In the matter of the adoption of the minor MARCIAL ELEUTERIO RESABA.
Luis The errors assigned by the Solicitor General are:
SANTOS-YÑIGO and LIGIA MIGUEL DE SANTOS-YÑIGO, petitioners and appellees,
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellant.
1.ADOPTION, PURPOSE OF; PERSONS DISQUALIFIED TO ADOPT.—The purpose of
adoption is to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having
one by creating, through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none
exists by blood relationship. This purpose rejects the idea of adoption by persons who
have children of their own, for otherwise, conflicts, friction, and differences may arise
resulting from the infiltration of foreign element into a family which already counts with
children upon whom the parents can shower their paternal love and affection.
2.ID. ; ADOPTION AGREEMENT EXECUTED BEFORE THE NEW CIVIL CODE TOOK
EFFECT; ADOPTION MADE THROUGH COURT, THE ONLY VALID ADOPTION IN THIS
JURISDICTION.—While the adoption agreement was executed at a time when the law
applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of Court, which does not prohibit persons
who have legitimate children from adopting, such agreement can not have the effect of
establishing the relation of paternity and filiation by fiction of law without the sanction of
court. The only valid adoption in this jurisdiction is that one made through court, or in
pursuance of the procedure laid down by the rule.
3.COURTS; THEIR DUTY.—The duty of the courts is to interpret and apply the law as they
see it in accordance with sound rules of statutory construction.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. Villalobos, J.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by Luis
Santos-Yñigo and his wife for the adoption of a minor named Marcial Eleuterio Resaba. It
is alleged that the legitimate parents of said minor have given their consent to the adoption
in a document which was duly signed by them on March 20, 1950, and that since then
petitioners had reared and cared for the minor as if he were their own. It is likewise alleged
that petitioners are financially and morally able to bring up and educate the minor.
By order of the court, copy of the petition was served on the Solicitor General who, in due
time, filed a written opposition on the ground that petitioners have two legitimate children, a
boy and a girl, who are still minors, and as such they are disqualified to adopt under the
provisions of the new Civil Code.
The court granted the petition holding that, while petitioners have two legitimate children of
their own, yet said children were born after the agreement for adoption was executed by
petitioners and the parents of the minor. The court found that said agreement was
executed before the new Civil Code went into effect and while the petition may not be
granted under this new Code, it may be sanctioned under the old because it contains no
provision which prohibits adoption in the form and manner agreed upon by the parties.
From this decision, the Solicitor General took the present appeal.
"I
"The lower court erred in granting the petition to adopt in violation of the provisions of
paragraph 1, article 335, new Civil Code.
"II
"The lower court erred in giving Exhibit 'A', the agreement to adopt, a binding effect."
There is merit in the contention that the petition should not be granted in view of the
prohibition- contained in article 335, paragraph 1, of the new Civil Code. This article
provides that persons who have legitimate children cannot adopt, and there is no doubt
about its application because the petition was filed on June 24, 1952 and at that time
petitioners had two legitimate children, one a boy born on November 12, 1950 and the
other, a girl born on April 13, 1952. This case therefore comes squarely within the
prohibition. This prohibition is founded on sound moral grounds. The purpose of adoption
is to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one by
creating, through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by
blood relationship. This purpose rejects the idea of adoption by persons who have children
of their own, for, otherwise, conflicts, friction, and differences may arise resulting from the
infiltration of foreign element into a family which already counts with children upon whom
the parents can shower their paternal love and affection (2 Manresa, 6th ed., 108109). This
moral consideration must have influenced the framers of the new Civil Code when they
reiterated therein this salutary provision.
But it is contended, this prohibition in the new Civil Code cannot have application to the
present case because, to do so, as it is now attempted, would impair the acquired right of
petitioners over the adopted child in violation of the transitory provisions of article 2252 of
said Code. It is pointed out that petitioners reared and took care of the child, since
February 24, 1950, and on March 20, 1950 they and the parents of the child executed the
adoption agreement in accordance with the Rules of Court, and since these rules do not
forbid adoption to persons who have legitimate children, that agreement shall be given full
effect in the same manner as any other contract which is not contrary to law, morals and
public order.
We find no merit in this contention. While the adoption agreement was executed at the
time when the law applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that rule
does not prohibit persons who have legitimate children from adopting, we cannot agree to
the proposition that such agreement has the effect of establishing the relation of paternity
and filiation by fiction of law without the sanction of court. The reason is simple. Rule 100
has taken the place of Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure (sections 765-772,
inclusive), which in turn replaced the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on adoption.
(Articles 173-180.) As was stated in one case, said chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure
"appears to be a complete enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be
regarded as the expression of the whole law thereof. So viewed, that chapter must be
deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on the matter." (In re adoption of
Emiliano Guzman, 73 Phil., 51.) Now, said rule expressly provides that a person desiring to
adopt a minor shall present a petition to the court of first instance of the province where he
resides (section 1). This means that the only valid adoption in this jurisdiction is that one
made through court, or in pursuance of the procedure laid down by the rule, which shows
that the agreement under consideration can not have the effect of adoption as now
pretended by petitioners.

Some members of the Court have advanced the opinion that, notwithstanding the
enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure or the adoption of the present Rules of Court
concerning adoption, those provisions of the Spanish Civil Code that are substantive in
nature cannot be considered as having been impliedly repealed, such as the one providing
that a person who has a legitimate child is prohibited to adopt (article 74). But the majority
is of the opinion that the repeal is complete as declared by this Court in the case of In re
adoption of Emiliano Guzman, supra. At any rate, this matter is not now of any
consequence considering the fact that when the adoption agreement was executed the
petitioners had not yet any legitimate child. Their children were born subsequent to that
agreement.

We are sympathetic to the plea of equity of counsel considering the fact that petitioners
had taken custody of the child and had reared and educated him as their own much prior
to the approval of the new Civil Code and that all this was done with the consent of the
natural parents to promote the welfare and happiness of the child, but the inexonerable
mandate of the law forbids us from adopting a different course of action. Our duty is to
interpret and apply the law as we see it in accordance with sound rules of statutory
construction.

The order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs. In re: Adoption
of Resaba, 95 Phil. 244, No. L-6294 June 28, 1954
No. L-36309. November 26, 1973.*
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF THE MINOR LUIS ALBERTO MARTIN DE
SANTOS, FREDERICK WILLIAM MALKINSON AND ANA MARIE DE SANTOS
MALKINSON, petitioners, vs. HON. CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the
JUVENILE & DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT OF MANILA, respondent.
Adoption; Persons disqualified by law to adopt and to be adopted; Alienage by itself not a
disqualification.—Alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a Filipino
child and the Civil Code “only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either
(a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken
diplomatic relations with their government.” Neither does the Civil Code require that both
adopter and adopted be of the same nationality.
Same; Same; Same; Reason.—It alienage alone of the adopter or of the adopted were to
be a disqualification, it is inconceivable that the lawmakers would not have so explicitly
provided, considering that in article 335 of the Civil Code non-resident aliens and resident
aliens with whose government the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations are the only
two classes of aliens expressly disqualified and prohibited to adopt while in article 339 only
an alien with whose state our government has broken diplomatic relations is expressly
disqualified and prohibited to be adopted. Inclusio unius exclusio alterius.
Same; Natural mother expressly authorized by law to adopt her natural child; Step-father
expressly authorized by law to adopt his step-child; Case at bar.—The petitioner-wife as
the natural mother is expressly authorized under article 338, paragraph (1) of the Civil
Code to adopt her natural child and raise its status to that of a legitimate child. Under
paragraph (3) of the same article, the petitioner-husband as the step-father is likewise
expressly authorized to adopt his step-child. The adoption sought would strengthen the
family solidarity of petitioners-spouses and the child because the child, after adoption,
would have its status of a natural child of petitioner wife and a step-child of petitioner
husband raised to that of a legitimate child of both petitioners with all rights and duties
appertaining thereto, as provided in article 341 of the Civil Code.
Same; Adoption statutes; Objectives thereof.—Adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and
are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the
adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation
of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Same; Same;’ Adoption statutes clear and only calls for application.—The Civil Code
provisions on adoption are quite plain and clear and are free from any ambiguity. Under
such circumstances, there is no room for construction, the law is controlling and the clear
task of the judiciary is to apply the law as it is.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this appeal from the dismissal orders of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, the Court, in reversing, reaffirms the established jurisprudence based on the plain
language of the codal provision that alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner from
adopting a Filipino child and that our Civil Code “only disqualifies from being adopters
those aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the Republic of
the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government.” Neither does our
Civil Code require that both adopter and adopted be of the same nationality.
On October 13, 1972, petitioners-spouses filed with respondent court their verified petition
to adopt the minor Luis Alberto Martin de Santos, who was born a Filipino citizen in Madrid,
Spain on August 4, 1969, the acknowledged natural child of petitioner Ana Marie de
Santos Malkinson who alone of his parents extended him recognition.
Petitioners-spouses averred that since their marriage on March 6, 1972, the said child who
owns no property has been living with them under their care and custody at their residence
at No. 1443 Jose P. Laurel Street, Manila; that petitioner Frederick William Malkinson is an
American citizen,1 gainfully employed as a seaman with an average yearly income of US
$7,000-$8,000, while his co-petitioner spouse is a Filipino citizen and a property owner in
the Philippines; and that it is to the best interest of the child that he be adopted by
petitioners-spouses who possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
such legal adoption.
Judge Vicente M. Santiago, Jr. then on detail with respondent court issued his order of
October 18, 1972 giving due course to the petition and setting it for hearing on January 8,
1973 and directed that appropriate notices be sent to the Solicitor General and the
Director, Bureau of Child and Youth Welfare, Department of Social Welfare and publication
of the order be made.
Upon respondent judge’s return to her court after her leave of absence, she issued her
order of November 22, 1972, stating that upon a review of the petition wherein “it is alleged
that petitioner husband is an alien, while the child sought to be adopted is a citizen of this
country” respondent court was of the opinion that “the petition, for that reason, is not
sufficient in substance, and the same cannot be given course” and ordered that “the
petition filed herein will be ordered dismissed after the lapse of 30 days from petitioners’
receipt of notice hereof unless, within said period, proper proceedings are instituted before
the Supreme Court for the purpose of questioning the correctness of this Order.”
Petitioners moved for reconsideration on the ground that no law prohibits a resident alien,
who is not a citizen of a country without diplomatic relations with the Philippines and is not
otherwise legally disqualified, from adopting a Filipino, and respondent court denied the
same under its order of December 18, 1972.
Hence, the present appeal by certiorari from respondent court’s dismissal orders.
Respondent judge thus ordered the dismissal of the petition on the basis of her known
view that “a Filipino could not adopt an alien and vice versa;” hence, since petitioner
husband is an alien while the child sought to be adopted is a Filipino, she decreed that the
petition cannot be given due course. While aware of the controlling doctrine enunciated by
this Court in the Therkelsen2 and Cathey3 adoption cases that alienage by itself does not
disqualify a foreigner from adopting a Filipino child and that the Philippine Civil Code “only
disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who
are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their
government”4 respondent court felt that Justice J.B.L. Reyes’ statement in Therkelsen as
to its non-exposition of its reasons for dismissal of the petition therein as set aside by this
Court left the way open for a review and restudy of the controlling precedents.
Respondent court thus once again as in Therkelsen ordered dismissal of the petition solely
on the ground of alienage of the petitioner husband, maintaining inter alia that Article 334
of the Civil Code (which provides that “Every person of age, who is in full possession of his
civil rights, may adopt”) “cannot be accepted literally. If Scaevola5 is correct, it should be
construed as not permitting a citizen to adopt an alien, or vice versa;” “that the prohibitions
contained in Article 335 (4) and (5) of the Code should be construed as aimed at the
adoption of aliens by other aliens, and not at the adoption by an alien of a Filipino;” “that an
alien who has adopted a Filipino child cannot be expected, by precept and example, to
imbue the adopted with love of the Philippines and veneration for Filipino national heroes”
(under Article 358 of the Civil Code) and that “solidarity of a family cannot be achieved if
we hold the view that a Filipino child can be adopted by an alien.”
Petitioners-spouses therefrom urge that under the clear and plain language of the Civil
Code and the Court’s express rulings in Therkelsen and Cathey, petitioner husband as an
American resident not suffering from any legal disqualification may jointly with his co-
petitioner Filipino wife legally adopt the latter’s acknowledged natural child.
The Solicitor General in a manifestation in lieu of appellee’s brief dated October 26, 1973
stated that “with all due respect to the opinion and reasons of the respondent judge for
wanting the above ruling to be reexamined and restudied by this Honorable Court,
undersigned counsel not only feel bound by said ruling but also honestly believe that the
same, is the correct, proper, and reasonable interpretation of our law on adoption; as a
matter of fact, in said cases of Therkelsen and Cathey, undersigned counsel were also
impelled by reason and the law to place themselves on the side of appellants in asking for
the reversal of the orders of the same respondent judge in said cases holding that an alien
cannot adopt a Filipino,” and joined petitioners in praying for reversal of respondent court’s
dismissal orders.
Petitioners-spouses’ appeal must be sustained on the strength of the controlling doctrine
enunciated in the cited cases.
In Cathey, Justice Jose P. Bengzon ruled for a unanimous Court that “(A)s this Court
pointed out through Mr. J.B.L. Reyes in Uggi Therkelsen v. Republic, L-21951, November
27, 1964: ‘the present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters
aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the Republic of the
Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government. Outside of these two
cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting under our
laws.’ ” The Court thus held therein that “(P)etitioner, Robert H. Cathey though an
American citizen, is a resident alien entitled to remain in the Philippines, as his Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (Exhibit D) shows. He is legally married to Helen Olalia and
presently is the administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Construction office at Clark Air
Base with an annual compensation of $6,295.00 and has P25,000 worth of personal
properties in the Philippines. As petitioners spouses have no child of their own, they wish
to adopt Bertha Ann Rivera and thus make her their heir. The welfare of the child being the
paramount consideration under the law (Art. 363, New Civil Code), the child now sought to
be adopted being virtually unwanted by her own mother, who, by the way, has seven other
children to feed (Tsn of May 2, 1963, p. 11), We see no reason why the adoption should
not be granted.”
In Therkelsen, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had occasion to discuss respondent court’s contrary
view and to reject for a unanimous Court its imposition of an additional requisite not
imposed by the Civil Code that both adopter and adopted be of the same nationality in this
wise:
“The court a quo denied the adoption sought, saying:
‘In Sp. Proc. No. D-00011, adoption of Benigno Lim, this Court has had occasion to rule
that a Filipino cannot adopt an alien (Chinese) minor about 19 years old. The adoption
would not confer Philippine citizenship on the Chinese, but could definitely legalize his stay
in this country. It was also stated that conversely, an alien cannot adopt a Filipino unless
the adoption would make the Filipino minor a citizen of the alien’s country. As petitioner
husband in this case is a Danish subject, it has to be held that he cannot legally adopt the
minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks, whose citizenship is of this country, following that
of his natural mother.’
“If we understand the decision correctly, the adoption was denied solely because the same
would not result in the loss of the minor’s Filipino citizenship and the acquisition by him of
the citizenship of his adopter. Unfortunately, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court did
not expound the reasons for its opinion; but it is clear that, if pursued to its logical
consequences, the judgment appealed from would operate to impose a further prerequisite
on adoptions by aliens beyond those required by law. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General in his brief, the present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from
being adopters those aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but
the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government.
Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from
adopting a person under our law. Petitioners admittedly do not fall in either class.
“The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would demand as a condition for the approval of
the adoption that the process should result in the acquisition, by the person adopted, of the
alien citizenship of the adopting parent. This finds no support in the law, for, as observed
by this Court in Ching Leng vs. Galang, G.R. No. L-11931, promulgated on 27 October
1958, the citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, and not civil, in nature, and the
ways in which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code. It is not within
the province of our civil law to determine how or when citizenship in a foreign state is to be
acquired. The disapproval of the adoption of an alien child in order to forestall
circumvention of our exclusion laws does not warrant denial of the adoption of a Filipino
minor by qualified alien adopting parents, since it is not shown that our public policy would
be thereby subverted.”
factors that show the merit of the petition below, viz, that petitioner wife as the natural
mother is expressly authorized under Article 338, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code to adopt
her natural child and raise its status to that of a legitimate child,9 that under paragraph (3)
of the same article, petitioner-husband as the step-father is likewise expressly authorized
to adopt his step-child, and that the adoption sought would strengthen the family solidarity
of petitioners-spouses and the child, because the child after adoption, would have its
status of a natural child of petitioner wife and a step-child of petitioner-husband raised to
that of a legitimate child of both petitioners with all the rights and duties appertaining
thereto, as provided in Article 341 of the Civil Code.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed dismissal orders of November 22 and December 18, 1972
are hereby set aside and respondent court is directed to give due course to the petition in
accordance with the previous order of October 18, 1972 and to reset the hearing thereof at
the earliest practicable date. In view of the established jurisprudence covering the case,
this decision shall be immediately executory upon promulgation.

