Viktor Frankl: Opposing Views

Author(s): Karlheinz Biller, Jay I. Levinson and Timothy Pytell

Source: Journal of Contemporary History , Jan., 2002, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp.
105-113
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3180748

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Journal
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HistoryCopyright
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? 2002
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SAGE
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Karlheinz
Karlheinz Biller,
Biller,Jay
JayI. I.Levinson
Levinsonand
and
Timothy
Timothy
Pytell
Pytell

Viktor Franki - Opposing Views

Prof. Dr Karlheinz Biller writes:

The following is a concise critique of selected accusations against Viktor

Frankl made by Timothy Pytell in his article 'The Missing Pieces of the Puzzle:
A Reflection on the Odd Career of Viktor Frankl', which appeared in the April
2000 issue of this Journal.
Viktor Frankl (1905-97) was a Consultant and Professor of Neurology and
Psychiatry at the University of Vienna. He was also the founder of logotherapy,
which brought him worldwide attention and recognition. Because he was a
Jew, he had to wind up his private consultancy in 1939 and take up the position
offered him as head of the neurological section at the Rothschild-Spital in
Vienna, where between 1939 and 1942 he stayed with the euthanasia pro-
gramme to the best of his abilities, working with patients who had attempted
suicide, including those on whom other doctors had given up. During this time,
his wife lost their first child in a medical abortion. Between 1942 and 1945, he
survived four concentration camps, but lost his parents, his brother and his
wife. In spite of all his sufferings, after the war he came out in favour of recon-
ciliation and against the notion of collective guilt. He thus attracted extensive
recognition and attention, but also much criticism. His untypical behaviour
puzzled some people, and many also could not understand his decision to
revisit Vienna after the war. Frankl defended himself against the criticisms of
the professionals concerning his logotherapy by citing accounts of empirical
investigations, mostly in American publications. He could not bear injustice,
and went out of his way to help everyone, even his enemies.
The accusations made against Frankl by Pytell are based on misinterpreta-
tions and assumptions. Recognition is only possible when we realize that the
meaning of what is real for ourselves and our actions can only be experienced
personally, and this meaning cannot be regulated the same for all by an
authority. Pytell sets himself up as just such an authority who wants to regu-
late the meaning of reality for others. Whatever does not correspond to his
interpretation of meaning, somewhat in the form of wishful thinking, is
excluded. But this serves neither to find the truth nor to increase knowledge. It
rather intensifies the opposition of the existing different readings of the actual
situation. The meaning of science lies in the continuity of interpretation, but
more especially in the contribution it has to make in helping the love between
humans to lead to a peaceful world. For, if pursued to the end, the final aim of
scientific clarification is to empower human beings to use their minds to create
a peaceful world in which love is the guiding principle.

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106 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 37 No I

Against this background, Pytell's article manifests methodological weak-

nesses, because he pays no attention to the basics of hermeneutical interpreta-
tion such as openly stating his prejudices; making known his assumptions, and
exploiting the details of Frankl's life and work in all their significance and not
just from a biased point of view, taking into account the hermeneutical differ-
ence so as to attain a better understanding of the author than he himself may
have had. It is also necessary to address self-critical objections and exonerating
facts. Pytell neglects to portray the spirit of the age, and thus man's state of
consciousness, and to bring these to bear on his opinions. He judges and inter-
prets from the perspective of today's consciousness, in which there has been a
deterioration in the usage and practice of language, which has taken on a
different meaning from that which pertained at the time in question. If the
interpretation of a lived life does not encompass the historical conditions of
that which is condemned, then it cannot be correct in reality. This is the case
with Pytell's elaborations.
Pytell does not use his sources impartially. He reports that Frankl spoke to
students of brain surgery at the United States International University in 1972
(294). But even here, Pytell finds nothing more useful to say of Frankl than:
'Never one to express much self-doubt, he confidently recounted his efforts'
(291). He even 'proudly narrated' that he had no training in brain surgery
(291). Pytell does not rise to any scientific level with such subjective comments.
Instead of value-free descriptions we are given assessments and interpreta-
tions, full of prejudice, which are presented as certainties. Pytell cites as an
example of Frankl's role 'as reconciler', his '(small) part' in the Waldheim affair
(304). Such a statement clearly indicates how the author's assessments and
interpretations predominate. Thus, Frankl was presented by Waldheim with
the 'Great Silver Badge of Honour with the Star' (304), and was honoured by
him as someone who advocated reconciliation. 'Frankl looked directly into the
camera with an expression that appeared slightly sheepish.... Waldheim, smil-
ing, towered over Frankl and appeared polished, genteel and happy' (304).
And: 'Frankl's wife, standing in the background with her eyes averted,
appeared sullen' (304). Here Pytell judges from appearances, based on precon-
ceptions which he does not make clear to the reader. From this uncertain basis,
he hazards a statement about reality, which indicates how open to attack Pytell
is. Throughout, this is Pytell's way of commenting on and assessing events,
actions and dates. He therefore does not arrive at new insights, but merely
expresses his insinuations and assumptions, thereby never reaching a scientific
level. The reader may thus ask himself what is the purpose of this subjective,
unverifiable interpretation of Frankl's look into the camera. The next sentence
gives him the answer. Pytell's interpretation prepares the ground for his next
claim: 'Frankl was helping in the domestic rehabilitation of Waldheim' (304).
The reader must see through Pytell's eyes how badly Frankl feels in his own
skin, how 'embarrassed' he is, in what a moral dilemma he finds himself. As
soon as the reader shares this view with Pytell, he cannot but reach the con-
clusion that Frankl should not have accepted this sign of recognition from

