Professional Documents
Culture Documents
What is a Law?
• Law: Rules made by a body of elected representatives or their delegates, or by a court,
using procedures that are also prescribed by law
• Laws impose duties and punishments, but also create rights
• Laws create rights and a framework to ensure that the activities of contemporary society
are carried out honestly and effectively
Types of Law
• Common Law and Statute Law
• Canada has laws developed by courts and laws passed by governments
• Laws made by courts known as common law
• Body of law (legislation) made by elected representatives known as statute law
• Harmful activity (a tort, or wrong) can be subject of both common law and statue law
•
• Common Law
• Courts must follow precedent (stare decisis)
• Statute Law
• When common law included in statutes with little/no change, this is known as
codification
• Statute law consists of statutes, regulations, and by-laws
Chapter 2
Multipurpose Agencies:
• Many admin agencies are multi-purpose bodies (i.e., several functions)
• Each function may require different procedures to ensure fairness
• Key requirement: Separation of functions to avoid unfairness (e.g., ensuring
investigators, prosecutors, adjudicators kept separate to prevent undue influence)
• Further requirement: No delegation of authority (adjudicators may not delegate decision-
making authority, per doctrine of “subdelegation”)
• Agencies with multiple & potentially conflicting functions avoid this by creating internal
structures and barriers (e.g., Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission)
Chapter 3
What is Administrative Law?
• Rules founded on 6 fundamental principles:
• Decision-makers must stay within jurisdiction
• Administrators to use reasonable discretion
• Administrators to follow “procedural fairness”
• Authority cannot be subdelegated
• Delegated legislation conforms to statute
• Courts can rectify violations by “judicial review”
• Jurisdiction:
• Scope of authority/powers given to government body or official by legislation or
common law; sources are statutes & common law
• Jurisdiction is generally limited to the powers granted to an administrative body in the
relevant statutes
• Necessary implication: Unreasonable to draw any other inference from facts. Agencies
have whatever powers are necessarily incidental to their explicit powers
• Two Sources of Jurisdiction (p.57):
1. Implied powers doctrine: Source of substantive jurisdiction
2. Inherent powers doctrine: Agency is master of its own process. Common law
source of jurisdiction; grants agencies necessary unwritten procedural powers
Application of Act
• Section 3.(1): Subject to subsection (2), this Act applies to a proceeding by a tribunal in
the exercise of a statutory power of decision conferred by or under an Act of the
Legislature, where the tribunal is required by or under such Act or otherwise by law to
hold or to afford to the parties to the proceeding an opportunity for a hearing before
making a decision.
• Where Act does not apply
• Section 3(2): This Act does not apply to a proceeding,
• (a) before the Assembly or any committee of the Assembly;
• (b) in or before,
• (i) Court of Appeal; (ii) Superior Court of Justice; (iii) Ontario Court of
Justice, (iv) Family Court; (v) Small Claims Court, or (vi) a justice of the peace;
• (c) to which the Rules of Civil Procedure apply;
• (d) before an arbitrator to which the Arbitrations Act or the Labour Relations Act
applies;
• (e) at a coroner’s inquest;
• (f) of a commission appointed under the Public Inquiries Act;
• (g) of one or more persons required to make an investigation and to make a report,
with or without recommendations, where the report is for the information or advice of the
person to whom it is made and does not in any way legally bind or limit that person in
any decision he or she may have power to make; or
• (h) of a tribunal empowered to make regulations, rules or by-laws in so far as its
power to make regulations, rules or by-laws is concerned.
• Waiver
• Section 4.(1): Any procedural requirement of this Act, or of another Act or a regulation
that applies to a proceeding, may be waived with the consent of the parties and the
tribunal.
Declining jurisdiction: Failure to carry out statutory function may breach procedural fairness
Discretion (p.60):
Power to choose a course of action from options available under the law
Discretion must be exercised reasonably (avoid viewing options too broadly/narrowly)
There are four limits on decision-maker’s right to choose among options (p.60)
1. Discretion must be exercised within the four boundaries of the statute (within the decision-
maker’s jurisdiction). Fundamental rule is that the choices made must be consistent both with the
purpose of the statute and the wording. Recent, courts state that discretion must be exercised
according to the purpose, wording and must act consistently with the values underlying the grant
of discretion including Charter values.
2. Officials must only consider relevant factors consistent with the purpose and wording of the
statute and relate to issues they are to decide.
3. Similar cases should be treated in a similar way,and diff cases in a diff way.
4. Discretion must be exercised in good faith.
(5). Decision-makers must act consistently with Charter values
Limits on the Authority to Rule out Options: The Rule Against Fettering Discretion
Fettering discretion (p.60): When officials refuse to consider an option that is available under
the law, or refusing to consider any factors that is relevant to the choice of an option, when
making a decision that affects a person’s rights or interests
o Refusing to consider an option available under law or to consider any relevant
factor when making a decision
o A body entrusted to make a decision must not fetter itself from exercising its
discretion in an individual case by blindly adopting a fixed rule or policy
o “Government agencies and administrative bodies must, of necessity, adopt
policies to guide their operations. And valid guidelines and policies can be
considered in the exercise of a discretion, provided that the decision maker puts
his or her mind to the specific circumstances of the case rather than blindly
following the policy….”
o Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests),
1999 BCCA 470
o Wade, "Administrative Law", 4th edition, at p. 317:
o An authority can fail to give its mind to a case, and thus fail to exercise its
discretion lawfully, by blindly following a policy laid down in advance. It is
a fundamental rule for the exercise of discretionary power that discretion must
be brought to bear on every case: each one must be considered on its own
merits and decided as the public interest requires at the time.
o In Trinity Western University v. The Law Society of British Columbia 2015 BCSC
2326 (“TWU-LSBC“), Chief Justice Hinkson found that the LSBC Benchers
incorrectly fettered their discretion by binding themselves to a ‘fixed blanket
policy set by LSBC members in the form of a non-binding vote (at para 120).
o [97] Fettering of discretion occurs when, rather than exercising its discretion
to decide the individual matter before it, an administrative body binds itself to
policy or to the views of others: ….Although an administrative decision-maker
may properly be influenced by policy considerations and other factors, he or she
must put his or her mind to the specific circumstances of the case and not focus
blindly on a particular policy to the exclusion of other relevant factors:
• Validity of Delegated Legislation Superior courts have the inherent power to review
alleged violations of fundamental principles of administrative law
• The right to judicial review is constitutional in nature - available even when a statute
prohibits it although courts will consider if there is a privative clause
• What is a privative clause?
