Antonio Boffa/Capstone Paper/PHIL 400/May 10th, 2021/9,531 words 1

I.A. FOUR DEFINITIONS AND EXAMPLES OF THE ABSURD

For Camus, the absurd is defined as the divorce between the individual human
being and their life around them. Specifically, this disconnect exists because while each
individual has an ordered view of their life and wants to ascribe meaning to it, they are
met only with a chaotic reality that is without emotion or meaning. As Camus eloquently
puts it, “what is absurd is the confrontation of this irrational and the wild longing for
clarity whose call echoes in the human heart. The absurd depends as much on man as on
the world” (Camus 70). Thus, it is not that reality is inherently absurd, for all other
animals do not run into this problem. Rather, it is man’s propensity for self-conscious
thought and the longing for a united and emotional universe that causes him to become a
stranger to his own life, like an actor divorced from his stage.
In a similar vein, Taylor talks of meaninglessness as endless pointlessness, and this
is what characterizes nearly every form of life. For Taylor, life is not meaningful because
“activity, and even long, drawn out and repetitive activity, has a meaning if it has some
significant culmination, some more or less lasting end that can be considered to have been
the direction and purpose of the activity” (Taylor 131). Because life lacks this sort of
ending achievement, meaninglessness inescapably perpetuates every person’s existence.
People strive after inherently transitory goals, which are objectively meaningless
achievements in the end no matter how much passion one puts into them:
Our achievements, even though they are often beautiful, are mostly bubbles; and those
that do last, like the sand-swept pyramids, soon become mere curiosities while around
them the rest of mankind continues its perpetual toting of rocks, only to see them roll
down (Taylor 133).

Nagel defines the absurd as the discrepancy between human aspirations and the
pretension for a meaningful reality versus the true arbitrary nature of the universe.
According to Nagel, the seriousness with which all people conduct their lives lies in stark
contrast to their inevitable doubts about the purposes of their lives and whether reality is
in fact arbitrary. Hence, life becomes absurd “because we ignore the doubts that we know
cannot be settled, continuing to live with nearly undiminished seriousness in spite of
them” (Nagel 139). Even after this contemplation, people never cease to be concerned
with their individual lives:
Think of how an ordinary individual sweats over his appearance, his health… his self-
knowledge, the quality of his ties with family, colleagues, and friends, how well he does his
job… leading a human life is a full-time occupation, to which everyone devotes decades of
intense concern (Nagel 140).

