Ancient Philosophy 26 (2006)

©Mathesis Publications 161

Discussion

What Is Presocratic Philosophy?

Gerard Naddaf

While the expression ‘Presocratic philosophy’ refers to a precise period in the

development of culture—the nascent period when philosophy originated and
began its distinguished career that was to change forever the direction of
thought—both the expression and its subject matter are not without a great deal
of controversy. There are in the main two problems. The first has to do with
showing that a major rupture (if not an intellectual revolution) did indeed occur,
with Socrates. The second lies in answering the question, in what does pre-
Socratic philosophy consist? Indeed, what do these individuals whom we charac-
terize as Presocratic have in common that enables us to depict them as
‘philosophers’? This question, in turn, elicits another: What changed with the so-
called Presocratics?
These and related questions are addressed in a collection of recent essays enti-
tled Qu’est-ce que la philosophie présocratique? What is Presocratic Philoso-
phy?, edited by André Laks and Claire Louguet (Lille: Presses Universitaires du
Septentrion, 2002).1 As Laks notes in his Foreword (7), contrary to other periods
in ancient philosophy, the Presocratics have not been the subject of an interna-
tional forum. If we consider that the ‘Presocratics’ dictated in many respects the
directions that philosophy was to take in subsequent centuries, the absence of
colloquia is rather surprising. But books on the subject are equally rare. While
single authors may ponder the subject ‘what is Presocratic philosophy?’ they
dedicate, at most, a few passing remarks to the subject.2 And collections of
essays on the Presocratics focus almost exclusively on interpretations of individ-

1 The collection is a selection of essays from a colloquium organized on the question, What is

Presocratic Philosophy? and held at the Maison de la Recherche de l’Université Charles de Gaulle in
October 2000. The full list of participants is provided in note 1 of the Foreword.
2 A good example would be Osborne 2004. Osborne does not provide us with a coherent picture

of what she understands by ‘Presocratic’. While she wants to avoid to some degree Aristotle’s influ-
ential representation of the Presocratics as engaged in a story of origins, this is still the picture that
dominates her short account. And even when Osborne examines some Presocratics from other angles
(e.g., the religious side of Empedocles), there is no coherent picture that emerges. Moreover, the
Sophists emerge as having little in common with their ‘Presocratic’ predecessors and contemporaries.
They were simply part of an intellectual scene that included medical writers, historians, geographers,
mathematicians, and others (112). With the sophists and Socrates we move from the debate about the
nature of the world to ‘a new kind of question, this time about human life and moral values’ (31). In
an otherwise delicious little book, the ‘Presocratics’ are presented as a rather narrow lot and there is
no sense of what we call ‘Presocratic’ philosophy or how philosophy tout court emerged.
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ual ‘philosophers’ and/or problems associated with their work.3 A notable excep-
tion is Long edd. 1999 that makes a conscious attempt to reply to the question
‘What is Presocratic Philosophy’, and I will discuss Long’s position on the ques-
tion below.
Ironically, the reluctance to address the question ‘What is Presocratic philoso-
phy?’, plagues Laks’s volume itself. Indeed, only five of the eighteen essays
specifically address this question, and this may explain why the volume is thus
divided into two main parts (‘General Questions’ and ‘Profiles and Problems’),
with each part subdivided into two and three parts respectively. Part 1 includes
‘Characterising the Presocratics’ and ‘Editing the Presocratics’; part 2 includes
‘Authors and Works’, ‘Problems of Ancient Cosmology’, and ‘Readings’.4
I shall examine the first five essays that specifically address the question ‘What
is Presocratic philosophy?’ I also review the other essays in the volume, all of
which are of excellent quality, but only insofar (with one exception) as they
appear to address the question in some form.
In the lead essay, ‘Philosophes Présocratiques: Remarques sur la construction
d’une catégorie de l’historiographie philosophique’, André Laks begins with a
reminder that the expression or term ‘Presocratic’ is a modern construction. He
notes (17) that the first occurrence can be traced to the German scholar J.A. Eber-
hard, who wrote a section in his manual on the history of universal philosophy in
1788 entitled ‘Vorsokratische Philosophie’.5 There are three reasons why the
term ‘Presocratic’ was accepted (23). First, because Socrates represents (or
appears to represent) a major turning point in the history of the human mind. Sec-

3 Two recent examples are Preus ed. 2001 and Graham 2002 (see Naddaf 2005b). Hussey 1995

is an excellent attempt to put the Presocratics, and in particular the Ionians, into perspective. Other-
wise, the volume does not focus on the ‘Presocratic’ philosophers and neither does Taylor ed. 1997.
Yet Osborne 1997 does attempt to put the origins of philosophy in a cultural context. Schofield 2003,
51 mentions three modes of ‘Presocratic theorizing’, and he characterizes these as proto-science, phi-
losophy (which seems to begin with Parmenides), and religious speculation. Frede 2003 is an excel-
lent analysis of the notion of ‘Presocratic’. Frede begins with an overview of the term philosophos
and its cognates and succinctly shows what the ‘presocratics’ do and do not have in common and as
such provides a lucid analysis of ‘What is Presocratic Philosophy?’ The chapter also puts the subse-
quent tradition of ‘what it means to be a philosopher’ into perspective. Frede reminds us that prior to
the end of the fifth century, the fact that there was no particular word for philosopher implies that nei-
ther they nor others perceived them as a separate group (5). But after some cautionary observations,
Frede notes: ‘At the same time, we also have to acknowledge that the Presocratics from Thales to
Democritus, as part of their general concern for wisdom, tried to provide an account of reality or a
theory of nature. And this in the end would solidify into a generally recognized enterprise of which
they saw themselves as forming a part’ (6). Yet, ‘from Socrates onward all philosophers in antiquity
thought of philosophy as being practical in the sense of being motivated by a concern for the good life
and as involving a practical concern for how one actually lives and how one actually feels about
things’ (8).
4 I have taken the liberty of translating the French throughout. It should be noted that five of the

