Teague vs.

Fernandez, 1973
MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner, vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al., respondent.
No. L-29745 June 4, 1973

MAKALINTAL, J.:
Subject: Torts and Damages
Doctrine: Violation of Rules and Statutes 

FACTS:

1. Four o’clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1995, a fire broke out in a store located about ten
meters away from the Realistic Institute, situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a
two-storey, semi-concrete edifice owned and operated by Teague.
2. It was unpartitioned with total area of about 400 square meters, with only one stairway, of
about 1.50 meters in width,
3. it had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders and the
presence of each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.
4. Apparently, upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted ‘Fire!
Fire!’ and thereafter, a panic ensued.
5. The instructresses and assistant instructress of the Institute, tried to calm down the students.
Even the registrar tried to stop the students from rushing and pushing their way to the stairs.
6. The panic, however, could not be subdued thereby causing stampede therein.
7. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire.
8. But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-
appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede.
9. The deceased’s five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M.
Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. 
10. The CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. 
11. It was however, reversed by the CA. The CA held that petitioner was negligent and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of
negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the
construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted in
the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide,
instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the
building had a second stairway under construction.
12. The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as
follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of “Fire!, Fire!”; (4)
panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death. As thus projected the violation of
the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability
since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained
of. According to the petitioner “the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes
with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance.”

ISSUE: Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence.

WON failure to comply with the ordinance requiring a building to provide two stairways
constitutes act of negligence.

HELD:  
YES.

It is true that the petitioner’s non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and
prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy
of the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of
safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the
building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate
the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency
conditions if there was only one stairway available.

“The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the
cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the
manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to
prevent.” To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not
portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the
overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the
ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under
the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to
such violation.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

a) Negligence in general.—Negligence is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and

its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance
which the circumstances reasonably require (Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company,L-21291,
March 28, 1969). Negligence is conduct, not a state of mind or the use of sound judgment.
Hence, the existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment but by the behavior of the actor in the situation before him (Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, L-12425, December 23, 1959).
b) Necessity to show connection between negligence and damage.—Negligence as giving rise
to a cause of action for damages for personal injuries, under the civil law as well as in American
law, requires not only proof of damage to the plaintiff and negligence on the part of the
defendant personally or of some person for whose acts he must respond, but also the connection
of cause and effect between negligence and damage (De Gregorio vs. Go Chong Bing, L-
7663, December 2, 1957).

Pacis vs. Morales, 2010

SPOUSES PACIS VS. MORALES
G.R. No. 169467
February 25, 2010

FACTS:
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store.
petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent Morales.
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident
inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun
store. 

On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and
caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun
owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer.
Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears
that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight
of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter
followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.

A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the
charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of the
RPC.

By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag
was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs
indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses
incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent
from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?

HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial court’s Decision reinstated.
YES
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of
the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising
from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for
damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the
homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages
against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for
damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.

**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the
employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and
direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176 states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular
No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the
business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and
safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended
or canceled.

Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control
an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such
person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business
which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should
have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury
to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms
should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for
ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be
loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what
happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and
placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the
defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair,
respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed,
respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open
and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the
gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case
whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to
restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms. 

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a
family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would
exempt him from liability in this case.

Heirs of Abiad vs. Albayda, 2010

Heirs of Abiad v. Albayda, Jr.

Heirs of Redentor Completo, and Elpidio Abiad v. Sgt. Amando Albayda, Jr.
2010 / Nachura [Negilgence > Standard of conduct > Special circumstance]

Facts
Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla which was
owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike on his way to the office, when Completo's taxi bumped and sideswept
him, causing serious physical injuries. He [Albayda] was brought to the PH Air Force General Hospital, but he was
transferred to the AFP Medical Center because he sustained a fracture and there was no orthopedic doctor available
in the first hospital. He was confined from 27 Aug 1997 to 11 Feb 1998, and again in 23 Feb to 22 Mar 1998
[approx. 7 months].
     Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda filed a complaint for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Completo before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay. Completo filed a counter-charge of
damage to property through reckless imprudence against Albayda. The Office of the City Prosecutor recommended
the filing of an information for Albayda's complaint, and Completo's complaint [against Albayda] was dismissed.
Albayda manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against Completo and Abiad.
     Albayda alleged that Completo's negligence is the proximate cause of the incident. He demanded the following
damages and their respective amounts: Actual damages - 276,550; Moral damages - 600,000; Exemplary damages -
200,000; Attorney's fees - 25,000 + 1,000 per court appearance. 
     On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the taxicab when he heard a strange sound
from the taxicab's rear right side. He found Albayda lying on the road, holding his left leg, so he brought Albayda to
PH Air Force General Hospital. Completo asserted that he was an experienced driver, and that he already reduced
his speed to 20km even before reaching the intersection. In contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at high speed, causing
him to lose control of the bicycle. Completo said that Albayda had no cause of action.
     Several people testified for each side, but here are some notes on the testimony of the owner of the taxi driver,
Abiad. Abiad said that aside from being a soldier, he also held franchises of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys, and
being a taxicab operator, he would wake up early to personally check the taxicabs. When Completo applied as a
taxicab driver, Abiad required him to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver's license. Completo never figured
in a vehicular accident since he was employed, and according to Abiad, he [Completo] was a good driver and good
man.
     RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and the defendants are ordered to pay actual [46k] and moral
[400k] damages, and attorney's fees [25k]. Upon appeal at the CA, the court affirmed RTC's decision with
modifications [no more actual damages; awarded temperate damages [40k]; moral damages only 200k; Completo
and Abiad are solidarily liable to pay Albayda; added legal interest].

Issues and Holding

1. WON CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the collision. NO
2. WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family. YES
3. WON the award of moral and temperate damages and attorney's fees for Albayda had no basis. NO / NO /
YES
Ratio
On Negligence
It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the
motorist's breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise
the diligence required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
suffered. NCC 2176 quoted, and said that the question of the motorist's negligence is a question of fact. Usually,
more will be required of a motorist [25mi/hr = 37ft/sec] than a bicyclist [10mi/hr = 15ft/sec] in discharging the duty
of care because of the physical advantages the former has over the latter.

It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence.
 He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albayda's bicycle; he did not slow down even when he approached
the intersection
 Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Albayda
 It was proven that Albayda had the right of way since he reached the intersection ahead of Completo
NCC 2180 cited - obligation imposed by NCC 2176 is demandable also for those persons for whom one is
responsible. Employers are liable for damage caused by employees, but the responsibility ceases upon proof that
employers observed the diligence of the good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
employees. The burden of proof is on the employer. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for QD is solidary. The employer's civil liability for his employee's negligent acts is also primary and direct,
owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising them, and this liability attaches even if the employer is not
in the vehicle at the time of collision.
     In the selection of employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience,
and service records. With respect to supervision, employers should formulate SOPs and monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches. To establish these factors in a trial involving the
issue of vicarious [secondary] liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence. 

ABIAD'S EVIDENCE CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, AND THIS IS

INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE
SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF COMPLETO.

On Damages
CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages because Albayda failed to present documentary evidence to
establish the amount incurred. Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. Moral damages are awarded in QDs causing
physical injuries, so the award is proper. The award of attorney's fees is deleted for failure to prove that petitioners
acted in bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent's just and valid claim.