RIGHTS OF THE

ACCUSED UNDER
SOURCE CONTEXT
CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION
Custodial People v. Custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
investigation meaning Judge Ayson custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions
to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.||| (Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R.
No. L-56291, [June 27, 1988], 245 PHIL 598-618)
The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that
Gamboa vs. when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a
Cruz confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States Federal
Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964).||| (Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-56291, [June 27, 1988], 245 PHIL 598-618)
while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is a
move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may
appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless
he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.||| (Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-
56291, [June 27, 1988], 245 PHIL 598-618)
This may begin even before the police line-up if the police officers started their investigation beforehand.

When does custodial Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the trial, inasmuch as the accused
investigation begin was "confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." However, as a result of the
People v. changes in patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adversaries and the judicial system well
Macam before his trial begins (U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 37 L Ed 2d 619, 93 Ct 2568 [1973]). It is therefore appropriate to extend
the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law enforcement machinery at present
involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might well settle
the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the
proceedings (U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct 1926 [1967]).||| (People v. Macam y Lontoc, G.R. Nos.
91011-12, [November 24, 1994], 308 PHIL 333-345)

It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of
an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
People v. particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect
Andan in connection with an alleged offense. ||| (People v. Andan y Hernandez, G.R. No. 116437, [March 3, 1997], 336 PHIL 91-
117)

The 1987 Constitution Section 12 (1,2, and 3), Article III provides: "Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommumicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."||| (Gamboa v. Cruz,
G.R. No. L-56291, [June 27, 1988], 245 PHIL 598-618)

In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the
police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is
People vs.
conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his
Pinlac
rights. (People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289).||| (People v. Pinlac y Libao, G.R. Nos. 74123-24, [September 26, 1988], 248
PHIL 114-123)

Rights of a person Whenever the person is under investigation for the commission of an offense - 1. he shall have the right to remain silent
under custodial People vs. and to counsel, and to be informed of each right; 2. nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
investigation Judge Ayson which vitiates the free will shall be usesd against him; and 3. any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall
be inadmissible in evidence.
 Rights of a person
under custodial
investigation

Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where
formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article
III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides: "(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
Peope v.
and in the presence of counsel. "(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
Bolanos
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited. "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him. "(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as
compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families."||| (People v. Bolanos, G.R. No.
101808, [July 3, 1992], 286 PHIL 358-361)

What was told by the Accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in an
ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation.
People v. Dy (People vs. Taylaran,G.R. No. 49149, October 31, 1981, 108 SCRA 373).The Trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to have
erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant
case||| (People v. Dy, G.R. No. 74517, [February 23, 1988], 241 PHIL 904-919)
Requisites of a valid Gamboa vs. the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.||| (Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-56291,
waiver Cruz [June 27, 1988], 245 PHIL 598-618)
A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be
Navallo v. deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been
Sandiganbayan "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own testimony.||| (Navallo v.
Law enforcement Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 97214, [July 18, 1994], 304 PHIL 343-354)
officers meaning It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed
People v. a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However,
Andan appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter.||| (People v. Andan y
Hernandez, G.R. No. 116437, [March 3, 1997], 336 PHIL 91-117)
Rule 116 on arraignment: (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has been
filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy
of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and
Additional statutory asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those
requirements for named in the complaint or information."||| (People v. Alicando y Briones, G.R. No. 117487, [December 12, 1995], 321 PHIL
People v.
admissibility of 656-724)
Alicando
extrajudicial Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
confession court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present
evidence in his behalf."||| (People v. Alicando y Briones, G.R. No. 117487, [December 12, 1995], 321 PHIL 656-724)

Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only
Ho Wai Pang v. the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such investigation. 1 "The admissibility of other evidence, provided
People they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation." ||| (Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, [October 19, 2011], 675 PHIL 692-712)

Exclusionary doctrine Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary
rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing
People v.
police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The
Andan
incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscure a later judicial determination of what really
transpired.||| (People v. Andan y Hernandez, G.R. No. 116437, [March 3, 1997], 336 PHIL 91-117)

According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as
a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the " fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The
Fruit of the poisonous People v.
" fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The
tree doctrine Alicando
rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.||| (People v. Alicando y Briones, G.R. No.
117487, [December 12, 1995], 321 PHIL 656-724)

The fact that the petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning without a counsel would not be sufficient
Ho Wai Pang v.
of his acquittal. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from his as evidence of his guilt. Nno
People
statement was taken from the petitioner during his detention and subsequently used against him.
Respondent judge did not act in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when he denied the petitioner's
Gamboa v. Cruz motion to acquit. There was no violation of his rights to counsel and due process when he was not assisted by his counsel
during the police line-up as such is not a part of custodial inquest.
Appellants' uncounseled identification by the prosecution witness during the police line-up at the hospital was found violative
People v. Macam of their constitutional rights. The Court ruled that after the start of the custdial investigation, any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in police line-up is inadmissible.
 Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the constitutional
protection. If not made "under custodial investigation", or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the
People v. Judge
statement is not protected.
Ayson
Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation prior to and during the administrative inuiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand.
SC reversed and acquitted the accused due to the findings that the conviction relied strongly on the testimony of the accused
People v. Pinlac made without counsel and such waiver was not in a written form. There was also findings of maltreatment and torture of the
accused.
Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner by which confession can be admissible in
evidence, and the glaring fact that the alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for
People v. Bolanos
the conviction, besides appellant's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, this Court has no recourse but to
reverse the subject judgment under review.
It cannot be successfully claimed that the appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. The mayor did not
question the appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. Thus, it has been held that the
People v. Andan
constitutional procedures on cutsodial investigation do not applu to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning
by the authorities.
Navallo v. A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be
Sandiganbayan deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule.|
The Trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on
People v. Dy custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case by reason of the accused statement is spontaneous and not
elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner.
The sentence of death penalty was anulled as the court strongly based the evidence to prove the accused guilt from his
People v. Alicando
uncounseled confession and the evidence gathered on the basis of such.
NON-IMPAIRMENT
SOURCE CONTEXT
OF CONTRACT
Oritigas & Co. it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
Ltd. Partnership guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
v. Feati Bank & exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
Trust Co. morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people."
We find not valid ground to sustain the contention that B.P. 22 impairs freedom of
contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to
enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful.
Lozano v.
We must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a
Martinez
Essence of the commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has become a convenient
Guarantee substitute for money; it form part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free
from the regulatory power of the state.
The questioned court orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause guaranteed
under the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the
payment of the P40,000.00 note would in effect change the terms and conditions of
Ganzon v.
the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the
Inserto
respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency and
dispensed with a primary condition.||| (Ganzon v. Inserto, G.R. No. L-56450, [July 25,
1983], 208 PHIL 630-638)
Here are instances by which these bounds may be transgressed: (1) The impairment
should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right ; (2) The protective power
of the state, the police power, may only be invoked and justified by an emergency,
temporary in nature, and can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in order
Rutter v. that it may not infringe the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts; (3) "A
Limitations
Esteban different situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to make the
remedy a shadow . . ."; (4) The decision in the Bleisdell case is predicated on the ground
that the laws altering existing contracts will constitute an impairment of the contract clause
of the Constitution only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances
occasioning their enactment.