eighteen essays are in English and several of the others have been translated from English into
French. It is unclear why.
5 For more on the development of the concept, see Most 1999.
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ond, because of the fragmentary nature of the written works of the Presocratics.6
Third, because of Nietzsche’s criticism of Socrates and his association of the Pre-
socratics with a critique of modernity. Indeed, Nietzsche sees Socrates as incar-
nating the ‘theoretical’ and the Pre-Socratics the practical.
As Laks correctly notes, the meaning conveyed by the expression ‘Presocratic’
did have ancient antecedents in the sense that both Plato and Aristotle (not to
mention Xenophon and Cicero) make it clear that the ‘philosophy’ of Socrates
represents a profound rupture with the philosophy of his predecessors (and con-
temporaries).
Aristotle, for his part, notes in his overview of his philosophical predecessors
in the Metaphysics that Socrates’ revolution in philosophy was to have disre-
garded the physical universe (the primary focus of the phusikoi or Presocratics)
and to have concentrated on moral questions and in conjunction with this the
problem of definition (987b1-4, 1078b17-32).7 This fits the picture of Socrates in
Plato’s earlier dialogues. However, it is in Phaedo 96a6-100a7 where Plato
briefly discusses Socrates’ intellectual development (and what is often called the
difference between ‘first’ and ‘second’ order questions) that we find a clearer
analysis (from Plato’s perspective) of the famous rupture.8 The portrait that one
can draw from Socrates in the Phaedo is, as usual, complex. The accent is placed
on Socrates’ preoccupation with the practical (and moral) versus the theoretical.
He is more interested in the ‘whys’ of the world (that is, why things are as they
are) rather than the ‘hows’ of the world (that is, how things came—and con-
tinue—to be as they are.).9 But it would be naive to think that Socrates alone
gave philosophy an entirely new direction. Indeed, this is one of the primary
objections, as a number of scholars observe, against the expression pre-Socratic.
Before addressing this, as Laks and others do, it is important to examine the other
side of the parenthesis, that is, what do the ‘pre-Socratics’ have in common that
merit the name? And why is there a convention that we begin with Thales?
Indeed, what preceded Thales?
Aristotle informs us that Thales was the founder of the earliest school of phi-
losophy (philosophia, Meta. 983b7, b21). He notes (ironically) that philosophia
did not originate for ‘practical’ reasons, but for the sake of knowing (Meta.
982b21-22) and this occurred (and could only occur) after the basic necessities of
life were acquired (Meta. 982b25).10 What preceded philosophia according to
6 Thus we read the Presocratics in a collection, that is, Hermann Diels’ famous 1903 collection

Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker.

7 Cicero makes it clear in Tusculan Disputations v 4.10 that moral philosophy begins with

Socrates: ‘Socrates first called philosophy down from the sky, set it in cities and even introduced it
into homes, and compelled it to consider life and morals, good and evil’ (trans. Guthrie 1971, 13).
8 This rupture is also evident in Plato’s Apology, where the master is contrasted with both the

physicists and the sophists. But many students see Socrates’ portrait here as, at best, ambiguous.
9 In the Timaeus, Plato provides the ‘whys’ Socrates appeared to be seeking. But there is a long

road between the Phaedo and the Timaeus. In the Phaedo the sensible world is seen as an ‘evil’ to be
avoided (see Naddaf 2004).
10 It is worth noting that in Critias 110a, Plato contends that mythology and research into the
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Aristotle was the philomuthia (Meta. 982b19) of the poets or theologoi. The fun-
damental difference between the two for Aristotle is that Thales’ position was
based on observation and argument, while the poets accepted tradition (984a1).
Plato, for his part, associates Thales most often with the famous sages of ancient
Greece. However, there is nothing to indicate that Plato thought that ‘philosophy’
began with Thales.
The terms philosophia, philosophos, and philosophein appear to have been ini-
tially associated with the pursuit of a ‘general culture’ and the ‘wisdom’ derived
from it (Laks, 29-30; see also Hadot 2000, 16-17).11 There is a much discussed
fragment of Heraclitus (DK22B35) in which there is an intimate relation between
historia and philosophia (‘lovers of wisdom ought very much to be inquirers in
to many things’).12 And in the Hippocratic medical text Ancient Medicine (ch.
20),13 the term philosophia is associated with accounts of the peri phuseôs type,
and this seems to be the first ‘technical’ use of the term philosophia. Plato uses
the word philosophia on numerous occasions to characterize a way of life or to
designate the desire that drives certain humans toward wisdom rather than the
possession of a particular kind of knowledge.
Meanwhile, there seems to be irrefutable evidence (contra Lloyd) that the ‘Pre-
socratics’ in general were all engaged in an investigation of nature, that is, a his-
toria peri phuseos, and that this historia involved many different but related
things; moreover, it covered all things.14 Plato’s famous account in the Phaedo of
Socrates’ encounter with the phusikoi substantiates much of this. Indeed, Plato
and Aristotle appear to be in agreement that all the Presocratics were interested in
the investigation of nature (see Phaedo 96a7 for the expression peri phuseôs his-
toria), although Plato does not explicitly note that it began with the Milesians.
Moreover, both Plato and Aristotle contend that the ‘first philosophers’ were pre-
occupied with providing natural and/or rational causes rather than supernatural or
‘mythical’ causes to account for the origin, development, and functioning of man
and the universe.
Laks, as others before him, correctly insists that the Presocratics were all
engaged in the same type of activity and it is this activity that tends to group them

past are contingent on leisure time (see Brisson 1998, xxiv).

11 This also appears to be the position of Frede 2003, 2-3. Lloyd 2002, 42 seems to contend that

the first uses of philosophos and philosophein were essentially negative, but only cites the occurrance
in Ancient Medicine 20 as an example.
12 As Frede 2003, 2-4 notes Heraclitus does not mean that knowing a lot of things will make one

wise, but rather that most people do not take the time or make the effort (or realize) that there are a
good many things to find out about. See also Curd below. For a discussion of this fragment see
Naddaf 2005a, 167-168 nn. 1 and 2.
13 The date of the treatise Ancient Medicine is the subject of controversy, but there appears to be

some consensus on the last third of the 5th century BCE.

14 Hussey 1995, 538 correctly emphasizes this point. He insists that the accent is on the notion of

an objective reality that was understood as entirely intelligible and a method, albeit basic in some
instances, for detecting and depicting this objective reality as intelligible.
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together.15 Of course, this does not preclude that they all had radically different
explanations of the world. Their respective explanations are simply (contra
Lloyd) responses to their predecessors. From this perspective, Laks sees Preso-
cratic philosophy as a dialectic that continues with the Sophists, Socrates, Plato,
and Aristotle—all of whom are still engaged in the search for causes. While we
may thus think of the Presocratics as the first philosophers rather than as a group,
Laks never loses sight of the common elements that bind them together and thus
of a continuous history. 16 Indeed, for Laks (32) both the naturalists and the
sophists (both sophoi) are occupied with an explanation of all things in the sense
that there is a -logia or discipline for all things.17 In the final analysis, speech and
nature are, as we see in Heraclitus, united: ‘all things are one’ (DK22B50).18
In the course of his essay, Laks (25) mentions Long’s explicit request to con-
tributors to Long ed. 1999, 21n33 (of whom Laks was one) to avoid the term
‘Presocratic’. One is left with the impression that this was an impetus behind
Laks’s volume. Long in his introduction to the Cambridge Companion provides a
number of reasons why the term ‘Presocratic’ should be avoided. These reasons
are not meant to denigrate the Presocratics themselves. Rather, Long’s point is
that because many of the philosophical interests traditionally perceived as having
commenced with Socrates, including ethics, psychology, theology, and episte-

