Adolescent Decision Making:: The Influence of Mood, Age, and Gender On The Consideration of Information

JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / July 1999
Ganzel / ADOLESCENT DECISION MAKING
Adolescent Decision Making:

The Influence of Mood, Age, and Gender
on the Consideration of Information
A. K. Ganzel
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
This study examined the impact of mood, age, and gender on decision processes of ado-
lescents and adults. A total of 161 7th through 12th graders and adults completed a
computer-administered decision task (choosing a part-time job). Each job varied on
eight categories of information. Positive, neutral, and negative moods were induced;
participants then used the computer to review information about the jobs. The computer
recorded the amount of time spent viewing each piece of information, categories that
were discarded, and the sequence of these views. Type of information processing (careful
vs. superficial) was affected by mood, but only for females, who discarded more informa-
tion and took longer to decide in negative vs. positive or neutral moods. Age affected par-
ticipants’ estimates of the probability of obtaining their desired job and predecision
search strategy: Junior high females were more pessimistic about their chances, and
adults used more sophisticated decision strategies.
During the past few years, there has been increasing interest in adolescent
decision making, both within the research community and the public at large.
For society in general, this is at least partly due to the realization that adoles-
cents make a number of choices that have ramifications not only for their own
lives (e.g., career/lifestyle choices), but may also affect society in general
(teenage sexuality resulting in pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases,
alcohol and other drug use and abuse, risky driving, etc.). Researchers inter-
ested in the origins of various “undesirable” choices have typically focused
on factors that predict those choices. Investigators interested in normative
decision making have looked at age-related changes in the decision process.
In both cases, however, these studies have focused on the cognitive aspects of
This study is based on the doctoral dissertation of the author. The author would like to thank Professors Janis
Jacobs, Ross Thompson, and Dick Dienstbier for their comments on this research. She also wishes to thank the
administrators and teachers at the school systems that made the study possible. Correspondence concerning
this article should be addressed to A. K. Ganzel, Department of Psychology, Creighton University, 2500 Cali-
fornia Plaza, Omaha, NE 68178. Electronic mail may be sent via the Internet to aganzel@creighton.edu.
Journal of Adolescent Research, Vol. 14 No. 3, July 1999 289-318

© 1999 Sage Publications, Inc.
289
290 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / July 1999
decision making; affective influences have been virtually ignored. There is

now, however, growing evidence in the adult literature that emotions play a
significant role in a variety of judgment and decision-making processes
(Forgas, 1991a), and some of these have been suggested as possible factors in
adolescent decision making as well (e.g., Jacobs & Ganzel, 1993).
To date, no one has empirically investigated the impact of emotion on ado-
lescents’ decision making. Studies with adults suggest that mood affects sev-
eral aspects of the decision process (Deldin & Levin, 1986; Forgas, 1989;
Isen & Means, 1986; Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982; Janis & Mann,
1977). However, there are unique dimensions to the affective experience of
adolescents; thus, effects seen in older populations may or may not be evi-
denced in teens. Furthermore, mood may interact with age as the decision
skills of teenagers are developing, and with gender, as males and females may
have differing affective experiences. Thus, after a review of the literature on
age-related changes in decision making, I turn to a summary of mood effects
on adults’ decision processes, and a report of findings investigating adoles-
cent affect.
AGE EFFECTS IN DECISION MAKING
Although there are a variety of theories regarding decision making, per-

haps the most common representation of the process is subjective expected
utility theory, or SEU. In this formulation, the decision maker generates a set
of alternative actions (e.g., going on a picnic or studying), and a set of possi-
ble consequences (e.g., getting caught up on coursework, adverse weather).
This can be represented in a matrix format, similar to that depicted in Con-
sumer Reports (see Wright, 1984 for a complete explication). Each alterna-
tive action is evaluated on each consequence, both with regard to desirability
(utility) and probability; typically, utility is multiplied by probability. These
calculations are then combined or “summed” across each alternative; that
with the highest overall score represents the best choice. This process can
occur presumably at both a conscious and subconscious level (cf. Gardner,
1993).
SEU grew out of expected utility theory, which had its origins in econom-
ics and business. It is termed subjective expected utility in that desirability
and probabilities are the subjective judgments of the decision maker. SEU
implies consideration of all the available information; thus, it is considered a
compensatory strategy in that positive aspects can compensate for negative
consequences. However, individuals may ignore particular aspects of a deci-
Ganzel / ADOLESCENT DECISION MAKING 291
sion problem, or use a noncompensatory decision strategy (Klayman, 1985;

Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1990). Two examples of this are satisficing
(Simon, 1955) and elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972). In satisficing,
individuals select the first alternative that is “good enough,” and cut short
processing of additional alternatives. In elimination-by-aspects, individuals
select some minimum level on a dimension (consequence) and then compare
each alternative to that level (e.g., the cost of an apartment cannot exceed
$500).
There is considerable debate as to how adolescents and adults compare on
this decision process. Some authors maintain that there are no fundamental
differences between the decision skills of teens and adults, especially given
frequent deficits in adult decision making (e.g., Melton & Russo, 1987;
Moshman, 1993). Others argue that such conclusions are premature (Gard-
ner, Scherer, & Tester, 1989). To date, research findings on this question are
inconclusive. Furthermore, even studies investigating changes in decision
skills within adolescence are contradictory. For example, Tester, Gardner,
and Wilfong (1987, as cited in Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992, p. 10) found
that in a gambling task, 12- and 13-year-olds used “less information about
possible options, possible consequences, utilities, and probabilities” than did
adults. Klitzner, Vegega, and Gruenewald (1988) investigated factors associ-
ated with drinking and driving, and riding with an intoxicated driver in 8th to
12th graders and found that knowledge of alternatives, use of alternatives,
reflectivity (as opposed to impulsivity), alcohol knowledge, and knowledge
of DWI laws all increased with age. This would suggest skills do mature
during the adolescent years. However, Ross (1981) found that when pre-
sented with a decision problem, 7th and 10th graders did not differ much in
their ability to identify alternatives, select consequences, and summarize
information.
Investigators have also looked at more specific aspects of the decision
situation, but again with contradictory findings. For example, several studies
suggest age-related differences in the consequences individuals generate.
Kegeles, Adler, and Irwin (1988, as cited in Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992)
found that adolescents are more likely to see condoms as an easy form of birth
control that facilitates sex, rather than a preventive of pregnancy and sexually
transmitted diseases. Lewis (1981) looked at 7th through 12th graders’ judg-
ments of medical situations, and found a linear trend in the spontaneous men-
tion of possible losses; older adolescents were more sensitive to possible
negative consequences. However, Weithorn and Campbell (1982) found that
14-year-olds did not differ from adults in generating rational reasons (conse-
quences) in considering hypothetical medical decisions. Similarly, in a study
of alcohol use, Barnes (1981, as cited in Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992) found
no differences in the consequences cited by adolescents and adults; both
reported the salient outcomes were feeling good and having a good time.
Research on the evaluation of consequences most often focuses on the
ability to estimate probability. Adolescents do not do this well. For example,
Namerow, Lawton, and Philliber (1987) found that adolescent women over-
estimated their probability of pregnancy, and Phelps (1987) found that teens
underestimated the increase of the chances of an accident after drinking.
Similarly, Finn and Bragg (1986, as reported by Furby & Beyth-Marom,
1992) found that 18- to 24-year-old male drivers perceive their chances of an
accident to be lower than do 38- to 50-year-olds. However, when compared
with known probabilities, adults are not good at such estimates either. Indeed,
Furby and Beyth-Marom (1992) state that “invulnerability feelings are
actually better established in the literature with adults than with adolescents”
(p. 21).
When it comes to the combination of information, again, findings are
mixed. For example, both Klayman (1985) and Nakajima and Hotta (1989)
found that, like adults, adolescents reduce the proportion of information they
consider as the total amount of available information increases. In a sample
of 8th through 12th graders, Brown and Mann (1990) found no age differ-
ences in decision “vigilance” (i.e., careful consideration of information).
However, Klayman (1985) investigated data from his 12-year-old partici-
pants for use of the strategies of satisficing and elimination-by-aspects
(EBA). He found that although these young adolescents did exhibit satisfic-
ing, he was unable to definitively identify EBA. Instead, he states that “most
individual protocols seemed to show a mixing or blending of strategies, both
sequentially and simultaneously” (p. 192). Similarly, Nakajima and Hotta
(1989), in their study of 12- to 23-year-olds, found that with age participants
were generally more efficient in their information search (using more sys-
tematic comparison). Furthermore, 19- to 23-year-olds were significantly
more likely to use an EBA strategy than were younger participants.
Thus, these studies present a contradictory picture of the emergence of
decision skills. In some cases, teens appear to generate the same kinds of con-
sequences as do adults, but in other situations are attuned to different out-
comes. Adolescents do not do well at estimating probabilities, but often do no
worse than adults. When it comes to putting it all together, again, teens
resemble adults in some aspects, but not others.
There are a number of factors that may contribute to these differential
findings, including the general research question (Can teens make decisions
as well as adults? vs. How do the fundamental skills of decision making
develop?), and the decision domain of interest (e.g., career vs. sexual deci-
sion making). However, in the nearly exclusive focus on cognitive skills, we

have overlooked a potentially important factor in explaining these findings,
and this concerns the role of affect. Preliminary work with adults has mapped
some of these effects, which are described next.
MOOD EFFECTS ON DECISION MAKING IN ADULTS
Although the terms affect, emotion, and mood are often used inter-
changeably, Forgas (1991b, p. 5) states that there is a “slowly developing con-
sensus” that mood refers to low-level affective states with “no immediate
salient antecedent cause and therefore little cognitive content,” whereas emo-
tions are responses to specific environmental events, and are thus predomi-
nantly cognitive (e.g., anger at one’s supervisor at being denied a promotion).
Mood is generally seen as a positive to negative continuum (sometimes incor-
porating arousal as a separate dimension, as does Fiske, 1982), whereas emo-
tions are discrete states. Affect applies as a generic term encompassing both
mood and emotion (Forgas, 1991b). Studies investigating affective impacts
on decision making have typically focused on mood. Because emotions are
strongly cognitive, they seem to operate like other cognitive inputs, that is, as
a source of information. Mood, on the other hand, seems to “have a relatively
constant, nonspecific, and additive effect on social judgments” (Forgas,
1991b, p. 5).
The adult literature suggests that mood influences both the content and
process of decision making (Isen et al., 1982). For example, people in posi-
tive moods may be more likely to generate positive as opposed to negative
consequences (cf. Bower and Cohen, 1982). Similarly, mood may affect the
assessment of probabilities, as Deldin and Levin (1986) demonstrated:
Positive-mood participants were more likely than neutral-mood individuals,
who were in turn more likely than people in negative moods, to choose a
hypothetical back operation with a 75% chance of curing pain but a 25%
chance of pain returning and being three times as bad.
Mood also affects the strategies individuals use in combining information.
In general, positive moods result in “looser,” less systematic, more superfi-
cial, and more unusual or creative information processing (Forgas, 1991b),
reflecting, in part, noncompensatory decision strategies. Isen and her col-
leagues (1982; Isen & Means, 1986) have demonstrated this in a number of
studies. For example, Isen et al. (1982) and Isen and Means (1986) have
found that participants in good moods make decisions faster, use less infor-
mation, and use that information more efficiently than participants in neutral
moods, who take more time to make a decision and use more information,
and in a less efficient manner. Isen and Means also found that more than half
of their 11 happy participants exhibited an elimination-by-aspects strategy,
whereas only 1 of the 11 in the neutral-mood group did so.
Negative moods, on the other hand, trigger more careful and complete
analysis and “tight” cognitive strategies (Forgas, 1991b). Forgas (1989) dem-
onstrated this, finding that negative mood participants looked at information
more than once, eliminated less information, took longer to decide, and were
less likely to use a noncompensatory predecisional search strategy, such as
elimination-by-aspects.
If mood has a similar impact on the decision processes of teens as it does
on those of adults, we would expect that adolescents in positive moods would
make decisions using less information and processing it faster, and when in
negative moods, attending to more information for longer times, and perhaps
repeatedly considering factors already previously considered. The effect of
these processing styles on the final choice remains open. With adult partici-
pants, Isen and Means (1986) argue that using less information and making
decisions quickly reflects efficient rather than “sloppy” decision making.
Such a characterization may be premature in the cases of teens. The same
behaviors (i.e., longer decision times, repeated consideration of information,
and fewer discards) could actually foster better decision outcomes, as teens
begin practicing their decision skills. (This question requires an identifiable
“best” choice and is beyond the scope of this study.) However, it is not certain
that mood would necessarily affect decision making in adolescents as it does
in adults, because affective experiences of teens are unique, as is discussed
next.
ADOLESCENT AFFECT
In terms of both general mood level and changeability, teens experience a

unique emotional life. In a survey of 473 children in late elementary and jun-
ior high grades (fifth to ninth graders), Larson and Lampman-Petraitis (1989)
found that seventh to ninth graders experienced fewer positive and more
negative moods than their younger counterparts. For both boys and girls,
means for almost all of their emotional scales declined in a linear fashion,
suggesting a decline in average emotional state as individuals enter their jun-
ior high years. The question of whether average mood remains lower
throughout the teen years remains open. In a longitudinal study of high
school students and adults, Freeman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Larson (1986)
found considerable stability for both mood and arousal during a 2-year
period. However, although the objective ratings of mood revealed few

