Code: P-17

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

AT THE
PEACE PALACE, THE HAGUE

The Case Concerning the Gul’ati Refugees and the other matters

DEMOCRATIC FIEFDOM OF JAMBUDVIPA

(APPLICANT)

v.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF REDNECK

(RESPONDENT)

ON SUBMISSION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM for THE APPLICANT

DEMOCRATIC FIEFDOM OF JAMBUDVIPA
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS I

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS V

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES VI

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION VII

STATEMENT OF FACTS VIII

QUESTIONS PRESENTED X

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS XI

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 2

1. JAMBUDVĪPA HAS NOT BREACHED ITS LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS THE

GUL’ATI REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE CRIME OF
GENOCIDE 2

1.1. Jambudvipa has adhered to the norms of international law and not
contravened any responsibilities it had towards Gul’ati refugees under the law od
genocide. 2

1.1.1. The act of genocide as stipulated under art. III(a) has not taken place since
the condition for actus reus has not been met[1.1.1.1] the condition of mens rea has
not been fulfilled[1.1.1.2] 2

1.1.1.1. The condition of actus reus under art. III(a) has been met 2

1.1.1.2. The requirement for mens rea has not been met 2

1.1.2. The act of direct and public incitement of genocide punishable as per
art.III(c) has not been carried out 3

1.1.2.1. The crime of genocide has not been committed since the statements made
by Prime Minister Nody and VFJ were not direct calls of action 3

1.1.2.2. The direct and public incitement requires mens rea which was not present
in this case 3

1.1.3. The act of complicity in genocide under art. III(e) has not been performed3

1.1.3.1. Jambudvipa is not complicit in commission of genocide since it did not

aid and assist the same. 3

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1.1.3.2. Jambudvipa cannot be held liable for complicity since it did not have
knowledge of genocidal intent 3

1.2. The punishable acts committed under the Genocide convention are not
attributable to Jambudvipa 3

1.2.1. As per article 4 of ARSIWA the acts of genocide cannot be attributed to

Jambudvipa 4

1.2.2. As per article 8 of ARSIWA the acts of genocide cannot be attributed to

Jambudvipa 4

1.3. Jambudvipa has not breached its responsibility to prevent genocide and
prosecute the culprits of genocide 4

2. JAMBUDVĪPA HAS NOT BREACHED ANY OF ITS LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS

REDNECK UNDER THE BILATERAL DATA PRIVACY TREATY. 5

2.1. The present dispute Jambudvipa and Redneck is not admissible in the ICJ 5

2.1.1. Jambudvipa can contest the admissibility of this claim 5

2.1.2. Redneck has not exhausted the local remedies available to their full extent5

2.2. Jambudvipa has fulfilled its obligations under the BDPT 6

2.2.1. Jambudvipa set up the supervisory authority under Art. 51 of the BDPT 6

2.2.2. Jambudvipa took measures to ensure that the independence of the

supervisory authority has not been compromised 6

2.2.3. Jambudvipa has performed its treaty obligations in good faith and not
breached the BDPT. 7

2.3. The claim filed by President Twimp cannot be upheld on its merits. 7

2.3.1. President Twimp’s data was collected lawfully and for no illegal purposes.7

2.3.2. No unauthorized transfer of data was done to a third party 8

3. THE DECOLONISATION OF JAMBUDVĪPA WAS NOT LAWFULLY COMPLETED AND

REDNECK CANNOT CLAIM LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY OR ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
OVER THE SENTINELLE ISLANDS 9

3.1. The decolonisation of Jambudvipa was not lawfully complete since Sentinelle
Islands were not decolonised along with it 9

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3.1.1. The principal of Uti possidetis endorses the sovereignty of Jambudvipa

over the Sentinelle islands 9

3.1.2. Denying the Sentinellese people the right to self-determination is a

violation of international law. 10

3.1.2.1. The arbitrary division of the territory is a violation of the the right to self
determination 11

3.1.2.2. The referendum conducted by Kitten is not valid as per the right to self
determination 11

3.2. Redneck cannot claim sovereignty or control over the Sentinelle islands 11

3.2.1. The transfer of power from Kitten to Redneck was illegitimate as it

infringed on the Sentinellese right to self-determination 12

3.2.2. In arguendo, Jambudvipa exercises sovereign control over Sentinelle

Islands 13

4. REDNECK HAS BREACHED ITS INTERNATIONAL LAW OBLIGATIONS BY

ASSASSINATING RISHAL DARULA ON THE SENTINELLE ISLANDS. 14

4.1. Redneck violated international law by resorting to the use of force. 14

4.1.1. Redneck has committed a gross violation of art. 2(4) by using force 14

4.1.1.1. Redneck has violated art. 2(4). 15

4.1.1.2. By breaching art. 2(4) Redneck has violated Jambudvipa’s state

sovereignty 15

4.1.2. The use of force by Redneck cannot be justified as self defence. 15

4.1.2.1. The principle of anticipatory self defence is not upheld in international

law 15

4.1.2.2. The claim of pre-emptive self-defence cannot be made in this case 16

4.1.3. In arguendo, any limited rights Redneck might have to exercise self
defence are inapplicable in the present case 16

4.1.3.1. In the circumstance of anticipatory self defence being recognised,

Redneck does not fulfill the requirements for it 17

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4.1.3.2. In any case, States cannot exercise self-defence against non-state actors as
per international law 17

4.1.3.3. In arguendo, in the absence of an armed attack, non state actors cannot be
attacked 18

4.2. Redneck has violated its human rights obligations 18

PRAYER 20

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

MEMORIAL for THE APPLICANT

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

MEMORIAL for THE APPLICANT

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Democratic Feifdom of Jambudvipa submits this Memorial in furtherance of the