15 There are different but converging notions of what the ‘Presocratics’ have in common. Thus

Vlastos 1975, 24 insists on their attitude toward how the natural world works: ‘all of them [the phusi-
ologoi] would account for this order [in nature] by the natures of the components themselves without
appeal to anything else, hence without appeal to a transcendent ordering intelligence’. Natural (or
rational) causes thus substitute for supernatural (or mythical) causes in explanations of how the pre-
sent order of things originated and continues to work. Hussey 1995, 532, while not ignoring this,
insists on their common epistemological approach: ‘for understanding to be possible, each basic
entity had to have specified its essential properties, those that were taken to determine its whole
nature and behaviour’. Xenophon Memorabilia i 1.14 refers to all the Presocratics including Par-
menides as falling into the scope of peri phuseôs. I discuss this text and a number of others in the
same context in Naddaf 2005a, ch. 1.
16 At one point, Laks 1999, 25 also confronts the Presocratic question from the perspective of the

‘continental divide’. He suggests that when the term ‘Presocratic’ (that is, the historical period)
denotes the pre-Socratics (that is, the phusiologoi or ‘naturalists’ themselves) as having a homoge-
nous and continuous ‘philosophy,’ that this is essentially a ‘continental’ interpretation in opposition
to the Anglo-Saxon preference for ‘Early Greek Philosophy’ (echoing Aristotle’s prôtoi
philosophôsantoi in Meta. 983b6), which in turn conveys a sense of discontinuity. Laks refers to Bur-
net 1896 and Long ed. 1999 as typical examples of this. I think that a quick survey would reveal that
most recent works in the Anglo-Saxon tradition actually insist on the term ‘Presocratic’. Ironically,
Long’s own interpretation (see below) is in fact quite close to Laks’s position.
17 As Laks 1999, 29 notes, many of the ‘pre-Socratics’ practiced other disciplines, e.g.,

medicine, which shows that philosophy itself was not a ‘distinct’ discipline.
18 Laks 1999, 36 speaks of a dialectic of ‘practical consistency’ in which he suggests, if I under-

stand correctly, that there is a relation between the ‘philosopher’ or thinker’s explanation of the world
and how one should live one’s life according to the model surmised. From this perspective, there is
again, he notes, a sense in which Socrates did not originate in a vacuum. In sum, there is always a
‘way of life’ associated with the philosopher’s historia.
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mology, are very much part of the ‘philosophical’ tradition prior to Socrates.19
Indeed, while Long concurs with Aristotle that what may best describe the
early philosophers is that they were all engaged with ‘an inquiry into nature’, that
is, nature as an ‘objectivity’, a more appropriate formulation would be ‘giving an
account of all things’ (10).20 In conjunction with this, he departs from the nar-
rower view that the early Greek philosophers were ‘detached observers and theo-
rists of nature, who do not include the mind and human subject within the scope
of their inquiries’ (11). It is the accounting for all things that for Long enables the
Sophists to be included in his volume (12). Indeed, both the ‘philosophers’ and
the ‘sophists’ had a wide range of overlapping interests. According to Long what
is revolutionary about ‘giving an account of all things’ is that the accounts are
characteristically (1) explanatory and systematic, (2) coherent and argumenta-
tive, (3) transformative, (4) educationally provocative, and (5) critical and uncon-
ventional.21
In the final analysis, Long and Laks both appear to put the accent on the same
notion of ‘giving an account of all things’ and thus have more in common than
Laks at least accepts. This is not the case with Geoffrey Lloyd in his contribution
‘Le pluralism de la vie intellectual avant Platon’ to Laks’s volume. He reminds
us that the Anglo-Saxon analytic tradition in philosophy is considerably different
from the ‘continental’ tradition, and this may explain, if I understand Lloyd, why
the two traditions have such different views on ‘Presocratic philosophy’.
Lloyd argues that in order to determine whether there is a philosophy that one
can characterize as ‘Presocratic’ it is important to analyse the categories that the
Greeks themselves employed to depict the intellectual life during the period. He
thus analyses a certain number of terms including philosophia, sophia, historia,
and peri phuseôs. Lloyd shows that these terms were not proper to those we now
categorize as ‘Presocratic philosophers’ but were also popular among the physi-

19 While Long ed. 1999, 4-5 suggests that Xenophanes is an important early philosopher, he con-

tends that had Xenophanes been an isolated figure, his work would not be any different from the ‘wis-
dom’ literature associated with Hesiod and Pherecydes (which may explain why a separate chapter is
not devoted to Xenophanes in his volume). On this point, I wholly disagree, and a number of essays
in Laks volume tend to reinforce my conviction.
20 Long correctly notes that Hesiod also attempts to give an account of all things, but his account

is based on trust and tradition, and this is a fundamental difference between the early Greek philoso-
phers and their predecessors even if they were well aware of their debt to them.
21 Most 1999 is also insightful with regard to our understanding of the question ‘What is Preso-

cratic philosophy?’. He looks at a context that is almost completely ignored in the Laks volume, the
relation between prose and poetry in early Greek philosophy. He contends that it was because of
Socrates that philosophy turned ‘irremediably’ from poetry to prose. Algra 1999 is a good introduc-
tion to the Presocratic question although he skillfully avoids the term ‘Presocratic’. Algra provides a
good summary of the difference between the Milesian cosmology (that is, the cosmology of the ‘first
philosophers’ ) and the mythical cosmology of their predecessors. He also provides some interesting
and cautious observations on the use and abuse of contemporary notions of science and philosophy
when characterizing the ‘Milesians’. Algra seems to take a middle road and sees them as essentially
‘protoscientists’ (63). His own position is derived from the view that the Milesians are ‘cosmolo-
gists’.
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cians, sophists, and historians. In sum, there are no fixed frontiers for these terms
but rather a great deal of overlap with other categories (e.g., medicine and his-
tory). Also included in the category of ‘Presocratics’ are a wide range of posi-
tions and methods, which suggests that practioners did not see themselves as
engaged in the same activity (whence, as Lloyd notes, Heraclitus’ famous frag-
ment DK22B40: ‘A lot of learning does not teach understanding, otherwise it
would have taught Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hecataeus’).22 In the
final analysis for Lloyd, the fundamental interests that Laks and Long see as
characterizing the ‘Presocratics’ do not exist.
Whatever the merits of Lloyd’s position (and there are many), it seems exces-
sively narrow. There is a great deal of consensus that the Presocratics beginning
with the Milesians were in search of an account of all things (ta panta) and this
was the primary object of their historia. This was not, however, the object of the
historia of the physicians, historians, sophists, mathematicians and so on. As for
the self-conscious methodologies, self-criticism, etc., I agree that these were also
shared with the other ‘disciplines’.23
The three other essays that comprise the section on ‘Characterizing the Preso-
cratics’, by Sassi, Gemelli, and Curd respectively, are equally rich and engaging.
While Sassi and Curd clearly side with Laks, Gemelli leans toward Lloyd. How-
ever, they all make their own arguments.
Maria Michela Sassi, in ‘La naissance de la philosophie de l’esprit de la tradi-
tion’, commences with Aristotle’s insistence that just as there is a new beginning
with Socrates so is there a new beginning with Thales. These are the traditional
ancient parameters for Presocratic philosophy. 24 She then asks: if Thales is
indeed considered as the father of philosophy, then it is legitimate to ask of
whom Thales is the child? (56). In the final analysis, she wants to reflect on the
origins of philosophy, and this is the only essay in the volume that attempts to
some degree to do so. Sassi approaches the subject in light of Cornford and Burk-
ert’s influential analyses of the resemblances between myth and philosophy and
their conclusion that philosophy was conditioned by its oriental models. Burkert
in fact contends that if the characteristic of Greek philosophy is rational argu-
mentation, then philosophy only begins with Parmenides. While I would concur
with Cornford and Burkert that the influence of oriental models (in particular,
theogonical models) is demonstrable, Sassi is correct, in my view, to insist that
there are a number of distinctive features in the accounts of the first philosophers