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Biller, Levinson and Pytell: Viktor Frank - Opposing Views 107

Waldheim, given the circumstances of the Waldheim affair. The reader has to
assess as 'disgraceful' Frankl's decision to accept the medal (304). But by doing
so, we learn nothing new, but are merely presented with an uncritical point of
view. According to members of Frankl's family, he wanted to draw attention to
the unjust attacks on Waldheim by the public. The 'sheepish' expression is
therefore clearly a misinterpretation by Pytell.
On the basis of this meta-critique, Frankl can no longer be directly or
indirectly accused of being all too ready to collaborate with the national
socialist establishment (medical research, the saving of suicide patients, the
reception of new arrivals at Theresienstadt), because basically he had been
prepared to adapt (the 19-year-old Frankl had adapted to the rules of the
Socialist Party which did not tolerate Jews). Hence, these facts cannot explain
either Frankl's rejection of the idea of collective guilt or his advocacy of recon-
ciliation. Consequently, the complex attack on Frankl is repelled.
To achieve scientific honesty, it is not enough simply to search out those
things 'which are not in his books' (Frankl, Was nicht in meinen Biichern
steht, Munich 1995), but also what the 'book' of his life contains. The 'book'
of his life proves, for example, that Frankl overcame his sub-human hate for
his attackers and realized one of the greatest achievements of which humans
are capable, namely to forgive and pardon, despite the fact that immeasurable
suffering had been inflicted on him. He thereby contributed to breaking the
chain of suffering and evil.
Frankl recognized the need to do everything possible to prevent the creation
of a climate in which an evil regime could again be established. He therefore
strengthened that which was sound in human life and society so that danger-
ous elements were denied the influence for which they strove. Since every
sickness originates in something or someone, he made every effort to prevent
anything which would produce new discord in society. He wanted to prevent
the next generation from being driven into the arms of those who sought a
revival of nazism, and kept repeating his fear of this happening, for which he
received much 'stick'. He pleaded not only in words and writing for the chain
of suffering and evil to be broken, but also by example. He showed that what
he called for was no utopia, but was realizable.
The achievement of a humanist who had to struggle cannot be too highly
acknowledged. Whoever takes his life as an example must also let the human
greatness of Frankl - especially his overcoming of hate and revenge - shine
through. In this way, we may come nearer to the truth. And whoever, with
today's knowledge, judges decisions taken by Frankl some 60 years ago, must
also take this into account.

Karlheinz Biller
is Professor of Pedagogy at Christian-Albrecht's University of Kiel
and Chairman of the German Association of Logotherapy and
Existential Analysis. He is the author of many books and articles.

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108 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 37 No I

Dr Jay Levinson writes:

It was with great sadness that I read the article by Timothy Pytell on Dr Viktor
Frankl. Although it appeared well-researched and 'documented', the con-
clusions drawn by the author are, in reality, completely inaccurate. As a
student and colleague of Dr Frankl for over 20 years, I feel compelled to
respond, although Frankl himself would never have done so. It was always his
feeling that any quasi-public figure might be criticized and had to learn to
endure it. In fact, I fear that by writing this, I am only drawing attention to its
vulgar theme, much like the media draws attention to terrorists by publicizing
their horrific actions. However, I was so taken aback by Pytell's attack on the
integrity of this wonderful man that I feel that I must set the record straight.
Despite Pytell's attempts to 'document' the facts, the conclusions he drew
were completely distorted and represent the basest kind of self-serving jour-
nalism.
It is patently absurd to suggest that Frankl was in any way pro-nazi. The
fact that he spent over three years in concentration camps qualifies him as a
victim of nazism, not a collaborator. Existence under any totalitarian regime is
tenuous at best. The Third Reich brought terrorism and racism to previously
unheard-of levels of dehumanization, death and destruction. Fear and intimi-
dation were their watchwords. Anyone, especially a Jew, wishing to continue
the practice and research of psychiatry at that time had to try to work within
the parameters established by the totalitarian regime, while hoping and pray-
ing for a political change.
I was recently privileged to hear a performance of Shostakovich's Thirteenth
Symphony, which puts to music the magnificent poem of Yevtushenko, 'Babi
Yar'. Before the concert, Yevtushenko himself explained the history of the
piece written under communist Russian rule. For many years, until the fall of
communism, the piece could not be played in the Soviet Union as it was origi-
nally written. Rather, both Yevtushenko and Shostakovich had to modify the
piece to appease their Russian oppressors. Given the choice of no performance
or a modified one, they chose the latter in order to convey the crucial message
of the atrocities of Babi Yar and the lessons to be learned from them. It is only
since the fall of the totalitarian regime that the piece has been performed in its
original form. The work of Frankl and all those who suffered at the hands of
the nazis must be similarly understood. Perhaps it is this very experience of
survivor guilt that forged Frankl's extraordinary sense of forgiveness.
Pytell's distorted interpretations of Frankl's 'experiments' with suicidal
patients is an outrage to any student of Frankl, whose views on suicide and
assisted suicide are well documented in the literature. He was opposed to
anyone taking their own life and even more opposed to those who would
help them. Frankl believed that suicide was always irrational and that if one
could focus on the meanings to be found in one's unavoidable suffering, one
could survive the experience. He felt that by rising to the challenge of one's
circumstances, rather than being overwhelmed by their burden, one could tap

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Biller, Levinson and Pytell: Viktor Frankl - Opposing Views 109

into
into the
thedefiant
defiantpower
power ofof
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human
humanspirit
spirit
and and
turnturn
tragedy
tragedy
into heroism.
into heroism.
He He
spent
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conveythis
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to others
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helped
helpedmillions
millions
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during
during
and after
and after
the war
thetowar
do to do
just that.
The notion that Frankl was an 'opportunist' and 'self-promoter' is ridicu-
lous. Frankl often modestly described himself by quoting Stekel who said (and
I paraphrase), 'Even the dwarf standing on the shoulders of the giant reaches
further.' He always felt that he was that dwarf standing on the shoulders of his
psychiatric predecessors. In addition, anyone who knew him understood that
he was a shy, humble man who shunned the spotlight and never indulged in
self-promotion. Nowhere does Frankl advertise his myriad of awards and
honours. In fact, as a guest in Frankl's home, I was surprised to see that he
kept his substantial collection of awards and memorabilia on inexpensive steel
shelves in a closed side room, turning it into a virtual storage cupboard. This
was certainly not the trophy room of an opportunistic self-promoter.
Lastly, if Frankl was, indeed, the opportunist whom Pytell described, why
did he die a man of very modest financial means who, by the accounts of most
scholars in the field, was tremendously under-recognized? Many people have
heard of Man's Search for Ultimate Meaning, but few associate it with
logotherapy and/or Dr Frankl. Although his impact, as reported by the Library
of Congress, was substantial, he never promoted himself. In fact, he sold the
rights to Man's Search for Ultimate Meaning for a paltry sum. He chose to
make personal appearances only to those groups he felt were worthy, many of
whom could not even offer an honorarium to cover his travel expenses. Few
people know that he wrote 32 books and published over 700 scholarly
articles. Unlike many famous authors, he refused the services of an agent,
publicist and/or marketing adviser. His family and close friends reluctantly
took on these duties at Frankl's insistence. He never asked to have his books
available for sale at his lectures and shunned promotional appearances such as
book tours and commercial talk television. Although Pytell described him as
'sheepish' (on account of his implied guilt) while accepting an award, he was
actually a shy man uncomfortable with public accolades, who only accepted
awards when pressured by others to do so. If Frankl was an opportunist, then
he was a very poor one. The fact is that he was neither an opportunist nor a
self-promoter.
In closing, I should like to say that many great men are subjected to the
criticism of others. I defend the right of a free press so to criticize. Lincoln,
Roosevelt, Kennedy and J. Robert Oppenheimer are but a few who come to
mind as having been inappropriately maligned in their time by their enemies.
As history vindicated them and placed them in their proper perspective, I
firmly believe that Frankl's work speaks for itself and will find its own place in
history. Unfortunately, although possibly well-intentioned, Pytell appears to
have fallen into his own trap by projecting his own need for self-promotion
and opportunism onto one of the finest men I have ever known.

