Crim Law 1 Case Digest

CRIMINAL LAW
(BOOK 1)
CASE DIGEST
CASE #1 PEOPLE V. BOHOLST-CABALLERO
G.R. No. L-23249 November 25, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CUNIGUNDA BOHOLST-CABALLERO, accused-appellant.
FACTS
Cunigunda stated that she went out carolling with her friend Crispina Barabad and a group of
men who played musical instruments. The proceeds from the carolling were divided at midnight
in Crispina's house and she went home. But just as soon as she arrived home, she ran into her
husband Francisco. He grabbed her by the collar of her dress and asked: "Where have you
been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch." she replied: "What is your business." Anyway you
have already left us. You have nothing to do with us" upon hearing these words Francisco
retorted, "What do you mean by saying I have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all, I will kill
you all" After that, Francisco grabbed her by the hair, slapped her on the face, and pushed her
to the ground. She clutched on to his waist to keep herself from falling, and while she did so, her
right hand grasped the knife tucked inside the left side of his body's belt line. Her husband then
knelt over her, choked her, and held her neck as she fell to the ground on her back. She pulled
out her husband's knife and stabbed it at him, hitting the left side of his body along the "belt line"
right above his left leg because she had "no other option" as she was being choked. Cunigunda
Boholst-Cabellero was found guilty of parricide after the trial of Francisco Caballero, who died
as a result of a stab wound.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellant stab her husband in the legitimate defense of her person
RULING
Yes. The Court found the location of the fatal wound as a valuable circumstance which confirms
the plea of self-defense. Also, there is lack of motive of appellant in attacking and killing her
husband because there is no record of any event which occurred immediately prior to January 2
which could have pushed her to plan and carry out the killing of her husband.
Moreover, in this case, all of the elements of self-defense are present. In the facts, the element
of unlawful aggression has been clearly shown. The second element, which is the
reasonable necessity of the means used, is also present. Here there is a woman who, after
being strangled and choked by a vengeful aggressor and being got nearly unconscious by the
strong pressure on her throat, had no choice but to grab any weapon she could to defend
herself. The lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself is the third
element of self-defense. Because appellant simply went carolling with a few acquaintances to
raise some money for their child, she did not provide sufficient provocation to warrant her
husband's anger or attack on her person.
CASE #2 PEOPLE V. SAMSON
G.R. No. 214883, September 02, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Vs.
CRISTINA SAMSON, Accused-Appellant
FACTS
The defense (Cristina) version stated that while she and her children were watching television,
Gerry arrived intoxicated. They were having arguments about something. Gerry fled, but
returned 30 minutes later with a knife in Cristina's neck. Gerry continued to point the knife at
Cristina, despite Cristina's pleas not to hurt her. Cristina was then slapped twice by Gerry.
Cristina pushed him and he fell to the ground while he was still holding the knife. She took the
knife which Gerry was holding and begged him not to come near her. When he suddenly
grabbed her and the knife came into touch with his chest, she was holding the knife near her
chest and pointed it at Gerry. According to the prosecution's version, as the fight between
Cristina and Gerry heated up, Cristina was able to grab the knife that had been placed on the
roof and stabbed the victim. The victim crawled to the door after falling to the ground.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in
favor of Cristina
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Cristina’s
husband as he grabbed her by the arm which could have precipitated her well-grounded belief
that her life was still in danger if he would be able to wrest the weapon from her. Also, it was a
reasonable means chosen by Cristina to stab her husband as his husband earlier pointed the
said knife to her throat, approached her and grabbed her arm, despite her plea that he refrain
from coming near her, and that she had no other available means or any less deadly weapon to
repel the threat other than the knife in her hand. Lastly, there was no sufficient provocation
when Cristina pushed her husband as she only save herself from what she had perceived to be
a danger to her life.
CASE #3 PEOPLE V. GENOSA
G.R. No. 135981 January 15,

2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
FACTS
Marivic, the appellant, said that she was worried that her husband, who was not home yet,
might have gone gambling because it was payday. The appellant proceeded to Isabel, Leyte,
with her cousin Ecel Arao to look for Ben at the market and bars, but he was not found. When
they arrived back at the Genosas' residence, they discovered Ben drunk. Then, Ben scolded
appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She then I nstead attend to their
children who were doing their homework, and disregarded him. Ben cut the television antenna
or wire with a chopping knife to stop her from watching television, apparently dissatisfied with
her reaction. Ben was about to attack her, so she ran to the bedroom, but he grabbed her hands
and turned her around, according to the appellant. Because she wanted him to leave, the
appellant packed his clothes. When Ben returned home and saw his packed clothing, he
allegedly became angry and took appellant out of the bedroom, dragging her by the neck to a
drawer and telling her, "You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me." Appellant stated
that she knew there was a gun in the drawer, but that because Ben didn't have the key, he took
his wallet to get a three-inch blade cutter. Her pipe, on the other hand, hit Ben's arm, causing
him to drop the blade and his wallet. As he was going to pick up the blade and his wallet,
Appellant 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe. After that, she rushed into the bedroom. The
appellant, on the other hand, claimed that she shot her husband to end his life. She allegedly
shot Ben after 'distorting' the drawer where the gun was kept.
ISSUE
Whether or not Marivic was suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome when he killed her
husband
RULING
Yes. Judge Ynares-Santiago believed that a ppellant was allowed and did in fact present clear
and convincing evidence that she was a battered woman for 13-14 years and that she suffered
from the "Battered Woman Syndrome". Expert testimony was presented and admitted to this
effect. Verily, the requirement of threatening behavioral pattern of the batterer in previous violent
episodes was sufficiently satisfied in the present case. This, juxtaposed to Marivic's affliction
with BWS justified the killing of the deceased. The facts are simple. Marivic was suffering from
the "Battered Woman Syndrome" and was defending herself when she killed her husband.
CASE #4 US V. RAMOS
G.R. No. L-7020 March 15, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DAMIAN SANTA ANA and DOROTEA RAMOS, defendants.
DOROTEA RAMOS, appellants.
FACTS
Dorotea Ramos, the appellant, admits to inflicting various wounds with a bolo on the
complaining party, Antonio Santos. Santos was made unable to perform his normal laboring
activities for a period of twelve days as a result of these wounds. The prosecution's witnesses,
including the complaining party, testified that on the night in question, Antonio Santos was
seated near a store when Dorotea Ramos approached him and said she wanted to talk with him
about some issues. Santos denied the request, claiming that Dorotea's husband might be
jealous of him and that he didn't want to be spotted talking with her late at night in the streets.
When he refused to comply with Dorotea's request, she approached him and drew a bolo from
beneath her clothing, concealing it, and inflicted the wounds.
On the other hand, the appellant and her witnesses testify that while she was walking from her
house to a certain store to make a small purchase, she was approached by Antonio Santos in a
dark, isolated area, and that Santos immediately grabbed her arm and began dragging her off
the street into an uninhabited area for the purpose of forcibly having illicit relations with her.
ISSUE
Whether or not Dorotea was entitled to an absolute acquittal upon the ground of self-defense
RULING
Yes. He grabbed her arm and dragged her away to a dark spot, but she objected strongly and
attempted to free herself using her own physical strength, but Santos persisted in his attempt.
The appellant then pulled out her bolo. She used it to defend her honor and to repel the violent
attack that had been initiated against her. The Supreme Court finds that, under the facts and
circumstances, the appellant was perfectly justified in using any weapon at her command that
was necessary to repel this attack, and in continuing to use it until she was able to release
herself from Santos' hands.
CASE #5 PEOPLE V. NARVAEZ
G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez together with the two deceased Davis
Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased
Davis Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by
George Fleischer. At the place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto
Narvaez. At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his
house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing
would go on, appellant would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his
ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and
if possible we will talk it over what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's
compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.'
Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As
Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep,
appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the
shotting.
ISSUE
Whether or not Narvaez was justified in defense of his property
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that there was aggression on the part of the victims but not on
the accused, but on his property rights. The assault on appellant's property, therefore, amounts
to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law. However, when the appellant fired his shotgun
from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack. But
the third element or lack of sufficient provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his
property was present. Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not
justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are present.
CASE #6 SOMBILON V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 177246, September 25, 2017
ANTONIO A. SOMBILON, Petitioner,
Vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondet
FACTS
When Nelson Andres was resting on his house's terrace, he spotted someone passing through
the gate. A gunshot startled him up right away, and he stood up to check what was happening
on. It was at that point that he noticed the person who had come through the gate and
recognized him as Antonio. He was forced to enter his house with his wife and daughter, shut
the door behind him, turn off the lights, and go upstairs because the latter was pointing a gun at
him. He peeked through the window of his upstairs room and saw the petitioner walking back
and forth in front of his house, yelling and shooting his gun from time to time.
That during night, the late SPO3 Gerardo Amerilla and others, such as Napoleon Martin, Jemuel
Agustin, Quennie Sacapao, and Edmund Escalante, were in Martin's house when they heard
three gunshots. Amerilla arrived in front of Andres' house right after leaving Martin's residence.
When Amerilla arrived at Andres' house, he asked the petitioner what his problem was, but the
latter fired immediately twice at Amerilla, causing him to fall face down to the ground. Amerilla
crawled up to Andres' house's gate to ask for help, but no one was able to reach him because
the petitioner stayed for almost 25 meters, preventing others from helping the victim.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was unlawful aggression by Amerilla
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner Antonio did not persuasively show that Amerilla
had committed unlawful aggression against him as to endanger his life and limb. The
petitioner's insistence that Amerilla had been the first to aim and fire his gun remained
uncorroborated, Verily, the claim of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was also weak
due mainly to the failure to recover the victim's alleged gun in the place where the shooting
happened during the ensuing investigation. More telling was the established fact that even
before Amerilla came around the petitioner had already been firing his gun in order to scare
Andres.
CASE #7 PEOPLE V. DULIN
G.R. No. 171284 June 29, 2015
vs.
ALFREDO DULIN Y NARAG, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
When Tamayao was walking down Tamayao Street, a young man came from Vicente Danao's
house to Batulan's house, shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had been stabbed. Tamayao
rushed to Danao's house, where he witnessed Dulin stab Batulan, who was already lying face
down on the floor. Dulin was kneeling with his left foot on the ground on top of Batulan. With his
left hand, Dulin was holding Batulan by the hair and thrusting the knife at him with his right. As
soon as he saw this, Tamayao hurried to Batulan's house to inform his aunt, Estelita Batulan,
about the incident.
ISSUE
Whether or not Dulin had acted in self-defense and there was unlawful aggression
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA that Batulan could no longer be considered
as unlawful aggressor. Appellant had nothing to repel. Therefore, appellant’s theory that he was
merely defending himself when he killed FRANCISCO is unavailing. There was no unlawful
aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin.
CASE #8 GOTIS V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 157201 September 14, 2007
NEMROD GOTIS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS
Serafin Gotis wasn't around when Nemrod Gotis and his brother, Nahom, arrived at Eddie
Bautista's coconut plantation. Carmen, Serafin's wife, and Nilda, his daughter, were also at the
plantation at the time. Carmen and Nilda were angrily confronted by petitioner and Nahom, who
were both armed with bolos, and asked them where Serafin was. After the petitioner and
Nahom had left, Carmen and Nilda went to Adolfo Malinao's house to wait for Serafin after
Nahom pointed his bolo at Nilda and shouted, "We will kill your father!" Carmen told Serafin
what had happened at the plantation and prevented him from going home when he arrived.
Carmen's warning, on the other hand, was ignored by Serafin, who insisted on returning home.
Serafin and his family had to pass past Nahom's house on their way home. Serafin called for
Nahom and requested him to come out when he arrived at his house's gate. When Nahom
heard Serafin's shouts, he immediately sought help from the petitioner. Serafin refused to go
when the petitioner came over and told him to go home. Instead, Serafin attempted to hack the
petitioner and tried to enter at Nahom's house's gate. After then, Nahom used a bolo to hit
Serafin on the head. Serafin ran away after being hit. The petitioner, on the other hand, pursued
him and continuously hit him in the back and arm.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was unlawful aggression on the part of the petitioner Nemrod
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed on the trial and appellate courts on correctly held that while
Serafin initially attacked petitioner with a bolo, the unlawful aggression already ceased when the
latter was able to go inside his brother’s house and the former ran away. At this point, there was
no longer any danger on his life; thus, there was also no necessity to "defend" himself by
pursuing and attacking Serafin.
CASE #9 PEOPLE V. MACARIOLA
G.R. No. L-40757 January 24, 1983

