Ibn Taymiyya and His Ash Arite Opponents On Reason and Revelation

(
Ibn Taymiyya and His Ash arite Opponents on

Reason and Revelation: Similarities, Differences,
and a Vicious Circle
Frank Griffel
Yale University
W
hen dealing with passages in revelation that have an ambiguous or problem-
atic meaning, Muslim theologians have a choice between at least two different
attitudes. They can consign the meaning to God and refrain from investigating
the passage or they can engage in finding an inner or allegorical meaning that would
imply the dismissal of the apparent one. The former attitude is known as tafwı̄d,
) :
“abstaining” or “entrusting” the meaning to God whereas the latter is known as ta wı̄l
“allegorical interpretation.”1 When it comes to anthropomorphic descriptions of God in
(
revelation – a reference to the Qur’an and the Hadith-corpus – Ash arites at least from
the generation of al-Juwaynı̄ (d. 478/1085) and al-Ghazālı̄ (d. 505/1111) onwards taught
that these verses must be interpreted in a way that rejects the outward meaning of revela-
tion (zāhir)
: and gives it an inner meaning (bāt: in). In one of his works on this subject,
The Decisive Criterion for Distinguishing Islam from Clandestine Unbelief (Fays: al al-
tafriqa bayna l-Islām wa-l-zandaqa), al-Ghazālı̄ teaches that the outward meaning of
revelation must be dismissed wherever a demonstrative proof (burhān) can be pro-
duced showing that it cannot possibly be true.2 In an earlier book, namely his Incoher-
ence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa), al-Ghazālı̄ had already clarified that the
rational arguments which show God’s impossibility of being in space and having a body
are so strong that they force the dismissal of the outward meaning of revelation:
(
Rational arguments (adillat al- uqūl ) have shown the impossibility of [attribut-
ing] place, direction, visage, physical hand, physical eye, the possibility of
1 )
Arab. ta wı̄l means to understand a word or textual passage in a way that differs from the apparent or
outward meaning (zāhir). : I translate it as “allegorical interpretation,” because the English word
“interpretation” does not include the aspect of rejecting the apparent or outward meaning.
2 (
al-Ghazālı̄, Fays: al al-tafriqa, ed. S. Dunyā (Cairo: Isā l-Bābı̄ l-Halabı̄,
: 1381/1961), 187.
C 2018 Hartford Seminary.
V
DOI: 10.1111/muwo.12228
11
THE MUSLIM WORLD VOLUME 108 JANUARY 2018
)
transfer and rest to God, praise be Him. Allegorical interpretation (ta wı̄l ) has
( 3
become obligatory here due to rational arguments (adillat al- uqūl ).
Wherever the Qur’an speaks of God’s hand, for instance, al-Ghazālı̄ denies that this is ref-
erence to a “hand” that God has – in whatever sense – but rather refers to God’s ability to
reward and to punish. In his Fays: al al-tafriqa, al-Ghazālı̄ tries to establish precise
ground-rules of how the inner meaning (bāt: in) of a passage whose outer meaning is to
be rejected must be understood. A “hand” is that bodily organ that grabs something and
that gives and takes. This latter function to give and to take also exists in God and it is
the link between the human hand and the divine “hand.” Whenever revelation mentions
a hand of God it must be understood as God’s ability to give and to take or to allow and
( (
to forbid (ya tı̄ wa-yamnu ).4
)
In his Rejecting the Notion That Revelation and Reason Contradict Each Other (Dar
( ( )
ta ārud: al- aql wa l-naql), a monumental work which in its modern edition stretches
over more than 4,000 pages in 11 volumes, Ibn Taymiyya attempts a comprehensive
( )
refutation of the Ash arite position on ta wı̄l together with other groups, such as the
(
Mu tazilites and the falāsifa, who also deem it permissible or even obligatory to reject
the outward sense (zāhir)
: of revelation.5 Since the full book has become available in
print during the 1980s, it has attracted numerous studies that try to explain its scope and
also its argumentative strategy. Particularly that strategy, however, is difficult to assess,
given that its author is prone to numerous digressions that sometimes make it hard to
determine what exactly he is arguing for – or against – in any given passage. I think that
) (
our understanding of Ibn Taymiyya’s Dar ta ārud: can be significantly improved if we
take a close look at the position that he refutes. Unfortunately, Ibn Taymiyya himself
contributes little to such an understanding. Khaled El Rouayheb recently remarked that,
“Ibn Taymiyya seems to have been averse to giving a sustained exposition of ideas with
which he disagreed – he rarely attributed more than isolated, single sentence assertions
to his opponents, shorn of any supporting arguments, before attacking them.”6 Other
3
al-Ghazālı̄, The Incoherence of the Philosophers / Tahāfut al-falāsifa. A parallel English-Arabic text,
ed. and trans. Michael E. Marmura. 2nd. ed. (Provo [Ut.]: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 214. I
slightly modified Marmura’s translation.
4
al-Ghazālı̄, Fays: al al-tafriqa, 181–82.
5 ) ( ( (
Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud: al- aql wa l-naql aw-muwāfaqat s: ahı̄ : h: al-manqūl li-s: arı̄h: al-ma qūl, ed.
M. Rashād Sālim, 11 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kunūz al-Adabiyya, n.d. [c. 1980]). This is the edition used in
(
this study. Its first volume already came out 1971 in Cairo with Mat:ba at Dār al-Kutub. An incomplete
) ( (
version of Dar ta ārud: appeared much earlier in print: Bayān muwāfaqat s: arı̄h: al-ma qūl li-s: ahı̄ : h: al-
manqūl, printed on the margins of Ibn Taymiyya, Kitāb Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya fı̄ naqd: kalām
( (
al-shı̄ a wa l-qadariyya, 4 vols. (Cairo: al-Matba a al-Kubrā al-Amı̄riyya, 1321–22 [1903–04], reprinted
in Beirut: Dār Sādir,
: 1973). Another incomplete version from a different manuscript was edited in 1950:
( (
Muwāfaqat s: ahı̄ : h: al-manqūl li-s: arı̄h: al-ma qūl, ed. M. M. Abd al-Hamı̄d
: and M. H. : al-Fiqı̄, 2 vols.
(
(Cairo: Mat:ba at al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya,
: 1370/1950).
6
Khaled El Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century. Scholarly Currents in
the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb (Cambridge [UK]: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 314.
12 C 2018 Hartford Seminary.
V
I BN TAYMIYYA AND H IS A SH (ARITE O PPONENTS
scholars have observed that at times Ibn Taymiyya misrepresents the teachings of his
opponents in order to make his own refutation easier and more effective.7
Ibn Taymiyya’s harsh polemics and his polarizing attitude toward disputes with his
opponents pose obstacles for identifying similarities between their positions and the
ones that he holds. This article wishes to shed light on two important issues connected
) (
with Ibn Taymiyya’s Dar ta ārud. : The first is the position that Ibn Taymiyya is arguing
against in the initial passages of this book. Given that it presents itself as a work of refuta-
tion (radd), what exactly is it trying to refute at the outset? The second is the position Ibn
Taymiyya develops in response to the views he rejects. The two questions are closely
connected and have – despite several attempts – not yet received a satisfactory answer in
the available secondary literature.8
In order to achieve its goal, this article needs to discuss the writings of Ibn
Taymiyya’s adversaries before it will be able to analyze his position. In fact, this article
can be seen as being concerned with the reception of al-Ghazālı̄’s and Fakhr al-Dı̄n
)
al-Rāzı̄’s (d. 606/1210) position on ta wı̄l by Ibn Taymiyya and hence fits into a journal
issue on Ibn Taymiyya and reception. In its first of four parts the article will discuss Ibn
7
For the case of Ibn Sı̄nā’s teachings see Roxanne D. Marcotte, “Ibn Taymiyya et sa critique des pro-
) ( (
duits de la faculte d’estimation (Wahmiyyāt) dans le Dar ta ārud: al- aql wa al-naql,” Luqmān: Revue
trimestrielle des Presses Universitaires d’Iran 18 (2002), 43–58, at 55–58.
8 ) (
Important contributions on Ibn Taymiyya’s strategy of refutation in the Dar ta ārud: are (in chrono-
logical order), Thomas Michel, “Ibn Taymiyya’s Critique of Falsafa,” Hamdard Islamicus 6 (1983),
3–14; Binyamin Abrahamov, “Ibn Taymiyya on the Agreement of Reason with Tradition,” Muslim
World 82 (1992), 256–72; Nicolas Heer, “The Priority of Reason in the Interpretation of Scripture: Ibn
Taymı̄ya and the Mutakallimūn,” in: Literary Heritage of Classical Islam. Arabic and Islamic Studies in
Honor of James A. Bellamy, ed. M. Mir in collobaration with J. E. Fossum (Princeton: Darwin Press
1993), 181–95; Yahya Michot, “Vanites intellectuelles. . . L’impasse des rationalismes selon le Rejet de la
contradiction d’Ibn Taymiyya,” Oriente Moderno 19 (2001), 597–617; Anke von K€ ugelgen, “Ibn
Taymı̄yas Kritik an der aristotelischen Logik und sein Gegenentwurf,” in Logik und Theologie. Das
Organon im arabischen und lateinischem Mittelalter, ed. D. Perler and U. Rudolph (Leiden: Brill,
2005), 167–225; Racha el Omari, “Ibn Taymiyya’s ‘Theology of the Sunna’ and his Polemics with the
(
Ash arites,” Ibn Taymiyya and his Times, ed. Y. Rapoport and S. Ahmed (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 2010), 101–19; Nadjet Zouggar, “Interpretation autorisee et interpretation proscrite selon le Livre
du rejet de la contradiction entre raison et r e lation de Taqı̄ l-Dı̄n Ahmad
e v : b. Taymiyya,” Annales
Islamologiques 44 (2010), 195–206; Ovamir Anjum, Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought:
The Taymiyyan Moment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 196–215 and passim; Anke
von K€ ugelgen, “The Poison of Philosophy. Ibn Taymiyya’s Struggle for and Against Reason,” Islamic
Theology, Philosophy and Law. Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, ed. B. Krawietz
and G. Tamer (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2013), 253–328; Yasir Kazi [also: Qadhi], Reconciling
Reason and Revelation in the Writings of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), An Analytical Study of Ibn
) (
Taymiyya’s Dar al-ta ārud, : PhD Dissertation, Yale University 2013; Carl El-Tobgui, Reason, ) (
Revela-
tion, and the Reconstitution of Rationality. Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 728/1328) Dar Ta ārud al-
(
Aql wa-l-Naql or the Refutation of the Contradiction of Reason and Revelation, PhD dissertation,
McGill University 2013; Nadjet Zouggar, “Aspects de l’argumentation elaboree par Taqı̄ l-Dı̄n b.
) (
Taymiyya (m. 728/1328) dans son livre du Rejet de la contradiction entre raison et E criture (Dar ta ārud:
(
al- aql wa-l-naql ),” Arabica 61 (2014), 1–17.
V 13
( )
Taymiyya’s presentation of the Ash arite position on ta wı̄l. Ibn Taymiyya observes that
(
the Ash arites’ argument for the priority of reason over revelation starts with the premise
that reason is “a foundation” (as: lan) of revelation. In the subsequent second part, the
article analyses what this talk about reason being “a foundation” means. In its third part
(
the article analyzes the Ash arite argument and divides it into three steps. In its fourth
and final part, it will ask which of these three steps Ibn Taymiyya accepts and which he
rejects. This fourth part will also offer a close comparison of Ibn Taymiyya’s position
(
about the relationship of reason and revelation with that of his Ash arite adversaries.
One of the results of this study is that Ibn Taymiyya’s own position on the relation-
ship between reason and revelation shows very significant similarities with that of his
( ) (
Ash arite opponents. Despite his denial in the early parts of Dar ta ārud, : Ibn Taymiyya
(
agrees with his Ash arite adversaries, “that reason is a foundation of revelation” and he
admits to that in later parts of the book. Based on this similarity I argue that Ibn Tay-
miyya’s most basic conception about the relationship between reason and revelation is
the same as, for instance, al-Ghazālı̄’s. Yet there remains a crucial difference between Ibn
(
Taymiyya’s and the Ash arites’ thinking about reason and revelation that I will point out
in the conclusions of this paper.
Another result of this paper is the insight that Ibn Taymiyya’s reception of and his
(
reaction to the Ash arite position on the priority of reason over revelation leads him into
a circular argument about the authority of reason and revelation. Overall, this article
aims to contribute to a recent trend in Ibn Taymiyya scholarship that understands him as
(
a rationalist rather than a pure scriptualist. Yet, whereas Ash arite thinkers such as
al-Ghazālı̄ or Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ aim to construct their rationalism on firm epistemologi-
cal grounds, Ibn Taymiyya’s rationalism lacks such solid foundation. His kind of
(
rationalism develops as a critique of the Ash arite one and is based on a scriptualist
epistemology. The article overall hopes to contribute to a better understanding of the
different positions that Muslim theologians developed on the relationship between rea-
son and revelation and what truly distinguishes them.
I. “Reason is the Foundation

