Psychological Reactions to Russian War 1

Citizens’ Psychological Reactions following the Russian invasion of the Ukraine: A

cross-national study

Morten Moshagen

Ulm University

Benjamin E. Hilbig

University of Koblenz-Landau
Psychological Reactions to Russian War 2

Abstract

Following the invasion of the Ukraine by the Russian Federation, NATO and European

countries implemented immediate, strong, and extraordinary unified policies sanctioning

Russia. Given that the degree of unity that can be upheld in the longer term arguably also

depends on citizens’ reactions and opinions in such countries, the present study sought to

explore emotional reactions, perceived justifiability, the willingness to welcome refugees, and

the desired severity of sanctions against Russia, and further investigated relevant individual

differences variables. Comparative analyses of samples from Germany (n = 296), Great-

Britain (n = 297), Poland (n = 291), and the United States (n = 297), indicate high emotional

involvement (in terms of anger, anxiety, empathy for people in the Ukraine, and perceived

threat), an almost complete absence of perceived justifiability of Russia’s action, a high

willingness to welcome refugees, and an overall strong – but more varied – desire to

implement severe sanctions against Russia. Whereas the European samples, and the Polish

sample in particular, overall exhibited the strongest reactions and desired the most severe

sanctions, responses were overall characterized by exceptional unity across the countries

studied.

Keywords: Anger; Anxiety; Justifications; Russian-Ukrainian war; Threat

Psychological Reactions to Russian War 3

Psychological Reactions following the Russian invasion of the Ukraine

On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation – by order of its President, Vladimir Putin –

invaded its southwest neighboring country, the Ukraine. Since this steep escalation of

conflict, much has been made of the uncommonly unified response of “western” countries,

that is, the strikingly unanimous actions taken by NATO, the European Union, and European

countries in general. However, although what is arguably the most severe military conflict in

Europe since World War II has, at least temporarily, united western politicians and

institutions, little is known about the individual psychological reactions of citizens in western

countries. More specifically, little is known about their emotional state or their judgments

about the justifiability of Russia’s invasion and the consequences their own countries ought to

draw. In the long run, such reactions will arguably co-determine the level of public support

politicians in different countries can rely on and, thus, the degree of unity that can be upheld.

Indeed, despite apparent western unity on the policy level, citizens’ reactions may

arguably differ depending on their (geographical) proximity to Russia and Ukraine. For one,

citizens in in former Soviet countries such as the Baltic states may consider it more likely that

they, too, become targets of Russian expansion. In addition, spatial and social proximity also

implies less psychological distance (Trope & Liberman, 2010), which stimulates concrete vs

abstract judgment processes and increases the intensity as well as motivational relevance of

emotions (Mühlberger et al., 2008; Williams & Bargh, 2008). Correspondingly, relying on

samples from Germany, Great-Britain, Poland, and the United States, the first aim of the

present study is to determine similarities and differences concerning the extent of emotional

involvement in terms of anger, anxiety, empathy with people in the Ukraine, and perceived

threat, expecting that closer geographical proximity translates to higher emotional

involvement on said dimensions.

As a second aim, the present study also investigates whether and to which extent

participants perceive the Russian action to be justified. Specifically, Putin argued in his
Psychological Reactions to Russian War 4

speech on 24 February 2022 effectively declaring war on the Ukraine that the Russian

invasion of the Ukraine is justified and necessary because (a) ethnic Russians and the

Russian-speaking minority living in the Ukraine are threatened and persecuted (“what is

happening in the Donbas … is genocide”), (b) the Ukraine is a neo-Nazi regime that poses an

immediate threat to Russia (e.g., backed up by alleged shelling by Ukrainian military forces

on a Russian border checkpoint), and (c) the Ukrainian state was actually created by Russia

and - therefore – is rightfully part of Russia. As such, Putin justified the invasion as a

legitimate act of self-defense, as a response to (ethnic) Russians being threatened and even as

support for the Ukrainian people against a terrorist neo-Nazi regime, but also as a necessary

action correcting the historic error of an independent Ukrainian state. Beyond these lines of

justifications, however, individuals might also justify Russia’s action on other grounds,

including seeing the NATO’s eastward expansion as an act of provocation (an argument also

mirrored in other statements by Putin) or based on more general world views (such as

competitive jungle beliefs; Duckitt et al., 2002) and/or on beliefs on the appropriateness of

actions concerning interpersonal behavior (such as negative reciprocity; Eisenberger et al.,

2004) that are translated to international relations.