Republic Act No. 342, which provides that payment of obligation cannot be enforced until
Rutter v. Esteban after the lapse of 8 years from the settlement of claim by the Philippine War Damage
Commission, is unreasonable and oppressive.
Non-impairment is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercse of
Ortogas & Co. Ltd.
police power. Resolution No. 27, declaring the lot at the case at bar as part of commercial
Partnership v. Feati
and industrial zone, was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health,
Bank & Trust Co.
safety, peace and order, and the general welfare of the people in the locality.
The enactment of BP 22 is valid on the ground that contracts which contravenes public
Lozano v. Martinez poplicy are not lawful. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is
freedom to enter into lawful contracts.
Substitution of the mortgage with asurety bond to secure the payment would in effect
Ganzon v. Inserto change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. The Court, therefore, cannot
order such as it will constitute as violation of non-impairment of contracts.
FREE ACCESS TO
COURT AND
SOURCE CONTEXT
ADEQUATE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE
In addition, this law deals mainly with "individual indigent" and it does not include
Foundations or Associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons.||| (Re:
Prioreschi , A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC (Resolution), [August 19, 2009], 613 PHIL 26-31)
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied
in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
In Re: Query of Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal
Extent of the
Mr. Roger assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Guarantee
Prioreschi The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to
adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free
access from the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal
protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific
protection of the poor.||| (Re: Prioreschi , A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC (Resolution), [August 19,
2009], 613 PHIL 26-31)
Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as
incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded
the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.||| (Re: Prioreschi , A.
M. No. 09-6-9-SC (Resolution), [August 19, 2009], 613 PHIL 26-31)
In Re: Query of There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in
Limitations Mr. Roger favor of a juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the
Prioreschi ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even
with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and
entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the
scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-
consuming and wasteful for the courts. DEacIT||| (Re: Prioreschi , A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC
(Resolution), [August 19, 2009], 613 PHIL 26-31)

In re: Query of Mr. The exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants cannot be granted
Roger Prioreschi to foundations working for indigent and underprivileged people.
RIGHT TO BAIL SOURCE CONTEXT
“Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused's interest in his provisional
Enrile v.
liberty before or during the trial, and the society's interest in assuring the accused's
Sandiganbayan
presence at trial.
The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the
possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused's
favor. 36||| (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 , [August 18, 2015], 767 PHIL
147-215)
Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.||| (Manotoc,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, [May 30, 1986], 226 PHIL 75-85)
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping
him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power
of the court as if he were in custody of proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the
accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him.
||| (Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, [May 30, 1986], 226 PHIL 75-85)
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the
Bail, meaning prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public
officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has
been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties
Manotoc, Jr. v. become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to
Court of prevent the principal from leaving the state.||| (Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
Appeals L-62100, [May 30, 1986], 226 PHIL 75-85)
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held
in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935). ". . . the result of the obligation assumed by
appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes
of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and
inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond
that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction."
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he
may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.||| (Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-62100, [May 30, 1986], 226 PHIL 75-85)
 While the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, this discretion, by the nature of things, may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of
an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding
or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
Baylon v. Sison
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court
may resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity,
there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting
bail should be considered void on that ground."||| (Baylon v. Sison, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0,
[April 6, 1995], 313 PHIL 99-119)
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
Enrile v.
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
Sandiganbayan
strong.||| (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 , [August 18, 2015], 767 PHIL 147-
215)
When available
[U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the
prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of
Enrile v.
the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of
Sandiganbayan
the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail;
||| (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 , [August 18, 2015], 767 PHIL 147-215)
Kinds of bail
It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower
Bail as a matter of
People v. Fortes than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.||| (People v. Fortes y Garra,
right
G.R. No. 90643, 91155, [June 25, 1993], 295 PHIL 683-705)
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if
the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of
the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;(b) That he has
previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
Enrile v. conditions of his bail without valid justification;(c) That he committed the offense
Sandiganbayan while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;(d) That the circumstances of his
case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or(e) That there is undue risk
that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.||| (Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 , [August 18, 2015], 767 PHIL 147-215)
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
Bail as a matter of
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
discretion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.||| (Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 , [August 18, 2015], 767 PHIL 147-215)
"Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a
People v. Fortes matter of right even if he appeals the case to this court since his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong."||| (People v. Fortes y
Garra, G.R. No. 90643, 91155, [June 25, 1993], 295 PHIL 683-705)
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail
becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The
court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But
People v. Fortes
once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of
right. . . ."||| (People v. Fortes y Garra, G.R. No. 90643, 91155, [June 25, 1993], 295 PHIL
683-705)
The only limitation of the waiver of right to bail is that Rights may be waived, unless
Waiver of the right, People v. waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
requirements Donato prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law (Art 6 of the Civil Code). The
Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights.
 We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to
Comendador v. the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where
Availability of the AFP
De Villa we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where
the right to bail does not exist."||| (Comendador v. De Villa, G.R. No. 93177, 95020,
96948, 97454, [August 2, 1991], 277 PHIL 93-123)
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty
is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not
Government of involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to
Hong Kong v. persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
Hon. Olalia cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold
human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also
be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked
in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or
Availability in non- guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
criminal proceedings The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the
judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well
as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore,
we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic
fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or
property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling
Government of
for its application." Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so
the U.S v.
hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the
Judge
law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
Puruganan
convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
||| (Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571,
[September 24, 2002], 438 PHIL 417-530)
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or
denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
Standard of evidence likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
Government of
to be granted bail in extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction.
Hong Kong v.
non-criminal In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new
Hon. Olalia
proceedings standard which he termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail
in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee
must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
 It is to be emphasized that although the court may have the discretion to grant the
application for bail, in cases of capital offenses, the determination as to whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong can only be reached after due hearing which, in this particular
Basco v. Rapatalo
instance has not been substantially complied with by the respondent Judge.||| (Basco v.
Rapatalo, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-1335 (Resolution), [March 5, 1997], 336 PHIL 214-
239)
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to
People v. Judge
the private respondent when he already waived his right in greeing to remaain in legal
Donato
custody even during the pendency of thr trial of his criminal case.
The clear implication, therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer
People v. Fortes such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion
on the part of the court.||| (People v. Fortes y Garra, G.R. No. 90643, 91155, [June 25,
1993], 295 PHIL 683-705)
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
Comendador v. De traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to
Villa the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.||| (Comendador v. De Villa, G.R. No.
93177, 95020, 96948, 97454, [August 2, 1991], 277 PHIL 93-123)
Mere affidavits or recitals of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay
Baylon v. Judge Sison evidence, hence they cannot legally form the basis of an order granting bail. ||| (Baylon v.
Sison, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, [April 6, 1995], 313 PHIL 99-119)
As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of
his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel,
Manotoc v. CA We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for
permission to leave the country, ||| (Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100,
[May 30, 1986], 226 PHIL 75-85)
Prior acts of herein respondent — (1) leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state
despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is
Government of the U.
charged with are bailable — eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the
S. v. Judge
requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
Puruganan
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight.||| (Government of
the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, [September 24, 2002], 438
PHIL 417-530)
By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
Government of Hong fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which
Kong v. Hon. Olalia prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.||| (Government of Hongkong Special
Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675, [April 19, 2007], 550 PHIL 63-77)
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
Enrile v.
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation
Sandiganbayan
of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
||| (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 , [August 18, 2015], 767 PHIL 147-215)
RIGHTS IF THE
SOURCE CONTEXT
ACCUSED
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
Sec 14 Art III
1987 contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
Constitutioninformed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
Criminal due impartial, to have a compulsory process to secure the attendance behalf. However, after
process the arraignment, trial mau proceed withstanding the absence of the accused: Provided,
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not
affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and
Alonte vs.
foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
Savellano
cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.||| (Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., G.R. Nos.
131652 & 131728, [March 9, 1998], 350 PHIL 700-770)
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it
over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard;
and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and
Alonte vs.
Requisites jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal
Savellano
justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal
acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due
process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."||| (Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.,
G.R. Nos. 131652 & 131728, [March 9, 1998], 350 PHIL 700-770)
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of
preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Delayed Preliminary Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of
Investigation vs. No Tatad vs. the petitioner's constitutional rights.||| (Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 72335-39,
Preliminary Sandiganbayan [March 21, 1988], 242 PHIL 563-577)
Investigation It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary
investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True — but the absence of a
preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But
an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for
until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time. Le||| (Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 72335-39, [March 21, 1988], 242 PHIL 563-577)
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to
stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of
law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to
be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to
render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or
the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the
pressures of politics and prejudice. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a
Galman vs.
Sham Trial mock trial - the non-trial of the century — and that the predetermined judgment of
Sandiganbayan
acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.||| (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670,
[September 12, 1986], 228 PHIL 42-102)
 Galman vs.
Sham Trial
Sandiganbayan