Feinberg’s definition of the absurd draws influence from both Camus and Nagel.
Like Camus, Feinberg sees people’s actions as cyclical, regressing infinitely rather than
culminating in some point. His supermarket regress describes how people work to earn
money, earn money to purchase food, and purchase food to keep working, “and so on,
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around the circle, over and over, with no significant culmination in sight” (Feinberg 157).
While Nagel points out that some actions, such as taking aspirin for a headache, are
justified in themselves, this does not solve the absurdity of the regress. As Feinberg
explains, “it is possible after all to hold both that there is a point in taking aspirin… and
that in the main course of human life the activities that preoccupy us are inevitably
absurd, forming an inescapable circle of activities each of which lacks a justifying point”
(Feinberg 158).
I.B. EXAMPLES OF ESCAPISM AND SELF-DECEPTION FROM THE ABSURD
According to Camus, people’s daily routines, filled with jobs, eating, traveling,
sleeping, etc., are used to distract them from the absurd. It is not until “the why arises and
everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement” (Camus 69). Additionally,
the natural beauty of the world, the hills and sky, serve as a means of escaping the problem
of the absurd, of tricking people into believing that the universe has a rational and
reasonable principle. As Camus elaborates “the world evades us because it becomes itself
again. That stage scenery masked by habit becomes again what it is” (Camus 69). In other
words, even when we are able to see reality for what it is (strange and unfamiliar), we
quickly go back to escaping and deceiving ourselves from the absurd through the
pleasurable and monotonous activities in our daily lives.
For Taylor, the ways in which people resort to escapism and self-deception from
the absurd include a multitude of largely accepted practices and institutions. These
encompass not only religion and philosophy, but also the secular and humanitarian
efforts for universal justice and brotherhood, along with feelings of nationalism and
environmentalism. In the face of the unnerving meaninglessness which constitutes reality
that is the absurd, “men invent ways of denying it, their religions proclaiming a heaven
that does not crumble, their hymnals and prayer books declaring a significance to life of
which our eyes provide no hint whatever” (Taylor 133). In a similar manner, the other
practices attempt to reach out to something which is everlasting, that has meaning within
itself and will be valuable forever. Though all of these aims are in place to provide people
with something which is permanent and will bring lasting prosperity, none of them are
able to be successfully employed.
The answer for Nagel as to how the majority of people instinctively avoid the
dilemma of the absurd is that they join one or several larger-than-self goals. Because the
absurd arises partly from each individual focusing so heavily on his small, insignificant
life, Nagel believes that many people seek larger purposes as a way to join something
which is fully understood. “They therefore seek fulfillment in service to society, the state,
the revolution, the progress of history, the advance of science, or religion and the glory of
God” (Nagel 141). Yet, Nagel argues that even these aims aren’t significant in themselves
(for they too need further justification). As he puts it, “if we can step back from the
purposes of individual life and doubt their point, we can step back also from [the
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aforementioned aims]… and put all these things into question in the same way” (Nagel
141).
Feinberg, in describing the multitude of ways in which people distract themselves
from the absurd, refers to the stage-like nature in which the majority of people live their
lives. For many “individual lives proceed according to their fixed rhythms”, with most
people never even stopping to question the significance and absurdity of the way in which
they live their lives (Feinberg 156). Just as the salmon swim upstream without
questioning the meaning behind its actions, so to do humans actively repeat the repetitive
aspects of their lives, including working, shopping, eating, spending time with family and
friends, leisure, and sleeping. These processes, Feinberg explains, “concentrate on
showing that vindicating purposes never get wholly realized” (Feinberg 162). In other
words, these efforts never reach a significant culmination, though humans continue to
strive relentlessly through them regardless.
I.C. FOUR RESPONSES TO THE ABSURD
According to Camus, our best response to the absurd is to accept reality as it truly
is (meaningless and incomprehensible), rather than try to deceive ourselves as so many
others do. When we become aware of the absurdity around us, we transcend our absurd
circumstances. As Camus writes, “the workman of today works every day in his life at the
same tasks [as Sisyphus], and this fate is no less absurd. But it is tragic only at the rare
moments when it becomes conscious” (Camus 74). Hence, although this realization of the
absurd makes our lives tragic, it is nevertheless necessary so that we can face the absurd
head-on. Despite life’s hardships, “the struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a
man’s heart” (Camus 75). Thus, by accepting our tragic state, we scorn against our fate
and face reality for the meaningless existence that it is.
Taking a different approach from Camus, Taylor contends that it is most important
to focus on one’s state of mind in taking on the monotonous labors of life. Although life is
objectively meaningless, this does not mean we should ignore our deep interests, which
compel our wills to act in a particular manner. By embracing our natural interests, our
lives hence possess a subjective meaning “of the inner compulsion to be dong just what
we were put here to do, and to go on doing it forever” (Taylor 134-5). Taylor, in arguing
to view meaning as within oneself, explains that this mindset keeps us from the hellish
fate of infinite boredom, where no interests are left. Therefore, “what counts is that one
should be able to begin a new task… it counts only because it is there to be done and he
has the will to do it” (Taylor 136).
Contrary to Camus, Nagel does not think that the absurd is a problem that one
needs to defy. Instead, Nagel views the absurd as a uniquely human experience, one that
is only possible due to our capacity to consciously think about our existence. In this view,
since the absurd naturally arises from perceiving the reality around us, it “need not be a
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matter for agony unless we make it so” (Nagel 146). Hence, Nagel advances that we should
appreciate the ironic nature of our lives and live on as we typically do, rather than wallow
in despair or defy the absurd with scorn. For if “there is no reason to believe that anything
matters, then that doesn’t matter either, and we can approach our absurd lives with irony
instead of heroism or despair” (Nagel 146).
Feinberg’s solution to the absurd centers around activity which has a point
intrinsic to itself. This concept of self-fulfillment, which is simply doing what comes
naturally to oneself, is partly based on what is common among all humans (our generic
nature), but more so dependent on our unique tendencies (our individual nature). Being
self-fulfilled is imperative because “from the point of view of the individual involved,
nonfulfillment marks… the denial once and for all of his own good” (Feinberg 170). Even
the absurdity of our lives does not change this fact; that self-fulfillment is inherently good
for one’s own nature. However, it is untrue that all lives can reach this worthwhile state
(though many still can). It takes luck to reach self-fulfillment in our absurd existence, but
those who attain it will come to accept the “modest kind of joke at the heart of human
existence” and appreciate their absurd lives with an ironic smile (Feinberg 175).
I.D. THE MOST PLAUSIBLE ABSURDIST VIEW
After considering each view under intense philosophical scrutiny, I have found
Camus’ view to be the most plausible for an atheist to believe in, or at least much more
agreeable than the more problematic theories of Taylor and Nagel. Before delving in to
the arguments for the former theory’s plausibility, the troubling counter-arguments of the
latter theories should be discussed.
While Taylor’s premise of acting according to one’s will seems prima facie to be a
compelling and satisfying answer, it doesn’t take much contemplation to realize its
troubling implications. For if someone was instinctively driven towards morally heinous
acts, Taylor would have to admit this could be the point of one’s continued existence. Even
morally neutral acts, such as lavishly enjoying a life of luxury (or rolling stones up a
mountain), seem difficult to argue as worthwhile, let alone an integral piece of life’s
meaning. Taylor even admits that a (personally) meaningful life from the will’s desires
“would be irrational one, no doubt… and not any that reason could discover” (Taylor 134).
By the same token, Nagel’s answer also makes itself unable to be analyzed by
reason due to its plainness. Though he takes a novel approach in denying that the absurd
is a problem, his answer of appreciating life with irony doesn’t offer much for reflection
or instruction. This answer, though appealing in theory, is akin to ignoring the problem
of the meaning of life entirely. Even Nagel acknowledges that his view risks “falling into
romanticism”, by arguing that if nothing matters, neither does the problem of the absurd
(Nagel 145). The issue here is not his reasoning, but the anti-philosophical approach of
arguing that we should blatantly accept that nothing at all matters in any form.
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In advocating to see reality for what it truly is and live with an iron fist against the
absurd, Camus’ policy offers an intriguing and fulfilling remedy. By revolting against our
meaningless existence through pursuing our dreams anyway, we can live in a similar
manner to people whose lives are meaningful while becoming fully aware of the absurd
character of our tragic existence. Our lives henceforth become wholly focused on
overcoming our human condition, each moment marking a step towards this goal. As
Camus describes Sisyphus, “each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled
mountain, in itself forms a world (Camus 75). Camus’ answer is compelling in part
because our lives are marked by struggle just as much as (if not more than) pleasure. By
making the strenuous nature of our lives central in creating a worthwhile existence,
Camus’ theory presents a solution to the atheist’s dilemma of dealing with life’s miseries.
What he says of Sisyphus in this regard just as aptly applies to our own lives: “he is, as
much through his passions as through his torture [an absurd hero]… the lucidity that was
to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory. There is no fate that cannot
be surmounted by scorn” (Camus 73, 74).
While part of Feinberg’s answer is subject to similar criticisms as Taylor and Nagel,
he elaborates on their theories to provide a more compelling and developed viewpoint. In
particular, by favoring a mindset of luck over optimism or pessimism on one’s ability to
reach self-fulfillment, Feinberg presents a realist view of attaining a worthwhile existence.
This stance enables us to focus wholly on the aspects of our lives we can affect, as “luck is
not always good in a world that contains violent passions, accidents, disease, and war”
(Feinberg 174).
I.E. AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO POJMAN’S CHALLENGE
In their respective essays, Pojman (and perhaps Tolstoy) point out the inherent
hurdle which absurdist philosophers face: that without some religious view being taken
as true, it is close to impossible to ascribe objective meaning to almost anything people
traditionally value, thus making life irreconcilably bleak and meaningless. Despite this
difficulty, I believe that Camus’ argument represents a way in which life could be lived, if
not meaningfully, then in a truly human way that cannot be said to be utterly meaningless.
As Tolstoy points out, many people avoid the dilemma of searching for a reason to
live by following one of several religious beliefs, which if fully embraced, usually provide
all-encompassing answers to all of the questions surrounding the meaning of life. While
Camus agrees in this fact, he denies that religion is an adequate answer, as it fails to
provide compelling enough evidence to resolve the inherent conflict between one’s
yearning for objective meaning in life and the irreconcilability of the reality around them.
In a section on the leap one must make to embrace these religious views, Camus describes
how, “he is asked to leap. All he can reply is that he doesn’t fully understand, that it is not
obvious… he does not want to do anything but what he fully understands… he wants to
find out if it is possible to live without appeal [to some religious belief]” (Camus 71). To
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clarify, Camus believes that most religious followers still hold some yearning for a truth
about life’s meaning which they can understand in human terms and in the reality around
them, rather than in the prophecies of some realm outside of their reach.
Instead of pointing to something which could make our lives meaningful without
religion, Camus instead demonstrates how we can break out of the suicide-meaningless
existence dyad. Camus’ recommendation, to work tirelessly and rebelliously at our goals
and passions despite their inherent meaninglessness, makes one’s efforts to live
worthwhile since they are doing them specifically to avoid the tragic dyad. Despite the fact
that these actions will not objectively make our lives any more meaningful, our relentless
attitude towards striving onwards brings much nobility to our efforts and makes them
worthwhile. As Camus writes, “one always finds one’s burden again… the struggle itself
toward the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart” (Camus 75). Hence, through accepting
the absurdity of our lives and giving our upmost efforts in trying to make something of
them regardless, our existence can be made personally redeemable and worthwhile, if not
objectively so.
Though our lives may still be tragic, it is preciously this tragedy that not only makes
the joyous parts of our lives worthwhile, but also creates these blissful moments in the
first place. Because our lives are inherently marked by grueling physical and mental
struggle in the face of the absurd, the points of happiness stand out and empower us to
strive for another day. Camus eloquently details that, “happiness and the absurd are two
sons of the same earth. They are inseparable… There is no sun without shadow, and it is
essential to know the night” (Camus 74). Therefore, in spite of the meaningless ordeals
that constitute our everyday existence, becoming aware of the absurdity of our endeavors
justifies our actions by making them noble and worthwhile in the end, making us masters
of our own fate rather than succumbing to an utterly meaningless existence without
religion.
II.A. PREVIOUS PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE MEANING OF LIFE
Before taking this course, my philosophical views on the meaning of the life,
though underdeveloped, bore similarities to some of the classical philosophers which
were discussed. One major parallel was to Aristotle’s doctrine of happiness being the
highest good. Although the concept is close to impossible to define exactly, seeking
happiness (rather than pleasure, honor, or wealth) is, after some philosophical thought,
intrinsically understood as something which all humans should (and usually attempt to)
strive for. In fact, the majority of people only aim for one or more of the above “goods” in
life because they think these goals constitute happiness in themselves. But since these
only lead to temporary or distorted forms of happiness, we should instead strive to
achieve happiness in itself, as Aristotle outlines:
For this [happiness] we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else,
but honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if
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nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also
for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on
the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other
than itself (Aristotle 7).

