been introduced to the study. This,
of course, should work against the researcher finding support
for his or her hypotheses. If the component, correlate, or conse-
quence of interest is thought to be present in depression and
other comorbid disorders, this still would not be a problem as
long as one obtains independent evidence of the specific variable
and is able to demonstrate its theoretical relationship to the de-
 JPSP DEPRESSION RESEARCH: A REPLY
pendent variable. However, if the specific variable of interest is
not present in depression but is present in the secondary, co-
morbid disorder, the secondary disorder is a confound; such
confounds must be identified in the context of a theory, albeit
perhaps a competing one. If the disorders are actually a single
disorder that has been incorrectly partitioned by aflaweddiag-
nostic scheme, then the secondary disorder cannot, of course,
be a confound.
In other words, it cannot automatically be assumed that dis-
orders such as anxiety or substance abuse constitute a confound
for a particular depression study. It may well be advisable, how-
ever, for researchers to focus more on specific components, cor-
relates, and consequences of depression and to indicate clearly
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whether their specific variable of interest is thought to be unique
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to a given constellation of symptoms or common to several. As
noted earlier, such studies ultimately may be more valid and
useful than studies of diagnostic categories.
Conclusion
To be sure, over the past 10 years there has been a spate of
articles decrying the use of self-report depression inventories,
the use of college students in analogue depression research,
and the failure of many investigators to use appropriate com-
parison groups; and to be certain, many of the suggestions
made by others and repeated by Tennen et al. (1995) regard-
ing multiple assessment periods and methods and the use of
comparison groups have merit. For some types of research,
they are absolutely essential (for a thoughtful discussion, see
Haaga & Solomon, 1993).
That notwithstanding, we hope that we have communi-
cated to some degree the complexity of issues that one must
consider in evaluating Tennen et al.'s (1995) critique. Things
are just not as black and white as some might wish. We be-
lieve that many, if not most, investigators publishing in JPSP
are aware that current diagnostic systems produce data of
questionable reliability and validity. In part for this reason,
many are not interested in nosological depression, but rather
in specific components, correlates, or consequences of de-
pression. Many, if not most, are aware that techniques for the
measurement of depression generally remain underdevel-
oped and that structured and semistructured interview meth-
ods are not necessarily better than self-report symptom mea-
sures. Indeed, many, if not most, recognize that data regard-
ing "the reliabilities and validities of current psychiatric
interviews and their associated diagnostic systems [are] not
very good" (Costello, 1993, p. 13). And, although some
differences have been uncovered between samples with self-
reported, subclinical levels of symptomatology and nosologi-
cal depression (Coyne & Downey, 1991), many of those pub-
lishing in JPSP &\so are aware of a number of variables either
on which these samples do not differ or for which there is a
continuous relationship across increasing levels of symptom-
atology (Haaga & Solomon, 1993;Vrendenburgetal., 1993).
Why, then, are there so many and, in some cases, such impas-
sioned articles debating who should be included as participants
in depression research? We strongly suspect that along with po-
tentially legitimate scientific concerns, two additional themes
889
might well underlie critiques of the methodological practices of,
in this case, JPSFs investigators.
Thefirsttheme has to do with perceived fairness. It is unques-
tionably true that many researchers interested in nosological
depression view the use of college students with varying degrees
of self-reported symptomatology as a convenience sample, one
that requires less work and fewer resources to obtain. As Coyne
(1994) has argued, "These studies are easily done with minimal
resources, and they will continue to be produced at a high rate,
irrespective of the soundness of critiques of them" (p. 30). We
suspect that many who use college student samples with self-
reported depressive symptomatology on two occasions sepa-
rated by several weeks would dispute the perceived ease of doing
such research. In any case, the real issue is whether such a sam-
ple can serve as an adequate analogue for diagnosable depres-
sion, if that is indeed the population to which the investigator
wishes to generalize. Certainly this remains a controversial issue
(Coyne, 1994; Vredenburg et al., 1993), and one that we believe
requires considerably more data.
The second and related theme potentially underlying some
critiques of depression research has to do with disciplinary pa-
rochialism, and is, to our minds, far more serious and destruc-
tive. Turf issues certainly are not new and have in the past stifled
many attempts at integrative work on various phenomena lying
at the interface of social and clinical psychology (Hill & Weary,
1983; Weary, 1987). As others have noted (Vredenburg et al.,
1993), many personality and social psychology researchers sim-
ply do not have access to diagnosed populations; many also
would find it difficult to obtain training in the use of structured
and semistructured interview techniques because of rigid disci-
plinary boundaries. Such "gateway" requirements that one use
populations and diagnostic techniques generally available only
to psychiatric or clinical psychology researchers would be more
than reasonable were the issues surrounding them less contro-
versial on scientific grounds; because there is considerable con-
troversy and, in many instances, insufficient data, such require-
ments would seem to exclude improperly and unfairly certain
groups of researchers.
Lest we be misunderstood, let us say up front that we are
not accusing Tennen et al. (1995) of promoting the themes of
fairness or disciplinary parochialism under the guise of scien-
tific rigor; however, when one evaluates the methodological
precision of a single subset of investigators working on a prob-
lem, one risks the appearance, at least, of doing so. What we are
arguing is that before anyone castigates depression researchers
in social and personality psychology or institutes a set of mini-
mum methodological criteria, some comparative data regard-
ing the methodological practices of other subsets of depression
researchers should be obtained. We strongly believe that al-
though such a comparison would reveal some differences, it also
would reveal many common methodological practices and
many of the same departures from the recommendations of
Kendall et al. (1987), and for many of the same reasons.
In sum, we agree with Haaga and Solomon (1993) that di-
chotomous thinking and specific recommendations may not be
the best way to handle the various methodological issues raised
in critiques of depression research. With respect to the specific
minimum criteria outlined by Tennen et al. (1995), we firmly
believe that blind adherence to them at this time by JPSPs ed-
 890 G. WEARY, J. EDWARDS, AND J. JACOBSON
itorial boards would do more harm than good and would do
little to further understanding of phenomena relevant to symp-
tom, syndromal, or nosological conceptions of depression.
Quite simply, we believe that JPSFs readers, reviewers, and ed-
itors would do better to evaluate the merits of studies on a case-
by-case basis, as they currently do, with attention given to the
purpose and theory guiding the research, the particular concep-
tual definition of depression being used, and the appropriate-
ness of operationalizations of all constructs.
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Received October 24,1994
Accepted December 10,1994 •