President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and
told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the
entire proceedings to assure the predetermined ignominious final outcome are without
parallel and precedent in out annals and jurisprudence||| (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.
R. No. 72670, [September 12, 1986], 228 PHIL 42-102)
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
Dumlao vs.
by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,
COMELEC
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt.||| (Dumlao v.
Presumption of
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-52245, [January 22, 1980], 184 PHIL 369-395)
innocence
Feeder A corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which
International right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.||| (Feeder
Line vs. Court of International Line, Pte., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94262, [May 31, 1991], 274
Appeals PHIL 1143-1156)
By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of
guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is
People vs.
required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to
Dramayo
constitute the offense. We feel that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of
reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the
penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent.||| (People v.
Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, [October 29, 1971], 149 PHIL 107-116)
Forfeiture proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133 which
involves such circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt does not apply.||| (Feeder International Line, Pte., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 94262, [May 31, 1991], 274 PHIL 1143-1156)
Feeder
Proof beyond Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are
International
reasonable doubt not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in
Line vs. Court of
the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in
Appeals
order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, the degree of proof required is
merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.||| (Feeder International Line, Pte.,
Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94262, [May 31, 1991], 274 PHIL 1143-1156)
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled
to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
Rules on
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error,
Evidence
produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (2a)
Section 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. — An
Rules on
extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
Evidence
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (3)
The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant
People v.
could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate
Evidence to destroy Dramayo
the act that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.||| (People v.
the presumption
Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, [October 29, 1971], 149 PHIL 107-116)
There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both
oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the
Corpuz vs. parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence
Equipoise rule
People should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. ||| (Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 74259,
[February 14, 1991], 271 PHIL 901-910)
 Marquez vs. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-politcal cases here or abroad are disqualified
COMELEC from running for any elective local position.
Flight is an indication of guilt, it may even be truly said that it is not the challenged
Presumption of Guilt, disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of innocent but rather
when allowed disqualifies perosn himself who has proven his guilt.
The failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
Corpuz vs.
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall prima
People
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
"In non-criminal proceedings, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgent nor
is it deemed essential to their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a
party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that
Feeder without such representation he will not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance
International of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted
Line vs. Court of in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the
Appeals safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he
cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side." (Nera v. The Auditor
General, 164 SCRA 1)||| (Feeder International Line, Pte., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 94262, [May 31, 1991], 274 PHIL 1143-1156)
when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to
comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before
being arraigned; 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask him if he
People vs.
desires the aid of an attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the
Holgado
court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 — If the accused desires to
procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
||| (People v. Holgado, G.R. No. L-2809, [March 22, 1950], 85 PHIL 752-757)
Right to Counsel
— It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction.
The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the
procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a
Agbayani vs.
presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it
Mendoza
has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively
proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be
presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right.||| (People v.
Agbayani y Mendoza, G.R. No. 122770, [January 16, 1998], 348 PHIL 341-369)
An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel,
will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and
specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a
Amion vs. criminal prosecution. Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of
Chiongson "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such
preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would
make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.||| (Amion
v. Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, [January 22, 1999], 361 PHIL 542-555)
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be little avail if it does
not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man
may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who
People vs.
Why Mandatory are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is
Holgado
deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented
that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the court to apprise an accused of
his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
||| (People v. Holgado, G.R. No. L-2809, [March 22, 1950], 85 PHIL 752-757)
 Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's pwn strategic machinations which brought
Amion vs.
upon the need for the appointment of a counsel de oficio in as much as the criminal case
When is the Court Chiongson
had been dragging on its lethargic course.
allowed to appoint a
counsel de officio The trial court is duty bound to appoint a counsel de officio, when the accused appears
without a counsel and informed that he has a right to be heard by counsel, that such
accused cannot afford the employ an attorney.
When may the
An accused may appear for himself without the presence of counsel when after he had
accused appear for
been informed of his right to be heard by counsel and had waived the same right.
himself
Right to be Informed
of the Nature and
Cause of the
Accusation
o so the accused can adequately prepare for his defense.
o To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense,
Purposes o To avail himself of his conviction of acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause
o To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support conviction.
o The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in
ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the
statute in defining the offense, but such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the
court to pronounce proper judgement.
What must be alleged o the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party,
the approximate date of the commission of the offense, and the place where the offense
was committed.
o The test of sufficiency of an information is whether it enables a person of common
knowledge to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgement properly.
o The description and not the designation of the offense is controlling. Even if there be
an erroneous designation, the accused may be validly convicted of the crime described
in the information.
o What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but
the actual facts recited in the information.
o It is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense and not the nomenclature of
the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the information.
Title of the Offense vs
o The description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited is the
Factual Allegations
controlling factor.
o A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is
not great, is more than substantial. Such an amendment would not alter the nature of the
offense.
o The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment or a
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made.
o An accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the offense charge,
or the offense charged included in the offense proved.
o An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
Offense charged vs
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information constitute
Offense Proved
the latter.
o An offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
 It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his
Borja v. life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must
Mendoza be fully informed of why prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An
arraignment serves that purpose.
Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to
why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face. This duty is an affirmative
one which the court, on its own motion, must perform, unless waived. he must be fully
informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. He is thus in a
Value of Arraignment position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences.
Objectives of the right to be informed:
a. to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense;
b. second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and