Special Arrangement between The Democratic Feifdom of Jambudvipa and the Federal
Republic of Redneck, under Articles 36(1) and 40(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Jambudvīpa, despite its introduction of a Bilateral Data Protection Treaty with the
intent of attracting investment, received criticism for not only increasing tariffs, but
for entering trade agreements with the People’s Republic of Zhōngguó and the
Republic of Amrub. While the socialist state of PRZ has been criticised for its
suppressive policies, Amrub has faced the effects of a civil war for several decades.
When the Amrub government banned 50 ethnic groups in 2012, one of the groups
banned was the Gul’ati community, a community dependent on growing cannabis for
sustenance. State sanctioned violent military operations against the Gul’ati
community forced over 900,000 Gul’ati people to flee to Jambudvīpa. As it was not
governed by the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to Refugees, the
Jambudvīpa government registered migrants through its own system, and allowed for
all Gul’ati refugees to be given official status and identification. Post-2014, all
members of the Gul’ati community were given automatic refugee status.
2. The Gul’ati community, after obtaining appropriate licenses under the JNDPS Act,
began growing and selling ‘Baku’ cannabis to pharmaceutical companies. However,
reports soon emerged that members of the Gul’ati community were facilitating the
drug trade through these activities. Despite no arrests being made, the Jambudvīpa
government was heavily criticised. In December 11, 2018, the Jambudvīpa
government passed the K.A.R.I.S.H.M.A, granting citizenship to illegal migrants of
Jingo, Gautamist, and Mahavarist religious minorities, excluding Gul’ati refugees.
3. The exclusion of the Gul’ati community led to heavy international criticism, and
protests within the country, particularly in the State of Massa. This was countered by
protests favouring K.A.R.I.S.H.M.A by conversative groups as well. Prime Minister
Nody allowed State police to stop protests violently, resulting in several fatalities and
injuries. Protests began peaceful protests after this. However, the Nody government
now stopped processing Gul’ati asylum applications, and began considering repealing
the 2017 order for automatic refugee status being granted. The State of Massa
witnessed extensive violence against the Gul’ati community.
4. In April, 2019, an online sting operation against Heartbook Inc, a PRZ headquartered
social media enterprise, revealed that a systematic campaign had been created on the
app by members of the VFJ to target Gul’ati community members, inciting arson,
rape and murder. The Nody government stated it would build ‘safety’ camps for

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Gul’ati refugees, housing them away from potential violence. A OHCHR report
however, revealed that 300,000 Gul’ati refugees in over a 100 camps were living in
unsafe conditions, without medical facilities or clean water. Prime Minister Nody
expelled the OHCHR from the country, while other Gul’ati refugees, currently not in
camps, faced increasing violence, with over 60,000 deaths.
5. In August, 2019, Heartbrook, with assistance from the JMZ government, used facial
recognition technology to confirm that VFJ members had been uploading anti Gul’ati
content on the platform, as well as the fact that there was evidence of communication
over this between VFJ members, and the Jambudvīpan Police Force. While Heartbook
did not categorically confirm that these were police officers, the Nody government
was angered, and banned 29 PRZ apps, including Heartbook. Citing privacy concerns,
and activities that threatened the ‘sovereignty and integrity of Jambudvīpa’, the app
was banned. In an attempt to circumvent this however, Heartbook Inc. moved its
operations for Jambudvīpa to HJPL. Effectively, this meant that all information
relating to Jambudvīpan accounts on Heartbook was now owned by a legal entity
registered in Jambudvīpa.
6. Kittish forces, in 1810 CE, colonised a number of islands off the eastern coast of
Jambudvīpa, called the Sentinelle Islands, which were located in a position of
strategic economic importance, with 37 inhabited islands. The Kittish colonisers
allowed a degree of self governance, with local councils and leaders. A military base
was built on Sentizor Island, and later, Kitten chose to enter an alliance with Redneck.
Redneck demanded access and control of the military base. Kitten regarded these
islands as a part of the territory of Jambudvīpa, such that when it was gaining
independence, Jambudvīpa demanded control over the islands, although Redneck
wanted to maintain control over the military base.
7. The islands became a bargaining chip during independence negotiations, with Kitten
wanting to separate the islands and the mainland. Jambudvīpa was hesitant, and while
it considered the option, a Kitten referendum of inhabitants of the island was held,
with a majority ultimately voting to join a newly formed ‘Kittish Sentinelle Island
Territory’. This came with the caveat that other than the final vote tally records, the
electoral rolls and other documentation were lost. In 1947, the Islands were detached
from Jambudvīpa.

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8. Post- the discovery of natural gas in the area, and consistent disputes over the
governance and control of the islands, in June of 2020, the BGM activist-leader
visited the island and prison to enquire the conditions within the prison, particularly
for black prisoners. Facial recognition and drone technology recognised that when she
was on the island, she met local drug distributor Rishal Darula, a criminal on
Redneck’s most wanted list. Despite internal objections, President Twimp ordered a
strike on Darula, killing him and nine other people. The President claimed that Darula
was part of a conspiracy to attack the island military base. Prime Minister Nody,
angered by the attack, and the compromise on Jambudvīpa’s internal investigation on
drug distribution, condemned President Twimp’s decision. The Secretary General of
the United Nations advised that the issue be taken up before the International Court of
Justice.

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The following questions arise for consideration before the Hon’ble International Court
of Justice:

1. Whether Jambudvīpa has breached its legal obligations towards the Gul’ati
refugees under international law governing the crime of genocide

2. Whether Jambudvīpa has breached any of its legal obligations towards Redneck
under the Bilateral Data Privacy Treaty

3. Whether the decolonization of Jambudvīpa was lawfully completed due to the

separation of the Sentinelle Islands from Jambudvīpa in order to create the Kittish
Sentinelle Islands Territory and whether Redneck can claim legal sovereignty or
administrative control over the Sentinelle Islands

4. Whether Redneck has breached its international law obligations by assassinating

Rishal Darula on the Sentinelle Islands.

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. Jambudvīpa has not breached its legal obligations towards the Gul’ati refugees under
international law governing the crime of genocide it is submitted that Jambudvipa did
not violate its legal obligations towards the Gul’ati refugees

2. Jambudvīpa has not breached any of its legal obligations towards Redneck under the
Bilateral Data Privacy Treaty;

3. The decolonization of Jambudvīpa was not lawfully completed due to the separation
of the Sentinelle Islands from Jambudvīpa in order to create the Kittish Sentinelle
Islands Territory and Redneck cannot claim legal sovereignty or administrative
control over the Sentinelle Islands;

4. Redneck has breached its international law obligations by assassinating Rishal Darula
on the Sentinelle Islands.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. JAMBUDVĪPA HAS NOT BREACHED ITS LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS THE GUL’ATI
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

It is hereby submitted that Jambudvipa has not breached its obligations towards the Gul’ ati
refugees as per the law of genocide [1.1] Alternatively, in the circumstance that the acts
punishable under genocide convention have been committed, the same are not attributable to
Jambudvipa[1.2] Further, Jambudvipa has not breached its obligations to prevent the crime of
genocide[1.3] Additionally, Jambudvipa has not violated its responsibility to prosecute those
perpetrating genocide[1.4].

1.1. Jambudvipa has adhered to the norms of international law and not contravened
any responsibilities it had towards Gul’ati refugees under the law od genocide.

This arises from the fact that the act punishable under art. III(a) has not been taken
place[1.1.1] Furthermore, the violation as per art. III(c) has not taken place[1.1.2] Lastly,
the acts punishable under art. III(c) and (d) have not taken place[1.1.3]

1.1.1. The act of genocide as stipulated under art. III(a) has not taken place since
the condition for actus reus has not been met[1.1.1.1] the condition of mens
rea has not been fulfilled[1.1.1.2]

1.1.1.1. The condition of actus reus under art. III(a) has been met

As per art II(b) of the Genocide Convention, the phrase ‘mental harm’ is interpreted to mean
lasting damage in consonance with the Reservations and applications made by Jambudvipa.1
This is also upheld by the travaux prepatoires of the Genocide Convention.2

In the present case, no lasting mental damage has occurred. The events of violence against
protestors, tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons do not qualify as mental harm. Hence
no mental harm as per art.II(b) has taken place.