The Court finds no justification for deviating or departing from the established doctrine.
Whatever may be the merit of respondent court’s views as above-cited, they go into the
wisdom or policy of the statute which are beyond the Court’s domain.6 The Civil Code
provisions on adoption are quite plain and clear and are free from any ambiguity. Under
such circumstances, there is no room for construction, the law is controlling and the clear
task of the judiciary is to apply the law as it is.

If alienage alone of the adopter or of the adopted were to be a disqualification, it is

inconceivable that the lawmakers would hot have so explicitly provided, considering that in
Article 335 of the Code non-resident aliens and resident aliens with whose government the
Philippines has broken diplomatic relations are the only two classes of aliens expressly
disqualified and prohibited to adopt while in Article 339 only an alien with whose state our
government has broken diplomatic relations is expressly disqualified and prohibited to be
adopted. Inclusio unius exclusio alterius. This is but in consonance with the liberal concept
that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care
and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.8

Finally, aside from the above-decisive consideration that under the plain language of the
law alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner such as petitioner-husband from
adopting a Filipino child, the Solicitor General further enumerated correctly various other
G.R. Nos. 89224-25. January 23, 1992.*
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband,
CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
Civil Law; Adoption; Petitioners' challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made
collaterally but in a direct proceedings frontally addressing the issue.—A no less important
argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption
cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding
frontally addressing the issue. The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral
proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is
thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments,
Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso,
this Court declared: Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American
Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus: An adoption order implies the
finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot
be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is
obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment
of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter
the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the
decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance
with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand
until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the
rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might
not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by
different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while
another court would hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
Same; Family Code; Paternity and filiation; Proof of filiation; Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Art.
265 of the Civil Code and Art. 172 of the Family Code.—On the question of Doribel's
legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court
must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of
the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only
prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such
evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Remedial Law; Evidence; The evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of
its falsity or nullity.—Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to
Edita Abila was understandably suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The
affidavit of Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel
is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower
courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v.
Court of Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Special Civil Actions; Partition; Doribel's legitimacy
cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party.—Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must
fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy
cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party. The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code x x x
does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The legitimacy
of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Same; Adoption; Succession; Representation; While it is true that the adopted child shall
be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights do
not include the right of representation.—There is no question that as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right
to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her
grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father
would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children. But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of
Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that
the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same rights as the
latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by
the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not
extend to the blood relatives of either party.
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit
from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right,
asserting it for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine
years later, on March 26,1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate
estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13
of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent's
lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the
couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional
Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil
Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit
Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of
practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26, 1986,1 that Delia and
Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the
decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967.2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967.3 Consequently, the three
children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. In his
decision dated September 30, 1986,4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No.
1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as
established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their
estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its
own decision dated February 28, 1989,5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil Case No. 1042 (CAG.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is
MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the
estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the
respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners
and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private
respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted
because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of
adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from
adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who
cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children,
or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in
a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother.6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul
the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a
legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by
denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the
decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in
1967.7 Assuming that the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was
seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified
Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should
have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although
Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance
of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth
of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a
petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not
one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is
of the considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO
SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having been
revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge
cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the
adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of
the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct
proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether
erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises
in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary
jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720].
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso,8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series,
Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on
the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show
statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact,
such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the
exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the
jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or
necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally
attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be
regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one
court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as
affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribers birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article
265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners
stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence9 of filiation and may be
refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandably suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila10
denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course
hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even
without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
Appeals,11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code x x x does not have this purely evidential
character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child
born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the
child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper
parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue
in another action for a different purpose. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the
exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as
a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children
and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his
collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to
leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for
their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisons
of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father
in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted
above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived,
which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed
to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include
the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the
adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party.14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children
and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their
exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct however, in holding that only Doribel has the
right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other
private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners. Sayson vs. Court of
Appeals, 205 SCRA 321, G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
G.R. No. 85044. June 3, 1992.*
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch
20, Vigan, IIocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
Supreme Court; Motions; While notice of time and place of hear-ing is mandatory in
motion, Supreme Court may suspend its rules thereon to prevent manifest injustice to
appellant—As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the
motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time.and place of hearing. In view, however,
of the nature of the issue raised in the instant Petition, and in order that substantial justice
may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to
prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably
filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration
filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal.
Actions; Quasi-delicts; Parents and Child; Adoption; The natural parents of a minor still
living with the former when the latter accidentally shot a girl with an air rifle are liable for
damages thus caused rather than the adopter even if petition for adoption filed before the
accident and granted thereafter.—We do not believe that parental authority is properly
regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents,
the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that
retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some
benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden
them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could
not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction
on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Same; Same.—Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child
during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet
begun or had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case,
actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents, against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents
with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident, In addition to this case for
damages, a criminal information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed
[Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted
and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura
had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-
T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was
granted on 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the
result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the
mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the
15-day reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January
1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court—that notice of the motion shall be given to all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said
notice shall state the time and place of hearing—both motions were denied by the trial
court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal.
In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed the notice of appeal, this time
ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22
December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari
questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18
April 1988 and 6 June 1988. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that
petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses
Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their
minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues:
(1) whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even
through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of
adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be given retroactive effect so as
to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against
their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter when actual custody was yet lodged
with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration
filed before the trial court, not having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule
41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and
hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held
that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become
useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period.1 As in fact
repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the
opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing.2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant Petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of
technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having
been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary
period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals:3
"Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not
be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure
not override, substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made,
their aim would be defeated."4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of
the Civil Code provides:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x."
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives
with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
"The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx      xxx      xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
(Italics supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious
liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a
person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by
others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities
of parents—their parental authority—which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child.5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by
the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
"With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or
omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect—and our Legislature has so elected—
to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is
imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that
liability , without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability—with
certain well-defined exceptions—to cases in which moral culpability can be directly
imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the
selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by
reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made
liable for their conduct."7 (Italics supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them,
may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and
natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental
liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed
parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The
parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overturned
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of
the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual
custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of
adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental
authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the
petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer with an air rifle. The
Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code8
which reads as follows:
"Article 36. Decree of Adoption.—If, after considering the report of the Department of
Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted before
it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the
child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best interests of the
child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall
be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. The decree shall state the name
by which the child is thenceforth to be known." (Italics supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to
Article 39 of the same Code:
"Art, 39. Effect of Adoption.—The adoption shall:
xxx     xxx     xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is the
spouse of the surviving natural parent;"
xxx     xxx     xxx" (Italics supplied)
and urge that their parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the
time the petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental
liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the
minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this
rule:
"Article 58. Torts—Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the
child under their parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code." (Italics supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite
that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents
sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
"Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children
living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law." (Italics supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air
rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the
decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where
such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted
child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at
the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would
be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above.
Article 35 provides as follows:
"Art. 35. Trial Custody.—No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until
the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six
months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the
period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents." (Italics
supplied)