vs.
RICARTE MACARIOLA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Appellant Ricarte Macariola approached and attacked Romeo de la Pea No. 29820-P, an
inmate at the New Bilibid Prison, standing in his cell with a makeshift weapon called "matalas."
Fellow inmates Romeo Sato, Fernando Gomez, now deceased, a certain Alvarez, and Severino
Pingkian witnessed the stabbing incident while they were inside their cell at Brigade No. 2-D.
'Inay, Inay,' Romeo de la Pea said as he rushed to a kubol. The appellant, as well as inmates
Nelson Binas and a certain 'Bugok,' pursued him. Inside the 'kubol,' De la Peña fell to the
ground and lay lifeless. Nelson Binas and 'Bugok' thrusts followed by stabs from the
appellant. De la Peña died inside the 'kubol'.
After hearing the victim shout "papatayin ako, papatayin ako," Fernando Gomez, who has been
known as Brigade No. 2-D "Mayor" since 1970, entered the cell and witnessed the victim laying
on the floor, with the appellant bending over him with a blood-stained knife in his hand.
The accused Macariola, on the other hand, testified that he only stabbed the victim after he
kicked him in the left chest.
ISSUE
Whether or not the unlawful aggression comes from the deceased
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the act of kicking does not constitute such unlawful
aggression as would justify the killing of the victim. It was not of such a nature that posed actual
or imminent and real danger to the accused's life.
CASE #10 US V. GUY-SAYCO
G.R. No. L-4912 March 25, 1909

vs.
EMILIA GUY-SAYCO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Emilia Guy-sayco is aware of her husband, Gelasio Calupitain, and deceased Lorenza
Estrada's illicit relationship. Her spouse had been away from the house for more than two
weeks, remaining in the barrio of Dujat, so she went to see him there. She rented a carromata
after getting some clothes and other necessities, but she alighted and dismissed the vehicle
after paying before reaching the barrio and the camarin where her husband was supposed to
be. She disguised herself with her husband's clothes and a hat given to her by her friend for fear
of being attacked. Her suspicions were confirmed when she saw her husband's horse tied in
front of a house. She then proceeded to the front steps of the house, where she found her
husband seated. She entered the house right away and found her husband, the deceased, and
the house's owners eating dinner together. She went at Lorenza Estrada, blinded by jealousy,
attacking her with a penknife she was carrying and inflicting five wounds on her, causing
Lorenza to fall to the ground covered in blood and die a few moments later. The accused quickly
left the residence after the assault and went to Modesto Ramos', where she changed her
clothing.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused acted in proper self-defense
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ruled that it had been shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused attacked the victim with a penknife and inflicted wounds that caused Lorenza's death
immediately as soon as she entered the residence where she found him. Even if it were true
that when the accused, Emilia, arrived, the deceased Lorenza arose with a knife in her hand
and asked the accused, in a threatening manner, what had brought her there, such behavior
does not constitute unlawful aggression, which is, among other things, the first and most
important requisite for a self-defense exemption to be sustained. An attack or material
aggression, an aggressive act positively determining the aggressor's purpose to cause injury,
must have occurred in order to consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed. A
mere threatening or intimidating attitude is insufficient to justify the commission of an act and to
support a claim of exemption from liability on the basis of self-defense.
CASE #11 PEOPLE V. REY
G.R. No. 80089 April 13, 1989