While I did not fully agree with Aristotle’s definitions of happiness and the greatest
human activity (i.e., to exercise reason to the highest extent possible as a means of gaining
wisdom in accordance with the virtues), I did believe that living a contemplative life and
acting in accordance with the noble virtues was a major component in making one’s life
more meaningful.
In a similar manner, there were aspects of Epicurus’ hedonism that also shared
similarities with my previous beliefs. Specifically, his doctrine of focusing on natural
desires rather than those which are groundless serves as a useful guidepost to figure out
which sorts of pleasures we should pursue to attain happiness. Additionally, his teachings
on self-reliance stress that we should avoid spending the majority of our time seeking out
desires so that we can enjoy every abundance of pleasure to the fullest extent possible. In
his essay, Epicurus thoroughly explains how by passing up some pleasures (and even
willingly taking on some pains), we can attain greater happiness overall, as we are
exercising our wisdom over simply following our animalistic desires:
We consider many pains to be better than pleasures, if we experience a greater pleasure
for a long time from having endured those pains. So every pleasure is a good thing because
its nature is favorable to us, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen — just as every pain is a
bad thing, yet not every pain is always to be shunned. It is proper to make all these
decisions through measuring things side by side and looking at both the advantages and
disadvantages, for sometimes we treat a good thing as bad and a bad thing as good
(Epicurus 2)

In other words, because choosing to give up some pleasures or accept some pains goes
against our natural inclinations, making these tough decisions not only strengthens our
wisdom and resolve, but also leads to greater happiness down the line.
Thus, the meaning of life would have been to pursue happiness by means of
wisdom, which includes avoiding lusts for honor, pleasure, and wealth for their own
sakes. Rather, one should choose to both contemplate what it means to live a virtuous life
while also willingly going through worthwhile pains (and avoiding some pleasures) to
cultivate a righteous attitude and ultimately find wisdom and joy.
II.B. HOW THE AUTHORS CHANGED MY PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE MEANING OF LIFE
In going through the multitude of viewpoints and arguments on the meaning of life
this semester, both my reasons and arguments concerning the problem have changed.
One of the most prominent challenges to my beliefs came from Tolstoy’s work. As
someone who had achieved all of the fame, fortune, pleasure, wisdom, friends, family, and
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practically everything else that people typically associate with living a good life, Tolstoy’s
admission that he still could not find happiness was a striking statement. As he details his
thought process:
“All right, you are going to have six thousand desyatínas of land in the Government of
Samara, and three hundred horses, -and then?” ... Or, when I thought of the education of
my children, I said to myself: “Why?” Or, reflecting on the manner in which the masses
might obtain their welfare, I suddenly said to myself: “What is that to me?” Or, thinking
of the fame which my works would get me, I said to myself… “what of it?” And I was
absolutely unable to make any reply (Tolstoy 8).

