102 OAsFE AT LAW. [Wo A. R.

1921. MCMILLAN, C.J.: Yes. The result of my judgment is very

HOUGH unfortunate in one respect, as there are in fact two roads now over
e. the defendant's property. There should be some method by
TAY'LOB.
which a reasonable way can be arrived at to get rid of one of
them. It looks as if the people who fLre interested in the gazetted
road are the people interested in the other road, and I think they
should take steps to get the other road closed.
Mr. Smith: No doubt they will do so.
Judgment accordingly. Stay of execution for 21 dOlJls.
Solicitor for the defendant: S. Howard-Bath.
Solicitors for the defendant: Norlhmore, Hole, Davy and
Leake.

1921. CLARKE (PETITIONER), ApPELLANT.

March 10. THE CROWN (RESPONDENT), R.EsroNDEN'l'.
McMiUan,
C.J. Contract-Formatwn-Offer and 'acceptance-:&,ward offered publicly for
information leading to the arrest and conviction of criminal_Know-
June 21. ledge of offer-Tntention to ai;c6vt offer--Motive or in&uooment-
Whether terms of offer complied with.
B1M'7t8ide, J. On 21st May, 1926, the Government of Western Australia publicly
Norlhmore, offerl)d a reward of £1,000 "for such information as shall lead to the arrest
J. and convidion of the person or persons who oommitted the murder of J'. J.
Draper, J.
Walsh, Inspector of Police, and A. H. Pitman, Sergeo.nt of Police."
The petitioner claimed the reward on the ground that on 10th June, 1926,
he gave the information required by the offer, to which information he sub-
llequently swore, at the trial of one Coulter and one Trefl'ene when indicted
for the wilfuU murder of Walll'h. On that indictment Coulter and Treffene
were convicted_ It appeared that the bodies of the murdered police officers
were found on 12th May, 1928. On 6th June, 1926, with a knowledge of the
procl1LIllation offering the reward the petitione~ gave a statement to the
police. The petitioner acknowledged that at that time he had no intention
of doing anything to earn the reward and that he made the statement of the
6th June, 1926, which was a f3ilse one, for the purpose of screening Coulter
and Treffene. On the sa.me day the petitioner was arrested on a. charge of
wilful murder, and on the 10th June, 19216i, he madJe a further statement
implicating Coulter and Treffene. ,On the trial of the petition before
McMillan, C..)'., evidence by the petitioner WII8 adduced as follows :-" On the
10th June I began to breok down under the strain. I was innocent anll
eould not stand the !!train of being charged with murdet'. Manning (pOlice)
tflok down my statement. on the 10th June at my request. I had no thought
wha.tever (if the reward th~t had been. offered'. My object was my own pTO-
tection against the false charge of murder. Up to the 10th JUJl(l I had no
intention of doing anything to earn the rewardL When I gave evidenCe in
the criminal court I had no intention of clia.iming the reward." Onbehalf
of the Crown it was conten(ed:-(l) That the petitioner did not give the
requh:ed informatiol!. upon the faith of or with the intention of accepting the
offer. (2). That the offer was to the person wbo first gave the required in·
formation and that the petitioner· was not that person; and (3) That the
!nformation given by the petitioner was given after the arrest of on - of the
VOL. XXIX.] OASES A.T· LAW. 103

murderers an(I tha.t it had then beeome impossible for 8Jly person to a.eeept 1921.
the offer by giving the required information.
CLABD
Held by MeMilI8JI, C.J., that the petitioner's claim failed. The petitioner
had given evidenee whieh was of the grea-test vaJIue to the Crown in the 'r'HE 11. CRoWN.
prO!leeution of Coulter 8Jld Treffene, 8Jld without it there would have beeu
no case ~'hich couJId have been left to the jury, but the mere faet that the
petitioner glll.ve evidence at the trial which procured the conviction of the two
aceu!l8d did not entitle him. to succeed, On the facts of the ease there was
no intention on the part of the petitioner to enter into a contract. The in·
ference tha.t the peitioner accepted the eontract which would have been
drawn fcrom his conduct in giving the information was negatived· by the facts
and by the petitioner'8 own evidence. He never was 8Jld never intended to
be 8JI informer. He only told the truth after his a.rrest in order to saye
himself from the unfounded charge of murder a.t a. time when the evidence
implieatE'd him even more th8JI Tre:tfene who ha.d been a.rrested on the S8J1IC
day.
On a.ppeal-
Held (by Burnside, J., 8Jld Draper, J., Northmore, J., Wi886t1tlente)
tha,t the petitioner wa.s entitled to llUeceedl. The petitioner ha.d done all that
eould be done under the then existing conditions in the perfOrJD8Jlce of the
conditions of the offer. The question of intention or motive on the part of
the petitioner. in giving the informa.tion had nothing to do with the deter·
mination of the issue rai!l8d on the petition. The petitioner ha.ving fulfillell
the conditions mentioned in the offer a contract was eres.ted between him and
the Orown.
WiZliams v. CMWMd4ne (a) followed.
Per Northmore, J. In no case ha.s it been held that the mere giving of
the required information amounts to an acceptance of the offer when a.s in
this case the person giving the information ha.s at the time no intention of
.accepting the offer. Knowledge of the offer of t·he reward prior to the
giving of the infOr:JIlation ha.s always been ta.ken to be necessary to such an
aeceptanee of the offer. When knowledge of the offer is shown then, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, an intention to accept the offer had been
presumed from the giving of the required informa.tion, but in the present
case that presumption is rebutted by' the evidence of the petitioner himself
who stated that when he gave the information he had no intention of claim·
ing the reward. Further the information which b~t about the petitioner's
arrest led to the statement made by him which in turn led to the arrest of
Coulter and the conviction of the murderers. The petitioner then, not being
the ftrst person to give the required information his claim fails upon thar.
point. A"" to the third ground of defence, after Tl:effene, o~e of the
murderers, had been arrested, it was not possible for the petitioner or any
other p~rson to bring himself within the terms of the ~rociIama.tion, which
required information leading (itttet· alia) to the a.rreat of the murderers.
On an appeal from the decision df McMillan,O.J. The facts
appear sufficiently in the headnote and in the judgments.
Keenan, K.C., and Roe, for the petitioner.
Walker (Crown Solicitor), for the respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
McMILLAN, C.J. The petitioner, Evan Clarke, alleges in 1927.
his petition, "that on the 21st day of May, 1926, the Commissioner March 14.
of Police, by and with the authority of the Government of
(a) 5 C. and P., 566; 2 l.o.J. (n.s.) K.B., 101; (1833) 4 B. and Ad.
621; 1 Nev. and M., 418, 38 R.R., 328.
104 CASES AT LAW. [Wo A. R.
1921. Western Australia, caused to be published a notice offering, intet'
CLA-BXE alia, a reward of £1,000 for such information as would lead to thc
".
'l'HF. CBOWlIi.
arrest and conviction· of the person or pers'Ons wh'O committed the
murders of John J oseph Walsh, Inspector of P'Olice, and
McMilZan, Alexander Henry Pitman, Sergeant of P'Olice, and that your
J.
petitioner 'On the 10th day of June, 1926, at Kalgo'Orlie in the
State 'Of Western Aust-ralia, gave the said information, which
information was subsequently sw'Orn to by your petiti'Oner at tl.e
trial 'Of one William Coulter and one Phillip John Treffene when
indicted for the wilful murder 'Of the said John Joseph Walsh,
on which indictment the said Willial1'l Coulter and Phillip John
Treffene were c'Onvicted."
Und'Oubtedly Clarke gave evidence which was of the greatest
value t'O the Crown in the prosecuti'On of Coulter and Treffene.
Without it, there would have been n'O case which C'Ould have
been left to the jury. With his evidence, supported as it was by
a mass of f811ts which corr'Oborated and strengthened it, there
was a strong case which the accused were compelled to answer.
They did so by setting up an absurd defence which they went into
the witness box to support. After they had told their stories
that which had been a strong case became conclusive, but without
Clarke's evidence they never W'Ould have been forced into that
positi'On. The mere fact that the petiti'Oner gave evidence at the
trial which procured the convicti'On of the two accused does not.
however, entitle him to succeed.
On behalf 'Of the Crown it is contended that he fails to prove
there was any contract between the parties 'Or that he perlformed
the condition which W'Ould entitle him t'O the reward. An agree-
ment must necessarily be made in the f'Orm, or what is equivalent
to the f'Orm, 'Of an offer of terms on the 'One side and an acceptance
'Of those terms 'On the 'Other side, communicated to the party
making the 'Offer. It has been decided in a series 'Of c~ that the
publicati'On 'Of an advertisement offering a reward f'Or informa-
tion is a general offer t'O any person who is able t'O give tht3
information asked, and the acceptance 'Of it bY' giving such inf'Or-
mation creates a valid c'Ontract. It was always realised that the
advertisement amounted t'O a promise to pay the m'Oney t'O the
pers'On who first gave inf'Ormati'On. At 'One time the difficulty was
suggested that it was a c'Ontract with all the world, but it was
held that it was an 'Offer t'O become liable t'O any pers'On wh'O, bef'Ore
the offer sh'Ould be retracted, should happen t'O be the pers'On t'O
VOL. nIX.] CASES AT LAW. 105