vs.
SATURNINO REY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Rosette Pagayunan, a San Esteban Elementary School teacher, was ready to make dinner
when she noticed there was no water. As a result, Mrs. Pagayunan instructed her two children,
Babette and Nicolas, to obtain water from the accused Saturnino Rey's faucet. Because of the
long drought, Mr. Rey's faucet was said to be the only one with water in the area at the time.
Babette and Nicolas went to Mr. Rey's house to get some water. Babette and Nicolas saw the
accused's son, Roban Rey, near the faucet. Roban was seated atop the kitchen stairwell,
talking with Nicolas. Nicolas was shot twice by Saturnino Rey from his bedroom window, which
was around 4 meters away, while standing beside the faucet waiting for his bucket to be filled
with water. Roban Rey and Babette Pagayunan, who were around three meters away from the
faucet, witnessed the gunfire. Nicolas said to Roban after he was hit, "I was hit," and then fell in
front of Roban. Roban went over to their house and told Saturnino Rey, "Daddy, you hit Colas."
Babette returned home and informed her mother, who passed out. The Pagayunan sisters and
their group went to the location to recover Nicolas' body, which was transported to the Medicare
Hospital in Pilar, Capiz, where he was treated for minor injuries. Nicolas was then transported to
Roxas City, but he died before reaching the hospital.
ISSUE
Whether or not the defendant-appellant acted in self-defense because of unlawful aggression
RULING
No. In this case, the Supreme Court found that the defendant-appellant failed to fulfill his legal
burden of proving self-defense. Furthermore, even if the testimony of the defendant-appellant is
true, it does not establish a case of self-defense. There is no proof that the deceased acted in
an unlawful manner. The defendant-appellant only testified that he saw a person open his
bedroom window, and when he asked who the person was and received no response, he fired a
shot into the air, then fired a second shot when the person lifted his right arm chest high. In
order for unlawful aggression to be justified as self-defense, there must be an actual and
imminent threat of attack, not just a threatening or intimidating attitude. The raising of the right
arm chest high alone by an unarmed person cannot be considered unlawful aggression.
CASE #12 PEOPLE V. SABIO
G.R. No. L-23734 April 27, 1967

vs.
TEODORO SABIO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Teodoro Sabio was squatting in Central Manapla's plaza with a friend, Irving Jurilla. They were
approached by Romeo Bacobo, Ruben Miosa, and Leonardo Garcia. They were all old and
close friends. Romeo Bacobo then asked about Sabio's holy week activities. He gave Sabio a
"footkick greeting" at the same time, touching Sabio's foot with his own left foot. Sabio then
stepped up and punched Romeo Bacobo in the face, causing a lacerated wound to the upper lid
of his left eye. It took 11 to 12 days to heal, and Romeo Bacobo was unable to work during that
time.
ISSUE
Whether or not the act of appellant was an act of self-defense and/or justifying circumstance
entitling the accused to acquittal and relief from all liabilities
RULING
No. Unlawful aggression is a prerequisite for self-defense. And there must be a genuine danger
to life or personal safety for unlawful aggression to exist. As a reason, a mere push or shove
without any accompanying acts has been ruled insufficient to constitute unlawful aggression. A
playful kick as a greeting between friends may be a practical joke, and it may even hurt; but, it is
not a serious or serious danger to a person's safety. The Supreme Court ruled that the
appellant's claim that it amounts to unlawful aggression cannot therefore be sustained. As the
Court of First Instance correctly determined, the kick was simply a slight provocation.
CASE #13 MASIPEQUINA V. CA
G.R. No. L-51206 August 25, 1989
NORBERTO MASIPEQUINA and JOVENCIO ALAMPAYAN, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
Barangay Capt. Nicolas Potane and his father, Pedro Potane, have asked the Police Sub-
station Commander of San Isidro for help in apprehending Leopoldo Potane, Pedro's son and
Nicolas' older brother, who has been showing signs of recurring insanity.
The sub-station commander ordered patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan
to arrest Leopoldo. Following that, the two cops, accompanied by several others, went to Pedro
Potane's house, where Leopoldo was staying. Masipequina entered the sala and was going to
sit down on a rocking chair when Leopoldo suddenly emerged from an adjacent room and ran at
him swinging a bolo. Masipequina pushed the rocking chair towards Leopoldo. Masipequina
pushed Leopoldo into the rocking rocker. Masipequina was hit on the bridge of the nose by
Leopoldo. Masipequina took his revolver and fired three shots as the latter retracted, causing
him to lose his balance. Leopoldo continued to advance towards him. He swung the rocking
chair at Leopoldo and rushed shouting for help out the door. Leopoldo chased him down and
continued his pursuit of Masipequina. As Leopoldo poised to hack Pat. Masipequina, Pat
Alampayan shot Leopoldo once in the thigh with his gun. While being transported to the health
clinic for treatment, Leopoldo Potane died 30 minutes later.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Masipequina had acted in lawful self-defense
RULING
Yes. According to Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, to justify someone from
criminal liability, he/she should act in defense of his person or rights, provided the that there is
unlawful aggression; reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The Supreme Court ruled in this case that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased Leopoldo Potane, that the means used by Masipequina to prevent or repel Leopoldo
Potane's attack by using a revolver were reasonable, and that Masipequina lacked sufficient
provocation, all of which were supported and evident by the established facts. In determining
that the elements of self-defense had been proved, the Court additionally considers the wounds
inflicted on the deceased. The elements of self-defense had been established to exculpate
petitioners from the charge of homicide.
CASE #14 CANO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 155258 October 7, 2003

CONRADO CANO y SAMPANG, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS
Conrado, the petitioner, was on his way to City Hall, which is why he combed his hair, when the
victim, Orlando, appeared out of nowhere and grabbed petitioner by the shoulders, turning him
around and confronting him. Conrado was able to escape and lock himself inside the dark room
after Orlando attempted to stab him with a balisong. Orlando pursued Conrado and kicked and
stabbed the door with his balisong, attempting to force it open. The dark room's door
unexpectedly opened. Orlando charged at Conrado right away, but he was able to avoid the
attack. Conrado reacted by grabbing a pair of scissors nearby, but the scissors were blocked by
Orlando and fell from his fingers. Conrado then grabbed the hand of Orlando, who was holding
the balisong, and the two wrestled for possession. Orlando eventually regained control of the
knife, and as he stood for a little moment, he picked up the scissors and lunged at him once
more. With nowhere else to go, the petitioner was forced to defend himself against the victim's
onslaught, which was armed with a nine-inch pair of pointed scissors. The victim suddenly
collapsed and fell bloodied to the floor.
ISSUE
Whether or not Orlando’s wound inflicted by Conrado would negate self-defense
RULING
No. The record reveals that while indeed numerous wounds were sustained by the victim, the
Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy admitted that of the thirty-five (35) wounds
supposedly inflicted, thirty-three (33) were scratches and contusions while only six (6) were
penetrating or stab wounds. As regards the finding that petitioner suffered only one hand
wound, it should be stressed that the superficiality of the nature of the wounds inflicted on the
accused does not, per se, negate self-defense. Indeed, to prove self-defense, the actual
wounding of the person defending himself is not necessary. It is sufficient that the aggression be
attempted so as to give rise to the right to prevent it. The act of a person armed with a bladed
weapon pursuing another constitutes unlawful aggression because it signifies the pursuer’s
intent to commit an assault with this weapon.
CASE #15 PEOPLE V. OLARBE
G.R. No. 227421 July 23, 2018

vs.
RODOLFO OLARBE Y BALINHANGO, Accused Appellant.
FACTS
In their house, Olarbe and his wife Juliet were sleeping. The sound of a gunshot and shouting
from Arca, who appeared to be drunk, awakened them. "Mga putang ina ninyo, pagpapatayin
ko kayo," Arca shouted, brandishing a rifle (an airgun converted to.22 calibre). Arca then forcibly
entered their house and pointed the gun at them. Olarbe grabbed the rifle from him immediately,
and the two wrestled for it. He was able to take the rifle from Arca's grip. Olarbe shot Arca in a
flash, causing him to lean to the side. Despite this, Arca was able to remove his bolo from his
belt and continue attacking them. Olarbe grabbed the bolo, and in their struggle for it, they
reached the outer portion of the house. Olarbe was able to wrestle the bolo and hack
Arca immediately. Olarbe voluntarily surrendered to police authorities after the killing occurred.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was unlawful aggression on the part of Arca
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court find that Arca engaged in continuous and persistent unlawful violence
against Olarbe and his common-law spouse from the time he violently barged into the house
brandishing his gun until he assaulted Olarbe's common-law spouse with the bolo. The above
armed assault was not merely a threat. Olarbe was justified in believing that he and his
common-law spouse's life were in serious danger from Arca, who had recently fired his gun in
anger outside their home and whose threats to kill could not be ignored given his forced entry.
The impending threat to Olarbe's life was significant enough to prompt him to act quickly to
repel the unprovoked aggression. It would have cost Olarbe his life if he had hesitated to act as
he had. Arca's gun was taken away from him, but after being injured in the head, he quickly
grabbed for the bolo and redirected his assault on Olarbe's common-law spouse. Olarbe was
compelled to fight for control of the bolo once more. Olarbe's sense that the danger to their lives
was present and imminent
CASE #16 PEOPLE V. TAC-AN
G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990