c. third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions
Speedy trial
the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial.
A speedy trial has been defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays and is intended to relive the accused of needless anxieties and inconviences
before sentence is pronounced upon him.
A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and
the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays||| (People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, [January 20, 2003], 443 PHIL 521-554)
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the
People v. Tee right has been violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of the
What is speedy trial delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and the
efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage
caused to the accused.||| (People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, [January 20, 2003], 443
PHIL 521-554)
Speed is not the main objective of the trial, careful and deliberate consideration for the
administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the
requirements of procedural due process and adherence to the court’s standing
admonition that discretion granted judges in the granting or denial of motions for
postponement.
Where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in the instance for
Conde v. Rivera more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom.
o Abardo v. sandiganbayan, the unexpected interval or inactivity of the sandiganbayan
for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable
delay in the disposition of cases.
When is there o Unreasonable delay of 10 years since the accused was arrested. Flores v. people
violation o Cojuanco v. sandiganbayan, delay of more than one year in resolving the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss the charges against him violated the right to a speedy trial.
o Padilla v. apas, repeated motions for postponements, caused the delay of the
proceedings from the time the information was filed.
o The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified
People v. Tee postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
||| (People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, [January 20, 2003], 443 PHIL 521-554)
Stages of the o the right to a speedy trial is available to an accused and is peculiarly criminal law
Proceedings covered concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be applied in any
by the right proceedings conducted by state agencies.
Tatad vs. Stage of the trial; in the absence of valid decision, the stage of trial has not been
Effects of violation
Sandiganbayan contemplated.
Impartial trial
Mateo, Jr. v. Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and
What is impartial trial
Villaluz that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar
Right Against People v. pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now,
Prejudicial Publicity Teehankee we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.
||| (People v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, [October 6, 1995], 319 PHIL 128-
216)
The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired
a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by
Totality of the People v.
evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias
Circumstances Test Teehankee
and he has not discharged the burden.||| (People v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-
08, [October 6, 1995], 319 PHIL 128-216)
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.||| (People v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos.
111206-08, [October 6, 1995], 319 PHIL 128-216)
Public Trial A public trial is not synonymous with a publicized trial
A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
Purpose
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago
The right to a public trial belongs to the accused. The requirement of a public trial is
satisfied by the opportunity of the members of the public and the press to attend the trial
Public trial vs and to report what they have observed. The accused's right to a public trial should not
In re: Ampatuan
Publicized Trial be confused with the freedom of the press and the public's right to know as a
justification for allowing the live broadcast of the trial.||| (In re Ampatuan, A.M. Nos. 10-
11-5-SC, 10-11-6-SC & 10-11-7-SC (Notice), [October 23, 2012])
Publicized trials are those which are aired in the media due to the interest of the public in
high profile criminal cases. To address the physical
impossibility of accommodating the large number of interested parties
inside the courtroom in Camp Bagong Diwa, it is not necessary to allow the press to
broadcast the proceedings here and abroad, but the Court may
allow the opening of closed-circuit viewing areas outside the courtroom where those who
may be so minded can come and watch the proceedings. This out-of-court, real-time
viewing grants to a larger audience the opportunity to monitor the proceedings as if they
were inside the trial court but at the same time obviates the massive publicity entailed in
media broadcasting.||| (In re Ampatuan, A.M. Nos. 10-11-5-SC, 10-11-6-SC & 10-11-7-
SC (Notice), [October 23, 2012])
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously
installed in the courtroom and the movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent
with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its
Recording of Judicial
Perez v. Estrada entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not be
Proceedings
held public pursuant to Rule 119, §21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. ||| (Perez v. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC (Resolution), [September 13,
2001], 417 PHIL 395-409)
 No comment shall be included in the documentary except annotations which may be
necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings
shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division
as the case may be.||| (Perez v. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC (Resolution), [September
13, 2001], 417 PHIL 395-409)
There are two principal reasons for the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which
says: "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the
Right to witnesses face to face." The first reason is the right of cross-examination, and the
U.S. v. Javier
Confrontation second is that the tribunal may have before it the department and appearance of the
witness while testifying. ||| (U.S. v. Javier, G.R. No. L-12990, [January 21, 1918], 37
PHIL 449-453)
o It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of
the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words,
Purposes U.S. v. Javier confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for
the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of
the witness while testifying. ||| (U.S. v. Javier, G.R. No. L-12990, [January 21, 1918], 37
PHIL 449-453)
ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in court and hearsay
Talino v. is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying
Hearsay Rule
Snadiganbayan declaration||| (Talino v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, [March 16, 1987], 232
PHIL 554-561)
Right to Compulsory
Processes
Available compulsory
processes
Test to determine
propriety of
compulsory
processes
After the arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
Borja v. provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. As
Trial in absentia
Mendoza pointed out by the Solicitor General, the indispensable requisite for the trial in absentia is
that it should come after arraignment.
Requisites
Effects of trial in
absentia
Rights waived in trial
in absentia
SUSPENSION OF
THE PRIVILEGE OF
SOURCE CONTEXT
THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Section 2. Who may grant the writ. — The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so
granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable
Rule 102 before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for the hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of
First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before
himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.
Writ of Habeas
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that "except as
Corpus
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
Jackson v. the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The
Macalino ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is
detained.||| (Jackson v. Macalino, G.R. No. 139255, [November 24, 2003], 462 PHIL 37-
52)
The arrest and detention of persons ordered by the President through the issuance of
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is merely preventive. ||| (In Re: Parong v. Enrile,
G.R. No. L-61388, [April 20, 1983], 206 PHIL 392-462)
The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for continuing with
perfect legality the detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or
quelled, and the need therefor in the interest of public safety continues.||| (In Re: Parong
v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-61388, [April 20, 1983], 206 PHIL 392-462)
"preventive detention" resulting from the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, is
the necessity of its adoption as a measure to suppress or quell the rebellion, or beat off
an invasion. The necessity of such measure as a means of defense for national survival
quite clearly transcends in importance and urgency the claim of those detained to the
right to bail to obtain their freedom. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the
constitutional grant of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on
the occasions expressly mentioned in the charter.||| (In Re: Parong v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-
61388, [April 20, 1983], 206 PHIL 392-462)
Purpose of In re: Parnong
Suspension v. Enrile The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is
to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course
thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the
field thereby jeoparding the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion,
rebellion or insurrection.||| (In Re: Parong v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-61388, [April 20, 1983],
206 PHIL 392-462)
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is
to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course
thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the
field thereby jeoparding the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion,
rebellion or insurrection.||| (In Re: Parong v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-61388, [April 20, 1983],
206 PHIL 392-462)
Sec. 15, Art III,
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
1987
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
Constitution