) (
(asl
: ) of Revelation”
Ibn Taymiyya begins his Dar ta ārud: right after the basmala and a brief khut: ba
with a relatively long quote that he introduces as coming from “someone” (“qāla
)
l-qā il” ). In that quote the “someone” explains the principle he applies regarding
passages where the outward sense of revelation differs from what has been decisively
established through reason. This is the position that Ibn Taymiyya wishes to refute.
Although this initial passage has been translated into English before, it is so central that it
should be read in full. The “someone” claims:
(
If the revelatory and reasonable arguments (al-adilla al-sam iyya wa-l-
( ( (
aqliyya) contradict each other- or revelation (al-sam ) and reason (al- aql ), or
what is transmitted (al-naql ) and reason, or the outward sense of revelation
(zawāhir
: naqliyya) and what has been decisively established through reason
V
( (
(qawāt:i aqliyya), or words similar to these- then (1) either one could bring
(
both together (jama a bayna-humā) – yet this is impossible because of the
[principle] of the excluded middle- or (2) one has to reject both together. Or
(3) one gives priority to revelation – and that is impossible because reason is
(
the foundation of revelation (al- aql as: l al-naql ) and if one gave revelation
priority over reason it would be a dismissal (qadh: ) of reason which is the
foundation of revelation (alladhı̄ huwa as: l al-naql ), and a dismissal of some-
thing that is a foundation of something else would also be a dismissal of this
something else so that giving priority to revelation would be a dismissal of
revelation and reason together. Thus, it is necessary (4) to give priority to
)
reason and then to revelation either through allegorical interpretation (ta wı̄l )
9
or through abstaining (tafwı̄d).
:
Before we analyze this argument, it is worth pointing out its origin. In the next sentence,
Ibn Taymiyya informs us whom he associates with this particular argument. The text of
) (
Dar ta ārud: continues:
[Fakhr ad-Dı̄n] ar-Rāzı̄ and his followers turned this position into a universal
rule (qānūn kullı̄ ) in regard to that which can be concluded from the Books
of God and the words of His prophets and that which cannot be concluded
from them. That is why they refuse to accept conclusions based on information
that comes from the prophets and the messengers about God’s attributes and
similar things that the prophets inform [us] of. These people believe that
(
reason (al- aql ) contradicts [this information]. For some of them this also
means that the information from revelation does not enjoy certainty.10
In a paper published in 1993 that stands at the beginning of the Western academic
) (
debate on Ibn Taymiyya’s Dar ta ārud, : Nicholas Heer pointed to two passages in works
of Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ (d. 606/1210) that might be the Vorlage of Ibn Taymiyya’s report
) (
at the beginning of Dar ta ārud. : The first of these) two passages comes from al-Rāzı̄’s
short programmatic work The Fifty Issues (al-Masā il al-khamsūn), the second from his
)
Foundations for [Understanding] Divine Transcendence (Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s).11 In both
passages al-Rāzı̄ develops the four-fold division that characterizes Ibn Taymiyya’s quote:
In a situation of conflict between reason and the outward sense of revelation, there are,
in principle, four possible combinations between these two sources of knowledge: (1)
the two agree, which is excluded by the premise that in this question the two conflict
with one another; (2) that both are false, which is also excluded by Fakhr al-Dı̄n for
9 ) (
Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud, : 1:4.3–10. Cf. the English translations in Heer, “The Priority of Reason,”
189 and the French in Zouggar, “Aspects de l’argumentation elaboree,” 3. There are several paraphrases
of this initial quote in, for instance, Abrahamov, “Ibn Taymiyya on the Agreement,” 257.
10 ) (
Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud, : 1: 4. ult.–5.5.
11
Heer, “The Priority of Reason in the Interpretation of Scripture,” 183–85. See also Tariq Jaffer, Rāzı̄.
)
Master of Qur ānic Interpretation and Theological Reasoning (New York: Oxford University Press,
2015), 86–99, 117–30.
V 15
reasons that he does not further explain; (3) that rational knowledge is wrong and the
outward sense of revelation is right; and finally (4) that rational knowledge is right and
the outward sense of revelation wrong.
This four-fold division can also be found in others of Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄’s works,
some of them will be looked at below. It is a typical strategy of Fakhr al-Dı̄n to present at
the beginning of the discussion of a given problem an exhaustive list of possible solu-
tions – a so-called sabr - and then dividing them into those that cannot lead to satisfac-
tory results and those that are possible solutions.12 In this case, the first two possibilities
cannot contribute to a solution. The first is discarded since it violates the initial assump-
tion of the problem, namely that of a conflict between reason and the literal meaning of
revelation. The second possibility is no longer discussed because Fakhr al-Dı̄n assumes
implicitly that one of the two conflicting sources of knowledge must be true. They could
both be false, of course, but that would again be a different situation from the one
assumed at the outset of the argument. Hence, relevant to our problem are only the two
last possibilities of giving priority either to reason (no. 3) or to revelation (no. 4). In these
two cases, says Fakhr al-Dı̄n, the two conflicting sources of knowledge cannot both be
true; subsequently one must be dismissed and the other be given priority. The most
important element in this argument is the dismissal of option no. 3, where revelation is
given priority over reason. In what follows we will take a close look into this step. Given
that Fakhr al-Dı̄n thinks he can convincingly exclude this option, he concludes that
option no. 4 is the only one that offers a solution to the problem. Hence, reason needs to
be given priority over the outward sense of revelation and subsequently, the latter needs
to be interpreted allegorically wherever it clashes with the conclusion of a reasonable
argument.
This latter principle is familiar to us from al-Ghazālı̄’s Fays: al al-tafriqa. Ibn Taymiyya
is aware of al-Ghazālı̄ and mentions him soon after the passage from the beginning of his
) (
Dar ta ārud: that we analyze here. The way he introduces al-Ghazālı̄ – which will be
looked at soon – makes clear that the position he quotes at the beginning is not only held
(
by Fakhr al-Rāzı̄ and his followers but also by earlier Ash arites such as al-Ghazālı̄. Like in
(
other of his works where he criticizes Ash arite theology, Ibn Taymiyya focuses on the
positions developed by Fakhr al-Dı̄n. He was the author whose works were most widely
(
read among Ash arites in Mamlūk Damascus and Cairo.13 Aided by the Mongol invasion
of Khorasān in 617/1220, quite a number of of Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s students made their way
12
This strategy is known as sabr wa-taqsı̄m and is described by al-Safadı̄,
: al-Wāfı̄ bi-l-wafayāt, ed.
H. Ritter et alii, 32 vols. (Istanbul/Beirut/Wiesbaden: Orientinstitut der Deutschen Morgenl€andischen
Gesellschaft, 1931–2013), 4: 249.16–19, in his biography of Fakhr al-Dı̄n, who credits him with its
invention.
13
According to Louis Pouzet, Damas au VIIe/XIIe si e cle. Vie et structures religieuse d’une m e tropole
islamique (Beirut: Dar El-Machreq, 1988), 202, Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄, “exerça une profonde influence
sur plusieurs damascains tout au long du [13eme] siecle (. . .).”
V
from the Muslim east to Syria, Egypt, and Anatolia and they spread his teachings.14 One
of Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s most eminent student, Shams al-Dı̄n al-Khusrawshāhı̄ (d. 652/1254)
was part of the academic entourage of several Ayyūbid sultans at their courts in Kerak
and Damascus.15 Although we have little information about the works that were used as
textbooks of madrasa instruction in Mamlūk institutions of higher education, we may
assume that writings by Fakhr al-Dı̄n were among them. The four-fold division quoted
by Ibn Taymiyya is most prominently – and also most comprehensively – discussed in
)
Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s, a book the author sent as a commission to the Ayyūbid
(
Sultan al-Malik al- Ādil (reg. 596–615/1200–1218), the brother and successor of Salāh
: al-
(
Dı̄n. In his biography of Fakhr al-Dı̄n, the historian Ibn Abı̄ Us: aybi a (d. 668/1270), who
lived in Damascus, informs us that he received one thousand dinars for this book, a very
substantial sum, several hundred times the annual wage of an unqualified laborer.16 The
dating of the work is a bit problematic because it is extant in at least two recensions with
a slightly different date of production. The two recensions can be distinguished by two
(
different beginnings (after the ammā ba du). In one, Fakhr al-Dı̄n mentions that he
wrote the book soon after he had arrived in Herat in Muharram
: of 596 (October-Novem-
ber 1199) as a response to the confusion that reigned among the people of the city on
the matter of God’s transcendence (al-taqdı̄s wa-l-tanzı̄h).17 This is a not very veiled
(
reference – and complaint – about the presence of Karrāmites in Herat. As an Ash arite,
Fakhr al-Dı̄n regarded Karrāmite teachings as anthropomorphist.18 This beginning led
Ramazan Şeşen to conclude that the work was written within the year 596/1199–1200.19
Another beginning in a different recension of the book does not mention the city of
Herat and can be dated – by way of the author’s colophon that specifies its date of
14 ) (
See Barhebraeus, Ta rı̄kh mukhtasar : al-duwal, ed. A. Sāli: hānı̄
: (Beirut: al-Matba
: a al-Kāthūlı̄kiyyya
2
1890, 1958), 445. This source is analyzed in Gerhard Endress, “Reading Avicenna in the Madrasa: Intel-
lectual Genealogies and Chains of Transmission of Philosophy and the Sciences in the Islamic East,” in
Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard
M. Frank, ed. J. E. Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 372–422: 403–8.
15
Al-Khusrawshāhı̄, for instance, taught al-Malik al-Nāsir : Dāwūd (d. 657/1259) in the “ancient scien-
( )
ces” ( ulūm awā il). See Endress, “Reading Avicenna in the Madrasa,” 406–7. On him see also Pouzet,
Damas au VIIe/XIIe si ecle, 38, 202, 444, and Michael Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in
Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 83n75, 84n76.
16 ( ( ) ) (
Ibn Abı̄ Us: aybi a, Uyūn al-anbā fı̄ t: abaqāt al-at: ibbā , ed. A. M€uller, 2 vols. (Cairo: al-Mat:ba a
al-Wahbiyya, 1299/1882), 2: 29. ult.
17 ) (
This introduction can be found in al-Rāzı̄, Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s, ed. A. M. A. al-Sharafāwı̄ and A. M. Khayr
al-Khat:ı̄b (Damascus: Dār Nūr al-Sabā
: h,
: 2011), 43. I am grateful to Jon Hoover for providing me with a
copy of this edition as well as to him and to Ayman Shihahdeh for working out the relationship between
the two recensions of the book.
18
On the theology of the Karrāmites see Aron Zysow, “Karrāmiyya,” in: The Oxford Handbook of
Islamic Theology, ed. S. Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 252–62.
19 (
Ramazan Şeşen, Mukhtārāt min al-makhtū : al- arabiyya al-nādira fı̄ maktabāt Turkiyā, ed.
: tāt
_
E. Ihsanoǧlu (Istanbul: ISAR, 1997), 658.
V 17
20
completion – to Ramadān : 598 (June 1202). Both recensions of the book fall into what
we might call the beginning of Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s late period when he taught in the city of
Herat under the patronage of the Ghūrid ruler of Fı̄rūzkūh (the modern town of Jam in
central Afghanistan), Ghiyāth al-Dı̄n Muhammad
: (d. 599/1203). Ghiyāth al-Dı̄n had built
a madrasa for Fakhr al-Dı̄n in Herat. This was the time when Fakhr al-Dı̄n began his
monumental Qur’an commentary The Keys to the Unknown (Mafātih: al-ghayb) and
when questions of Qur’an interpretation may have been on his mind.21 We might even
)
suspect that Fakhr al-Dı̄n wrote a first recension of Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s in 596/1199–1200 out
of concerns stemming from his own research and from the situation he found himself in
in Herat, and that he later “sold” a slightly modified version of the book to the Ayyūbid
(
Sultan al-Malik al- Ādil in Damascus.
This latter connection to a prominent Ayyūbid ruler may have led to the wider distri-
bution of the book in Syria. Ibn Taymiyya was well familiar with the work. He mentions
) ( 22
it briefly in Dar ta ārud. : More importantly, his multi-volume work Exposing the
Deceptions of the Jahmites (Bayān talbı̄s al-Jahmiyya) presents itself as a refutation
)
(radd) of Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s.23 The label “Jahmites” is not so much a refer-
ence to the original teachings of the early Muslim theologian Jahm ibn Safwān :( (d. 128/
745–46) rather than one of Ibn Taymiyya’s polemical labels for Ash arites. In Ibn
Taymiyya’s view both, the historical Jahm ibn Safwān : – whose positions are considered
(
heresy among a great number of Muslim groups – as well as the Ash arites deny certain
(
attributes of God and are hence guilty of ta t: ı̄l (“depriving God of something that is His
due”). Ibn Taymiyya’s Bayān talbı̄s al-Jahmiyya is also known under the title Critique of
)
the Setting of Foundations by the Jahmites (Naqd: ta sı̄s al-Jahmiyya) which makes the
)
connection to Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s (Setting Foundations for [Understanding] Divine Transcen-
dence) even clearer.
)
Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄’s Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s has four main parts.24 In the first the author
develops rational arguments for the fact that God is not a body (jism) and that He does
20
All available editions of the book, with the exception of the Damascus 2011-edition, represent this
recension. The author’s colophon can be found in MS Istanbul, S€ uleymaniye Yazma Eser K€ ut€
uphanesi,
)
Esad Effendi 1278, fol. 175a. The text of Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s begins in this MS on fol. 113a.
21
For the dating of Mafātih: al-ghayb, see Frank Griffel “On Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄’s Life and the
Patronage He Received,” Journal of Islamic Studies 18 (2007), 313–44: 324–326.
22 ) (
Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud, : 4: 218.7.
23 ) ( )
Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān talbı̄s al-Jahmiyya fı̄ ta sı̄s bida ihim al-kalāmiyya, aw-Naqd: ta sı̄s al-
(
Jahmiyya, ed. Y. ibn M. al-Hunaydı̄, 10 vols. (al-Madı̄na [Saudi Arabia]: Majma al-Malik Fahd, 1426 /
2005–6).
24 )
For this study, I use two recent editions of Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s in order to base it on the largest number of
( (
manuscripts. The first edition used is Asās al-taqdı̄s, ed. A. M. A. Ibrāhı̄m (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-
Azahariyya li-l-Turāth, 2010). It is based on MSS Istanbul, Fayzallah 1106, K€ opr€
ul€
u 798 and a copy
(
preserved at Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Wataniyya,
: described in Fihrist al-kutub al- arabiyya al-mahfūza :
( (
bi-l-Kutubkhāna al-Khidı̄wiyya, 7 vols. (Cairo: al-Matba : a al- Uthmāniyya, 1301–1309 [1883–1891]),
7:198–99. This latter manuscript has the erroneous title Asās al-taqdı̄s, and since it was the one most
readily available when modern scholars got interested in the text, it is responsible for the fact that
V
not reside in a place (hayyiz).