22 Heraclitus’ hostility to Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus in 22B40 is not

because they are polymaths (see above) as Lloyd implies, but because they are unaware of the correct
method of inquiry.
23 Contrary to what Lloyd (41) contends, Plato’s synopsis of accounts of the peri phuseôs type in

Laws x 888e-890a summarizes well the object and content of their respective works (see Naddaf
2005a, 32-34).
24 Sassi correctly takes Mansfeld (for whom philosophy as ontological and epistemological spec-

ulation begins with Heraclitus or Parmenides) to task for his excessively narrow view of philosophy
(56).
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(Milesians) that characterize their accounts as ‘philosophy’. Aristotle was

already well aware of this. While Aristotle believed that there could be logos in
mythos (e.g., the idea that Homer and Thales were saying the same thing with
regard to water), he also recognized that consciousness or deliberate reflection
was behind the philosophical conception (69; see also below).25 She notes that
while the life of myths in oriental cultures was long, beginning with Thales there
are a series of theories that succeed one another with astonishing speed. Each the-
ory, as Popper noted, has different hypotheses on the birth and development of
the cosmos, and these hypotheses are (and were) subject to falsification. In the
final analysis, what is characteristic of this style of rationality is that it combines
innovation and egoism with an authentic mutation in the temporal dimension of
reflection (71). It is this new method associated at the outset with philosophy that
was adopted by physicians, historians, and mathematicians (whence Sassi’s pen-
chant for Laks’s position over Lloyd’s). Moreover, it is thus unimportant whether
Thales did or did not write a treatise. 26 The importance is that his doctrine
remained linked to the tradition that accompanied the memory of his name (77).
Laura Gemelli Marciano, in ‘Le contexte culturel des Présocratiques adver-
saires et destinataires’, approaches the problems of the Presocratics (in particular,
Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Empedocles) from a cultural perspective, that is, in
terms of their respective adversaries and audiences.27 She argues that the first
philosophers or phusiologoi did not see themselves in competition with other
phusiologoi, nor did they see themselves belonging to a group that Aristotle char-
acterizes as phusiologoi, but rather that they saw themselves in competition with
other sophoi (including poets, diviners, healers). From Gemilli’s perspective, the
individuals that we generally group under the rubric ‘Presocratics’, when anal-
ysed in terms of their adversaries and audiences, are so different from one
another that there is no justification to the precise category of ‘natural philoso-
pher’ as conceived by Aristotle (she thus agrees with Lloyd). There is much to be
gained from reading this essay, but it fails to focus on what these philosophers
have in common. There were no doubt numerous adversarial groups, traditional
and nontraditional. Greece was at an exceptionally rich cultural crossroads where
the order of the day was debate in a secular arena. Anaxagoras had a widely
diversified audience, and the richness of Xenophanes’ account and the length of
his life suggest that he communicated with many different groups. Gemilli has at
best focused on one aspect of this complex puzzle. Moreover many of her con-
clusions are difficult to sustain.
For example, while it may be true that Heraclitus is competing with other poly-

25 Sassi contends that Plato had a similar position, but his position (and attitude) on myth is too

complex to discuss here.

26 Sassi sees the democratic effects of writing as the instrument of conceptual development in

ancient Greece with mythology as its first victim (76).

27 She opens with the contention that most approaches to the Presocratics have been too influ-

enced by Zeller’s Hegelian perspective, that is, as an expression of the progressive development of
the mind/spirit (83-84). This is new to me.
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maths (including Xenophanes and Pythagoras, albeit for different reasons), she
contends that the audience to which Heraclitus addresses himself is not the
majority but the aristoi, who may be influenced by pedestrian polymaths such as
Pythagoras. She believes that Heraclitus did not intend his text to be read to the
public but rather that it was restricted to a circle of initiates (i.e., aristoi), which
explains his enigmatic approach. But this seems indefensible in light of the fact
that the Ephesian believed that ‘thinking (including sound thinking) is common
to all’ (B113, 116; and Curd below 122-123). As for his enigmatic approach, we
see a whole school of Heracliteans, in particular in the area of medicine, develop
shortly after his death (if not during his life).28 Moreover, while she provides a
number of pertinent examples (including theological and cosmological) that
show that Xenophanes wants to demonstrate to his audience that his historia
when compared with those of his adversaries (other rhapsodes, including Homer
and Hesiod) can be shown to be more truthful and therefore that his polymathia is
superior to theirs, there is strong evidence that he drew a great deal of inspiration
from his Milesian masters (as Mourelatos, see below, correctly notes). As for
Empedocles, although she correctly notes that Pythagoras is his inspiration, the
fact that he sees fit to challenge Parmenides with a ‘typical’ peri phuseôs account
strongly suggests that he still sees himself as working within this particular tradi-
tion. Indeed, the Pythagoreans themselves had their own peri phuseôs account, as
we see in Philolaus.
Patricia Curd, in ‘The Presocratics as Philosophers’, wants to defend some of
the earliest philosophers from recent trends that recommend that they not be
regarded as philosophers.29 She endorses the traditional Anglo-American inter-
pretation of philosophy as it pertains to the Presocratics. That is, they were the
first to engage in rational inquiry (that is, I assume, explanatory efficiency) and
provide naturalistic explanations of the world—the two distinguishing character-
istics of philosophical thought (116). But what does this mean?
Curd begins her analysis in light of Heraclitus’ much discussed claim that
‘lovers of wisdom must be inquirers into many things’ (DK22B35) and concurs
with Barnes 1979, 147 on this fragment that an inquiry into many things ‘is a
necessary condition for wisdom’. There is, as Curd notes, overwhelming evi-
dence that the Presocratics were indeed inquirers into many things (including
cosmology, ethics, and politics), but other inquirers (as Lloyd stresses) could also
fall into this category.
The Presocratic comprehension of the natural world without resorting to super-

28 While Heraclitus may have believed in an aristocracy of the mind, he seems to have favored

democracy over aristocracy (see Naddaf 2005a, 126-127, 133-134).