Grounds for
Suspension
 Pursuant to provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur for the valid
exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ, to wit (a) there must be
"invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or-pursuant to paragraph (2), Section 10, of Art. VII of
the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension of the privilege.||| (In re Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964, L-33965, L-
Grounds for 33973, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039, L-34265, L-34339, [December 11, 1971],
Suspension 149 PHIL 547-627)
In re: Lansang
Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of
v. Garcia
force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law — such as by rising publicly and taking
arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of
rebellion — there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the
aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, when public safety requires it.||| (In re Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964, L-
33965, L-33973, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039, L-34265, L-34339, [December 11,
1971], 149 PHIL 547-627)
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
Section 18,
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
Article VII, 1987
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
Constitution
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law.
Who may Suspend
Worthy of profound notice and keen appreciation is the fact that the authority to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been deliberately vested on the President
In re: Parnong as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, together with the related power to call
v. Enrile out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence and impose martial law. (Section 9,
Article VII, Constitution).||| (In Re: Parong v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-61388, [April 20, 1983],
206 PHIL 392-462)
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.
Indeed, the co-equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our
constitutional system, seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of Congress
and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same. Hence,
In re: Lansang
counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper standard is not correctness,
v. Garcia
but arbitrariness.||| (In re Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973, L-
Standard of Evidence
33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039, L-34265, L-34339, [December 11, 1971], 149 PHIL
to Determine the
547-627)
Existence of Grounds
Furthermore, as in the case of the Court's review of the President's proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, the Court's judicial review of the
Congress' extension of such proclamation or suspension is limited only to a determination
of the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. By its plain language, the Constitution
Lagman v.
provides such scope of review in the exercise of the Court's sui generis authority under
Pimentel III
Section 18, Article VII, which is principally aimed at balancing (or curtailing) the power
vested by the Constitution in the Congress to determine whether to extend such
proclamation or suspension.||| (Lagman v. Pimentel III, G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061,
236145 & 236155, [February 6, 2018])
Section 18,
President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
Period of Suspension Article VII, 1987
or any part thereof under martial law for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days.
Constitution
 Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
Section 18,
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
Article VII, 1987
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
Constitution
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the
Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the
time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings." 106 On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not
Revocation and only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the
Extension Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be
Lagman v.
discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy
Medialdea
of the facts presented before it.||| (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 &
231774, [July 4, 2017], 812 PHIL 179-853)
On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be
activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
||| (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, [July 4, 2017], 812 PHIL
179-853)
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the
Padilla v. petitioners' argument that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session
Congress of the following the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
Philippines the writ of habeas corpus, under all circumstances.||| (Padilla v. Congress of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 231671 & 231694, [July 25, 2017], 814 PHIL 344-440)
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be releas
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
Jackson v. restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is
Constitutional Macalino detained.||| (Jackson v. Macalino, G.R. No. 139255, [November 24, 2003], 462 PHIL 37-
Safeguards 52)
To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
Rule 102
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF SOURCE CONTEXT
CASES
1987 Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
Constitution all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
— The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result
in the precipitate loss of a party s right to present evidence and either in plaintiff's being
Padua v. Ericta
non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment.
||| (Padua v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-38570, [May 24, 1988], 244 PHIL 479-485)
Speedy Trial vs The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision, Acebedo v.
Speedy Disposition of Sarmiento, 9 "means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, . .
Cases ." ||| (Flores v. People, G.R. No. L-25769, [December 10, 1974], 158 PHIL 967-975)
"The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only
Flores v. People where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not
exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where once a
person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature
of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced."||| (Flores v.
People, G.R. No. L-25769, [December 10, 1974], 158 PHIL 967-975)
SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must
be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.
Stages of the 1987 (3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed
Proceedings covered Constitution by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The
certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued
within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof,
shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without
further delay.
Under the circumstances, and in the light of the precedents set out in the opening
paragraphs of this opinion, the respondent Judge's action was unreasonable, capricious
Padua v. Ericta
and oppressive, and should be as it is hereby annulled.||| (Padua v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-
38570, [May 24, 1988], 244 PHIL 479-485)
As was also pointed out in Sarmiento: "The remedy in the event of a non-observance of
this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by
Consequences of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case." 11 ||| (Flores v.
Violations People, G.R. No. L-25769, [December 10, 1974], 158 PHIL 967-975)
Flores v. People Further: "We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without
good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the
accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom."
||| (Flores v. People, G.R. No. L-25769, [December 10, 1974], 158 PHIL 967-975)
RIGHT AGAINST
SELF SOURCE CONTEXT
INCRIMINATION
1987
SECTION 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Constitution
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was recognized in England
in early days is a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was raised
against odious inquisitional methods of interrogating an accused person by which to extort
Villaflor v. unwilling confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the crime of perjury. The
Summers principle was taken into the American Constitutions, and from the United States was brought
to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as States was brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly
as wide — but no wider — a scope as it existed in old English days.||| (Villaflor v. Summers,
G.R. No. 16444, [September 8, 1920], 41 PHIL 62-71)
An old Philippine case speaks of this constitutional injunction as "older than the Government
of the United States"; as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of
interrogating the accused person"; and as having been adopted in the Philippines "to wipe out
such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit
to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the offenses which they were
charged." So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of
which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant of
valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. The Supreme Court
Origin of the of the United States thru Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "the constitutional privilege was
Right intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and the foresighted." It is
in this context that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern. Tañada
and Fernando take note of U.S. vs. Navarro, which reaffirms the rule that the constitutional
prescription was established on broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of policy
Chavez v.
because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury, and of
Court of
humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species
Appeals
and degree of which the law abhors. Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's
own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to
compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the
crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right
to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.||| (Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.
R. No. L-29169, [August 19, 1968], 133 PHIL 661-691)
Compulsion as it is understood does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be
the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable
him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would
in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling
lips of the defendant."||| (Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29169, [August 19, 1968],
133 PHIL 661-691)
The prohibition contained in the Philippine Bill (sec. 5) that a person shall not be compelled to
be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
Extent of the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
Guaranty The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
Villaflor v.
witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
Summers
incrimination.||| (Villaflor v. Summers, G.R. No. 16444, [September 8, 1920], 41 PHIL 62-71)
The examination of the substance was made by competent medical authority and the result
showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. Such evidence was clearly
U.S. v. Tan admissible. The prohibition against compelling a man in a criminal cause to be a witness
Teng against himself is a prohibition against physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be
material. ||| (U.S. v. Tan Teng, G.R. No. 7081, [September 7, 1912], 23 PHIL 145-154)
 On a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of
Villaflor v.
the accused is permissible.||| (Villaflor v. Summers, G.R. No. 16444, [September 8, 1920], 41
Summers
PHIL 62-71)
There have been cases where it was lawful to compel the accuse to write in open court while
he was under cross-examination (Bradford vs. People, 43 Pacific Reporter, 1013), and to
make him write his name with his consent during the trial of his case (Sprouse vs. Com., 81
Beltran v.
Va., 374, 378); but in the first case, the defendant, in testifying as witness in his own behalf
Samson
waived his constitutional privilege not to be compelled to act as witness; and in the second,
he also waived said privilege because he acted voluntarily.||| (Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No.
32025, [September 23, 1929], 53 PHIL 570-579)
Evidence We cannot agree with the trial court's rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I", "J" and "K")
Covered taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken
while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an
accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an
accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it
may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused
does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not
People v.
required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is,
Gallarde
the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that
a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to
determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical
examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel
morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with
bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.||| (People v.
Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, [February 17, 2000], 382 PHIL 718-741)
The petitioner, in refusing to write down what the fiscal had to dictate to him for the purpose
of verifying his handwriting and determining whether he had written certain documents
alleged to have been falsified, seeks protection — his constitutional privilege.||| (Beltran v.
Samson, G.R. No. 32025, [September 23, 1929], 53 PHIL 570-579)
The English text of the Jones Law reads as follows; "Nor shall he be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself," thus, the prohibition is not restricted to not
compelling him to testify, but extends to not compelling him to be a witness.||| (Beltran v.
Samson, G.R. No. 32025, [September 23, 1929], 53 PHIL 570-579)
"The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of
crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure
toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence
obscure, that it is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal
Evidence Beltran v. rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the
Excluded Samson well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of
oral testimony, but embraced as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word
of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret." (28
R. C. L., par. 20, page 434, and notes.)||| (Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, [September
23, 1929], 53 PHIL 570-579)
The difference between this case and that of Villaflor vs. Summers (41. Phil., 620, is that in
the latter the object was to have the petitioner's body examined by physicians, without being
compelled to perform a positive act, but only an omission, that is, not to prevent the
examination, which could be, and was, interpreted by this court as being no compulsion of the
petitioner to furnish evidence by means of a testimonial act; all of which is entirely different
from the case at bar, where it is sought to make the petitioner perform a positive testimonial
act, silent, indeed, but effective, namely, to write and give a sample of his handwriting for
comparison.||| (Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, [September 23, 1929], 53 PHIL 570-579)
 An accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each
question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse
to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the
purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The
Chavez v. rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a
Court of person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This rule may apply
Appeals even to a co-defendant in a joint trial.||| (Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29169,
[August 19, 1968], 133 PHIL 661-691)
Accused vs
The guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be
Witness
compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but the
capability of abuse."||| (Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29169, [August 19, 1968],
133 PHIL 661-691)
Where petitioner was the respondent in the malpractice charge filed against him with the
Pascial, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, the said Board cannot compel him to take the witness stand as
Board of a witness for the complainants. The principle against self-incrimination is equally applicable to
Medical a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical
Examiners profession.||| (Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, [May 26, 1969],
138 PHIL 361-369)
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus be distinguished, it suffices to refer to an
American Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character. 10 In the language of
Justice Douglas: "We conclude .. that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment
Pascial, Jr. v.
has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to
Board of
other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of
Medical
Proceedings disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." We reiterate that
Examiners
Covered such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of
the privilege to practice the medical profession.||| (Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical
Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, [May 26, 1969], 138 PHIL 361-369)
The right is available in criminal, civil, and administrative cases, as well as on impeachment
and other legislative investigations that possess a criminal or penal aspect. It does not apply
to private investigations done by private individual.
Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there are two types of
statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional immunity and the used-
and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection.
By its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of
the act or transaction. 4 In contrast, by the grant of use- and-derivative-use immunity, a
witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will
not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.||| (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 100295, [April 26, 1994], 301 PHIL 794-818)
This section 5 immunity frees and releases one from liability, and as it inures to the benefit of
an accused, it can be invoked at any time after its acquisition and before his final conviction.
Our regard for the rights of an accused dictates this result. Thus, we have consistently held
that laws that decriminalize an act or a grant of amnesty may be given retroactive effect. They
constitute a bar against the further prosecution of their beneficiaries' regardless of the
appearance of their guilt. To be sure, the guilt of the petitioners in Criminal Case No. 11960
has yet to be established beyond doubt. The PCGG itself does not appear certain and
confident of the strength of its evidence against the petitioners in said criminal case.||| (Mapa,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, [April 26, 1994], 301 PHIL 794-818)
Immunity Mapa, Jr. v. Finally, we reject respondent court's ruling that the grant of section 5 immunity must be strictly
Statutes Sandiganbayan construed against the petitioners. It simplistically characterized the grant as special privilege,
as if it was gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this posture, it misread the raison
d'etre and the long pedigree of the right against self-incrimination vis-a-vis immunity statutes.
||| (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, [April 26, 1994], 301 PHIL 794-818)
Immunity Mapa, Jr. v.
Statutes Sandiganbayan