Emotional responses and the perceived justifiability of the Russian action likely co-

determine the extent to which sanctions against Russia are desired and supported. Generally

speaking, individuals usually endorse more severe punishments as function of the extent of

harm and moral outrage, both to restore retributive justice (e.g., Bastian et al., 2013; Darley &

Pittman, 2003), but also for the sake of special and general prevention (Twardawski et al.,

2020). It is thus to be expected that both, less perceived justifiability of the Russian action and

geographical proximity to Russia – and resulting increased emotional involvement – lend

itself to increased support for more severe sanctions against Russia, which is thus investigated

as a third aim of the present study.

Psychological Reactions to Russian War 5

Finally, beyond cross-national differences, we also investigate individual differences

concerning emotional involvement, the perceived justifiability of Russia’s actions, and the

desire to sanction Russia along with other consequences such as taking in refugees. Beyond

age and gender, we consider political orientation (in terms of a single left-right dimension)

and individual differences in socially aversive (“dark”; Paulhus & Williams, 2002)

personality (in terms of the Dark Factor of Personality, which represents the commonalities of

all socially aversive personality traits; Moshagen et al., 2018). In contrast to the historically

strong anti-communist and anti-Soviet positions associated with more right-leaning political

positions, (populist) right-wing parties in the West more recently often show rather strong

allegiance to Russia as an international “conservative power” (Diesen, 2020), so one might

expect a higher degree of perceived justifiability and less desire to sanction Russia associated

with more right-wing political orientations. Further, it seems plausible to assume that

individuals who strive for power and dominance (i.e., those who “maximize their individual

utility at the cost of others” Moshagen et al., 2018, p. 657) and hold beliefs that are used to

sanctify corresponding behaviors (Hilbig et al., 2022) apply similar rationales when judging

the behavior of others, including nation states, and are thus more likely to consider military

action as a legitimate way to reach political goals. Correspondingly, it is to be expected that

individuals with elevated levels of aversive personality will find Russia’s action more

justifiable and will be generally more will be more lenient in judging Russia.

Methods

The study has not been preregistered. The data and analysis scripts are available at the

open science foundation (osf) at https://osf.io/8e97a/?

view_only=5f9416cf761c47f7a18e9a004d6bef86

Participants and Procedure

Samples from Germany, Great Britain, Poland, and the United States were obtained

via a professional panel provider (prolific.co) between February, 26-27th (noon) and thus prior
Psychological Reactions to Russian War 6

to the Russian government’s announcement of having ordered the nuclear deterrent forces to

high alert, and also prior to the first peace talks at the Belarussian border. After providing

informed consent, participants first completed a measure of the Dark Factor of Personality,

then indicated their personal reactions to the event, and finally provided their judgements on

consequences and justifiability, the latter two presented in random order. All items within a

measure were presented in random order, including two interspersed attention check items.

Participants received a flat fee as compensation. Data collection was stopped upon completion

of 300 participants in each country. Participants were excluded if they failed at least on

attention check or due to insufficient language proficiency, which led to final sample sizes

between 291 and 297 participants by country. The sample characteristics by country are

shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Sample Characteristics by Country

Country N Age (SD) % male RILE (SD)

Germany 296 34.0 (10.7) 50 3.0 (1.1)
Great Britain 297 42.0 (15.7) 49 3.4 (1.3)
Poland 291 30.3 (9.4) 49 3.4 (1.3)
United States 297 41.8 (16.3) 49 3.0 (1.7)
Note. RILE = political orientation (left-right scale).