fulfil the contract of which the advertisement was an offer. With 1927.
the exception of one case I can find none in which there is any CLAlutE
interlference with the general law of contract that an acceptanCle f.
THE CI!.OWN.
of the offer is required. What the cases have decided is that it is
McMillan.
not necessary for a person to notify his acceptance, but that the C.J.
performance of the conditions is sufficient to show his intention
to accept the offer. The case to which I have referred, and one
on which Mr. Keenan strongly relies, is the case of WiUiam.~ v.
Carwardine (a). The headnote to that case is: "A, by puhlic
advertisement stated, that whoever would give information
which shol!ld lead to the discovery of the murder of B should,
on conviction, receive a reward of £20. Held, that C, who ga....e
such information, was entitled to recover the £20, though she was
led to inform, not by the proffered reward, but by other motives. "
The motive of a person in expressing an intention is, in general,
immaterial to the question of agreement and cannot be enquired
into. But I cannot help thinking that in the case in question there
is some confusion between motive and intention. The judgments
are very short, and the case may be badly reported, but I am
glad to find that my dissatisfaction with it is shared with others.
Sir Frederick Pollock, in his preface to the 38th valume of the
&!vised Reports, says, "Williams v. Oarwardine, p. 328, is one
of the cases perhaps more cited than they deserve, because they
happen to be reported while the particular subject is young. Thcl
language of the· judgments is certainly not satisfactory. We now
have a case on the effect of promises made by advertisement, in
which the principles are adequately discussed: Carlill v. Carbolic
Smoke Ball 00. (b)." That case was tried before Mr. Justice
Hawkins (c), and the learned judge added a note to his judg-
ment, in which he says, "In this case the court held, that the fact,
as found by the jury, that the plaintiff was not induced by the
offer of the reward, but by other motives, to give the information,
did not affect her right to recover. I presume, however, that the
offer had been brought to her knowledge before the information
was given. Otherwise, it is difficult to UJlderstand how it could
be said that she was party to a contract, or gave the information
in fulfilment of the condition." That case went to the Court of
Appeal (d), and was dealt with, among others, by Bowen, L.J.,
who considered the real nature of the contract. He said (at page
268), "It was also said that the contract is made with all the
(a) 4 B. a.nd Ad. (K.B.), 621, 38 (0) (1892) 2 Q.B., 484.
R.R., 328. (d) (1893) 1 Q.B., 256.
(b) (1893) 1 Q.B., 256, C.A.
106 CAS1iE AT LAW. [Wo A. 1l..

1927. world-that is, with everybody; and that you cannot contract
CLARKE with everybody. It is not a contract made with all the world.
.11. There is the fallacy of the argument. It is an offer made to all
THE CrwWN.
the world; and why should not an offer be made to all the world
McMill(1,,,, which is to ripen into a contract with anybody who comes forward
C.J.
and performs the condition ~ It is an offer to become liable to
anyone who, before it is retracted, performs the condition, and,
although the offer is made to the world, the contract is made with
that limited portion of the public who come forward and perform
the condition on the faith oIf the advertisement." On the follow-
ing page, Bowen, L.J., says: "Then it was said that there was no
notification of the acceptance of the contract. One cannot doubt
that, as an ordinary rule of law, an acceptance of an offer made
ought to be notified to the person who makes the offer, in order
that the two minds may come together. Unless this is done the
two minds may be apart, and there is not that consensus which
is necessary according to the English law-I say nothing about
the laws of other countri~to make a contract. "
I have therefore to ask mysel.Jfi whether, in the language of
Bowen, L.J., the petitioner performed the condition on the faith
of the proclamation, whether the two minds have come together
so that there is that cons~nsus which is necessary to make a con-
tract. It seems to me to be perfectly clear that tue petitioner never
intended to accept the offer when he made his statements of the
10th and 12th June. The detectives were last seen alive on the
27th April last year. Their bodies were found on the 12th May_
The reward was offered on the 21st May. On the 6th June, with
the knowledge of the proclamation offering the reward. Clark'l
gave a statement to the police. He says he had no intention of
doing anything to earn the reward, and that he made his state-
ment, which was a false one-for the purpose of screening Coulter
and Treffene and putting the police off their track. He had nl)
idea at that time that he would be charged, but on the same day he
was arrested and the case began to look very black against him.
Then, to use his own words, "On the 10th June I began to break
down under the strain. I was innocent and could not stand the
strain of being charged with murder. Manning took down my
statement on the 10th June at my request. I had no thought what-
ever of the reward that had been offered. My object was my own
protection against the false charge of murder. Up to the 10th
June I had no intention of doing anything to earn the reward.
VOL. XXIX.] CASES AT LAW. 107
When I gave evidence in the criminal court I had no intention. of 1927.
claiming the reward."
11.
On the facts of this case I am unable to find any intention to THE CILOWN •
. enter into a contract. The inference that the petitioner accepted
MaMiIlan,
the contract which would have been drawn from his conduct in C.J.
giving the information is negatived by the :facts and by Clarke's
own evidence. He never was and never intended to be an in·
former. He knew that his associates in illicit gold dealing had.
committed a horrible crime and he endeavoured to shield thelll
from the consequences. He made himself an accessory in order to
screen them. He told lies to the detectives. He only told the
truth after his arrest in order to save himself from the unfounded
charge of murder. At that time the evidence implicated him even
more than Treffene, who had been arrested on the same day.
HaV'ing come to the conclusion that no contract was ever
made, and that the information was not given in pursuance of the
offer, it is unnecessary for me to consider any of the other points
that were discussed. In my opinion the petitioner has failed to
make out any cause of action and this petition must be dismiss.ed.
The Crown Solicitor; I move Ifor judgment for the Cr()WD.
I am asked not to press for (losts.
Judgment for respondent.
Solicitors for petitioner: Parker ana Roe.
Solicitor for respondent: Crown Solicitor.
The petitioner appealed: 1927.
Keenan, K.C., and Roe, for the appellant (pe1iitioner). The lune21.
Crown issued a proclamation advertising a reward of £1,000 for
such information as would lead to the arrest and conviction of the
murderer or murderers of lnspector Walsh and Sergeant Pitman.
The appellant accepted the proclamation as an offer of a contract,
and having performed the conditions of the contract now claims
the reward. It was upon the appellant's evidence that the Crown
. had been in a position to successfully charge one of the murderers,
Coulter, with the murder of Inspector Walsh, and this had also
led to the conviction oIf the other murderer, Treffene. When the
appeal before the court of criminal appeal was disallowed the
reward became operative, and it was then thatClarke lodged hiil
claim for it. The 9rown had declined to pay the reward on the
ground that Clarke had assisted the criminals to evade the law for
the time being. That, however, was beside the point. for he subse-
108 CASEB AT LAW. [Wo A. R.
1927. qllently gave information which led to their arrest and conviction.
CLARXE If Clarke was an accomplice--:-and the proclamation refers to
tI.
THE CBOWN.
information given by an accomplice-he was only an accomplice
after the fact and not before. It was admitted by the Crown
that his testimony had led to the first arrest in the case. The
learned Chief Justice, in his judgment, relied on the question of
motive and intention. Motive had nothing to do with the matter,
if'or Clarke had specifically performed the contract and earned
the reward stated in the proclamation. The same principle that
appl~es in building contracts applies in this case where a lump
sum is offered for a specific service. Carlill V. Carbolic Smoklj
Ball Co. (a); Williams and Carwardine (b); Halsbury, vol. 7,
Note (t), p. 349, and Note (i), p. 347; Dakin and Co. Ltd v. Lee
(c); Gibbons V. Proctor (d).
Walker (Crown Solicitor), for the respondent. The Crown
resists the claim on the grounds (1) that there was no contract
because there was no consensus between the parties; (2) that there
was no contract because the petitioner did not carry out the con-
ditions contained in the proclamation by the Government -and is
therefore nQt entitled to the reward ; and (3) that there ;was no
contract between the parties, because other persons than the
petitioner had given information which led to the arrest ofTreffene,
one of the murderers, prior to the petitioner having made the
statement upon which he bases his claim. The contract set out in
the proclamation was indivisible, and must be complied with in its.
entirety. The proclamation referred to a reward that was offered
to the discoverer of the murderer or murderers of the twu police
officers, and the contract thus offered could not be fulfilled by
any person in part only. The petiti<>ner had given his informa-
tion to the police which led to the arrest and conviction of one
murderer, Coulter, in order that he might be released from gaol,
and his motive in giving information was other than the motiYe
<>If claiming the reward. The contract therefore was not accepted
by the petitioner, and moreover had never been completed by him.
The giving of the information by Clarke did not amount to an
aooeptance of the offer of the Crown. He had never intended that
the information he gave should be in fulfilment of the contract;
and it cannot be presumed that he did, in fact accept the offer.
Moreover, the offer of the Crown had been impliedly revoked
when one of the murderers, Treffene, was arrested on a charge of
(a) (1893) 1 Q.B., 256. (11) (1916) 1 K.B., 566.
(b) 4 B. and Ad., 621; llO E.R., (d) il4 L.T.R., 594.
590; 5 C. and P., 566.
 CAIiIEB AT LAW;. [Wo A. R. 109