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110 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 37 No I

Jay I. Levinson
is a licensed psychologist in private practice in Baltimore, MD. He
served as a Special Assistant to Dr Viktor Frankl for over 20 years
and edited his last book, Man's Search for Ultimate Meaning
(New York 1997).

Professor Timothy Pytell responds:

No doubt, as students and followers of Frankl's brand of psychotherapy -

logotherapy - both Biller and Levinson are invested in the public memory of
Viktor Frankl. I certainly do not expect that my revelations and reflections on
Frankl's life will disabuse them of their idolatry. But Frankl was certainly a
much more ambiguous figure than his quasi-saintly public persona belied. In
my opinion this ambiguity is established because neither Biller nor Levinson
dispute the facts but just the interpretation I bring to them. Therefore, based
on this common ground of facts, it seems to me that Biller's and Levinson's
apologetics reflect an unspoken acceptance of much of my revision.
Biller begins by accusing me of conceiving myself as 'an authority on
reality'. For sure, when it comes to the life of Viktor Frankl I know more than
most but I rest assured that others know as much or more and I respect their
authority.' Still, both Biller and Levinson claim that my approach to Frankl
is biased. Therefore, I think it might be helpful to clarify the origins of my
critical approach. For anyone who has written a doctoral dissertation it will
come as no surprise that the questions I was asking that drew me to study
Viktor Frankl, and the subsequent intellectual production, are somewhat
remote. Originally I was interested in the theoretical issues of nihilism, the
popularization of existentialism, the association of existentialism with the
origins of thanatology and the phenomenon of mass death in the twentieth
century. In the simplest terms I was trying to write a history that began with
Freud's positing of the death instinct and concluded with Kervorkian and the
science of thanatology. Somewhat naively, I thought Frankl's life might pro-
vide a case study for these issues.2 But these theoretical issues soon became
overwhelmed by the biographical details of Frankl's life.
I can trace my critical approach to Viktor Frankl to a specific moment. In
the summer of 1995, I spent a month researching the life of Frankl at the
Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California. As I reflected on the
research, I kept returning to one slightly shocking discovery that seemed out of
character for a Holocaust survivor. In his 1981 taped interview with the
Canadian film-maker, Tom Corrigan, Frankl hesitantly described the experi-

1 I am thinking here of Frankl's official biographer, Haddon Klingberg.

2 For those very familiar with Frankl's intellectual life this thought may not appear naive, espe-
cially since he claimed that logotherapy solved the philosophical issue of nihilism.

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Biller, Levinson and Pytell: Viktor Frankl - Opposing Views IIIl

mental brain surgery he performed on suicidal Jewish patients from 1940 to

1942. Obviously something seemed strangely amiss. What was the context of
these experiments? Why had there been no discussion of his efforts in the
literature on him? Was Frankl hiding something? It seemed that he was, since
he began the discussion of the experiments by telling Corrigan that he was
describing details of his life 'scarcely known to anyone'. Frankl also told
Corrigan that these details were 'only for you and Joseph Fabry' and 'can't be
used without special permission', and then added 'even though these details
can't be of use . . . but might be of interest'. At that moment a gap opened up
between Frankl's public persona and the reality of his activities as a man. The
gap became a chasm as I pursued my research, but I never set out to criticize
him or attack his integrity, although I did maintain a certain critical distance
that I consider objective.
Of all Frankl's ambiguous activities the experimental surgery is the most
troubling. Biller's claim that my description of Frankl's attitude toward the
research is biased sidesteps the issue that these experiments were morally, and
in terms of the medical practice of his time, ethically questionable. To cover
this ambiguity, Biller begins his article with the statement that at the
Rothschild hospital Frankl 'stayed with the euthanasia programme to the best
of his abilities . . .'. There is a problem of translation here because, as stated,
this claim suggests Frankl was fulfilling an obligation to the euthanasia pro-
gramme. In the original German text Biller uses the term 'unterlaufen', literally
under-run, translated as 'avoid' the euthanasia programme. Even with the
proper translation, Biller's claim raises a number of questions. I am very
curious to know more about the context of these experiments and what moti-
vated Frankl. Did Frankl tell Biller that he conducted the experiments in order
to avoid or accommodate the euthanasia programme? When I asked the
specialist on euthanasia, Wolfgang Neugebauer, who is the Director of the
Dokumentationsarchiv des Osterreichischen Widerstandes in Vienna about
Frankl's experiments, he claimed that Frankl had nothing to do with the
euthanasia programme.3
I found Levinson's comments on the experiments to have more substance,
despite the fact that he conceives of my work as 'self-serving journalism'. His
claim that 'Anyone . .. wishing to continue the practice and research of psy-
chiatry . . . had to try to work within the parameters established by the totali-
tarian regime' seems to echo my own opinion that the experiments were highly
questionable and a form of accommodation. That said, it would certainly have
been the right, albeit difficult choice, if Frankl had refused to continue to