After realizing that practically everything which people typically assign as

components of a meaningful life fail to deliver any ultimate satisfaction, Tolstoy realized
that another answer is needed in order for us to face death knowing that what we did in
our lives was meaningful. Even if one does not agree with his conclusion that faith can
attribute (or in Tolstoy’s case, is) meaning to life, his compelling observation on the
implications surrounding this argument have been utilized by several later philosophers.
Namely, that without fully believing in some sort of religious view, no part of one’s life
can be said to be objectively meaningful.
I, as with many who haven’t studied this philosophical topic in depth, was unaware
that such a dichotomy existed, let alone be supported by philosophers holding widely
different opinions. While each philosopher has a starkly different answer as to what to do
with this condition, most of them agree that one either has to accept faith as a
comprehensive (though philosophically irrational) answer as to what gives life its
meaning, or adhere to the notion that though a faithless life might be objectively
meaningless, it can still either hold some subjective meaning or be worthwhile in some
other fashion. The idea that there are only two types of answers to the meaning of life
drastically changed my perception of the problem overall. While classical views on what
makes life meaningful (e.g., Aristotle’s happiness and wisdom doctrines) can still be
incorporated, from Tolstoy forward they can only do so in one of two manners. Either
they are part of a faith-filled, objectively meaningful existence, or they are incorporated
as one part of a personally meaningful (or otherwise worthwhile), yet objectively
meaningless existence.
Because of the inherent physicality of what we can observe in our lives, no amount
of scientific or empirical knowledge can bring us an answer as to how our lives can be
meaningful, which is an inherently nonphysical property. “The strictly scientific
knowledge… cannot give any other answer to the question of life than what I [Tolstoy]
received, - an indefinite answer… life is nothing” (Tolstoy 13). Furthermore, philosophy,
despite it being the most absolute usage of our rationality, cannot create objective
meaning out of thin air either. Tolstoy, with his years of experience, explains how “the
rational knowledge [philosophy] brought me to the recognition that life was meaningless,
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- my life stopped, and I wanted to destroy myself” (Tolstoy 14). Thus, not only is
philosophy ineffective at bridging the gap between objective meaning and life without
nonphysical faith, but it can even lead to the idea that life can be self-destructive (an idea
which would be further developed by Camus).
Whereas before this course my views on a meaningless existence were relatively
narrow, after studying Taylor’s essay I have come to realize that avoiding such a tragedy
is much harder than it initially appears. What was especially interesting from Taylor’s
account of meaninglessness is that it does not require a life filled with pain, suffering, or
burdensome labors. Rather, “meaningless is essentially endless pointlessness… activity,
and even long, drawn out and repetitive activity, has a meaning if it has some significant
culmination, some more or less lasting end that can be considered to have been the
direction and purpose of the activity “(Taylor 131). What follows from this is that ascribing
meaning to life is not so simple as doing what brings one eventual pleasure or seeking
wisdom for the good of knowledge (as classical philosophers believed to be true). Perhaps
frighteningly, pointing out a meaningful existence requires backing up some practice or
activity as a rational means to some greater good which can be objectively supported as a
meaningful goal.
In what is essentially an analysis of Tolstoy’s theory that life without faith cannot
be classified as objectively meaningful, Taylor demonstrates how all of the activities of all
forms of life can be described as examples of meaningless existence. Taylor’s essay
eloquently describes how even though us humans may believe our goals to be self-
righteous and necessary (as otherwise we wouldn’t strive for them in the first place), these
innate feelings cannot be used in an argument to bridge our aspirations to an objective
standard of meaning that transcends the physicality of our lives:
Our achievements, even though they are often beautiful, are mostly bubbles; and those
that do last, like the sand-swept pyramids, soon become mere curiosities while around
them the rest of mankind continues its perpetual toting of rocks, only to see them roll
down. Nations are built upon the bones of their founders and pioneers, but only to decay
and crumble before long, their rubble then becoming the foundation for others directed to
exactly the same fate. The picture of Sisyphus is the picture of existence of the individual
man, great or unknown, of nations, of the race of men, and of the very life of the world
(Taylor 133).

Hence, between Taylor’s and Tolstoy’s arguments, the guideposts for defining what
makes life meaningful have not only been marked, but also adhered to by a majority of
the philosophers that followed. Either one succumbs to the notion that it is better to live
according to faith (and in doing so, slightly discard rational knowledge) in order to have
an objectively meaningful existence, or acknowledges that although a faithless existence
may be objectively meaningless, it nevertheless can hold strong personal convictions and
meanings that make it worthwhile for either the individual or for some greater goal
(though this larger goal, most would argue, is still meaningless in the objective sense).
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This evaluation of the problem of the meaning of life was unknown to me before reading
these authors, and ever since I have wrestled with the alternatives it provides, letting go
of romantic notions of ascribing meaning from the subjective standpoint and instead
incorporating rational arguments to see exactly what constitutes a worthwhile lifestyle.
Although I was able to formulate some reasons as to how the absurdity of life can
be avoided or rationally ignored (creating a meaningful existence in the process), Nagel’s
counterarguments on the topic forced me to reconsider these notions. In his essay, Nagel
explains how once we reach a state of rationality in which it is possible to doubt the
purpose and meaning of our lives, as soon as these thoughts initially arise they forever
change the person in a small yet significant manner. Though we eventually quell these
doubts in some fashion, our actions are forever seen as somewhat ironic. As Nagel
elaborates, this initial doubt concerning the meaning of our lives occurs:
After we have put in question the seriousness with which we take our lives and human life
in general and have looked at ourselves without presuppositions. We then return to our
lives, as we must, but our seriousness is laced with irony. Not that irony enables us to
escape the absurd… we take ourselves seriously in action no matter what we say (Nagel
144)