murder by the p<>lice, of which fact the petitioner was. well aware. 1927.
---~
This revocation of the contract would preclude Clarke from CLARE
accepting the offer and thus making a binding contract. Although 11.
THE ClWWN.
not expressed, a revocation had taken place. Clarke has now
received a pardon. This was given because, in his evidence befQre
the criminal court, he had made statements which in a way im-
plicated him in the murder.
BURNsIDE, J. The Crown pardoned Clarke as an accomplice.
and the term" accomplice" is that which is mentioned in thJ
proclamation.
Walker: If the Crown is to be saddled with a charge Of mora]
turpitude the moral turpitUde of the petitioner must be taken
into account. ,Austin's Jurisprudence, vol. 1, pp. 161, 345, 416,
423 and 442; WiUiams v. CarU)(l.rdine; Beach on Contracts, vol.
1, page 59; Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.; Cutter v. PoweU
(a) ; Pollock on Contracts, 7th ed., p. 265; Orr v. The Queen (b) ;
Lancaster v. Walsh (c); Halsbury, vol. 7, par. 718; Leake on
Contracts, 4th ed., p. 22; Tamer v. Walker (d).
K eenan, K.C., in reply: There is no legal support of the
Crown case in any case dealing with the advertisin~ of rewards.
If the part that is left undone makes the part that is done of no
value no reward is payable, but 'in this case the part performance
of the contract was of the utmost value, seeing that it led to the
arrest and conviction of the murderers. If the proclamation were
read in its strict sense it would be impossible for an~ne to have
fulfilled it. The petitioner was the person who first gave thf.:
necessary information to the police. Refusal to pay the reward on
technical grounds would be a grave departure from the ordinary
rules which should control governments. There is no justification
'for. departing from the decision given in the case of Williams v.
Carwardine. Cur. adv. vult.
BUBNsIDE, J. 'fhis is iln appeal from the judgment of the 1927.
learned chief justice in an action in which the petitioner claimed ...4.'ugust 31.
to recover from the respondent the sum of £1,000 under the fo12
lowing circumstances. On the 21st May, 1926, the Oommissioner
of Police, with the authority of the Government, by public ad-
vertisement, offered" a reward for such information as shall lead
to the arrest and conviction of the person or peI'SQns who com-
mitted the murder of John J oseph Wa18h and Alfred Henry
Pitman." On the 6th June the petitioner and one Treffene were
(a) 101 E.R., 573. (d) L.R. 1 Q.B.C., 641;. and L.R.,
(b) N.S.W.8 Sup. et. Rep., 71. 2 Q.B.C., Wl.
(0) 51 R.R., 441.
110 CASE AT LAW. . [W• .A.. B.

1927. arrested on the charge of having committed the murder (\f John
CLAB.KE Joseph WaIsh. On 10th June, 1926, whilst so being in custody,
11.
THE CRoWN.
the petitioner made a statemcnt to a police officer. After having
received this statement one Coulter was arrested. In August,
Burnside, .T.
1926, an indictment was presented by the Crown against Treffenc
and Coulter for the willful murder of John Joseph Walsh. The
petitioner was called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution,
and he repeated to the jury the statement which he had made to
the police,1Lnd the jury, after hearing the testimony of other wit-
nesses corroborative of the petitioner's statement, convicteil.
Treffeneand Coulter of the. murder of Walsh. Both of the con-
victed men were executed. No indictment was presented with
reference to the murder of Pitman and the petitioner was released
from custody. He thereupon brought his action, and at the trial
before the learned chief justice the petitioner said that his object
in giving the information was to clear himself of the cha.rge of
murder, that he had given no consideration to, and had no in-
tention of, claiming the reward at that time, that he first made
up his mind to claim the reward a few days after the final deter-
mination of th'e case in the court of criminal appeal. The learned
chief justice found as a fact, "that without the petitioner's evi-
dence there would have been no case which could have been left
to the jury," on the trial for the murder of W aIsh. He found,
however, that the petitioner was not entitled to recover the
amount offered, as he did not intend to claim it when he made his
statement on the 10th June. The appellant now claims to be en-
titled to the reward offered on the ground that he gave informa-
tion which led -to the conviction of the accused Coulter and
Treffene. The advertisement of the reward is admitted.
The defence set up is twofold: (1) that the petitioner gay'!
no information leading to the arrest of the murderer or murderer'!
ofWalsh and Pitman; (2) that the confession was not made with
a view to obtaining the reward. The offer was made' by advertise-
ment addressed to all the world. It was meant to be read by the
man in the street, and how would an ordinary person -reading it
construe it? To put it in a few words, the advertisement amounted
to an offer of a reward for information which led to the conviction
of the ofl'ende~. The advertisement prefaces the offer by indi-
cating the object to which it was directed, namely, the discovery
of the person or persons who had murdered two police officers who
had mysteriously disappeared SOme weeks before, and whose muti-
VOL. XXIX.] CASES AT LAW. 111

lated dead bodies, when discovered, clearly showed that they had 1927.
been brutally murdered. It may be that if the advertisement Ul..ABXE
1).
were read with strict regard to the rules oIf grammatical construe" THE C:R.oWN.
tion, a result may be arrived at which would render the advertise-
B'Urnaiae, J.
ment somewhat illusory, but such a construction does not recom-
mend itself to me. The first ground set up by the defence is
sought to be supported, ~ I understand it, in two ways. First,
it is submitted that as a fact Treffene had been arrested before
the petitioner gave the statement; and, secondly, that the state-
ment did not lead to the arrest and conviction of! the offenders, as it
was the outcome of the petitioner being placed under arrest,
which arrest had been brought about by information in the hands
of the police. It is not suggested that before the time the petiti-
oner gave his statement of .10th June that it was known by the
f)olice who were the persons implicated in the murder, or whether
the two police officers had been murdered by the same person or
persons on one occasion, or whether their several deaths had re-
sulted' from acts totally discol!lIlected in point of time or place.
The word "information" in the context in which it is used in the
advertisement means the imparting of knowledge of some material
fact not knO'Wn before, Lancaster v. Walsk (a) (per
Alderson, B.) . It does not cease to be information
merely because the person to whom it is given had
already strong grounds for believing or suspecting the facts
communicated to be true. In my opinion, therefore, when the
petitioner told the pQlice of his interview with Treffene and
()QuIter soon after the murder had been committed, and what
Treffene and Coulte·r had told him, not only as to their connectiDn
with the murder, but how it was co~mitted and also the manner
in which the bodies were disposed of, he was imparting to the
police knowledge of material facts which they did not possess
before. It is submitted, however, that the information so given
did not lead to the arrest and conviction of the murderer or mur-
derers, and the.case of Tarner v. Walker (b), i.c; cited in support
of this proposition. The question whether information givel'
leads to any partiCUlar result is a question of fact, not a question
of law. It is a question that, if canvassed, must be'left to the
determination of the jury. In Tarner v. Walker the facts were
that some jewellery had been stolen and a reward of £1,000 was
offered by the defendant, Walker, to any person who would give
such information as should lead to the recovery of the jewellery
(a) 4 M. and W., HI. (b) L."R., 1 Q.B.C., 641; and 2
Q.B.C., 301.
1111 CASE AT LA.W. [Wo A. B•.
1927. and the apprehension at: the thieves. After the reward was
CLAu:B offered a man named Roberts brought some of the stolen property
".
THE CROWN.
to the shop 01) the plaintiff, T·amer, who was a working jeweller.
Tarner suspected it immediately to be stolen property, and he
BurtlBide, .r. made an arrangement with Roberts to bring the property back
again in the afternoon, together with some other property which
Roberts said he had. IlDiIIlediately upon that arrangement being
made Tarner communicated with the police and told them what
he knew. He arranged for the police to come to his shop, where
they lay hidden in waiting for Roberts to return. When Roberts
returned with the stolen property the police pounced' upon him
and arrested him with the stolen property in his. possesion. He
was taken away and put into custody. While he was in custody,
he told the police he had some information that some of the
thieves, whose names he did not know, would be f&und in an eel
pie shop. in Whitechapel Road. Shortly afterwards the police
arrested some of the thieves at the eel pie shop. They also ar-
rested others of the thieves at a place in BQw Road, recovering
more of the jewellery. Roberts and the thieves were prosecuted,
and convicted. Tamer then brought an action to recover tlll~
amount of the reward. For the defence, the police constables
who arrested the thieves were called, and they swore that the
information given by' Roberts had nothing to do with the appre-
hension of the thieves, as the police were already aware of the
eel pie shop being one df their haunts. The principle laid down
by the learned chief baron in that case is stated in these words,
, , . . . whether the case consist of a single cause followed
directly and immediately by a single consequence, or whether
there be a chain of causes and consequences leading to the ulti-
mate result, it becomes a judge,unless in doing so he would violate
some principle of l~w applicable to that particular case, to leave
the whole case to the jury, with such observations as h.e may think
fairly warranted by the different facts of the case before him. "
If I have correctly ascertained the principle laid down in that
case, then it seems to me to follow that it must be within the
province of the jury to find the fact either way. The learned
chief baron expressed his view in that case that the jury came to a.
proper conclusion; but if the verdict of the jury be looked at, an;}
not merely the headnote of the report, it will be seen that the jury
Itound that both Roberts and Tamer gave information, and they
awarded Tarner £250, together with £150 for the recovery of the
jewellery, being of opinion that it was upon Roberts's informatiQU
VOL. XXIX.] CASES AT LAW. 113