Measures

Psychological Reactions. Anger (e.g., “I feel angry.”; based on Spielberger, 1999) and

perceived threat (e.g. “I feel safe.”; reversed) were assessed with two items each.1 Anxiety

(e.g., “I feel worried.”; based on Marteau & Bekker, 1992) and empathy (e.g., “I try to

imagine what people in the Ukraine are going through.”; adapted from Čehajić et al., 2009)

were measured using three items each. All items were answered on a five-point scale ranging

from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”.

1
Due to a storage error, anger was assessed with a single item only in the British sample.
Psychological Reactions to Russian War 7

Consequences. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a five-point

scale to five statements describing a particular measure their country could take, namely “my

own and other countries should send military to support the Ukraine”, “my country should

send weapons to the Ukraine”, “my country should cutdown diplomatic relations with

Russia”, “my country should economically sanction Russia, even when this hurts the

economy of my own country.”, and “my country should welcome Ukrainian refugees”. We

also computed a total score (omitting the refugee item) indicating the overall tendency to

endorse sanctions against Russia.

Justifiability Judgements. Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale (ranging

from “not at all” to “completely”) to what extent they feel the Russian action is justified. Nine

statements that might be used as a justification were presented (Table 2), which include

reasons stated in the Russian declaration of war, but also reasons mentioned in other sources,

and statements that can be derived from social world views and interpersonal behavior. In

addition, a total score was computed indicating the overall perceived justifiability.

Individual Differences. Political orientation was assessed using a 7-point left-right self-

placement scale using “left” and “right” as anchors. A set of 16 items (8 negatively keyed;

e.g., “My own pleasure is all that matters.”; Moshagen et al., 2020) was used to measure the

Dark Factor of Personality, again using a five-point response scale.

Results

Emotional Reactions

Participants reported high levels of anger and empathy as well as elevated levels of

anxiety and perceived threat (Figure 1). Linear regressions with contrast-coded predictor

variables – c1: EU vs. US, c2: Poland vs. (DE, GB), and c3: DE vs. GB – provided support for

a proximity effect on perceived threat (β1 = .12, p < .01; β2 = .13, p < .01; β3 = .07, p = .08)

with participants from Poland reporting the highest (d = 0.54 compared to all other countries)
Psychological Reactions to Russian War 8

and participants from the US reporting least threat (d = -0.50 compared to all other countries).

Partial support for a proximity effect with European countries yielding stronger responses

compared to the US was evident concerning anxiety (β1 = .05, p < .01; β2 = -.01, p = .56; β3

= .03, p = .50) and anger (β1 = .06, p < .01; β2 = .02, p = .50; β3 = -.09, p = .02). By contrast,

concerning empathy the only difference occurred between Germany and Great-Britain (β1

= .03, p = .10; β2 = .02, p = .44; β3 = .27, p < .01). Thus, although participants from the US

tended to report less emotional involvement compared to participants from the remaining

countries, reactions were similar across countries overall, with perceived threat being the

main exception and most clearly yielding a proximity effect.

Justifiability

As evident from Table 2, the vast majority of participants of either country rejected

any of the provided justifications of Russia’s actions and thus judgments were extremely

unanimous across countries. Indeed, only 4% (Poland) to 6% (US) of respondents judged at

least one reason as “partly” or “completely” providing a justification. Nonetheless, small

differences were apparent in that participants from Poland indicated the least justifiability

overall (d = -0.21 compared to all other countries), which was also confirmed by linear

regression (β1 = -.03, p = .05; β2 = -.06, p < .01; β3 = .01, p = .73).