In summary, regardless of how hard we may struggle to convince ourselves that life is
somehow objectively meaningful (and no matter how much reason we apply in said
labors), the absurdity of our lives is an inescapable characteristic of the human condition.
This realization forced me to deeply analyze just how our lives could be made to
meaningful if the absurd is a truly unavoidable condition of them. Yet, as Nagel points
out, “it would be wise to consider carefully whether the absurdity of our existence truly
presents us with a problem, to which some solution must be found” (Nagel 145). While I
find Nagel’s recommendation (to simply accept our absurd lives as ironic) as defeatist as
the skepticism to which he compares it to, the idea that absurdity can somehow be
incorporated into the worthwhileness of living was a novel idea that deserved my
attention.
II.C. EFFECTS OF CHANGES TO PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS ON MY THEORETICAL LIFE AFTER DREW
If taking the all of the theories and premises which constitute them as factual, then
it would necessarily follow that several lifestyle changes should occur not just in my own
life, but in that of anyone who reads these same philosophers. One of the most drastic of
these changes would be to remove attachment from the pleasures which are commonly
thought to give life its meaning. This sentiment is felt strongly by Tolstoy, who after
describing how his life included many typical marks of pleasure and success (a family,
wealth, friends, fame, knowledge, health, etc.) proclaimed that “while in such condition I
arrived at the conclusion that I could not live, and fearing death, I had to use cunning
against myself, in order that I might not take my life” (Tolstoy 9).
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This passage marks two key components of how one’s life should change after
reading Tolstoy’s piece. First, that the typical pleasures and goals for which we strive for,
in the end, do not bring the meaning to one’s life that we so hopefully wish they would.
Thus, less focus should be spent on these activities in favor of others which can bring us
closer to either objective meaning (i.e., faith) or worthwhile activity and subjective
meaning, as described by the absurdist philosophers. Furthermore, Tolstoy’s struggle
with finding a reason to continue living at all acts as a stern warning to the reader; that
without adhering to faith (and nothing besides faith) as the meaning of life, we risk
becoming almost non-human (in a similar manner to Meursault). As Tolstoy writes, “faith
is the power to life. If a man lives he believes in something. If he did not believe that he
ought to live for some purpose, he would not live” (Tolstoy 14).
Of course, the absurdist philosophers would argue that this purpose for living can
come from more than just faith, though in most cases this meaning would exist only in
the subjective sense rather than an objective one. Particularly, Taylor’s recommendation
advocates for a stark rethinking in how the reader should live their life henceforth. In his
work, Taylor argues that everyone’s life, no matter how noble their goals or how fulfilling
their accomplishments, is in the end objectively meaningless because these aims never
culminate in some objective achievement. Their lives are pointless, and those of the
generations that follow continue this cycle of endless pointlessness. As Taylor writes:
We toil after goals, most of them – indeed every single one of them – of transitory
significance and, having gained one of them, we immediately set forth for the next, as if
that one had never been, with this one being essentially more of the same… And if we think
that, unlike Sisyphus, these labors do have a point, that they culminate in something
lasting and, independently of our own deep interests in them, very worthwhile, then we
simply have not considered the thing closely enough… Each man’s life thus resembles on
of Sisyphus’ climbs to the summit of his hill, and each day of it one of his steps (Taylor
132-133)

Even before one delves into what lifestyle recommendations Taylor draws from this
argument, the point in itself already implies a drastic change in how readers should live
their lives (if they agree with Taylor’s points). Rather than hanging on to the hope that
one’s toils, goodwill, pleasures, or aspirations will ultimately be meaningful, they should
accept that these activities are simply part of a long-lasting and never-ending chain of
objectively meaningless forms of existence.
Unsurprisingly, only a handful of those who read Taylor’s (or any absurdist
philosopher’s) work go through with the above conclusion. Taylor appears to point to the
reason why; that humans instinctively invent ways to deny their meaningless existences.
One prominent example is religion, which is almost always based upon something that is
permanent after death (thus creating meaning). Humanitarian ideals, which envision that
improvements in justice, environmentalism, altruism, or nationalism will bring long-
lasting changes in the welfare of future generations, are also used as methods to ascribe
Antonio Boffa/Capstone Paper/PHIL 400/May 10th, 2021/9,531 words 12