: The second part, which is by far the longest, discusses the
meaning of passages in the Qur’an and in the Hadith-corpus whose outward wording
suggests that God has a body or any other spatial component. Part three explains how
Muhammad’s
: companions and other early Muslims (al-salaf ) thought about this issue,
and part four deals with a number of related questions, most importantly whether some-
one who believes that God has a body and resides in space can still be regarded as a
Muslim. At the end of the long second part, Fakhr al-Dı̄n discusses in a brief chapter a
“general rule” (qānūn kullı̄) that applies in cases where the wording of revelation
clashes with what is known from reason.25 Here he develops the four alternatives of a
relationship between reason and revelation as sources of knowledge and clarifies that in
case of a conflict between the two, only possibilities 3 and 4 can be considered as valid.
Option 3 suggests that the outward sense of revelation (al-zawāhir
: al-naqliyya) should
(
be valid and evidence from reason (al-barāhı̄n al- aqliyya) should be dismissed. Fakhr
al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ rejects this option with the following argument:
This is false (bāt: il ) because we cannot know the truth of the outward sense of
revelation (al-zawāhir
: al-naqliyya) unless we have understood through
) (
rational arguments (dalā il aqliyya) the evidence (ithbāt) for the existence of
the Creator and for His attributes, and [unless we have understood] how the
(
signs of prophetical miracles (mu jizāt) point to the truthfulness of his messen-
ger and [how] miracles appear from the hand of Muhammad : – peace be upon
him. Would we allow [any] dismissal (qadh: ) with regard to the decisive
rational arguments, then reason would become suspect and it could not be
accepted. If that were the case, then it would cease to be acceptable evidence
with regard to these foundations.26 If these foundations cannot be confirmed,
then the arguments from revelation cease to be instructive. So, it becomes clear
that dismissing reason in the interest of strengthening revelation turns into a
dismissal of both, reason and revelation together.27
) (
The textual overlap with Ibn Taymiyya’s report at the beginning of Dar ta ārud: is
significant. Most importantly, both texts describe the third possibility when revelation is
)
almost all modern editions of the text have adopted that inaccurate title. The second edition is Ta sı̄s al-
(
taqdı̄s ed. A. M. A. al-Sharfāwı̄ and A. M. Khayr al-Khat:ı̄b (Damascus: Dār Nūr al-Sabā : h,
: 2011). It is
(
based on MS Istanbul, Esad Efendi 1278, MS Cairo, Library of al-Azhar, 97549 āmm–2002 khās: s: , as well
as the editio princeps of the book edited by Muhyı̄ : al-Dı̄n Sabrı̄
: al-Kurdı̄ (Cairo: Mus: t:afā l-Bābı̄ l-Halabı̄,
:
1354/1935). I divide page reference to these two editions by a slash.
25 )
al-Rāzı̄, Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s, ed. Cairo, 315–16 / ed. Damascus, 217. The beginning of this chapter, no. 32
of the of this second part (qism) of the book, is translated below (See note 58). The chapter ends in the
sentence: “This is the general rule (al-qānūn al-kullı̄ ) that applies in all cases of the mutashābihāt.”
The Cairo-edition (316.4–6) adds: “All success comes through God,” the Damascus-edition has, how-
ever, “And God’s knows best.” (217.19).
26
“fı̄ hādhihı̄ l-us: ūl”; in addition to the foundations just listed (knowledge of God’s existence, of His
attributes, and of prophetical miracles) this word also refers to us: ūl al-dı̄n in general; a phrase that is
often used equivalently to how we use “theology” today.
27 )
al-Rāzı̄, Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s, ed. Cairo, 315.9–15 / ed. Damascus, 217.8–14.
V 19
prioritized over reason as qadh: – meaning a “dismissal” or also a “slander” or

“defamation” – of evidence based on reason. Both texts develop an argument that ends
in the conclusion that dismissing reason implies dismissing reason and revelation
( )
together (ma an). And yet there are also differences. In the passage from Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s,
(
Fakhr al-Dı̄n does not use the phrase “reason is the foundation of revelation” (al- aql as: l
al-naql). Ibn Taymiyya was most probably well aware of this, which is why he does not
bring up the book in the context of his initial quote despite the fact that he knew the text
well. In fact, Ibn Taymiyya is circumspect in his association of Fakhr al-Dı̄n with this
argument and only says he and his followers are committed to the conclusion of this
argument – not to every step of it.
In other versions of the four-fold division in cases of conflict between reason and
revelation, however, Fakhr al-Dı̄n does use the phrase “reason is the foundation of reve-
lation.” Hence, he should clearly be identified as the “someone” who is quoted at the
) (
beginning of Dar ta ārud.: A brief summary version of this argument in his monumental
Qur’an commentary Mafātih: al-ghayb, for instance, reads:
And the third [option] is false (bāt: il ) because reason is the foundation of
(
revelation (al- aql asl : al-naql ), for if one cannot( prove through reasonable
arguments the existence of an [expert] maker (s: āni ) [of the world], His knowl-
edge, His power, and His sending of messengers, one cannot prove revelation.
Dismissing (qadh: ) reason implies dismissing revelation and reason together.
There remains only the [fourth option] to assert the truth of reason and engage
)
in allegorical interpretation (ta wı̄l ) of revelation. And this is a decisive demon-
( 28
stration (burhān qāt: i ).
How does Fakhr al-Dı̄n argue for the rejection of the third option? He says that any
acceptance of revelation as a reliable source of knowledge is pre-conditioned on a
proper understanding of proofs for the existence of God, for His attributes, and of proofs
for Muhammad’s
: prophecy. Such an understanding must be by means of rational argu-
) (
ments (dalā il aqliyya). Hence accepting revelation is pre-conditioned on evidence
based on reason. The argument is not further elaborated but seems intuitively convinc-
ing. The claim that the Qur’an is God’s speech and hence contains original information
that comes from God is unpersuasive for someone who does not believe in God’s exis-
tence, who doubts that God is able to speak or convey a message to humans, or to some-
one who doubts that Muhammad
: was a prophet. Everybody who accepts the Qur’an as
revelation also accepts that there is a God, that He can reveal knowledge, and that
Muhammad
: was a messenger who conveyed that revelation to other humans. Yet why,
one might ask, need these points be established by reason? Why would one necessarily
need reason to accept Muhammad’s
: prophecy? It is quite conceivable that one acquires
certainty about Muhammad
: prophecy by means that do not rely on reason. Many
28 (
al-Rāzı̄, al-Tafsı̄r al-kabı̄r aw-Mafātih: al-ghayb, ed. Abd al-Rahmān
: Muhammad
: et alii, 32 vols.
(
(Cairo: al-Matba
: a al-Bahiyya. n. d. [1933–39]), 22: 7.4–7 [ad Q. 20:5].
V
Muslims assert, for instance, that reading the Qur’an and acting upon its prescriptions
conveys a certainty about the divine origin of the text that transcends reason. Numerous
Muslim groups also claim that belief in God, in His attributes, and in revelation can be
acquired by means other than reason.
Significantly, Fakhr al-Dı̄n claims that in order to become convinced of these three
(
positions, one must use evidence based on reason ( aql). Here, he seems to think of
philosophical proofs for God’s existence and His attributes. This claim is probably least
(
controversial with regard to God’s existence. Ash arites as well as a number of other
Muslim groups believed that there are necessary proofs for God’s existence that argue
(
from reason. Examples are the so-called “four claims” of the Mu tazilite theologian Abū
l-Hudhayl
: (d. c. 227/841) or Ibn Sı̄nā’s (Avicenna, d. 428/1037) proof of God’s existence
which was accepted by Fakhr al-Dı̄n.29 Ibn Taymiyya rejects this and claims that formal
proofs for God’s existence are at best useless and quite often harmful. Humans know the
existence of a single God through an innate epistemological faculty he calls fit: ra.30
God’s attributes, particularly His attribute of speech, is a different matter, where
rational proof is more difficult than on the issue of God’s existence. Most controversial,
however, is the claim that Muhammad’s: prophecy can be proven through reason.
(
Classical Ash arites – meaning the generations before al-Ghazālı̄ – vehemently denied
that revelation can be verified by recourse to reason.31 Yet this is precisely what Fakhr al-
(
Dı̄n suggests: Humans require the use of reason ( aql) in order to identify the Qur’an, for
instance, as revelation. This is, in fact, what is meant when Fakhr al-Dı̄n says that reason
is the foundation (as: l) of revelation, as will become clear.
II. Reason as the Character Witness (muzakkı¯) of