vs.
RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.
FACTS
Renato Tac-an, then 18 years old, and Francis Ernest Escano III, then 15 years old, were
classmates in third year high school and also close friends because they were both members of
the Bronx gang. However, Francis withdrew from the gang, and Renato and Francis'
relationship deteriorated, and they quarrelled many times. Renato found Francis seated at his
scrapbook in his chair at Room 15. A fistfight would have occurred, but Mrs. Baluma
intervened, and the two exchanged handshakes instead. Renato snuck out of class and went
home to get a gun while the class was still going on. Renato came into the room, shut the door,
and shouted "Where is Francis?" with both hands raised, carrying a gun. When Renato saw
Francis seated behind, he fired at him but missed. As Francis was running towards the door, he
was shot for the fourth time. This time, Francis was hit on the head, and fell on Ruel's back,
knocking them both to the ground. Renato left the room, but when he discovered Francis was
still alive, he returned and closed the door behind him. Renato, who was standing above
Francis, who was face down on the floor, aimed at Francis' chest and fired once more. The
bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder and exited just above the right nipple on
his front chest.
According to Renato's statement, Francis approached him and they had a talk., 'You go home
get your firear’ Francis instructed Renato. ‘if you won't go home and get a gun, I will go to your
place and kill you including your parents, brothers and sisters.'
ISSUE
Whether or not Renato has acted in self-defense
RULING
No. Such statements, according to the Supreme Court, cannot be considered unlawful
aggression, which is the first and most essential requisite of self-defense. Such statements,
allegedly made in a high school classroom by an obviously unarmed Francis, could not
reasonably inspire Renato's "well-grounded and reasonable belief" that "he was in imminent
danger of death or bodily harm." Furthermore, as the Solicitor General pointed out, Francis was
evidently without a firearm or other weapon when Renato returned and burst into Room 15
demanding to know where Francis was and firing at him repeatedly, without the slightest regard
for the safety of his other classmates and of the teacher. There could be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, if there was no unlawful aggression, thus there is no need to
refer to the other elements of lawful self-defense.
CASE #17 PEOPLE V. REY
G.R. No. 80089 April 13, 1989

vs.
SATURNINO REY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Rosette Pagayunan, a San Esteban Elementary School teacher, was ready to make dinner
when she noticed there was no water. As a result, Mrs. Pagayunan instructed her two children,
Babette and Nicolas, to obtain water from the accused Saturnino Rey's faucet. Because of the
long drought, Mr. Rey's faucet was said to be the only one with water in the area at the time.
Babette and Nicolas went to Mr. Rey's house to get some water. Babette and Nicolas saw the
accused's son, Roban Rey, near the faucet. Roban was seated atop the kitchen stairwell,
talking with Nicolas. Nicolas was shot twice by Saturnino Rey from his bedroom window, which
was around 4 meters away, while standing beside the faucet waiting for his bucket to be filled
with water. Roban Rey and Babette Pagayunan, who were around three meters away from the
faucet, witnessed the gunfire. Nicolas said to Roban after he was hit, "I was hit," and then fell in
front of Roban. Roban went over to their house and told Saturnino Rey, "Daddy, you hit Colas."
Babette returned home and informed her mother, who passed out. The Pagayunan sisters and
their group went to the location to recover Nicolas' body, which was transported to the Medicare
Hospital in Pilar, Capiz, where he was treated for minor injuries. Nicolas was then transported to
Roxas City, but he died before reaching the hospital.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased
RULING
No. The Supreme Court found that in order for unlawful aggression to be justified in self-
defense, there must be a real and imminent threat of attack, not just a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude. The raising of the right arm chest high alone by an unarmed person cannot
be considered unlawful aggression. Absent unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased,
there cannot be self-defense on the part of the accused.
CASE #18 PEOPLE V. DURAN
G.R. No. 215748
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
PAUL DURAN, JR. y MIRABUENO, Accused-appellant
FACTS
Duran was on his way to Parañaque to buy fish when he was stopped by two people he didn't
recognize. One of the men, who turned out to be the victim, pointed a gun at him and stated
they only needed his money. Grimaldo was able to hold the victim's right hand, which was then
holding the gun, while attempting to get the money from his belt bag. Grimaldo then boxed his
nape with his left hand. Then they wrestled for around thirty seconds for possession of the gun.
Then he (Duran) was able to take Grimaldo's gun from him. He pulled the trigger of the gun and
hit Grimaldo as he stepped backward. He was afraid that the other guy would retaliate at the
time, which is why he was able to pull the trigger on the .38 caliber revolver gun.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was unlawful aggression on the part of Grimaldo
RULING
No. There was no unlawful aggression. Duran was unable to prove the presence of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, according to the Supreme Court, which agrees with the
RTC and CA. Even if Duran's claim of an attempted robbery against him is true, his evidence
also demonstrates that Grimaldo ceased being the aggressor once Duran wrested the weapon
from him. Duran then fired four shots at Grimaldo, three of which hit Grimaldo in vital areas of
his body. The accused's acts were already retaliatory and not self-defense at this point. Duran's
claim that he was acting in self-defense is contradicted by his own testimony. Grimaldo's
unlawful aggression ceased when he was disarmed and shot, as Duran admitted. This Court
further held that when an unlawful aggression has ceased to exist, the person who uses self-
defense has no right to kill or even injure the former aggressor.
CASE #19 PEOPLE V. LOPEZ
G.R. No. 232247 APRIL 23, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
RONILLO LOPEZ, JR. y MANTALABA @ "DODONG", Accused-Appellant
FACTS
Ronillo Lopez, Jr. was drinking with his father, Lopez, Sr., and cousins and uncles at an uncle's
house. He then proceeded to went home, drunk. He fell asleep as soon as he got home. He
then awoke to his drunken father, Lopez, Sr., beating him and shouting "BAKIT KA
NAGSUSUMBONG!" He responded that he had no idea what his father was accusing him of.
Lopez, Sr. then pleaded with his own son to fight back, but he refused. Lopez, Sr. then struck
his son in the head with a hard object. The accused, filled with rage and his judgment affected
by his father's blows ("Nagdilim po ang aking paningin at di nakapagpigil"), retaliated by
stabbing his father with a knife. He cried and sought help when he saw his injured father lying
down, first with Michael, who was renting the second floor of his house, then with his
grandmother, and last with his mother at her workplace.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ronillo acted in self-defense

RULING
No. The physical evidence in the present case tending to establish that Lopez, Sr. did not
commit unlawful aggression against said appellant contradicted Ronillo's claim of self-defense.
In view of the foregoing, this Court is convinced that Lopez, Sr. was not the unlawful aggressor
in any manner. The means used by Ronillo, the gravity and location of the stab wound, as well
as the abrasions, contusions, and hematoma sustained by Lopez, Sr., were all significant in the
Supreme Court's ruling, as they revealed his intent to kill, not merely to prevent or repel an
alleged attack from said victim. The nature and placement of the victim's wound reveal
appellant's determination to take the victim's life rather than just defend himself. Even if it were
assumed that Lopez, Sr. was the initial aggressor, the nature of the wound and the weapon
used established that Ronillo's actions were not reasonable or appropriate to the victim's
alleged unlawful aggression.
CASE #20 MIRANDA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 234528 January 23, 2019
ISIDRO MIRANDA y PARELASIO, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
FACTS
Miranda was at home with his wife and daughter when they heard a thud at their door, followed
by even more thuds and stones being thrown at their house. Pilo was throwing stones when he
peeked through the window. He claimed he heard Pilo challenge him to come out so they could
kill each other before peeping through the door. Miranda asked as to whether anything was
wrong, but Pilo ignored him and resumed throwing stones. According to Miranda, Pilo
approached him and throw a stone into his upper left face. Miranda hacked Pilo's arm with his
bolo as he bent his two arms downwards to pick something up from the ground, in order to
defend himself from Pilo's incoming attack. At this point, Damaso arrived and wrestled with
Miranda to get a grip of the latter's bolo. Damaso was injured as well as a result of this.
ISSUE
Whether or not Miranda merely acted in self-defense
RULING
No. When the aforementioned doctrines are applied to the facts of the case, it becomes clear
that the evidence does not support Miranda's claim that Pilo used unlawful aggression against
him. It's important to remember that Pilo was only throwing stones at Miranda's house, not at
him. Pilo even approached him, causing him to believe that Pilo was attempting to make
apologies. Miranda's life is clearly in danger. Miranda's life was not in great danger. The stones
were never directed against Miranda. Even assuming for the purpose of argument that Pilo
stooped down to the ground, which Miranda interpreted as a threat that Pilo was going to pick
up a stone, there is absolutely nothing life-threatening in such a situation. In the instant
situation, Miranda continued to hack Pilo even after the latter ceased throwing stones. Miranda's
action was clearly retaliation against Pilo, not self-defense.
CASE #21 PEOPLE V. BORDAJE
G.R.No. 238119 (Notice) April 3, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintijf-appellee,
vs.
JULITO RECEMIENTO BORDAJE, accused-appellant.
FACTS
Bordaje approached the victim while the latter was intoxicated, and then asked him a question.
After the victim answered, Bordaje suddenly pulled out his gun and then shot him. The attack
was thus sudden, unexpected, and consummated with the use of a firearm no less. Clearly,
treachery attended the attack.
ISSUE
Whether or not unlawful aggression was present
RULING
The Supreme Court agrees with the CA that the elements of self-defense were not sufficiently
established. In this case, the element of unlawful aggression was not successfully established
because Bordaje's claim that the victim was the aggressor was belied by evidence established
by the prosecution. As noted by both the RTC and the CA, the victim's gun and bolo were still
tucked in his waist when the police officers responded to the crime scene. This fact alone
negates Bordaje's claim that he was able to wrestle the victim's gun away from him, and that the
victim was running towards him with a bolo on his hand when Bordaje shot him.
CASE #22 PEOPLE V. INCIONG
G.R. No. 213383 June 22, 2015