1.1.1.2. The requirement for mens rea has not been met

The requirement of mens rea in a crime and specific intent i.e. dolus specialis has not been
fulfilled in this case.3 Such intent requires a standard of every act done in pursuance of
1 Compromis ¶17.
2 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) [1986] (Judgment), ICJ Rep587, p 23;
3 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras) case; Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina
Faso/Mali) [1986] (Judgment), ICJ Rep587, p 23; Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) (Judgment) [1994] ICJ Rep 6, 89

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genocide to have a specific intent of eliminating a group partly or wholly.4 Here, the measure
of atrocities committed, the number of members of a group targeted, their geographical
location and the significance of members targeted becomes important to take into account.5
Additionally, the conduct of the party and the context of such conduct must indicate specific
intent.6 It must be noted that an intent to displace a group does not amount to intent to destroy
it.7 Furthermore, if there is no genocidal policy or campaign being endorsed by a state,
specific intent cannot be deduced.8

In the present case, there is no proof that Jambudvipa had specific intent. This is signified by
the fact that those who may have died in the clashes did not belong to the Gul’ati community.
Jmabudvipa had no genocidal policy in place. K.A.R.I.S.H.M.A is legislation based on
religious lines while Gul’atis are an ethnic community.The significant members of the group
were not targeted and the geographical boundaries of Massa are unknown. With regard to
context, the Gul’ati community was being aided since doctors were being sent to their camps
and PM Nody agreed to look into improving the conditions of their camps. Therefore, there is
no hint of specific intent.

1.1.2. The act of direct and public incitement of genocide punishable as per
art.III(c) has not been carried out

Art III(c) pertain to the criminalisation of direct and public incitement of genocide which
cannot be proved in this case since the actus reus[1.1.2.1] and mens rea[1.1.2.2] requirements
have not been met.

1.1.2.1. The crime of genocide has not been committed since the statements
made by Prime Minister Nody and VFJ were not direct calls of action

4 ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 568; 80 ILR, p. 473; Burkina Faso/Mali

5 The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States, G.A RES/2625(XXV) (October 27,1970).

6 MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 378 ( 8th edition, 2017).

7 MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 378 ( 8th edition, 2017).
8 Decision regarding delimitation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Eritrea-Ethiopia) (2002) RIAA
XXV pp. 83-195; Columbia-Venezuela Boundary Dispute (1922) 1 RIAA 223;he Arbitration Commission of
the European on the former Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2, 31 I.L.M. 1497 (1992); Case Concerning the Frontier
Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) [1986] (Judgment), ICJ Rep587, p 23.

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The condition of directly inciting genocide is met when one incites another to commit
genocide with an explicit call for action.9 Such statements must not have vagueness or
ambiguity10 and be aimed at those who would carry out genocide.11

Presently, there has been no call to action since the statements made by PM Nody were
related to Iftekhars and not the Gul’atis. Further, the assertions made on Heartbrook by VFJ
members do not amount to a direct call for action.

1.1.2.2. The direct and public incitement requires mens rea which was not
present in this case

For public incitement of genocide to be proved, its mens rea must be showed.12 Additionally,
the one inciting genocide must have the capacity to impact an audience.13 Only a statement
with the intention to incite genocide will qualify as a crime.14

Presently, Heartbrook broadcasted statements that were anonymous and do not suggest the
destruction of group, partly or wholly.

1.1.3. The act of complicity in genocide under art. III(e) has not been performed

As per art.III(e) complicity in genocide has been criminalised. Such complicity is regarded as
assistance under ARSIWA. However, Jambudvipa is not complicit since it did not aid the
genocide[1.1.3.1] and did not have knowledge of the intent[1.1.3.2]

1.1.3.1. Jambudvipa is not complicit in commission of genocide since it did not

aid and assist the same.

9 Malcolm Shaw, International Law 291 (6th ed., 2008).

10 United Nations Charter of the United Nations 1 UNTS XVI (October 24,1945) art 76(b).

11 UNGA, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights UNTS XXX (16 December, 1966 ) art 1.

12 League of Nations Covenant of the League of Nations (28 April 1919) art. 22(4).

13 United Nations Charter of the United Nations 1 UNTS XVI (October 24, 1946) art. 1, 55, 74, 76.
14 UN General Assembly, The right of peoples and nations to self-determination, 16 December 1952,
A/RES/637; UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, 14 December 1960, A/RES/1514(XV).
.

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The aid provided by a state for genocide must be financial in nature.15 Additionally, such aid
must be provided with the intention of enabling genocide and its successful completion.16

Presently, the government of Jambudvipa did not provide any financial or material id to VFJ.
They acted of their own accord and clashes with the police as well. However, in the case that
the clash with the police is considered assistance, it was carried out with the sole purpose of
quelling protests.

1.1.3.2. Jambudvipa cannot be held liable for complicity since it did not have
knowledge of genocidal intent

To prove complicity, knowledge of specific intent of those inciting genocide must be

proven.17 Simply showcasing political ties and use of state funds is not sufficient.18 This too,
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.19

Presently, the political ties between PM Nody and the VFJ extend to his previous party
membership but do not indicate that he would have any knowledge of the specific intent they
had. Additionally, any knowledge of violence being demonstarted would not suggest
genocide since the protests were in favour of the amendment to that citizenship act.

1.2. The punishable acts committed under the Genocide convention are not
attributable to Jambudvipa

15 U.N. General Assembly, Special Committee on Decolonization, 284th Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.109/PV.284 30 Sept. 1964), p. 22

16Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa (convert font for author and book name to small caps) 134
(1986).

17 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and

Peoples, 14 December 1960, A/RES/1514(XV) ¶6.

18United Nations Charter of the United Nations 1 UNTS XVI (October 24,1945) art 1(2); UNGA,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights UNTS XXX (16 December, 1966)art 1;

UNGA, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples A/RES/1514(XV)

(December 14,1960).

19Art. 2 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV),
U.N. Doc. A/4684, 66 (1960) [Declaration on the Granting of Independence]; THÜRER, D & T. BURRI, SELF-

DETERMINATION (2008) 15;Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in

1965 (Mauritius/United Kingdom) (Advisory opinion)[2019] ICJ Rep 2019.

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Assuming not admitting that the punishable acts of genocide have been committed, the same
cannot be attributed to Jambudvipa since the test of attribution under ARSIWA article
4[1.2.1] and article 8 [1.2.2] have not been satisfied.