meaning to our meaningless actions. Even philosophy, which often times aims for
permanence (e.g., Plato’s forms) can be rationalized by the knowledgeable as a way to
demonstrate how the absurd can be avoided. Yet, according to Taylor, “if we can in
imagination disengage our wills from our lives and disregard the deep interest each man
has in his own existence, we shall find that they do not so little resemble the existence of
Sisyphus” (Taylor 132). To elaborate on Taylor’s argument, none of the above options are
persuasive enough to make life objectively meaningful, as all of them culminate in non-
permanent achievements (no matter the conviction or passion with which we toil through
them).
Hence, here lies another recommendation for how myself (along with other
readers) should change their lives henceforth. Since all of the above methods are futile in
reaching out to some permanent and objectively meaningful concept, they should not be
practiced for purely such means. Although one can continue to engage in these activities,
they should do so without any conviction that these acts will somehow bring any objective
meaning into their life.
Rather than seeking to base our actions by what brings our lives the most meaning
(as this is a hopeless goal), Taylor advocates for a different set of criteria to be utilized in
reasoning how to live our lives in a worthwhile manner. Stated generally, Taylor contends
that one should focus on the state of mind in which their activities are completed instead
of what meaning these activities (supposedly) would give. Using the Sisyphus example,
“if Sisyphus had a keen and unappeasable desire to be doing just what he found himself
doing, then, although his life would in no way be changed, it would nevertheless have a
meaning for him” (Taylor 134). In a similar vein, if we embrace our inner compulsions to
act in ways which bring us fulfillment, then we consequently do exactly that which
constitutes our personal point to living. While this would not bring the objective meaning
which many previous philosophers futilely searched for, the subjective meaning that one
can achieve is surely better than living a pointlessly meaningless life in both respects.
Paradoxically, one last recommendation from Taylor is that we should in fact not
hope to complete some ultimate achievements to give our lives objective meaning. The
reason for this is that if some objective criteria exist that can be completed to give life
meaning, then the culmination of said objectives would bring us not lasting fulfillment,
but infinite boredom. Instead, Taylor asserts that we should embrace:
Our own wills, our deep interest in what we find ourselves doing. If we do this we find that
our lives do indeed still resemble that of Sisyphus, but that the meaningfulness they thus
lack is precisely the meaningfulness of infinite boredom… This is the nearest we may hope
to get to heaven [perhaps barring religious faith], but the redeeming side of that fact is
that we do thereby avoid a genuine hell (Taylor 135).

Therefore, we should not only follow the actions of what one’s will desires to do, but also
never cease in having and accepting such compulsions, less we be faced with the lack of
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any goals and the infinite boredom such a situation would entail. Despite many people
living lives in which they frequently disregard their true, deepest passions and instead
pursue other objectives (namely, those activities which are commonly cited as sufficient
for living a successful and meaningful life), adhering to Taylor’s teachings would advise
us to forgo this standard in favor of one which brings us a subjective, though irrational,
meaning to life.
III. DEFIANT AMBITIONS
The question of the meaning of life is perhaps the paradigm for how all
philosophical questions are reasoned with. One starts by thinking that they have a well
thought-out answer, only to have all of their previous assumptions doubted and beliefs
countered. After struggling through the various intricacies and viewpoints surrounding
the problem, the reader emerges with simply a vague understanding of a formulated
answer to the question, let alone a confident response. Surely, the temptation to fully
accept one philosopher’s answer while brushing aside those who critique them is strong,
as a wishful sense of closure soothes the mind more so than a validated sense of confusion.
But as philosophers, we must avoid this temptation to accept such arguments, no matter
how persuasive their appeal, without subjecting them to intense logical scrutiny. This is
the nature of philosophy, and why it is the catalyst for changes across all spectrums of
human life and knowledge.
Of course, it is now human life itself that is being put into question. More so than
any other topic in philosophy, the problem meaning of life sets the foundation for thinking
about not only other philosophical problems, but all topics of debate in human discourse.
It, as Camus writes, “amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy”
(Camus 66). Paradoxically, before one embarks on such a treacherous endeavor, they will
be much more successful in analyzing less encompassing philosophical problems, as this
both sharpens their philosophical toolbox and gives them a vast background of arguments
to support their theses. It is for these reasons that anyone who strives to answer the
question of the meaning of life should do so with the highest levels rigor and
wholeheartedness, as it is an opportunity which few have both the necessary time and
knowledge to attempt.
In earlier sections of this paper, we discussed a dichotomy that essentially divides
up answers to the meaning of life into two paths. Since faith (or some concept which
transcends the knowledgeable human experience) is the only thing which can objectively
justify one’s life, one must either accept it as their rationale for meaning or submit to the
argument that life is inherently marked by the absurd; that it cannot be objectively
rationalized. This argument, advocated by both theistic and absurd philosophers (albeit
from two different sides), can be said to be one of the few commonalties across many of
their essays. As such, I am not attempting to discredit such an argument, though I do
believe that it may be hitting a moot point.
Antonio Boffa/Capstone Paper/PHIL 400/May 10th, 2021/9,531 words 14

While at first glance it may be concerning for one to not having an objectively
meaningful life (or have only one option to do so), upon further inspection one finds that
defining exactly what counts as objectivity is a rather tricky proposition. Just because
faith rests one tier “above” our human lives on Earth, one could argue (in a cosmological
fashion) that religion too needs to be justified upon some further concept. As Nagel
illustrates:
Even if someone wished to supply a further justification for pursing all the things in life
that are commonly regarded as self-justifying, that justification would have to end
somewhere too. If nothing can justify unless it is justified in terms of something outside
itself, which is also justified, then an infinite regress results, and no chain of justification
can be complete. (Nagel 138).