A section in a law creating an administrative tribunal stating that all or select decisions of
that tribunal are final and conclusive and not subject to judicial review.
In Ontario, the Divisional Court hears judicial review applications and can:
1. Declare that an action is contrary to the law
2. Quash a decision already made by an official or agency
3. Order an official or agency to take any action that is required by law
4. Forbid an official or agency from taking or from continuing any action that is prohibited
by law
5. Require an official or agency to follow a fair procedure in making a decision
6. Order an agency to free a person whose illegally imprisoned
Chapter 4
• Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn v Douglas College, [1990] the Supreme Court found
that community colleges (and therefore their policies) were subject to Charter oversight.
• the system of community colleges was established by government policy. Also the board
of the college was appointed and removable by the government
• The Court asked whether that body was “essentially part of the fabric of government.” If
yes, then the Charter will apply to the body, even if the activities that it is engaged in are
of a private nature.
• McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] the fact that a university performs a public
service does not make it a part of government. University was legally autonomous. The
university was not implementing government policy in establishing mandatory
retirement.
• Eldridge v. BC (AG) [1997] hospitals are considered private for certain purposes and
subject to the Charter for some functions – where they act on behalf of government in
delivering a specific government policy or program.
• Providing interpreter for hearing-impaired patients contrary to s. 15
• Decisions regarding the provision of medically necessary services is carried out
for a specific government objective under the Hospital Insurance Act. In deciding
what services to provide the hospital was delivering a specific government policy
or program – that decision is subject to Charter scrutiny.
• Hospital’s not subject to Charter scrutiny over all decisions – is human resource,
corporate decisions.
• Consider the issue of the government contracting out the provision of public
services to private entities
In relation to administrative law, rights & freedoms in the Charter that have greatest impact on
administrative law are:
• Fundamental freedoms in section 2 and equality rights in section 15
• 1st class (penal) - Rights in sections 9, 11, and 13
• 2nd class - Rights in sections 7, 8, and 14
Suresh v Canada
FACTS
• Suresh came to Canada from Sri Lanka in 1990.
• recognized as a Convention refugee by the Refugee Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board in April 1991 and applied for landed immigrant status.
• Recognition as a Convention refugee has a number of legal consequences; the one
most directly relevant to this appeal is that, under s. 53(1) of the Immigration Act,
generally the government may not return a Convention refugee “to a country where
the person’s life or freedom would be threatened for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion”.
• In 1995 the government detained him and started proceedings to deport him to Sri
Lanka on grounds he was a member and fundraiser for the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”), an organization alleged to engage in terrorist activity in Sri
Lanka.
• certificate under s. 40.1 of the Immigration Act alleging that Suresh was inadmissible
to Canada on security grounds
• Suresh asked for judicial review of the Ministers decision ordering his deportation
• Procedural Protections required under s. 7 of the Charter
• The principles of fundamental justice of which s. 7 speaks, though not identical to
the duty of fairness elucidated in Baker, are the same principles underlying that
duty.
• must be informed of the case to be met
• an opportunity be provided to respond to the case presented to the Minister
• Present evidence that they do not pose a danger to Canada and/or that they will be
tortured if deported
• Minister’s decision not saved under s. 1 – while safety important objective does not
justify the failure of the Minister to provide fair procedures where this exception
involves a risk of torture upon deportation.
Canada v. Khadr
• Khadr apprehended by the US military in 2002.
• Detained in a US military facility in Afghanistan and later in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
• During his detention in Cuba, Canadian officials, including CSIS, interviewed Khadr.
Canadian officials shared the evidence obtained with US officials.
• When he was charged by US Khadr sought disclosure of evidence from Canada.
• Request denied. Khadr sought review in Federal Court. Appeal dismissed. Further appeal
to Federal Court of Appeal allowed in part. Canada appealed to SCC.
• The Charter bound Canada to the extent that the conduct of Canadian officials involved it
in a process that violated Canada’s international obligations.
• s. 7 imposes a duty on Canada to provide disclosure of materials in its possession arising
from its participation in the foreign process that is contrary to international law and
jeopardizes the liberty of a Canadian citizen.
• Section 12: Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment. P.96
• Section 13: protects the right of witnesses who testify in proceedings against self-
incrimination – protection against having compelled evidence be used against you in
future prosecutions
• Equality before and under law and equal protection and benefit of law
• Section 15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age
or mental or physical disability.
• Affirmative action programs
• (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
• In R v Kapp, the SC rule that to convince a court that an administrative rule
or action violates section 15, an applicant must demonstrate the following:
1. The statute, program policy or activity results in a disadvantage being
imposed on a listed or analogous ground; and
2. This disadvantage results from discrimination, which the SCC has
identified as the perpetuation of prejudice, or stereotyping.
-Court required to balance “the fundamental importance of open, and even forceful,
criticism of our public institutions with the need to ensure civility in the profession
-Flexible approach required for Charter analysis in administrative law: full Oakes
test is too messy
2. Determining how the Charter values at issue are best protected in view of the
statutory objectives
-A court review the decision-maker’s objectives must decide if the decision reflects
a proportional balancing of Charter rights in play
-Applied to this case: Abella found that the court had to balance right of freedom
of expression and being able to openly criticise the judicial process with the need to
ensure civility in the legal profession (defines civility)
-Court found that that the Disciplinary Council’s decision (21 day suspension) was
not unreasonable
Ratio
A reprimand from a lawyer does not automatically flow from criticizing a judge or a
judicial system.
The Issue
In this case the Supreme Court of Canada was conducting a judical review of the decision of the Law
Society of Brithish Columbia (LSBC) to not accredit Trinity Western University (“TWU”) law school. As
an evangelical Christian postsecondary institution the law school required its students and faculty to
adhere to a religiously-based code of conduct, the Community Covenant Agreement (Covenant). The
Covenant prohibited “sexual intimacy that violates the sacredness of marriage between a man and a
woman.”
The Decision
The Supreme Court considered the statutory objectives of the LSBC and the limitation on the religious
protections under s. 2(a) of the Charter. The court found that the LSBC was entitled under its enabling
statute to consider TWU’s admissions policies, apart from the academic qualifications and competence of
individual graduates, in determining whether to approve accreditation.
The court found the LSBC was entitled to consider an inequitable admissions policy in determining
whether to approve the proposed law school. The court wrote at paragraph 44:
“...Its mandate is broad. In promoting the public interest in the administration of justice and,
relatedly, public confidence in the legal profession, the LSBC was entitled to consider an admissions
policy that imposes inequitable and harmful barriers to entry. Approving or facilitating inequitable
barriers to the profession could undermine public confidence in the LSBC’s ability to self-regulate in
the public interest.”