that the thieves were arrested and the remainder of the property 1927.
recovered. But, after all, it is clearly law that the finding of the CLABKB
jury in one case does not bind a jury upon another set of facts, ",
THE CBoWN.
nor does the finding of any court bind another court where the
facts are not the same. HowOIrd v. Patent Ivory Manufacturing Bur1l8ide, J.

Co. Ca).
The real question to be decided is, in my opinion, not what
caused the petitioner to give the information, but whether the
information he gave was sufficient to and did lead to the arrest
and conviction of the murderer or murderers. In my opinion, as
regards the man Coulter it did. But Treffene was arrested before
the information was supplied, and it is therefore contended that
the inlformation did not lead to his arrest. Now, what are the
facts? Treffene was arrested on 6th June, 1926, on a charge of
having boon guilty of the murder of Walsh. The information
given by the petitioner disclosed that Coulter was the person
who shot Walsh and Treffene was the person who shot Pitman.
The circumstances surrounding the shooting clearly establish the
legal conelusi(ln that they were both equally guilty of the murders.
But Treffene was not in custody on the charge of murdering
P<itman. After having received the information from the petitio
oner there was nothing to prevent a charge being preferred
against Treffene of having been guilty of the murder of Pitman
and a formal arrest made. It is true that such a proceeding
would have been a mere formality, but, if Treffene being under
arrest, the inlformation supplied cannot therefore be said to have
led to his arrest, the question which, to my mind, immediately
arises is, was the condition as to his arrest one which went to the
root of the oontract and essential to its performance? The sub-
stance or foundation of the contract, in my opinion, was to obtain
the conviction of the murderer or murderers. A conviction for
the crime of murder cannot be obtained by law in absentiac-the
accused must be heard, and whether he be under legal arrest or
not a conviction may be obtained if he be present at the trial and
be heard in his defence. The appellant had done all that could
be done under the then existing circumstances in the performance
of the conditions. If authority is wanted for the proposition
which I have laid down, it will be found in the decision of Tatylor
v. Caldwell Cb), and in the long line of cases down to Krell v.
Henry Cc), the famous coronation case. I agree with the finding
of the chief justice that without the petitioner's evidence there
would have been no case to go to the jury, and I conclude that it
(a) 38 Ch.D., 156. (c) (19(}3) 2 K.B., 740,
(b) 3 B. ~d 8./ 826. .
114 CASE AT LAW. [Wo A. B.

1927. was the petitioner's statement tha.t led to the conviction of both
CLARKE Trefl'ene alid Coulter.
11.
THE CROWN.
The other point raised by the defence is that the statement
of the petitioner made on 10th June was not made with lit view
B'M?I8ide, J. to obtaining the reward. The learned- coUnsel for the petitioner

submits that this fact is not material, and he relies on Williarns

v. Carwardine to support his contention. The learned counsel for
the petitioner did not, I understand, question the correctness of
the decision in W",1liams v. Carwardine, but he said that the
principle that it laid down was not relevant to the consideration
of the present case. It is not suggested that the petitioner had
no knowledge of the advertisement or that the giving of the in·
formation was not intentional. We were invited to consider some
Qbservations of the learned editor of the Revised Reports, on the
case of Williams v. Carwardine, which are to be fOlmd in the
p~face to volumt' 38, R.R., and also a note of Hawkins, J., upon
that case, which is to be found appended to the report of his
judgment in the case of CarliU v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (a).
The opinions of learned writers have no judicial authority, nor
does the obiter dictum of a judge appended to his judgment
stand on any higher plan~. I am not quite sure that I understand
exactly what is the import of the one, whilst as to the other it
appears to me to be founded upon the report of the case in B.
and Ad. only. But whatever may be the effect of these notes I
have been unable, after considerable research, to find any case or
any authority competent of overruling Williams v. Ca'f'wardirw
which has done so either expressly or by implication. If the rulf!
of law laid down in Williams v. Carwardine can be ascertained by
recourse to recognised authorities, then, if it is applicable to the
present case, it must, in my' opinion, be followed until overruled;
The principle laid down in a case must be ascertained from the
judgment and from nowhere else. It is true, in order to under-
stand the judgment, you must have recourse to the 'facts, but it is
from the judgment and the judgment only that the principle of
law can be obtained. If the report of the case of Williams v.
Carwardine be looked at, it will be seen that learned Ohief Justice
Denman put his decision in very short terms He mentions
nothing about motives or intention's, nor do either of the two
other judges who were associated with him; but the fourth judge,
Pi.ttteson, J., after concurring' in the decisions already given,
added, "We cannot go into motives." It is upon that that the
conclusion has been based that motives may not be regarded. Now,
(a) L.R. (1892),2 Q.B., 484.
VOL. XXIX.] CASES AT LAW. 115