29 Curd characterizes these ‘opposing’ trends as hyper-rational and hypo-rational respectively.

According to the former, the Presocratics do not engage in what we would characterize as ‘scientific
method’, and according to the latter the Presocratics were in the main enigmatic poets, prophets, heal-
ers, and lawgivers. In sum, Aristotle either misunderstood them or distorted their views. It is worth
noting that the terms ‘hyper-rational’ and ‘hypo-rational’ are not clearly explained and should have
been avoided.
170

natural entities is also part of the traditional interpretation. But we could well
imagine, she notes, someone adopting this position without engaging in what we
would characterize as ‘scientific method’ (118).30 Indeed, the Presocratics were
not only engaged in a study of the natural world, but they also had methodologi-
cal concerns with that enterprise and some understanding of what was appropri-
ate. This is what the early philosophers have in common, and this is what enables
us to distinguish them from other groups of sophoi.
Curd examines Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Parmenides in particular in light
of these observations. She convincingly shows that Xenophanes (on whom she
focuses most of her paper) is indeed a systematic and original thinker for whom
observation and inquiry are the order of the day. 31 Curd’s position on Xeno-
phanes is somewhat similar to my own (see Naddaf 2005a, 114-120), although I
would insist on the fact that Xenophanes’ notion of God (for which he argues
persuasively) and its consequences for his account on the natural world order are
so radically different from the traditional notion and the practices premised on it
that it seems odd to consider him anything but a philosopher (although Mogy-
oródi appears to argue otherwise below).
The same case can, of course, be made for Heraclitus and Parmenides. She
argues that even if we do not see Heraclitus’ worldview as grounded in some
type of ‘scientific method’, there can be do doubt that the logos reveals a more
profound structure than the one described by the senses. Indeed, the evidence is
that he prefers his method of inquiry to that of his predecessors, notably Xeno-
phanes. As for Parmenides, it would seem almost absurd to conclude that he is
not profoundly concerned with the correct method of inquiry and that his poem
was essentially ‘philosophical’. But Curd is concerned to reiterate this in light of
recent claims that Parmenides was not primarily a ‘philosopher’ but rather an
enigmatic poet, prophet, healer, and lawgiver (e.g., Kingsley 1999), or again that
he contended that humans as opposed to the divine did not have access to the
truth except, that is, through ‘revelation’ (Most 1999).
The next three contributions, under the rubric ‘Editing the Presocratics’, are
relevant to our understanding of the Presocratics but they do not (with the excep-
tion to some degree of Bernabe’s essay) directly confront the question : What is
Presocratic philosophy?
Walter Leszl, in ‘Problems Raised by an Edition of Democritus with Compar-
isons with Other Presocratics’, examines the problems in preparing a new edition
of Democritus and Leucippus. He focuses in particular on tracing the sources

30 I confess that I would have to see examples of hard evidence, in particular during the early

period, before I would concur with this overly cautious position.

31 Curd suggests (122n21) that the fact that Long ed. 1999 did not accord Xenophanes an indi-

vidual chapter suggests that he was not held in sufficient esteem as a philosopher to be granted one. I
totally agree on the importance of Xenophanes as an early Greek philosopher, but I think that Curd is
being somewhat unfair. As Long himself notes, Xenophanes is nonetheless given a lot of coverage in
several chapters. In the Laks volume, Xenophanes appears to get more ‘airtime’ than any of the other
Presocratics.
 171

behind our information. Leszl concludes that while Theophrastus may be a com-
mon source for much of the fragments and testimonia found in Aetius, Pseudo-
Plutarch, and Stobaeus (despite their different approaches to Democritus), it is
also evident that there are other important sources notably, Epicurus and the
Sceptics. It seems surprising to think that the original works of at least some of
the Presocratics were not still in circulation well after Theophrastus, and the next
essay by Primavesi makes precisely this point.32
Olivier Primavesi, in ‘Lecteurs antiques et byzantins d’Empedocle de Zénon à
Tzétzes’, examines the traditions preserving Empedocles. He provides several
comprehensive lists of all the authors in antiquity who have contributed frag-
ments and testimonia of Empedocles (it was this analysis that lead to the discov-
ery of the famous Strasbourg fragments). Primavesi notes that it is clear that at
least Aristotle, Plutarch, and Simplicius actually had the text of Empedocles in
front of them. Indeed, Simplicus (sixth century) provides us with the largest
number of new fragments. He notes that, since John Tzetzes in the twelfth cen-
tury produced one new fragment of Empedocles and since there is some docu-
mented evidence that explicitly mentions that an original text of Empedocles had
been found (again mentioned in the fifteenth century), consultation of the Preso-
cratics continued into the Byzantine period. From this Primavesi optimistically
concludes that it is not inconceivable that a complete text of Empedocles may
still surface at some point in the future.33
Alberto Bernabé, in ‘Orphisme et Présocratiques: bilan et perspectives d’un
dialogue complex’, provides an overview of the relation between the Orphics and
the Presocratics in light of the fact the Orphic studies are again flourishing. But
also, I assume, because of the more recent Derveni Papyrus.34 This essay is rich
and interesting and is one of few essays (besides those in section A of part 1) that
are, in my view, directly relevant to the stated theme of the volume. I mention
this for a number of reasons, and in particular because, as Bernabé notes
(although others have also done so), there are clear references to Orphic texts in
Presocratic authors beginning with the Milesians. However, it is not always pos-
sible to determine if certain Orphic texts influenced certain Presocratic authors or
the contrary. Given that Orphic texts first appear in the second half of the sixth
century and thus within a generation or so of the first Presocratic texts, it seems
difficult to know for certain. Indeed, there is no consensus on a coherent (or uni-
fied) Orphic doctrine (with the exception, I think, that certain initiations will
assure a better lot in the afterlife) as there is in Pythagoreanism, with which it is
often closely associated.