1.2.1. As per article 4 of ARSIWA the acts of genocide cannot be attributed to

Jambudvipa

As per art. 4 of ARSIWA the actions of a state are attributable to it.20 When a group has not
been accorded the state of a de jure organ, it requires complete reliance on state bodies to
attribute any acts to the state.21 Any independent action of the group does not establish the
dependence on the State.22

Presently, VFJ acted independently without guidance from state or dependence on them.
They have not been accorded the status of a de jure organ. Further, their clashes with the
police indicate their lack of dependence on the State. Finally, since the army of Jambudvipa
only bought Gul’ati community to safe camps the lack of the state’s genocidal intent is
signified.

1.2.2. As per article 8 of ARSIWA the acts of genocide cannot be attributed to

Jambudvipa

According to ARSIWA Article 8, for an act to be attributed to a state, those committing the
act must be under direct control of the state.23 This implies that the state must have effective
control over every entity perpetrating genocide in addition to their every act.24

In the present case, there is no proof that Jambudvipa had any effective control or guided the
actions of any non-state actor within Jambudvipa. This conclusion is indicated by the fact that
Heartbrook could not successfully link the actions of the VFJ with Jambudvipian police.
Additionally, Prime minister Nody’s denial of any such claims confirms the same.

20Chagos para 160; The Arbitration Commission of the European on the former Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2, 31
I.L.M. 1497 (1992); MUSGRAVE, T., SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 247 (2000)

21United Nations Charter of the United Nations 1 UNTS XVI (October 24,1945) art 1(2); UNGA, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights UNTS XXX (16 December, 1966 ) art 1.

22Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 (Mauritius/United
Kingdom)(Separate opinion)( JudgeSebutinde) [2019] ICJ Rep 2019, para 15

23
24
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1.3. Jambudvipa has not breached its responsibility to prevent genocide and
prosecute the culprits of genocide

According to ARSIWA Article 8, for an act to be attributed to a state, those committing the
act must be under direct control of the state.25 This implies that the state must have effective
control over every entity perpetrating genocide in addition to their every act.26

In the present case, there is no proof that Jambudvipa had any effective control or guided the
actions of any non-state actor within Jambudvipa. This conclusion is indicated by the fact that
Heartbrook could not successfully link the actions of the VFJ with Jambudvipian police.
Additionally, Prime minister Nody’s denial of any such claims confirms the same.

2. JAMBUDVĪPA HAS NOT BREACHED ANY OF ITS LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS

REDNECK UNDER THE BILATERAL DATA PRIVACY TREATY.

It is submitted that Jambudvipa did not contravene the legal obligations owed to Redneck
under the Bilateral Data Privacy Treaty (‘BDPT’) entered into by both parties in June 2018. 27
The present dispute is not admissible before this Court[2.1] Further, Jambudvipa has
complied with all the terms of the treaty [2.2] Lastly, the merits of the case do not support the
accusations made by President Twimp [2.3]
2.1. The present dispute Jambudvipa and Redneck is not admissible in the ICJ

The issue of admissibility of the ongoing dispute between Redneck and Jambudvipa can be
raised[2.1.1] since Redneck has not exhausted the extent of the local remedies
available[2.1.2].

2.1.1. Jambudvipa can contest the admissibility of this claim

The requirements for the ICJ to adjudicate a case are jurisdiction and admissibility. 28 While
the determination of jurisdiction is a primary responsibility, the court can look into the

25Compromis ¶53

26Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands, USA) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 857.

27Sovereignty over PulauLigitan and PulauSipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 625,
682 ;Case Concerning Sovereignty over PedraBranca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge

(Malaysia/Singapore) (Judgment) [2008] ICJ Rep no. 130

28Malaysia/Singapore para 247; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Judgment) [1933] PCIJ Rep Series A/B
No 53, 45-46.

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admissibility of a claim, even after the parties have prima facie agreed to the jurisdiction to
the court.29
In the present case, Jambudvipa and Redneck have as per Article 2 of the Special Agreement
settled their position as Applicant and Respondent respectively. 30 However, such an
agreement does not impact the burden of proof. Since the procedural respondent, Redneck, is
claiming the violation of the BDPT by Jambudvipa, the procedural applicant, they have the
right to question the admissibility in court.

2.1.2. Redneck has not exhausted the local remedies available to their full extent

Not exhausting local remedies forms part of a valid claim to question the admissibility of an
issue.31 As per this rule, disputes and the infringement of rights cannot be resolved at an
international level if a judicially adequate functionary addresses issues at the
municipal/domestic level.32 Not only is this upheld by the ICJ in art. 38 33 but also forms a
facet of customary international law.34

In the present case, when the NSA asserted that the popular meme made on President Twimp
was source coded in China, even though its video feed belonged to HJPL, he filed a case with
the BDPT Tribunal which dismissed the claim. However, as per article 78 of the BDPT, the
tribunal’s decision must first be challenged in another court of law in Jambudvipa. 35
Presently, the same recourse has not been taken and President Twimp has brought the case to
an international forum. This is violative of the terms of the BDPT.

2.2. Jambudvipa has fulfilled its obligations under the BDPT

29Compromis ¶ 51

30Compromis ¶49

31Compromis ¶49

32Compromis ¶49

33 Compromis, Annexure IV.

34 Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Préparatoires 2024(Brill, 2008).

35 Application Of The Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of Genocide (Bosnia V. Serbia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, ¶373.

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Jambudvipa undertook all required steps to ensure that its conduct is compliant with the
treaty signed between the parties. It arranged the operation of a supervisory authority as per
Article 51 of the BDPT [2.2.1] Additionally, Jambudvipa secured the independence of the
supervisory authority and made sure its integrity remains intact[2.2.2] Lastly, Jambudvipa has
completed its duties under the duty with good faith[2.2.3].

2.2.1. Jambudvipa set up the supervisory authority under Art. 51 of the BDPT

Reading Art.4(13) and Art. 51 of the Jampudvipa-Redneck BDPT in conjunction, it becomes

clear that the supervisory authority set up by the signatory state is supposed to function
independently.36 Their main aim is to ensure the appropriate balance between the fundamental
rights of individuals and the free flow of data between signatories and make sure there is
proper application of the BDPT.37

In the present case, Jambudvipa set up a tribunal under art. 51 of the BDPT. In addition, the
tribunal fulfilled its purpose as per the treaty. When President Twimp filed a motion with the
tribunal, they heard his matter and provided him with a swift decision. Jambudvipa did not
interfere with the decision the Tribunal deemed appropriate since that would be infringing on
the independence of the tribunal envisaged within the BDPT. Recourse was still available to
President Twimp in the form of challenging the decision in the courts of Jambudvipa.

2.2.2. Jambudvipa took measures to ensure that the independence of the

supervisory authority has not been compromised

The BDPT gives vital importance to the independence of the public authority set up to
adjudge matters between parties.38 It expressly prohibits the signatory state that from
interfering with the functioning of an adjudicatory body. 39 The independence of the Tribunal
is essential to its impartiality.40 In Commission v. Germany, it was held that the independence
of an authority set up under the GDPR must be free from the scrutiny of not only other

36 Id.
37 Application Of The Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of Genocide (Bosnia V. Serbia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, ¶198-200.
38 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v.
Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 3, ¶418.
39 Prosecutor v Radislav Kristić, Partial Dissenting Opinion Of Judge Shahabuddeen, ¶57.