the way the case has been considered, not authoritatively, but the 1927.
manner in which it has been received by the profession, can be as- CLARKE
V.
certained by reference to Pollock on Oontracts (8th ed.), a work THE CROWN.
well known to the profession. At page 15 of that book the learned
author says, "The established modern doctrine is that there is a BurMiik, .J.
contract with any person who performs the condition mentioned
in the advertisement; see Williams v. Carwardine; that is, the
advertisement is a proposal which is accepted by performance of
the conditions. It is an offer to become liable to any person who
happens to fulfil the contract oIf. which it is the offer." F'urther'
on, at p. 22, after discussing the correctness of the decision, he
refers to the case of Williams v. Carwardine in these words,
"There a reward had been offered by the defendant for infor-
mation which should lead to the discovery of a murder. A state-
ment which had that effect was made by the plaintiff, but not (as
tht' jury found) with a vit'w to obtaining the reward; it does
not appear to whom it was made, or whether with any knowledge
that. a reward had been offered. The court held, nevertheless,
that the plaintiff had a good cause of action, because, 'there was a
c·ontract with any person who performed the condition men-
tioned in the advertisement,' and the motive with which the
information was given was immateriaL"
I pause here for a moment. to indicate that the very words
which are used by this learned author, that. the information wa,;
not given with a view to obtaining the reward, are the words
which are used in' the defence t.o this action. The report of the
facts of the case of Williams v. Carwardine in B. and Ad. is not
very abbreviated. It is now nearly one hundred years old, and it
may be that the art of stenography had not then advanced to that
pitch of perfection which exists at the present day. The facts are
given at considerable length, and I think that a closer reference
to the facts would perhaps have modified some of the criticisms.
The facts are given thus in B. and Ad.: A man named Walter
Carwardine was seen on 24th March, 1831, at a public house. He
was not heard of again until 12th April, when his dead body was
found in a river. An inquest was held on 13th April, and, it
appearing that the plaintiff was at the house of the deceased on
the night he was supposed to have been murdered, she was exam-
ined before the magistrate, but did not give any information
which could lead to the apprehension of the real offender. On
25th April a reward was offered. Later on two persons were
tried for the murder and acquitted. Soon after the plaintiff wa&
118 CABm AT LAW. [Wo A. B.
1921. severely beaten and bruised by. a man named Williams. On 23rd
CLABD August, believing she had noli long to live and to ease har con-
'11.
THE CRoWN.
science, she made a voluntary statement containing information
which led to the subsequent conviction of Williams. On those
Btlf'Nidfl, J.
facts the learned judge (Parke, J.) held that, having given the
information which led to the conviction, she had performed .the
condition and was entitled to the reward, and he directed the jury
so to find .. He askecf th'e Jury, however, to find specially whether
she was induced to give the information by the offer of the pro-
mised reward. The jury found she was not, but by other motives.
On motion for new trial, it wa~ submitted that the ~romise coUld
only' be enforced in favour of persons who should have been in-
duced to make disClosures by the promise of the reward.' None
of the judges referred to motives, except the last judge, Patteson,
J., who con<:urred and added, "We cannot go into the plaintiff's
motives."
But the case also is reported in N. and M., C. and P. and the
L.J.R. In 1 N. and M., 418, the case is reported thus, "It clearly
appeared upon the trial of this cause, and was so found by th(~
jury, thaJt the plaintiff had given information of the murder not
from any hope or expectation of receiving the reward offered in
the advertisement, bp.t from a feeling of revenge." If I under-
stand the English language correctly, revenge is not a motive;
it is an 'intention. Revenge springs from a prece4ing feeling of
illwill. It is a desire which one seeks to obtain. In moving for a
new trial the point was taken that the plaintiff did not rely on the
promise. Denman, C.J., asked was there any doubt of the plain.
tiff having notice of the handbill, to which the defendant 'Cl
counsel replied, "None whatever. She must have known it. Tt
was advertised all ovEtr the town," but he said the jury found
that. the handbill did not operate upon her mind, and did not
induce her to make the disclosure.
In t.he report in 5 C. and P., 573, the case is reported in this
way: the declaration averred that the plaintiff, confiding in the
promise, gave the information. In giving leave to move for a
nonsuit, Parke, J., said, "It is to be taken, as found by the jury,
that the plaintiff gave the information which led tothe discovery
of the murderers; but that she did not give that inlformation for
the sake of the £20 reward, nor in consequence of the handbiH,
but from stings of conscience." At page 574 will be found Lorti.
Denman's query as to her knowledge and the counsel's reply,
"She mqst have known of it. "
YOL. XXIX.] C~ES AT LAW. 11'1'

In the Law Journal Reports (2 K.B., n.s., 101) the case is 1927.
reported in this way: it appeared at the trial that the plaintiff CLARKE
did not give the information with an;y view to the reward nor with '11.
'fHE ClWWN.
any intention to avail herself of it, but from entirely other
motives. It is somewhat difficult to say that the word "motive" Burnside, .r.
is used in the way in which it is used by others who are precis!'
in the use of language. But the difficulty, if any, is cleared away
by the case of Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (a). The oll-
servations I have read have not passed unscathed at the hands of
legal writers, but this is the position. Hawkins, J., who gave his
considered judgment in the first case, opened his observations
in this way: "1st. Was there a contl'act of any kind between the
parties to this action 1 I am of opinion that the offer or
proposal in the advertisement, coupled with the performance by
the plaintiff of the condition, created a contract on the part of the
defendant t.o pay the £100 upon the happening of the event men-
tioned in the proposal. " After making some further observations
he refers specifically to Williams v. Carwardine, and says, "If.
authority was wanted to confirm the view I have taken, it is fur-
nished by the case I have just cited." That case was taken tl)
appeal, and in the court of appeal (b) L'indley, L.J., deals with
the matter thus at p. 262: "In point o~ law this advertisement is
an offer to pay £100 to anybody who will perform these contiitiolls,
and the performance of the conditions is the ~cceptanee of the
offer. That rests upon a string of authorities, the earliest uf
which is Williams v. Carwardine, which has been !followed by
many other decisions, upon advertisements offering rewards." In
the paragraph of the judgment of Bowen, L.J. (on page 268\ ill
which he is dealing with the question that a contract cannot be
made with all the world, he states the principle in almost the
same words as Lindley, L.J., "It is an offer made to all the world;
and why should not an offer be made to all the world which is to
ripen into controot with anybody who comes forward and per-
forms the condition? It is an offer to become liable to any ODP
who, before ibs retracted, performs the condition, and, although
the offer is made to the world, the contract is made with that
limited portion of the public who come forward and perflll'll' the
condition on the faith of the advertisement." Upon those last
few words it is suggested he intended to disagree with the other
judges, but the learned judge goes on IEther. The paragarph
winds up in this way, "If this is an offer to be bound, then it is a
(a) (1892) 2 Q.B., 484. (b) {1893) 1 Q.B., 256.
118 CAS]E AT LAW. [Wo A. R.

1927. contract the moment the person fulfils the condition." On the
CLARKE next page he quotes with approval the words of Willes, J., in.
11. • Spencer v. Harding (a), namely, "1.t was an offer to become
THE CRoWN.
_ liable to any person who before the offer ~hould be retracted
Bum8ide, J. should happen to be the person to fulfil the contract, of which the
advertisement waS an offer. ." And on the next page (270)
he says, dealing with the method of acceptance, "That seems to
me to be the principle which lies at the bottom of the acceptance
cases. " He refers to Lord Blackburn's judgment in Brogden v.
Metropolitan Railway Co. (b), in which that learned judge says,
at p. 691, "I have always believed the law to be this, that when
an offer is made to another party,and in that offer there is a
request, express or implied, that. he must signify his acceptance
by doing SQme particular thing, then as soon as he does that thing,
he is bound."
In the judgment of Smith, L.J., at p. 273, he says, "In my
judgment, the advertisement was an offer intended to be acted
upon, and when accepted and the conditions performed consti.
tuted a binding promise. . " It must be ho·me in mind
that in that paragraph the learned judge is dealing with the
suggestion that had been put forward, that it was not an offer
which the defendants intended to be acted upon, but that it was il
mere puff or promise of honour. At p. 274 the learned judge
says, "In my judgment, therefore, this first point fails, and this
was an offer intended to be acted upon, and, when acted upon
and the conditions performed, constituted a promise to pay."
The learned counsel for the defendant places emphasis on these
paragraphs as indicating that the offer must be acted upon by the
plaintiff, that there must be an intention accompanying the doing
of the act which constitutes the acceptance. If Smith, L.J., is
accurately reported, then both of those sentences are redundant
in their phraseology or inconsistent. With regard to the phrase-
ology, if the performance of the condition is the acceptance of
the offer, there can be no necessity to accept the offer and perform
the condition. They are the same thing put in two different ways.
In the second pal"agraph to which I have referred, where the
words "acted upon" occur twice, they are used in the first
instance as referring to the intention of the defendant, that is,
that the defendant intended to be acted upon; secondly, they take
the place of the word "acceptance" used in the :former paragraph
and with the same consequences. If any doubt is entertained as
(a) L.R., 5 C.P., 561. Cb) 2 A.C., 666.
VOL. :XXIX.] CASES AT LAW.

to this bein'g correct, reference has only to be made to the report 1927.
of the case in the Law Journal as well as in the Law Times. In CLARKE
Ca) the judgment of Smith, L.J., reads in this way at p. 265 '11.
THE .CRoWN.
" . . the advertisement was an offer intended to be acted
upon, and when accepted by performance of the conditions,," (not Burn8f;ie" J.
when accepted ffild the conditions performed) "constituted a
binding promise ~ which an action would lie." In (b) it is
reported thus, " . the advertisement was an offer in-
tended to be acted upon ~f the conditions were performed, and
when accepted, constituted a binding promise on which an actioh
would lie."
It appears to me that if Williams v. Carwardine is to be re-
garded as not being good law, it is difficult to understand why
the judges referred to it in the way they did, and referred to it as
being a binding anthority i£or the proposition that the perform-
ance of the condition is the acceptance of the offer without any-
thing more The learned counsel for the defendant referred to
certain American authorities upon the case of Williams v.
Carwardineand the principles which it is supposed to establish
in America. Unfortunately, American reports are 'not available
to any extent in this State, but from such reports as are available
I have not been able to gather very much assistance, except this:
In the majority of the American cases referred to it will be found
its has been held that knowledge of the offer is not even necessary,
that the contract is binding when a person performs the' con-
dition even without knowledge of the offer. In a few cases~I
think three in the State of New York-it was held to the contrary,
that knowledge was essential. In one case the decision in
Williams v. Carwardine was supported upon the theory, which
may be good or otherwise, that the intention was irrelevant,be-
cause the delfendant had got all that he offered to pay for, and
was in no way affected by the intention of the person giving it.
If the decision in Williams v. Carwardine is wrong in principle,
that is not to my mind a reason why this court should refuse to
follow it. It does not relieve us from the obligation of following
it, because the whole theory of our system is that the decision or
a superior court is binding on an inferior court, or on a court of
co-ordinate jurisdiction, in so far as it is a statemeIit of the law
which the court is bound to accept.
In a recoo.t case in the High Court of Australia, that of
Sexton v. Horton (c), the Chief Justice of Australia gave it 8..<;
(a) 62 L.J., Q.B., 257. (c) (1903) 2 K.B., 740.
(b) 67 L.T.R., n.!!., 837.
120 CAsm AT LAW. [Wo A. R.