changes over time, the individuals themselves felt like things had changed
dramatically. The authors state that “while there was virtually no difference
in the reported quality of immediate experience over the two-year span,
respondents believed a strongly positive change to have taken place” (p. 175).
This suggests that mood itself does not actually improve during late adoles-
cence, but as adolescents get older, they learn to interpret their experiences in
more positive ways. By adulthood, mood improves; adults report higher aver-
age mood states than teens, and in particular feel more active and alert
(Larson, 1987).
Adolescents also experience more mood swings than adults. For example,
Larson (1987) found that compared with adults, moods of teens changed
fairly frequently, lasting a few hours at most. This changeability apparently
continues throughout adolescence. Larson, Csikszentmihalyi, and Graef
(1980) compared 75 9th through 12th graders and 107 adults (aged 19 to 65)
on three aspects of variability: extremity of variation (i.e., degree of variabil-
ity), instability (mood changeability), and degree of consistency (the extent
to which moods relate to particular situations). They found that adolescents
experienced more mood variation than adults, along with more changeabil-
ity; in other words, they experienced “higher highs and lower lows” (Larson
et al., 1980, p. 488), and their moods “disappear[ed] more quickly and [were]
less stable” (p. 479).
In summary, these studies suggest the following picture of adolescent
affect: In late childhood, moods change fairly quickly, and this pattern con-
tinues into adolescence. However, quality of mood declines as children enter
their teenage years. Apparently, although mood levels themselves remain
relatively low objectively, as teens get older they learn to “put a good spin” on
their affective experience. By adulthood, average mood state has stabilized,
and changeability smoothes out as well.
SUMMARY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Because the affective experience of teens differs from that of adults, the
kinds of mood effects exerted on adults’ decision making may or may not oc-
cur in adolescents. The purpose of this research is to explore this question,
looking both at how teens compare with adults and at age-related changes
during adolescence itself. In particular, this study focused on the impact of
mood in reviewing and combining information and assessing probability.
Thus, the alternatives and dimensions of the decision task—choosing a part-
time job at a fast-food restaurant—were presented to participants via a com-

puter. Independent variables included age, mood, and gender in a 4 (7th to 8th
grade, 9th to 10th grade, 11th to 12th grade, adult) × 3 (positive, neutral, nega-
tive) × 2 (male, female) factorial. Conceptually, dependent variables were su-
perficial (loose) versus careful (tight) processing, decision search strategy,
and estimates of the odds of obtaining one’s desired job. Drawing on the adult
literature, the following main effects were hypothesized:
1. Individuals in negative moods would exhibit more careful information pro-

cessing in that they would take longer, review information more than once,
and discard more (presumably) irrelevant information. Those in positive
moods would exhibit more superficial processing; adults would exhibit more
careful processing than teens.
2. Similarly, individuals in negative moods would exhibit a more systematic, and
more frequently a compensatory predecision search sequence than individu-
als in positive or neutral moods; adults would exhibit a more complex (and
more frequently noncompensatory) predecision search strategy than would
teens.
3. Individuals in negative moods would be more pessimistic about their chances
of obtaining their desired job, with individuals in positive moods more opti-
mistic, and adults would be more optimistic about their chances than teens.
Possible interactions were unknown and were not specified.
METHODS
Participants
A total of 161 participants were included in the experiment. This included
42 7th to 8th graders (mean age 13.07, ranging from 12 to 15), 41 9th to 10th
graders (mean age 15.02, ranging from 14 to 16), 39 11th to 12th graders
(mean age 17.08, ranging from 16 to 18), and 39 adult participants (mean age
23.74, ranging from 21 to 46). Of the participants, 79 were males and 82 were
females.
Junior high and high school participants were recruited in local area
schools. Adult participants were recruited from an undergraduate psychol-
ogy course and received partial course credit for participating; however, to
better differentiate the adolescent and adult populations, only students 21
years of age and older were accepted for participation.
TABLE 1: Discriminant Function Analysis of Mood Manipulation—Correlations

Between Mood Adjectives (discriminating variables) and Canonical
Discriminant Functions and Mean Ratings of Adjectives in Each
Mood Condition
Correlation to Functions Mean Ratings—Mood Conditiona

Adjective
(variable) Function 1 Function 2 Positive Neutral Negative
Sad .700 .210 1.13 1.18 2.87

Cheerful –.513 .482 3.24 2.14 1.45
Downhearted .485 .260 1.54 1.38 2.89
Blue .439 .133 1.11 1.14 2.16
Worried .306 .153 1.19 1.12 1.89
Nervous .126 .092 1.22 1.16 1.47
Interested .175 .701 3.17 2.10 3.31
Playful –.446 .645 2.89 1.56 1.22
Bored –.092 –.556 1.52 2.42 1.55
Alert .068 .341 2.94 2.40 2.96
Focused .131 .329 2.93 2.44 3.15
Lighthearted –.101 .179 2.35 1.92 1.87
a. Range is from 1 (low) to 4 (high).
Data on ethnicity and socioeconomic status were not collected; however,