This sequence, if it could even begin in the first place, would continue ad nauseam, each
step requiring further justification to objectively justify all the ones below. Thus,
providing an objective meaning for our lives might not only be impossible, but the word
in such an all-encompassing context may even cease to make logical sense. The
bewildering task essentially amounts to providing objective justification for everything all
at once.
Naturally, the theist (and perhaps even the absurdist) would reply that religion is
self-justifying, which if true would imply that it can justify itself, and consequently the
meaning of our lives. But here we must look at exactly what is meant by justification. For
while it is hard to argue against faith being a subjectively self-justifiable concept to base
the meaning of our lives around, whether it can do so in an objective sense is doubtful.
Going back to Nagel’s example, most people can (and often do) objectively justify the have
headache-take aspirin dyad. Even though whether this chain of justification is complete
is up for debate, the fact remains that the chemical properties of the aspirin are objectively
useful in alleviating the symptoms of one’s headache.
Conversely, it is impossible for people to generally agree upon whether faith can
objectively justify life as meaningful. Not only are there countless viewpoints on faith and
religion, but all of them by definition require reaching out to something that cannot be
objectively justified through our sensory experiences. Therefore, the preconceived
requirement that life must be objectively justified to be meaningful cannot be done by
simply appealing to faith. Perhaps a more intensive argument could accomplish such a
task, but for our purposes the possibility that nothing can objectively justify life is enough
to, at least partially, escape the faith-absurd dichotomy.
It is important to note that nothing has changed about the human condition. Life
(without faith) is still marked by the absurd, as our lives are still objectively meaningless.
The only difference is that such a statement should no longer be fearful, as it is a moot
point, akin to saying that our lives consist of being alive. Perhaps this is what Nagel was
alluding to when he stated, “if a sense of the absurd is a way of perceiving our true
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situation (even though the situation is not absurd until the perception arises), then what
reason can we have to resent or escape it?” (Nagel 146). While I disagree with his reasons
for such an argument, his conclusion is nevertheless justified through the above analysis.
With the objectivity of life’s meaning no longer a concern, we can now turn to the
sorts of attitudes and concepts which constitute a meaningful existence. When dealing
with an (almost) insurmountable problem such as this one, I believe that it is close to
impossible for any singular philosopher to solve the entirety of it alone. Instead, it is much
more likely that each one discovers a certain aspect to the solution, one that can more
often than not work harmoniously with other pieces of the puzzle. Although discerning
how the pieces fit and which ones do not belong at all is an arduous process, it is certainly
one worth attempting.
The first part to solving this predicament is deciding which sort of attitudes one
should have towards their life overall. Of the many outlooks on life previously discussed,
I believe that Camus’ holds the most rational basis not only because the alternatives
(Nagel’s irony, Tolstoy’s four attitudes, etc.) each have their own counters, but also
because it presents the most opportune mindset for maximizing human potential. Put
simply, Camus argument is that since the absurd cannot be avoided, it is better to fully
accept our condition and act defiantly against it rather than attempt to ignore it or end
our meaningless lives altogether. According to Camus:
The absurd man says yes [to defiance and pursuing his vision] and his effort will
henceforth be unceasing. If there is a personal fate, there is no higher destiny, or at least
there is but one which he concludes is inevitable and despicable. For the rest, he knows
himself to be the master of his days… a blind man eager to see who knows that the night
has no end, he is still on the go (Camus 74).

By choosing defiance over irony, we enable ourselves to pursue the same goals and
compulsions which we thought to be objectively meaningful before our realization of the
absurd (though such goals can be meaningful in a more relevant sense).
On the other hand, an attitude of irony, even if it involves a slight smile, engenders
a defeatist attitude; that we should simply do as we please since we cannot change our
condition. Although the Camus scholar also believes that their actions cannot drastically
alter their fate, they at least live in constant resistance to such fate instead of yielding that
nothing they do will ultimately matter. In the latter case, they may very well end up losing
the drive to even follow their desires, as their ironic smile cannot brush aside the
hopelessness of their condition.
On a positive note, one other attitude that fits coherently with Camus’ defiance is
Feinberg’s luck-based view on achieving fulfillment. As empowering as Camus’ scornful
attitude towards the absurd is, it is equally important (as Feinberg points out) to realize
that the capacity for any given person to attain an overall meaningful life is dependent
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upon many uncontrollable and external factors. Due to this fact, Feinberg recommends
that one should always keep in mind that some people have better (or worse) luck in their
ability to pursue their goals or follow their vision. In his essay, he elaborates that there
are many:
Ordinary humans whose bizarre and untimely deaths climaxed their undeveloped and
unfinished lives. In contrast, many individuals do achieve fulfillment in long, active,
creative lives. These lives are more than just “worthwhile”; they represent to those who
lead them the achievement of the only condition that can plausibly be deemed “their good”
[i.e., pursuing their dreams despite the absurd]… fulfillment requires luck, and luck is not
always good in a world that contains violent passions, accidents, disease, and war
(Feinberg 174).

Therefore, in determining the best attitude for living a meaningful life, one should both
recognize their innate ability to defy the binary nature of the absurd while simultaneously
acknowledging that their ability to do so is, to an extent, outside of their control.
Unsurprisingly, it may be countered that it is hypocritical for someone to hold
these two beliefs simultaneously, for if external factors make it so that some people
(regardless of their defiance) cannot obtain the goals that constitute a meaningful life,
then perhaps it is naive and futile for anyone to attempt to do so. This certainly seems to
be the attitude of Taylor, and Nagel uses this idea to formulate his ironic attitude.
Nevertheless, I believe that just because the odds may be slim or somewhat
uncontrollable, it is not only reasonable but logical for any given person to attempt to
attain a meaningful life with all one’s conviction, at it is the most important thing for a
human being to do. Feinberg too, in critiquing the pessimism of his predecessors, also
touches upon the desire attain meaning, a desire which is innate in all humans. In
referencing a somewhat lucky individual who attains their highest potential and meaning,
Feinberg writes:
All of this [his achievements] is a source of rich satisfaction to him, until in the
philosophical autumn of his days, he chances upon the legend of Sisyphus, the
commentary of Camus, and the essays of Taylor and Nagel. In a flash he sees… the
absurdity of his (otherwise good) life. At first he will feel a keen twinge. But unless he be
misled by the sophistries of the philosophical pessimists who confuse the empty ideal of
long-term coherence with the Good for Man, he will soon recover (Feinberg 175).