Revelation.
Ibn Taymiyya was well acquainted with debates among Muslim theologians as to
how one can prove Muhammad’s
: prophecy. After all, this is one of the most important
subjects of Islamic theology. The whole edifice of revealed religion rests on a reliable
method to distinguish a proper prophet from others who make false claims about proph-
) (
ecy. In his Dar ta ārud: Ibn Taymiyya immediately turns to al-Ghazālı̄ and his method of
29
See his commentary on the fourth namat: of Ibn Sı̄nā’s al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbı̄hāt: al-Rāzı̄, Sharh al-
(
Ishārāt wa-l-tanbı̄hāt,
: ed. A. R. Naǧafzādah, 2 vols. (Tehran: Ānjuman-i Asār ve-Mafākhir-i Farhangı̄,
1384/2005), 2: 346–72.
30
On fit:ra see further below. On Ibn Taymiyya’s rejection of formal proofs for God’s existence see
Sophia Vasalou, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theological Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79–83;
von K€ ugelgen, “Ibn Taymı̄yas Kritik an der aristotelischen Logik,” 196; eadem, “The Poison of
Philosophy,” 299–300; and Wael B. Hallaq, “Ibn Taymiyya on the Existence of God,” Acta Orientalia 51
(1991), 46–69.
31
Frank Griffel, “Al-Ġazālı̄’s Concept of Prophecy: The Introduction of Avicennan Psychology into
(
As arite Theology,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004), 101–44: 101–4.
V 21
) (
proving revelation. In the next passage from the beginning of his Dar ta ārud: – the
passage that follows right after the one where he identifies Fakhr al-Dı̄n and his followers
as those who are committed to the argument he had quoted – Ibn Taymiyya writes:
About this rule (qānūn) that they apply, [we say that] another group has pre-
ceded them and one of them was Abū Hāmid : [al-Ghazālı̄]. He posited a rule
(qānūn) in response to questions put before him about certain revealed texts
that posed problems for the one who asked him. These questions are similar
(
to the ones that the Qādı̄
: Abū Bakr ibn al- Arabı̄ asked al-Ghazālı̄. The Qādı̄:
(
Abū Bakr ibn al- Arabı̄ rejected many of the answers he got [from al-Ghazālı̄]
and said: “Our teacher Abū Hāmid
: [al-Ghazālı̄] entered into the bellies of the
falāsifa; and when he wanted to get out of there, he couldn’t.”32
Ibn Taymiyya here refers to a text by al-Ghazālı̄ that circulated under the title The
)
Universal Rule of Allegorically Interpreting Revelation (al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l).
It was initially a written response to questions put to him by his student Abū Bakr ibn
(
al- Arabı̄ (d. 543/1148).33 In this small text of just eight pages, al-Ghazālı̄ makes an
important claim that can rarely be found elsewhere in his writings, namely that revelation
can only be verified by reason.
)
Al-Ghazālı̄’s al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l is a highly interesting text for a number of
reasons. Some of which I have dealt with in a recent article.34 The short text introduces a
number of concepts that are readily picked up by both Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ and Ibn
(
Taymiyya. Among these concepts is the opposition between al-ma qūl, meaning “what
results from a reasonable argument” and al-manqūl, meaning “what is transmitted [in
revelation].” As far as I can see, al-Ghazālı̄’s al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ is the first Arabic text to
introduce these two terms. Out of them will, of course, develop the two opposing terms
(
of aql and naql that are so often used by Fakhr al-Dı̄n and Ibn Taymiyya. This short text
also introduces the word “foundation” (lit. “the root,” as: l) when describing the approach
of different groups of theologians toward the conflict between reason and revelation.
All this is introduced in a brief passage from the mid-section of the text where
(
al-Ghazālı̄ begins with his answers to Abū Bakr ibn al- Arabı̄’s questions. Here,
al-Ghazālı̄ promises a “universal rule” (qānūn kullı̄) about how to deal with cases of
conflict between the outward sense (zāhir) : of revelation and the results of a reasonable
inquiry. Al-Ghazālı̄ begins his response by stating how much he, “dislikes plunging into
32 ) (
Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud, : 1:5.6–10.
33
Frank Griffel, “Al-Ghazālı̄ at His Most Rationalist: The Universal Rule for Allegorically Interpreting
)
Revelation (al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l),” in: Islam and Rationality. The Impact of al-Ghazālı̄. Papers
Collected on His 900th Anniversary, vol. 1, ed. G. Tamer (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 89–120, at 91–2.
34 )
Griffel, “Al-Ghazālı̄ at His Most Rationalist.” On al-Ghazālı̄’s al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l see also
)
Nicholas Heer, “Al-Ghazali’s The Canons of Ta wil,” Windows in the House of Islam: Muslim Sources on
the Spirituality and Religious Life, ed. J. Renard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 48–54,
)
and Jaffer, Rāzı̄. Master of Qur ānic Interpretation and Theological Reasoning, 74–77.
V
these questions and giving answers. But since these requests may come again, I will
mention a universal rule (qānūn kullı̄ ) that one can benefit from on this occasion.”35
Unfortunately, al-Ghazālı̄ nowhere clearly identifies what the “universal rule” is that
he wishes to convey to his student. If we take this text at face value, then the “universal
rule” is most probably what comes right after this sentence and what is introduced by
“. . .and I say. . .” The text continues:
At first glance and after a superficial examination [it appears] that there is a
(
clash (tas: ādum) between what reason dictates (al-ma qūl ) and what has been
transmitted [in revelation] (al-manqūl ). Those who have plunged into this
question divide into [1] those who exaggerate in focusing on what has been
transmitted (al-manqūl ); [2] those who exaggerate in focusing on what reason
(
dictates (al-ma qūl ); and [3] those in the middle, who wish to bring [reason
and revelation] together and reconcile [them]. Those in the middle [again]
(
divide into [3.1] those who make the dictates of reason (al-ma qūl ) fundamen-
tal and what is transmitted (al-manqūl ) secondary and who do not pay much
attention to research into the latter; [3.2] those who make what is transmitted
fundamental and what is dictated by reason secondary and who do not pay
much attention to research into the latter; and [3.3] those who make each of
the two fundamental and who desire to combine the two and bring them
)
together (al-ta lı̄f wa l-talfı̄q bayna-humā). There are, therefore, five
36
groups.”
On the following three pages al-Ghazālı̄ describes these five groups without,
however, identifying them by name.37 Each of the groups represents a certain attitude
towards reason and revelation that range between the extremes of a strict literalism on
the one hand and a radical rationalism on the other. Regarding someone who adheres
excessively to reason, there is agreement among Muslim scholars, al-Ghazālı̄ says, that
such a rationalist – who dismisses any conflicting scriptural passage by describing it as
an imagination (tas: wı̄r) of the prophet invented solely to benefit (mas: laha)
: the masses
( 38
( awāmm) – is an unbeliever “who must have his head cut off.” The description of
these two extreme groups is very much parallel to passages in al-Ghazālı̄’s later Fays: al
al-tafriqa, where these two attitudes are identified with Ahmad: ibn Hanbal’s followers
39
and with the falāsifa. Regarding the latter, al-Ghazālı̄ repeats his earlier legal condem-
nation at the end of his Tahāfut al-falāsifa.40 In between these two extremes are a more
35 ) )
al-Ghazālı̄, al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l, published under the title Qānūn al-ta wı̄l, ed. M. Z. al-
Kawtharı̄ (Cairo: Maktab Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya, 1359/1940), 6. See also the English translation
)
in Heer, “Al-Ghazali’s The Canons of Ta wil.”
36 )
al-Ghazālı̄, al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l, 6.11–17. My translation has adopted many suggestions in
Heer, “The Canons of Ta’wil,” 48.
37 )
al-Ghazālı̄, al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l, 6–10; cf. Heer, “The Canons of Ta’wil,” 48–52.
38 )
al-Ghazālı̄, al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l, 7.12–13; Heer, “The Canons of Ta’wil,” 49.
39
al-Ghazālı̄, Fays: al al-tafriqa, 184, 192.
40
al-Ghazālı̄, The Incoherence of the Philosophers / Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 226.
V 23
moderate group of rationalists, “who reject what they find difficult to interpret,” and a
more moderate group of literalists “who accept a clash between the dictates of reason
and the outward meaning only in some fringe issues of the rational sciences.” The fifth
and last attitude lies with regard to its combination of literalism and rationalism right in
the middle of these five groups. It is the group that has found truth (al-firqa al-muhiqqa)
:
and is, not surprisingly, that of al-Ghazālı̄ himself. The teachings of this fifth group are
characterized in the following way:
The fifth group is the group in the middle that combines the inquiry into what is
(
mandated by reason (al-ma qūl) and what is mandated by revelation
(al-manqūl) and says that each one of the two is an important foundation (as: l
(
muhimm). They deny a contradiction between reason and revelation (shar ) and
(
that there would be any truth in such a position. Whoever says that reason ( aql)
is not true also says that revelation is not true because it is only through reason
(
that the truth of revelation (s: idq al-shar ) is known. Were it not for the truth of
that reason we would not know the difference between the true prophet and the
false pretender to prophecy (al-mutanabbı̄), nor between the person who speaks
truth and the one who tells an untruth (al-s: ādiq wa-l-kādhib).41
(
True to the Ash arite technique of characterizing one’s own teaching as the middle of
several extremes – here the literalism of the anthopomorphists and the rationalism of the
falāsifa – al-Ghazālı̄ stresses that the right attitude combines literalism and rationalism
and treats both reason and revelation as two important foundations (singl. as: l).
The explanation of the attitude of the fifth group, that is to say, the one that has a
correct position, is followed by three “recommendations” (singl. was: iyya). The first
