G.R. No. 76714.
 June 2, 1994.* which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ZOTICO A.
TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan,
respondent.
Succession; Probate of Wills; Conflict of Laws; Proof that wills executed
abroad conform with the formalities prescribed by laws in the foreign jurisdiction or
by Philippine laws is imperative.—The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who
were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with
the following  724
________________
*
 FIRST DIVISION.
723
VOL. 232, JUNE 2, 1994  723  the rules shall be “liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist
Vda. de Perez vs. Tolete
provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: “Art. 816. The will of an alien
who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.”
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York
laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of
wills which have been probated outside the Philippines.—The evidence necessary
for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the
foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact
that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court,
1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54
Phil. 610 [1930]).
Same; Same; Same; Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.—The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin,
56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; In the probate of wills, the courts should relax
the rules on evidence, as the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter
is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate.—Petitioner
must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the
pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent
Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein
courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of
(Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
Same; Same; Same; The separate wills of the spouses may be probated
jointly.—There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the
Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules
on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be
interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of
the 
724  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Vda. de Perez vs. Tolete
Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks
the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that
the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.” A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would
only result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
Same; Same; Same; Joint Wills; What the law expressly prohibits is the
making of joint wills, not the joint probate of separate wills containing essentially
the same provisions and pertaining to property which in all probability are conjugal
in nature.—What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for
the testators’ reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed
separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain
to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations
dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch
to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743
[1990]).
Same; Same; Same; With regard to notices, the will probated abroad should
be treated as if it were an “original will” or a will that is presented for probate for
the first time and accordingly must comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which
require publication and notice to the known heirs, legatees and devisees, and to the
executor, if he is not the petitioner.—The rule that the court having jurisdiction over
the reprobate of a will shall “cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
will presented for allowance” (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means
that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an
“original will” or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly,
compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice
by mail or personally to the “known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are
required.
1
 Same; Same; Certiorari; Parties; A judge whose order is being assailed is
merely a nominal or formal party.—This petition cannot be completely resolved
without touching on a very glaring fact—petitioner  determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I
725
VOL. 232, JUNE 2, 1994  725  distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption
Vda. de Perez vs. Tolete
has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and
because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably
failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant
petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is
being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General,
215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.
     Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set
aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No.
1793-M.
We grant the petition.
II
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became
American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A.
The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with
their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to
his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death
"wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he
bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and
testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his
will states:
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under
such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to
predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and
(Rollo, p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and
testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article
VIII of her will states:
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the
order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased
me, and my estate shall be administered and distributed in all
respects, in accordance with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31).
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were
trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the
probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On
April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were
issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan,
and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the
two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she
be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting
primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by
Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of
special administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond.
The following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special
administration.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the
Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount
of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr.
Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial court
granted the motion.
2
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a
manifestation, stating that said company then filed a manifestation, stating that said
company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the
proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be
ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in
savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total
amount of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the
heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan
Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan
Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's
motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate
case and therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the
proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the
motions of May 19, 1983.
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that
the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and
"no right to intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn
Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance with the
solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this
jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3)
that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the husband
predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither distributees,
legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution" under a
will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983. However,
on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set
aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the
estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated:
(1) that being the "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose
F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of
the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to
believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation"
deprived them of their right to "due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the
Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate
of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan
court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and concealment committed by" petitioner
rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.