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionallyvested in the adopting
parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption,
preciselybecause the adopting parents are given actual custody of thechild during such
trial period. In the instant case, the trialcustody period either had not yet begun or had
already beencompleted at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case,actual custody of
Adelberto was then with his natural parents,not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents,
were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already
before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in CA-G.R.
No. SP15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before
the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This
Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED. Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 518, G.R. No. 85044 June 3,
1992
NO. L-26476. August 31, 1970.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR SANTIAGO
SENERES,DR.FERNANDO P. HOFILEÑA,and CORAZON DE GUIA-HOFILEÑA,
petitioners-appellants, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Civil law; Adoption; Person who has already an adopted child may still adopt another.—
Petitioners who are a childless couple, had already adopted two minor children. Petitioners
have filed again petition for the adoption of another minor. Since birth said minor had been
and has until now remained in the care of petitioners who had become so much attached
to him that they finally decided to adopt him in accordance with law, with the full consent of
the minor’s mother. Held: A person who has already an adopted child may still adopt
another.
Same; Same; Reasons for the law.—Reasons for the law to the above effect may perhaps
be found in these considerations: the persons who, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 335(1) of the Civil Code, can not adopt are related by blood with the children whose
existence prevents them from adopting any other child; the provision took into account the
need to save or protect the successional or hereditary rights of living children related to
them by blood; upon the other hand, the adoption of a minor child does not create or
establish blood relationship between him and the adopter; neither does the adopted child
become the legitimate or legitimated or natural child of the adopter, nor does he become a
natural child of the latter by legal fiction; adoption is, undoubtedly, a mere act of generosity
on the part of the adopter and should not prevent the adopting parent or parents from
carrying out another act of generosity by adopting another child. True, an adopted child
acquires successional rights by virtue of his adoption but it is plain to see that such right is
not based on the same consideration—blood relationship—that sustains the successional
right of children in relation to their natural parents.
DIZON, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila in Special
Proceedings No. G-00100 dismissing the petition filed by the therein petitioners—
Hereinafter referred to as appellants—for the adoption of the minor Santiago Señeres.
The following facts are not disputed:
Petitioners are husband and wife. The husband is a physician and a professor of Pediatrics
and Mental Hygiene at the University of Santo Tomas; engaged in the practice of medicine
since 1948 and he and his wife, have an annual income of around P18,000.00. They own
not only the house where they live in Manila but also own residential and agricultural lands
in Occidental Negros. They are childless, but on September 6, 1962, they filed a petition
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila for the adoption of the minors
Lourdes and Reynaldo Yusay, children of Dr. Eduardo G. Yusay and Eva Hofileña-Yusay.
On November 14, 1962 the above-named Court granted the petition in a decision that has
long become executory.
On March 23, 1966 appellants filed with the same Court a similar petition for the adoption
of another minor named Santiago Señeres born on May 11, 1961 to appellants’
housemaid, Veronica E. Señeres and a certain Felix Lisondra. Since birth said minor had
been and has until now remained in the care of appellants who had become so much
attached to him that they finally decided to adopt him in accordance with law, with the full
consent of the minor’s mother.
After the required publication had been accomplished and notices served in accordance
with law to the Office of the Solicitor General and the Chief, Office of Child Welfare, Social
Welfare Administration, the case was set for hearing and evidence was presented.
Thereafter, the lower court rendered the appealed decision dismissing the petition upon
the ground that the provisions of Article 335, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code prohibits the
intended adoption because appellants had already previously adopted the two minors
mentioned heretofore. In the present appeal, therefore, the sole question to be resolved is
whether or not a person who already has an adopted child may still legally adopt another.
Article 335, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code upon which the appealed decision is based
reads as follows:
“ART. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those, who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction;”.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise the rule is that only
statutes with, an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
interpretation (2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Section 4502, p. 316).
Similarly well known is the rule that words and phrases used in law which have acquired a
precise legal meaning are to be understood in their proper technical sense unless it plainly
appears that they were not so used by the Legislature (Black Interpretation of Laws, 2nd
Ed., p. 182).
The words used in Article 335(1) of the Civil Code in enumerating the persons who “cannot
adopt” appear to be clear and unambiguous and have a clearly defined meaning in law.
“Legitimate children” are those conceived during the marriage and, in certain cases, those
conceived before but born during the marriage (4 Castan, 6th Ed., p. 6; Article 255, Civil
Code).
“Legitimated children” are those originally natural children but later considered as
legitimate by virtue of their recognition by both parents and the latters’ subsequent
marriage (4 Castan, supra; Article 271, Civil Code).
“Natural Children” are children “born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other”
(Article 269, Civil Code). On the other hand, “acknowledged natural children” are natural
children duly acknowledged or recognized by the father and mother jointly, or by only one
of them (Article 276, Civil Code).
Finally, “natural children by legal fiction” are “children conceived or born of marriages
which are void from the beginning” (Article 289, Civil Code).
That “adopted children” do not fall within the meaning of anyone of the above kinds of
descendants seems to be clear. As a matter of fact, the Office of the Solicitor General,
instead of filing brief for the Republic of the Philippines as appellee in tins case submitted
for the record the following:
“MANIFESTATION
COMES NOW oppositor-appellee, through the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable
Court respectfully states:
1. That on March 23, 1961, a petition for adoption was filed with the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court;
2.That on June 1, 1966, a decision was rendered by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court, dismissing the petition on the ground that the petitioners has already an adopted
child and therefore can no longer legally adopt another;
3.That the Republic of the Philippines is the oppositor-appellee in this appeal interposed by
Dr. Fernando P. Hofileña and Corazon de Guia-Hofileña from said decision of the Juvenile
& Domestic Relations Court;
4.That upon a careful study of the issues raised and discussed in petitioners-appellants’
brief and taking into account on the following commentaries, to wit:
‘May a person who has an adopted child still adopt another? This article does not prevent
him from doing so’.—(Capistrano, Civil Code of the Philippines 1950 ed. Vol. 1, p. 305;
Francisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated and Commented, 1953 ed. Vol. 1, p.
876). ‘A person with an adopted child may still adopt.’—(Padilla. Civil Law, Civil Code
Annotated 1961 ed. Vol. I, p. 855).
‘The law says that if you have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or
natural children by legal fiction, you cannot adopt. By implication therefore those who have
adopted children may adopt.’ (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, 1965 ed.
Vol. I, p. 612).
‘It should be noted that the fact that a person has illegitimate children, who are not natural,
or adopted children, does disqualify him further from another child.’ (Tolenti-no,
Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed. Vol. 1, p.
639).
‘Under the doctrine, however, of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the illegitimate
children, who are spurious, and adopted children not having been mentioned in the
enumeration, it is submitted that a person who has an illegitimate spurious child or an
adopted child can “still adopt.’ (Coquia, Comments and Cases’ on Civil Law, 1959 ed. Vol.
1, p. 399).
we deem it unnecessary to submit oppositor-appellee’s brief, and on the basis of
petitioners-appellants’ pleading, we are submitting this case for decision.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court consider this case
submitted without oppositor-appellee’s brief.
Manila, Philippines, March 14, 1967.”
It is clear from the foregoing manifestation that the Office of the Solicitor General agrees
with the views expressed by the distinguished commentators cited therein to the effect that
a person who has already an adopted child may still adopt another.
Reasons for the law to the above effect may perhaps be found in these considerations: the
persons who, in accordance with the provisions of Article 335(1) of the Civil Code, can not
adopt are related by blood with the children whose existence prevents them from adopting
any other child; the provision took into account the need to save or protect the
successional or hereditary rights of living children related to them by blood; upon the other
hand, the adoption of a minor child does not create or establish blood relationship between
him and the adopter; neither does the adopted child become the legitimate or legitimated
or natural child of the adopter, nor does he become a natural child of the latter by legal
fiction; adoption is, undoubtedly, a mere act of generosity on the part of the adopter and
should not prevent the adopting parent or parents from carrying out another act of
generosity by adopting another child. True, an adopted child acquires successional rights
by virtue of his adoption but it is plain to see that such right is not based on the same
consideration—blood relationship—that sustains the successional right of children in
relation to their natural parents.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside and, as a result,
judgment is rendered allowing appellants to adopt the minor Santiago Señeres as prayed
for in their petition. Without costs. Hofileña vs. Republic, 34 SCRA 545, NO. L-26476
August 31, 1970
G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998.*
HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V.
CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdiction; The established rule is that the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.—
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court. As such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25,
1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive
Order No. 91.
Civil Law; Adoption; The written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained
a requisite for its validity.—It is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the
law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for
its validity.
Same; Same; Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity “insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.”—During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family
Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the
Family Code provides for its retroactivity “insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” As amended by the
Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads: “Art. 188. The
written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be
adopted, if ten years of age or over; (2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality; (3) The legitimate and adopted
children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; (4) The illegitimate
children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said parent and the
latter’s spouse, if any; and (5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.”
(Italics supplied)
Same; Same; The requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child.—As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written
consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is “insane or hopelessly intemperate.” The court
may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or
one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which
this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
Same; Same; Allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the
written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction.—The
allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of
petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the
child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their
minor children.
Same; Same; The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary
issue that an adoption court must first confront.—In cases where the father opposes the
adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he
had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of
abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court
must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be
considered on its merits.
Same; Same; Meaning of Abandonment.—In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon”
means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to
the root idea of “putting under a ban.” The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with
which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up
absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s rights or interests. In reference to
abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports “any conduct of the
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.”
Same; Same; Same; Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion,
is not tantamount to abandonment.—In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s
conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement
alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While
admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was
not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He
maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone.
He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Same; Same; Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could
give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent.—In a number of
cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply
because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural
parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, the Court awarded custody of a minor
illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to
his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with
his mother.
Same; Same; In awarding custody, the court shall take into account “all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit.”—The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue
of the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental
authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family
Code states: “. . . in case of legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the court.” In awarding custody, the court shall take
into account “all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.”
Same; Same; Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.—Parental authority and
responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender
to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Same; Divorce; A divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code
is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy.—As regards the
divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v. Escaño that a
divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized
in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an American
citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce
has no legal effect.
Remedial Law; Appeals; Although the Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to
review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not
conform to the evidence on record.—As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final
and binding upon this Court. This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast
the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. However, although this Court
is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the
lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the evidence on record.
Same; Same; Exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.—In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, this Court
has held that the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record.
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this interesting query,
certainly not one of first impression, would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of
law and jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,2 in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, “In the Matter
of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all
surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners.”
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23,
1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple’s relationship was undisturbed.
Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband’s alleged extramarital
affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband’s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite3 with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Cebu4 which rendered a decision5 approving the joint manifestation of the Cang
spouses providing that they agreed to “live separately and apart or from bed and board.”
They further agreed:
“(c)That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from the date of the filing of the complaint. This
shall constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the house and lot jointly owned by the
parties situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue City;
(d)That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any
person or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent of the husband; or any
undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husband’s consent as the parties are by this
agreement legally separated”6;
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before
the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce
decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving
“rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places” to petitioner.7
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning
P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month8 a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for
his children’s expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special
Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his
adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had
“evaded his legal obligation to support” his children; that her brothers and sisters including
Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she
would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, “leaving the children
would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad”; and
that her husband had “long forfeited his parental rights” over the children for the following
reasons:
1.The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any contract without the
written consent of her husband;
2.Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the United States and had
been transferring from one place to another to avoid detection by Immigration authorities;
and
3.Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and
Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances
were “too meager” compared to theirs, he could not “in conscience, allow anybody to strip
him of his parental authority over his beloved children.”
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over
his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving
custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect,
relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred
to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to
petitioner.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of
adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the minors Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioners-spouses Ronald V.
Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and approved. These children
shall henceforth be known and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D. Clavano and
Joseph Anthony D. Clavano respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption shall:
(1)Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties as though they were in
fact the legitimate children of the petitioners;
(2)Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the children; and,
(3)Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of this Decree of
Adoption for registration purposes.
SO ORDERED.”
In so ruling, the lower court was “impelled” by these reasons:
(1)The Cang children had, since birth, developed “close filial ties with the Clavano family,
especially their maternal uncle,” petitioner Ronald Clavano.
(2)Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their printing press, real
estate business, export business and gasoline station and mini-mart in Rosemead,
California, U.S.A., had substantial assets and income.
(3)The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie, nicknamed “Menchu,” approved of the
adoption because of her heart ailment, near-fatal accident in 1981, and the fact that she
could not provide them a secure and happy future as she “travels a lot.”
(4)The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual direction as they would go
to church together and had sent the children to Catholic schools.
(5)The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted by the Clavanos—Keith
had testified and expressed the wish to be adopted by the Clavanos while the two younger
ones were observed by the court to have “snuggled” close to Ronald even though their
natural mother was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest on “a very
shaky foundation” because of its findings that:
(1)Petitioner was “morally unfit to be the father of his children” on account of his being “an
improvident father of his family” and an “undisguised Lothario.” This conclusion is based on
the testimony of his alleged paramour, mother of his two sons and close friend of Anna
Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife in the very
house of the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
(2)The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of “comparatively recent dates” were
“attempts at verisimilitude” as these were joint deposits the authenticity of which could not
be verified.
(3)Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the possibility of his reconciliation with Anna Marie was
“dim if not nil” because it was petitioner who “devised, engineered and executed the
divorce proceedings at the Nevada Washoe County court.”
(4)By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner “is now an alien from the standpoint of
Philippine laws” and therefore, how his “new attachments and loyalties would sit with his
(Filipino) children is an open question.”
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her
Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:
from two judicial pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges
him to pay the children P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the divorce decree
of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly support of US$50.00
for each child. Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to show compliance with the
decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45)
drawn in the children’s names totalling $2,126.98. The last remittance was on October 6,
1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support commenced under the divorce decree on
May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made 53 remittances of
$150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were shown to have been made
after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date, oppositor was woefully in arrears under the
terms of the divorce decree. And since he was totally in default of the judgment in JD-707
CEB, the inevitable conclusion is oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a
father, contrary to his protestations.

“Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And abandonment of True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in different banks, as
a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with follows—
his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]).
Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not only without the consent of the parent, Acct. No.
but even against his opposition.
Date Opened
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that
it would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private Balance
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption
was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not Name of Bank
have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and
Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption 1)
did not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development who made the case study report required by law. 118-606437-4

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating: July 23,1985

“Article 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of the $5,018.50
child to be adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the parent who has
abandoned the child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Great Western Savings, Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be
considered as having abandoned the children. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes Oct. 29, 1987
any conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish parental
claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations 2)
which parents owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of the
parent’s presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary affection. The issue of 73-166-8
abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first error.
March 5, 1986
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the children and has in
fact even maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty to provide support comes 3,129.00

Matewan National Bank of Williamson, West Virginia, U.S.A.
Oct. 29, 1987
3)
564-146883
December 31, 1986
2,622.19
Security Pacific National Bank, Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
Oct. 29, 1987
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositor’s name as trustee for
Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In other words, the accounts
are operated and the amounts withdrawable by oppositor himself and it cannot be said that
they belong to the minors. The second is an ‘or’ account, in the names of Herbert Cang or
Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and in the Philippines, said account is operable only by
oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his offer of evidence ‘the
aim and purpose of providing for a better future and security of his family.’ ”
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He emphasized that
the decree of legal separation was not based on the merits of the case as it was based on
a manifestation amounting to a compromise agreement between him and Anna Marie.
That he and his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne
out by the fact that prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with
petitioner’s parents. Moreover, he alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he
and his wife initiated the “joint complaint” for divorce.
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children was
belied by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took
exception to the appellate court’s findings that as an American citizen he could no longer
lay claim to custody over his children because his citizenship would not take away the fact
that he “is still a father to his children.” As regards his alleged illicit relationship with
another woman, he had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the
instant adoption case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family
friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away
from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony
of Wilma Soco should not have been given weight for it was only during the hearing of the
petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came to know her and went to
her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a witness for monetary considerations.
Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that they
could love the children much more than he could.11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court,
alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written
consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188(2) of the Family Code.
Article 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides—
“ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary.—The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:
(1)The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2)The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of the Department of Social
Welfare or any duly licensed child placement agency under whose care the child may be;
(3)The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.” (Italics
supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 91
amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus
amended, Article 31 read:
“ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary.—The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:
(1)The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2)The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving counselling and
appropriate social services from the Ministry of Social Services and Development or from a
duly licensed child-placement agency;
(3)The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly licensed child-placement
agency under whose care and legal custody the child may be;
(4)The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.” (Italics
supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court.12 As such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September
25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by
Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code
which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family
Code provides for its retroactivity “insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” As amended by the
Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads:
“Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1)The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2)The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality;
(3)The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or
parents;
(4)The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with
said parent and the latter’s spouse, if any; and
(5)The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.” (Italics supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law,
the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as
follows:
“SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.—There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to
the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and
by the child’s spouse, if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if there are no such parents by
the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an
orphan asylum, children’s home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or
officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate
and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be
required.” (Italics supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the
child13 or that such parent is “insane or hopelessly intemperate.” The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the
parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption
from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court
treats the procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the Court declared:
“x x x. The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption
proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts relating
to the child and its parents, which may give information to those interested, than that it
should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will
confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts
necessary to give the court jurisdiction.”14
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the
petition for adoption. Petitioner’s consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the
petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the
natural father as follows:
“3. That the children’s mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO, has given her
express consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of Consent, Annex ‘A.’ Likewise,
the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14 years of age appears on page 2 of this petition;
However, the father of the children, Herbert Cang, had already left his wife and children
and had already divorced the former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the DECREE OF
DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex ‘B’) which
was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he abandoned his family to live in the
United States as an illegal immigrant.”
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written
consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since
abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which
our statutes and jurisprudence16 dispense with the requirement of written consent to the
adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a
proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent
is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the
oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his
child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court.17 This
Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties.18 However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it
has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that
these do not conform to the evidence on record.
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that factual
findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are
the following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties
and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion21 on the issue of
whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon” means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of “putting under a ban.” The
emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control
of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or
claim one’s rights or interests.22 In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the
act of abandonment imports “any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means “neglect
or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents
owe their children.”
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as
to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.24 While admittedly, petitioner was physically
absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication
with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail
and catered to their whims.
Petitioner’s testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of
the following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:
1.Exh. 1—a 4-page undated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie) addressed to “Dear Bert” on a
C. Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had been “a long
time since the last time you’ve heard from me excluding that of the phone conversation
we’ve had.” She discussed petitioner’s intention to buy a motorbike for Keith, expressing
apprehension over risks that could be engendered by Keith’s use of it. She said that in the
“last phone conversation” she had with petitioner on the birthday of “Ma,” she forgot to tell
petitioner that Keith’s voice had changed; he had become a “bagito” or a teen-ager with
many “fans” who sent him Valentine’s cards. She told him how Charmaine had become
quite a talkative “almost dalaga” who could carry on a conversation with her angkong and
how pretty she was in white dress when she won among the candidates in the Flores de
Mayo after she had prayed so hard for it. She informed him, however, that she was worried
because Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as she loved clothes. About
Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told petitioner that the boy was smart for his age and “quite
spoiled” being the youngest of the children in Lahug. Joeton was mischievous but Keith
was his idol with whom he would sleep anytime. She admitted having said so much about
the children because they might not have informed petitioner of “some happenings and
spices of life” about themselves. She said that it was “just very exciting to know how
they’ve grown up and very pleasant, too, that each of them have (sic) different characters.”
She ended the letter with the hope that petitioner was “at the best of health.” After
extending her regards “to all,” she signed her name after the word “Love.” This letter was
mailed on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose address was P.O. Box 2445,
Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2.Exh. 2—letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden print of “a note from
Menchu” on the left upper corner. Anna Marie stated that “we” wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2,
1984 and that Keith and Joeton were very excited when petitioner “called up last time.”
She told him how Joeton would grab the phone from Keith just so petitioner would know
what he wanted to order. Charmaine, who was asleep, was so disappointed that she
missed petitioner’s call because she also wanted something that petitioner should buy.
Menchu told petitioner that Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for
her walking shorts and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie informed petitioner that the kids were
growing up and so were their needs. She told petitioner to be “very fatherly” about the
children’s needs because those were expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie asked for a
subscription of Glamour and Vogue magazines and that whatever expenses he would
incur, she would “replace” these. As a postcript, she told petitioner that Keith wanted a size
6 khaki-colored “Sperry topsider shoes.”
3.Exh. 3—an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:
“Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It’s nice to be thought of at X’mas.
Thanks again.
Sincerely,
Menchu”
4.Exh. 4—a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose Clavano, Inc. addressed
to “Dear Dad.” Keith told his father that they tried to tell their mother “to stay for a little
while, just a few weeks after classes start(s)” on June 16. He informed petitioner that
Joeton would be in Kinder I and that, about the motorbike, he had told his mother to write
petitioner about it and “we’ll see what you’re (sic) decision will be.” He asked for
chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some
clothes for outing and perfume. He told petitioner that they had been going to Lahug with
their mother picking them up after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From
her aerobics, his mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 o’clock in the
evening. He wished his father “luck and the best of health” and that they prayed for him
and their other relatives. The letter was ended with “Love Keith.”
5.Exh. 5—another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his father for the Christmas
card “with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00” and the “card of Joeton with $5.00 inside.” He told
petitioner the amounts following his father’s instructions and promise to send money
through the mail. He asked his father to address his letter directly to him because he
wanted to open his own letters. He informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas
season—that they enjoyed eating, playing and giving surprises to their mother. He
apprised him of his daily schedule and that their mother had been closely supervising
them, instructing them to fold their blankets and pile up their pillows. He informed petitioner
that Joeton had become very smart while Charmaine, who was also smart, was very
demanding of their mother. Because their mother was leaving for the United States on
February 5, they would be missing her like they were missing petitioner. He asked for his
“things” and $200.00. He told petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like he would make
the sign of the cross even when they would pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his
insistence that Aquino was not dead because he had seen him on the betamax machine.
For Keith, Charmaine had become “very maldita” who was not always satisfied with her
dolls and things but Joeton was full of surprises. He ended the letter with “Love your son,
Keith.” The letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
6.Exh. 6—an undated letter of Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for the bathing suit, key
chain, pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She reminded him of her
birthday on January 23 when she would turn 9 years old. She informed him that she wore
size 10 and the size of her feet was IM. They had fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes
would start on January 9 although Keith’s classes had started on January 6. They would
feel sad again because Mommy would be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep
writing them. She signed, “Love, Charmaine.”
7.Exh. 7—an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner that they had not been
remiss in writing letters to him. He informed him of their trip to Manila—they went to
Malacañang, Tito Doy Laurel’s house, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the executive house,
Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for one week. He informed him that he got “honors,”
Charmaine was 7th in her class and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton would be
enrolled in Sacred Heart soon and he was glad they would be together in that school. He
asked for his “reward” from petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton. He asked for a
motorbike and dollars that he could save. He told petitioner that he was saving the money
he had been sending them. He said he missed petitioner and wished him the best. He
added that petitioner should call them on Sundays.
8.Exh. 8—a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently written by the latter. She
asked for money from petitioner to buy something for the school and “something else.” She
promised not to spend so much and to save some. She said she loved petitioner and
missed him. Joeton said “hi!” to petitioner. After ending the letter with “Love, Joeton and
Charmaine,” she asked for her prize for her grades as she got seventh place.
9.Exh. 9—undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had been writing him; that
he would like to have some money but he would save them; that he learned that petitioner
had called them up but he was not around; that he would be going to Manila but would be
back home May 3; that his Mommy had just arrived Thursday afternoon, and that he would
be the “official altar boy.” He asked petitioner to write them soon.
10.Exh. 10—Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told petitioner that he was
saving some in the bank and he was proud because he was the only one in his group who
saved in the bank. He told him that Joeton had become naughty and would claim as his
own the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised petitioner to send pants and shirts to
Joeton, too, and asked for a pair of topsider shoes and candies. He informed petitioner that
he was a member of the basketball team and that his mom would drive for his group. He
asked him to call them often like the father of Ana Christie and to write them when he
would call so that they could wait for it. He informed petitioner that they had all grown
bigger and heavier. He hoped petitioner would be happy with the letter that had taken him
so long to write because he did not want to commit any mistakes. He asked petitioner to
buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added that the latter should buy
something for Mommy.
11.Exh. 11—a Christmas card “For My Wonderful Father” dated October 8, 1984 from
Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
12.Exh. 12—another Christmas card, “Our Wish For You” with the year ‘83 written on the
upper right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
13.Exh. 13—a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written him even when their Mom
“was there” where she bought them clothes and shoes. Keith asked petitioner for $300.00.
Because his mother would not agree to buy him a motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit
that would cost P12,000.00. He informed petitioner that he would go to an afternoon disco
with friends but their grades were all good with Joeton receiving “stars” for excellence.
Keith wanted a bow and arrow, Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire that
petitioner would come and visit them someday.
14.Exh. 14—a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the date January 1986.
Keith told his father that they had received the package that the latter sent them. The
clothes he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not Charmaine and Joeton who had both
grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in behalf of
his mother, for low-heeled shoes and a dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards
that would make her look sexy. He intimated to petitioner that he had grown taller and that
he was already ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the grocery even though his
mother had told him not to be shy about it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A.
showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts
for the benefit of his children.25 Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to
the children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts
below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also
the emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the
courts below emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the
fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these were “withdrawable by him alone.” Simply
put, the courts below attached a high premium to the prospective adopters’ financial status
but totally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and
psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his
seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his
feelings towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to
conclude that Keith’s testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for
adoption that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the
capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents’ emotional attachment to the children. This is
hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to their
presence. Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones’ act of snuggling
close to private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional
detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the
children, could not but come to their succor when they needed help as when Keith got sick
and private respondent Ronald spent for his hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a
person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than
his natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court awarded custody of a
minor illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead
of to his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go
with his mother. The Court said:
“Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent
promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a
decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.”
In Celis v. Cafuir27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award
custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said:
“This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived mother and
son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable memories engendered by the
relationship of parent and child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of
bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of
means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of
satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her
little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster mother and
a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its
foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that
they have done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and
even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts and their
home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever
treasuring memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and
disappointing. Flesh and blood count. x x x.”
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court stated that “(I)n ascertaining the welfare and
best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all
relevant considerations.” Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father, the Court
said:
“A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are
more intent on emphasizing the ‘torture and agony’ of a mother separated from her
children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a key
issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her
children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature,
either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of
custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It
is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the
child which is the paramount consideration.” (Italics supplied)29
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over
his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the
physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.30 The
conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary
support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly
affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally
abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were
given to adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that petitioner
maintained the more important emotional tie between him and his children. The children
needed him not only because he could cater to their whims but also because he was a
person they could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioner’s “meager”
financial support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned
his family. The omission of said courts has led us to examine why the children were
subjected to the process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to
their father. To our consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare
of the children was not exactly the “paramount consideration” that impelled Anna Marie to
consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in the
country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that would naturally
hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other words, the adoption appears to be a matter of
convenience for her because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her
children.31 In his testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been
out of the country for two years and came home twice or three times,32 thereby
manifesting the fact that it was she who actually left her children to the care of her
relatives. It was bad enough that their father left their children when he went abroad, but
when their mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation worsened. The Clavano
family must have realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed the adoption of the
children, they decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna Marie’s brother Jose.
However, because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the task upon
private respondents.
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A
businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu and Manila
while his wife, private respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight stewardess.34
Moreover, private respondent Ronald claimed that he could “take care of the children while
their parents are away,”35 thereby indicating the evanescence of his intention. He wanted
to have the children’s surname changed to Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take
them to the United States as it would be difficult for them to get a visa if their surname
were different from his.36 To be sure, he also testified that he wanted to spare the children
the stigma of being products of a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister
Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just
wanted to keep the children away from their father. One of the overriding considerations for
the adoption was allegedly the state of Anna Marie’s health—she was a victim of an almost
fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However, she herself admitted that her
health condition was not that serious as she could still take care of the children.37 An
eloquent evidence of her ability to physically care for them was her employment at the
Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles38—she could not have been employed if her health
were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos’ attempt at depriving petitioner of
parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that he was an inveterate
womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children would “never be at ease
with the wife of their father.”39
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and father
to the sons of Wilma Soco.40 As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the point.
Philippine society, being comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from being
Catholic in orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a family man,
considering the baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the
Court place a premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between siring children and
parenting them. Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a
paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was
necessarily an unfit father.41 Conventional wisdom and common human experience show
that a “bad” husband does not necessarily make a “bad” father. That a husband is not
exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a
father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children.42 Petitioner has
demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he took the trouble of sending a
telegram43 to the lower court expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately
after learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify
about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in the United
States.44
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the agreement
with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United
States. As such, he could not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents
failed to refute petitioner’s testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the
conjugal home,45 pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal
separation case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale
redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his children. The proceeds may not have
lasted long but there is ample evidence to show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by
his agreement with his wife and sent his family money, no matter how “meager.”
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries
out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted
child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit
and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and
perspective. The Court’s position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to
extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.46 The discretion
to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child
but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.47
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents’ reliance on the
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie which became
the basis of the decree of legal separation. According to private respondents’ counsel,48
the authority given to Anna Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the
legal separation was “all embracing”49 and, therefore, included giving her sole consent to
the adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored on the wrong premise that the
authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into contracts that obviously refer to their
conjugal properties, shall include entering into agreements leading to the adoption of the
children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis as private respondents’ apparent
reliance on the decree of legal separation for doing away with petitioner’s consent to the
adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of
placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: “. . . in case of
legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated
by the court.” In awarding custody, the court shall take into account “all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit.”
It should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the
“exercise” of parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall
implement the sum of parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent
spouse shall have the right to the child’s services and earnings, and the right to direct his
activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and
religion.50
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise of
which is vested by the law upon the parents,51 as
“x x x a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of
the children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their hearts and senses. As regards parental authority, ‘there
is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a
sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.’
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When
a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in
a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company.”52 (Italics supplied)
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely
deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the
legal separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the
basis of the agreement of the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise,53
there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an
irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are
grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal
separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from
Anna Marie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Marie’s
motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the
transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that the latter was forced to file a contempt
charge against them.54
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case
for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to
warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is
one of the effects of a decree of adoption.55 But there cannot be a valid decree of
adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding
of the courts below on the issue of petitioner’s abandonment of his family was based on a
misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v.
Escaño 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code
is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now
an American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino
citizen, the divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established
customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals,57 a case involving
the visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion
that:
“Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their
children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This
authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be
renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each
other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged.
Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave
and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.”
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been a
pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of
childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest of a child who needs the love
and care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the
Family Code, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043
on Intercountry Adoption58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the
domestic adoption of Filipino children.59
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the following
policies in the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998”:
(a)To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and
be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards the full and harmonious
development of his/her personality.60
(b)In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall
be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United
Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child.61
(c)To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s).62
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its mandates.
Of particular relevance to instant case are the following provisions:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED. Cang vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 128, G.R. No. 105308 September
25, 1998