recommendation is simply an admission of ignorance and an expression of the
(
bilā-kayfa attitude of Ash arite kalām: one should not aspire to a complete understand-
ing of revelation, inasmuch as some passages in revelation are simply incomprehensible
)
and not meant to be interpreted by reason. This position is confirmed by the Qur ānic
declaration that, “of knowledge, you have been given but little” (Q. 17:85). The second
recommendation expresses al-Ghazālı̄’s rationalism most clearly: never dismiss the
testimony of reason! Or, as al-Ghazālı̄ puts it: “A [valid] rational demonstration is never
wrong.”42 If reason is properly applied in a demonstrative argument – a burhān – then it
cannot assert any falsehood. Reason is the witness for revelation through which the
latter’s truth is known. Revelation tells us about details that reason might not be able to
prove, but reason is the character witness of the truth of revelation, without which the
truth of revelation would not be accepted: “How can the truthfulness of a witness be
known through the testimony of a character witness who is wrong?”43 The character
41 )
al-Ghazālı̄, al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l, 9.12–16; Heer, “The Canons of Ta’wil,” 51.
42 ( )
“lā yakdhibu burhānu l- aqli as: lan”, al-Ghazālı̄, al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l, 10.16; cf. Heer, “The
Canons of Ta’wil,” 52.
43 (
“fa-kayfa yu rafu sidqu
: l-shāhidi bi-tazkiyati l-muzakkı̄ l-kādhib?”, al-Ghazālı̄, al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄
)
l-ta wı̄l, 10.18; cf. Heer, “The Canons of Ta’wil,” 52.
V
witness must be right in order to convince the court of the truthfulness of the chief
witness in a trial. The chief witness (al-shāhid) in this comparison is revelation, which
informs us about things hidden from any other source of knowledge. The character
witness (muzakkı̄) that testifies for the chief witness’ truthfulness (s: idq) is reason. The
whole edifice of revealed religion, al-Ghazālı̄ argues in this letter, rests on reason, and if
reason were unreliable the reliability of revelation could not be established.
The comparison of reason to a character witness is highly instructive. It puts us in a
court of law where the testimony of revelation is challenged. Those who sit over the
court of law as judges are not certain whether they can trust the information (or the
instructions) that they receive from revelation. They do not know whether revelation is
truthful about what it says. The court, however, has already established the truthfulness
(
(s: idq) of another witness, namely that of reason ( aql). Reason is considered beyond
reproach and the information it gives to the court is never doubted. The cause of its
universal truthfulness lies in the method of demonstration (burhān) as it has been devel-
oped by Aristotle and further clarified and advanced by the falāsifa. “A [valid] rational
demonstration is never wrong.” Hence, the court accepts whatever reason says – mean-
ing what is based on a valid demonstrative argument (burhān) – as true. Al-Ghazālı̄ now
claims that the only way the court can verify the truthfulness of revelation is by having
reason speak as a character witness (muzakkı̄) for revelation. Whenever possible, the
truth-claims that are made by revelation should be checked by reason. If reason confirms
the truth of what revelation claims, then it confirms its truthfulness. That is the task of a
character witness, namely establishing the truthfulness of the chief witness. Once revela-
tion’s truthfulness is confirmed in this way it is trusted even in those cases where reason
cannot confirm the truth of its claims. Revelation may well know things that reason does
not know. In those cases, revelation is trusted because its truthfulness is now fully
established. At the end, this court has established the truthfulness of both reason and
revelation and it trusts both.
The crucial step in this process is the verification of revelation’s truth claims by
recourse to reason. In order to function as a character witness for revelation, reason must
be able to confirm that in those fields of knowledge where reason has expertise, the
claims that revelation makes are valid. In short: The truth of revelation needs to be com-
pared with what is already known to be true from reason. This is a highly controversial
(
claim in the context of Ash arite theology. Yet, that this is the only way to reliably verify
revelation is expressed in another of al-Ghazālı̄’s writings, The Correct Balance (al-Qist:ās
al-mustaqı̄m), a late work from the period shortly before al-Ghazālı̄’s teaching activity at
the Niz: āmiyya madrasa in Nishapur, which began in 499/1106. There, in al-Qist: ās
al-mustaqı̄m al-Ghazālı̄ reflects on how he himself found certainty that the Qur’an is a
text of revelation:
Likewise, I gained belief in the truthfulness of Muhammad (āmantu anā bi-
s: idq Muhammad.
: . . ) – peace be upon him – and the truthfulness of Moses –
peace be upon him – not by reason of the splitting of the moon and the
V 25
changing of a stick into a serpent, for that way is open to much ambiguity and
one should not rely on it. (. . .) Rather, I learned the balances (al-mawāzı̄n)
[scil. syllogistic arguments] from the Qur’an, and then I weighted by it all the
(
[suggested] knowledge about God (al-ma ārif al-ilāhiyya), and about the states
in the afterlife, about the punishment of the debauchers and the reward of the
)
obedient, just like I mention in [my] book Jawāhir al-Qur ān, and I found all
of this in agreement with what is in the Qur’an and in the Hadith. Thus, I
obtained certain knowledge (tayaqqantu) that Muhammad – peace be upon
44
him – is truthful and that the Qur’an is true (haqq).
:
Here, al-Ghazālı̄ uses a terminology that he coined himself and that he explains
elsewhere in al-Qist: ās al-mustaqı̄m. In that language, he declares that he scrutinized the
available knowledge about God by means of, as he says, “the balances,” a word that
refers to the syllogistic, i. e. Aristotelian method of logic. Using rational analysis, he was
able to determine which teachings about God are true. Once the truth about those two
subjects has been determined in such a rationalist way, al-Ghazālı̄ compares it to divine
revelation and found that it is in agreement (muwāfaqa) with what he found to be true
through reason. This gave him certain knowledge that the Qur’an is true divine revela-
)
tion. This position is the same as the one in al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l, where
(
al-Ghazālı̄ says that, “it is only through reason ( aql) that the truth of scripture is known.”
Behind the comparison of reason with a character witness of revelation stands the
idea that reason and revelation have different domains of authority, which, however,
overlap. To emphasize that, one can use a so-called Venn diagram of two overlapping
circles:
The diagram tries to illustrate that there exist quite a number of fields of knowledge,
such as mathematics, geometry, or geography, for instance, where revelation is not
considered an authority and where scholars usually do not rely on it. Then there is the
domain of overlap between reason and revelation, where both are considered authorities
and where, according to this model, they convey the same information. This is, for
44
al-Ghazālı̄, al-Qistās
: al-mustaqı̄m, ed. Victor Chelhot (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1959), 81.
V
instance, the field of history, where the Muslim revelation refers to events that are also
recorded independently. Other examples are the natural sciences, among them psychol-
ogy with its proofs for prophecy or astronomy. Much of theology, with its rational proofs
for the existence of a single God and arguments for some of His attributes also falls into
this domain. In these cases, the information we find in revelation may not be particularly
precise, yet, if read correctly, it concurs to what is known through rational inquiry. Finally,
there is a third domain of knowledge where only revelation is considered an authority
and where reason cannot yield knowledge: revelation’s predictions of what will happen
(
in the afterlife.45 As an Ash arite, he also counts the field of moral judgments among these
domains. What is right and wrong in human actions must be learned from revelation.
The key point in al-Ghazālı̄’s comparison of reason with a character witness is that it
expands the domains of human knowledge by establishing a second source of certain
knowledge that did not exist before. Through its witnessing that revelation is truthful
and can be trusted – it can be the object of tas: dı̄q - he enlists revelation as a source of
original knowledge in fields where reason cannot yield knowledge. In other words, if it
weren’t for reason being a character witness of revelation, we would never know what
will happen to us in the afterlife, or we would never know with certainty which of our
actions are wrong and which are right.
It has become clear now, I think, what is meant by the phrase that, “reason is the
foundation (as: l) of revelation.” Significantly, however, al-Ghazālı̄ does not use that
phrase; only Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ uses it, from where it is picked up by Ibn Taymiyya.
Al-Ghazālı̄ merely says that the fifth group, which expresses the correct attitude, “makes
reason and revelation each one to an important foundation (as: l)” and they deny that
( 46
there is a contradiction (ta ārud) : between the two. In contrast to that, al-Ghazālı̄’s third
group is the one that is described as, “turning the outcome of reason into a foundation.”47
This group is the one which, in the five-fold-scheme of two extreme groups on each side
of rationalism and literalism, and a moderate one in the middle, is the less extreme group
on the side of rationalism. Given that the far-extreme group on the side of rationalism can
be – through its condemnation as unbelievers – identified as the falāsifa, these less-
(
extreme rationalists are groups who, in the mind of the Ash arite al-Ghazālı̄, go too far in
(
prioritizing reason over revelation. Here, the Mu tazilites come to mind or other rationalist
groups influenced by them such as Zaydis, Twelver-Shiites, or Ibādites.:
III. The Structure of Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s Argument on the