had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized his father, 
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan,
Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in
the Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-
122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and
void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and
(3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate
of the deceased spouses.
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an
inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate.
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her
daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals";
hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to
notice; (2) that she could not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills
but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to
the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved
outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention
of notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision, should himself file
the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate
came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods
to his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs,
misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly assigned assets of the estates
to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and
the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and
divide equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a
time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185).
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for
failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the
estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of
November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which
rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr.
Evelyn P. Cunanan’s executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a]
par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming
that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that
3
by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provisions of Sections 3,
4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and
legatees must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings
in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix;
(3) that she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies
which she had received and to surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr.
Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of
the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements
from the estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner
moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement
proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242).
The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that
petitioner had received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogate’s Court as part of legacy"
based on the aforesaid agreement of November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate
of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix,
requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her
as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic.
Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on
procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the
wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such
evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the
same as the law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two
witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three
witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a requirement
of the Philippine law.
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New
York governing the execution of last wills and testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of
petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in
the country within which to act on the other order issued that same day. Contending
that the second portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel
for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform with the pertinent
provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of
Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court,
Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that
"(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated
and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order
amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the
estate the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and
purposes, closed (Records, 
p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the
final settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later,
petitioner filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30,
1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days
upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of
the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion and
reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985.
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad,
filed a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey,
U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel)
should be named substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the
Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant
probative value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and admission to
probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses including all procedures undertaken
and decrees issued in connection with the said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of
August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the
motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner
proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed,
genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters testamentary
were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken
by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being
satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question."
However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New
York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381).
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence
on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent
Judge issued an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove
4
the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional
evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence,
respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no
compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to
"file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p.
391).
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for
reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law
obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity
to present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and
allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of
two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and
established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed
out that even in New York "where the wills in question were first submitted for
probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of
July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no
party may institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out
that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the
same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective
wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of
the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for
reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records, 
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and
that the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance,
petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the
Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental
motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills
of two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be
undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at
the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York
on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need
not be probated in separate proceedings.
II
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before
respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of
Evelyn and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs.
"F" and "G");
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and
Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L.
Reagan is the Surrogate of the Country of Onondaga which is a
court of record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine,
and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the
respective wills of Evelyn and Jose 
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E.
Moore stating that they have in their records and files the said wills
which were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and
Exh. "G-3" — "G-6");
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to
the genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the
two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of
the Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is
duly authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of
probate, letters testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs
duly taken 
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters
testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and
"I-2");
5
 (i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge
Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued
and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-
3" and  petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
"I-10");
(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that
proceedings were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-
5");
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were
properly executed, genuine and valid and that the said instruments
were admitted to probate and established as wills valid to pass real
and personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and
(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the
genuineness and authenticity of each other’s signatures in the
exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary
and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6") (Rollo,
pp. 13-16).
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Court’s
Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November
29, 1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only
be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the
Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of
the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this
Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York
laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in
accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on
the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954];
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in
the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56
SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to
submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request
respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special
proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive
the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is
probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393
[1978]).
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan
spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on
allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to
mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan
spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions
of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall
be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the
delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155
SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines,
Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills.
Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property
which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their
joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle
the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the
seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact
— petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of 
Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr.
6
Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge,
forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal
party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause
notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance"
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the
will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and
4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the
"known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to
the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are
entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of
Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the
notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint
probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters
of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to
the probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
[No. 19759. December 20, 1922]
B. E. JOHANNES, principal administrator, CARLOS D'ALMEIDA, JOHN E.
JOHANNES and IDA D'ALMEIDA, petitioners and appellees, vs. ALFRED
D'ALMEIDA, ancillary administrator, opponent and appellant.
1. 1.DUTY OF ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR.—After an ancillary
administration has been completed and upon the tender of a proper receipt,
it is the duty of the ancillary administrator to deliver the assets in his
possession to the domiciliary administrator of a foreign country.
1. 2.ON PROPER SHOWING COURTS WILL PROTECT CITIZENS.—As
in this case sometimes in the orderly administration of justice, and to
protect its own citizens, the courts will retain a sufficient amount of the
assets of the estate in custodia legis within the Philippine Islands, pending
the final decision of a foreign court as to whether or not a local resident is
entitled to share in the distribution of the estate.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Harvey, J.
213
VOL. 44, DECEMBER 20, 1922  213 
Johannes vs. D'Almeida
The f acts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Fisher, DeWitt, Perkins & Brady for appellant.
Amzi B. Kelly for appellees.
STATEMENT
This is an appeal by the defendant from the following decision of Judge Harvey of
the Court of First Instance:
"This refers to a petition presented by B. E. Johannes 'in his capacity as administrator
appointed by the Supreme Court of Singapore, Straits Settlements, where the
deceased Carmen D'Almeida resided on the date of her death, to order the delivery to
him of the balance of the f unds of this estate.
"The records show that the administrator has presented his final report in which it
appears that he has paid all the debts and expenses of the administration and which
report was approved by this court.
"It appears of record that Mr. B. E. Johannes is the lawful husband of the
deceased Carmen D'Almeida Johanness and the legally appointed administrator of
the estate of Carmen D'Almeida Johannes in Singapore, Straits Settlements; that the
said B. E. Johannes is actually within the jurisdiction of this court and by request of
his attorney of record asks the court to direct the administrator here (the ancillary
administrator) to turn over to him as the domicile administrator appointed in the
residence of the deceased all the cash money, liberty bonds and Spanish shares
pertaining to said estate.
"Ordinarily the court would have been justified in transmitting the funds of this
estate to the probate court of the last residence of the deceased for distribution in
accordance with the laws of said jurisdiction, but in this case the administrator B. E.
Johannes is temporarily within this jurisdiction and asks the court, through his
attorney, to deliver to him the balance of the funds of the estate in 
214
214  PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Johannes vs. D'Almeida
his capacity as administrator appointed by the court of the last residence of the
deceased and the court is of the opinion that it is proper to deliver the funds to said
administrator.
"By virtue of which, the administrator Alfred D'Almeida is authorized to
withdraw the deposit slips and all the money deposited in the bank and, after
payment of the corresponding inheritance tax, make delivery of same to the referred
B. E. Johannes in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Carmen D'Almeida
7
Johannes, together with the liberty bonds and Casino Español shares, and after
making the delivery of the funds and the payment of the tax, administrator Alfred
D'Almeida shall be relieved of his duties and responsibilities."
The appellant contends that the court erred in considering the application of B. E.
Johannes, the principal administrator, and the motion of August 25, 1922, for the
reason that it was 'not presented within the rules of the court; in ordering the
ancillary administrator to pay the inheritance tax; and in ordering him to deliver the
property of the estate to B. E. Johannes, as administrator, and in denying the motion
of reconsideration.
JOHNS, J.:
In different forms this is the third time this case has been before this court. The
proceedings had their origin in the death of Carmen D'Almeida, who was then a
resident of Singapore, Straits Settlements. The plaintiff B. E. Johannes, her surviving
husband, was duly appointed administrator of her estate by the Supreme Court of
Singapore, qualified and entered upon the discharge of his duties.
At the time of her death Carmen D'Almeida left an estate in the Philippine
Islands, consisting of liquid assets of about P100,000, over which. Alfred D'Almeida
was appointed ancillary administrator by the Court of First Instance of Manila. It
appears that the deceased left few, if any, debts or claims in the Philippine Islands,
and that all of the duties of the defendant were simple, and that there was nothing to
do but to comply with the f ormalities 
215
VOL. 44, DECEMBER 20, 1922  215  matters are assigned, that he shall then be entitled to have and receive any and all of
Johannes vs. D'Almeida
of law. It also appears that the administration in the Philippine Islands has been
completed, and that any and all debts and expenses of administration have been paid,
and that the only remaining thing to be done is to turn over the remaining assets to
someone that is legally authorized to receive them. Apparently, about the only