vs.
ERNIE INCIONG y ORENSE, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
In a restaurant or carinderia located at Banay-Banay II, opposite the building of Metro Batangas
Concrete Mix Corporation, accused-appellant was having a drinking spree with a certain Bico
and Eman. After that, victim Jumar Lumbera crossed the street on his way to the carinderia and,
as he approached the opposite side, he was suddenly poked with an iron pipe, which turned out
to be a homemade firearm or sumpak, by accused-appellant. The accused-appellant then fired
the sumpak at Lumbera, striking him in the stomach and causing him to fall to the ground.
Unsatisfied, the accused-appellant approached the fallen Lumbera and struck him twice in the
head with the sumpak. After then, the accused-appellant quickly left. Lumbera died as a result
of the gunshot wound in his abdomen, as well as traumatic brain injuries, despite being taken to
the hospital right away for medical treatment.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was unlawful aggression from the victim
RULING
No. The requisite unlawful aggression from the victim, Lumbera, is noticeably absent in this
case. The evidence did not show that the accused-appellant's life was in danger when he met
Lumbera. Instead, as the CA correctly pointed out, it was accused-appellant who was the
aggressor, firing the sumpak at Lumbera when they crossed paths by the side of the road, then
hitting him twice in the head with the weapon after the latter had fallen to the ground. Since the
accused-appellant failed to meet his burden of showing unlawful violence, the Supreme Court
upholds the R TC and CA's findings that he did not act in self-defense.
G.R. No. 227421 July 23, 2018

vs.
FACTS
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a reasonable necessity to prevent or repel the aggression of Arca
RULING
Yes. The above armed assault was not merely a threat. Olarbe was right to believe that Arca
was putting his and his common-law spouse's lives in serious danger. The impending threat to
Olarbe's life was significant enough to force him to act quickly to repel the unlawful aggression.
It would have cost Olarbe his life if he had hesitated to act as he had. The courts should keep in
mind that a person who has been assaulted does not have the time or mental clarity to think,
calculate, or choose the weapon to be used. In such situations, human nature acts in obedience
to the instinct of self-preservation, rather than on processes of formal reason; and when it is
clear that a person has reasonably acted on this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to hold the
actor not liable in law for the consequences.
CASE #24 MARIANO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 224102 July 26, 2017
RYAN MARIANO Y GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
FACTS
Mariano went at Pamela's house and found Natividad and Yuki arguing over Yuki's refusal to
buy marijuana for Natividad. Natividad went mad, slapped Yuki, and kicked Pamela's daughter,
Pia Rivera. Mariano went inside to inform his mother-in-law and Pamela of Natividad's treatment
of Yuki and Pia. Natividad hit Pamela in the face and shoulder when Pamela confronted him.
Natividad was pushed to the ground by Mariano. Natividad got back up and grabbed a piece of
wood, which he used to continue striking Mariano. Mariano avoided Natividad's blows because
Natividad was drunk and staggering. Mariano stabbed Natividad in the buttocks with a knife.
Mariano stabbed Natividad again, this time on the right side of his body, as a result of his
continuous hitting.
ISSUE
Whether or not the means employed by Mariano were reasonable
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that, despite the fact that the offended party was drunk and thus
unable to land his blows, his attacks were persistent. He had already injured three other people,
including the two minors and the petitioner's common-law wife. While it may be true that
Pamela, Pia, and Yuki had already gone inside the house at the time of the stabbing, it then
appeared to the petitioner that there was no other reasonable means to protect his family except
to commit the acts alleged. The courts should not expect behavior that could only be discovered
in hindsight and without the stress created by the dangers that the petitioner actually
experienced.
G.R. No. 214883 September 02, 201

vs.
CRISTINA SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
On August 14, 2002, Cristina was charged with the crime of Parricide after killing his husband.
On the version of Defense (Cristina), she said that while her and her children are watching
television, drunk Gerry arrived. They had an argument about something. Gerry left but after 30
minutes, he returned and pointed a knife at Cristina’s neck. Cristina was begging not to hurt her
but Gerry continued to point the knife on Cristina. Gerry then slapped Cristina twice. While the
latter was still holding the knife, Cristina pushed him and he fell on the ground. She took the
knife which Gerry was holding and begged him not to come near her. She was holding the knife
near her chest pointed at Gerry when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the
knife went in contact with his chest. However, on the version of Prosecution, as the fight of
Cristina and Gerry escalated, Cristina was able to get hold of the knife which was placed on the
roof and stabbed the victim. The victim fell on the ground and crawled until he reached the door.
ISSUE
Whether or not the means to prevent or repel the aggression was reasonable
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the lone stab wound located on the victim's chest supports
the argument that Cristina feared for her life and this fear impelled her to defend it by stabbing
him. It was a reasonable means chosen by her since her stronger husband, who had earlier
pointed the said knife to her throat, approached her and grabbed her arm, despite her plea that
he refrain from coming near her; and that she had no other available means or any less deadly
weapon to repel the threat other than the knife in her hand. She did not have the time or
sufficient tranquillity of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used.
CASE #26 ZAPATOS V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 147814-15 September 16, 2003

RAUL ZAPATOS Y LEGASPI, Petitioner,
vs.
FACTS
Zapatos testified that he was the Team Leader of the DENR Sentro Striking Force, whose
primary duty is to seize illegally cut forest products. He was deployed at the DENR checkpoint
at Bayugan, Agusan del Sur's Barangay Maygatasan. He instructed Pacheco Tan, a coworker,
to man the checkpoint on January 14, 1990, at 7:00 p.m. because he was sleepy. He also told
Tan to wake him up if anything went wrong. A burst of bullets woke him up while he was asleep.
He noticed that gunshots were piercing the walls and hitting some of the guardhouse's contents.
He immediately knelt on the floor and grabbed the armalite rifle from the locker beneath his bed.
He fired at his assailants from behind a barricade. Fearing for his life, he then smashed the
guardhouse's flooring and crawled through the hollow area beneath it to reach the back door.
He continued walking until he arrived at Nilo Libres' house, where he spent the night. The next
day, he learned that Mayor Cortez had been assassinated. He immediately surrendered himself
and his armalite rifle to Sgt. Benjamin Amorio.
ISSUE
Whether or not the means employed by Zapatos were reasonable to defend himself
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court believe that petitioner's use of an armalite rifle to defend himself was
reasonable, given the number of aggressors, the nature and quality of their weapons, the
manner of the assault, and the fact that he was alone. Petitioner was justified in firing back at
them after being awakened by gunfire. His acts are in line with man's natural instinct to protect
himself from imminent danger. The Court cannot simply expect him to retreat or wait for the
bullet to strike him and kill him.
CASE #27 PEOPLE V. IGNACIO
G.R. No. L-40140 November 27, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANSELMO IGNACIO Y VELASCO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Jose Vizcarra was working at the Paco railroad station, unloading several fish boxes. One of the
two men that unloaded the boxes was Anselmo Ignacio, and one of the boxes fell on the ground
and was damaged. This angered Jose Vizcarra, who shouted some harsh epithets at the
accused. They got into a fight, but after Jose Vizcarra was hit in the face, they were separated.
Jose Vizcarra sent a messenger to his father, Felix Vizcarra, and uncles to inform them of the
situation. The three of them set out towards the Paco station as soon as they received the
message. Because of what transpired at the boxes, they hit Ignacio with their fists and sticks.
Believing his life to be in danger, he took out his knife and struck at his assailants until he was
able to free himself.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to
protect his life
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court is compelled to determine that the Vizcarras were the aggressors and
that the accused used his knife in self-defense after being attacked by the four Vizcarras and
being cornered with no way out and no other means of protection. Although the use of a knife to
repel an aggression after one has been assaulted by another with his fists is not permissible
under special circumstances, the Court is convinced that the accused's measures were
reasonably necessary to safeguard his life in this case.
CASE #28 VELASQUEZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 195021
NICOLAS VELASQUEZ and VICTOR VELASQUEZ, Petitioners