The Supreme Court agreed with the LSBC that their duty included upholdinf and protecting the public
interest in the administration of justice as precluding the approval of TWU’s proposed law school because
the requirement that students sign the Covenant as a condition of admission effectively imposes
inequitable barriers on entry to the school, affected diversity within the legal profession and would have
harmed LGBTQ individuals. Such consequences would undermine the public interest in the
administration of justice.
The Supreme Court found that the LSBC actions did infringed upon TWU’s students freedom of religion
under s. 2 of the Charter. The court then looked to justification under s. 1 of the Charter. The court
ultimately concluded, at paragraph 102 and 103:
In the end, it cannot be said that the denial of approval is a serious limitation on the religious rights of
members of the TWU community. The LSBC’s decision does not suppress TWU’s religious
difference. Except for the limitation we have identified, no evangelical Christian is denied the right to
practise his or her religion as and where they choose.
The refusal to approve the proposed law school means that members of the TWU religious
community are not free to impose those religious beliefs on fellow law students, since they have an
inequitable impact and can cause significant harm. The LSBC chose an interpretation of the public
interest in the administration of justice which mandates access to law schools based on merit and
diversity, not exclusionary religious practices. The refusal to approve TWU’s proposed law school
prevents concrete, not abstract, harms to LGBTQ people and to the public in general. The LSBC’s
decision ensures that equal access to the legal profession is not undermined and prevents the risk of
significant harm to LGBTQ people who feel they have no choice but to attend TWU’s proposed law
school. It also maintains public confidence in the legal profession, which could be undermined by the
LSBC’s decision to approve a law school that forces LGBTQ people to deny who they are for three
years to receive a legal education.
Constitution is Supreme
• Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides:
• The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency,
of no force or effect.
• Facts:
• Mr. Oakes was found in possession of 8 vials of hashish oil and $619.45.
• charged with unlawful possession of a narcotic for the purposes of trafficking under s.
4(2) of the Narcotic Control Act
• s.8 of the Narcotic Control Act placed a “reverse onus” on Mr. Oakes to prove that he did
not intend to traffic drugs. Anyone in possession of narcotics was deemed to be
trafficking unless they proved otherwise. The trial judge found that Mr. Oakes did not
meet the burden to show he was not trafficking and he was found guilty.
• Mr. Oakes challenged this “reverse onus” provision: it violates. 11(d) of the
Charter.
• SCC held that s. 8 of the Narcotics Act is a violation of s. 11(d) of the Charter
• Issue – could the government justify the infringement under s. 1?
• In order for a law to be considered a reasonable limit of a Charter right the
government (burden on the government) must show:
• The law must be prescribed by law.
• There must be a pressing and substantial objective for the law or government
action.
• The means chosen to achieve the objective must be proportional to the burden on
the rights of the claimant.
i. The objective must be rationally connected to the limit on the Charter
right.
ii. The limit must minimally impair the Charter right.
iii. There should be an overall balance or proportionality between the
benefits of the limit and its deleterious effects.
1. The government must establish that the law under review has a goal that is both “pressing
and substantial.” The law must be both important and necessary. Governments are usually
successful in this first step.
a. The government must first establish that the provision of the law which limits a Charter right
is rationally connected to the law’s purpose. If it is arbitrary or serves no logical purpose, then
it will not meet this standard.
c. Finally, the court examines the law’s proportionate effects. Even if the government can
satisfy the above steps, the effect of the provision on Charter rights may be too high a price to
pay for the advantage the provision would provide in advancing the law’s purpose.
In Oakes itself, the court considered that combatting the public health and safety risk created by
narcotics was a pressing and substantial goal. However, the Court ruled that a “reverse onus,”
where an accused is presumed guilty of drug trafficking unless he proves otherwise, was not
rationally connected to this goal.[5] The Court found that it would be irrational to presume an
intention to traffic narcotics when an accused only possessed a small amount of drugs. Having
failed this first step, the court did not consider step 2 (b) or (c), and the law was “struck down,”
that is, declared unconstitutional.
1. Section 24:
24(1) allows individuals to challenge administrative actions that allegedly violate
a Charter right
• A court or tribunal may declare a law to be inapplicable in a particular
situation, but a law can only be declared void or invalid under s.52(1)
• 24(2) allows a court to exclude evidence obtained through the breach of a Charter
right
• Only a court of competent jurisdiction may grant remedies that it considers
appropriate and just; tribunals may be courts of competent jurisdiction
• Awards in tribunals may be limited in practice b/c they can only award
remedies provided in their enabling statute
• 2010, R v Conway: the SCC set out a new approach for deciding whether
a tribunal can grant remedies for Charter breaches under section 24(1) of
Charter. The question of jurisdiction to grant the particular remedy is
decided after it has been decided that the tribunal is a court of competent
jurisdiction.
• Must ask the following:
1. Whether the tribunal can grant Charter remedies generally
a. Whether the tribunal has jurisdiction -explicit or
implicit- to decide questions of law
b. If it does, unless it’s clearly demonstrated that the
legislature intended to exclude the Charter from the
tribunal’s jurisdiction, the tribunal is a court of
competent jurisdiction and can consider & apply the
Charter
2. Once threshold question is decided in favour of Charter
jurisdiction, the remaining question is whether the tribunal
can grant the particular remedy sought
a. This is a question of statutory interpretation; requires
consideration of the tribunal’s statutory mandate &
functions to determine whether the kinds of remedies
sought are the kinds of remedies that the legislature
appears to have anticipated would fit within the
statutory scheme governing tribunal
• Court may grant any remedy considered “appropriate and just in the
circumstances,” including damages
2.In contrast to section 24 of the Charter, Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides:
Remedy is to for courts or tribunals to declare unconstitutional law to be void (i.e.,
“of no force or effect”)
Whether the tribunal ahs the power to strike down an unconstitutional law or provisions
depends on whether the legislature intended to grant the tribunal the power to interpret
and apply the Charter.
Because most tribunals have either explicit or implicit jurisdiction to decide questions of
law -at least those they must answer in order to resolve the dispute before them- the result
is that most also have the power to strike down unconstitutional laws.
Constitution is Supreme
• Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides:
• The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or effect.
• A Tribunal cannot make a general declaration of invalidity. The Tribunal may only treat
an impugned provision as invalid for the purposes of the matter before it.
Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1991] 2 SCR 5
• Peter W. Hogg explains in Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf, 5th ed. (Supp.)