Over the years, however, came the need to assist government in its task of containing crime
for peace and order is a necessary matrix of public welfare. To accommodate the need, the
right against self-incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying
shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness to testify despite
his plea of the right against self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of
unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use-
derivative-use immunity, as heretofore discussed. Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are
not a bonanza from government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it
— the surrender of their precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that the
right against self-incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect
and protection. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must necessarily
be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The government has a right to solve
crimes but it must do it, rightly. LLjur||| (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, [April
26, 1994], 301 PHIL 794-818)
WAIVER: "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently,
understandably, and willingly made; such waiver follows only where liberty of choice has
been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his
privilege on vague and uncertain evidence. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.||| (Chavez v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-29169, [August 19, 1968], 133 PHIL 661-691)
Chavez v.
IN CASE OF VIOLATION: A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the
Court of
course of the proceedings due to failure to complete the court as the Sixth Amendment
Appeals
requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has
not intelligently waived this constitutional guarantee, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If
this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has
jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction
is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.||| (Chavez v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29169, [August 19, 1968], 133 PHIL 661-691)
The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not limited to that of allowing a
witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being
Self Notes subsequently incurred. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence.
||| (Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, [May 26, 1969], 138 PHIL
361-369)
REASON. — Why the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination protects as well the
right to silence should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along
with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go
Pascial, Jr. v.
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
Board of
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
Medical
accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
Examiners
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given
due weight.||| (Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, [May 26, 1969],
138 PHIL 361-369)
It is of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which
the right against self-incrimination is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or
compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its
identification with the right to privacy.||| (Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No.
L-25018, [May 26, 1969], 138 PHIL 361-369)
INVOLUNTARY
SOURCE CONTEXT
SERVITUDE
1987 Sec. 18. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form as a punishment for a crime whereof
Definition
Constitution the party shall have been duly convicted.
Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to
Aspects of Involuntary Aclaracion v. another or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment
Servitude Gatmaitan and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not.||| (Aclaracion v.
Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-39115, [May 26, 1975], 159-A PHIL 424-437)
Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 does not offend against the constitutional
inhibition proscribing involuntary servitude. An employee entering into a contract of
employment after said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other
conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among which is the "implied condition
that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or
laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or
Philippine arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision by it,
Refining Co. the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so
Workers' Union enjoined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has
v. Phil. Refining already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall
Co. be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute can
not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled. . . ." (Italics supplied.) The
voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment — he has
a free choice between entering into it or not — with such an implied condition,
Exemptions
negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.||| (Philippine Refining Co.
Workers' Union v. Phil. Refining Co., G.R. No. L-1668, [March 29, 1948], 80 PHIL 533-
541)
An appellate Court may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe his
stenographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate
jurisdiction and is a part of its inherent powers which are necessary to the ordinary and
efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the due administration of justice.
||| (Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-39115, [May 26, 1975], 159-A PHIL 424-437)
Aclaracion v.
Compelling a court stenographer who had ceased to work with the court, to transcribe
Gatmaitan
his stenographic notes does not constitute involuntary servitude. Involuntary servitude
denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the condition
of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment and against his will, to
labor for another, whether he is paid or not.||| (Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-
39115, [May 26, 1975], 159-A PHIL 424-437)
PROHIBITED
SOURCE CONTEXT
PUNISHMENT
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
When is punishment 1987 punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
cruel Constitution reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
To come under the constitutional ban against cruel and unusual punishment, the penalty
imposed must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." (24 C. J. S., 1187-
1188.) Five years' confinement for possessing firearms can not be said to be cruel and
unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience.
||| (People v. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, [August 27, 1953], 93 PHIL 647-657)
Remedy when (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any
1987
punishment is prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
Constitution
excessive subhuman conditions shall be dealt by law.
The death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited
case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons, this Court held that "[p]unishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
Death punishment
the meaning of that word as used in the constitution .It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."||| (Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, [October 12, 1998], 358 PHIL 410-476)
In death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. ||| (People v. Esparas, G.R. No.
Automatic Review
120034 (Resolution), [August 20, 1996], 329 PHIL 339-362)
"Section 10. Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty.— In all cases where the
death penalty is imposed by he trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme
Court for automatic review and judgment,within twenty (20) days but not earlier than (15)
Sec. 10 Rule
days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or
122
reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing
thereof by the stenographic reporter."||| (People v. Esparas, G.R. No. 120034
(Resolution), [August 20, 1996], 329 PHIL 339-362)
Direct Review
Intermediate Review
As Republic Act No. 4 provides a penalty of from 5 to 10 years imprisonment for illegal
Consequence of possession of a firearm, the court can not but impose upon the offender the minimum at
Removal of Unusual least of the penalty provided. In this case, however, considering the degree of malice of
Punishment from the the defendant, application of the law to its full extent would be too harsh, and a
List of Prohibited recommendation is made to the President to reduce to fix months the penalty imposed
Punishment upon this defendant.||| (People v. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, [August 27, 1953], 93 PHIL
647-657)
Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of
imprisonment, confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing or carrying firearm is not
cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to
curb.||| (People v. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, [August 27, 1953], 93 PHIL 647-657)
NON
IMPRISONMENT
SOURCE CONTEXT
FOR DEBT OR POLL
TAX
1987
Origin Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Constitution
Wisdom/Policy
Generally, a debtor cannot be imprisoned for failure topay his debt. However, if he
Lozano v.
Extent of Guaranty contracted his debt through fraud, he can be validly punished in a criminal action as his
Martinez
responsibility arises not from the contract of loan but from commission of a crime.
DOUBLE
SOURCE CONTEXT
JEOPARDY
As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double
Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the
Philippine
abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been
Savings Bank v.
confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial
Spouses Bermoy
would be unfair.||| (Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912,
Origin
[September 26, 2005], 508 PHIL 96-113)
In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no
limit ti attempts to prosecute for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the
Lejano v. People
infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would
eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged with the
same offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted anew for
the same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of such offense, or (c) the
Philippine
prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same case. 19 The last is based on Section
Savings Bank v.
2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court 20 which provides that "[a]ny party may appeal from a
Spouses Bermoy
final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double
Kinds of Double jeopardy."||| (Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912,
Jeopardy [September 26, 2005], 508 PHIL 96-113)
Then a subsequent complaint or information was fied containing a crime that is:
1. The same offense;
2. An attempt to commit the said offense;
MemAid 2018
3. A frustration of the said offense;
4. Any offense which necessarily includes the first offense charged; and
5. Any offense which is necessarily included in the first offense charged.
Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
Identity of Offenses MemAid 2018
charged, the constitutional protection against deoble jeopardy is available only where an
identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.
Identity of Acts MemAid 2018 Where one is punished by law and an ordinance, the inquiry is on the identity of the acts.
For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first
criminal case:

