G.R. No. 96681.
 December 2,1991.* adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture 6, Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as
Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA
IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO,
ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on Human Rights; Court
declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory
powers over certain specific type of cases like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.—The threshold question is whether or not the
Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and
determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human 
________________
* EN BANC.
484
484  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite
Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights
rights violations in volving civil or political rights. The Court declares the
Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by
the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may be conceded to the Commission
in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights.—The most that may be conceded to the Commission. in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings
of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of
a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusion in a controversy must be accompanied by
the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution clearly and categorically
grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations invoking civil and political rights.—As should at once be observed, only
the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of
procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt
in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted
by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its
findings.
485
VOL. 204, DECEMBER 2, 1991  485 
Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice or even quasi-judicial bodies do.—But it
cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or
even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether
distinct meanings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Human Rights
having merely the power to investigate cannot and should not try and resolve on the
merits the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90–775.—Hence it is
that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power “to investigate,”
cannot and should not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters
involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90–775, as it has announced it means
to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The matters are undoubtedly
and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and also
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.—These are matters
undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under
the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION of certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the
Commission on Human Rights.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NARVASA, J.:
1
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar,
instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief
sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the
review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice
or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the
Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise,
where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or
other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the
Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the
same purposes of hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence
taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in
the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases
recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are
hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they
described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight
resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that
had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had
decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at
the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call
for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response
from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from
their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable
assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass
actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in
24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to
hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued
into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8)
private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila,
who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and
given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for
ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced
(unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario
Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers,
opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when
their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the
Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration
orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their
counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated
December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers,
affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the
service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran,
Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked
CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court
(on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged
violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly
docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the
Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were
filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other
teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public
school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated
September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while
they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by
the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking
Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled
a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring
his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he
(Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the)
2
Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin
and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants'
counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended
without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b)
expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The
Commission thereafter issued an Order 13reciting these facts and making the
following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly
guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that
these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages,
which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent
of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are
hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on
October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all
documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the
Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the
complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
x x x           x x x          x x x
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was
granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was
submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint
states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments
affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as
aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in
Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario
Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos.
95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals,
if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service
Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it
was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work orders,
file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them,
and issue decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec.
Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit
their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall
proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents
counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of
law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights
which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its
"utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from
those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably
to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor
General, in behalf of petitioner Cariño, has commenced the present action
of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel
bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has
also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide
or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists
for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors;
and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify
their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with
character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon
and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared
that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said
matters, if still timely.
3
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the
power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or
even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or
the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers
of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent
office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of
all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information
to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human
rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human
rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international
treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions
bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and
categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its
own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to
such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite
for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request
the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be
required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice,
or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and
quite distinct meanings.
4
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to
subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function,
the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec.
257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to
settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.
To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge"
means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More
particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of
(a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute
and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by
the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts
or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to
him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance
of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably
taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court
itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary
of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial
evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not
having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of
Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a
motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the
event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and
eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It
has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education
Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same
ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions
involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining
teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education
Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be
adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no
useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those
reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to reverse the
Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service
Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate
Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
5
Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights
and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case
(i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100150. January 5, 1994.*
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND
GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Human Rights; Commission on Human
Rights; Creation of.—The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. It was formally constituted by then President Corazon
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her
legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase“human rights” is
so generic a term that any attempt to define it could at best be described as
inconclusive.—It can hardly be disputed that the phrase “human rights” is so generic
a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be
described as inconclusive. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or more
specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of
human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual’s social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the
term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what
is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing
almost all aspects of life.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Civil Rights”, defined.—The term “civil
rights,” has been defined as referring—“(to) those (rights) that belong to every
citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or administration of government. They include the
rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc.
Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of
his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general
sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.” Also quite
often mentioned are the guaran-
________________
*
 EN BANC.
118
118  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Simon, Jr. vs. Commission on Human Rights
tees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches
and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Political Rights”, explained.—Political
rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the right
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitutional Commission delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more
severe cases of human rights violations.—Recalling the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the
more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the “(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4)
cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious.” While the enumeration has not likely been meant to
have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is,
nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not
apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the
CHR’s scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve,
6
instead, that “Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that
should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia does not fall within the compartment of “human rights violations
involving civil and political rights” intended by the Constitution.—In the particular
case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by
private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a “People’s
Park.” More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this
Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger
to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that
a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place,
even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-visthe circumstances obtaining in this  The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
119
VOL. 229, JANUARY 5, 1994  119 
Simon, Jr. vs. Commission on Human Rights
instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within
the compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and political rights”
intended by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contempt; The CHR is constitutionally authorized
to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt.—On its contempt powers,
the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its operational guidelines and rules
of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court.” Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its
revised rules, its power “to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and
to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines
and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify,
the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to
cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who
decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An “order to desist”, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that the CHR
does not possess.—The “order to desist” (a semantic interplay for a restraining order)
in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds
from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
Prohibition; Moot and Academic; Prohibition not moot simply because the
hearings in the proceedings sought to be restrained have been terminated where
resolution of the issues raised still to be promulgated.—The public respondent
explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot
and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been
fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done,
and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. Here,
however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR
Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to
also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for prohibition.