(Toronto: Carswell, 2007), at pp. 40-52 to 40-53:
• [A] decision by a tribunal that a law is unconstitutional is no more than a decision that the
law is inapplicable in the particular case. It is not a binding precedent. According to the
[Supreme] Court, only “superior courts” have the power to issue binding declarations of
invalidity that will invalidate a law with general effect.
Chapter 5
Discrimination:
• Laws prohibiting discrimination have existed in Canada since turn of 20th
century
• In some jurisdictions, human rights commissions & tribunals also administer pay
equity programs (right of women to receive same pay as men for work of equal
value) and
• Employment equity: Elimination of under-representation of individuals in
designated groups (women, Indigenous peoples, members of visible minorities,
people with disabilities) in workplace
• Human rights codes also apply to the private sector (cover the actions of individuals i.e
landlords, employers, and vendors of goods & services) unlike s.15 of the Charter
Chapter 6
Right to be Heard
• Right to be present: Parties have right to be present throughout the entire hearing
process
• Electronic hearing: satisfied if all parties are able to hear each other and
adjudicator in a teleconference, or see & hear everybody in a video
conference
• Written hearing: right to receive all relevant info presented to tribunal and
be given reasonable opportunity to respond
• Right to be represented p.144: Parties may present their own case or have it
represented; does not include an absolute right to an adjournment to find representation,
only a reasonable opportunity
• Limits to be represented: p.144
• Does not give a party an absolute right to an adjournment to obtain
representation
• Right to present evidence: Parties have the right to present evidence to establish facts of
case; a summons issued by the tribunal to a witness requires the witness to attend the
hearing, bring relevant documents and present evidence.
• Failure to comply with a summons issued under the SPPA is an offence
• Right to cross-examine: Parties can respond to evidence brought against them; some
provinces allow tribunals the right to place reasonable limits on cross-examination
• Right to be heard in a timely manner and receive a decision without delay: “Justice
delayed is justice denied”
• Requirement that the person who hears must decide p.146: Person who hears a case is
only person who may decide the case (see Mary Shuttleworth v Licence Appeal Tribunal)
• See also Chapter 6 feature box, “Shuttleworth, Adjudicative Ethics, and the Modern
Tribunal”
• Requirement to base the decision solely on the evidence: Parties can expect tribunal’s
decision will be based on facts established at hearing, not on other information;
Exception is judicial notice or administrative notice
• Requirement to give reasons for a decision: Arises when the decision may seriously
affect an individual’s rights, privileges, or interests, or when reasons are necessary to
exercise the right to appeal
• For more on procedural fairness and legitimate expectations, see Baker v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
• Statutes
• Various pieces of legislation and rules of tribunals deal with conflicts of interest,
for example:
• Public Service of Ontario Act, 2006 (PSOA) provides for the Conflict of Interest
Commissioner to assist public servants’ understanding of conflict of interest rules
and how to apply them.
• Social Justice Tribunals of Ontario – Conflict of Interest Rules
• Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. M.50
Brian Crane has suggested that the following types of bias can be identified from the case
law;
• Institutional bias;
• Pecuniary interest in the outcome;
• Other relationships;
• Pre-judgment;
• Interference with the Hearing
•
• Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, [1978] 1 SCR 369
• Facts: National Energy Board conducted hearings considering competing
applications for a Mackenzie Valley pipeline.
• The Board assignment Mr. Crowe as part of the panel to hear the applications.
• The appellants objected to Mr. Crowe’s participation because of reasonable
apprehension of bias.
• Mr. Crown had recently been employed as a director of an organization that was
intimately connected to an earlier proposal to build this pipeline. Mr. Crowe had
helped plan the terms of a contemplated application to the NEB.
• He had quit that job to work for NEB less than 6 months before the hearings, and
he assigned himself to be on 3 person panel hearing this.
• Issue: is there bias?
• Held
• the function of the NEB is quasi-judicial, or, at least, is a function which the
Board must discharge in accordance with the rules of natural justice.
• A reasonable apprehension of bias arises where there exists a reasonable
probability that the judge might not act in an entirely impartial manner. The issue
in this situation was not one of actual bias. Thus the facts that Mr. Crowe had
nothing to gain or lose either through his participation in the Study Group or in
making decisions as chairman of the National Energy Board and that his
participation in the Study Group was in a representative capacity became
irrelevant.
• The participation of Mr. Crowe in the discussions and decisions leading to the
application by Canadian Arctic Gas Pipeline Limited for a certificate did however
give rise to a reasonable apprehension, which reasonably well-informed persons
could properly have, of a biased appraisal and judgment of the issues to be
determined.
• Dissenting judgment sets out the test for reasonable apprehension of bias that is
still used today.
• the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right
minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the
required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is “what
would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically—and
having thought the matter through—conclude. Would he think that it is more
likely than not that Mr. Crowe, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not
decide fairly.”
• NEB is a tribunal that must be staffed with persons of experience and expertise.
Dissenting judged distinguished the NEB from courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
• Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. V. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and
Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52
• An initial police investigation and a subsequent investigation by a Senior
Inspector with the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch led to allegations that the
respondent, which operates a hotel and pub, had committed five infractions of the
Liquor Control and Licensing Act and Regulations.
• Following a hearing, another Senior Inspector with the Branch concluded that the
allegations had been substantiated and imposed a penalty that included a two-day
suspension of the respondent’s liquor licence.
• The respondent appealed to the Liquor Appeal Board.
• The findings on four of the five allegations were upheld, and the penalty was
confirmed.
• Pursuant to s. 30(2)(a) of the Act, the chair and members of the Board “serve at
the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor in Council”. In practice, members are
appointed for a one-year term and serve on a part-time basis. All members but the
chair are paid on a per diem basis. The chair establishes panels of one or three
members to hear matters before the Board “as the chair considers advisable”.
• The Court of Appeal concluded that members of the Board lacked the necessary
guarantees of independence required of administrative decision makers imposing
penalties and set aside the Board’s decision.
• It is well established that, absent constitutional constraints, the degree of
independence required of a particular government decision maker or tribunal is
determined by its enabling statute. The statute must be construed as a whole to
determine the degree of independence the legislature intended. Confronted with
silent or ambiguous legislation, courts generally infer that Parliament or the
legislature intended the tribunal’s process to comport with principles of natural
justice. However, like all principles of natural justice, the degree of independence
required of tribunal members may be ousted by express statutory language or
necessary implication.
• There is a fundamental distinction between administrative tribunals and courts.