Consequences

Figure 2 shows that there was strong support to sanction Russia, though with notably

more variance across countries. Individuals from Poland typically showed the strongest

support across all measures (d = 0.57 compared to all other countries), but in particular

concerning supply of arms and sending military. Correspondingly, linear regression partially

supported a proximity effect in showing the largest support for consequences in Poland (β1

= .18, p < .01; β2 = .06, p < .01; β3 = -.18, p < .01), but least support in Germany, which was

primarily driven by the reluctance to cutdown diplomatic relations in this country. Of note,

31% (Germany) to 59% (Poland) endorsed sending military and thus risking an open military
Psychological Reactions to Russian War 9

conflict with Russia. Vice versa, only 0.1% (Poland) to 5% (US) of respondents rejected all

provided sanctions. Finally, there was a high willingness to welcome refugees in all countries

(83% to 93%), with only 2%-3% rejecting the acceptance of refugees.

Figure 1

Emotional Reactions by Country

Note. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. DE = Germany; GB = Great Britain; PL =

Poland; US = United States

Figure 2
Psychological Reactions to Russian War 10

Proportionate Agreement to Consequences

Note. DE = Germany; GB = Great Britain; PL = Poland; US = United States

Psychological Reactions to Russian War 11

Table 2

Judgements of Justifiability

Statement Germany Great-Britain Poland United States

M (SD) % Agree M (SD) % Agree M (SD) % Agree M (SD) % Agree

The Russian action is justified, because...

the world is just a merciless struggle for power and resources. 1.32 (0.72) 2.7 1.22 (0.61) 1.3 1.22 (0.62) 2.1 1.25 (0.69) 2.0

Russia was threatened and this is a legitimate form of self-protection. 1.26 (0.68) 2.4 1.27 (0.66) 1.7 1.10 (0.42) 0.7 1.32 (0.77) 3.0

Russia was provoked and had to take action. 1.29 (0.68) 2.0 1.27 (0.72) 3.0 1.08 (0.38) 0.7 1.26 (0.76) 3.0

the Ukraine is simply the inferior state. 1.08 (0.40) 0.7 1.08 (0.36) 0.0 1.11 (0.49) 1.7 1.10 (0.43) 0.7

it serves to balance power in the world. 1.21 (0.61) 1.4 1.19 (0.54) 0.7 1.08 (0.34) 0.0 1.20 (0.65) 2.4

it gives Russia the respect it deserves. 1.13 (0.44) 0.7 1.14 (0.48) 0.7 1.08 (0.39) 1.0 1.13 (0.49) 0.7

Russia has to protect Russian people living in the Ukraine. 1.27 (0.67) 1.7 1.25 (0.64) 1.3 1.14 (0.54) 1.7 1.37 (0.86) 3.7

the Ukrainian territory was historically part of Russia. 1.20 (0.63) 2.0 1.25 (0.61) 0.3 1.18 (0.54) 1.7 1.32 (0.73) 2.0

Note. % agree = Proportion of participants who judge a reason as “partly” or “completely” justifiable for Russia’s action.
Psychological Reactions to Russian War 12

Relations between Reactions, Justifiability, and Consequences

Table 3 shows the intercorrelations pooled across countries. Emotional responses were

moderately to strongly interrelated, and exhibited small to moderate associations to

consequences and justifiability in that participants reporting greater feelings of anxiety, anger,

empathy, and/or threat judged the Russian action to be less justified and supported stronger

measures against Russia. Also, seeing less justification for Russia’s actions was associated

with a stronger desire to implement measures against Russia. The overall pattern of relations

was similar in every country studied (see osf for details).

Individual Differences

As evident from Table 3, there were substantial gender differences with females

reporting stronger emotional responses (0.39 ≤ d ≤ 0.64), less justifiability (d = -0.35), and a

higher willingness to welcome refugees (d = 0.20). The magnitude of gender differences

varied substantially by country, however, with generally weaker gender differences in Poland

(see osf for details). By contrast, there were generally only weak relationships to age, both

within and across countries.