40 Prosecutor v Kayishema (Trial Judgement) ICTR-95-1-T (1999) ¶35; Prosecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana,
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngenze (Trial Judgement) ICTR 99-52-T (2003), ¶520.

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supervisory authorities but also scrutiny of the state. 41 Influence of the state may impede
justice since political influence may interfere with the decision and such a power can be
used.42 Since the BDPT is modelled on the GDPR, 43 its judicial decisions would be relevant
for Redneck and Jambudvipa.

In the present case, the Ambassador of Redneck to Jambudvipa had requested the
Jambudvipian government to interfere with the tribunal’s decision since the same was not in
President Twimp’s favour. Such intrusion by Jambudvipa would evidently be a gross
violation of the State’s obligation of non-interference. Therefore, by its fair conduct,
Jambudvipa has ensured that the independence of the tribunal has not been prejudiced.

2.2.3. Jambudvipa has performed its treaty obligations in good faith and not
breached the BDPT.

A treaty is supposed to be interpreted in good faith in consonance with the ordinary meaning
being given to the terms in their context and the purpose and object of the treaty. 44 This
interpretation as per the principle of pacta sunt servanda, encourages states to fulfil the
ordinary meaning of the provisions agreed upon.45 It forms an important facet of customary
international law.46
In the present case, Jambudvipa has fulfilled its obligations as per such interpretation. By
changing their domestic laws to comply with the BDPT and setting up the Jambudvipa Data
Privacy tribunal under Article 52 it acts in accordance with its obligations. Further, Article
78 directs an aggrieved party to appeal the decision of the tribunal in the courts of the
signatory state. Based on the ordinary meaning of the treaty, Jambudvipa fulfilled each of

41Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu (Appeal Judgement) ICTR-96-4-A (2001) ¶560.

42 Prosecutor v Muvunyi (Trial Chamber Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal) ICTR-00-55A-T
(2009) ¶24-25; United Nation, Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the
Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, Art. 18, 45, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), 22.

43 supra note 10 ¶557.

44Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu (Appeal Judgement) ICTR-96-4-A (2001) ¶560.

45 Susan Benesch, Vile Crime in Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 Va. J. Int'l L. 485
(2008).

46 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant
of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber I (2009), ¶143.

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these terms in good faith by facilitating these mechanisms and letting them function
independently.

2.3. The claim filed by President Twimp cannot be upheld on its merits.

It is submitted that President Twimp’s claim cannot be upheld for two reasons. Firstly, the
allegations made Twimp are not verified since his personal data has been acquired lawfully
and for legitimate purposes [2.3.1] Subsequently, no illegitimate data was transferred to a
third party [2.3.2].

2.3.1. President Twimp’s data was collected lawfully and for no illegal purposes.

Article 5 of the BDPT directs that personal data be processed in a transparent, fair and lawful
manner.47 Its lawfulness is ensured if it is done for legitimate interests. 48 It is further
established that a balance must be maintained within the right to data protection and public
interest.49 This implies that the personal and sensitive data provided by data subjects need to
be balanced in light of its public interest.50 Subsequently, processing data is considered lawful
if the information rights of internet users supersede the right of the data subject.51

In the present case, it was the media’s duty to fairly report the event and speech of President
Twimp. His trip to Jambudvipa in the midst of a pandemic to solve a refugee crisis garnered
the interest of millions. Being a public figure and world leader he was aware of the extensive
media coverage that he would encounter. In light of the same, HJPL balanced his right to
personal data and the public interest by reporting fairly, hence their actions constitute lawful
processing of data.

2.3.2. No unauthorized transfer of data was done to a third party

Article 44, 46 and 49 of the BDPT pertain to the transfer of personal data to third countries or
international organizations.52 As per Article 46 of the agreement, data transfer to a third
47 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
with Commentaries, earbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, Art. 16.

48 Id.
49 Application Of The Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of Genocide (Bosnia V. Serbia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, ¶421.

50 Id ¶422.
51 Id ¶423.
52 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10),
chp.IV.E.1, Art. 4.

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country can take place only if the controller or processor has taken appropriate safeguards
for the same.53 Further, as per article 49 data controllers or processors can transfer data to
third countries without authorization in the case of certain exceptions. 54
In the Lindqvist case it was held that an upload of personal data to the internet, even if it was
considered processing, does not amount to data transfer since everyone on the internet could
access it. 55
In the present case, assuming but not conceding that Heartbrook was able to get access to
HJPL’s data, it is asserted that Jambudvipa and HJPL took adequate safeguards for the same.
The ban on apps from PRZ including Heartbrook, and the compliance of HJPL with
Jambudvipian Data privacy laws as indicated by its annual report and incorporation of 4
Indian directors with complete authority prove to be adequate safeguards as per Article 46.
Presently, assuming but not conceding that Heartbrook was able to get access to HJPL’s data
it would fall under the exception of Article 49(1)(d) that outlines public interest as an
exception since President Twimp was making a statement regarding the refugee crisis which
is globally pertinent and in the public interest.
Additionally, there was no unauthorized transfer of data since placing the video covered by
HJPL on the internet only constitutes processing and not transfer. Lastly, while the source
code of the meme points to its origins in PRZ, the same cannot be asserted for the video since
that was uploaded by HJPL in Jambudvipa.

3. THE DECOLONISATION OF JAMBUDVĪPA WAS NOT LAWFULLY COMPLETED AND

REDNECK CANNOT CLAIM LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY OR ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
OVER THE SENTINELLE ISLANDS

It is submitted that the decolonisation of Jambudvipa was not lawfully complete since the
decolonisation of Sentinelle islands was not facilitated [3.1] Therefore, Redneck cannot claim
legal sovereignty and administrative control over Sentinelle Islands [3.2]

3.1. The decolonisation of Jambudvipa was not lawfully complete since Sentinelle
Islands were not decolonised along with it

53 Application Of The Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of Genocide (Bosnia V. Serbia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, ¶392.
54 Id ¶394.
55Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10),
chp.IV.E.1, Art. 8.