Superior courts, by virtue of their role as courts of inherent jurisdiction, are
constitutionally required to possess objective guarantees of both individual and
institutional independence. .. Administrative tribunals, by contrast, lack this
constitutional distinction from the executive. They are, in fact, created precisely
for the purpose of implementing government policy. …While tribunals may
sometimes attract Charter requirements of independence, as a general rule they do
not.
• The legislature’s intention that Board members should serve at pleasure is
unequivocal. …The Board is not a court, nor does it approach the constitutional
role of the courts. It is first and foremost a licensing body….
• 2747-3174 Quebec Inc. v. Quebec (Régie des permis d’alcool), [1996] 3 SCR 919
• Following a hearing, the directors of the Régie des permis d'alcool du Québec
revoked the respondent's liquor permits on the ground of disturbance of public
tranquility -- The company challenged various provisions of the Quebec liquor
licencing statute. The provisions dealt with both the operation and structure of the
Regie
• The company alleged institutional bias.
• The arguments against the Regie relate primarily to its role at various stages in the
liquor permit cancellation process àthe act allows employees of the Regie to
participate in the investigation, filing of complaints, the presentation of the case to
directors Ø Although overlapping functions are not always a group for concern, it
must nevertheless not result in excessively close relations among employees
involved in different stages of the process
• Held: a detailed review of the Régie's structure and multiple functions raises a
reasonable apprehension of bias on an institutional level.
• The Act authorized employees of the Régie to participate at every stage of the
process leading up to the cancellation of a liquor permit, from investigation to
adjudication…. here a person informed about the role of the Régie's lawyers
would have a reasonable apprehension of bias in a substantial number of cases.
• …Prosecuting counsel must never be in a position to participate in the
adjudication process. The functions of prosecutor and adjudicator cannot be
exercised together in this manner. Moreover, the Act and regulations authorize the
chairman to initiate an investigation, decide to hold a hearing, constitute the panel
that is to hear the case and include himself or herself thereon if he or she so
desires.….
• The three main components of judicial independence are:
• financial security,
• security of tenure and
• institutional independence.
• The structure of the Régie was not problematic. However, a separation among the
Directors and lawyers involved in the various stages was necessary to eliminate
the apprehension of bias arising from their overlapping roles.
•
Bias
Back when strictly a component of natural justice, bias was a * This is still true, and most
very simple concept: if the DM had a financial interest, he or governmental actors, even
she was disqualified to make the decision. For direct financial the purely political ones,
are also bound by statute
conflicts of interest, this idea was routinely extended to other to avoid acting when their
administrative decisions, but on grounds of bad faith rather financial interests are
than bias once we moved away from a quasi-judicial affected.
decision.*
But, as with everything in administrative law, the devil is in the details. How direct does
the financial interest have to be?
Cases A to E
A. A judge hears a case involving someone who owes her $4,000. The party complains
at the start of trial. The judge thinks to herself, “It’s only $4,000, and to me, it’s not a
lot of money. I know I can keep that out of my mind when deciding this case, and if I
step down, it will be another six months before the case can be heard.” Should the
judge recuse herself? Why?
D. Another councillor on the same committee hearing the same matter has announced
she intends to retire before the New Year and go back to her successful restaurant
supply business. Her business, now held in blind trust, is in the same neighbourhood
as the restaurant owner. Should she recuse herself?
E. In Louisiana, a statute permits police departments and courts to seize the “proceeds
of [the] illicit drug trade.” This means that if, say, a go-fast car is caught with drugs in
it, local police can seize it after a guilty finding. Any cash found in the car will go,
after a guilty finding, to the coffers of either the state police or state courts. Any bias
problems?
Like right to be heard, missteps are fatal if the DM proceeds despite bias.
Expanding Bias
Bias, from its simple beginning, expanded in two ways: more things (besides financial
interests) now qualify as bias, and more kinds of decisions are covered by bias.
Most writers separate bias into two flavours, personal and institutional bias. Personal
bias is what it sounds like: the DM has some personal interest that makes him or her an
unfair choice. Institutional bias means something in the decision-making system injects
unfairness.
Consequently, the old test for bias—direct, personal financial interest—needed some
tweaking. De Grandpré J. gives us the Canadian test for reasonable apprehension of
bias:
[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one held by reasonable and right
minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the
required information. . . . [T]hat test is what would an informed person, viewing the
matter realistically and practically—and having thought the matter through—
conclude. Would he [or she] think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-
maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly. 1
Justice de Grandpré goes beyond a mere “reasonable person” test. Instead, he embeds
features of administrative law in his test. Breaking it down a bit,
Reasonable here means what it usually does: whether a prudent person think the
DM was compromised.
1
Committee for Justice and Liberty v National Energy Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 at 394–5. Emphasis
added.
The rest, though, are unique to administrative law: a right-minded person, informed
about the situation, and viewing it realistically and practically, and thinking it
through. This isn’t a simple amplification of reasonableness. Instead, de Grandpré J.
seems to suggest that the test must recognise that administrative DMs will never
have the independence of judges, and the practical, right-minded, thoughtful,
deliberative thinker knows this.
For example, we know instantly that it would be improper for a judge to hear a case
involving a party that lent the judge money. Direct financial interest. No problem.
But what about a provincial human-rights adjudicator deciding a case where the
respondent is the Province of Ontario? Civilians may conclude that the adjudicator, who
is appointed by the province, isn’t going to bite the hand that feeds her. This would be a
reasonable conclusion.
Justice de Grandpré’s test, though, forces us to confront the fact that all administrators
are appointed by and paid by the government. That can never change. (If appointed for
fixed terms and subject to renewal, the government has even more control.) The right-
minded, deliberative, thorough thinker would understand this, and could not use that
by itself as grounds for bias. We need something more.
Note too that it’s reasonable apprehension of bias. Actual bias isn’t the test. As the
bumper sticker says, “Justice must not only be done, but be seen to be done.” We want
the appearance of fairness. It does not matter that the DM is actually unbiased or can
discount any personal factors. In fact, the DM is not allowed to lead evidence of actual
impartiality. Reasonable apprehension is enough to fatally review the decision.
Proving actual bias is tough—no DM (other than someone like Duplessis, who
unapologetically brandished his bad faith) would admit to personal bias, which
means many covertly unfair decisions would be left standing
Proving actual bias is embarrassing to the DM and government, and ultimately
undermines faith in public institutions
Apprehension of bias, on the other hand, lets a judge say the DM made a correct,
fair decision, but should have let someone else make it—very face-saving for the
government
Personal Bias
Cases F and G
F. Commissioner Gordon at a quasi-judicial board looks at the docket for the morning
and sees his mother is bringing a complaint against his archenemy, Jack “Why So
Serious?” Napier. “This will be sweet,” he says to himself, as he rubs his hands
together in cartoonish, malicious glee. That afternoon he notices that he will hearing
a matter with his old buddy Bruce Wayne in the respondent’s chair.