Political orientation showed small to moderate associations with the outcomes under

scrutiny, in that in all countries more right leaning orientations were associated with less

anger, anxiety, and empathy, an increased sense of justifiability of the Russian actions, a

decreased desire to implement measures against Russia, and, in particular, less willingness to

welcome refugees. Of note, the association to perceived threat was negligible. Political

orientation showed the most pronounced relations to emotional responses in Germany (.13 ≤ |

r| ≤ .23), whereas the relations to justifiability, sanction severity, and willingness to welcome

refugees were strongest in the US (.23 ≤ |r| ≤ .38). However, overall, political orientation

exhibited similar relations to the outcomes under scrutiny in every country studied.
Psychological Reactions to Russian War 13

Individual differences in socially aversive personality exhibited a similar pattern as

observed for political orientation, but showed comparatively stronger effects, in particular

concerning empathy (r = -.39), and also yielded a more consistent pattern across countries

(see osf for details).

Table 3

Reliabilities, Gender Differences, and Intercorrelations

Variable d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Anger 0.46 (.76)
2. Anxiety 0.64 .56 (.63)
3. Empathy 0.39 .43 .27 (.66)
4. Threat 0.41 .45 .66 .23 (.75)
5. Justifiability -0.35 -.34 -.30 -.29 -.18 (.92)
6. Sanctions 0.00 .38 .21 .32 .20 -.45 (.75)
7. Refugees 0.20 .38 .28 .41 .14 -.37 .42 (-)
8. D -0.67 -.27 -.24 -.39 -.08 .30 -.08 -.26 (.86)
9. RILE -0.41 -.16 -.23 -.14 -.05 .22 -.12 -.33 .21 (-)
10. Age -0.01 -.03 -.12 .07 -.12 .04 -.01 -.13 -.27 .15
Note. d = standardized mean difference (Cohen’s d), positive values indicate higher values for

females. D = Dark Factor of Personality. RILE = political orientation. Cronbach’s alpha

estimates of reliability on the diagonal, correlations below the diagonal. All |d| ≥ .05 and

correlations |r| ≥ .10, respectively, differ significantly from zero at p < .05.
Psychological Reactions to Russian War 14

Discussion

The Russian invasion of the Ukraine can be seen as a disruptive event incurring

immediate, strong, and unified reactions on policy level by NATO and European countries.

Given that the degree of unity that can be upheld in the longer term arguably also depends

citizens’ reactions and opinions in these countries, the present study sought to explore

emotional reactions, perceived justifiability, the willingness to welcome refugees, and the

desired severity of sanctions against Russia in samples from Germany, Great-Britain, Poland,

and the United States, and further investigated relevant individual differences variables.

Participants from all countries reported elevated levels of anger, anxiety, and threat, as

well as empathy with people in the Ukraine. These overall strong reactions might indicate that

participants interpret the Russian actions as an attack that is not exclusively directed against

the Ukraine, but more generally against the Euro-Atlantic security structure with immediate

threats to themselves. Plausibly, the extent of perceived threat directly varied with the

proximity to Russia, with participants from Poland reporting the highest and participants from

the United States the lowest perceived threat. Nevertheless, more than half of the participants

from the United States felt threatened by Russia’s action as well. Likewise, there was very

strong unity across countries concerning the perceived justifiability of Russia’s actions, which

was rejected by the vast majority of participants, whereas only a diminishing minority of

approximately 5% judged at least a single reason as “partly” or “completely” justifying

Russia’s action.

Arguably due to both, high emotional involvement as well as the apparent lack of

perceived justifiability of Russia’s action, there was also strong support – though with notably

more variance - to sanction Russia in all countries studied: Only 0.1% - 5% of respondents

opposed imposing at least a single sanction. However, support for specific consequences

differed more notably. In particular, mirroring their strong emotional involvement,

Psychological Reactions to Russian War 15

participants from Poland also reported the strongest desire to implement measures against

Russia, especially concerning supply of weapons and direct military intervention. Concerning

the latter, it is remarkable that approximately half of the respondents across all countries

under scrutiny (though with substantial variation across countries) endorsed sending military

and thus an open military conflict with Russia.

