G.R. No.

129670 February 1, 2000

MANOLET O. LAVIDES vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding
over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Petitioner Lavides was arrested for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610. His arrest was made without a warrant as a
result of an entrapment conducted by the police. The parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the
police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at
petitioner's room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the
police received reports of petitioner's activities. The police knocked at his door where petitioner was staying.
When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an
underwear, whereupon they arrested him.

Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate
Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse
Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which
He is Charged.

Nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant and by three other
minor children. No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine
cases.

Trial court issued an order resolving petitioner's Omnibus Motion, as follows:

1. In Crim. Case No. Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under detention, his arrest having
been made in accordance with the Rules. He must therefore remain under detention until further order of this
Court;
2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He is hereby granted the right to post bail in the
amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must
always be present at the hearings of these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited,
warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire
jurisdiction over the accused;

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those filed in Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550
or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on
May 23, 1997. Then on May 22, 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be
reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment.

Trial court denied petitioner's motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend
arraignment. Petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then
ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the
May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order.

CA: Considering that the conditions imposed under Nos. 2-a) and 2-b), of the Order, are separable, and would not
affect the cash bond which petitioner posted for his provisional liberty, with the sole modification that those
aforesaid conditions are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, the May 16, May 23 and May 23, 1997 Orders are
MAINTAINED in all other respects.
The appellate court invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the grant of bail to
petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition making arraignment a prerequisite for
the approval of petitioner's bail bonds to be moot and academic. It noted "that petitioner has posted the cash
bonds; that when arraigned, represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that he has
already been released from detention."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may require arraignment before the grant of bail

HELD:
NO. We agree with petitioner that the appellate court should have determined the validity of the conditions
imposed in the trial court's order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail because petitioner's contention is that his
arraignment was held in pursuance of these conditions for bail.

The trial court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his early
arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest in their cases. Hence, to
ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioner's bail bonds should be deferred until he could be
arraigned. After that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of
hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution, trial in absentia is
authorized.

This theory is mistaken. In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is
dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. Trial court could ensure the presence
of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the
proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions
of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these
Rules,".

On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because
until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion
to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly
undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.

It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only
after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the
trial court's order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be
present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under
Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to
him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the
notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia."

Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not
at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, (b)
during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for
a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the
proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.
 GOVERNMENT OF USA V. PURGANAN
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

FACTS:

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels,
sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also
known as Mario Batacan Crespo.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila,
Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the
TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition.
The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and
to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.

Acting on the MR filed by the SOJ, this Court issued another resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three
justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. The Resolution has
become final and executory.

Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.

RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez. In the hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant
of arrest.

In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to
post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued
Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos
in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.

Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons,
including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to
bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.

ISSUE:
WON the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

HELD:
No. SC agreed with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on
bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

The constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

Extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused
are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument
to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for
the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against
him, not before the extradition court.

The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 of the
Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut
short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall
into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for
their speedy disposition.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty
to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of
basic fairness to extraditees.

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been
arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a
clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a
judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it
partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any
intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital
international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short,
while this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia, Jr. and Juan Antonio Munoz
G.R. No. 153675,
April 19, 2007
FACTS:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong – 3 counts of Accepting Advantage as Agent, 7 counts of
conspiracy to defraud. Warrants were issued and Hong Kong filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent. Private respondent filed, in the same case, a petition for bail which was opposed
by petitioner. The petition for bail was denied by Judge Bernardo.

Eventually, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case and thus  it was then raffled off to
Branch presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying
his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge setting the bail at P750,000

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge in his Order. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being
limited solely to criminal proceedings.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail.

HELD:
Yes. In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, SC held that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings,".

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, SC cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international
law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to
human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the
sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only
to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of
the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life
and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited
to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have
likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted
to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to
persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of
the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is
no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.