question involved on this appeal is as to whether the defendant should turn over the
assets in Manila, or whether they should be forwarded to the Supreme Court of
Singapore for distribution.
The record is conclusive that the plaintiff is the surviving husband of Carmen
D'Almeida, and in the absence of any will, it is very apparent that, under the laws of
Singapore, as such, he is entitled to have and receive all the proceeds of her estate.
The defendant is a resident of the Philippine Islands, and claims or asserts that he is
an heir of the deceased and is entitled to share in the distribution of the estate.
Be that as it may, that question is not before this court, and under the law and the
decisions of this court, after the administration has been completed, it is the duty of
the defendant to deliver the assets to the plaintiff as domiciliary administrator of the
Supreme Court of Singapore, and, in' legal effect, that was the decision of the Court
of First Instance.
It is the inherent duty of courts to protect property rights of its own citizens in so
far as it can legally be done.
The record before us clearly indicates that the defendant Alfred D'Almeida is not
an heir of Carmen D'Almeida, and is not entitled to share in her estate. But no harm
or injustice will be done in retaining a sufficient amount of the assets of the estate
in custodia legis within the Philippine Islands pending a final decision of the
question as to whether or not he is entitled to share in the estate. To that extent and
for that purpose, the decision of the lower court will be modified, so that P40,000 of
the estate of the deceased now within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands shall
be and remain here in custodia legis pending the 
216
216  PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Giberson vs. A. N. Jureidini Bros.
final decision as to who is entitled to share in the estate of the deceased Carmen
D'Almeida, and subject to the control and jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
in which the probate proceedings were instituted. Such money to be placed as a
special deposit in some good bank in the city of Manila to be selected by the Judge
presiding over the probate proceedings in the city of Manila, and to remain there,
subject to the approval and order of such Judge.
The bank so selected shall receipt the defendant for the money, and such receipt
shall be a f ull and complete voucher to the defendant for that amount in the
settlement of the estate. It is further ordered that at any time pending the final
decision of such heirship when the plaintiff shall file a good bond to be approved by
the Judge presiding in the branch of the Court of First Instance to which probate
the proceeds of the estate. In all other things and respects the decision of the lower
court is affirmed, with costs in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendant is
peremptorily ordered to turn over and deliver all other assets to the plaintiff, as the
principal administrator of Carmen D'Almeida, or his order. So ordered.
Araullo, C.
J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Judgment modified.
______________
No. L-54919. May 30, 1984.*
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
Succession; Due Process; Attorneys; There being a proper substitution of
attorneys where the Motion to Dismiss Opposition to reprobate of will was filed,
8
trial judge acted properly in hearing evidence ex parte on probate of will in
question.—We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.
No proof was adduced to support petitioner’s contention that the motion to withdraw
was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his
counsel of record. The records show that after the filing of the contested motion, the
petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion
to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the
motion was filed, the petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long
withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in
turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old
man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the
withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate
of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
Same; Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of will is resolved,
probate court should meet the issue.—The third issue raised deals with the validity
of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is
limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However,
where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v. Court
of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
________________
*
 FIRST DIVISION.
523
VOL. 129, MAY 30, 1984  523  resident of Cavite” as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped
Cayetano vs. Leonidas
Same; The U.S. law on succession in the state of Pennsylvania applies to the
intrinsic and extrinsic validity of the last will and testament of a U.S. national and
resident of Pennsylvania under whose laws a person may give his entire estate to a
complete stranger.—Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright,
the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time
of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code
which respectively provide: x x x x the law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will
is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes
and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the
sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions
of Philippine Law.
Same; Same.—It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code,
the national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case
of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).
Motions; Due Process; There was no denial of due process as what the court
repeatedly set for hearing was the Petition for Relief, not the Motion to Vacate
Order of Jan. 10, 1979.—As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the
petition for relief, the records will bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled
for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner’s petition for
relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason
why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even
admonished the petitioner’s failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief
was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he
requested “for the future setting of the case for hearing x x x” did not mean that at
the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of
the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and
not in a mere notice of hearing.
524
524  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Cayetano vs. Leonidas
Succession; Jurisdiction; Probate of Will of American citizen who left an
estate in the Philippines was properly filed in the City of Manila where estate is
located.—Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was
alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and
permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a “usual
from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a
settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.
PETITION for review on certiorari the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Br. XXXVIII. Leonidas, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
     Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
9
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit: 
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which
admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion C. At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion
Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.  C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of
America with a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street,
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive, Adoracion C.
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of
C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat
the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the
Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila
of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.  (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and in the
United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate by
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the
executed in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
of the deceased testatrix.  Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in
favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills
of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while any disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix
temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her of the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos. 
lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament on July 10, 1975, according to
the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion
executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, C. Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed
Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of
appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said
favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of
there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81
eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.  of the Rules of Court. 