the makeup of all the participating schools was predominantly White and
middle-class.
Mood Manipulation
Mood was manipulated through the use of short (approximately 7-minute)
videotapes. These included a comedy skit from Saturday Night Live (Star-
maker Entertainment, 1991) to induce positive affect; an instructional film on
back pain (American Medical Information, Inc., 1989) to induce neutral
affect; and portions of Dear America: Letters from Vietnam (Couturie &
Bird, 1987) to induce negative affect. To assess the effect of the mood
manipulation, participants completed a mood checklist consisting of 12
adjectives rated on 4-point Likert-type scales. Adjectives used in the mood
checklist are shown in Table 1.
Decision Task
Selection of a decision task involved the following considerations: Choos-
ing a domain that was least likely to in and of itself evoke an emotional re-
sponse, although still being a relevant choice; and selecting a domain as ap-
propriate as possible to all age groups involved. The task selected involves
choosing between four part-time jobs at fast-food restaurants. (According to
Fine, Mortimer, and Roberts, 1990, this is one of two primary sources of
part-time jobs for teenagers, the other being retail work.) It was constructed
in the manner of a traditional decision matrix, with the four alternatives vary-
ing on eight dimensions, or sources of information. Four of these concerned
interpersonal or social information, and four concerned more objective infor-
mation. Specifically, social categories included parental attitude toward the
job, whether friends were employed at the same restaurant, the likeability of
the supervisor, and the reputation of the restaurant among other teens. Objec-
tive categories included whether the restaurant provided free meals, the wage
paid, flexibility of scheduling, and the potential impact on a future career.
Within each individual category, either high or low values were possible, as
follows:
Parents: Your parents would really be unhappy if you took this job. (low)
Your parents would really be happy if you got this job. (high)
Friends: You don’t know anybody who works at this place. (low)
Two of your friends work at this place. (high)
Supervisor: The supervisor at this job is really mean and no fun at all. (low)
The supervisor at this job is really nice and a lot of fun. (high)
Reputation: Most kids your age think this is a really gross (low)
restaurant.
Most kids your age think this is a really cool restaurant. (high)
Meals: At this job, you have to pay for everything you eat. (low)
At this job, you get to eat free when you’re working. (high)
Wages: This job pays $4.25 per hour. (low)
This job pays $4.75 per hour. (high)
Schedule/ At this job you have to work a lot of evening and (low)
hours: weekend hours.
At this job you get to decide when and how often (high)
you’ll work.
Career: This job has nothing to do with your future career. (low)
This job can help you a lot in your future career. (high)
Each job contained a balanced mix of both high and low values within
both the social and objective categories. Thus, on the face of it, each job was
designed to have equal expected utility. (The combination of values used for
each of the four jobs is presented in the appendix.) Although each of the jobs
was ostensibly equal, it was possible that participants might respond more fa-
vorably to a particular combination of variables. To investigate this possibil-
ity, a second jobset was constructed using a mirror image of the first jobset;
thus, if a particular job was selected more often in one jobset, it should con-
versely be even less desired in the second jobset. These are also presented in
the appendix.
The decision task was administered by computer. The first screen of the
task itself was divided into quadrants, each depicting four job folders. Upon
clicking a folder to “open” it, the eight category labels were displayed (see
Figure 1 for depictions of main computer screens). To view contents of the
categories themselves, however, participants were required to press and hold
the mouse button; this invoked a pop-up box containing information about
that category. The computer tallied the amount of time (in seconds) that par-
ticipants spent looking at each category, as well as the sequence of search. In
addition, participants were able to discard (by deleting) individual categories
within jobs. From this, it was also possible to calculate the number of times a
category was viewed and re-viewed, the number and categories of discards,
and the total decision time (time participant opened the first file to the time
participant chose a job).
After viewing the categories to the extent desired, participants selected
one of the jobs by clicking on the desired folder. Participants then viewed a
screen that asked “how likely . . . you think it is that you could get this job” (on
a scale of 0 = no chance to 100 = absolutely certain).
These measures were used to construct the following dependent variables,
each of which has been identified in the adult literature as affected by mood
state:
1. Type of information processing (superficial or “loose” vs. careful or “tight”):

total time, number of re-views, number of discards (cf. Forgas, 1989; Isen et
al., 1982; Isen & Means, 1986);
2. Pre-decision search strategy: sequence of categories viewed (cf. Forgas, 1989;
Isen & Means, 1986; Klayman, 1985); and
3. Odds or probability of obtaining desired job (cf. Deldin & Levin, 1986).
Procedure
Junior and senior high school participants and their parents completed
consent forms at least a day prior to administration of the task. Adult partici-
pants completed consent forms immediately prior to administration of the
task.
Adolescent participants were tested in small groups (2 to 5) in their
respective schools; adult participants were tested in small groups on campus.
Participants were seated at computers, and the computer programs first asked
Figure 1. Main computer screens for decision task.
participants to indicate their gender and grade. An experimenter then

explained the nature of the decision task, reviewed the eight categories of
information, and indicated that the purpose of the study was to investigate the
kinds of information important to people in considering part-time work and
whether different kinds of television shows might affect this.
Participants were then trained on the computer task. The training involved
selecting between two candy bars that varied on three dimensions: cost, size,
and ingredients ($1.00, larger, and chocolate, peanuts, and marshmallow vs.
$.50, smaller, and chocolate, caramel, and almonds). The screens mimicked
the actual task. Participants received instruction in opening, reopening, and
eliminating categories, and were allowed as much time as desired to practice
with the task.
Following training and practice with the program, participants viewed one
of the three television clips. Upon completion of the film, participants were
instructed to quickly fill out the mood checklist and then proceed to the
decision task with the explicit instructions to not speak with each other
while completing the task, and to “take as long as you need to make a good
decision.”
When all participants in a group had completed their respective decision
tasks, all groups then viewed (or re-viewed in the case of positive affect con-
dition) the Saturday Night Live clip to attenuate any lingering negative mood
effects. Participants were invited to ask questions, thanked for their participa-
tion, and dismissed.
RESULTS
Data were first checked for two things: To determine whether the four jobs
in each jobset in fact conveyed equal expected utility, and to confirm that the
mood manipulation was successful. Analyses of the effects of the indepen-
dent variables on the dependent variables proceeded after this. An alpha level
of .05 was used for all statistical tests.
Check of Equal Expected Utility (Jobset)

Chi-square analysis of Jobset 1 revealed no systematic bias toward any of
2
the four jobs (χ [3, N = 98] = 1.510, p > .10). Each job was selected with about
equal frequency; 21 participants selected Job 1, 28 selected Job 2, 27 selected
Job 3, and 22 selected Job 4. However, chi-square analysis of Jobset 2 indi-
cated that participants selected Job 1 more often than would be expected by
chance, and selected Jobs 2 and 4 less often than would be expected by
2
chance (χ [3, N = 73] = 28.753, p < .001); respective frequencies for Jobs 1
through 4 are 37, 8, 18, and 10.
Nevertheless, differential selection of jobs in Jobset 2 was not expected to
affect the remaining analyses for the following reasons: First, the opposite
pattern did not hold for Jobset 1 (i.e., Job 1 in Jobset 1 less desirable and Jobs 2
and 4 more desirable), despite the fact that this would have been expected to
occur. Second, separate analyses of variance within Jobset 2 alone using each
of the eight categories (meals, parents, etc.) as grouping variables to contrast
the mean time of views for each of the four jobs revealed no significant differ-
ences. In other words, within a given category, participants spent about the
same amount of view time across the four jobs, suggesting no systematic bias
attributable to the type of job. Finally, separate chi-square analyses within
each jobset also revealed that neither mood (χ [6] = 4.25, p > .10 and χ [6] =
2 2
2
6.54, p > .10 for Jobsets 1 and 2, respectively), nor grade (χ [9] = 14.08, p >
.10 and χ [9] = 9.42, p > .10 for Jobsets 1 and 2, respectively), nor gender (χ
2 2
[3] = .81, p > .10 and χ [3] = 1.14, p > .10 for Jobsets 1 and 2, respectively)
2
systematically affected participants’final choices (their decision outcomes).
Check of Mood Manipulation