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
FACTS
Jesus and Ana Del Mundo left their home to sleep in their nearby nipa hut. The Del Mundo
Spouses arrived at the nipa hut to find Ampong and Nora Castillo having sex. Jesus Del Mundo,
outraged by what he saw as a defilement of his property, shouted invectives at Ampong and
Nora, who both flew away. Jesus made the decision to go after Ampong and Nora. Jesus went
to Ampong's aunt's house, but neither Ampong nor Nora were there. He started walking back
home when he was stopped by Ampong and his co-accused. Nicolas, without provocation,
struck the left side of Jesus' forehead with a stone. A stone was also thrown at Jesus' left
eyebrow by petitioner Victor. Accused Felix did the same. Sonny attacked Jesus with a bamboo,
then Ampong punched him in the left cheek. The accused then left Jesus bloodied on the
ground. Fearing that the accused might return, Jesus crawled and hid beneath grass blades. He
then stood up and walked back to their house.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to prove that justifying circumstances existed
RULING
No. Petitioners' claims of self-defense and defense of their relative, Mercedes, are found
inadequate by the Supreme Court. The entire defense of the petitioners rests on proving that
Jesus was the one who started the assault. Petitioners provided nothing more than a self-
serving, uncorroborated allegation that Jesus appeared out of nowhere and went mad in the
neighborhood of their homes, contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense
of a relative entails. They failed to provide independent and credible evidence to support their
claims. Even if it were assumed that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating he received
from petitioners and their co-accused was clearly in excess of what would have been required to
neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably necessary means to repel his supposed
aggression.
CASE #29 PEPITO V. CA
G.R. No. 119942 July 8, 1999
FELIPE E. PEPITO, SINONOR E. PEPITO, and SONNY E. PEPITO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
FACTS
Noe Sapa, who was drunk and armed with a bolo and "indian pana," caused trouble in the
neighborhood, causing Estrella to call the barangay captain, Godofredo Espino, who carried the
victim home. However, Noe Sapa returned half an hour later and challenged the accused's
family to a fight. He pursued Felipe, who was returning home from the beach at the time. Felipe
dashed towards their house. Sapa decided not to pursue any further. He came to a halt around
8 meters from Pepito's front door and then returned home. Sinonor, who was eating breakfast in
the kitchen, thought his father had been harmed. He grabbed a bolo and ran out of the home,
eventually catching up with Noe Sapa on the highway. Sapa used his "indian pana" and a bolo
to attack Sinonor in the right arm. Sinonor, on the other hand, was able to grip the victim's right
arm, which was holding the bolo, and stab him multiple times. Sapa attempted to flee, but
Sinonor chased him down until they arrived at the former's house. Sapa staggered into their
home, collapsed on the kitchen floor, and died. Felipe, Sonny, and Estrella met Sinonor as he
came out, his clothes, hands, and bolo all bloodied.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was lack of sufficient provocation on part of the accused
RULING
Yes. In this case, the acts of the victim of challenging the family of petitioners while armed with
a bolo and an "indian pana" and of chasing Felipe clearly constitute sufficient provocation on his
part. Several witnesses for the defense testified that Sinonor attacked the victim shortly after the
latter's provocation.
G.R. No. 214883 September 02, 201

vs.
CRISTINA SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
On August 14, 2002, Cristina was charged with the crime of Parricide after killing his husband.
On the version of Defense (Cristina), she said that while her and her children are watching
television, drunk Gerry arrived. They had an argument about something. Gerry left but after 30
minutes, he returned and pointed a knife at Cristina’s neck. Cristina was begging not to hurt her
but Gerry continued to point the knife on Cristina. Gerry then slapped Cristina twice. While the
latter was still holding the knife, Cristina pushed him and he fell on the ground. She took the
knife which Gerry was holding and begged him not to come near her. She was holding the knife
near her chest pointed at Gerry when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the
knife went in contact with his chest. However, on the version of Prosecution, as the fight of
Cristina and Gerry escalated, Cristina was able to get hold of the knife which was placed on the
roof and stabbed the victim. The victim fell on the ground and crawled until he reached the door.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was no provocation on the part of Cristina
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court found that it was not Cristina who provoked her husband when she
suddenly pushed him. Her shoving him cannot be considered a sufficient provocation
proportionate to the act of aggression. She merely capitalized on a window of opportunity, when
her husband removed the knife away from her throat, to save herself from what she had
perceived to be a danger to her life. Anybody, in her situation would have acted in the same
reasonable way.
CASE #31 U.S. V. PASCA
G.R. No. L-9247 October 15, 1914

vs.
GENARO PASCA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
The defendant and the deceased owned adjoining rice lands. Both were working on their
separate areas of land, and a feud had erupted between them after the accused discovered that
the deceased had constructed a portion of his fence on the accused's property. Defendant
asked the deceased why he had done so, and the deceased became angry and ran at the
accused, pushing him into the pool of water, and then attempting to push him even further into
the pool. The defendant claimed self-defense when he struck the victim on the right temple with
a piece of bamboo roughly 7 feet long and as thick as a man's arm.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was no sufficient provocation on part of the accused

RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused's question to the deceased about why he had
put a fence on his property does not constitute sufficient provocation on part of the accused.
The accused as the owner of the land had the right to demand an explanation from the
deceased.
CASE #32 PEOPLE V. VIERNES
G.R. No. 118091 October 3, 1996

vs.
WILFREDO VIERNES, JOEL SOSA, CORNELIO INCIANO, and ROMY PATULAY, accused-
appellants.
FACTS
Viernes went to Nanding Tomas' house to watch a betamax film. He was seated on one of the
benches near the door, but outside Nanding Tomas' house. Five (5) minutes later, a group of
people arrived to watch the film and sat behind Viernes. These people had a strong alcoholic
smell. Herminio Doniego, the person right behind Viernes, moved Viernes' head back so that
the latter could watch the movie. Viernes complied, but later returned his head to its original
position so that he could see the movie as well. Viernes heard Herminio's friend say "tiroemon"
(hit him) after Herminio pushed his head a second time. Herminio slit Vierne's back with a razor,
and Viernes responded by turning around and stabbing Herminio in the left breast. Viernes fled
after stabbing Herminio for fear of being attacked by Herminio's companions, Sony Doniego and
Dionisio Crisostomo.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was sufficient provocation on part of the accused