Philippine (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and
Savings Bank v. substance to sustain a conviction;
Spouses Bermoy (b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express
consent. ||| (Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, [September
Requisites of Double 26, 2005], 508 PHIL 96-113)
Jeopardy In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the
following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint
People v. or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
Obsania (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.||| (People v. Obsania, G.R. No. L-
24447, [June 29, 1968], 132 PHIL 682-693)
Double jeopardy is when the same person is exposed to a second legal jeopardy on top
MemAid 2018
of the first legal jeopardy for the same act or offense.
That is, the following requisites concur: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to
People v. Tampal the second; (2) The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) A second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
Requisites of Legal Legal jeopardy exists when a person is placed at a real risk of conviction and deprivation
MemAid 2018
Jeopardy of life, liberty or property for some act or offense.
 When the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will
not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having
the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the
reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and
rendering a judgment of conviction against him.||| (People v. Obsania, G.R. No. L-24447,
[June 29, 1968], 132 PHIL 682-693)
Here the controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the
People v.
Dismissal vs Acquittal accused that the complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of
Obsania
the court a quo and not on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and failure of the
government to prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in this case now under
consideration did not terminate the action on the merits, whereas in Cloribel and in other
related cases the dismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to prosecute
presupposed that the Government did not have a case against the accused, who, in the
first place, is presumed innocent.||| (People v. Obsania, G.R. No. L-24447, [June 29,
1968], 132 PHIL 682-693)
An acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it
happens in the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. Only when there is a
Appeal of Dismissal MemAid 2018 finding of a sham trial that the doctrine of double jeopardy is inapplicable because the
people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied due process (People v. Tria-
Tirona)
Dismissal upon the
MemAid 2018 Exception: Dismissal is ade upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant.
motion of the accused
Dismissal on technical
grounds
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion
of the accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two
Philippine exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the
Dismissal due to
Savings Bank v. denial of the right to speedy trial. 16 A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under
demurrer to evidence
Spouses Bermoy the first exception. 17 Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an
acquittal. ||| (Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, [September
26, 2005], 508 PHIL 96-113)
Dismissal due to
violation of speedy
trial
To reconsider a judgement of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being
Lejano v. People
punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved.
Appeal/MR of
Exceptions: (1) When the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion,
Acquittal
MemAid 2018 resulting in loss of jurisdiction; or (2) When a mistrial has occurred, in any of such cases,
the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
doctrine of Supervening Event allows the prosecution for another offense if subsequent
MemAid 2018 development changes the character of the first indictment under which he may have
already been charged or convicted (People v. Villarama).
An offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another
offense, for the purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both
Doctrine of
offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if
Supervening event
the second offense was then inexistent, no double jeopardy could attach therefor during
Melo v. People
the first prosecution, and consequently a subsequent change for the same cannot
constitute second jeopardy. By the very nature of things there can be no double jeopardy
under such circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to recognize the
existence of a condition where such condition in reality does not exist.
EX POST FACTO
AND BILL OF SOURCE CONTEXT
ATTAINDER
An ex post facto law is one which, among others, aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than it was when committed or changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed. 16 Penal laws and
Nasi-Villar v.
laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses
People
and prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be
given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused. ||| (Nasi-Villar v.
People, G.R. No. 176169, [November 14, 2008], 591 PHIL 804-812)
The Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law which will make an act done before its
adoption a crime. A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil action, providing it is
U.S v. Conde curative in character, but ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its
retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant.||| (U.S. v. Conde, G.R. No. 18208,
[February 14, 1922], 42 PHIL 766-770)
Kinds of ex post facto
law An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done
before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
Salvador v. Mapa required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant. 22 This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes
to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation
of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection
of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. ||| (Salvador v. Mapa,
Jr., G.R. No. 135080, [November 28, 2007], 564 PHIL 31-46)
Moreover, the term "ex post facto," as applied to statutes, in section 3 of our organic
law, is a technical term, used only in connection with crimes and penalties. The term is
never used to indicate the obnoxious character of statutes dealing retroactively with civil
rights. Of course retroactive statutes dealing with civil rights may also be
unconstitutional if they impair the obligations of contracts or deprive a person of a
vested right, but this remedial Act is not subject to criticism on this ground.
||| (Concepcion v. Garcia, G.R. No. 32380, [November 29, 1929], 54 PHIL 81-85)
Concepcion v. As was said in Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal (38 Phil., 367,
Characteristics of ex Garcia 377), "The Act in question is not an ex post facto law, as it is not penal in its nature. It
post facto law has long been settled that the phrase 'ex post facto laws' is not applicable to civil laws,
but to penal and criminal laws which punish a party for acts antecedently done which
were not punishable at all, or not punishable to the extend or in the manner prescribed.
In short ex post facto laws relate to penal and criminal proceedings, which impose
punishment or forfeitures, and not to civil proceedings, which affect private rights
retrospectively."||| (Concepcion v. Garcia, G.R. No. 32380, [November 29, 1929], 54
PHIL 81-85)
Ex post facto law must: (1) refer to criminal matters; (2) Be retroactive in its application;
Golden Notes
and (3) to the prejudice of the accused.
People v. Ferrer It is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial, its essence being the
(from Golden substitution of legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt. (People v. Ferrer, G.R.
Bill of attainder, Notes) Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972)
definition
Two kinds of bill of attainder 1. Bill of attainder proper (legislative imposition of the
Golden Notes
death penalty); and 2. Bill of pains and penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty.)
CITIZENSHIP SOURCE CONTEXT
Citizenship - A term denoting membership of a citizen in a political society, which
membership implies, reciprocally, a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and duty
Golden Notes
of protection on the part of the state. It is personal and more or less permanent in
Citizenship vs
character.
Nationality
Nationality - It has a broader meaning, embracing all who owe allegiance to a state,
Golden Notes whether democtratic or not, without theryby becoming citizens. Because they owe
allegiance to it, they are not regarded as aliens.