To confirm that the mood manipulation was successful, a discriminant
function analysis was performed using the twelve variables from the mood
checklist (see Table 1) as predictors and the three mood conditions (positive,
neutral, and negative) as grouping variables. The analysis revealed two dis-
criminant functions, with a combined χ (24, N = 161) = 312.773, p < .0001.
2
After removal of the first function, there was still a strong association
between groups and predictors, χ (11) = 95.792, p < .0001. The two discrimi-
2
nant functions accounted for approximately 78% and 22%, respectively, of

the between-group variability. As shown in Figure 2, the first function maxi-
mally separates the positive and negative mood conditions, with neutral
mood falling between, whereas the second function discriminates the neutral
from the positive and negative groups.
The loading matrix of correlations between predictors and discriminant
functions, as seen in Table 1, suggests that the predictors that best distinguish
positive mood participants from negative mood participants (first function)
are sad, cheerful, downhearted, blue, worried, and playful. Examination of
the means for these groups (see Table 1) reveals these are in the expected
direction: positive mood participants are less sad, more cheerful, less down-
hearted, less blue, less worried, and more playful than negative mood partici-
pants. The loading matrix also suggests that the predictors that best discrimi-
nate neutral mood participants from the other groups are cheerful, interested,
playful, bored, alert, and focused. Examination of means here (Table 1)
reveals that neutral participants are less interested, more bored, less alert, and
Figure 2. Plot of centroids of the three mood conditions on the two functions de-
termined by discriminant function analysis.
less focused than the positive and negative mood groups, but mean feelings of
playfulness and cheerfulness are intermediate to the positive and negative
groups.
These two functions suggest a complex structure of emotional responses
to these stimuli, rather than a simple linear trend (i.e., neutral falling between
positive and negative). The first function reflects more of a quality of mood,
whereas the second function seems to embody an arousal component (see
Figure 1). Nevertheless, most of the variability is embodied in the first func-
tion, which separates negative from positive and neutral mood conditions.
Effects on the Independent Variables

on Type of Information Processing
To investigate effects on information processing style, a 4 (grade) × 3
(mood) ´ 2 (gender) between-participants MANOVA was performed on
TABLE 2: Information Processing: Mean Total Time (in seconds) of Decision

Process, Mean Number of Discards, and Mean Number of Reviews;
Main Effects and Mood by Gender Interaction
Mood Condition
Positive Neutral Negative
Total timea
Female 203.27 234.15 297.76
Male 229.15 206.17 234.15
b
Total (main effect) 216.45 220.98 264.73
a
Total number of discards
Female 0.85 2.30 5.80
Male 4.56 3.83 2.96
c
Total number of reviews
Female 11.92 16.52 18.20
Male 14.15 10.42 10.74
a. Total time and number of discards contribute to multivariate interaction effect.
b. Only total time contributes to multivariate main effect of mood.
c. Number of reviews does not contribute to multivariate interaction effect; shown
here for illustrative purposes only.
three dependent variables: total time, total number of discards, and total
number of reviews. Using Wilks’s criterion, there was a main effect for mood,
F(6, 260) = 3.23, p = .004, and a mood by gender interaction, F(6, 260) =
2.27, p = .037. None of the remaining main effects nor interactions exhibited
significant differences.
Univariate follow-ups to the main effect of mood suggest that total time
was primarily responsible for differences among the conditions, F(2, 132) =
6.43, p = .002. The three mood conditions did not elicit significant differ-
ences between either the number of discards or the number of reviews, F(2,
132) = .1.24, p = .293, and F(2, 132) = .38, p = .685, respectively. Means for
each of these variables are shown in Table 2.
Follow-up analyses consisted of contrasts between neutral mood and
positive and negative conditions combined, and between negative mood and
positive and neutral moods combined. These contrasts are suggested by the
structure revealed by the discriminant function analysis of mood manipula-
tion, and are used in all subsequent mood comparisons as well. (Bonferroni
corrections set individual alphas at .025.) These analytical comparisons
revealed that neutral mood was not significantly different from positive and
negative moods, t(153) = –1.29, p = .198, but that negative mood was signifi-
cantly higher than the other groups, t(153) = 3.05, p = .003. Thus, in general
participants in negative moods simply took longer to make a decision.
However, this general pattern is different for males and females. Univari-
ate follow-ups to the mood by gender interaction suggest that total time, F(2,
132) = 4.23, p = .017, and total number of discards, F(2, 132) = 4.98, p = .008,
were affected by these independent variables. Number of reviews was not
significantly different in this interaction effect, F(2, 132) = 2.15, p = .12.
Means for this interaction are reflected in Table 2. They show that whereas
the amount of time to decide rises dramatically for females from positive to
neutral to negative mood condition, total amount of decision time for males
remains more constant across mood conditions (dipping slightly for neutral
mood). There is an even more dramatic interaction in the case of number of
discards (see Table 2), the number of discards for females increases across
the three mood conditions whereas it decreases for males. Although not sta-
tistically significant, a similar pattern is exhibited in the number of reviews
(see Table 2).
Separate follow-up analyses again compared neutral mood to positive and
negative moods combined, and negative mood to positive and neutral mood
conditions combined, for both of the variables that contributed to the multi-
variate effect, namely, total time to decision and total number of discards.
Analytical comparisons of the variable of total time revealed that among
females, there were significant differences between negative mood and posi-
tive and neutral moods combined, t(75) = 3.31, p = .001, but not between the
neutral condition and positive and negative mood groups, t(75) = –.70, p =
.487. However, among males there were no significant differences between
the three mood conditions.
Analytical comparisons of the variable of total number of discards
revealed the same pattern: Females in negative moods discarded significantly
more information than females in positive and neutral moods, t(79) = 3.64,
p = .0001; differences between the neutral group and positive and negative
mood conditions were not significant, t(79) = –.74, p = .460. However, this
pattern is exactly the opposite of that predicted from earlier research, which
suggests that in positive moods, participants discard more information,
presumably to facilitate processing. Again, among males there were no
significant differences in the number of discards between the three mood
conditions.
To summarize, then, there is a general mood effect on the type of informa-
tion processing in decision situations (with negative mood slowing decision
time), but also a mood by gender interaction. The information processing of
females is affected by mood such that females in negative moods take signifi-
cantly longer and discard more information than positive or neutral-mood

females. However, the information processing style of males is unaffected by
mood condition.
Effects of Independent Variables on Predecision Search Strategy