In all countries a pronounced willingness to welcome refugees from the Ukraine was

evident, with only about 2% (Germany, Poland) to 7% (Great-Britain, United States)

opposing to accept refugees. This is remarkable given how widespread anti-migration

sentiments and policies are both in Europe and the United States. One explanation might be

that emotional involvement and experienced empathy with Ukrainian people increases

solidarity and thus the willingness to accept refugees (Jaskulowski, 2019; Miklikowska,

2018). However, these migration-friendly attitudes arguably also arise from perceived cultural

similarities – and thus low psychological distance - assigned to Ukrainian people (Montreuil

& Bourhis, 2001), as reflected in statements from government officials (e.g., by the Bulgarian

Prime Minister Kiril Petkov: “These are not the refugees we are used to... these people are

Europeans”; Brito, 2022). Without such an ethnic and/or cultural bias it is difficult to account

for the current support, especially when compared to other recent refugee waves that were

also characterized by Russian involvement (such as the one from Syria).

Relatedly, the strongest link between political orientation and consequences was

evident concerning the acceptance of refugees in that individuals holding more right-wing

orientations were also more likely to reject acceptance of refugees, which is a robust finding

across all countries studied. More generally, right-wing political orientation showed small, but

consistent associations with less anger, anxiety, and empathy, a stronger belief that Russia’s

actions are justified, and, arguably as a consequence, less endorsement of sanctions against

Russia. The more lenient position concerning Russia associated with more right-wing

orientation mirrors the shift of right-wing populists in the West to show a greater affinity to
Psychological Reactions to Russian War 16

Russia (Diesen, 2020), but was also evident in Poland, where most political parties, including

the ruling right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS), share skepticism and hostility against

Russia. One explanation might be that individuals in post-communist countries assign

different meaning to the left-right dimension, so the results are not fully comparable across

countries (Thorisdottir et al., 2007). It is also conceivable, however, that pacifist attitudes

prevail in left-wing oriented individuals, which may dominate pro- or anti-Russian

sentiments.

Beyond political orientation, the present study also investigated the role of age,

gender, and individual differences in aversive personality. Tying with ample evidence

concerning gender differences in emotionality (Lee & Ashton, 2020; Moshagen et al., 2019),

women reported substantially stronger emotional responses with respect to anger, anxiety, and

perceived threat, exhibited a higher degree of empathy with people in the Ukraine, and found

the Russian action less justified. However, there was no gender difference regarding the

desired severity of sanctions against Russia. Similarly, there were only minor effects of

respondents’ age on either outcome. By contrast, individuals with an elevated dispositional

tendency to engage in socially aversive behavior - in terms of the Dark Factor of Personality -

expectedly reported less emotional reactions and less empathy in particular, and found the

Russian action more justified. The latter thus suggests that corresponding individuals use the

same set of beliefs they rely on to justify their own aversive interpersonal behavior (Hilbig et

al., 2022) to justify actions of others and even nation states.

A limitation is that the study rests on comparatively small, self-selected convenience

samples. It is well possible that those feeling more emotionally involved are more likely to

take part in such studies, so that the extent of involvement and thus arguably the desired

severity of sanctions may have been overestimated. As such, replications with national

probability samples are strongly advised.

Psychological Reactions to Russian War 17

In sum, the present study indicates overall strong and similar reactions following the

Russian invasion of the Ukraine in samples from Germany, Poland, Great-Britain, and the

United States. Whereas there was some support for the preposition that geographical and

psychological proximity triggers different emotional responding and thinking, in particular

concerning perceived threat and the desired severity of sanctions against Russia, participants

from all country showed overall strong emotional reactions, found virtually no justifiability of

the Russian action, and desired rather severe sanctions against Russia, thus pointing to a large

degree of unity not only concerning the currently implemented policies, but also among

citizens from the studied countries.

Psychological Reactions to Russian War 18

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