1921. his opinion at p. 244, and other judges of the high court agreed
CLARKE with him, that, "Unless some manifest error is apparent in a de·
1-'. cision of the court of appeal this court will render the most
THE CROWN.
abiding service to the community if it accepts that court's decis·
Burnside, J. ions, particularly in relation to such subjects as the law of pro-
perty, the law of contrActs and the mercantile law, as a correct
statement of the law of England until !sUIne superior authority
has spoken."
In my opinon, therefore, the question of intention or motive
has nothing to do with the determination of the issue which is
raised by this plea. It may be that a difficulty arises, and I think
it does arise to a large extent, from the attempt that has beea
made to engraft an eXC(i)ption on a well-known principle; and to
engraft upon the exception another. It appears to me that 'as
long as Williams v. Carwardine is law we should follow it, and,
therefore, in my opinion the appeal should be allowed.
NORTH MORE, J. This is an appeal from the judgment of the
learned chief justice, given in favour of the Crown, upon It
petition of right by which the appellant claimed the sum of
£1,000, the amount of a reward offered by the Grown, through
the Commissioner of Police, for information leading to the arrest
and conviction of the murderer or murderers of Inspector Walsh
and Sergeant Pitman. The 9rown resisted the claim upon three
grounds, viz. (1) that the petitioner did not give the required in-
formation upon the faith of or with the intention of accepting the
offer; (2) that the offer was to the person who first gave the
requi~ed information and that the petitioner was not that person;
and (3) that the information given by the petitioner was given
after the arrest of one of the murderers, and that it had then be-
oome impossible for any person to accept the offer by giving the
required information. By a strange misuse of terms these de-
fences were, during the argument, referred to as "technical"
defences, and considerable indignation was expressed because the
Crown Solicitor stated that he relied uPQn them, and desired the
appeal to be determined in accordance with the strict legal rights
of the parties. I do not share that indignation. Personally, [
find it difficult to discover any merits in the peitioner's claim for
a reward which is based on the fact that he ga.ve certain informa-
tion to the police,although admittedly he was not induced to give
that information by the offer of the reward, but in order to save
his own neck.
VOL. XXIX.] CASES AT LAW. 121

The facts are not in dispute, and may be stated briefly as 1921.
foll'OWS :-On the 31st day of May, 1926, a proolamation was CLARKE
11.
issued by which, after reciting that Inspector Walsh and THE CBoWN.
Serge8iIlt Pitman had been murdered, a reward of £1,000 was
'Offered for "such inf'Ormati'On as shall lead to the arrest and N orlhmor8,.r.
conviction of the person or persons who committed the murders: "
The petitioner was in possession of the required inf'Ormation, and
knew of the offer, but, so far from then ac.cepting it, he made a
false statement to the p'Olice which was designed to put them off
the track 'Of the murderers, and which did in fact put them 'Off
the track 'Of 'One 'Of them. The P'Olice, however, had acquired
other inf'Ormation and, n'Otwithstanding the petitioner's state-
ment, they arrested him, together with Treffene, one of the actual
murderers, 'On the charge of wilful murder. That was on the 6th
June. A few days later the petitioner, with no intention of
accepting the 'Offer of the £1,000 reward, but m'Oved theret9 by
the desire to clear himself from the charge of murder, gave the
info:rntation to the police, ,which he now claims entitles him to the
reward. The learne~ chief justice decided the case upon the
point toot there was no contract between the parties, because the
petiti'Oner did n'Ot accept the 'Offer Of the Crown. It is elemen~ary
law that in 'Order t'O· create a contmet between two parties there
must be an offer by 'One party, an acceptance 'Of that 'Offer by the
other party and a notificati'On 'Of the acceptance to the party
making the 'Offer. It has, h'Owever, ,been decided that in the case
'Of the 'Offer of a reward f'Or inf'Ormation to be supplied, 'Or upon
the perf'Ormance 'Of a specified condition, the acceptance 'Of the
'Offer by the giving 'Of the information 'Or the performance 'Of the
specified conditi'On 'Operates as a notification 'Of the ·acceptance.
and creates a valid contract. But in no case has it been held that
the mere giving 'Of the required inf'Ormation am'Ounts t'O an ac-
ceptance 'Of the 'Offer, when, as in this case, the person giving the
inJ.f.ormati'On has at the time n'O intenti.on 'Of accepting the 'Offer.
Kn'Owle~ of the 'Offer .of the reward, prior t'O the giving of the
inf'Ormati'On, has always been taken to be necessary to such an
acceptance 'Of the offer. When knowledge 'Of the 'Offer is shown,
then, in the absence 'Of evidence to the contrary, en intenti'On t'O
accept the offer has been pr~umed from the giving of the re-
quired inf'Orm'ation, but in the present ease that presumpti'On is
rebutted by the evidence of the petitioner himself, who stated
that when he gave the inf'Ormation he had no intention 'Of claim-
ing the reward.
122 CASEE AT LAW. [Wo A. B.

1927. I agree, therefore, with the judgment of the chief justice

CLARKE upon the point upon which ne decided the case. In these circum-
V. stances it is perhaps unneceSS1a;ry to deal with the other points
THE CIWWN. , raised on the appeal, but I may say that I agree also with the
Northmore, contention oIf the Crown upon those points. The offer of the
J
Crown was for" Such information as shall lead to the arrest and
(lonviction of the person or persons who committed the murders. "
In my view the information which resulted in the arrest of
Treffene and Clarke undoubtedly led to the subsequent arrest of
Coulter, and the conviction of both the murderers. The information
given by the petitioner WIaS of great assistance to the police, but
there can be no doubt that it would not have been given at all if he
had not himself been arrested with one of the actual murderers. In
other words the information which brought about the petitioner's
arrest led to the statement made by him, which in turn led to the
arrest of Coulter and the conviction of the murderers. The pe-
titioner then, not being the first person to give the required inf01'-
mation, his claim fails upon that point.
I think also that the third point was If,atal to the petitioner's
claim. After Treffene, one of the murderers, had been arrested,
it was not possihle for the petitioner or any other person to bring
himself within the terms' of the proclamation which required in-
formation leading (inter alia) to the arrest of the murderers.
I think, therefore, this appeal should be dismissed.
DRAPER, J. The Crown contends firstly th8!t the decision in
Williams v. Carwardine does not apply to the facts which are
before us on the present appeal, and that, as la matter of law,
there is no consensus on the part of the petitioner to form the
contract which he sets up, viz., the performance of work which he
alleges is the work for which a reward was offered in a procla-
mation published by the Crown. I can find no judicial decision
which questions the authority of Williams v. Carwardine. This
case is reported-in 2 L.J., n.s., K.B., p. 101; 1 Nev. and M., 418; 5
C ana P., 566; and in 4 B. and Ad., 621. The report otl' the trial
is given at length in 5 C. and P., 566, and shows (1) that the
plaintiff was claiming a reward of £20 offered by a handbill for
giving such information as wght lead to a discovery of the
murderer of William Carwardine 'Rnd the conviction of the
murderer; (2) that the plaintiff was aware of the handbill be-
fore she gave the information required. This is admitted by
defendant's counsel; see 50 and P., 574, and 1 N. and M., 419;
VOL. :lOITx.) CASES A:T LAW. 123
(3) that the plaintiff gawe such information. voluntarily and 1927.
believing that she had not long to live, to ease her consrience, and CLARKE
"'.
in the hope of forgiveness hereafter.. It was contended for the THE QMWN.
defence that although the plaintiff had stated in her declaration
that she made the disclosure confiding in thepl'Omise contained Drllper, J.
in the handbill, the evidence showed that the disclosure was made
from other motives, and consequently there was no acceptance
of the off,er. It appears from the report in 4 B. and Ad., 622,
that the learned judge directed the jury to find a verdict for the
plaintiff and directed them to find specially whether she was
induced to give the inforination by the offer· of the reward. The
jury found that she was not induced by the offer of the reward,
but by other motives. The defendant moved fo~ a new trial B.nd
the judgment of the court of King's Bench is given in 4 B. and
Ad., 623, more explicitly, I think, than in the other reports. How-
ever, I do not think there is a material difference between the
reports. From the report in Neville and Manning the argument
advanced by counsel in support of a new trial was that the dis-
closure must be made in consequence of the handbill, otherwisE,
there was no consent by both parties to the contract. The judg-.
meut of the court, as reported, in 4 B. and Ad. 'at 623, is as follows:
-Denman, C.J.: "The plaintiff, by having given information
which led to the conviction of the murderer of Waiter Carwardine,
has brought herself within the terms of the advertisement, and
therefore is entitled to recover." Littledale, J., "The advertise-
ment amounts to a general promise, to give a sum of money to any
person who shall give information which might lead to the dis-
covery of the offender. The plaintiff gave that information."
Parke, J. : "There was a contract with any person who performed
the condition mentioned in the advertisement." PattesonJ J.:
., I am of the same opinion. We cannot go into the plaintiff's
motives." It was suggested that the facts in Williarns v.
Carwardine might differ from the facts in the present appeal.
and I have quoted the argument and admissions of counsel for
the defence to show what were the actual facts before the court
when Williarns v. Carwardine was decided. These ,facts bear a
strong analogy to the facts in the case before us. Ido not think
think there is any mater~al difference.
It cannot be disputed that marke .knew of the reward offered
by the proclamation of the 21st May before he gave the informa-
tion to the police. He had seen the proclamation,and he also says
in his evidence, in erQSS-examinJation, "Up to the 10th June I had
124 CASE!! AT LAW. [Wo A.. B.