“States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . . . to provide,
in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and
guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”63

“States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular
basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests.”64

“A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a
regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct contacts
with both parents . . .”65

“States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide direction to
the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child.”66

Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes
with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best
interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary
right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents
vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be
respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.

Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of
legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure,
they shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is
not to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and
best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition
for adoption was filed.67 Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required
consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not
abandoned them.
No. L-23828. February 28, 1966.
PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. GREGORIA ARANZANSO
and DEMETRIA VENTURA, respondents.
Adoption; Consent of parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned.—
Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite. If the natural parents
have abandoned their children, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.
Same; Meaning of abandonment.—In adoption proceedings abandonment imports “any
conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child”. It means “neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their
children.” (2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, Sec. 32, pp. 886-887.)
Same; Review of trial court’s finding of abandonment.—The settled rule is that even when
the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established
before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral
attack upon its order (In re McKeag’s Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74 Pac. 1039, 1949; In re
Camp’s Estate, 131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736). It follows, therefore, that in the case at bar, the
Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a collateral attack, the determination of the
adoption court that the parents of the adopted children had abandoned them.
Same; Adoption proceedings being in rem, constructive notice by publication is sufficient.
—Adoption is a proceeding in rem (Jacinto, Special Proceedings, 1965 Ed., p. 347; Van
Matre vs. Sankey, 148 111. 536; 36 N.E. 628), and constructive notice, such as the
publication duly made in a newspaper of general circulation, is enough where the
residence of the parents is unknown (2 Am. Jur., 2d, Adoption, Sec. 56, p. 906). Moreover,
notice is not required in adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent (Parsons vs.
Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147, 148).
Same; Philosophy behind adoption statutes.—The philosophy behind adoption statutes is
to promote the welfare of the child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption
(Prasnik vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 666) and every leasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote that objective.
Judgments; To set aside judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud, a separate action is
necessary.—A judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud only in a
separate action brought for that purpose; not by way of collateral attack (Gomez vs.
Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717; Ramos vs. Mañalac, 89 Phil. 270).
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio Santos
and Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 4, 1949.1 Paulina
Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old. The petition, which was
under oath, alleged inter alia, that the whereabouts of the minors’ nearest of kin,
particularly their parents, were unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors
have been abandoned by their respective parents; and that for years, since their infancy,
said children have continuously been in petitioners’ care and custody. A guardian ad litem
Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the minors. Said guardian ad litem
forthwith gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina Santos, being over fourteen
years of age, likewise gave her written consent there-to.2
After due publication and hearing, the adoption court (CFI) rendered on August 25, 1949 a
decision, hereunder quoted in full:
“This is a petition for the adoption of the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos
Reyes by the spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana R. Santos. After due publication in the
‘National Weekly’, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila, once a week for
three consecutive weeks, the case was then set for trial. The office of the Solicitor General
was duly notified of the petition and at the hearing did not offer any objection.
“From the evidence presented at the hearing, it appears that the petitioners have been
married for the past twenty-seven years and have no children of their own. They desire to
adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes, both of whom are and
for years have been living under their care and custody; that the former, since she was
barely three months old has already been taken care of by them up to the present time,
and the latter has been cared for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos
Reyes is now seventeen years old and has given her consent to the adoption as shown by
her signature at the foot of the petition. She ratified the same in open Court. Both parents
of the minors have long been unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts of the petitioners
to locate them, they could not be found. The consent to the adoption has been given by the
guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. The petitioners are both proprietors and have
substantial income, more than enough to support and educate the minors. The Court is of
the opinion that this adoption will be for the best interest and welfare of the minors.
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the petition of the spouses Simplicio Santos and
Juliana R. Santos to adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes
and in accordance with Rule 100 of the Rules of Court in the Philippines, hence forth, the
minors are freed from all legal obligations to their natural parents and are, to all legal
intents and purposes the children of the petitioners.
“NOW, ORDERED.
“Manila, Philippines, August 25, 1949.”
No appeal was taken from the aforesaid decision.
Subsequently—eight years later—on October 21,1957, Juliana Reyes died, in Manila,
without testament. On November 25, 1957 Simplicio Santos filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.3 In
said petition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he,
as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age,
respectively. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed administrator of the
estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed on January 2,
1958 an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator. For her grounds she
asserted that Simplicio Santos’ marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus
void: and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio
for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not
abandoned them. An answer to the opposition was filed by Simplicio Santos on March 7,
1958 and oppositor Aranzanso filed a reply thereto on March 17, 1958.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is the first cousin of the deceased Juliana
Reyes and adding that she is the mother of the child Paulina Santos, filed on March 19,
1959 an opposition to the petition of Simplicio Santos to be named administrator, and,
moreover, thereunder adopted, as her own, the pleadings filed by Gregoria Aranzanso.
By order of April 6, 1959, the Court of First Instance decided the point in dispute, ruling that
the validity of the adoption in question could not be assailed collaterally in the intestate
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 34354). From the order Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria
Ventura appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its decision, promulgated on September 14, 1964, the Court of Appeals reversed the
appealed order, finding instead that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the
absence of consent thereto by the natural parents of the minor children, which it deemed a
jurisdictional defect still open to collateral attack.
After denial of their motion for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, Paulina Santos and
Aurora Santos appealed to this Court by way of petition for review, filed on November 18,
1964, to which due course was given. Five months after submission of this case for
decision—or on October 14, 1965—petitioners herein filed a petition for preliminary
injunction, and later, on October 26,1965, a supplemental petition therefor, to stop the trial
court from allowing Gregorio Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, as well as of two other
persons, namely, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, to intervene in the settlement proceedings
or to withdraw cash advances from the estate.
It was alleged in the petition and supplemental petition for preliminary injunction that on
September 22, 1965 the probate court issued an order allowing Gregoria Aranzanso and
Demetria Ventura to intervene in the settlement proceedings of Juliana Reyes’ estate (Sp.
Proc. No. 34354); that on October 2, 1965 said court issued an order allowing, on previous
motions therefor, withdrawal of the sum of P7,000 each, under bond, to all the parties,
including Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventu-ra; that on October 7, 1965 two
strangers to the proceedings __ the aforesaid sisters Consuelo and Pacita Pasion—filed a
motion, stating that they are also first cousins of the decedent and praying that an order be
issued allowing them to withdraw the sum of P7,000 each under bond; that on October 13,
1965 the same Pasion sisters filed a supplemental motion in the same proceedings
praying that their motion of October 7 be treated as a motion to intervene; that on October
18, 1965 the probate court issued an order allowing the Pasion sisters to intervene in the
settlement proceedings and allowing them to withdraw under bond the sum of P7,000 each
from the funds of the estate.
On November 4, 1965 respondents, together with Consuelo and Pacita Pasion——who
thereby submitted themselves to this Court’s jurisdiction and stated that they, “for purposes
of expediency, are also denominated respondents”——filed their “Comment”, as required
by this Court, opposing the aforesaid petition for preliminary injunction. On November 15,
1965 this Court granted the prayer for preliminary injunction and the writ was issued upon
posting of a bond of P5,000 on November 20, 1965. Respondents however moved for
reconsideration or modification thereof on November 23, 1965, stating inter alia that they
would now be precluded from taking part in the scheduled hearing for settlement of the
accounts of the special administratrix (Araceli A. Pilapil). On November 26, 1965 we
ordered modification of the preliminary injunction, so that on November 29, the writ was
modified so as to enjoin the probate court, until further orders: (1) from hearing and/or
approving the settlement of special administratrix’s accounts; (2) from allowing any sale,
disposition or disbursement of the estate except when essential for strictly maintenance
purposes; and (3) from allowing respondents, Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura,
or Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, or any of them, to receive any advance, cash or otherwise,
from the funds of the intestate estate.
The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondents-oppositors
Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in
favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos. In sustaining their right to make such a collateral
attack, the respondent Court of Appeals rested as abovementioned on the premise that
failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the
adoption void ab initio. In its view, said consent was not properly dispensed with, not only
because the evidence adduced in the adoption proceedings was insufficient to support a
finding that the parents had abandoned the children, but also since the adoption court
fatally omitted to expressly and specifically find that such abandonment in fact occurred.
In this regard it should be stated that the Court of Appeals completely relied on American
jurisprudence and authorities to the effect that parental consent to the adoption is a
jurisdictional requisite (E.g., 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, Section 45 [a] p. 435;
Whetmore vs. Fratello, 282 P2d 667, 670). The point to remember, however, is that under
our law on the matter, consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite:
“SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.—There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to
the adoption signed by the child if over fourteen years of age and not incompetent, and by
each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian or guardian
ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children’s home,
or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or
society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the
consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.” (Rule 100, Old Rules of Court.)4
Stated otherwise, if the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent to the
adoption by the guardian ad litem suffices. This brings as to the question whether in the
proceedings at bar the Court of Appeals can still review the evidence in the adoption case
and conclude that it was not sufficiently established therein that the parents of Paulina and
Aurora Santos had abandoned them.
First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the adoption court made no determination of
the fact of abandonment. As quoted earlier, it is stated in the decision of the adoption
court, that:
“From the evidence presented at the hearing it appears that the petitioners have been
married for the past twenty-seven years and have no children of their own. They desire to
adopt the minors Paulina Santos [y] Reyes and Aurora Santos [y] Reyes, both of whom are
and for years have been living under their care and custody; that the former, since she was
barely three months old has already been taken care of by them up to the present time,
and the latter has been cared for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos [y]
Reyes is now seventeen years old. x x x Both parents of the minors have long been
unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them, they could not
be found. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed
by the Court, x x x.” (Italics supplied.)
Abandonment—under persuasive American rulings—imports “any conduct on the part of
the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties a.nd relinquish all
parental claims to the child”. It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children.” (2 Am. Jur. 2d,
Adoption, Sec. 32, pp. 886-887.) It can thus readily be seen that altho the CFI judgment
approving the adoption does not use the word “abandoned”, its findings sufficiently contain
a set of facts and circumstances which truly constitutes a finding of abandonment.
Coming now to the power of the Court of Appeals to review in this case the finding of
abandonment made by the adoption court, we find that even under American jurisprudence
—relied upon, as stated, by said Court—the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction
of an inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established
before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral
attack upon its order (In re McKaeg’s Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74 Pac. 1039, 1040; In re
Camp’s Estate, 131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736).
Anent this point the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series,
Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
“An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on
the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show
statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact,
such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the
exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the
jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or
necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally
attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be
regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one
court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail.”
Freeman on Judgments says the same thing:
“In general, therefore, where the right of the court to assume jurisdiction of a cause and
proceed to judgment depends upon the ascertainment of facts in pais and the court retains
jurisdiction it thereby impliedly adjudges that the requisite jurisdictional facts exist and
having found such facts in favor of jurisdiction, its decision in this respect, whether
erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceedings, for a presumption
arises in such cases, when the validity of the judgment is attacked, that the necessary
jurisdictional facts were proven. x x x.” (Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720.)
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, construing a statute akin to our law in this regard, said in
Parsons vs. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147, 148:
“The statute to be considered is section 4022, Rev. St. 1878, which reads as follows: ‘No
such adoption shall be made without the written consent of the living parents of such child
unless the court shall find that one of the parents has abandoned the child or gone to parts
unknown.’ Thus it will be seen that upon the fact being established that the living parent
has abandoned his child, he is deemed by the statute to have thereby relinquished all
parental right to be consulted in respect to the child’s welfare, and his consent to the
adoption is therefore dispensed with. The term ‘abandon’ obviously means no more than
neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe to their children. The fact of abandonment, judicially determined, was
essential to the jurisdiction; not essential that it should be determined on proper evidence,
necessarily, or in accordance with the truth, because mere error in that regard does not
affect jurisdiction. If jurisdiction be obtained to determine a fact, its determination wrong or
on insufficient or improper evidence is immaterial on the question of legal right to proceed
judicially to the next step. That is deemed to be elementary, x x x A judicial determination
may be contrary to conclusive evidence, or legal evidence, or without any evidence, yet
cannot be impeached for want of jurisdiction. Van Fleet, Coll. Attack, Secs. 663, 665. That
rule applies to all judicial proceedings, x x x.”
It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a collateral attack,
the determination of the adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had
abandoned them. This is so even if such fact of abandonment is deemed jurisdictional, a
point which we need not—and do not—rule upon in this case.
For the same reason, it is not in point to argue here that Simplicio Santos in fact concealed
the adoption proceedings from the natural parents, thereby rendering the judgment
obtained therein null and void or being secured by extrinsic fraud. The rule is well
recognized that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud only in a
separate action brought for that purpose; not by way of collateral attack (Gomez vs.
Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717; Ramos vs. Manalac, 89 Phil. 270).
Anent the alleged lack of notice of the adoption proceedings on the natural parents, suffice
it to mark that adoption is a proceeding in rem5 and that constructive notice, such as the
publication duly made as aforesaid, is enough where the residence of the parents is
unknown (2 Am. Jur., 2d, Adoption, Sec. 56, p. 906). Notice, moreover, is not required in
adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent (Parsons vs. Parsons, supra).
Assuming that Simplicio .Santos was not validly married to Juliana Reyes, it will not make
any difference as far as the right of respondents to intervene in the intestate proceedings is
concerned. Juliana Reyes should then be deemed to have filed the petition for adoption as
a person whose status is single, not married. The defect would then lie only as to Simplicio
Santos, who, as allegedly married to another person (a point that we do not decide in this
case), could not adopt without joining his wife in the petition.6 It being the estate of Juliana
Reyes that is the subject matter of the settlement proceedings, the flaw, if any, would not
affect the consideration of the right of Paulina and Aurora Santos to succeed as adopted
children of Juliana Reyes, to the exclusion of respondents.
It must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the
welfare of the child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption (Prasnik vs.
Republic, 5 O.G. 1942) and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
that objective.
From 2 Corpus Juris Secundum 375-376 we quote:
“Accordingly, as the main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of
children, bereft of the benefits of the home and care of their real parents, wherever
possible without doing violence to the terms of the statute, such a construction should be
given adoption laws as will sustain, rather than defeat, this purpose.
“Although, as against the interests of the child, the proceedings must be strictly in
accordance with the statute, there is a tendency on the part of the courts, however, where
the adoption has been fully consummated, to construe the statute with a reasonable
degree of liberality, to the end that the assumed relationship and the intention of the parties
be upheld, particularly as against strangers to the proceedings collaterally attacking them x
x x.”
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura and
those who, like them (Pasion sisters), claim an interest in the estate of Juliana Reyes as
alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of
the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins
(Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption
must be—as in the instant case—considered valid.
Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the order of the
probate court a quo sustaining the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is affirmed. Respondents
Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura as well as Consuelo and Pacita Pasion are
declared without right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of the intestate estate of
Juliana Reyes. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved, except insofar as
it enjoins the intervention or allowance of withdrawals of property from the estate by
Gregoria Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, in the concept of
heirs, as to which it is hereby made permanent. No costs. So ordered.
     Justices Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, J.B.L. Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Zaldivar and Sanchez, concur. Mr. Chief Justice Bengzon took no part.
Judgment reversed.
RESOLUTION
OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
May 19, 1966.
Adoption; Abandonment in case of failure to perform duties of parenthood.—Negligent and
careless failure to perform the duties of parenthood is a significant element of
abandonment, regardless of actual intention (Emmons vs. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 133 NE 2d
56).
Same; Leaving child in care of others constitutes abandon-ment—A strong basis for a
finding of the parent’s abandonment of his or her child is found in the case where the
parent has left the child permanently or indefinitely in the care of others, given it to another,
or surrendered it entirely (2 Am. Jur. 2d 888).
Same; Parental consent.—The parental consent required by the law in adoption
proceedings refers to parents who have not abandoned their child (Sec. 3, Rule 100, Rules
of Court). Same; Petitioner need not sign petition.—Personal signature by the petitioner of
the petition to adopt is not among the requisites of the law.
Same; Findings of adoption court cannot be attacked collaterally; Case at bar.—Movants
contend that, according to the Court of Appeals, the findings of abandonment by the
adoption court had totally no support in the evidence. For the Court of Appeals to arrive at
such a conclusion, however, it had to pass under review the entire proceedings in the
adoption court, and it cannot do so in a collateral suit, but only in a direct action for that
purpose. What was before the Court of Appeals was not an appeal from the decision of the
adoption court, or a direct suit assailing the adoption, but an appeal from an order in the
settlement proceedings where the adoption was sought to be collaterally attacked.
Accordingly, said Court was not in a position to determine that the findings of the adoption
court had totally no support in the evidence. For even assuming that the finding of
abandonment is jurisdictional, the settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exist, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral
proceedings, for a presumption arises in such cases, where the validity of the judgment is
thus attacked, that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven. (Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719, 720.)
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Respondents, thru newly retained counsel, Atty. Juan T. David, moved for reconsideration
of Our decision of February 28, 1968 and/or modification of its dispositive portion. A
supplemental motion thereto was filed by respondents’ other counsel, Atty. Cuadrajento A.
Mendoza. In addition, a motion to substitute pages 11 and 12 of the motion for
reconsideration was made, which is hereby granted. The substitute pages are already in
the record. Also, we received and take note of respondents’ counsels’ manifestation and
comment.
1. The principal argument of movants is that the adoption court made no finding of
abandonment by the natural parents of the children sought to be adopted. Altho the point
has already been fully discussed in the decision, it will elaborate further on the same.
It is now argued that such long absence and status of being unheard from on the part of
the natural parents, and their having left their children since infancy to the care and
custody of others, is not abandonment, for the reason that abandonment must be willful
and that time is not an element of abandonment.
As stated in the decision, abandonment means, under persuasive American rulings, “any
conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.”1 In other words, “neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and suppbrt which parents owe to their
children.2
Negligent and careless failure to perform the duties of parenthood is a significant element
of abandonment, regardless of actual intention. (Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 133 NE
2d 56.) And as to the element of time, far from being immaterial, it is recognized that: “A
strong basis for a finding of the parents’ abandonment of his or her child is found in the
case where the parent has left the child permanently or indefinitely in the care of others,
given it to another, or surrendered it entirely.” (2 Am. Jur. 2d, 888; Italics supplied.)
It cannot seriously be disputed, therefore, that the adoption court did find that the fact of
abandonment by the parents was attendant. It was rule In re Asterbloom’s Adoption, 63
Nev. 190, 165 P 2d 157 that: “A parent who withholds his presence, his love, his care, and
the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintainance,
relinquishes all parental claim and abandons the child.”3 Such elements of abandonment
are what the findings of the adoption court, abovementioned, amount to.
2. Pursuing the argument, movants contend that, at any rate, according to the Court of
Appeals, said finding of abandonment had totally no support in the evidence. For the Court
of Appeals to arrive at such a conclusion, however, it had to pass under review the entire
proceedings in the adoption court. And as ruled by us in the decision, it cannot do so in a
collateral suit, but only in a direct action for that purpose. It must not be lost sight of, that
what was before the Court of Appeals was not an appeal from the decision of the adoption
court, or a direct suit assailing the adoption, but an appeal from an order in the settlement
proceedings where the adoption was sought to be collaterally attacked. Accordingly, said
Court was not in a position to determine that the findings of the adoption court had totally
no support in the evidence. For even assuming that the finding of abandonment is
jurisdictional, Freeman on Judgments, to repeat, states the settled rule that a finding that
the requisite jurisdictional facts exist, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a
collateral proceedings, for a presumption arises in such cases, where the validity of the
judgment is thus attacked, that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven. (Vol. I, 350,
pp. 719-720)
3. In regard to the cases of Hook vs. Wright, 160 NE 479 ,and In Re McCormick’s Estate,
84 NW 559, relied upon once more by movants, suffice it to observe: First, that in the Hook
case it was expressly ruled that “Neither the petition nor the degree made any reference or
finding as to such desertion.”4 Secondly, the McCormick case, far from overruling Parsons
v. Parsons,5 distinguished therefrom, in that in the Parsons case the fact of abandonment
was judicially determined, whereas, in the said McCormick case, there was no fact of
abandonment being found by the lower court.6 It being Our view in the present case before
Us that the adoption court made a finding of the fact of abandonment, said cases invoked
by movants do not apply.
4. Apparently in reply to Our reference to the trend in modern jurisprudence to sustain
adoption in the face of collateral attack, movants stress that parental ties are too noble and
sacred to be lightly severed in the absence of a written consent of the parents. It cannot be
stressed too much that the parental consent required by the law refers to parents who
have not abandoned their child (Sec. 3, Rule 100, Rules of Court). And from the findings of
the adoption court, it is rather something remarkable that the natural parents of the children
herein involved paid no heed to the sanctity and nobility of the selfsame parental ties for
almost twenty years. It would seem, from all that appears in this collateral attack, that only
when a fortune was bequeathed and about to befall upon their children, did said parents
come to the fore, not alas to assert parental rights in order to enhance the welfare of said
children, but to defeat their claim to the estate as adopted children, so as to succeed to
said estate themselves, as collateral heirs. Such attitude strikes Us as too selfish for
parents to take, so much so that it would not be surprising if said parents were impelled
thereto by other would-be successors. At any rate, for such purposes, the sacredness of
parental ties cannot be invoked. In such cases, the rule that favors sustaining the validity of
adoptions under collateral attack holds true with full vigor.
5. It is also raised that if Juliana Reyes was not validly married to Simplicio Santos, a point
We did not decide, their joint petition for adoption would be defective, since only Simplicio
Santos signed ‘the same. As We said, the petition would then be deemed that of Juliana
Reyes alone; as to the signature, SimpLicio Santos may likewise be deemed to have
signed in behalf of Julian Reyes, as her representative. Personal signature by the
petitioner of the petition to adopt is not among the requisites of the law. At any rate, any
defect on his has obviously been cured by Juliana Reyes’ subsequent prosecution of the
adoption case.
“Anyway, this is an argument that should be submitted when the case is considered on the
merits.”
7. Anent the motion for modification of the dispositive portion of Our decision, the same is
due to the fear that the same may be interpreted as foreclosing respondents’ avenue—if
any is open at this stage—to a direct action to annul the adoption decree. Suffice it
therefore to clarify the same. Said dispositive portion ought to be read together with
relevant discussions in the body of the decision, especially the last sentence immediately
preceding it: “The same holds true as long as the adoption must be—as in the instant case
—considered valid.” Should respondents, therefore, succeed by a direct attack in
invalidating the adoption, the dispositive portion of this Court’s decision herein shall not be
deemed to hinder their rights thereunder. Furthermore, said dispositive portion described
the court a quo’s order of April 5, 1959 as sustaining the adoption, in the sense of holding it
valid in the face of a collateral attack, nothing more. As to whether a direct attack will
prosper or not, We say nothing, and can say nothing, in this case. Thus clarified, We see
no further need to modify the dispositive portion of Our decision. Motion denied. So
ordered. Santos, et al. vs. Aranzanso, et al., 16 SCRA 344, No. L-23828 February 28,
1966