On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the
petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and
will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; deed. 
and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the
same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.  On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the
order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. According to him, the
Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in
stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed with the
confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also
an ex-partepresentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his
made.  counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case.

10
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made 2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not
several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.  made in a public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a
petition presented to the court but by way of a motion presented
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the law especially
Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented,
jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided:  within 30 days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the
estate in accordance with the rules of Court. 
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29,
1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and 3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be
resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no
may I also request for the future setting of the case for hearing on provision is made for the forced heir in complete disregard of Law
the Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.  of Succession 

The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the
case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his
motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief.
Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for
failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also
denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will,
which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced
heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly
Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a
motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the
court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner
Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and
her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12,
1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:  to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the
Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss
opposition with waiver of rights or interests against the estate of
deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the
hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.  of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no
evidence was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no
Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of
his petition — a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the
Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmariñas,
Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July
1955). 
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the
withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will. 
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof
was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was
secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel
of record. The records show that after the firing of the contested motion, the
petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion
motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long
withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in
turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old
man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the
withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate

The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a
general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of
11
the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed
the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his
legitime which was reserved by the law for him.  successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
This contention is without merit. 
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents
have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an
American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively
provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.  vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief.
Art. 1039. 
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent. 
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given
away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law
should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public
policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.  First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the
decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20
SCRA 358) wherein we ruled: 
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
provisions must prevail over general ones. 
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen
of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. 
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the
records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate
dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to
vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should
have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner's
failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing.
There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting
of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to
Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice
of hearing. 
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly
devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that: 
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
12
 shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record.  of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with
the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and
proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident
of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as
alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a
party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63
284, April 4, 1984).  prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.  where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139868. June 8, 2006.*
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-
DALAYGON, respondent.
Succession; Settlement of Estate; Decree of Distribution; Once it becomes
final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.—A decree of distribution
of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in
exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack
of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730 (1951), the Court
ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
_______________
*
 FIRST DIVISION.
141
VOL. 490, JUNE 8, 2006  141 
Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon
Judgments; Annulment; Grounds; Extrinsic Fraud; The prescriptive period
for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the
discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s.—It should be pointed out that the
prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences
to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge
complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent
law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission,
alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year
period should be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition.—There is extrinsic fraud within the
meaning of Sec. 9, par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which
prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case
to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself,
but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of
the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the
case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from
court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where
an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar
cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the
case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the
former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.
Constitutional Law; Public Lands; Ownership; Parity Rights Amendment of
1946; As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution
explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or
to lands of the public domain.—The Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-
opened to 
142
142  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon
American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands
of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of
natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation
of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by
aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with
the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the
transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article
XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution
explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to
13
lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the
acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Quasha, Ancheta, Peña and Nolasco for petitioner.
     Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo for respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were
American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an
adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving
a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as
executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore,
Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s
renunciation of his appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as
ancillary administrator.3
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he
has two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.  property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s
On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.4 As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines,
petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audrey’s
conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes
Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current
account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares
of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire
estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.
shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s
Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise
appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member
of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary
administrator.
Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was
appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.8
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23,
1987, a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾
undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc.,
and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest
in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its
Order dated February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7,
1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the
name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W.
Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest); directing
the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W.
Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the
amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.12
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No.
155823 in the names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a
project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati
three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of
the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the
testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate
to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares,
then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to
respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated
December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the
Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided
interest in the Makati property to respondent.15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended
complaint for the annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and
April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.16Respondent contended that
petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the
State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will.
Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the
Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and
since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to
respondent.
14
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended
that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court
in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s
laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is
to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they
would receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be
annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No.
9625.17 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are
hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:
(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor
of the estate of W. Richard Guersey; and
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati
City Registry and the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W.
Richard Guersey.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per
Resolution dated August 27, 1999.19
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court alleging that the CA gravely erred in not holding that:
A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE
PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED
AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG
BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND
EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD
FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR
INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S
ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER
EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN
PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20
Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12,
1988 and April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment,
which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved in such
judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the
parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and the
same has already been executed.21
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an
ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of
partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that
the partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes
knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubrey’s will,
stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the
will and how the estate will be divided.22
Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary
administrator of Aubrey’s estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to
respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will,
and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner
is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant
laws. 
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of
partition because she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of
Aubrey’s will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta
filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of
Richard’s estate.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land
of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely
appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in
rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may
be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the
Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. 26
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the
issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An
annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a
15
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by
extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be
extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the
fraud.29
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of
the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in
respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s
will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The
CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the
decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate
in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was
prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to
equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because
as early as 1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s
will,30 and the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand,
justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to
question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625,
and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special
Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was
prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.31
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based
on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent
act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this
case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent
act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and
therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondent’s
discovery thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the
opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition
in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in 1991.32Respondent cannot be
faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through
Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of
petitioner’s acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the
circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was
filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court
of Appeals,33 the Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will
always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where
it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or
from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not
pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that
there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers
to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as
by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the
defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of
the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his
defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in
the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to
set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair
hearing.34
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a
position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable
diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is
not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be
infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a
fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves
as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.36
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate
according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to
extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12,
1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in
Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it
was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the
Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated
August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore,
Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of
16
Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was
admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the
will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of
the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with
regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the
State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed
by the law of the nation of the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will
Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall
grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such
letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator
in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will
may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by
law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of
another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary
administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the
pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law
is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court
peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s
will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the
trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented. 
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The
Court cannot accept petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume
that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the
trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen,
domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior
partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library." 39 He had
all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to
exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to
discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to
perform his fiduciary duties. 
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial
court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs,
and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full
successional right to the Makati property. 
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that
the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an
aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be
relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the
court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
whenever the purposes of justice require it.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of Audrey’s estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution
made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner
believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated,
which the Court adopts, thus:
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities,
defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the
forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the
absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57
Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle,
however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary
responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in
accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle
established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the
citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the
17
defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the
matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law
of Audrey O’Neill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While
there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the
Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light as
indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:
xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey
O’Neill Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the
subject realty equally benefit the plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to
have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject
estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic
fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said
defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last
will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the decedent
and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject
orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total
disregard of the law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary
duties. It does not rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made
applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded
from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her
own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to
analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she
realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of
justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial
aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.42
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888
noted the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public
General Laws of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be
subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the
personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration and
distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is
expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the
testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7,
Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary"
and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the
decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as
expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances".43
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following:
(1) Audrey’s conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount
of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey’s death.
Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.
When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed
on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of
Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the
testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in
Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice
thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took
judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court
held, viz.:
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have
found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C.
Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section
9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein)
counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of
First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and
admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23,
1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-
quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above
circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada,
especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial
notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the
project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to
record before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888
appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of partition
of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for
18
that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey’s and
Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not
according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire
Makati property belongs to respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v.
Manarang,45 wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same
force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life
making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the
special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of
that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of
the testator's having meant just what he said.
Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate
cannot prevail over Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46
domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a
former natural-born citizen. 
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent
who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the
Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the
Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his
duties as an official of the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.