1927. no intention of doing anything to earn the reward. At the

CLARKE inquest I was committed for trial as an accessory. I had given
'V.
'rHE CROW),;.
my evidence voluntarily. & was that given at the trial. I did
not ask to be allowed to give evidence. The p·olice asked me to.
Draper, .T.
No inducement was offered and nothing was promised. When I
gave evidence in the criminal court I had no intention of claim-
ing the reward. I first decided to claim the reward a few days
after the appeal had been dealt with. Inspector Condon told me
to make application. I had not intended to apply for the rewlU'd
up to that date. I did not know exactly the position I was in. Up
to that time I had not considered the position. No one had
suggested I was entitled to it until Condon spoke to me." In re··
examination he says, "I had not given the matter consideration
at all. My motive was to clear myself of the charge of murder.
I gave no consideration and formed no intention with regard to
the reward. The reward only became operativeaiter conviction.
There was an appeal. I was afraid while the others were at large
to speak the truth. I instructed my solicitor to write claiming
the reward from the Commisioner of Police. "
The material facts are analogous to those in Williams v.
Carwardine, and the contentions of the Crown are practically ·the
same as those urged on behalf of Carwardine. It was suggested
that the case of Carlill v; Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., the trial of
which before Hawkins, J., is reported in (1892) 2 Q.B.D., 488, and
on appeal in (1893) 1 Q.B.D., 256, had altered in some way the
effect of WiUiams v. Carwardine. Hawkins, J., obviously agreed
with the decision, and on the appeal, referring to the acceptance
of offers made by advertisement, Lindley, L.J., at pp. 262-3
observes, "It is contended that the promise made by the adver-
tisement is not binding. In the first place,it is said that it is not
made with anybody in particular. Now that point is common to
the words of this advertisement and to the words of all other
advertisements offering rewards. They are offers to anybody
who performs the conditions named in the advertisement, and
anybody who does perform the condition accepts the offer. In
point of law this advertisement is an offer 00 pay £100 to any-
body who will perform these condit.ions, and the performance of
the conditions is the acceptance of the offer. That rests upon a
string of authorities, the earliest of which is Williams v. Car-
wardine, which has been followed by many other decisions upon
advertisements offering rewards. But then it is said, 'Supposing
that the performance of the conditions is an acceptance of the
VOL. XXIX.] CASES AT LAW. 125

offer, that acceptance ought to have been notified.' Unquestion- 1927.

ably, as a general proposition, when an offer is made, it is neces- CLARKE
V.
sary in order to make a binding contract, not only that it should THE ClIllWN.
be accepted, but that the acceptance should be notified. But i~
that so in cases of this kind? I apprehend that they are an excep- Draper,J.
tion to that rule, or, if not an exception, they are open to the
observation that the notification of the aceeptance need not pre-
cede the performance. This offer is a continuing offer. It was
never revoked, and iif notice of acceptance is required-which I
doubt very much, for I rather think the true view is that which
was expressed and explained by Lord Blackburn in the case of
Brogden v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (a)-if notice of accept-
ance is required, the person who makes the off/er gets the notice of
acceptance contemporaneously with his notice of the performance
of the condition. If he gets notice of the acceptance before his
offer is revoked, that in prihciple, is all you want. I, however,
think that the true view, in a case of this kind, is that the person
who makes the offer shows by his language and from the nature
of the transaction that he does not expect and does not require
notice of the aceeptance apart from notice of the per\fornlance. "
Bowen, L.J., uses almost identical words at pp. 269-270. He says,
"One cannot doubt that, as an ordinary rule of law, an accept-
ance of an offer made ought to be notified to the person who
makes the offer, in order that the two minds may come together.
Unless this is done the two minds may be apart, and there is not
that consensus which is necessary according to the English law-
I say nothing about the laws of other countries-to make a con-
tract. But there is this clear gloss to be made upon that doctrine;
that as notification of acceptance is required for the benefit of the
person who makes the offer, the person who makes the offer may
dispense with notice to himself if he thinks it desirable to do so,
and I suppose there can be no doubt that where a person in an
offer made by him to another person, expressly or impliedly inti-
mates a particular mode of acceptance as sufficient to make the
bargain binding, it is only necessary for the other person to whom
such offer is made to follow the indicated method of acceptance;
and if the person making the offer, expressly or impliedly inti-
mates in his offer that it will be sufficient to act on the proposal
without communicating acceptance of it to himself, performance
of the condition is a sufficient acceptance without notification. That
seems to me to be the principle which lies at the bottom of the
(a) 2 A.C., 666.
126 CAsm AT LAW. [W.A. R.

1927. acceptance cases, of which two instances 'are the well-known judg·
CLARKE ment of Mellish, L.J., in Harris's case Ca), and the-very instructive
'V.
judgment of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v. Metropolitan Rail-
THE CIWWN.
way Co., in which he appears t6 me to take exactly the line I have
Dr.aper, J. indicated. ' ,
The observations of Lord Blackburn, to which Lindley, L.J.,
and Bowen, L.J., both refer, are set out in 2 A.C., 691, where
Lord Blackburn states, "I have always believed the law to
be this, that when an offer is made to another pa.rty, and in that
offer there is a request express or implied, that he must signify
his acceptance by doing some particular thing, then as soon as
he does that thing, he is bound."
Further, A. h Smith, L.J., in Carlill's case, at p. 274, ob-
serves, "Then it was argued, that if the advertisement constituted
an offer which might culminate in a contract if it was accepted,
and its conditions· performed, yet it was not accepted by the
plaintiff in the manner contemplated, and that the offer contem-
plated was such that notice of the acceptance had to be given by
the party using the carbolic ball to the defendants before user,
so that the defendants might be at liberty to superintend the
experiment. All I can say is, that there is no such clause in the
advertisement, and that, in my judgment, no such clause can be
read into it; and I entirely 'agree with what has fallen Ifrom my
brothers, that this is one of those cases in which a performance
of the condition by using these smoke balls for two weeks three
times a day is an acceptance of the offer. It was then said there
was no person named in the advertisement with whom any con-
tract was made. That, I suppose, has taken place in every case
in which actions on advertisements have been maintained, from
the time of Williams v. Carwardine, and before that, down to the
present day. I have nothing to add to what has been said on that
subject, except that a person becomes a persona designata and
able t,o sue, when he performs the conditions mentioned in the
advertisement. "
I can find nothing in the judgments of the L.JJ., which
throws any light upon the correctness of the decision in Wil~m~
v. Carwardine. They all approve it, and Lindley, L.J., and
Bowen, L.J., expressly point out the reason why performance of
the work required by an advertisement is, in law, an acceptance
of the offer of a reward. The Crown urged that there could be
(a) L.R., 7 Ch., 587.
VOL~ XXIX.] CASES AT LAW. 127