Priority of Reason Over the Outward Sense of Revelation
As far as I can see, Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ does not use the comparison of reason with a
character witness (muzakkı̄). He does, however, agree with al-Ghazālı̄ that the most
45
See e.g. al-Ghazālı̄, Fays: al al-tafriqa, 191.15–18.
46 )
al-Ghazālı̄, al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l, 9.13–14.
47 ( ( an”
“ja alū al-ma qūl asl: ; ibid., 8.19.
V 27
reliable way of verifying revelation is through a comparison of what is already known

from reason. In a passage from the eighth volume of his late work The Exalted Questions
(
(al-Mat: ālib al- āliya) – a passage that has already attracted the attention of Western
scholars – Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ discusses different ways of verifying revelation.48 He
assumes that at least some humans are able to distinguish the genuine prophet from the
(
impostor solely through the use of reason. In al-Mat: ālib al- āliya, Fakhr al-Dı̄n writes:
We say: First of all, we know what is true (haqq) : ( and what is right (s: idq)
regarding the things we are convinced of (al-i tiqādāt). And regarding the
(
things that we do (al-a māl ), [we do know] what is right (s: awāb). If we know
this, and we then see a man who calls the people to the true religion, and we
see that his message includes a strong incitement for people to change from
falsehood to truth, then we know that he is a true prophet and that one has to
follow him. And this method [to verify the claims of a prophet] is closer to
(
reason ( aql ), and there is less uncertainty in it.49
(
This passage severely challenges traditional Ash arite teachings on two fronts. Like
al-Ghazālı̄, it assumes that revelation can be verified through recourse to reason. Unlike
al-Ghazālı̄, however, it also assumes that normative knowledge about what is right or
wrong in human actions can be established in that way. These controversial teachings
are echoed in a remark in a brief handbook by Fakhr al-Dı̄n, Signposts in Theology and
(
Jurisprudence (al-Ma ālim fı̄ l-usūlayn) written also at the end of his life.50 There, he
discusses the kinds of evidence that exist for Muhammad’s
: prophecy. He first discusses
(
the traditional Ash arite proof for prophecy from the performance of miracles on the
Prophet’s behalf. In a first step the Prophet issues a claim for prophecy. Then, in a
( (
second step, “miracles appear on his behalf” (zaharat
: al-mu jizāt alayhi). In the case
of Muhammad,
: these miracles are the Qur’an itself as well as its effect on his Meccan
opponents – namely that they gave up their opposition to him –, as well as numerous
minor miracles that are reported in the Hadith-corpus even if some of these reports are
48 (
On the dating of al-Māt: alib al- āliya into Fakhr al-Dı̄n latest period shortly before his death see
Griffel, “On Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄’s Life and the Patronage He Received,” 326.
49 (
See al-Rāzı̄, al-Nubuwwāt wa-mā yata allaqu bihā, ed. A. H. : al-Saqqā ((Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyya
al-Azhariyya, 1985), 163. The book is an edition of part 8 of al-Mat: ālib al- āliya on prophecy. The text
( (
in this edition differs from the one in the standard edition of al-Rāzı̄, al-Mat: ālib al- āliya min al- ilm al-
(
ilāhı̄, ed A. H.
: al-Saqqā, 9 parts in 5 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al- Arabı̄, 1987), 8:103. Given that the text
in the 1985-edition is the lectio difficilior and given also that it is confirmed in MS Kayseri, Reşit Efendi
(
503, fol. 370a, a copy of al-Mat:ālib al- āliya not used by al-Saqqā in either of his two editions, I have
come to conclude that the text in the 1987-edition, i.e. the standard edition, is distorted. On these teach-
(
ings of Fakhr al-Dı̄n see Sabine Schmidtke, The Theology of al- Allāma al-H: illı̄ (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz,
1991), 151–2, Binyamin Abrahamov, “Religion versus philosophy. The Case of Fahr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄’s
Proof for Prophecy” Oriente Moderno, 80 (2000), 415–25; and Griffel, “Al-Ġazālı̄’s Concept of Proph-
ecy,” 108–9.
50
See Eşref Altaş, “Fahreddin Er-R^az^ı’nin Eserlerinin Kronolojisi,” in: Islam ^ Duş € uncesinin
€ D€ € um
onuş €
C¸a gında Fahreddin Er-R^ € T€
az^ı, ed. O. urker and O. Demir (Istanbul: I_SAM, 2013), 91–164: 135–36.
V
not fully credible.51 Fakhr al-Dı̄n, however, also discusses a second way of verifying
prophecy. Prophets are those humans who have themselves achieved perfection
(kamāl) and who, in addition to this, are also able to achieve the perfection of others
(takmı̄l) both in theoretical as well as in practical matters. When we consider
Muhammad’s
: achievements we find that he, “turned the world from error to truth, from
falsehood to sincerity, and from darkness to light.”52 He has introduced so many changes
to the better that there can be no doubt that he was on the highest level of prophecy:
Since there is no other meaning to prophecy than achieving the perfection of
those who are defective in their theoretical faculty and their practical faculty,
and [since] we see that what has happened in this regard due to the offices of
Muhammad
: – God bless him and grant him salvation – is more perfect and
better than what has appeared due to the offices of Moses and Jesus – peace
be upon them – we know that [Muhammad]
: is the lord of the prophets and
the exemplar of the sincere.53
Fakhr al-Dı̄n adds that this latter method of proving prophecy is superior to the first
because it proves the existence of prophecy trough “the why” of prophecy (al-lima) and
argues from there for its need and subsequently for its existence. The more traditional
way to prove prophecy through miracles is described as methodologically similar to a
“demonstration through the ‘that” (burhān al-inna), which is, according to al-Rāzı̄,
inferior in strength to the first.54 This latter demonstration argues for the existence of a
thing from empirical evidence like – in this case – eyewitness reports. Yet, eyewitness
report is highly problematic as one relies on the judgment of people who have long
passed away as well as the sincerity of those who conveyed their judgment through
uninterrupted chains of transmission (tawātur) to the present day. Fakhr al-Dı̄n neither
trusts the first nor the second group of people, which is why he thinks no eyewitness
report of miracles will give sufficient evidence for prophecy.55
(
Like the proof of prophecy from al-Mat: ālib al- āliya, the second method in al-
(
Ma ālim also requires prior knowledge of what is true in theoretical matters and what is
right in practical ones. If one argues that Muhammad’s
: prophecy has turned the world
into a better place, then that requires knowledge or at least an understanding of what is
better which is independent from revelation. For Fakhr al-Dı̄n, such knowledge is
acquired through reason. Both al-Ghazālı̄ and Fakhr al-Dı̄n argue that prophecy – and
hence revelation – are verified through reason. This is what Fakhr al-Dı̄n means when
51 ( ) ( (
al-Rāzı̄, al-Ma ālim fı̄ l-usūlayn, in: As ilat Najmaddı̄n al-Kātibı̄ an al-Ma ālim li-Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-
( ( (
Rāzı̄ ma ā ta ālı̄q Izz al-Dı̄n Ibn Kammūna, ed. S. Schmidtke and R. Pourjavady (Tehran and Berlin:
Iranian Institute of Philosophy and Institute of Islamic Studies, 1386/2007), 94.
52
Ibid., 95.20–21.
53
Ibid., 95–96.
54 ( (
Ibid., 96. See also al-Rāzı̄, al-Mat: ālib al- āliya, 8:74; idem, al-Nubuwwāt wa-mā yata allaqu
bihā, 184.
55
Griffel, “Al-Ġazālı̄’s Concept of Prophecy,” 109.
V 29
he says that reason is the “foundation” (as: l) of revelation. Humans are only able to iden-
tify revelation through the use of reason. Without reason, one cannot distinguish true
revelation from false one. Given the central role of reason in the process of verifying
revelation, one cannot dismiss it whenever the outward sense of revelation violates it. In
cases of conflict between reason and the outward sense of revelation, the Muslim reader
must follow the first and dismiss the latter.
Here, at the end of the treatment of Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s position and as a way of conclud-
ing, I will try and reconstruct the argument he makes about why reason should be
prioritized when it clashes with the outward sense of revelation:
The initial premise in this argument is (1) that reason verifies revelation, which is a
( (
position Fakhr al-Dı̄n takes in his al-Mat: ālib al- āliya and in his al-Ma ālim fı̄ l-usūlayn.
These two works were written close to the end of his career. This position is also
)
expressed by al-Ghazālı̄ in his short epistle al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-t: a wı̄l. In Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s
)
earlier work Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s, written around 596/1199 this premise is expressed in a
weaker form: revelation cannot be verified without recourse to reason, namely the
rational proof of God’s existence, some of his attributes (such as His knowledge and His
speech), and proof of the possibility of prophecy. In his Tafsı̄r al-kabı̄r – written late in
( (
his life parallel to al-Mat: ālib al- āliya and al-Ma ālim – he refers to this premise with the
(
phrase, “reason is the foundation of revelation” (al- aql as: l al-naql). This short-hand for-
) (
mula is picked by Ibn Taymiyya and given great prominence in his Dar ta ārud. :
In a second step of his argument, Fakhr al-Dı̄n claims that (2) in cases of conflict
between reason and the outward sense of revelation (zāhir), : giving priority to revelation
would imply the dismissal (qadh: ) of reason, which in light of the first premise implies
(
dismissing reason and revelation together (ma an). This is because dismissing reason
makes the identification of revelation impossible and hence voids both.
Given that the four options in Fakhr al-Dı̄n initial exhaustive distinction have already
been reduced to two, namely giving priority to reason or to revelation, there remains –
in light of the second step of the argument – only the option (3) to give priority to
reason.
(
IV. Ibn Taymiyya’s Alternative to the Ash arite Position
that Reason Enjoys Priority Over the Outward Sense of
Revelation ) (
It has already been said that Dar ta ārud: is a complex work and written in a way
that often conceals the position Ibn Taymiyya takes in the disputes he picks up in the
book. Driven by his eagerness to produce a complete refutation of quite a number of
different opponents who often do not agree with one another, Ibn Taymiyya presents
rhetorical and dialectical arguments that he may not have subscribed to. This, the work
has in common with other refutations of falsafa in Islam, such as al-Ghazālı̄’s Tahāfut
al-falāsifa. Books like these need to be studied with great care in order to identify which
V
strategy of refutation they adopt and what is the position their author wishes to express
in their refutations.56
) ( (
In the case of Ibn Taymiyya’s Dar ta ārud: al- aql wa-l-naql, an important clue
about the most central claim he makes in this book can be deduced from its title.
“Rejecting the Notion that Reason and Revelation Contradict Each Other,” implies that
Ibn Taymiyya believes his opponents hold that notion. The initial quote of the book,
)
which is close to a passage in Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s, does indeed give that
impression. As already seen, there, Ibn Taymiyya characterizes the initial assumption of
his opponents with the following words:
(
If the revelatory and reasonable arguments (al-adillat al-sam iyya wa l-
( ( (
aqliyya) contradict each other – or revelation (al-sam ) and reason (al- aql ),
or what is transmitted (al-naql ) and reason, or the outward sense of revelation
(zawāhir
: naqliyya) and what has been decisively established through reason
((
(qawāt:i aqliyya), or words similar to theses (. . .).57
If this is meant to be a report of Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s position, it is at least careless since it