This is dead easy: What issues of personal bias does the case raise?
Institutional Bias
As the doctrine expanded to cover more decisions, personal bias grew to include
institutional bias. Is the decision-making organisation set up in a way that introduces
bias?
If you’re old skool, you call this abuse of discretion, improper subdelegation, fettering
discretion, irrelevant consideration or bad faith, the traditional jurisdictional errors we
used to use to challenge decisions not covered by natural justice. If you are more
fashionable, you call it institutional bias, and don’t have to worry about whether the
decision-making is governed by natural justice because bias is included in procedural
fairness, and all but a handful of DMs have to give that.
Keep in mind that a statute can incorporate some bias, and that’s OK. For example, if
the statute says an investigator can sit on the board, then that’s fine. Labour law
provides an example, too. Three-member panels of labour boards are deliberately
biased—one member is chosen by the employer, one by the union, and the third is
chosen by first two members. However, if the legislative goal is independent decision-
making, the decisions must ultimately be “free-ish” of bias. In de Grandpré’s J. words,
bias deliberately added by statute would be a factor the reasonable person, apprised
fully of the facts, would include (and be forced to discount) when deciding whether the
decision was fairly made.
Case H
H. After being hammered by the Divisional Court, a quasi-judicial board decides to rely
more on its lawyers. The chair sends an internal memo which reads, “From now on,
please have your decisions reviewed by in-house counsel. We need to use the
language of the court to avoid embarrassing reviews.” The lawyer does a good
editing job, and decisions now sound as good as they are on their merits. Lately,
though, the lawyer has been asking for clarifications, clarifications that sound
increasingly like cross-examinations. At some points he has even said, “Are you
sure? That’s not the law. In a case like this, you have to side with the applicant. Just
saying.”
Timeliness
When considering the right to be heard, the first requirement of fairness, the defect can
almost always be cured later by an internal review or rehearing by the same or another
DM. The courts consequently insist on exhausting all remedies before bringing an
application for review on this ground. Only if a party was never fairly heard during the
entire process would a decision be void.
Bias, though, is different. A DM who doesn’t at first respect your right to be heard can
later do so; but a biased DM is biased throughout. Nothing can cure a biased DM except
a new DM. Because a DM’s bias saturates the whole process involving that DM, courts
are more willing to hear an application on this ground right away.
If you complain too late after you learn of bias, then you may have waived your right
to complain.
If you complain, and the DM carries on anyway, you should participate despite the
bias. If it turns out later you were wrong (and there was no reasonable apprehension
of bias), and you did not participate at the first hearing, you could be stuck with the
first decision. In that case, not participating would be a waiver of the right to be
heard.
Intervenor Status:
• Intervenor: Person who may participate in a hearing without the full range of
party rights
• The power to grant participant or intervenor status may be set out in statute or be
an aspect of tribunal’s authority to make rules of procedure
• Like party status, intervenor status may be determined by pre-hearing conference
or motion brought by an interested person
• In absence of rules/guidelines/previous tribunal decisions related to granting
intervenor status, factors to consider include:
• Nature of the case
• Nature of the person’s interest in the proceeding
• Extent to which person is likely to be affected by outcome of proceeding
• Likelihood the person can make useful contribution to resolution of issues
Pre-Hearing Conferences:
• Pre-hearing conferences (PHCs) also sometimes called preliminary hearings or case
conferences: Allow tribunals to make procedural orders and obtain agreements from the
parties
• Ontario’s SPPA, BC’s Administrative Tribunals Act (ATA), Quebec’s AJA all provide
for PHCs
• Purpose and format of PHCs
varies among tribunals
Disclosure of Evidence:
• Evidence: Information a party
seeks to use in legal proceeding
to prove or disprove allegation
Disclosure of evidence may take the form of:
• Exchange of documents
• Oral or written questions and answers (examination for discovery,
interrogatories)
• Witness statements, expert witness reports, list of other documents, access to
other evidence
Time at which disclosure required determined by:
• Statutory and procedural rules
• Requirements set out in the notice of hearing
• Discussion at a PHC
• A request for disclosure brought in a motion
• A combination of these methods
Disclosure of Particulars:
Tribunals may order parties to disclose particulars if requirement is in the tribunal’s
procedural rules
Advantages of settlement before the hearing:
• Parties resolve the dispute on their own terms
• Parties and tribunal are saved cost of a hearing
Tribunal may have power to overrule; parties who do not settle may not be bound by
settlement
Hearing Procedures:
Introductory Remarks—at beginning of hearing, adjudicator will often:
• Introduce themselves
• State names of parties; describe purpose of the hearing
• Confirm that all parties are present
• Ask if any other person present will participate
• Describe the hearing process
• Ask if any questions about tribunal’s procedure
• Ask if any preliminary matters before hearing begins (e.g., requests for
adjournment, clarification of procedures, jurisdictional issues)
• (See text App. D for sample opening statement)
Preliminary matters:
• Adjudicator’s 1st task—determine if any preliminary matters should be decided before
hearing proceeds or after the hearing
• Adjudicator’s 2nd task—if there are any preliminary motions, determine in which order
they should be heard
• Preliminary matters can include:
• Jurisdiction
• Absence of a party or representative
• Request for adjournment
• Request for stay of proceedings (temporary suspension of hearing until other
proceedings are completed)
Contempt Proceedings:
13(1) Contempt proceedings
Where any person without lawful excuse,
(a) on being duly summoned under section 12 as a witness at a hearing makes default in
attending at the hearing; or
(b) being in attendance as a witness at an oral hearing or otherwise participating as a witness at
an electronic hearing, refuses to take an oath or to make an affirmation legally required by the
tribunal to be taken or made, or to produce any document or thing in his or her power or control
legally required by the tribunal to be produced by him or her or to answer any question to which
the tribunal may legally require an answer; or
(c) does any other thing that would, if the tribunal had been a court of law having power to
commit for contempt, have been contempt of that court,
the tribunal may, of its own motion or on the motion of a party to the proceeding, state a
case to the Divisional Court setting out the facts and that court may inquire into the matter and,
after hearing any witnesses who may be produced against or on behalf of that person and after
hearing any statement that may be offered in defence, punish or take steps for the punishment of
that person in like manner as if he or she had been guilty of contempt of the court. (SPPA)
Contempt Proceedings:
• See West End Development Corp (1994), 29 Admin LR (2d) 71
s. 13 entails a two-step process:
1) Was there contempt?