Interestingly, two thirds (106 or 66%) of the sample looked at all of the
categories in all of the jobs at least once, suggesting the use of a compensa-
tory decision strategy. The average proportion of information considered was
93%. This is much higher than the findings of Klayman (1985) who reported
the percentage of search varied from 54% to 79%, or Nakajima and Hotta
(1989) who found that participants searched from 20% to 38% of available
information. This was the case even though the amount of total information in
all the studies was comparable (32 pieces of information in this study vs. a
maximum of 36 pieces of information in the other two studies).
On average, 7th to 8th graders, 9th to 10th graders, 11th to 12th graders,
and adults considered 95.68%, 97.18%, 94.47%, and 85.74% of the available
categories, respectively. Analysis of variance revealed a significant grade
effect, F(3, 157) = 4.60, p = .004. Analytical comparisons (with Bonferroni
correction resulting in individual alphas of .017) revealed no differences
between the adolescent groups (i.e., no differences between the 7th- to 8th-
grade group and the 9th- to 10th-grade group, t(157) = .45, p = .650, nor
between the 9th- to 10th-grade group and the 11th- to 12th-grade group,
t(157) = –.80, p = .42). However, adults considered proportionately less of the
total available information than the adolescent group as a whole, t(157) =
3.62, p = .0001. Although most participants took advantage of all of the infor-
mation at hand, when they did ignore part of the decision matrix, they were
more likely to be adults. There were no significant mood nor gender effects
on the proportion of information considered.
Decision strategy was further investigated by classifying participants
according to their sequence of search. Klayman’s (1985) classification
served as a model for this; protocols were investigated for intrajob shifts (e.g.,
viewing the meal category of Job 1 followed by viewing the parents category
of Job 1), intradimension shifts (e.g., viewing the meal category of Job 1 fol-
lowed by the meal category of Job 2), and cross-shifts. This resulted in the
following three categories: (a) search primarily within jobs (in which partici-
pants searched the information within each job in turn, typically viewing
each category in each job in the order presented on the screen [see Figure 1
for screen arrangement]); (b) search primarily across categories (in which
participants viewed information by category, for example, viewing the infor-
mation regarding meals in each of the four jobs, then viewing information
TABLE 3: Frequency of Choice of Predecision Search Strategy by Each Grade

Level
Grade Level
Initial Strategy 7th to 8th 9th to 10th 11th to 12th Adult Row Total
Search within jobs 23 29 25 12 89

(23.2) (22.7) (21.6) (21.6) 55.3%
Search across 3 1 1 3 8
categories
(2.1) (2.0) (1.9) (1.9) 5.0%
Complex search 16 11 13 24 64
(16.7) (16.3) (15.5) (15.5) 39.8%
Column totals 42 41 39 39 161
26.1% 25.5% 24.2% 24.2% 100%
NOTE: Expected frequencies shown in parentheses.
regarding the parents in each of the four jobs, and so on); and (c) complex
search (a strategy characterized by a mixture of searching within job
and across category, and often including use of the discard function). (Note
that this is not random searching, but rather represents a variety of complex
strategies.)
Separate chi-square analyses of these search strategies revealed no mood
nor gender effects, χ s are, respectively, (4, N = 161) = 1.08, p = .897 and (2, N =
2
161) = 1.60, p = .448. There was, however a grade effect, χ2 (6, N = 161) =
15.34, p = .018. Observed and expected frequencies are summarized in Table 3;
these reveal that adults are much less likely to use a search-within-jobs strat-
egy and more likely to use a complex search strategy than would be expected
by chance. In other words, the search sequence of teens was more often
driven by the spatial arrangement of information on the screen.
Effects of Independent Variables on Estimates of Probability

Previous research has suggested that individuals in negative moods may
react more pessimistically or cautiously in estimating the chances of a given
occurrence (e.g., Deldin & Levin, 1986). This was investigated by looking at
participants’ estimates of the probability of obtaining their preferred job.
Analysis of variance using mood, grade, and gender as independent variables
and probability estimates as dependent variables found no mood nor gender
effects, but a main effect for grade and a grade by gender interaction. (None
of the remaining two-way or three-way interactions revealed significant dif-
ferences). On average, 7th through 12th graders and adults estimated these
chances of getting their preferred job at 66.90%, 79.20%, 87.97%, and

87.46%, respectively. Analytical comparisons of each age group to the next
older group (Bonferroni correction resulting in individual alphas of .017)
indicated there were significant differences between 7th to 8th and 9th to 10th
graders, t(156) = 3.47, p = .001, and between 9th to 10th and 11th to 12th
graders, t(156) = 2.48, p = .014, but not between 11th to12th graders and
adults, t(156) = –.14, p = .886.
Means for females in the 7th to 8th, 9th to 10th, 11th to 12th grades, and
adult groups averaged 60.64, 81.23, 90.74, and 87.05, respectively. Averages
for males were 73.80, 76.72, 85.35, and 87.85, respectively. This reveals that
at the youngest age group (junior high), females estimate their chances of get-
ting the job lower than do the youngest males, whereas high school females
(9th through 12th grade) estimate their chances of getting the job higher than
do high school males. There were virtually no differences between the esti-
mations of male and female adults. Separate analytical comparisons (Bonfer-
roni correction resulting in individual alphas of .017) of females and males
reveal that in the male participants, there were no significant differences
between the age groups. Among the female participants, there were signifi-
cant differences between the 7th to 8th graders and the 9th to 10th graders,
t(78) = 4.70, p = .000, but not between any of the remaining groups. Thus, in
particular, female junior high students are more pessimistic about the
chances of obtaining their preferred job.
DISCUSSION
The findings suggest that mood affects an adolescent’s decision processes

in some of the same ways that an adult’s decision making is affected. How-
ever, several of the findings were related to age; these generally were differ-
ences between the adolescent groups as a whole and the adults. Even more
interesting, however, is the fact that some of these results were qualified by
gender.
Mood Effects on Information Processing