32 Mansfeld 1999 makes an excellent and lucid case for this.

33 Martin and Primavesi 1999 have added a new dimension to our understanding of Empedocles.
Their research following the discovery of new fragments shows that Empedocles integrated the
themes of nature and religion in one poem, thus ending the controversy over whether he wrote two
very different poems. However some of the research and conclusions have been recently contested by
Laks in Caston and Graham edd 2002, 127-137.
34 Bernabé notes that he is preparing an edition of the Orphic fragments and testimonia (207).
172

As Bernabé (209) notes, there are two types of Orphic texts: poetical texts, on
the one hand, and texts performing an exegesis of poetry, on the other. He argues
that the exegetical texts, under the influence of philosophy (as in the Derveni
Papyrus), influence the later (in particular Neoplatonic) Orphic texts. Of course,
Bernabé was not the first to see this, but it is worth noting that the examples he
provides are overwhelming.35
Meanwhile Bernabé shows that the Derveni Papyrus is important because it
employs the methods and criteria of Ionian philosophy, including those of the
Atomists, Diogenes of Apollonia, Anaxagoras, and Heraclitus. (He also shows
that there are numerous other references to Presocratic philosophers in Orphic
texts). Again, this is not new, but the importance of much of this essay resides, in
my view, in the discussion of the role of allegory in Presocratic philosophy. What
did the author of the Derveni Papyrus intend in his ‘Presocratic’ exegetical inter-
pretation of an Orphic poem? There is evidence that many of the later Presocrat-
ics, including Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus were themselves all
engaged in allegorical interpretation of traditional poetic texts in a manner in
which the earlier Presocratics, including the Milesians, Xenophanes, and Heracli-
tus would have been adamantly opposed (with Parmenides coming somewhere in
between). While Bernabé does not explicitly address this change in attitude
toward allegory, his essay nonetheless shows the degree to which allegory played
a prominent role among the Presocratics and their followers.36
The subsequent triumvirate of essays, which fall under the rubric ‘Authors and
Works’, focus on Xenophanes, Democritus, and the fifth century sculptor Poly-
clitus and his relation to the Pythagoreans.
The first essay by Emese Mogyoródi, ‘Xenophanes as a Philosopher: Theology
and Theodicy’, is one of the more interesting contributions to this volume and
one that deserves close attention. Mogyoródi makes the case (as with Curd and
others, albeit for different reasons) that Xenophanes does indeed deserve to be
considered a ‘philosopher’. However, he sees Xenophanes neither as a critic of
religion nor as a ‘natural theologian’, but as a religious reformer whose theology
is grounded in a ‘religious-moral logic’.
Mogyoródi contends that Xenophanes is responding to a religious crisis associ-
ated with a new notion of social justice, in which the cooperative virtues and val-
ues have largely replaced their competitive counterparts. Xenophanes is of the
opinion that religious-moral behavior is determined by religious beliefs and atti-
tudes and therefore endeavors to change the latter to affect the former (278).
Indeed, according to traditional religion, the gods are not only unpredictable and
unaccountable, but they are often portrayed as immoral beings whose actions
could be (and were) used as a justification for human actions and values. Thus to
change moral behavior, one must establish a new conception of the divinity; reli-
35 Thus while no one contests that Empedocles was influenced by the Pythagoreans, Bernabé

shows to what degree Empedocles doctrine of the four elements influenced the later Orphic cosmolo-
gies.
36 Most 1999, 339-340 succinctly addresses the allegorical issue.
 173

gious beliefs must conform to the new notion of social justice advocated by the
polis, where the co-operative values and virtues are perceived as crucial to the
survival of the state.37 In conjunction with this, there has to be a credible notion
of theodicy that shows ‘that the gods punish injustices as a rule and that justice
played a vital role in earthly “success”’ (271). From this perspective, Xeno-
phanes’ theology is neither ‘natural’ nor grounded in naturalism.38
Mogyoródi observes meanwhile that Xenophanes’ ‘greatest God’ (a reformed
Zeus) appears too lofty and detached from human affairs to be involved in retri-
bution (272). He sees this as connected with a form of theodicy (276). He
believes that Xenophanes’ description of God (in particular the denial of anthro-
pomorphic features) is meant to indicate that the divine cannot be measured with
or subject to human expectations or demands, moral or otherwise (276).39 In
sum, Xenophanes’ solution is that God’s judgment is invincible but inscrutable
(281).40
This essay is an interesting and serious attempt to give Xenophanes his proper
place among the pantheon of Presocratics, but it fails to account for Xenophanes
as a ‘natural’ philosopher. Indeed, according to Mogyoródi there is no relation
between the natural world and Xenophanes’ God. What is clear, in my view, is
that Xenophanes’ God is an active principle, a true archê kineseôs, that pervades
the primordial substance and somehow governs or controls its ‘physical pro-
cesses’ (DK21B25). From this perspective, there are both passive and active
principles, with the latter having an ontological, rather than a temporal, superior-
ity. The greatest god is thus analogous to Plato’s conception of the divinity in
Laws x (and Timaeus 34b), where there is not, strictly speaking, a distinction
between god and the world, although the divinity is portrayed in similar anthro-
pomorphic terms as synoptically governing the universe. Yet, Xenophanes’
‘greatest God’ is clearly inspired by the Milesian conception of the primordial
substance. Indeed, there is no good reason to believe that Xenophanes was not
explicating (and thus clarifying) certain implications that would follow from the
Milesian conception of the primordial substance from the perspective of tradi-
tional religion. In fact, if Anaximander (or Anaximenes) were confronted with

37 Or alternatively, I assume, a utopian idea of justice that the thinker himself advocates as a sine

qua non for human flourishing.

38 Mogyoródi (265) contends that Xenophanes’ theological speculations are thus similar to

Plato’s logical approach in the Republic, where nature is strictly avoided. There are good grounds for
this (see Naddaf 1996).
39 Mogyoródi conjectures that this may have been associated with Xenophanes’ perception that

human reverence for the gods was decreasing (277). But was there a great deal of moral and social
upheaval around Xenophanes, as Mogyoródi suggests (278-279) there was, say, during the Pelopon-
nesian war? Moreover, we do not know that during the period the behaviour of the traditional gods
was used as paradigm for human morality, as Mogyoródi suggests (279). The institutions of the state
could not tolerate such behaviour (thus such and such a crime will be punished with such and such a
penalty).
40 Perhaps this is what Heraclitus wants to convey when he notes ‘to the God everything is beau-

tiful and good and just, but mortals assume that some things are unjust and others just’ (DK22B102).
174