2) If there was, whether the Board, in the exercise of its discretion, ought to forward the matter to
the court.
A Tribunal’s jurisdiction to entertain contempt allegations is limited to deciding whether to state
a case to the Divisional Court. It is restricted to determining whether a prima facie case has been
made out for the conduct described in s. 13 of the SPPA.
The jurisdiction to make findings of fact, to adjudicate findings of guilt, and to determine
whether to punish a person in like manner as if the person had been guilty of contempt of court is
reserved to the Divisional Court
Contempt Proceedings:
• Double booking by lawyers
Lawyers are officers of the court and a lawyer who undertakes to appear in court on behalf of a
client at a specified time commits to being present at that time unless he or she takes the remedial
steps called for in R. v. Anders …(arrange for an adjournment, ask to be excused from attending
or find substitute counsel), or unless some unforeseen event occurs. A lawyer's ethical and
professional obligation is the same whether the court attendance is for a murder trial or to speak
to sentence or even to attend on a matter to be spoken to. But when determining whether to make
a finding of contempt of court, … the court should consider the consequences of failing to
appear. The nature of the proceedings, delay, inconvenience to the participants ….prejudice to
the client, wastage of court time and resources, and repetitious conduct may all be relevant in
assessing the consequences of a lawyer's non-attendance on the administration of justice.
Conduct that has little or no effect on the administration of justice cannot support a conviction
for contempt.. . . . .
In short, the fault requirement for criminal contempt calls for deliberate or intentional conduct, or
conduct which demonstrates indifference, which I take to be akin to recklessness. Nothing short
of that will do. And, of course, the court hearing a contempt charge must consider the accused's
explanation, including any apology tendered, and then determine on all of the evidence whether
the case has been made out beyond a reasonable doubt ... (pp. 750-1)
• R. v. Glasner, 19 O.R. (3d) 739 (September 1994), Ontario Court of Appeal
Abuse of Process
23(1) Abuse of processes
A tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers
proper to prevent abuse of its processes.
23(2) Limitation on examination
A tribunal may reasonably limit further examination or cross-examination of a witness where it
is satisfied that the examination or cross-examination has been sufficient to disclose fully and
fairly all matters relevant to the issues in the proceeding.
23(3) Exclusion of representatives
A tribunal may exclude from a hearing anyone, other than a person licensed under the Law
Society Act, appearing on behalf of a party or as an adviser to a witness if it finds that such
person is not competent properly to represent or to advise the party or witness, or does not
understand and comply at the hearing with the duties and responsibilities of an advocate or
adviser. (SPPA)
Abuse of Process
• Refers to conduct by a participant in a proceeding involving a flagrant and serious
violation of the rules of procedure or other reasonable expectations of the tribunal.
• Vexatious Litigants
• The HRTO has the power to find an individual a vexatious litigant as part of the
Tribunal’s power to control its processes and prevent abuse of power.
• an individual could be declared a vexatious litigant if the Tribunal was satisfied that, on
an objective standard, the applicant has persistently and without reasonable grounds
instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted herself in a vexatious manner during the
proceedings.
Power to Maintain Order—Some tribunals can deal with disorderly conduct by ordering
offending person to obey tribunal’s procedure and, if the conduct continues, calling the police
Power to Award Costs
• Tribunals do not generally have power to award costs, but some enabling statutes
allow for it
• 9(2) Maintenance of order at hearings
A tribunal may make such orders or give such directions at an oral or electronic hearing
as it considers necessary for the maintenance of order at the hearing, and, if any person
disobeys or fails to comply with any such order or direction, the tribunal or a member
thereof may call for the assistance of any peace officer to enforce the order or direction,
and every peace officer so called upon shall take such action as is necessary to enforce
the order or direction and may use such force as is reasonably required for that purpose.
• I.B.E.W., Local 353 v. Bemar Construction (Ont.) Inc., [1992] O.L.R.B. Rep. 565
Costs
o 17.1(1) Costs
Subject to subsection (2), a tribunal may, in the circumstances set out in rules made under
subsection (4), order a party to pay all or part of another party's costs in a proceeding.
o 17.1(2) Exception
A tribunal shall not make an order to pay costs under this section unless,
o (a) the conduct or course of conduct of a party has been unreasonable, frivolous or
vexatious or a party has acted in bad faith; and
o (b) the tribunal has made rules under subsection (4).
o ….
o 17.1(4) Rules
A tribunal may make rules with respect to,
o (a) the ordering of costs;
o (b) the circumstances in which costs may be ordered; and
o (c) the amount of costs or the manner in which the amount of costs is to be determined.
o Robinson v. College of Early Childhood Educators, 2018 ONSC 6150
o Facts: Robinson was an early childhood educator and member of the College of Early
Childhood Educators. After an 18-day hearing of the Discipline Committee of the Early
Childhood Educators he was found guilty of professional misconduct for abusing a child
under his supervision.
o Discipline Committee revoked his certificate of registration and ordered him to pay 2/3 of
the costs of the College for the hearing. The Committee awarded he pay costs in the
amount of $257,353.76.
o Robinson appealed the order to the Divisional Court challenging the Committee’s
jurisdiction to order costs but not the quantum.
• Tribunal relied on the power to grant “any expenses incurred by the victim as a result of
the discriminatory practice” as its jurisdiction to award costs.
• SCC disagreed with the Tribunals statutory interpretation:
• [37]…… If the use of the term “expenses” had been intended to confer a free-
standing authority to confer costs in all types of complaints, it is difficult to
understand why the grant of power is repeated in the specific contexts of lost
wages and provision of services and also why the power to award expenses was
not provided for in its own paragraph rather than being repeated in the two
specific contexts in which it appears. …
• Moreover, the term “costs”, in legal parlance, has a well-understood meaning that
is distinct from either compensation or expenses. It is a legal term of art because it
consists of “words or expressions that have through usage by legal professionals
acquired a distinct legal meaning”: …Costs usually mean some sort of
compensation for legal expenses and services incurred in the course of litigation.
If Parliament intended to confer authority to order costs, it is difficult to
understand why it did not use this very familiar and widely used legal term of art
to implement that purpose.
