1.

a.1 The Defendant is criminally responsible for the crimes perpetrated as the mens rea and
actus rea requirements for aiding and abetting under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome
Statute are satisfied.

i. Article 25(3) of the Statute distinguishes the modes of individual criminal responsibility
within the Court’s jurisdiction. Sub-paragraph (c) relates to situations where the perpetrator
“for the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise
assists in its commission”.1 To be held criminally responsible, the Defendant must have
assisted in the commission of the crime and by engaging in such conduct, intended to
facilitate the commission of the crime.2 There is no requirement to meet any specific
threshold in satisfaction of assistance, any form of assistance that aids in the commission of a
crime will satisfy Article 25(3)(c).3 It is only necessary that the perpetration of the accused
had a causal effect on the commission of the crime.4
ii. The Defendant provided the means for the commission of the attacks against the Sanctuary. It
is immaterial that the Defendant’s practical assistance occurred before the action were
perpetrated.5 There is a causal connection6 between the Defendant’s conduct and the
commission of the murder, extermination, and other inhumane acts. By giving the orders to
Diallo, the Defendant advanced the commission of the destruction. Therefore, the attacks,
resulting deaths and collateral damage of baobab tree sanctuary were dependant on the
Defendant’s assistance.
iii. The Defendant must have had both specific intents required under Article 25(3)(c) together
with general intent required under Article 30 of the Statute to satisfy the mens rea of aiding
and abetting7. Specific intent requires that the aiding and abetting was for the purpose of
facilitating the crime8. Pursuant to Article 30, to satisfy the mens rea of aiding and abetting of
a crime, the aider or abettor at a minimum must have known that the principal perpetrator’s
offence would occur in the ordinary course of events. It is not necessary for the accused to
1
Article 25(3)(c) of Statute
2
PTC I Goudé [167].
3
PTC II Gombo et al [35]; PTC I Goudé [167]; PTC II Ongwen [43]; PTC I Al Mahdi [26]; TCVII Gombo et al
[93-94]
4
TCVII Gombo et al. [93-94]
5
AC Blaškić [48]
6
TCVII Gombo et al. [94]
7
PTC I Mbarushimana [289]; TCVII Gombo et al. [97]/
8
Article 25(3)(c); PTC I Mbarushimana [274] & [281]; TCVII Gombo et al. [97]
 know the precise crime committed; rather it is sufficient that the accused was aware of the
essential elements of the crime9.
iv. The Defendant knew that giving orders for extraction of oil by moving into the momayo’s
territory would lead to the destruction of the natural environment. It was made very clear
from the investigation done that there are 24% chances of nadawada river would get
contaminated in the normal course of drilling. The Defendant knew his conduct would assist
in the commission of the crimes and that the crimes would be committed in the ordinary
course of events.

a.2 N
v. The environment must be taken into consideration in deciding what is necessary and
proportionate when pursuing legitimate military objectives.10 It is international custom that in
an international armed conflict,11 incidental damage on the natural environment which are not
military objectives cannot be excessive.
vi. The attack by Diallo was also disproportionate. The ICRC Guidelines state that the burning of
an entire forest to eliminate a small enemy camp of minute importance would be
disproportionate.16 This is analogous to our case as Garba had caused a destruction of 25,000
baobab trees saplings in an attempt to target and secure the access points.
vii. The prohibition against widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural
environment is international custom, applicable in international armed conflicts. 12 It is
enshrined in Principle 13(2) of the International Law Commission’s Draft Principles on the
Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict 13 and Rule 2 of the ICRC
Guidelines.14
viii. The three conditions of this prohibition are cumulative 15 are satisfied on the facts. The first
requirement of widespread damage requires a scale of several hundred square km to be
affected.21 The area of damage equating to 1.3 km of land distance being covered by
destroying baobab tree sanctuary.

9
TC VII Gombo et al. [98]
10
Legality of the Threat or Use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶30 [Hereinafter
nuclear weapons].
11
ICRC Guidelines, supra note 5, ¶114.
12
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶76 [Hereinafter Oil Platforms].
13
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 71st Sess., Apr. 29-June 7, July 8-Aug. 9, 2019, U.N. Doc. A/74/10, at 213
14
ICRC Guidelines, supra note 5, at ¶29.
15
Id. ¶50.
 ix. The second requirement of long-term damage requires impacts lasting 10 to 30 years. 16 The
artillery attack caused damage to saplings which will take decades or even centuries to
recover17.The long-term requirement is satisfied.
x. The third requirement of severity was satisfied 18. The use of warfare against endangered
species is also a factor going towards severity, 19 and baobab tree sanctuary is home to three
endangered species. The requirement of severity is satisfied and therefore, president garba
has violated this prohibition.
xi. The CCNH applies even amidst an armed conflict 20. Article 6.3 requires States to not take
deliberate measures which might damage natural heritage in the territory of other States 21.
MCH would qualify as a natural heritage under Article 2 of the CCNH 22 as it houses 3890
endangered species of Insects.23 Unlike other provisions,24 Article 6.3 does not make
reference to Article 11 of the CCNH which relates to the World Heritage List.25
xii. Garba would have violated this obligation if acts that damage MCW are attributable to
Garba.26 President Garba had deliberately engaged in an artillery attack destroyed 25,000
Baobab tree saplings of MCH,27 which is situated in Momayo. This is a violation of Article
6.3 of the CCNH.