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Jambudvipa’s decolonisation is not lawfully complete since the decolonisation of Sentinelle

islands was not facilitated along with it. As per the internationally recognised principle of Uti
possidetis Sentinelle islands is a part of Jambudvipa[3.1.1] and the right of Self-determination
of the Sentinellese people was violated[3.1.2]

3.1.1. The principal of Uti possidetis endorses the sovereignty of Jambudvipa over
the Sentinelle islands

The principle of Uti Possidetis is instrumental in determining the title of a territory. 56 It

upholds the territorial borders that exist prior to independence, thus transforming colonial
administrative borders to international frontiers.57 The principal fosters stability of a newly
independent territory58 and its integrity is furthered by the principles and purposes of the
United Nations i.e. territorial integrity and political independence.59
Additionally, the ‘critical date’ principle forms an important tenet of applying uti possidetis
since the borders at independence may not be sufficient to ascertain the historically accepted
borders.60 The ‘critical date’ is resolved as the date from which the borders between parties
gain permanence for future reference of their rights. 61 As per customary international law, the
date must be the one decided at an earlier time and cannot be modified at a later time. 62 It has
also been further interpreted to implicate that there must be no changes to existing frontiers at
the time of independence.63
In the present case, during their colonial rule, Kitten deemed Sentinelle Islands a part of their
Jambudvipian colony. It decided to bifurcate them into two separate territories only in 1947,
close to Jambudvipian independence in order to preserve Redneck’s control over their
military base on the islands. With reference to uti possidetis and critical date, as opposed to
the bifurcation ascertained immediately before independence, the longstanding colonial

56 supra note 21 ¶400.

57Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10),
chp.IV.E.1, Art. 8.
58 supra note 21 ¶400.
59 R.K. GARDINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 488 (2003).
60 Id.
61 Art. 2, Special Agreement.
62 Bin Cheng, Burden of Proof Before the I. C. J., 2(4) INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY 596 (1953).

63 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgement, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 59;
ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: LAW AND ARBITRATION 6
(2009).

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arrangement of territories must be upheld. As a result, Sentinelle islands form an integral part
of Jambudvipian sovereignty without which the decolonisation cannot be considered to be
lawfully complete.

3.1.2. Denying the Sentinellese people the right to self-determination is a violation

of international law.

The process of decolonising a territory must include the exercise of the right of the self-
determination by the people of the territory gaining independence. 64 While validated as
customary international law in the 1960s65 the principle of self-determination has existed and
been upheld since the early 20th century.66 The UN Charter propounds its essence in the form
of “freely expressed wishes of the people concerned” 67 and multiple general assembly
resolutions endorse it.68 Therefore, by the arbitrary division of a territory[3.1.2.1] and a
misguided referendum[3.1.2.2] denied the Sentinellese people their right to self-
determination.

3.1.2.1. The arbitrary division of the territory is a violation of the the right to
self determination

In ushering decolonisation and facilitating the independence, the territorial integrity of the
colony must be maintained to accomplish the purpose of self-determination. 69 Arbitrarily
dividing a territory before independence and subsequently usurping its right to self-
determination is against the morals of international law. 70 An essential factor in valid self-
determination and successful decolonisation is the consideration of the free will of the
people.71
In the present case, Kitten’s attempt to dismember Sentinelle islands from Jambudvipian
colony right before independence to further Redneck’s selfish interests hampers the right to

64 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38, ¶1(b).

65 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment, Judgement, 1989 I.C.J. Rep.
15, 59; Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), Judgment, 1959 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 27.

66 Art. 78, BDPT.

67 General Data Protection Regulation, COM/2012/010, 2018, Recital 117-120; PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, A
GUIDE FOR POLICY ENGAGEMENT ON DATA PROTECTION, THE KEYS TO DATA PROTECTION PART 7(2018).
68 Art. 4(13), 51, BDPT.
69 Compromis, Annexure 1, Art. 52(1).

70 Id, Art. 52(2).

71 C-614/10, Commission v. Austria., 16. Oct.2012.
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self determination of not only the people of Sentinelle Islands but also Jambudvipa. In the
absence of territorial integrity the exercise of self-determination is disturbed. Further, even
the popular opinion within Jambudvipa was against the division and their express objection
being ignored constitutes a violation of the free will of the entire territory. Thus, such
dismemberment blocks the right to self-determination.

3.1.2.2. The referendum conducted by Kitten is not valid as per the right to self
determination

For a referendum to be valid and in consonance with self determination, it must take into
account the will of all people of the territory.72
Presently, since at the time of independence Sentinelle islands were a part of Jambudvipian
territory, a referendum must include the entire Jambudvipian electorate and not just
Sentinellese people. In the absence of the same, the referendum becomes invalid.

3.2. Redneck cannot claim sovereignty or control over the Sentinelle islands

Redneck cannot claim legal sovereignty over the Sentinelle Islands as the transfer of power
from Kitten to Redneck was illegitimate [3.2.1]. In arguendo, Jambudvipa exercises
sovereign control over Sentinelle Islands [3.2.2].

3.2.1. The transfer of power from Kitten to Redneck was illegitimate as it infringed
on the Sentinellese right to self-determination

The right to self-determination forms an important part of international principles concerning

sovereignty73. Their erga omnes character specifically extends to territories of colonial and
alien domination74. The foundational position of self-determination in the formation of

72 C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, 9. Mar.2010, ¶18-25; Alexander Balthasar, ‘Complete Independence’ of

National Data Protection Supervisory Authorities– Second Try: Comments on the Judgment of the CJEU of 16
October 2012, C-614/10 (European Commission v. Austria), with Due Regard to its Previous Judgment of 9
March 2010, C-518/07 (European Commission v. Germany), 9(3) UTRETCHT LAW REVIEW 28(2013).

73 Id.
74 Compromis, ¶17.
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territorial integrity75 and its customary nature76 proves that its omission illegitimatizes any
claim of sovereignty. The Chagos case outlined its status as jus cogens, by stating that the
negotiation between the U.S. and U.K, regarding Mauritius, is an act of denying Mauritius its
sovereignty77. Furthermore, it must be noted that the applicability of jus cogens is universal
and hierarchically superior.78 Therefore, they cannot be derogated, abrogated or modified
under any circumstances.79

In the present case, Redneck’s claim over Sentinelle islands arises from the transfer of control
from Kitten. When Kitten passed the Sentinelle Islands Act transferring authority to Redneck
on October 1, 2014, and Redneck passed its own Sentinelle Islands Act on November 3,
2014, it claimed its sovereignty on the basis of a legislative act that infringes on the right of
self-determination of the island inhabitants.80 As in the Chagos case, such negotiation and
transfer of power deny the Sentinelese people their sovereignty. Additionally, the absolute
nature of jus cogens makes the domestic legislations passed by Redneck and Kitten a gross
violation of the right to self-determination.

3.2.2. In arguendo, Jambudvipa exercises sovereign control over Sentinelle

Islands

To establish sovereignty, there must exist occupancy of territory which is continuous and
peaceful81. This is also established with the aid of Titre De Souverain, an internationally
recognised principle which indicates that states claim sovereignty over their territory by the
practice of various acts82. These may include administrative, jurisdictional, legislative or
cultural acts and signify the intention and will of the state to act as the sovereign 83. For

75 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series,
vol. 1155, p. 331, Art. 26.
76 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Judgement, Merits, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 202; MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 903 (6th ed., 2008).
77 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgement, Merits, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045.