Represented v. Unrepresented
• If a party is represented, the adjudicator may make the representative responsible for a
client’s conduct
• If a party is unrepresented, adjudicators sometimes choose to let the party express anger
rather than strictly enforcing standards of procedure
Protestors:
• Protestors may demonstrate outside or bring banners and signs into the hearing room
• Adjudicators must balance respect for protestors’ constitutional rights with the need to
protect the rule of law
Abusive Participants:
Laurel Cropley (former immigration adjudicator, federal) suggests “three strikes & you’re out”
rule:
(1) Stop the individual who is speaking, warning them that the behaviour will not be tolerated
(2) If the behaviour continues, warn the individual that they will be asked to leave unless it
ceases
(3) If the individual ignores the warning, ask them to leave the proceeding
Introduction:
Standards of conduct observed by participants and tribunal members outside the hearing apply
to:
• communication outside the hearing between participants and tribunal members
• social contact between tribunal members and individuals or organizations that
may appear before tribunal in future proceedings
• contact with media by participants and tribunal members
• public statements by adjudicators about previous decisions of the tribunal or
issues that may come before the tribunal in the future
Ex Parte Communication:
Ex parte: “On one side only”
• Prohibited by principle of procedural fairness (the obligation of impartiality) in
tribunal proceedings
• Participants should not discuss case with an adjudicator without all panel
members and participants present
• Procedural matters should be dealt with through the tribunal staff
Tribunals
Following the hearing, the adjudicator:
• identifies issue(s) raised by parties in the course of the hearing
• reviews and weighs evidence presented
• reviews the arguments of the parties
• makes findings of fact based on the evidence
Tribunals—Decision-makers can only base decisions on evidence obtained during the hearing,
excluding:
• Commonly known facts that are not disputed by reasonable people
• Specialized knowledge that is inherently uncontroversial (i.e.,
immediately/ accurately demonstrated by available /reliable sources)
Standards of Review
Pre-Dunsmuir standards:
• Correctness: One correct answer to question
• Reasonableness simpliciter: Tribunal’s decision will be accepted if it is based on
a reasonable interpretation of the facts or law
• Patent unreasonableness: Defect is so obvious that no doubt decision was
defective
Dunsmuir and Standards of Review
In 2008, SCC eliminated standard of patent unreasonableness in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick
• Reasonableness: Still applies
• Correctness: Court will not show deference to decision-maker’s reasoning;
follows own analysis
• Patent unreasonableness: Only applies when a statute explicitly states that it
applies
After Dunsmuir:
• If a standard of review has not already been established, the court must carry out a
standard-of-review analysis
Factors include:
Presence or absence of privative clause
Purpose of tribunal
Nature of question at issue
Expertise of tribunal in dealing with matter at issue
Role of Statutory Standards of Review
Stating a Case
• To avoid making errors in their decisions, a tribunal may state a case by asking a
court to clarify/resolve an important legal question
• Formulated question to court is stated case
• Right to state the case must be provided for in a tribunal’s governing statute;
generally, agencies other than tribunals may not state a case
Review by the Ombudsperson
• Party affected by agency’s decision may submit complaint to federal or provincial
ombudsperson
• Federal ombuds-like officials, including Privacy Commissioner, also receive
complaints
• It is appropriate for ombudsman to scrutinize fairness of a proceeding but less so
the findings of a tribunal
Mr. Vavilov was born in Toronto in 1994. In 2010, his parents were arrested for spying in the
United States, where they were living. Mr. Vavilov learned then that his parents had been
undercover Russian spies his whole life. The United States sent the parents back to Russia as
part of a spy exchange.
Mr. Vavilov tried to renew his Canadian passport. He was rejected twice. Officials said he
needed proof he was Canadian, and his birth certificate wasn’t enough. He needed a
certificate of Canadian citizenship. He got this and applied again. But he still didn’t get a
passport. Instead, he got a letter from the Registrar of Citizenship. The Registrar makes the
final decision on who is a Canadian citizen. The letter said giving Mr. Vavilov the certificate of
citizenship was a mistake and that he was not a Canadian citizen.
The Registrar’s decision was based on her view of the Citizenship Act. The general rule is that
anyone born in Canada is a Canadian citizen. But there is an exception. This exception applies
to a child of “a diplomatic or consular officer or other representative or employee in Canada of
a foreign government.” If neither parent is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident, the
child won’t be a citizen. The Registrar said the exception applied in Mr. Vavilov’s case.
The Registrar relied on a report for her decision. The report was written by a junior analyst.
The analyst noted there was no definition of “other representative or employee in Canada of a
foreign government” in the Act. But she said it could include undercover spies. The analyst
recommended the Registrar cancel Mr. Vavilov’s certificate of citizenship.
Mr. Vavilov asked the Federal Court to review the Registrar’s decision. The Federal Court
ruled for the Registrar. It said the decision was “correct.” The Federal Court of Appeal ruled
for Mr. Vavilov. It said the decision was “unreasonable” and quashed (canceled) it. (To better
understand what “correct” and “unreasonable” mean here, read the “Case Law in Brief” on the
Standard of Review.)
All the judges at the Supreme Court said the Registrar’s decision was “unreasonable” and that
the Federal Court of Appeal was right to quash it. They said Mr. Vavilov was a Canadian
citizen.
The judges said the Registrar didn’t justify her view of the law. They said she didn’t properly
consider lawmakers’ debates, court cases, the text of the Citizenship Act, and international
law. These sources showed that the exception was only meant to apply to people who had
diplomatic “privileges and immunities.”
Citizens have to follow all their country’s rules. For example, Canadian citizens have to pay
Canadian taxes and obey Canadian laws. But people working for foreign governments, like at
embassies or consulates, don’t always have to. They may have “privileges and immunities.”
These are like exceptions to the rules that citizens have to follow. They are meant to make
sure one country can’t meddle in another country’s foreign policy through its officials. The
officials need the privileges and immunities to do their jobs properly. That’s why diplomats
and other foreign representatives to Canada can’t become Canadian citizens.
The majority said it didn’t matter that Mr. Vavilov’s parents were working for a foreign state.
What mattered was whether they had privileges and immunities. They didn’t. That meant the
exception didn’t apply to Mr. Vavilov.
Normally, if a court finds an administrative decision unreasonable, it will send it back to the
decision-maker to try again. In this case, the majority said it wouldn’t be useful to do that.
Mr. Vavilov had already brought up all these issues and nothing changed the Registrar’s mind.
The judges said that Mr. Vavilov was a Canadian citizen.
This case was one of three cases known as the “administrative law trilogy.” (The other two
cases, decided in Bell Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), were about Super Bowl
ads.) Vavilov and the Super Bowl ad cases were about very different issues. But they all dealt
with an area of administrative law called “standard of review.” To learn more about this (and
to better understand the Court’s reasons in this case), read the “Case Law in Brief” on the
Standard of Review.