neglects to take account of the latter’s focus on the outward meaning (zāhir)
: of revela-
)
tion as that which can possibly come into conflict with reason. In fact, in his Ta sı̄s
al-taqdı̄s, Fakhr al-Dı̄n describes the situation that would lead to his four-fold division in
the following way:
Chapter Thirty-two on how to react if rational demonstrations contradict the
outward sense of revelation (al-zawāhir
: al-naqliyya).
Know that if decisive rational arguments are produced that establish
something, and then we find evidence in revelation (adilla naqliyya) whose
outward sense (zāhir)
: informs of something different, then one of four differ-
ent options must apply.58
Fakhr al-Dı̄n only admits conflict with the outward sense of revelation, which in his
(
opinion is not the true meaning (ma nā haqı̄qı̄)
: of the text but a mere metaphor (majāz)
that stands in for what the text wishes to express. Like Ibn Taymiyya, he claims that there
is no contradiction between reason and what revelation wishes to express. Ibn Taymiyya
engages in polemic when he implies that al-Ghazālı̄ and Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ held the
position that reason contradicts information that comes from the prophets.59 In his short
)
epistle al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l, al-Ghazālı̄ is keen to deny that there is opposition or
56 ) (
The 44 “viewpoints” or “aspects” (wujūh) in which Ibn Taymiyya divides his Dar ta ārud: contribute
surprisingly little to the analysis of the book’s strategy of refutation. For a sequential summary and a
thematic overview of these 44 different wujūh, see Kazi, Reconciling Reason and Revelation in the
Writings of Ibn Taymiyya, 118–80.
57 ) (
58 )
al-Rāzı̄, Ta sı̄s al-taqdı̄s, ed. Cairo 315.1–5; ed. Damascus 217.1–5.
59 ) )
For the phrase “information that comes from the prophets” (mā ja at bi-hi l-anbiyā ) see, for
) (
instance, Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud, : 1:5.2.
V 31
( ( (
contradiction (ta ārud) : between reason (al- aql) and revelation (al-shar ). Such opposi-
tion is only an impression (“at first glance and after a superficial examination”), in reality
(haqq
:
an
) no such opposition exists.60 The medium way among the five attitudes is to
bring reason and revelation together.
Equally polemical are some maximalist claims Ibn Taymiyya makes at the beginning
) (
of Dar ta arud: about what he wishes to achieve in the book. After characterizing the
position of his opponents and after identifying them,61 he expresses the goal of his
(
book. In a most general sense it is the rejection (daf ) of “the rationalist objector”
( (
(al-mu ārid: al- aqlı̄ )62 and “the explanation . . . that the false rule is false” (bayān (. . .)
fasād al-qānūn al-fāsid).63 A slightly more concrete goal is expressed at the end of this
passage:
Long time ago, about thirty years, we had already composed a work
(mus: annaf ) on the falsity of this [kind of] talk. We [also] explained a good
part of its falseness in our comments on [Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s] al-Muha
: s: s: al and else-
where. There, we confirmed the arguments from scripture and explained that
they are certain and decisive. In this book we explain how the rationalist
( (
objector (al-mu ārid: al- aqlı̄ ) is to be refuted and how the teachings of
someone who gives absolute priority to reasonable argument are shown to be
false.64
) (
This passage allowed Muhammad
: Rashād Sālim, the editor of Dar ta ārud,
: to date the
composition of the book into the years around 715/1315, when Ibn Taymiyya resided in
Damascus. The earlier book on a similar subject, which is mentioned in this quote, as of
yet cannot be identified. It would have been composed when Ibn Taymiyya was in his
) (
twenties.65 The passage also gives an explicit account of Dar ta ārud’s : goal: Refutation
) (
(intifā ) of the Ash arite position on the priority of reason over revelation and showing
it to be false (ibt: āl).
( (
The strong language from the beginning of Ibn Taymiyya’s Dar ta ārud: raises the
expectation that Ibn Taymiyya thoroughly rejects Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s premise that reason is
the foundation of revelation. Indeed, there are programmatic statements that deny the
60 )
al-Ghazālı̄, al-Qānūn al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-ta wı̄l, 6.11–12, 9.14; Heer, “The Canons of Ta’wil,” 48, 51.
61 ) (
See Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud, : 1:10–11, where the following names are listed after also mentioning
( )
“al-mutafalsifat al-bātiniyya,”
: and “al-mul hidat
: al-ismā ı̄liyya”: the authors of the Rasā il Ikhwān al-
)
s: afā , al-Fārābı̄ (d. 339/950–51), Ibn Sı̄nā, Yahyā al-Suhrawardı̄ (d. 587/1191), Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198),
( (
Ibn Arabı̄ (d. 638/1240), Ibn Sab ı̄n (d. 669/1270), and Ibn Tufayl : (d. 581/1185).
62
In Ibn Taymiyya’s view this “objector” objects to the truth of revelation.
63 ) (
64
Ibid., 1:22.3–8.
65 ) (
In the introduction to his edition of Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud, : 1:7–10, Rashād Sālim suggests this
earlier book is Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya. Jon Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual
Optimism (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 10–11, however, notes that in his Minhāj al-sunna Ibn Taymiyya refers
) (
back to Dar ta ārud; : hence Minhāj al-sunna should be dated after the latter work. Hoover also clari-
fies ( p. 10) that Ibn Taymiyya’s commentary on Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s al-Muha : is currently considered lost.
: s: sal
V
validity of this initial premise. One such statement is made at the beginning of the 44th
viewpoint (wajh) of Ibn Taymiyya’s refutation:
(
The judgments of reason (al- aqliyyāt), of which it has been said that they are
a foundation (as: l ) of revelation and that they contradict it, are not from the
kind of knowledge that the truth of revelation depends on. Thus, it is impossi-
ble that they are a foundation of it. They are also false.66
In the third part of this paper we could show that this talk about reason being the foun-
dation (as: l) of revelation really means that revelation can only be verified through
recourse to reason. This, however, is a position Ibn Taymiyya shared. At the beginning
) (
of the 10th viewpoint (wajh) of his Dar ta ārud, : Ibn Taymiyya engages in a thought
experiment. What if one would simply turn Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s and al-Ghazālı̄’s teaching
about the priority of reason into its opposite? Ibn Taymiyya ask his readers if it could not
be correct to say:
To give priority to reason is impossible because it is reason which points to
( (
(dalla alā ) the truth of revelation (al-sam ) and the necessity of accepting that
which the messenger – God bless him and grant him salvation – has revealed.
Were we to deny revelation we would therefore deny the evidence of reason
(
(dalālat al- aql ).67
The context of a thought experiment, however, makes it impossible to rely on this pas-
sage. It may simply be a rhetorical device employed to show how far from the truth the
(
opponent’s position is: If the square opposite of the Ash arite’s position sounds even
vaguely true, then it makes a case for their error. Vaguely true, however, need not be
fully true. A more nuanced statement on the relationship between reason and revelation
can be found in the 7th volume of the book where this relation is described as a two-
way street. Reason does indeed confirm the truth of revelation. The difference between
Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ and Ibn Taymiyya is that whereas the former sees the relation as
one-sided – reason confirms revelation – the latter regards it as reciprocal: reason
confirms revelation and revelation confirms reason:
( (
Since the pathway to the truth is revelation (al-sam ) and reason (al- aql ) –
these two being interconnected (mutalāzimān) – whoever follows the path of
reason is pointed towards the one of revelation, which is [that of] the truthful-
ness (s: idq) of the messenger; and whoever follows the path of revelation, the
)
arguments of reason are made clear to him, since this is what the Qur an
explains. Whoever does not follow any of these two is a wretched soul,
punished [in this life and the next].68
66 ) (
Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud,: 7:141.2–4.
67
Ibid., 1:170.13–14; the passage is translated in Heer, “The Priority of Reason,” 190–91, from which
this translation is adapted.
68 ) (
Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud,: 7:394.5–9.
V 33
(
The difference between the first statement that the “judgments of reason” (al- aqliyyāt)
(
are false and the second that reason (al- aql) points to the truth of revelation can be
)
explained by two different meanings of “reason” that Ibn Taymiyya applies in his Dar
( (
: In the first quote, “reason” ( aql) refers to the claims of his opponents, namely
ta ārud.
what they think they can establish through arguments based on their understanding of
(
reason. In the second quote, Ibn Taymiyya uses aql as a reference to his own under-
standing of reason, which differs from that of Fakhr al-Dı̄n and al-Ghazālı̄. In a recent
paper Anke von K€ ugelgen characterized this latter understanding of reason by Ibn
Taymiyya as “uncontaminated reason.” With this phrase she renders the Arabic s: arı̄h: al-
(
aql (literally: “clear reason”).69 That phrase appears prominently, for instance, in Ibn
) (
Taymiyya’s parallel tile of Dar ta ārud: : The Agreement of What is Correctly Transmitted
[in Revelation] with What is True According to Clear Reason (Muwāfaqat s: ahı̄ : h: al-
(
manqūl li-s: arı̄h: al-ma qūl).70 For Ibn Taymiyya, the phrase “clear reason” refers to those
judgments that are necessary true (darūrı̄)
: as well as those that a human develops from
his or her fit: ra.71 These include, for instance, moral judgments about human actions,72
but also rational judgments that are not contaminated by any tradition that Ibn Taymiyya
(
regards alien to the human fit: ra. Falsafa, or Ash arite kalām, would be teaching tradi-
tions that alter the human fit: ra and contaminate its judgments.
Characteristically, Ibn Taymiyya posits a faculty of reasoning that is shared by all
human beings. Von K€ ugelgen has used the phrase “innate intelligence” to characterize
the human fit: ra and that faculty.73 She also points out that Ibn Taymiyya, “nowhere
systematically exposes his own epistemology or explains what he categorizes under
‘clear reason,’ and this subject has not yet been exhaustively studied.”74
(
The fact that Ibn Taymiyya uses the Arabic word aql (“reason”) in two meanings,
(
one taken from his Ash arite and philosophical opponents and describing their method,
which in Ibn Taymiyya’s eyes yields wrong results, and a second usage as
(
“uncontaminated” aql that produces correct judgments is confusing and remains a likely
69
von K€ ugelgen, “The Poison of Philosophy.” 297–302.
70 ) (
This phrase also appears within the text of Dar ta ārud. See, for instance, 9:67.12–13: “The text (al-
qawl ) that the messenger has brought is that what is in agreement with what is correctly transmitted
( (
(sa : h: al-ma qūl ) and with what is true according to clear reason (sarı̄
: hı̄ : h: al-ma qūl ).”
71
The human fit: ra is a key concept in Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemology and has hence attracted much
attention among Western researchers, see Vasalou, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theological Ethics, 36–37, 77–97,
109–10, and passim; Anjum, Politics, Law, and Community, 203, 211, 215–32; Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s
Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism, 39–44; Kazi, Reconciling Reason and Revelation, 250–83; El-Tobgui,
€
Reason, Revelation, and the Reconstitution of Rationality, 276–79 and passim; M. Sait Ozervarli,
“Divine Wisdom, Human Agency and the fit: ra in Ibn Taymiyya’s Thought,” Islamic Theology, 37–60.
72
On Ibn Taymiyya’s position that ethical judgments are part of the human fit: ra see Vasalou, Ibn
Taymiyya’s Theological Ethics, 65–77, and von K€ ugelgen, “The Poison of Philosophy,” 305.
73
von K€ ugelgen, “The Poison of Philosophy,” 299.
74
Ibid., 298.
V
(
source of serious misunderstanding. When we read aql in Ibn Taymiyya, we always
(
have to ask ourselves whether he means the aql he finds in the writings of his oppo-
nents or the one that he regards as correct. In the following I shall mark the latter use of
(
reason ( aql), the “uncontaminated” one, with an asterix in superscript: reason*.
) (
The Dar ta ārud: as well as other writings of Ibn Taymiyya such as his Refutation of
(
the Logicians (al-Radd alā l-mant: iqiyyı̄n), a book that was written a few years before
) ( 75
Dar ta ārud, : is first of all a work of refutation that focuses on how reason is used by
Ibn Taymiyya’s opponents.76 It is similar to al-Ghazālı̄’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa insofar as it
tries to show that the arguments produced by the authors’ opponents do not achieve
what they claim. In the Tahāfut’s case, the arguments of the falāsifa do not reach the
) (
claimed status of being demonstrative;77 in the Dar ta ārud’s: case, the arguments of Ibn
Taymiyya’s opponents are not reasonable, meaning they do not follow the rules of
“uncontaminated reason.”
We are now in a position that we can reconstruct Ibn Taymiyya’s alternative to Fakhr
al-Dı̄n’s argument about the priority of reason over revelation.78 Ibn Taymiyya, of course,
rejects that priority, yet he does not reject the initial premise that reason* confirms and
verifies revelation. The asterix behind “reason” indicates that it is only uncontaminated
reason that is able to do so. Ibn Taymiyya holds that:
1) Reason* verifies revelation.
2) Revelation verifies reason*.
3) Cases of conflict between reason* and the outward sense of revelation are impossible.
If such a case appears, a mistake had been made about what reason* mandates.
This, however, is a circular argument. If the truth of what is mandated by reason is
verified by recourse to revelation, then there is no verification of reason independent of
revelation. And if that is the case, how can reason verify revelation?
75 (
On the dating of al-Radd alā l-mantiqiyyı̄n into the year 709/1309–10, when Ibn Taymiyya was
imprisoned in Alexandria, see von K€ ugelgen, “Ibn Taymı̄yas Kritik an der aristotelischen Logic,” 171.
76 ( (
Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd alā l-mant: iqiyyı̄n (Bombay: al-Mat:ba a al-Qayyima, 1949). The book has
(
been abbreviated by Jalāl al-Dı̄n al-Suyūt:ı̄ (d. 911/1505), Jahd al-qarı̄ha : ed. A. S. al-
: fı̄ tajrı̄d al-nas: ı̄ha,
Nashshār (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjı̄, 1947) and this latter book has been translated into English: Ibn
Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians, translated with an introduction and notes by W. B. Hallaq
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
77
See Frank Griffel, “Taqlı̄d of the Philosophers. Al-Ghazālı̄’s Initial Accusation in the Tahāfut,” in
Ideas, Images, and Methods of Portrayal. Insights into Arabic Literature and Islam, ed. S. G€ unther