RULING
No. The Supreme Court believed that Viernes' act of covering the screen may be considered a
provocation, but that it was insufficient to provoke the deceased's particular act of aggression.
CASE #33 CARUNGCONG V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented

by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
FACTS
The above-named accused, Willian Sato, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused convinced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, who
was already blind and 79 years old at the time, signed and thumbmarked a special power of
attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favour of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the accused’s
daughter, leading her to believe that the document was only about her taxes, despite the fact
that the accused knew full well that the document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a
minor, to sell, assign, transfer, or otherwise dispose of her properties in Tagaytay. After
obtaining the special power of attorney and other necessary documents, the accused directed
Wendy Mitsuko Sato to sign three Deeds of Absolute Sale totaling $1,150,000. These special
powers of attorney were then used to enable the sale of four valuable pieces of land in
Tagaytay, with William receiving P22,034,000.00 in revenues. Despite repeated demands, he
failed to provide the funds, to the damage and prejudice of Manolita’s heirs.
ISSUE
Whether or not William and Manolita’s relationship by affinity was extinguished by the death of
William’s wife
RULING
No. The Supreme Court pronounced that the relationship by affinity between the surviving
spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased
spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced a children or not.
CASE #34 PEOPLE V. MANES
G.R. No. 122737 February 17, 1999

vs.
SERGON MANES and RAMIL MANES, accused-appellants.
FACTS
Alan Catequista went to watch a basketball game in the barangay plaza with Nicanor Tamorite
and Jose Cubita. After the game, Alan approached Nicanor Tamorite and asked him to return
home. Accused Ramil Manes approached Nicanor Tamorite and pointed a.38 caliber revolver at
him, saying, "It's a shame you didn't murder me during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan; now
I'll be the one to kill you." Nicanor Tamorite ran to Alan Catequista and used him as a shield
against Ramil. When Alan Catequista turned around, he heard a thud and saw accused Sergon
Manes holding a bloody knife, as well as Nicanor Tamorite leaving with blood on his back.
Nicanor Tamorite was pursued by Ramil Manes, who shot him in the back, just above the
waistline. Nicanor Tamorite, who was running towards Ading Ablado's residence, was pursued
by both accused.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ramil Manes acted in defense of relative
RULING
No. The Supreme Court convinced that the behavior of accused Ramil Manes after the
killing, further contradicts his claim of defense of relative. He would not be afraid to present
himself to the proper authorities if he acted in defense of his younger brother Sergon, who was
under attack at the time. Instead, he failed to update such a report. Persons who act in self-
defense of their person or rights generally surrender to authorities and report everything that
transpired in detail in order to justify their acts. They lose no time in going to the punong
barangay, the municipal mayor or the police and lay before them all the facts.
CASE #35 PEOPLE V. DANO
G.R. No. 117690 September 1, 2000

vs.
ALBERTO DANO y JUGILON, accused-appellant.
FACTS
Wilfredo Tapian was resting in the house of a Neneng Miras when Teresita Dano approached
him, asking for his help and informing him that her husband, Emeterio, had assaulted his
brother Alberto. Wilfredo noticed the victim pacing back and forth in appellant's front yard when
he arrived. The victim, with a scythe, yelled for the appellant, who was looking out the window,
to come down so they could fight to the death. Appellant was standing with his head out the
window when Emeterio lunged at him and slashed him with his scythe, but he missed. Wilfredo
and a certain Fernando Teves notified Demosthenes Peralta, Tiguian's barangay leader, that
the Dano brothers were arguing. Demosthenes investigated the appellant's home. He met
appellant on the way. Peralta was informed by the latter that he had killed Emeterio and that he
had voluntarily surrendered to him. Demosthenes went to the appellant's house and found the
bloodied body of the victim in the yard, which he saw had multiple hacking and stabbing
wounds. The appellant told the police that he killed his younger brother because he was drunk
and provoked him into a scythe duel, which prompted him to get his scythe and come down
from his house, where he allegedly boxed first his brother and then hacked several times
because he was already commanded by his evil thoughts.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellant acted in self-defense and/or defense of relative
RULING
No. The element of unlawful aggression is required to appreciate self-defense or the defense of
a relative, whether complete or incomplete. There is nothing to prevent or repel if there is no
unlawful aggression. To be considered unlawful aggression, there must be a sufficiently strong
act of real aggression, not just a mere threat or an intimidating attitude. As a result, the accused
who claims self-defense or defense of a relative must prove that the victim initiated an actual,
sudden, and unexpected attack or was in imminent danger of doing so. The appellant was able
to disarm his assailant before he was killed, according to the Supreme Court. When the victim
lost his weapon, there was no longer any actual danger to the appellant or his family's life or
safety. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no complete or incomplete self-defense or
defense of a relative, and the appellant must be found guilty.
CASE #36 PEOPLE V. BARRAMEDA
G.R. No. 130177 October 11, 2000

vs.
JOAQUIN BARRAMEDA and ADOLFO BELGA, accused-appellants.
FACTS
Romeo Barsaga, who was at the barangay hall for the barangay fiesta at 7:00 p.m. on June 9,
1996, testified that he left for Edelina Burce's residence at 9:00 p.m. that same evening. He
overheard a woman screaming on the way. He rushed in the direction of the screams and
witnessed the two accused simultaneously hacking Ruperto Dizon from a distance of around 5
meters. The victim was unarmed. The first to hack Ruperto with a bolo was Joaquin, who was
standing in front of him. Ruperto was also attacked with a bolo by Adolfo, who was chasing him
from behind. The victim was knocked out by the two accused's continuous hacking.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellant has acted in defense of relative
RULING
No. The appellant's claim of defense of relative was dismissed by the Supreme Court because
he failed to provide sufficient evidence of the deceased's positively strong act of real
aggression. Except for his self-serving and uncorroborated claims, there is no evidence that his
killing of Ruperto was justified. He even failed to produce his wife to support his accusation that
the deceased sexually assaulted her. As a result, a relative's plea of defense cannot be justified
when it is not only uncorroborated by any other competent evidence but also extremely doubtful
in itself.
G.R. No. 227421 July 23, 2018

vs.
FACTS
ISSUE
Whether or not Olarbe was induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive to do such
thing at Arca
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Olarbe was justified in believing that he and his common-law
spouse's life were in serious danger from Arca, who had just fired a gun in anger outside their
house and whose threats to kill could not be ignored since he had forced his way into their
house. The impending threat to Olarbe's life was significant enough to prompt him to act quickly
to repel the unprovoked aggression. The absence of any evidence that Olarbe provoked Arca,
or that he was motivated by revenge, resentment, or any other evil motive, has been equally
noteworthy. The Supreme Court believes that the third element of the justifying circumstances
of self-defense and defense of stranger were present.
CASE #38 MARIANO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 224102 July 26, 2017
RYAN MARIANO Y GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
FACTS
Mariano went at Pamela's house and found Natividad and Yuki arguing over Yuki's refusal to
buy marijuana for Natividad. Natividad went mad, slapped Yuki, and kicked Pamela's daughter,
Pia Rivera. Mariano went inside to inform his mother-in-law and Pamela of Natividad's treatment
of Yuki and Pia. Natividad hit Pamela in the face and shoulder when Pamela confronted him.
Natividad was pushed to the ground by Mariano. Natividad got back up and grabbed a piece of
wood, which he used to continue striking Mariano. Mariano avoided Natividad's blows because
Natividad was drunk and staggering. Mariano stabbed Natividad in the buttocks with a knife.
Mariano stabbed Natividad again, this time on the right side of his body, as a result of his
continuous hitting.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mariano was induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ruled that, despite the fact that the offended party was drunk and thus
unable to land his blows, his attacks were persistent. He had already injured three other people,
including the two minors and the petitioner's common-law wife. While it may be true that
Pamela, Pia, and Yuki had already gone inside the house at the time of the stabbing, it then
appeared to the petitioner that there was no other reasonable means to protect his family except
to commit the acts alleged. The courts should not expect behavior that could only be discovered
in hindsight and without the stress created by the dangers that the petitioner actually
experienced. Finally, the petitioner was not motivated by revenge, resentment, or any other evil
intent. In this case, all of the elements for invoking the justifying circumstance of stranger
defense were present.
CASE #39 PEOPLE V. AYAYA
G.R. No. L-29396 November 9, 1928