Xenophanes’ conception of the greatest god, would their own answers be any dif-
ferent? Indeed, is there any good reason to believe that Xenophanes, as with
Milesian counterparts, did not treat his ‘greatest God’ as a cosmogonical and cos-
mological principle? Anaximander describes the apeiron as a conscious and
intelligent agent even if the processes that it initiated are purely natural. More-
over, there is also a sense in which the apeiron continues to control all the natural
processes. In fact, the terminology employed by Anaximander is no less provoca-
tive than that of Xenophanes. And this is also the case with Anaximenes! His pri-
mordial substance, aêr, is again not only characterized as divine, but it is also
what holds together and controls both the macrocosm and the microcosm via
psuchê or soul (DK13B2). Moreover, gods and other divine things are said to be
the offspring (apogonoi) of air (DK13A7). Given Xenophanes’ connection with
the Milesians, he may very well have been thinking along these lines when he
stated that his one god is the ‘greatest among gods and men’ (DK21B23).
David Sider, in ‘Demokritos on the Weather’, examines the relation in Dem-
ocritus’ theories between the practical and the theoretical (297). Sider shows that
there is indeed some evidence that Democritus did attempt to discover signs that
predicted both short and long-term changes in the weather. This bodes well with
the atomist’s famous statement that nature does nothing in vain, but that every-
thing happens logically and by necessity (Sider, 300 = DK67B2). Of course, this
must be linked to the other famous statement not mentioned by Sider that ‘he
would rather find a single explanation (aitiologian) than possess the kingdom of
the Persians’ (68B111). In sum, I would interpret this as saying that explanations
are thus clearly ‘possible’, and Sider’s argument would appear to confirm this.
But the importance of Sider’s essay for the present volume is that it shows to
what degree Democritus’ method, theory, and concerns are different from both
the mythical approach and the Socratic approach and thus what it means to be
‘pre-Socratic’.
Carl Huffman, in ‘Polyclete et les Présocratiques’, draws the attention of
philologists and historians of philosophy to two extant fragments from the book
of the famous sculptor Polyclitus of Argos (c. 460-420). Huffman shows, through
a detailed philological analysis of the two fragments, that contrary to what some
contemporary scholars (e.g., Raven) have argued, there is little evidence that
Polycletes was influenced by Pythagoreanism. Although Huffman’s analysis is
convincing, there is little in the essay that makes it relevant to the general theme
of the volume. Huffman’s contribution on the Pythagoreans to Long ed. 1999
would have been much more relevant here, in particular his section on the rela-
tion between religion and philosophy.
The next three essays, by Alexander Mourelatos, Daniel Graham, and Gábor
Betegh, comprise the section entitled ‘Problems of Archaic Cosmology’.
Alexander Mourelatos, in ‘La terre et les étoiles dans la cosmologie de Xéno-
phane’, argues that the expression eis apeiron in Xenophanes’ famous fragment
B28 does indeed convey the sense of infinity, contrary to the predominant mod-
ern interpretation. But he also argues that B28 affirms that not only are the roots
 175

and thus the depth of the earth ‘infinite’, but that the width of the earth and thus
the ‘volume’ of the earth in general are also infinite or without limits (335; 347).
If such is the case for the earth, then a fortiori, it is also the case for the universe
in general. Mourelatos then examines in light of the testimonia how this assertion
of infinity effects the movements of the sun, moon, and fixed stars. He shows
how Xenophanes’ astronomy (in particular the movement of the stars) can be
reconciled with his model of the earth. The demonstration is connected with
Anaximenes’ cosmological model, where the stars move on an inclined or tilted
plane around the earth as a felt cap turns around the head. Moreover, Mourelatos
cogently argues that Xenophanes borrows from Anaximenes’ cosmological pro-
cesses of rarefaction and condensation when he describes that risings and settings
of the stars as kindlings and extinguishings. Despite this well-argued thesis, I am
not convinced that Xenophanes understood the roots of the earth reaching eis
apeiron as conveying the notion of ‘infinite’ rather than ‘indefinite’. And I find it
more difficult again to concur with Mourelatos’s thesis that Xenophanes also
understood the ‘width’ of the earth as ‘infinite’. How would Xenophanes convey
this notion on a ‘map’ or again in the form of a mechanical model (and they were
beginning to circulate during his period)? Moreover, Mourelatos’ discussion
shows that Xenophanes was well aware of the cosmological theories of his Mile-
sian colleagues. Indeed, it suggests that Xenophanes was not first and foremost a
‘religious reformer’.
Daniel Graham, in ‘La lumière de la lune dans la pensée grecque archaïque’,
addresses the question of who was the first to discover the source of the moon’s
light. The importance of this question is that it is not possible to hypothesize that
the moon derives its light from the sun without postulating that celestial bodies
are spherical. There are, of course, conflicting doxographical sources on the per-
son with whom this astronomical discovery originated, and Graham reviews the
evidence to show that this discovery could be attributed to none of the Presocrat-
ics prior to Parmenides. The evidence is found in the second part of Parmenides’
poem, where he clearly states that the moon receives (or borrows) its light from
something else and that the moon always faces the rays of the sun (28B14, 15).
Graham focuses on several important consequences that follow from this discov-
ery by Parmenides for the future of Greek astronomy, including the notions that:
celestial bodies are spherical; the sun is above the moon; celestial bodies have a
permanent existence; the orbits of the celestial bodies are circular and also pass
under the earth; celestial bodies have a causal interaction. Moreover, the discov-
ery leads to the correct explanation of eclipses (as we see in Anaxagoras). In the
final analysis, Graham portrays Parmenides as the finest theoretical astronomer
of the Presocratic period (375); a keen observer with a cosmology superior to any
of his predecessors in explanatory power. Indeed, it was the sine qua non for sub-
sequent ‘mathematical’ explanations of astronomical phenomena (377).41

41 In conjunction with this, Graham should have mentioned Coxon’s position that Parmenides

employed an armillary sphere, as Betegh notes below.