6. Respondents-movants would cite Ragudo vs. Pasno, L-16642, April 18, 1962, where
this Court stated:

“But this is not an adoption case. This is a civil action to annul an order of a justice of the
peace court, allegedly obtained thru fraud. It is based on Sec. 43 of Act 196. Of such
action, justice of the peace courts can not take cognizance. And it falls within the general
jurisdiction of courts of first instance.

“It is argued for the appellees that under Art. 348 of the New Civil Code; fraud is not one of
the grounds for revocation of an adoption. The appellants reply, quite correctly, that those
grounds refer only to an adoption validly decreed—not to an adoption void from the
beginning because tainted with fraud. Anyway, this is an argument that should be
submitted when the case is considered on the merits.”

Said case, however, involved a direct action to annul an adoption decree on the ground of
fraud. Furthermore, the ruling therein is simply that such direct action falls within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not the municipal court. The second paragraph
above-quoted is, therefore, not ratio decidendi, as shown by the last sentence therein:
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA,
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
Parents and Children; Adoption; Names; It is both of personal as well as public interest that
every person must have a name.—For all practical and legal purposes, a man’s name is
the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is
best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears
for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with
him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
Same; Same; Same; The name of an individual has two parts—the given or proper name
and the surname or family name; The given name may be freely selected by the parents
for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.—The name of an
individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name.
The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies
the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may
be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled
is fixed by law.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Adoption is defined as the process of making a
child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child; The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish
a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a
legitimate status.—Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or
not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a
juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar
to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also
as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with
social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,”
secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.
Same; Same; Same; An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname
of her father and her mother.—Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows
that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.—It
is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of
the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 10 of the Civil Code which presumes in the
interpretation of application of law that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail was intended to strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.— Art. 10 of the
New Civil Code provides that: “In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.” This
provision, according to the Code Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted
by her natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court finds no
reason why she should not be allowed to do so.—Hence, since there is no law prohibiting
an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name
her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia;
that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now
a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle
name Astorga be changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname
“Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption,
thus:
“After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the
absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive
parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be
adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the
minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner’s care
and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough
compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be
the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar
concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.”4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration5 praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from
having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for
every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or
initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of
the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5)
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name “Garcia” (her mother’s surname) avoids the
stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of “Garcia” as her middle name is not
opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural
mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the
latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship
or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family
Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that “the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will
be before the surname of the mother.”7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law—
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word
or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and,
also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as
public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname
or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or
at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which
the child is entitled is fixed by law.
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate
the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he
may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously
married woman, or a widow, thus:
“Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1)Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or
(2)Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname or
(3)Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as
‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume
her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her
former husband’s surname, unless:
(1)The court decrees otherwise, or
(2)She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband’s surname as though he were still living,
in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged
to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct
male descendants shall either:
(1)Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or
(2)Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x”
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name—
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise
known as “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,” is
silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted
above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365
of the Civil Code merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.” Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
likewise silent on the matter, thus:
“(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters;
x x x”
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that
the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father,
thus:
“Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the father’s surname indicates the family to which
he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s surname by the
child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother,
how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point
is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive
in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364,
which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso
Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but
everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez
and his mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it
shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the
surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they
take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed
Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can
be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice
Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many
traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given name and
the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the
Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee approved the suggestion.”12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that “the adopted shall bear the surname
of the adopters.” Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only
expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname
of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of Adoption
Is In Favor of the Adopted Child—
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption
not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act
which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989,
when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated
by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and
moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.18
Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,” secures
these rights and privileges for the adopted.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and
Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in
the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house
built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides
for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls
them “Mama” and “Papa.” Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption
Statutes In Favor Of Adoption—
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of
the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
“In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”
This provision, according to the Code Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law.”28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname “GARCIA” as her
middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.