3 Frankl claimed that he, along with his mentor Otto Potzl, sabotaged euthanasia by having
schizophrenic patients re-diagnozed with physical problems. But once again this claim raises a
number of questions. For example, which nazis asked for patients? How often? Under what cir-
cumstances?, etc. Most importantly, if Frankl was really aware of these things, one is left wonder-
ing why he provided no witness in the euthanasia trials after the war. As far as I know, Frankl first
made this claim about sabotaging euthanasia in 1968 in an interview with Mary Hall in
Psychology Today. Potzl could not corroborate Frankl's claim because he died in 1962.

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1 12 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 37 No I

practise. I agree with Levinson that Frankl 'qualifies as a victim of nazism' but
I still maintain that his experiments 'border on collaboration'. Victimhood
and collaboration are not mutually exclusive; actually, the latter implies the
former. I also agree that my view would be 'an outrage to any student of
Frankl'. But the point is that I am not his student. And, I concede in the article
that Frankl 'was long concerned with the problem of suicide'. I also argue that
his opinion that suicide is never an option belies the complexity of life. But
more to the point, the doctors in Berlin who faced similar choices when con-
fronted with suicides, decided not to revive them. As horrible as that reality is,
that was the right choice.
Although the historical circumstances are profoundly different, Levinson's
analogy between the origins and performance of Yevtushenko's 'Babi Yar' and
Frankl's logotherapy works to a degree. But unlike Yevtushenko, Frankl never
made such a contrite act in public. He never came forward and said 'Under the
nazis I modified logotherapy and my medical practice.' I suspect that it will be
up to the logotherapists to attempt to draw these distinctions. It certainly
would have been better if Frankl had.
As a historian, I hold to the ideal that straightforward and honest portrayals
of the past (although often uncomfortable and not necessarily fulfilling Biller's
aspirations for love between humans, etc.) are the best way to stabilize liberal
democratic political cultures. In my view, Austria's political malaise is deeply
tied to the failure to come to terms with its nazi past. That Waldheim (and
Haider) exemplifies this malaise is a generally-accepted supposition of
historians. The fact that Frankl appeared publicly with Waldheim after the
revelations about his past insulted Viennese Jews in particular and the memory
of the Holocaust in general. I maintain that it was disgraceful. Perhaps it was
wishful thinking then, or the hope that Frankl had a conscience that led me
to describe his countenance as sheepish. But where I see a sheepish Frankl,
Levinson sees a humble, shy man who was pressured to accept the award.
Biller, on the other hand, claims, 'According to members of Frankl's family, he
wanted to draw attention to the unjust attacks on Waldheim.' Which of us is
correct? A picture is worth .... But what is clear is that the two disciples are
in direct contradiction. Levinson sees a humble, shy man under pressure, while
Biller's 'official' family version suggests that Frankl identified with Waldheim
and actively supported him. And here we come to the heart of the controversy
over Frankl - memory.
In recent years, historians have come to realize that memory often has a
mythical quality somewhat removed from fact and reality. We have also come
to recognize that memory has a multitude of levels (personal, public, local and
national) where particular events take on different significance. In addition,
the function that memory plays in stabilizing different identities has become a
central concern. I believe that I have successfully proved that Frankl's personal
memory as put down in his autobiography, Was nicht in meinen Biichern
steht, omitted important details and falsified certain realities. I also believe
that Frankl's public statements and appearances both supported the burial of

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Biller, Levinson and Pytell: Viktor Frankl - Opposing Views 1 13

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Timothy Pytell
is Visiting Assistant Professor of History at Colorado College,
Colorado Springs. He is the author of 'Viktor Frankl and the Genesis
of the Third Viennese School of Psychology', The Psychoanalytic
Review, 88, 2 (April 2002), and of Der Mann, der gerne Konig wire
(Innsbruck, Vienna and Munich 2002).

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