a.3 The gravity of the case is sufficient to meet the threshold under Article 17(1)(d)

xiii. Article 17(1)(d) provides that a Court will determine that a case is inadmissible where is not
considered sufficiently grave to justify ‘further action’ by the Court. 28 ICC jurisprudence
demonstrates that the number of victims is a ‘key consideration’29 in determining the gravity
of a case.

16
ICRC Guidelines, supra note 5, ¶61.
17
P¶34.
18
ICRC Guidelines, supra note 5, ¶70.
19
ICRC Guidelines, supra note 5, ¶71.
20
2009 UNEP Report and EACT, supra note 33
21
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, art. 6.3, Nov. 16, 1972,
1037
22
Id. at art 2.
23
P|3
24
CCNH, supra note 46, art 12.
25
Id. art 11
26
Craig Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage 249 (1st ed. 2010)
27
P|20
28
PTC I Al Mahdi [43]
29
ICC-OTP Iraq p.9
i. There are a sufficient number of victims to satisfy the gravity threshold.

xiv. PTC VI ruled that 1,000 victims was insufficient to satisfy the gravity threshold in terms of
the admissibility of the case under Article 17(1)(d) of the Statute. 30 The PTC in Comoros
listed a number of factors which must be considered in order to reach a gravity determination
for the admissibility of a case.31 These factors include: the scale, nature, the manner of
commission and the impact of the alleged crimes.32 In Goudé, the PTC held that the gravity
threshold had been sufficiently met, despite there being below 1,000 victims. 33 Moreover, in
Katanga34, the PTC ruled that the killing of 200 people was a sufficient number of victims to
constitute a ‘widespread’ attack. Furthermore, the PTC in Ruto observed that an attack does
not need to be against an entire “population” to be considered widespread.35
xv. It is evident that a specific quantity of victims is not necessary to satisfy the gravity threshold.
In assessing the gravity of a case, the Court must consider quantitative and qualitative
factors.36 The rulings in Katanga and Goudé clearly demonstrate that fewer than 1,000
victims may satisfy the gravity threshold. Therefore, PTC VI erred in ruling that the number
of victims does not satisfy the gravity threshold for admissibility under Article 17(1)(d) of the
Statute.
a.4 Garba failed to treat the environment as a civilian object

xvi. The MNP, a vast area of which is baobab tree sanctuary, wildlife and forest 37 has been
obliterated by president Garba’s actions. This is not only an important environmental site
with respect to its role in climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, 38 but the
environment is also recognised as a civilian object under international law.39 Therefore, Garba
must have due regard for the environment during armed conflict regardless of the treaties it
has ratified.
30
PTC VI Megor [13]
31
PTC I Comoros et al. (2) [20]
32
PTC I Comoros et al. (2) [20]
33
PTC I Goudé [21-22]
34
PTC I Katanga & Chiu [408]
35
PTC II Ruto [164]
36
PTC I Comoros et al.
37
P|3
38
Joseph Fargione et al., Natural Climate Solutions for the United States, Sci. Adv. (14 Nov 2018),
https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aat1869
39
UNEP, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law,
(2009) 13-21; ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Cambridge University Press (2005) Rule 43, 44, 45. 8 Legality
of the Threat or Use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226.
xvii. In Nuclear Weapons, this Honourable Court held that the environment must be considered
when pursuing military targets.40 Other international organisations had similar findings.41
Several treaties42 also prohibit attacks that would cause severe damage to the environment,
demonstrating the existence of legal obligations towards the environment when conducting
hostilities. Accordingly, these examples dispel any doubt as to the customary nature of the
environment as a civilian object as sufficient State practice and opinio juris exist.
xviii. Garba’s actions were a gross violation of its international obligation to protect the
environment, a civilian object, when conducting a targeted military attack.
xix.

CASE LAWS:
AL MAIDI, GENGE BEMBA, THOMUS LUBANGA DIALO, GOUDE, COMORUS,
MEGOR, KATANGA AND CHIU.

40
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226.
41
Chris Hedges, Serbian Town Bombed by NATO Fears Effects of Toxic Chemicals, N.Y Times (14 July 1999)
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/14/world/serbian-town-bombed-by-nato-fears-effects-of-toxicchemicals.html
; UNSC Res. 687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
42
Rome Statute, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, Article (2)(b)(iv); Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 10 Dec 1977, 1108 U.N.T.S 151, Article I
and II; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3, Articles 35(3) and 55
[hereinafter AP I].