SO ORDERED. In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 454
SCRA 541, G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
G.R. No. 57062. January 24, 1992.*
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA
MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Complaint; The Court of Appeals correctly adopted the
settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in
the complaint constituting the cause of action.—A perusal of the entire allegations of the
complaint, however, shows that the action is principally one of partition. The allegation with
respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their
rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the
settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in
the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282
[1988]). It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be
granted under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action,
and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his
complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the
action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
Same; Evidence; Disputable presumption; Once a man and woman have lived as husband
and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their
being married must be admitted as a fact.—Courts look upon the presumption of marriage
with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law x x x." (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in
Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]). So much so that once a
man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor
contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v.
City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
Civil Law; Family Code; Filiation; Art. 172 of the Family Code provides that filiation of
legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.—Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Evidence on record
proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a
record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove
facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other
private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of
the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children
of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
Same; Same; Prescription; Prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when
the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner.—In view of the foregoing, there
can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs
of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an
action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run
against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as
the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not
lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA
532 [1982]). Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the
other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC,
156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once
an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Same; Same; Wills and Succession; Repudiation; Petitioners' registration of the properties
in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.—
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462
[1988]), the Court held: "Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership,
must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in
turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such
an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other coowners; (3) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by
law." x x x "It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of
title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for
fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of
repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration operates as a universal notice of title." Inasmuch as petitioners registered the
properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have
commenced from the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of
defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be
invoked by petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action barely
two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.
BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision** of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24,1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. vs. Maria del
Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instancce of
Rizal, Branch VIII*** at Pasig, Metro Manila. The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116;
8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife,
Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8,1904, he begot four (4) children, namely:
Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by
her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife,
Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May
8,1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930.
They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February
16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941
(Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he
was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are
described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate
(Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely,
Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the
Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration
proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court
issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828
was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered
owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which
separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian
and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163
together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo
Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of
the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for
partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial
partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas,
Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as
unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they
acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the
parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal,
p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on
Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of
action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for
recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by
the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
"It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by
counsel for the defendants are of erroneous application to this case. The motion to dismiss
is therefore denied for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED." (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were
dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
"The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their
continuous enjoyment and possession of status of children of their supposed father. The
evidence fails to sustain either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained.
(Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
committed an error "x x x in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui
and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not
legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance x x x."
(Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24,1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children
and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina
(children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui;
directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually
acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor,
and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons
are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair
market value of their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a
project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other
government charges and outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on
December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription
barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui,
and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for
recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of
these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of
the complaint filed by the private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased
spouses Lupo Mariategui x x x and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo
Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the
latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of
their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on
intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record
on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and
heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the
estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is
principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased.
Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action
filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of
action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted
under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the
relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint,
although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1
Moran, p. 127,1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of
Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are
legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about
1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto
who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he
and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal."
The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the
community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between
Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in
lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85
SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado
v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the
following rationale:
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to
that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and
if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
the constant violation of decency and of law x x x." (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil.
43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be
admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven.
However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar
must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have
been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R No 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only
two classes of children—legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various
types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA
656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Evidence on record
proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a
record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove
facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other
private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of
the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children
of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in
substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these
are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite
the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's
death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the
admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners
herein, that "x x x Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama x x x" (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents
are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation
prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case.
Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing
of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked,
have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the coownership. In other words, prescription of
an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by
the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing
Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand
partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA
55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action
for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the
extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in
their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by
petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the
subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet
set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs.
C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners,
except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and
convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This
allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never
successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge
of their relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners
fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui.
According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria
del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by their deceased father
and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they will get
some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he
now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462
[1988]), the Court held:
"Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been
preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to
certain conditions: (1) a coowner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law."
x x x      x x x      x x x
"It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has
likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is
therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of
repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration operates as a universal notice of title."
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence,
prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had
registered in their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED. Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 57062 January
24, 1992

No. L-22523. September 29, 1967.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR,EDWIN VILLA Y
MENDOZA.LUIS E. SANTOS,JR.and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Civil law; Adoption; Relatives by blood or affinity are not prohibited from adopting another.
—There is no provision in the law prohibiting relatives, by blood or by affinity, from
adopting one another. To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and
the adopted are related to each other, except in those cases enumerated in Article 338 of
the Civil Code, is to preclude adoption among relatives, no matter how far removed or in
whatever degree that relationship might be, which is not the policy of the law.
Same; Interest and welfare of child to be adopted should be paramount consideration.—
The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary and designed to provide homes, care and
education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of
such children by persons who can properly rear and educate them.
Same; Elder sister may adopt a younger brother.—The fact that the adoption in this case
will result in dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the
son of the adopting elder sister, should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while
the other is by fiction of law.
Same; Same; Relationship established by adoption is limited to adopting parents.—The
relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not
extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted
child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting
parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that
the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the
children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter.
ANGELES, J.:
An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in Special
Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr.
and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother. The
trial court dismissed the petition reasoning thus:
“A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of the minor to be adopted
are also the parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is the latter’s legitimate
brother.
“In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an incongruous situation where the minor
Edwin Villa, a legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In the opinion of
the court, that incongruity, not neutralized by other circumstances absent herein, should
prevent the adoption.”
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the same was denied. Hence, this
appeal.
The facts are not disputed.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8, 1963,
praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their (petitioner’s)
son by adoption. Evidence was presented that the order setting the case for hearing has
been duly published, Exhibit A. There having been no opposition registered to the petition,
the petitioners were permitted to adduce their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the
City of Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their
own. They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate,
legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor
has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y
Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the
common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos,
Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA
electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry, Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of
Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife
is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of about P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He
was a sickly child since birth. Due to the child’s impairing health, his parents entrusted him
to the petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter, and as a result,
there developed between the petitioners and the child, a deep and profound love for each
other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their
consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent
and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of
the adoption of their child by the petitioners.
We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been pointed to Us by the
Solicitor General who argues for the State in this case, that relatives, by blood or by
affinity, are prohibited from adopting one another. The only objection raised is the alleged
“incongruity” that will result in the relation of the petitioner-wife and the adopted, in the
circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate brother of the adopter, will also be her
son by adoption. The theory is, therefore, advanced that adoption among people who are
related by nature should not be allowed, in order that dual relationship should not result,
reliance being made upon the views expressed by this Court in McGee vs. Republic, L-
5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820.
In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E. McGee, married to a Filipina by whom he had
one child, instituted a proceeding for the adoption of two minor children of the wife had by
her first husband. The lower court granted the petition of McGee to adopt his two minor
step-children. On appeal by the State. We reversed the decision. We said:
‘The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation where none
existed before. Where therefore the relationship of parent and child already exists whether
by blood or by affinity as in the case of illegitimate and stepchildren, it would be
unnecessary and superfluous to establish and superimpose another relationship of parent
and child through adoption. Consequently, an express authorization of law like article 338
is necessary, if not to render it proper and legal, at least, to remove any and all doubt on
the subject matter. Under this view, article 338 may not be regarded as a surplusage. That
may have been the reason why in the old Code of Civil Procedure, particularly its
provisions regarding adoption, authority to adopt a step-child by a step-father was provided
in section 766 notwithstanding the general authorization in section 765 extended to any
inhabitant of the Philippines to adopt a minor child. The same argument of surplusage
could plausibly have been advanced as regards section 766, that is to say, section 766
was unnecessary and superfluous because without it a step-father could adopt a minor
step-child anyway. However, the inserting of section 766 was not entirely without reason. It
seems to be an established principle in American jurisprudence that a person may not
adopt his own relative, the reason being that it is unnecessary to establish a relationship
where such already exists (the same philosophy underlying our codal provisions on
adoption). So some states have special laws authorizing the adoption of relatives such as
a grandfather adopting a grandchild and a father adopting his illegitimate or natural child.”
Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a study of American precedents would reveal
that there is a variance in the decisions of the courts in different jurisdictions regarding the
matter of adoption of relatives. It cannot be stated as a general proposition that the
adoption of a blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in many states of the
Union, no restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes authorizing adoption, although
laws of other jurisdiction expressly provide that adoption may not take place within persons
within a certain degree of relationship (1 Am. Tur. 628629). Courts in some states hold that
in the absence of express statutory restriction, a blood relationship between the parties is
not a legal impediment to the adoption of one by the other, and there may be a valid
adoption where the relation of parent and child already exists by nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d
869). Principles vary according to the particular adoption statute of a state under which any
given case is considered. It would seem that in those states originally influenced by the
civil law countries where adoption originated, the rules are liberally construed, while in
other states where common law principles predominate, adoption laws are more strictly
applied because they are regarded to be in derogation of the common law.
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has
been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from
adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the
minor child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law.
Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or
mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the
step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts
that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship
of parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed
when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in these cases
enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far
removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the
policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of
paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to
provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to
encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear and educate
them (In re Havsgord’s Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).
With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual
relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the
adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature,
while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by the adoption is limited to
the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly
provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which
they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain impediments to
marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as
descendants of the adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p. 652, citing 1
Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 177; Munoz, p.
104). So even considered in relation to the rules on succession which are in pari materia,
the adoption under consideration would not be objectionable on the ground alone of the
resulting relationship between the adopter and the adopted. Similar dual relationships also
result under our law on marriage when persons who are already related, by blood or by
affinity, marry each other. But as long as the relationship is not within the degrees
prohibited by law, such marriages, are allowed notwithstanding the resulting dual
relationship. And as We do not find any provision in the law that expressly prohibits
adoption among relatives, they ought not to be prevented. For all the foregoing
considerations, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the petition for the adoption of
the subject minor, granted. No pronouncement as to costs. Santos, Jr. vs. Republic, 21
SCRA 379, No. L-22523 September 29, 1967
HIPOLITA ALMACEN, plaintiff and appellee, vs. TEODORO N. BALTAZAR, defendant
and appellant.
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering appellant to pay
appellee a monthly support of P50.00 beginning August 1955. The case was directly
appealed to this Court because the appellant raises purely questions of law. Did the court
err in not taking plaintiff's own adulterous act of infidelity as defense against her claim for
support and in not exempting him from the obligation to give such support? The obligation
to support shall cease "when the recipient has committed some act which gives rise to
disinheritance" (Article 303, new Civil Code). A spouse may be disinherited when "she has
given cause for legal separation" (Article 921 [4], supra). One of the causes for legal
separation is "adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband"
(Article 97, supra), as defined in the Penal Code. If the plaintiff was the only one who
committed adultery, defendant's theory would be correct. In the instant case defendant is
still bound to support his wife because (1) plaintiff and defendant were guilty of infidelity,
but before the filing of the action defendant had pardoned plaintiff's unfaithfulness; (2) the
law on support (Title IX, Book I, Articles 290-304, Civil Code) contains no provision
squarely applicable to the present case in which both parties had committed infidelity;
neither is there a provision to the effect that when both spouses committed marital
offenses against one another, one can no longer ask support from the other; and (3) there
is the general principle that when two persons acted in bad faith, they should be
considered as having acted in good faith, which principle may be applied to the present
case to the effect that plaintiff and defendant being in pari delicto, the latter cannot claim
the adultery of the former as defense to evade the obligation to give her support. Did the
court err in finding that the evidence on record was sufficient to establish a condonation of
plaintiff's adulterous act and reconciliation between plaintiff and defendant? The plaintiff's
testimony and documentary evidence showing that the defendant had given money to
plaintiff on several occasions through third persons are sufficient to show condonation or
reconciliation. The act of giving money to an erring wife and the fact that no action was
taken against her before the courts of justice are sufficient to establish forgiveness
amounting to condonation, for "condonation is the forgiveness of one of the married parties
of an offense which he knows the other has committed against the other." (Words &
Phrases, 8A, pp. 19-20.) At any rate, pardon or condonation does not require sexual
intercourse and it may be express or implied.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the defendant. Endencia, J.,
ponente. Almacen vs. Baltazar, 103 Phil. 1147, No. L-10028 May 23, 1958