During Xi Jinping's initial five years in power, China's policies shifted dramatically, affecting the

country's ties with Southeast Asia. With the Chinese economy slowing in need of tough
reshaping, a financial meltdown risking China's markets and sources of funding, the Communist
Party facing legitimacy issues amid rampant corruption, and serious environmental problems
threatening growth and people's welfare, Xi took an unexpected path. He sounded more eager
for China to take its place – after just a "century of humiliation" – at the seat of regulation with
other major countries. The Chinese government has established as one of its aims the
development of China into a global naval power, despite the fact that it is already the world's
largest trade nation and a biggest trading partner of over 120 nations. In the process, China
under Xi became more forceful in preserving territorial rights in neighboring waters, particularly
the East China Sea, which borders Japan and Korea, and the South China Sea, which borders
many Southeast Asian nations. (Baviera, 2017)

Resurrecting the Silk Road: China's Massive Plan

The formation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, and other
monetary support agreements for developing nations, as well as the launch of the "One Belt,
One Road Initiative," renamed the Belt and Road Initiative or BRI, were indicators that China
was ready to be a global economic and financial leader. BRI comprises enormous China-led
infrastructure investment in developing nations west of China all the way to Africa, as well as
strategic cooperation in finance and trade and the building of sociocultural ties. Also, BRI was
China's solution to its commercial excess capacity, excess foreign currency reserves, and
resource needs; and from the other, it was a pledge to help bolster development financing
(primarily through infrastructure) and economic cooperation at a time while both were losing
steam due to global financial troubles. (Baviera, 2017)

The results of these initiatives were a big adjustment in terms of how China was seen,
particularly in Southeast Asia, with a few nations ready to welcome China's new position and
others refusing it. Challenges have emerged with Chinese investment projects in Thailand, Laos,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Myanmar. Nonetheless, with the exception of Vietnam, regional
governments have chosen to participate in the BRI, as well as the Philippines, where ties with
China have improved.

China's Political Disputes to Other Countries in Southeast Asia

Political conflicts with China have arisen in the midst of internal affairs and bilateral diplomacy.
In Malaysia, after several years of outstanding ties with China, during which Kuala Lumpur has
minimized even its own issues with China in the South China Sea as a policy matter. Singapore
was not immune to mounting interference from what was viewed as a new power's rising
assertiveness. The significant strategic mistrust that China's acts in the South China Sea have
fostered among ASEAN governments in past few years was a balancing element to China's
expanding economically and politically dominance. (Baviera, 2017)

Major incidents such as China's seizure of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012,
China's operation of the HYSY oil platform on Vietnam's continental shelves in 2014, and the
perform of military and security activities on James Shoal and Luconia Shoals off Malaysian
coasts in 2015, and near Indonesia's Natuna Islands and offshore gas reserves in 2016, all
assisted to erode rather than gain confidence in China's South China Sea strategic goals.
Furthermore, China's ruling not to engage in, acknowledge, or abide with the July 2016
arbitration award in the Philippines versus China case (which called for China to recognize the
Philippines' maritime rights and entitlements under UNCLOS while calling China's 9 dashed line,
"historic rights" argument into question) casts doubt on its pledge to regulations agreement
and multilateralism. (Baviera, 2017)

The issue on everyone's lips in Southeast Asia is the type of power will Beijing be in the end. 
The power that grants to be a keystone for global economic development, carrying emerging
economies from Africa to Asia as it rises to new heights, or the force that utilizes its strength to
claim on territorial entitlements and respect for authority from smaller neighbors while
disregarding treaty obligations and law.

If ASEAN fails to promote its own concept of regional order, future scenarios might include big
power war or collaboration between them. Both eventualities have the potential to uplift
decades of ASEAN and middle-power attempts to secure their own autonomy, centrality, or
voice in regional affairs. If ASEAN is sidelined, the US-led alliance structure is not the sole form
of region, as China has aggressively sought backing for its own step endeavors. In the future,
China hopes to play a greater role in global relations. (Baviera, 2017)

ASEAN plays a vital role in China's overall strategy for ongoing economic development and
modernization, whether it be through the sustained advocacy for economic cooperation and
accessible regionalism, the resolution of South China Sea disputes, or aid for Xi Jinping's Belt
and Road interconnection proposal. However, in order for ASEAN to provide such a
commitment, it must be competent, with its structures and procedures still capable of making a
difference, and its participant united in their viewpoint. Just in this manner, they play a much
more vital part in the development of power dynamics in the region.

 Baviera, A. (2017, December 1) "Will The Real China Please Stand Up: A Southeast Asian
Perspective on China's Growing Power and Influence." Retrieved from Asia Pacific
Pathways to Progress Foundation, Inc. https://appfi.ph/resources/commentaries/1801-
will-the-real-china-please-stand-up-a-southeast-asian-perspective-on-china-s-growing-
power-and-influence
 Baviera, A. (2017, September 6) " ASEAN at Fifty: Challenges to Unity and Centrality."
Retrieved from Asia Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation, Inc.
https://appfi.ph/publications/commentaries/1550-asean-at-fifty-challenges-to-unity-
and-centrality