176

I find Graham’s essay both plausible and persuasive, although I am not con-
vinced that Parmenides was more important than Anaximander for the history of
astronomy.42 More importantly, Graham’s thesis should challenge (although he
does not argue this point) the numerous scholars who insist that the second part
of Parmenides poem is not to be taken seriously.
Gábor Betegh, in ‘Le problème des représentations visuelles dans la cosmolo-
gie présocratique: pour une histoire de la modélisation’, examines the origin and
development of ancient cosmological models as well as their practical and theo-
retical uses. There were two types of spheres, global and armillary. The former
were solid with fixed rings while the later were mechanical masterpieces that
could be simple or complex, that is, complex enough so that astronomical predic-
tions could be made (383-384). Betegh argues that both types were employed in
the practice and teaching of mathematical astronomy (as we see in Plato’s Laws
x).43 Betegh goes through the doxographical evidence (and primary sources such
as Aristophanes’ Clouds) and convincingly shows that almost every Presocratic
beginning with Anaximander (and including Parmenides and certain sophists)
employed models and in some instances, as with Anaxagoras, corresponding dia-
grams.
Betegh argues (as does Couprie, from whom he draws a good deal of inspira-
tion) that the first to have employed a three-dimensional cosmological or astro-
nomical model was Anaximander. He contends, however, that Anaximander’s
model was simple, that is, it did not permit the observational functions and possi-
bilities (including calculating distances) that are found in later models. More
importantly, these models, beginning with Anaximander’s, express the notion
that the cosmos is a ‘structured unity’ (413), and it is this, in my view, that is fun-
damentally ‘Presocratic’. I thus found this essay highly relevant to the general
theme of the volume.
Four essays under the rubric ‘Readings’ complete the volume. These essays do
not enlighten us on the general theme of the volume with the possible exception
of Louguet’s contribution insofar as it engages Anaxagoras’ notion of nous, a
notion that is implicitly connected with most Presocratic cosmological principles.
In the first essay, ‘The Fluctuating Fortunes of Heraclitus in Plato’, Mantas
Adomenas examines Plato’s ascription of the doctrine of universal flux to Hera-
clitus. While most scholars conclude that Plato attributes to Heraclitus a radical
doctrine of flux, that is, the doctrine that everything is constantly changing in
every respect, the common opinion is that this contradicts Heraclitus’ own doc-
trine of the unity of opposites. Adomenas brilliantly reconstructs the different
aspects of Plato’s representation of flux and proposes a different Platonic inter-
pretation of flux that resolves the contradiction: to wit, that the doctrine of flux is
introduced as a tool to characterize ‘the historical genesis and the internal logic
42For a convincing argument to the contrary, see Couprie 2003, 167-254; see also Betegh below.
43Betegh actually glosses over Plato, but it is worth noting that cosmological models were
employed in the Academy ‘to save the phenomena’, as we see in the marvellous machines to which
Plato refers in Laws x 893c-d.
 177

of the Presocratic philosophy’ (442). This essay can be read with considerable
profit, but not for an analysis of Heraclitus, for the essay is clearly focused on
Plato rather than the Ephesian.
In the second essay, ‘Démocrite dans les Parva naturalia d’Aristote’, Pierre-
Paul Morel begins with the reminder that the testimonia and fragments of the
Presocratics cannot be understood independently of the intention they were
meant to serve for the source-author. Morel then reconstitutes the image that the
Parva naturalia provides of the Democritian conception of causality with regard
to vision, dreams, and respiration. He convincingly shows how Aristotle engages
in a polemic with Democritus while profiting from his conceptual vocabulary. He
concludes that our sources for Presocratic philosophy must be understood (at
least in part) in the context of the history of polemics, of conflicts of interest, of
occultations, and of lies (463). In this essay, we learn more about Aristotle than
Democritus, but it is an insightful way to comprehend the source of certain doxo-
graphies and also why we should be mindful of Aristotle as a historian of philos-
ophy.
In the third essay,’La dichotomie de Zénon chez Aristotle’, Richard McKira-
han argues that Aristotle treats Zeno quite differently from the way he treats Par-
menides and Melissos, because he believes that Zeno’s arguments, contrary to
the others, represent a real challenge for physics. McKirahan shows that while
Aristotle’s Physics is the primary source for nearly all of Zeno’s existing para-
doxes, Aristotle’s reference to and analysis of Zeno’s paradoxes teaches us more
about the characteristic traits of the Stagarite’s philosophical method than they
do about Zeno’s arguments. Thus Aristotle provides different refutations of
Zeno’s argument from dichotomy depending on the section of his own work
under consideration. One important thing that we can derive from this, according
to McKirahan, is that we must be suspicious of Aristotle as a source for other
ancient authors.
In the final essay, ‘Note sur le fragment B4a d’Anaxagore’, Claire Louguet
examines Anaxagoras’ controversial fragment B4a in which he speaks of
‘another place’ that is ‘just like our place’. This essay offers valuable and insight-
ful analysis of one of the more perplexing and controversial concepts in
Anaxagoras’ system, the role of Intellect or nous. But this notion is no less
important for our understanding of Presocratic philosophy in general and thus
makes this essay deserving of a closer analysis.
Louguet first explores three major interpretations (those of Simplicius,
Fränkel, and Mansfeld) of fragment B4a, all of which focus on identifying this
‘other place’, and then examines why this other world must be identical to ours—
something the others have failed to do (499).
Louguet argues that the why in question must be understood in conjunction
with the faculty one attributes first and foremost to the Intellect (that is, cognitive
or purely mechanical). She reviews the arguments of Sider, Lesher, and Laks in
favor of a teleological interpretation but rejects them all in favour of the standard
interpretation that we find in Plato’s Phaedo, where the Intellect is understood as
178

having a mechanical function. Louguet argues that it is not the Intellect that
chooses or decides how things will be, it is the things themselves that are respon-
sible for what they are. She then analyses B4a in conjunction with B12 to show
that B4a must be understood in light of Anaxagoras’s reply to Parmenides.
Indeed, if Anaxagoras admitted that the Intellect decides, this would entail that
he accepts that the Intellect can bring into being what did not previously exist,
which is contrary to Parmenides’ canon that nothing can come from what is not.
In the final analysis, the Intellect is not an author but a means, as Plato and Aris-
totle observed. She therefore interprets B4a as: if there exists another world, then
it must be identical to ours given that the origin of things is already contained in
their information before the intervention of the Intellect.
However, if Intellect does not mix with anything, how would Louguet account
for humans evolving into something other than they previously were, therefore
defying Parmenides’ canon? Louguet addresses this (525) when she asks if artifi-
cial objects invalidate Parmenides’ canon. She argues that these things continue
what had already existed in a certain way. However, while this may work for cer-
tain functions such as farming, what about the superfluous things, that is, the
things that Plato associates with the luxurious state in the Republic? And how
would the variety of cultures be accounted for? There is also the cognitive effect
of knowing for humans. Humans learn, at least in part, through experience; that
is, humans learn what they did not previously know. Or is knowledge not
included in the Parmenidean canon? I am not persuaded (as Louguet suggests)
that humans are controlled by the mechanical rather than the cognitive attributes
of the Intellect. The Intellect, we are told, is in control of whatever things have
psuchê (B12), and this refers first and foremost to humans. Indeed, it is the Intel-
lect that enables us to apprehend the elements of which we are composed. Or is
this also mechanical? In brief, a lot of questions remain unanswered, although the
essay invites us to explore new avenues.
The essays in this volume are uniformly good and in many cases novel and
exciting, but one wonders what the result would have been had all the partici-
pants responded with the same enthusiasm to the question: What is Presocratic
philosophy? Nonetheless, Qu’est-ce que la Philosophie Présocratique? is a sig-
nificant work that deserves a place on every library shelf. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that the book is badly put together and thus the binding problem in
subsequent volumes must seriously be addressed by the publisher.
Department of Philosophy
York University
Toronto ON M3J 1P3 Canada

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