78 Compromis, Annexure 1, Art. 5.

79 Compromis, Annexure 1, Art. 6; INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, GUIDE TO THE GDPR 20(2019).
80 Id, ¶¶53, 66; C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. AEPD (The DPA) & Mario Costeja Gonzalez, 13. May.2014;
ADV. PRASHANT MALI, GDPR ARTICLES WITH COMMENTARY AND EU CASE LAWS 205(2019).

81 Id.

82 ID; JURE GLOBOCNIK; THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IS TAKING SHAPE: CJEU JUDGMENTS IN GC AND
OTHERS (C-136/17) AND GOOGLE V CNIL (C-507/17), 69(4) GRUR INTL. 385(2020).
83 BDPT Art. 45, 46, 49.
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instance, in the Malaysia/Singapore case, the court upheld the installation of naval
communication, the inclusion of the disputed territory in maps and the investigation of
marine accidents to be acts sufficient to indicate sovereignty.

In the present case, Jambudvipa fulfils the criteria required to indicate their effective control
and sovereignty of the islands. The Governing Council had entered into an agreement with
the Jambudvipan governments, allowing Jambudvipan companies to set up oil rigs off the
coast of Sentibar in exchange for profits 84. Further, the Governing Council invited the JNC
and JPP to set up chapters of their political parties in the Sentinelle Islands. Soon, these
parties had a significant following in Sentinelle islands and went on to put up islanders as
candidates for governing council elections on behalf of their parties85. By 1997, the governing
council elections were fought by only Jambudvipian candidates86. The Permanent Court of
Arbitration ruled in Jambudvipa’s favour regarding the dispute of marine rights. Thus,
upholding that Jambudvipian representation in Sentinelle politics and administration is valid.
Additionally, from 1979 onwards, all maps drawn in Jambudvipa showcased the islands as a
part of Jambudvipian territory87. Lastly, The inclusion of KSIT as an area covered under the
terms of Southern Anatolasia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty signed by Jambudvipa is
conduct indicating sovereignty. Therefore, Jambudvipa’s claim of sovereignty is clearly
stipulated by these acts.

4. REDNECK HAS BREACHED ITS INTERNATIONAL LAW OBLIGATIONS BY ASSASSINATING

RISHAL DARULA ON THE SENTINELLE ISLANDS.

It is hereby submitted that Redneck assassinating Rishal Darula amounts to a violation of its
international law obligations. These include resorting to the use of force [4.1] and violating
internationally recognised human rights [4.2]

4.1. Redneck violated international law by resorting to the use of force.

It is argued that Redneck evaded its international obligations by resorting to an unlawful use
of force against Jambudvipa. This is in light of the blanket prohibition on the use of force
84 BDPT Art. 46.
85 BDPT Art. 49.
86 C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist v. Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping, 6. Nov. 2003; Shakila Bu-Pasha, Cross-border
issues under EU data protection law with regards to personal data protection, 26(3) INFORMATION &
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 216(2017).

87 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 (Mauritius/United
Kingdom) (Advisory opinion)[2019] ICJ Rep 2019 ¶172.

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under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (‘Art. 2(4)’) [4.1.1] Further, it cannot
be justified as a lawful exercise of the right to self-defence[4.1.2] In arguendo, any limited
rights Redneck might have to exercise self defence is inapplicable[4.1.3].

4.1.1. Redneck has committed a gross violation of art. 2(4) by using force

Redneck has acted in contravention of Article 2(4)[4.1.1.1] and violated Jambudvipa’s state
sovereignty[4.1.1.2].

4.1.1.1. Redneck has violated art. 2(4).

As per art. 2(4) the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of a state is prohibited. 88 This blanket prohibition on the use of force is a jus
cogens norm89 and by its violation is a derogation of customary international law.90

The interpretation of Article 2(4) as per its travaux preparatoires makes it clear that it is a
blanket ban on all uses of force. 91 While exceptions may exist in Article 51, it too must be
interpreted in light of the primary position of 2(4) within the Charter. 92 Further, an exception
in the interest of peace, right and justice” was also explicitly rejected by those drafting the
UN Charter.93
In the present case, Redneck using reaper drones carried out multiple missile strikes against
Rishal Darula while he was on Sentinelle islands. This act amounts to a violation of the
prohibition of use of force under art. 2(4).

4.1.1.2. By breaching art. 2(4) Redneck has violated Jambudvipa’s state

sovereignty

88 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Art.2(4);
89 Nicaragua
90 Corfu channel; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), ICJ Reports 2005, p.168, 223.
91 United Nations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San
Francisco, 1945, UNCIO Vol. VI 335,459 (1945).
92 Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical Context, 10 Yale Journal of International Law 278 (1945).
93 Ruth B. Russell & Jeannette E. Muther, A History Of The United Nations Charter 270 (1958).

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The use of force displayed by Redneck violates Jambudvipa’s state sovereignty. This is
propounded by the equation of territorial integrity within art. 2(4) as exclusive sovereignty of
a nation over its territory.94 Without the consent of the concerned state, any use of force
infringes on its sovereignty.95

In the present case, the use of force resorted to by Redneck is a violation of Jambudvipian
sovereignty since the missile strike took place on Sentinelle Islands. Further, Redneck did not
ask either Jambudvipa or Sentinelle governing council for consent. The lack of such
authorisation makes their act a gross contravention of their duties.

4.1.2. The use of force by Redneck cannot be justified as self defence.

An act undertaken as self-defense forms an exception for use of force. However, in this case,
self defence cannot be justified since anticipatory self-defence is not acknowledged within
international law[4.1.2.1] Further, pre-emptive self defence cannot be claimed either[4.1.2.2]

4.1.2.1. The principle of anticipatory self defence is not upheld in international

law

The exception to the use of force i.e. self defense, is outlined in Article 51 of the UN
Charter.96 However, since the requirements of harm under article 51 are not met the use of
self defence will not be applicable, it is anticipated that the plea for anticipatory self defense
will be asserted. Nevertheless, the principle of anticipatory self defence has not been
recognised within international law.97 In Armed Activities the court opined that the counter

94Military and Paramilitary Activities In and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Merits, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 1, ¶209; S. Blay, Territorial Integrity and Political Independence in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), ¶8; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).

95 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) 2005 I.C.J.
168, ¶153; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep 226, ¶39.

96 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 19, 1966) 999 U.N.T.S.171 [“ICCPR”], Article
2(1); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 1996 I.C.J. (July 11) ¶31.

97 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion
2004 I.C.J. Reports 136, ¶111; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v

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of self defense must be restricted to strictly Art. 51. 98 Further, the irregularity in the state
practice of anticipatory self defence does not support its use as a legitimate means. 99 This
implies that the absence of consistency by states in the use of force as a result of anticipatory
self defence becomes an indicator of it not being a recognised international norm.100 Any state
anticipating an attack must seek help from the Security Council since allowing states to act
on their own assessment would increase the chance of abuse.101

In the present case, if the Respondent relies on the anticipation of future attacks to justify the
assassination of Darula, his defence would be illegitmate since anticipatory self defence is not
a recognised principle of international law.