no consensus between the parties, because Clarke was not induced 1927.
by the offer of a reward to give the information, inasmuch as he CT.ARKE
V.
did not think of the reward and he did not intend to claim it, and
THE CROWN.
that these facts, inaccurately described as int.entions in the
argument before us,coulq not be regarded as motives, and also Draper, J.
that these statements showed the absence of intention to accept
the offer. In my opinion, they disclose motive, and motive only,
and do not affeet the acceptance of the offer. Clark.e certainly
intended to give the information and he knew of the proclamation,
and if this information was sufficient it was in laiw an acceptance
of the offer. We ought not to consider the motives in Clarke's
mind when he gave the information, any more than the court of
appeal ,considered the motives of the plaintiff in Willimas v.
Carwardine, and the decision in that case clearly applies to the
facts before us in this appeal. The 1aw as laid down in Williams
v. Carwardine is accepted in all countries where the common law
of England prevails, as declaring the main principles upon which
offers of reward for th.e discovery of crime can become enforce-
able contracts against the person making the offer.
The next question is whether the information given by Clarke
on the 10th June was the information for which the Crown
promised to pay the reward of £1,000. The wording of the
proclamation is not free from ambiguity. The reward is offered
for the information which leads to the arrest and conviction iJf
the person or persons who committed the murders. Whether the
iniformation giv.en led to the arrest and conviction is a question
of fact and not of law. The Crown relied upon the case of Tarnc:>'
v. Walker, reported in L.R., 1 Q.B.C., 641; and on appeal in 2
Q.B.C., 301; but this case merely decides whether Blackburn, J.,
had l.eft to the jury evidence which he himself subsequently
thought was too remote, on the question of what led to the appre.
hension of certain thieves. This case is no authority that the facts
therein appearing amount in law to a construction of the words
"lead to" in similar cases. The facts in each case are for a jury.
The learned chief justice in the court below did not decide the
point, and it is open for this court to decide it in the same manner
as a jury. In my view we must regard the causa proxima, i.e., the
causa causans of the arrest and conviction. The proclamation
was issued on the 21st May. We need not therefore consider any
information in the pussession oIf the police prior to that date,
such as the discovery of the remains which were found in the
shaft on the 12th May. The notes of evidence of the judge who
128 CASES AT LAW. [W•. A. B.
1927. presided at the criminal trial of Coulter and Treft'ene were put
CLARKE in as evidence on the hearing of this petition. Coulter and
'V.
THE CR.oWN.
Treft'ene were both indicted with the wilful murder of John
Joseph Walsh, who is mentioned as one of the two persons alleged
Draper, J.
in the proclamation to have been murdered. Coulter and Treffene
were both convicted of the IJlurder of Walsh. The learned chief
justice found as a fact that without Clarke's evidence on th~
prosecution of Coulter and Treffene on the charge of murdering
Walsh there would have been no case which could have been left
to the -jury. Detective Sergant Purduc, who gave evidence for
the respondent and took a prominent part in enquiries relating
to the murder, swore that" Outside Clarke's evidence the Crown '8
case was corroboration, and after Clarke's statement on the 10th
June the Crown could prove the truth of it," and also, "That
after Clarke's statement on the 10th C.oulter was arrested."
From the evidence given at the criminal trial it is clear that the
information given by Olarke to the police on the 10th June was
the causa causans of the arrest of Coulter and of the conviction of
Coulter and Treffene on the charge of murdering Walsh. The
Crown contends that it did not lead to the arrest of Treffene, who
was arrested on the 6th June on the charge of murdering Walsh,
and therefore that the reward is not due to Clarke. It does not
appear that anyone was arrested on the charge of murdering
Pitman. The Crown would, for the first time, have been justified
in arresting'both Coulter and Treffene on such a charge after the
lath June on the information then given by Clarke. The Crown
C/ID.not, however, and does not set up as a defence to this petition,
the absence of something which Clarke's information enabled
them to do, but which for reasons of practical convenience the
Orown did not perform. The contention of the Crown that the
information given by Clarke is not that for which the reward was
offered, because it did not lead to the arrest of Treffene, com-
pelled its counsel to admit before us that if this be the construc-
tion of the proclamation no one could claim the reward on infor-
mation given aJfter Treffene's al'!rest on the 6th June, and also to
admit that the fact that no person was prosecuted and convicted
of the murder of Pitman could not be set up by the Crown, be·
cause the Crown was responsible for this omission and could not
take advantage of such omission. The facts are that after the
arrest of Treffene on the 6th June the offer of the reward was not
withdrawn or altered in any way and was, so far as the public
could understand, still subsisting when Clarke gave his evidence
VOL. XXIX.] CASES AT LAW. 129

on the 10th June. The proclamation recites that Walsh and 1927.
Pitman had been brutally murdered,and at the time of issue and CLARXE
11.
up to the 10th June the Crown did not know whether Pitman THE CRoWN.
andWalsh had been murdered at the same time or place, or by the
same persons or person. The proclamation offers the r~iWard for Draper, J.

such information as shall lead to the arrest and conviction of the

person or persons who coIIJlllitted the murders. It obviously re-
fers to one or more persons who may have been respectively guilty
of one or both murders.
In the case oIf Thatcher v. England (a), Maule, J., at page
263, says, "Advertisements oJl this sort generally specify the
person to whom the reward is to be paid." The offer in the
present c·ase was not made to the person who gave the information,
but for the information and must be construed as made to any
one or more persons who first gave the information required.
The construction sought to be placed upon it by the Crown would
involve that to earn the reward the information given must lead
to the arrest and conviction of every person who committed both
murders. I cannot believe that the Crown intended this. The
proclamation does not, taken as a whole, support such construe·
tion. The proclamation must be construed in its plain meaning,
as the public would understand it. It was isued to the public
and to be read by the public. If, when read as a whole, it be am-
biguous, it must be construed in accordance with the maxim,
Verba chartarum fortius accipiAmtur contra proferentem, and I
think it would be construed by the public to mean that any person
who first gave information which led to the arrest and conviction
of any person who was guilty of the murder of either Walsh or
Pitman would be entitled to the reward 01.£ £1,000, or, at least a
proportionate part of such reward. If more than one perS<lil
gave information which led to the arrest and conviction of any
of the murderers, such persons might claim jointly, if not sever-
ally, for the £1,000. Whether more than one person could claim
the reward in respect of two different arrests and convictions is
not material in the present case, because Clarke, and Olarke only,
was the first person to give the information which led to the
arrest and conviction, of Coulter and the conviction of Treffene,
and it is also perfectly dear from the evidence at the trial that
the murderers of Walsh were also the murderers of Pitman. It
was not suggested or pleaded that Clarke was an accomplice and,
as a foot, he had nothing to do with committing the actual
(a) 3 C.B., 254.
13() CAsm AT LAW. [Wo A. B.
1927.
murders. In my opinion, on the facts belfore us, even on a
CLARKE narrow coustruction of the proclamation, Clarke by giving the
'V.'
THE CROWN. information which led to the arrest and conviction of Conlter of
the murder of Walsh is entitled to the £1,000 offered by the pro-
Drape,r. J.
clamation. This appeal should be allowed.
Appeal allowed with costs, including costs of trial.
[Note.-This decision was reversed by the Hight Co'urt of
Australia on 22nd November, 1927.]
Solicitors for the appellant: Parker and Roe.
Solicitor for the respondent: Crown Solicitor.

1927. RENNIE (DEFENDANT), ApPELLANT.

March 28. FREMANTLE MUNICIPAL TRAMWAYS AND ELECTRIC
r.IG HT BOARD (PLAINTIFF), RESPONDENT.
MoMillan,
C.J. Tort-Negligence-Collision of vehicles-Traffic Act, 1919 (No. 60 of 1919)
Northmore, and amendments thereto-Regulation 51 thereunder.
J. It is the duty of traffic on a side mad to give way to that on the main
road, but the traffic on the main road is not entitled to continue its course
and speed without regard to traffic from the !liide roads. Regulation 51
under the Traffic Act, 1919, provides that vehicles preceding on a main
road shall have the right of pI'Oceed,ing on their way before vehicles coming
into the main road from other roads. That means that Where, in order to
avoid a collisi6n, it is necessary for one of the drivers to stop, the one woo is
going into the main road is the one Who must stop. It does not authorise the
orher of any vehicle to rush along without any consideration for the rights
of those woo ,are driving into or aeroS!! the main road. The drivers of tram
cars are subject to the same !hiability as the drivers of other vehicles for
driving recklessly or dangeI'Ously.
On an appeal from a judgment of the magistrate of the local
court, Fremantle. 'fhefacts appear sufficiently in the judgment
of McMillan, C.J.
Keenan, K.C., and F. W. Martin, for the appellant.
Dwyer, for the respondent.
McMILLAN, C.J. This is an appeal from the judgment of
the magistrate sitting in the Fremantle local court. The plain-
tiff's cl-aim against the defendant was for damages to a tram car,
the property of the plaintiff, by reason of the negligent driving
of a motor lorry by defendant's servant. The collision between
the two vehicles took place on the 16th March, 1926, at the inter-
section of Market Street, Fremantle, and Leake Street. The
magistrate gave judgment for the plaintiff for £24, and judgment
for the plaintiff on the countercliaim. Mr. Keenan, who appeared
on behalf of the defendant, the appellant, found fault with the