Previous studies have found that participants in negative moods exhibit
more careful or “tighter” decision processing in that they review more and
discard less information, and take longer to make a choice. This study offers
only partial support for this viewpoint, and more important, only in the case
of females; the decision processes of males were unaffected by mood. Mood
had no impact on the propensity to review information already considered
once, and mood effects on the act of discarding information (in females) was
opposite of that found in previous work. Mood did, however, affect decision
time (of females) as expected.
Past studies have found that positive mood is associated with discarding
more information. The explanation given for these earlier findings is that par-
ticipants in good moods get rid of data deemed irrelevant, whereas a negative
mood might cause one to vacillate, reviewing any available information even
if it has little bearing on one’s choice. In this study, rather than discarding
more information, females in positive moods retained almost all the data
available to them (eliminating on average only one item). It was females in
negative moods who discarded more—on average, almost 6 (18%) of the 32
pieces of information available. Neutral mood was intermediate to this.
Although mood caused no statistically significant differences in the number
of discards among males, it is interesting to note that the trend goes in the
opposite direction.
Why the different pattern for discards in this study? This finding may be
related to the methodology of the decision task. In earlier studies (e.g., For-
gas, 1989; Isen & Means, 1986; Nakajima & Hotta, 1989; Klayman, 1985),
participants physically handled the information via index cards or informa-
tion display boards. When information is presented via a computer, it may be
easier to simply ignore (or not open) irrelevant categories than to take the
extra step to discard them. If this is so (and future research is necessary to
determine this), the fact that females in negative moods eliminated more
information supports an interpretation of tighter information processing.
Perhaps females are simply more deliberate overall under conditions of nega-
tive affect, making a careful judgment as to what is useful and what is not.
The fact that participants used much more of the available information than in
earlier studies suggests they respond differently to a computer task.
Mood effects on decision time, on the other hand, support findings from
previous work, at least in their impact on females. Females in positive and
neutral moods took roughly 3½ minutes to make a choice, whereas females in
negative moods took almost 5 minutes to do so. Furthermore, the three-way
interaction of mood, grade, and gender on the dependent variable of total time
to decide approached significance, F(18, 368.18) = 1.51, p = .082, and
reveals that negative mood exerted a particularly acute effect on the junior
high females. On average, it took them almost 7 minutes to make a choice. In
contrast, males took about 3½ to 4 minutes to make a choice, regardless of
mood condition.
One might argue, of course, that although these decision times are statisti-
cally different, there is little practical significance between 3½ and 7 minutes.
The assumption, however, is that mood maps onto basic cognitive process-
ing. The exact nature of this interface is a matter of some debate. For example,
Isen et al. (1982) suggest that in positive moods, individuals may be seeking
to avoid cognitive strain, whereas Forgas (1989) suggests that different
moods may operate like a heuristic, automatically invoking different process-
ing styles. Regardless of the exact nature of mood influence on basic cogni-
tive functioning, the fact that a mild mood can elicit differences on a rela-
tively menial and short-lived decision task suggests that such effects may be
amplified with more intense affective states and more immediate and person-
ally relevant decision situations. Furthermore, the work of Larson and
Lampman-Petraitis (1989) reveals that in early adolescence, negative mood
states occur more frequently. Thus, if it often seems that young adolescent
women have difficulty “making up their minds,” this could be primarily due
to affective considerations and not to cognitive capacities.
The more important issue, of course, is why mood appears to have no dis-
cernible impact on the decision processes of males—why should only the
information processing of females be affected this way? As noted, earlier
studies among adults found no gender differences; negative moods elicited
more careful information processing for both males and females.
One possibility is that the mood manipulation for males was simply inef-
fective. However, data do not support this. Individual t tests for each of the
adjectives on the mood checklist revealed only one significant gender differ-
ence (males describing themselves as significantly more alert than females).
Furthermore, examination of the number of cases correctly classified by the
linear discriminant function procedure reveals that 86.6% of females and
79.7% of males were correctly classified for mood condition. Thus, it does
not appear that the mood manipulation procedure was ineffective (at least to
the extent that it alone could account for results on the decision task). A
related explanation could be that males simply report feeling how they think
they should feel (demand characteristics). However, to assume that this might
be true because males exhibit no effects on the decision task is a bit of the tail
wagging the dog. A third possibility is that mood effects attenuate rapidly in
males but are more persistent in females.
One intriguing, but highly speculative explanation lies in the nature of
affect itself. As briefly noted in the introduction, there is discussion about
whether affect involves simply quality of mood, or an additional separate
dimension of arousal. Analyses of the mood manipulation in this study sug-
gest two dimensions: whereas the films associated with the positive and nega-
tive mood conditions elicited quality of mood, the film used for the neutral
condition suggested an arousal component (or more accurately, an under-
aroused component). Interestingly, the means for total decision time for
males in each of the age groups reveal that with the exception of junior high
males, neutral mood elicits the fastest decision time (although for junior high
males it reflects the slowest decision time). (For the 7th- to 8th-grade boys,
means for positive, neutral, and negative moods are 208.17, 223.50, and
204.13 seconds, respectively; for the 9th- to 10th-grade boys, means are
234.29, 208.67, and 227.17, respectively; for the 11th- to 12th-grade boys,
they are 231.75, 178.50, and 255.60, respectively; and for adult males they
are 240.67, 214.00, and 256.00, respectively.) Perhaps (and this can be stated
in only the most tentative of terms), whereas the decision processes of adoles-
cent females are affected by the quality of mood, decision making in adoles-
cent males is affected more by the intensity of mood. If this were true, these
findings would suggest that higher mood intensity (whether positive or nega-
tive) elicits longer consideration of information for males; being bored sim-
ply diminishes processing time. Thus, future research should incorporate
both dimensions of affect (e.g., anger vs. sadness, euphoria vs. contentment).
Age Effects
Age affected participants’ assessment of their odds or probability of
obtaining their preferred job. This rose steadily through junior high and high
school, and peaked with the oldest adolescents whose estimates were compa-
rable to those of adults. However, gender also played a role in this judgment.
In particular, seventh- to eighth-grade females estimated their probabilities
significantly lower than other females, whereas the seventh- to eighth-grade
males were more optimistic.
There are at least three possible explanations for this finding. On one
hand, this may parallel what we know about diminished self-confidence and
lower perceptions of ability among young adolescent females. It could also
be the case, however, that these judgments reflect actual possibilities; it may
be more difficult for seventh- to eighth-grade girls to get a job than for junior
high boys. Or, as an alternative, junior high boys may be unrealistically opti-
mistic about their abilities and chances.
When viewing the general trend, it is interesting to note that by adulthood
these gender differences in perceptions have virtually disappeared. It would,
however, be useful in future research to make adolescent and adult compari-
sons of gender differences with a task in which actual probabilities were
known.
Age (grade) also affected participants’ predecision search strategy. First,
adults were less likely than teens to use all the information available to them;
in other words, they were more likely to skip over certain categories, whereas
the teens were more likely to use a compensatory strategy, looking at all of the
categories at least once. Nevertheless, the proportion of total information
viewed at least once was quite high for all groups (close to 95% for the three
teen groups, about 85% for adults). These findings are remarkably different
from the findings of Klayman (1985) and Nakajima and Hotta (1989) who
reported much lower rates.
This difference between the current and previous research may, again, be
due to differences in methodology; that is, the difference between physically
handling information cards or opening doors on information display boards,
and accessing data on a computer. Perhaps when material is presented elec-
tronically, participants are either more willing or more able to deal with more
information than if they are physically handling it. The only way to know this
for certain is to directly compare the two methods. If this is the case, however,
it suggests that computer programs may be an effective way to assist teens
(and others) in making choices (presuming, of course, that greater informa-
tion facilitates better decisions). Indeed, such programs are available for
vocational decision making (Gati & Tikotzki, 1989); perhaps these could be
broadened to other areas as well.
However, even as adults were considering comparatively less informa-
tion, they were handling it in a more complex way. The search sequence of
teens was more often spatially driven (by arrangement of information on the
screen), whereas adults did more comparisons both within and across jobs.
This suggests that adults have developed more varied and more sophisticated
ways of contrasting all the elements affecting a choice, and supports the find-
ings of Nakajima and Hotta (1989), who found that 19- to 23-year-olds were
more likely to use elimination-by-aspects, a noncompensatory strategy, than
the younger adolescent participants in their sample.
Future Research
As is true for adults, mood state appears to affect the decision making at
least of teenage women, most notably by slowing down processing of infor-
mation under conditions of negative mood. Effects of mood on the decision
making of males are less clear. As suggested earlier, it may be the arousal or
activation component of mood that has a greater impact on males. One recent
study supports this distinction. In an investigation of choices between high-
risk/high-payoff and low-risk/low-payoff options, Leith and Baumeister
(1996) found that participants in negative moods opted for high-risk options
only when they were simultaneously aroused; participants in sad moods
(negative state and low arousal) behaved differently. Thus, additional
research is necessary to see if this might account for the gender differences
identified here.
It is also important to determine whether these different processing styles