120
120  SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 
Simon, Jr. vs. Commission on Human Rights
     The City Attorney for petitioners.
     The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR")
is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining
order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent
CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled
"Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos
Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City
Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within
which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.1Prior to their receipt of the
demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that
their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990,
the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-
samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor
Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was
docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North
EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.4
7
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July
1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990
the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the
private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest."6
A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The
motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the
(petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement
whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the
demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the
moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the
demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but
independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office
admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants
are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land,
particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon
City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive
discretion and authority whether or not a certain business
establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction
of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued,
upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance.8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement,
arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved.
The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners,
stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only
to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights
allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their
privilege to engage in business."9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for
resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the
private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that
the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).10
In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt
for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite
the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss
and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional
mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-
vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to
create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it
(should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate
legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to
development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and
violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little
regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children,
and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have
psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were
witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's
inhumanity to man.
In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, this recourse.
8
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was
subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we
also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and
DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private
respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and
authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by
the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from
filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own
comment,18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also
resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had
since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such
comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987  (10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law;
Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her
legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights.21
The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution,
thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and
cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human
rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention
facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided
by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR
theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to
make CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This view, however, has not heretofore been
shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,24 the Court,
through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that
it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be
synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
9
 . . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in
this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts
of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other
kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative
power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any
attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as
inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines,
sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has
been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants,
representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied
answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of
his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether
the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United
States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty,
and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion,
academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of
law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be
elected to public office, and to form political associations and
engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an
education, employment, and social services.25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual
person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are
inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be
recognized and protected by it.26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social,
and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is
human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and
inalienable.28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can
be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic,
cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the
universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost
all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986
Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and
in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to
look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have,
in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many
voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the
sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected
jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of
Human Rights in the Philippines,"29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in
their Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the
International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the
proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary
action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became
subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for
indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until
ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this
representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances
10
 became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were
strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship
and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost
independence and security of tenure, except members of the
Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of resignation
and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like
Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can
see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made
clear in view of the importance of human rights and also because
civil and political rights have been determined by many
international covenants and human rights legislations in the
Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of
Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a
wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise
nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that
the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and
political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights
covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual
involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw
the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been
made clear in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a
number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the
right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific
rights that are considered enshrined in many international
documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and political
rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and
political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right
against torture. 
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights
that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social
and economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of
citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and
authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define
its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be
authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore
or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary
investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I
correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we
would like to define the specific parameters which cover civil and
political rights as covered by the international standards governing
the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and
civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners.
This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law
which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had.
Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the
proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those
are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of
Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the
rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political
rights.
11
 xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of
human rights, I would like to state that in the past regime,
everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos
regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had
defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing
and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to
political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to
confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to
repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human
Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political
detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures;
3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings
and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the
religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner
Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed Commission
more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to
future expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional
area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this
morning when the reference was made without qualification to the
rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights,
although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political
rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia,
after mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other
human rights specified in other convention which I do not
remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the
Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner
mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are
signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have
a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not
have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible
that there are rights specified in that other convention which may
not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to
link our concept of human rights to general terms like
"convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the
convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned,
the Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to
us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the
concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of
including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give
the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be
included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need
arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of
Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be
considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various
specific civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned
initially by this provision — freedom from political detention and
arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well
as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and
collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes
precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group
of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the
definite areas.
12
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the
Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept of the
Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political
rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an international
instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and
every specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the
civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission
on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the
distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the
International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of
labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense
of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of
human rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a
Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay
and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so,
they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is,
the cases involved are very delicate — torture, salvaging, picking
up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons
who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men
in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights
Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this
commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little individual
who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we
should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if
we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to
go again and we will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis
supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its
own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or
country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or administration of the
government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal
protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise
defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of
his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer,
in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude,
religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for
debt.32
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right
of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the
rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is
readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that
would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations.
Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of
political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair
and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6)
13
other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely
been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of
priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the
delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive
delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it
fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of
human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into
account its recommendation."35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished
are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected
by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's
Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this
Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger
to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that
a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place,
even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are
not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment
of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within
its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in
direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance
with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to
cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its
adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be
exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly
withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in
pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a
restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in
character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court,
speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may
not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue
a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is
never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services"
mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial
remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the
CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which
the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the
Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in
a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the
rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."
(footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its
findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government.37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of
financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in
the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the
petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with
the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the
petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No.
90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final
resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an
act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate
its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended,
among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission
on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No.
90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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