(Leiden: Brill. 2005), 273–96.
78
Zouggar, “Aspects de l’argumentation elaboree,” provides a close analysis of the first five wujūh of
) (
Dar ta ārud: and explains several of Ibn Taymiyya’s initial objections to Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s argument.
These, however, do not always express Ibn Taymiyya’s most fundamental disagreements which some-
times come very late in his work (see, e.g. note 82). Kazi, “Reconciling Reason and Revelation,” 204–6,
attempts to formulate a “Taymiyyan Version of the ‘Universal Law’” which takes account of Ibn
)
Taymiyya’s admission of ta wı̄l and tafwı̄d. :
V 35
V. Conclusions
In recent years a number of studies pointed to the rationalism in Ibn Taymiyya’s
thinking.79 While engaged in a heavy polemic against people he terms “rationalist
objectors”,80 Ibn Taymiyya’s most fundamental positions often bear a great deal of simi-
(
larity with the positions held by his Ash arite opponents. This study has shown, for
instance, that whereas Ibn Taymiyya polemicizes against his opponents’ claim that
reason verifies revelation, his own position includes that claim as well.
Another example of a fundamental similarity between Ibn Taymiyya and his oppo-
nents is al-Ghazālı̄’s view of reason as the character witness (muzakkı̄) of revelation. Ibn
Taymiyya does not, as far as I can see, address this teaching from al-Ghazālı̄’s al-Qānūn
al-kullı̄ and hence we have no idea how he reacted to it. A parable from the early pages
( (
of Dar ta ārud,: however, addresses the claim that reason is the foundation (as: l) of
revelation and develops a position that is very close to what al-Ghazālı̄ says about reason
as a character witness. The passage talks about reason* and its role in the process of
verifying revelation:
Reason* points to the trustworthiness (s: idq) of the prophet in a general and
(
absolute way. [Reason*] is like an untrained man ( āmmı̄), who, if he knows
the expertise of the muftı̄ [M] and points someone else [S] towards him,
explains to the latter [S] that the former [M] is a scholar and a muftı̄. When the
untrained man, who points to the muftı̄, disagrees with the muftı̄, it is incum-
bent upon the one who requests a fatwā [S] to submit to the teachings of the
muftı̄. Now, consider the untrained man says to the one who requests a fatwā
[S]: “I am the foundation (al-as: l ) of your knowledge that he is a muftı̄. Now
that his teachings oppose my teachings, if you give preference to his teachings
over mine you dismiss (qadahta) : the source by which you found out that he
is a muftı̄.” The one who requests the fatwā [S] answers: “Once you acknowl-
edged that he is a muftı̄ and once you pointed to this fact, you acknowledged
the necessity of following him rather than following you, and this is what your
pointing (dalı̄l ) acknowledged. My agreement with you regarding this particu-
lar knowledge [namely knowing who is the muftı̄] does not mean that I also
agree with you in your knowledge about other issues. Your mistake in
79
Yahya Michot, “Vanites intellectuelles;” idem, “A Mamlūk Theologian’s Commentary on Avicenna’s
) (
Risāla ad: hawiyya
: being a Translation of a Part of the Dar ta ārud: of Ibn Taymiyya, with Introduction,
Annotation, and Appendices,” Journal of Islamic Studies 14 (2003), 149–203 and 309–63; von
K€ugelgen, “Ibn Taymı̄yas Kritik an der aristotelischen Logik;” Jon Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of
Perpetual Optimism (Leiden: Brill, 2007); von K€ ugelgen, “The Poison of Philosophy,” Vasalou, Ibn
Taymiyya’s Theological Ethics; Anjum, Politics, Law, and Community, 182–86, and Merlin L. Swartz,
(
“A Seventh-Century Sunni Creed: The Aqı̄da Wāsit:ı̄ya of Ibn Taymı̄ya,” Humaniora Islamica 1 (1974),
91–131: 95. For a review of recent Arabic publications that appreciate Ibn Taymiyya’s rationalism see
Georges Tamer, “The Curse of Philosophy. Ibn Taymiyya as a Philosopher in Contemporary Islamic
Thought,” Islamic Theology, 329–74.
80
See above note 63.
V
disagreeing with the muftı̄, who is more knowledgeable than you, does not
mean that you are also mistaken in knowing that he is a muftı̄.”81
(
In this parable, the untrained man ( āmmı̄) verifies the expertise and the trustworthiness
of another person – namely the muftı̄ ([M]) – quite similar to how al-Ghazālı̄’s character
witness points to the chief witness’ truthfulness (s: idq). In their two respective parables, the
untrained man and the character witness represent reason. In both cases their task is to
point to the truthfulness of those who in this parable represent revelation. Through their
witnessing that revelation is truthful and can be trusted the untrained man as well as the
character witness both enlist revelation as a source of original knowledge in fields where
they themselves (i.e. reason) have no expertise. These similarities between Ibn Taymiyya’s
and al-Ghazālı̄’s parable again illustrate that both hold reason verifies revelation.
Yet Ibn Taymiyya’s parable is longer and introduces a third character, the one who
seeks advice in matters of Islamic law ([S]). He represents the Muslim believer who is
puzzled by two sources of knowledge (reason and revelation), which in al-Ghazālı̄’s
model overlap and lead to a possible conflict, at least on the level of the outward sense
of revelation. In Ibn Taymiyya’s parable, reason* is dismissed once it has done its job of
pointing to revelation. The Muslim believer resorts to revelation and dismisses the claims
of reason – here represented by the claims of the untrained man – to hold any expertise
in matters where revelation – namely the muftı̄ – is authoritative.
The decisive difference between Ibn Taymiyya and opponents such as al-Ghazālı̄
and Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ is not about whether reason is a foundation (as: l) of revelation –
they all agree that it indeed is – but what claims follow from that. Ibn Taymiyya clarifies
this only late in his work, namely at the beginning of the 34th viewpoint (wajh) of his
)
Dar :
Those who oppose revelation and prioritize their opinion over what the Mes-
senger conveys, they [also] say: “Reason is the foundation (as: l ) of revelation. If
we prioritized revelation over reason, this would mean the dismissal of the
foundation of revelation.” This statement is indeed correct on their part (s: ahı̄: h)
:
82
if they acknowledge the truth (s: ih: hat)
: of revelation without objecting [to it].
From the fact that revelation relies on reason in order to be identified and to work – so
to speak –, al-Ghazālı̄ and Fakhr al-Dı̄n deduce that it must be understood through the
parameters of the same reason that makes it work. It is this claim that Ibn Taymiyya
denies. Ibn Taymiyya hence denies the second step in our reconstruction of Fakhr
al-Dı̄n’s argument and not the initial premise of reason being the foundation (as: l) of
revelation. Like his opponents, he needs reason to identify revelation, but once that has
happened he is no longer in need of it, at least as far as theology is concerned, and
claims that what can be known in theology must be taken from revelation.
81 ) (
Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud, 1:138.9–17.
82 ) (:
See Ibn Taymiyya, Dar ta ārud,
: 5:340–41; see Abrahamov, “Ibn Taymiyya on the Agreement,” 270.
V 37
So far so clear. This dispute, however, is complicated by the fact that with regard to
(
certain objects of theology, Ash arites such as al-Ghazālı̄ held the same position as Ibn
Taymiyya about the sole authority of revelation. Regarding the afterlife, for instance,
al-Ghazālı̄ fully agreed with the notion that reason cannot contribute to its knowledge
and that it is the sole domain of revelation.83 Not so, however, when it comes to God’s
attributes, where al-Ghazālı̄ claims that reason and revelation must be used together.
From this perspective, the dispute between al-Ghazālı̄ and Ibn Taymiyya looks like an
ordinary disagreement on the bounds of reason, similar, for instance, to the one between
al-Ghazālı̄ and Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 595/1198). Ibn Rushd claimed that metaphysics
and theology is a field that is fully subject to demonstrative arguments. Al-Ghazālı̄ denied
that.84 In principle, both agreed on their understanding how reasonable arguments are
produced and how their conclusions can be verified. They disagreed on how far the
authority of reason reaches into such fields as metaphysics. The case looks similar here:
In his dispute with Ibn Taymiyya, al-Ghazālı̄ claims that the divine attributes are an object
where demonstrative arguments contribute to a human understanding of the divine. Ibn
Taymiyya denied it. Hence, Ibn Taymiyya and al-Ghazālı̄ disagree about which objects
of human knowledge fall into the sole authority of revelation. Their focus point is the
divine attributes. Despite all his polemics, however, I would argue that Ibn Taymiyya’s
most basic conception about the relationship between reason and revelation is the same
as al-Ghazālı̄’s, represented by the earlier Venn diagram.
Ibn Taymiyya and al-Ghazālı̄, however, disagree on more than just the bounds of
reason. Their dispute is further complicated by the fact that they have different
(
understandings of the meaning of the word “reason” ( aql). For, al-Ghazālı̄ and also
Fakhr al-Dı̄n, this word refers to an inquiry that is guided by Aristotelian logic and by an
Aristotelian understanding of demonstration (burhān). These two expect every credible
scholar in Islamic theology and its adjacent disciplines to be firm in Aristotelian logic.85
Aristotelian logic is the tool that allows scholars like al-Ghazālı̄ and Fakhr al-Dı̄n to verify
their teachings. Aristotle’s “toolbox,” the Organon, teaches among other things the
correct formation of definitions and how these definitions are used in prepositions.
These prepositions, in turn, are employed in syllogistic arguments that yield correct con-
clusions which themselves form the premises of other syllogisms. In the understanding
of such scholars as al-Ghazālı̄ and Fakhr al-Dı̄n, the correct use of Aristotelian logic
allows the construction of epistemological edifices that reach to the highest knowledge
that is possible for humans and even contribute to our knowledge of God.
83
Cf. al-Ghazālı̄, The Incoherence of the Philosophers / Tahāfut al-falāsifa, 214.17–18: “What has come
down [in revelation] describing paradise and fire and the details of these states has reached a degree [of
certainty] that does not allow allegorical interpretation.”
84
Frank Griffel, Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam. Die Entwicklung zu al-Ġazālı̄s Urteil gegen die
Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 467–68.
85
See, for instance, al-Ghazālı̄, who in his Faysal
: al-tafriqa, 188.10–18, says that all disputes between
Muslims theologians would disappear if they were familiar with the rules of burhān, i.e. Aristotelian
apodeixis.
V
This does not hold true for Ibn Taymiyya. In several of his writings, most importantly
( ) (
al-Radd alā l-mant: iqiyyı̄n and Dar ta ārud, : Ibn Taymiyya presents a far-reaching
critique of Aristotelian logic that thoroughly undermines any suggestion it could serve as
the basis of whatever epistemological edifice. Definitions, Ibn Taymiyya claims, “define”
what is already known to those who use concepts. These definitions do not grasp any
“essences” or “realities” (haqı̄qāt)
: of the concepts since none of that exists outside of the
human minds. “Genus,” “species,” and “specific differences” are nothing but hollow
words that represent artificial distinctions with no grounding in the individuals they are
supposed to describe. Syllogisms are formal constrains to a wide variety of arguments
that people may find convincing. The Qur’an and the Hadith teach the use of arguments
in a much better way than any textbook of Aristotelian logic.86
Despite his harsh criticism of Aristotelian logic, Ibn Taymiyya does not deny that
there are rules that govern the right conduct of human reason*. These, however, are not
those taught in the textbooks of logic written by Ibn Sı̄nā, al-Ghazālı̄, or Fakhr al-Dı̄n
al-Rāzı̄. Rather, the correct rules are those that are encompassed in what Ibn Taymiyya
calls the human fit:ra. They can be learned, for instance, from revelation, which is a
manifestation of the correct use of reason*. The correct use of reason* verifies the truth
of revelation and revelation verifies the right use of reason.
In an article published in 2007 about the role of fit: ra and claims about “natural law”
(
in the works of Sayyid Qut:b (1906–66) and Abū l-A lā Mawdūdı̄ (1903–79), I have
already pointed to a vicious circle in Islamist or Salafist claims about reason and natural
law.87 I see the same vicious circle here in the theology of Ibn Taymiyya. In fact, it is the
circle in Ibn Taymiyya’s theology that will eventually lead to the one we find in the
thought of Sayyid Qut:b, Mawdūdı̄, and other Islamist thinkers. They claim that natural
reason* (or “uncontaminated reason”) reaches the very same results as those that we find
in revelation. Given, however, that for Ibn Taymiyya and his modern followers there is
no method of verifying reason* which is independent from revelation, we have no way
of really knowing what reason* actually teaches other than taking it from revelation. For
(
his Ash arite opponents, logic, the method of demonstration (burhān), and the formal
rules of arguing provide a method of verifying the judgments of reason which is indeed
independent of revelation. Ibn Taymiyya’s rejection of formal logic, however, and his
failure to put something in its stead that does not itself depend on revelation,88 deprives
him of that independent verification and leads to the circularity that I think characterizes
his thought and that of many of his followers.
86
von K€ugelgen, “Poison of Philosophy,” 291–97, 314–20; eadem, “Ibn Taymı̄yas Kritik an der aristote-
lischen Logik,” 176–214.
87
Frank Griffel, “The Harmony of Natural Law and Shari’a in Islamist Theology,” Shari’a: Islamic Law
in the Contemporary Context., eds. A. Amanat and F. Griffel (Stanford [Calif.]: Stanford University Press,
2007), 38–61, 196–203. On this vicious circle see also Vasalou, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theological Ethics, 251–
61.
88 (
On the obscurity and vagueness of Ibn Taymiyya’s two key concepts sarı̄ : h: al- aql and fitra
: see, for
instance, von K€ugelgen, “Ibn Taymı̄yas Kritik an der aristotelischen Logic,” 194–95.
V 39

Ibn Taymiyya and His Ash Arite Opponents On Reason and Revelation

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Ibn Taymiyya and His Ash arite Opponents on

I. “Reason is the Foundation

not reside in a place (hayyiz).

prioritized over reason as qadh: – meaning a “dismissal” or also a “slander” or

II. Reason as the Character Witness (muzakkı¯) of

III. The Structure of Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s Argument on the

reliable way of verifying revelation is through a comparison of what is already known

If this is meant to be a report of Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s position, it is at least careless since it

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