evoked by different mood states affect the decision outcome. Does careful
consideration result in a better choice? Although this is a common assump-
tion, processing styles may not affect the ultimate decision; perhaps a looser
style actually results in a superior outcome. Although determining an identi-
fiable “better” decision is problematic more often than not, the work of Wil-
son and Schooler (1991) suggests some possible ways to accomplish this.
Future research should also investigate how mood may affect different
steps of the decision process. For example, mood may affect the alternative
actions adolescents generate; perhaps positive mood fosters more alterna-
tives. This might then compensate for the more superficial processing of that
information, which might in turn lead to a reasonable choice, despite the
process the decision maker engages.
Finally, it may be that mood effects on decision processes vary by decision
domain. Some decisions in and of themselves generate affective responses
(e.g., sexual decision making); thus, mood state may accentuate, negate, or
have no impact on other types of choices. For example, although negative
moods may lead to more careful processing in everyday decisions (choosing
a job, choices about clothing or music or hairstyle, etc.), mood might elicit
different effects in domains of risky behavior (e.g., smoking, sexual behavior,
driving) and/or life choices (career, marriage).
Despite all that remains to be learned, these findings allow for an initial
insight into affective impacts on adolescents’ decision making. Although
greater explication of cognitive facets of the process is useful, a deeper under-
standing of emotional and motivational factors is also necessary. With a more
complete picture of all the components, perhaps we can provide better guid-
ance as teens face the myriad of choices affecting their lives, the lives of those
around them, and society as a whole.
APPENDIX
Decision Task
Jobset 1
Job 1
Meals: At this job, you have to pay for everything you eat. (low objective)
Parents: Your parents would really be unhappy if you took (low social)
this job.
Wage: This job pays $4.25 per hour. (low objective)
Friends: Two of your friends work at this place. (high social)
Schedule At this job you get to decide when and how often (high objective)
/hours: you will work.
Supervisor: The supervisor at this job is really mean and no (low social)
fun at all.
Career: This job can help you a lot in your future career. (high objective)
Reputation: Most kids your age think this is a really cool (high social)
restaurant.
Job 2
Meals: At this job, you get to eat free when you are (high objective)
working.
Parents: Your parents would really be unhappy if you (low social)
took this job.
Wage: This job pays $4.75 per hour. (high objective)
Friends: You do not know anybody who works at this place. (low social)
Schedule/ At this job you have to work a lot of evening and (low objective)
Supervisor: The supervisor at this job is really nice and a (high social)
lot of fun.
Career: This job has nothing to do with your future career. (low objective)
restaurant.
Job 3
Parents: Your parents would really be happy if you got (high social)
this job.
Schedule/ At this job, you have to work a lot of evening and (low objective)
fun at all.
Reputation: Most kids your age think this is a really gross (low social)
restaurant.
Job 4
working.
this job.
Schedule/ At this job, you get to decide when and how often (high objective)
hours: you will work.
Supervisor: The supervisor at this job is really nice and a lot (high social)
of fun.
restaurant.
Jobset 2
Job 1
working.
this job.
of fun.
restaurant.
Job 2
this job.
Schedule/ At this job, you get to decide when and how often (high objective)
fun at all.
restaurant.
Job 3
working.
this job.
Schedule/ At this job you get to decide when and how often (high objective)
of fun.
restaurant.
Job 4
this job.
fun at all.
Reputation: Most kids your age think this is really a cool (high social)
restaurant.
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A. K. Ganzel currently holds an adjunct appointment as an assistant professor with the

Department of Psychology at the University of Nebraska–Omaha. She received her B.A.,
M.A., and Ph.D. from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln, and has held appointments
with the Center for Children, Families and the Law in Lincoln, Nebraska, and Creighton
University in Omaha. Her research interests focus on factors affecting the development
of adolescent decision making, including social, emotional, and motivational influences.
In addition to studies on the effects of mood, her previous work includes studies of joint
decision making by parents and young adolescents, as well as theoretical considerations
of motivational factors in adolescent decision making. Current research studies involve
the impact of self-esteem and mood and social and objective decisions, development of a
decision typology, and a study of how naturally occurring mood states affect decision
outcomes.

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JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / July 1999

Ganzel / ADOLESCENT DECISION MAKING

Adolescent Decision Making:

Journal of Adolescent Research, Vol. 14 No. 3, July 1999 289-318

decision making; affective influences have been virtually ignored. There is

AGE EFFECTS IN DECISION MAKING

Although there are a variety of theories regarding decision making, per-

sion problem, or use a noncompensatory decision strategy (Klayman, 1985;

sion making). However, in the nearly exclusive focus on cognitive skills, we

MOOD EFFECTS ON DECISION MAKING IN ADULTS

In terms of both general mood level and changeability, teens experience a

period. However, although the objective ratings of mood revealed few

SUMMARY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

time job at a fast-food restaurant—were presented to participants via a com-

1. Individuals in negative moods would exhibit more careful information pro-

Possible interactions were unknown and were not specified.

TABLE 1: Discriminant Function Analysis of Mood Manipulation—Correlations

Correlation to Functions Mean Ratings—Mood Conditiona

Sad .700 .210 1.13 1.18 2.87

Data on ethnicity and socioeconomic status were not collected; however,

1. Type of information processing (superficial or “loose” vs. careful or “tight”):

Figure 1. Main computer screens for decision task.

participants to indicate their gender and grade. An experimenter then

Check of Equal Expected Utility (Jobset)

systematically affected participants’final choices (their decision outcomes).

Check of Mood Manipulation

nant functions accounted for approximately 78% and 22%, respectively, of

Effects on the Independent Variables

TABLE 2: Information Processing: Mean Total Time (in seconds) of Decision

cantly longer and discard more information than positive or neutral-mood

Effects of Independent Variables on Predecision Search Strategy

TABLE 3: Frequency of Choice of Predecision Search Strategy by Each Grade

Search within jobs 23 29 25 12 89

Effects of Independent Variables on Estimates of Probability

chances of getting their preferred job at 66.90%, 79.20%, 87.97%, and

The findings suggest that mood affects an adolescent’s decision processes

Mood Effects on Information Processing

It is also important to determine whether these different processing styles

American Medical Information, Inc. (Producer). (1989). Back pain [Video].

A. K. Ganzel currently holds an adjunct appointment as an assistant professor with the

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