MODES OF ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP 1. By birth a. Jus Sanguinis – On the basis of
blood relationship. b. Jus Soli – On the basis of the place of birth. 2. By naturalization –
Modes of acquiring
Golden Notes The legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a citizen. 3. By
citizenship
marriage – When a foreign woman marries a Filipino husband, provided, she possesses
all qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization.
The following are natural-born Filipino citizens: (1) Those who are citizens of the
Principles in acquiring Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Golden Notes
citizenship by birth Philippine citizenship; (2) Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with Par.
3, Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1987 Constitution shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are Filipino citizens at the time
of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
Who are citizens of
Golden Notes of the Philippines; (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
the Philippines
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and (4) Those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. (Art. IV, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution)
Philippine Bill of 1902
Jones Law
1935 Constitution
1987 Constitution
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Status of Foundlings Poe-
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
and Illegitimate Llamanzares v.
would definitely exclude foundlings either. ||| (Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
Children COMELEC
Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, [March 8, 2016], 782 PHIL 292-1305)
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
Poe-
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation
Llamanzares v.
or incorporation.||| (Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 &
COMELEC
221698-700, [March 8, 2016], 782 PHIL 292-1305)
Election of Citizenship
Who are required to
elect
When to elect
Formal election
Informal Election
Effect of election
Naturalization - An act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
Naturalization Golden Notes
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen
Initial Acquisition of
Citizenship
Ways to reacquire citizenship 1. Naturalization; 2. Repatriation; and 3. Direct act of
Golden Notes
Congress.
Re-acquisition of
citizenship Reacquisition Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Filipino
Golden Notes citizenship due to naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship;
 Modes of Naturalization: 1. DIRECT NATURALIZATION effected by: (a) Individual
proceedings, usually judicial under general naturalization laws; (b) Special act of
legislature, often in favor of distinguished foreigners who have rendered some notable
service to the loca state; (c) Collective change of nationality as a result of cession or
subjugation; (d) Adoption or orphan minors as nationals of the State where they are born;
and (e) Administratove proceedings.
1. Declaration of Intention - this must be filed with the Office of the Solicitor General one
year before filing the application for naturalization. Such declaration shall set forth the
applicant's: a. Name; b. Age; c. Occupation; d. Personal description; e. Place or birth; f.
Last foreign residence and allegiance; g. Date of arrival; h. Name of aircraft or vessel, if
any; and i. Place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration.
2. Filing of the Petition for Naturalization with the Court
3. Publication of the application - Upon the receipt of the petition, the clerk f court has the
duty if publishing it in the official Gazette and in one newspaper of general circulation in
Procedure of the province or city once a week for three consecutive weeks and to post notices thereof
naturalization and of the hearing.
4. Hearing - At least 6 month after the last publication, but in no case within thirty days
before any election, the hearing shall begin, at which the petitioner shall establish all the
allegations of his petition, to be corroborated by at least two credible witnesses.
5. Grant or Denial of Petition - If the petitioner is able to prove that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications, the petition shall be granted and it will
become final after thirty days from notice. But the order shall only become executory after
the period of two years during which the petitioner shall be under probation.
6. Application to take his Oath of Allegiance - After probation, applicant may apply for
administration of oath of citizenship in accordance with the decision rendered. His motion
shall be granted provided: a. Petitioner has not left the country; b. Devoted hmself to a
lawful calling; c. Has not been convicted of any violation of law; and d. Has not commited
any act in contravention of any government announced policies.
7. Administration of oath of citizenship, by virtue of which the petitioner shall embrace
Philippine citizenship and renounce allegiance to any foreign State.
Derivative Derivative Naturalization conferred on: (a) Wife of the naturalized husband; (b) Minor
Naturalization children of a naturalized parent; and Alien woman upon marriage to a national.
Golden Notes 1. Naturalization in a foreign country;
Golden Notes 2. Express renunciation of citizenship (expatriation); or
3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
Golden Notes
attaining 21 years of age; or
4. Rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country
unless: a. The Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said
Grounds for losing foreign country; or b. The said foreign country maintains armed forces in the Philippine
Golden Notes
Philippine Citizenship territory with its consent provided that at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance
of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does
so only in connection with its service to said foreign country.
Golden Notes 5. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization (Denaturalization); or
6. Having been declared by final judgment a deserter of the armed forces of the
Golden Notes
Philippines in times of war; or
7. In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in
Golden Notes
her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
 R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases.
They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC 141 where we described it as an
"abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship . . . ." Also
Poe- included is Parreño v. Commission on Audit, 142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of
Llamanzares v. Appeals, 143 where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
COMELEC recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on Audit 141 is categorical
that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will . .
. recover his natural-born citizenship."||| (Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, [March 8, 2016], 782 PHIL 292-1305)
Repatriation - The recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
Golden Notes citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Repatriation Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
(Bengzon vs. HRET and Cruz, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001)
Repatriation shall be effected by: 1. Taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Golden Notes Republic of the Philippines; and 2. Registration in the proper civil registry and in the
Bureau of Immigration.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
Bengzon v.
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
HRET
before he lost his Philippine Citizenship, he will be restored of his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
It is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactve effect, but even the
Frivaldo v.
repatriation granted under said law is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his
COMELEC
application therefor.
It arises when, as a result of concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
Golden Notes
States, a person is simultaneously considered a citizen of both said states.
It is allowed considering that their condition is merely an unavoidable consequence of
Golden Notes
conflicting laws of different states
Only those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualifies to run for public office. If we allow
Dual Citizenship dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and
Maquiling v.
afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for
COMELEC
there dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code.
The Supreme Court stressed that the constitutional policy is not against dual citizenship
Mercado v.
but dual loyalty, such as that often manifested by naturalized Filipinos who, while
Manzano
profesisng allegiace to their natie land and even involve themselves in its political affairs.