x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of SO ORDERED. 
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail
over general ones.47

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were
American citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do
not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property. 

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to
acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the
Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities
owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the
Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and
business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the
disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the
Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural
lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to
the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private
lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a former
natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands,
Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-
Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public

19

G.R. No. 169144. January 26, 2011. * naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, petitioners, vs. ERNESTO PALA-
GANAS, respondent.
Civil Law; Probate Proceedings; Wills and Succession; Our laws do not
prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have
not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution.—But our
laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil
Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines
if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where
he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
Same; Same; Same; The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has
already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.—Our rules
require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as
known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the
probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person
for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court,
the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of
death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left
in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
539
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 539
Palaganas vs. Palaganas
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Alan Ramiro L. Guevara for petitioners.
  Fernandez, Fernandez and Associates Law Offices for respondent.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad
by a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.
The Facts and the Case
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a
testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas
(Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and
in the U.S.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of
Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition
for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of
her estate.1 On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas
(Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta,
opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the
Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that,
assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid
nonetheless for having been executed under duress and
_______________
1 Docketed as Special Proceedings 112-M-2003, Branch 10, RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan.
20
540
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. Palaganas
without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto,
they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio,
were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto
filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On
April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the
issue of whether or not Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a
court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: 2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s
last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of
Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of
Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), 3 arguing that an unprobated will executed by
an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the
Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, 4 affirming the assailed order of the
RTC,5  holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to
respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents
specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance
of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 73-77.
3 CA-G.R. CV 83564.
4 Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rebecca De Guia Salvador and Fernanda Lampas Peralta.
5 Rollo, pp. 26-39.
541
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 541
Palaganas vs. Palaganas
Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers
to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different
rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to
this Court.
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a
foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been
previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners
abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it
can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal
formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only
allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been
admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to
probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the
proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of
compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a
will.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their
execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of
the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place 
542
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. Palaganas
where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.6
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the
province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named
in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show,
so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the
probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person
for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court,
the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of
death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left
in such province.7 The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already
been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
21
 In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by
the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the
procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-
authentication of a will already probated and al-
_______________

6 Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 816.

7 Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, 153 Phil. 115, 133; 53 SCRA 360, 377 (1973);
Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III-A, Rex Bookstore, 1996 ed., p. 46.
543
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 543
Palaganas vs. Palaganas
lowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented
for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by
Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule
applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In
reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign
probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do
not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving
them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper
court.8
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial
ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Ruperta’s will
and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the
estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the
will, i.e. the testator’s state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with
the formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial
court’s directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta’s will
and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.
SO ORDERED.

22