4.1.2.2. The claim of pre-emptive self-defence cannot be made in this case

It is asserted that even though the threshold of pre-emptive self defence is lower, 102 it is
inapplicable. Pre-emptive self defence aims to broaden the scope of ‘imminence’ to provide a
state more discretion to use force. 103 However, it has been opined that a number of factors
become relevant in doing so.104 Such defence is not supposed to give a state arbitrary power
and is supposed to be resorted once peaceful means have been exhausted, the capability of the
attacker in the light of current threats is assessed and the gravity of the situation at hand. 105

In the present condition, none of the limits imposed on pre-emptive self defence are met.
When the reaper drone spotted Darula, he was not engaging in violence or threatening either
Jambudvipa or Redneck. Redneck did not attempt to peacefully approach the situation or
resort to capturing or arresting him as opposed to assassinating him. Further, since the
situation was not grave enough, due to the absence of an attack, any violence or disturbance

98 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, No. 12747/87 E.Ct.H.R. (Jun. 26, 1992), ¶91.

99 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) 2005 I.C.J.
168, ¶153.
100 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, Article 6; Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36, U.N.
Doc CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018), ¶7.
101 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, Article 6; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶153.
102 Article 51 UN charter
103 supra note 96.
104 Federica I. Paddeu, “Use of Force against Non-State Actors and the Circumstance Precluding
Wrongfulness of Self-Defence” (2017) 30(1) Leiden J Intl L 93.
105 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(Advisory Opinion), 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶95,105 (July 9) [hereinafter Palestinian Wall]

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 -Summary of Arguments-

the resort to using force by Redneck, becomes arbitrary and falls out of the scope of pre-
emptive self defence.

4.1.3. In arguendo, any limited rights Redneck might have to exercise self defence
are inapplicable in the present case

Assuming it the anticipatory self defence is recognised, its requirements are not met in this
case[4.1.3.1]Additionally, self defence cannot be invoked against non-state actors[4.1.3.2] In
arguendo, in the absence of an armed attack, non-state actors cannot be ambushed.[4.1.3.3]

4.1.3.1. In the circumstance of anticipatory self defence being recognised,

Redneck does not fulfill the requirements for it

Assuming, but not admitting that the declaration of anticipatory self defence is legitimate, the
requirements for it have not been fulfilled. Rationalizing an act as a form of anticipatory self
defence requires fulfilling the cumulative conditions of necessity, imminence and
proportionality.106

To fulfill necessity, it must be ensured that the means used to achieve legitimate means are
necessary.107
In the present case however, assassinating Darula was not necessary since he was not inciting
violence at the time and could have instead been captured . Further, since Redneck used the
island as a military base, they had the means to facilitate the same or rely on alternative
recourses without violating Jambudvipa’s sovereignty.

To ensure imminence, the state must prove that there existed the threat of an immediate
attack.108
In the present case, however, there was neither the threat of an imminent attack nor the proof
of one. Redneck spotting Darula on the island was not a sign of imminence since he was
visibly not resorting to violence.

The condition of proportionality is fulfilled, if the state exercising its right to self defence
takes the recourse of measures that are proportional to the force being countered and the state
using such force does not use disproportionate weapons. 109

106 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392,
¶¶54-55,60 (Nov. 26) [hereinafter Nicaragua]
107 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo
v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶145-46 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities].

108 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 245, 247 (1988).

109 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
an Armed Conflict art 6(1), March 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S 172 (1999).

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 -Summary of Arguments-

In the present case, in the the absence of an attack from Darula, his assassination indicates the
disproportionality of force used by Redneck.
To conclude, Redneck’s use of force does not fulfill the criteria for use of force.

4.1.3.2. In any case, States cannot exercise self-defence against non-state actors
as per international law

The claims of States using force against non-state actors are not supported by the norms of
international law.110 The ICJ in the Palestine Wall case held that a State cannot justify its self
defence if the attack on them did not emanate from another State. 111 Further, in the Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua the Court made
clear that the armed attacks by “armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries” must be
attributable to the State, which in turn becomes the target of any subsequent act of self-
defense.112 Additionally, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ upheld
that claiming self-defense against an action that did not arise from a state or was not
undertaken on its behalf would be unjustified.113

In the present case, Redneck used force in Jambudvipian territory against Rishal Darula,,
even though his acts could not be attributed to any state. While he held an Indian passport,
and was known to aid with laundering and perpetuating attacks, the role of any state in the
same is absent. Even if his actions could assumably be attributed to PRZ due to their
involvement with guerrilla attacks in Amrub, as per above principles only the state to which
action of non-state actors can be attributed should be the target state. Further, Jambudvipa
was investigating Darula and apprehending him alive was the police’s top priority.
Consequently, in the absence of a nexus between Darula and Jambudvipa, Redneck was not
justified in using force against Jambudvipa.

4.1.3.3. In arguendo, in the absence of an armed attack, non state actors cannot
be attacked

110 supra note 117.

111 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th edn, 2008), 1129–30.
112
113
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As admitted previously, a State can invoke its right of self defence in the circumstance of an
armed attack.114 Assuming but not admitting that such a right is also consistent when
combating non-state actors, it must be highlighted that the same is in response to an armed
attack.115 The mere presence of a non-state actor cannot trigger a state’s self defence.
In the present case, Redneck drones have merely spotted Darula. Since he, as a non-state
actor, did not engage in an armed attack with Redneck he cannot be attacked.

4.2. Redneck has violated its human rights obligations

The ICCPR envisages the protection of human rights of the individuals by the state within
which they reside and within any territory of their jurisdiction. 116 Further, such jurisdiction
does not require a territorial nexus.117 When a State’s actions produce an effect on another
state’s territory it amounts to extraterritorial jurisdiction. 118 This stems from the consent of a
state required to interfere within its territory. 119 As per art 6(1) of the ICCPR, States are not
permitted to engage in arbitrary acts that lead to the deprivation of life. 120 Additionally, states
must respect their obligations under the ICCPR and not intrude within another state’s
territory and independence.121

In the present case, Redneck sought recourse in an arbitrary decision to assassinate Darula
which led to not only material damage but also the loss of life of ten humans. This is a grave
violation of the ICCPR, a mandate to which both parties are a signatory. The evidence
indicates that Redneck could have taken a decision that would not lead to loss of life.

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
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 -Prayer-

PRAYER

In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is humbly
submitted that the Hon’ble International Court of Justice be pleased to: 
1.
2.
3.
4.
And for this act of kindness, the Claimant shall duty bound forever pray.
 

Sd./-
(Agent for the Applicant)

MEMORIAL for THE APPLICANT

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