In other words, because one’s mindset is foremost in describing whether any individual’s
life is said to be meaningful (for it has already been shown that the actions of defiant
person and the escapist are only incidentally different, and that objective meaning is a
groundless concept), maintaining a dual perspective of luck and defiance allows one to be
humbled in their actions while simultaneously driven against the pessimistic fate of
human nature.
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Of course, defining what sorts of activities should be pursued by someone with this
attitude is no easy task. Many philosophers, both absurdist and otherwise, are tempted to
advocate that meaningful actions are those which are beneficial towards some larger,
valuable goal. Wolf believes that such activities’ “justifications lie elsewhere, [specifically
in] objective value” (Vitrano 209). Though as Vitrano points out, the problem with trying
to categorize certain activities as meaningful and others as meaningless is that there are
always large areas for disagreement, which implies that the distinction has no objective
basis.
In critiquing Wolf, Vitrano writes that “she [Wolf] relies on supposedly shared
intuitions regarding the worth of various activities, but to assume such agreement is
unjustified. Some people appreciate an activity Wolf disparages, yet dismiss one she
values highly” (Vitrano 209-210). Furthermore, if the advocate of Wolf responds by
stating that it is the motive under which worthwhile activities are completed that makes
them meaningful, then these very pursuits have lost their objective meaning. For if the
same activity can be meaningful or meaningless depending on one’s motive, then the task
has no objective meaning inherently attached.
Luckily, the idea that activities may have no inherent meaning is not a terrifying,
but a liberating realization. With this, we can return back towards the classical
philosophers and define meaningful pursuits as those in which one “acts morally while
achieving happiness” (Vitrano 210). For such an intimidating topic, the recommendation
is quite simple to rationalize. Since happiness and satisfaction are appreciated by all
humans, it is only natural that their lives should be made meaningful by attaining these
states as much as possible. The means to these ambitions may vary widely, but this is
simply because each of our wills are tailored differently; what constitutes our defiant
ambitions in the face of the absurd will naturally manifest themselves in an innumerable
number of forms. While I believe that Vitrano places too little emphasis on completing
goals and visions (as they provide the confidence boost necessary to achieve genuine
satisfaction), she points out that people’s “paths to contentment are different, yet their
degree of satisfaction may be the same… the judgement of satisfaction is the individual’s,
not anyone else’s” (Vitrano 210).
The second criterion for meaningful actions, that they be moral in character, may
be objected as the very sort of thing which Vitrano criticized Wolf for. To elaborate, one
may counter that the doctrine that lives filled with immoral acts are meaningless and
those filled with moral acts are meaningful is just as arbitrary as attempting to define
some grandiose or benevolent projects as worthwhile and anomalous and selfish ones as
meaningless. However, unlike Wolf’s specious criteria for projects of worth, morality does
in fact have an immeasurably dense and defended basis; its justification lies in our ethical
theories. In particular, adjoining utilitarianism into Vitrano’s criteria for meaningful
action adds much-needed support to how such acts can be said to be more justified (and
Antonio Boffa/Capstone Paper/PHIL 400/May 10th, 2021/9,531 words 18

thus more meaningful) than others. After some thought, it is self-evident that basing one’s
life around goals which do not violate moral values is a sufficient (though not necessary)
condition to living a meaningful life, as doing the opposite would directly prevent others
from making their own lives meaningful, hence destroying the concept that was originally
sought after.
Lastly, it is important to note that these standards hold up regardless of whether
one chooses to accept religion as a basis for meaning or reject it as an insufficient or
illogical tool for such basis. Though I have proposed some arguments against faith brining
objective meaning, it still does an exemplary job at making life subjectively meaningful.
Therefore, regardless of which (if any) version of faith one accepts, they can still hold a
defiant attitude against the absurd while looking to maximize satisfaction and happiness
in a moral manner. We shall call these sorts of mindful acts defiant ambitions.
With all of these contingencies in place, we now have at our disposal the logical
arguments and philosophical grounds necessary to provide a proposal on the best mindset
and course of action for attaining a meaningful life. As was detailed earlier, our typical
notion of an objectively meaningful life is (as the absurdists claimed) unattainable. Yet,
the reason for this is that the term in fact carries no philosophical meaning, since the only
logical concept which could make life objectively meaningful (i.e., faith) is itself unable to
be justified as to the manner in which it could do so.
Let us not forget; however, that this does not rid us of the problem of the absurd.
If anything, the fact that our lives are characterized by chaos and worthless actions is
amplified by the loss of any objective meaning. Nonetheless, with subjective meaning as
the only attainable type left, it is all the more imperative that we seek it with every fiber
of our being. This is to be done not through a saddened yet ironic smile, but through
determined and defiant action. While doing this may never bring us objective meaning, it
enables us to avoid the hellish fate of succumbing to pessimism, for we can only achieve
happiness with hope, and hope with determination, no matter how highly the odds are
stacked against us.
Simultaneously, we must hold the somewhat paradoxical mindset that our failures
(and even our successes) in these strivings will be partly up to luck. Though we cannot
change the constantly changing landscape around us, we can control our reactions to
them and alter our strategies along the way. And the characteristics of our actions with
these mindsets shall be moral and satisfying. The former provides both the ethical and
rational basis for delegating such acts as meaningful in the first place, while the latter
furthers this justification by advocating for each human being to seek genuine satisfaction
and fulfillment within these bounds. As Aristotle declared, “Every art and every inquiry,
and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good [happiness]; and
for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim”
(Aristotle 1).
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Perhaps the most liberating part of this philosophy is that it heavily emphasizes
that making and deciding what makes a particular person’s life meaningful is up to the
individual (as any account of subjective meaning should). In Vitrano’s words:
How do you achieve satisfaction, considering that it has eluded so many? The key lies
within yourself, because you cannot control the events outside you. If your satisfaction
depends on whether others praise you, then they control how satisfied you will be with
your life. If you wish to avoid being subject to the power of others, then you have to free
yourself from dependence on their judgements (Vitrano 211).

Hence, it is up to the individual to either accept any particular version of faith as

justification for a meaningful life or adhere to the view that disagreements between
religions make a secular approach preferable. In either scenario, they will be wise in
following their defiant ambitions, as their reasons for doing so will be based not on
testimony or instinct, but on the highest logical scrutiny of philosophical inspection.