vs.
PRAXEDES AYAYA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Praxedes Ayaya, her husband Benito de la Cruz, and her son Emilio drank tuba in Felicidad
Losloso's store before going to the cinema. Her husband, who was drunk, threw punches at her
without warning as they returning home. Her husband went home first, followed by her and her
son, and when they arrived, the door was locked. Her son and her attempted to open the door,
but her husband, who was inside, prevented it. Then, when the door gave way a little and her
son Emilio managed to insert put his head between the opening of the door and the wall, she
pushed it open and hit her husband with the umbrella she was carrying. When she and her son
finally gained entry to the house, they discovered Benito already in bed, suffering from a head
wound.
ISSUE
Whether or not Praxedes has intention to kill her husband
RULING
No. The Supreme Court found that the Praxedes' act of putting her umbrella into the opening of
the door to save her son from the imminent danger of having his head crushed or strangled; and
if she thus caused her husband's injuries, it was by accident, without any guilt or purpose to
inflict it
CASE #40 PEOPLE V. RETUBADO
G.R. No. 124058 December 10, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JESUS G. RETUBADO alias "JESSIE," appellant.
FACTS
After a day's work, 50-year-old Emmanuel Caon, Sr., a pedicab driver, called it a day and went
home. The appellant, Retubado, who was talking with Marcial Lucio, noticed him. "Noy, why is it
your son did something to my brother?" Emmanuel ignored the appellant. The appellant
became angry and pursued Emmanuel. He caught up to Emmanuel, grabbed the pedicab, and
pushed it into a canal. Emmanuel rode on, ignoring the appellant once more, till he arrived at his
house. Norberta Caon, his wife, was waiting for him on the balcony of their home, which was
located over the porch. Meanwhile, Emmanuel, Jr. was already asleep. Despite this, the
appellant continued to pursue Emmanuel. Emmanuel burst through the door, demanding to
know why he was being followed. The appellant told Emmanuel that he just wanted to speak
with Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told him that his son had already fallen asleep. The
appellant immediately took a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel in the
forehead. As the appellant walked away from the scene, the latter fell on the ground.
ISSUE
Whether or not the death of Emmanuel was caused by mere accident without fault or intention
of causing it by Retubado
RULING
No. The Supreme Court has carefully reviewed the records and sees no reason to contrast the
trial court's findings that the appellant was the provocateur, unlawful aggressor, and author of a
deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim in the forehead at close range, and that the
appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.
CASE #41 MASIPEQUINA V. CA
G.R. No. L-51206 August 25, 1989
NORBERTO MASIPEQUINA and JOVENCIO ALAMPAYAN, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
FACTS
Barangay Capt. Nicolas Potane and his father, Pedro Potane, have asked the Police Sub-
station Commander of San Isidro for help in apprehending Leopoldo Potane, Pedro's son and
Nicolas' older brother, who has been showing signs of recurring insanity.
The sub-station commander ordered patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan
to arrest Leopoldo. Following that, the two cops, accompanied by several others, went to Pedro
Potane's house, where Leopoldo was staying. Masipequina entered the sala and was going to
sit down on a rocking chair when Leopoldo suddenly emerged from an adjacent room and ran at
him swinging a bolo. Masipequina pushed the rocking chair towards Leopoldo. Masipequina
pushed Leopoldo into the rocking rocker. Masipequina was hit on the bridge of the nose by
Leopoldo. Masipequina took his revolver and fired three shots as the latter retracted, causing
him to lose his balance. Leopoldo continued to advance towards him. He swung the rocking
chair at Leopoldo and rushed shouting for help out the door. Leopoldo chased him down and
continued his pursuit of Masipequina. As Leopoldo poised to hack Pat. Masipequina, Pat
Alampayan shot Leopoldo once in the thigh with his gun. While being transported to the health
clinic for treatment, Leopoldo Potane died 30 minutes later.
ISSUE
Whether or not Masipequina and Alampayan acted in fulfilment of their duty
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased
Leopoldo Potane, that there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by Masipequina
to prevent or repel Leopoldo Potane's attack by using a revolver and Alampayan in trying to
prevent Leopoldo Potane from further attacking Masipequina with a bolo, and there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of Masipequina, which was all supported and evident from the
established facts, and that Alampayan was not motivated by any evil motive is shown by the fact
that he, together with Masipequina, only proceeded to the place where the incident happened to
look for Leopoldo Potane because they had been ordered by their substation commander to
apprehend Leopoldo Potane. In short, the two patrolmen were fulfilling their lawful duties.
CASE #42 CABANLIG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148431 July 28, 2005
SPO2 RUPERTO CABANLIG, Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
FACTS
Cabanlig, Padilla, Mercado, Abesamis, and Esteban, five fully armed police officers in uniform,
escorted Valino to Barangay Sinasahan, Nueva Ecija, to recover the missing flower vase and
radio. Cabanlig, Mercado, and Esteban were seated inside the jeep's main body alongside
Valino. Valino was positioned at Cabanlig's left and Mercado's right, not handcuffed. Valino
snatched Mercado's M16 Armalite and leapt out of the jeep just after crossing the Philippine
National Railway bridge and while the jeep was slowly navigating a bumpy and potholed road.
Cabanlig, who was facing the back of the truck at the time, witnessed Valino taking the M16
Armalite. Cabanlig took action right away. Cabanlig fired one shot at Valino without warning and
with one foot still on the running board, and then fired four more shots in quick sequence after
two to three seconds. Valino did not fire a single bullet.
ISSUE
Whether or not Cabanlig acted in fulfilment of his duty
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court find that Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado, and Esteban, were
performing their duties as police officers when they escorted Valino, an arrested robber, to
retrieve some stolen items. When Cabanlig shot Valino, he was undoubtedly acting in the
course of his official duties. If the use of force was absolutely necessary to prevent Valino's
escape, the policemen would have been justified in shooting him. Valino had put the lives of the
police officers in serious danger by snatching Mercado's M16 Armalite, a formidable firearm.
The policemen would have been sitting ducks if Cabanlig had not shot Valino right away. In the
presence of impending danger, the officers had no choice but to act quickly. Cabanlig is thus not
guilty of homicide.
CASE #43 PEOPLE V. DELIMA
G.R. No. L-18660 December 22, 1922

vs.
FELIPE DELIMA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the prison where he was being held for a crime he had
committed. After a few days, Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him at Jorge
Alegria's house, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded
his surrender. With a stroke of his lance, the fugitive responded. The policeman swerved and
fired his revolver to show his authority, but the bullet missed him. The criminal fled without
surrendering his weapon. This peace officer pursued him and shot another bullet from his
revolver, killing him.
ISSUE
Whether or not Delima acted in fulfilment of his duty
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court acquitted the policeman on the ground that the killing was done in the
fulfillment of duty. It may appear that a public officer acting in the course of his duty is the
aggressor, but his aggression is legal because it is necessary to carry out his duties. The
deceased was ordered to surrender and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to
commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in his hand, which prompted the police officer
to use such a drastic measure, which, although fatal, was justified by the circumstances
CASE #44 FRIAS V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-65762 June 23, 1984
JOSE FRIAS, JR. and GERVACIO TACAS, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents-appellees.
FACTS
Tacas was awakened by the sound of gunfire and cries for help from a neighbor. He stood up,
looked out the window, and saw Pajela bleeding on top of a table about to be carried to his
house. He grabbed his armalite rifle and went down in his brief and undershirt, went out of the
house, saw Bartolome Arellano with a shotgun leaving Pajela's yard, went after him, fired
warning shots and asked him to surrender. When Arellano refused to surrender but attempted
to avoid arrest by pointing his gun at Tacas, Tacas had no choice but to defend himself.
ISSUE
Whether or not the killing was justified by fulfilment of duty

RULING
Yes. It was Tacas' duty to apprehend B. Arellano and, in order to prevent him from fleeing, the
lawman and the suspect would have to encounter each other sooner or later. When Tacas and
B. Arellano met for the first time, it was a crucial moment. When Arellano and his partner, both
armed, faced each other, they had to choose between putting their guns down or firing. They
both decided to fire each other, and B. Arellano was killed, but Tacas managed to survived. It's
hard to argue that Tacas should have fired at all in these circumstances. His judgment cannot
be questioned because his life was in danger. The Supreme Court agreed at the Solicitor
General that Tacas acted in fulfilment of duty and in the legitimate exercise of his authority.
CASE #45 PEOPLE V. MARGEN
G.R. No. L-2681 March 30, 1950

vs.
DARIO MARGEN, ET AL., defendants.
ANDRES MIDORANDA, appellant.
FACTS
Diego Testor was asked by one Ponting in the barrio of Trinidad. The detachment consisted of
seven or eight men, led by Dario Margen. Testor traded the fish for camote when he needed
food for his children, and when he was sent to the barracks, he was given a quantity of kalapion
by Sergeant Margen. Sergeant Margen, angered by Testor's behavior, grabbed the fish and
threw them in his face, then tied Testor's hand behind his back and gave him fish blows. Three
men, Julian Tarrayo, Domingo Ramos, and Andres Midoranda, followed the sergeant's lead and
maltreated Testor by beating him in different parts of the body. Following that, Sergeant Margen
made Testor eat up to two kalapions. The sergeant and Miranda, who had the other end of the
rope with which Testor's hands were tied, both forced Testor's mouth open. After this incident,
Testor was transferred to Calbayog, where he died the next day despite medical treatment. The
cadaver had multiple contusions, but an autopsy revealed that death was caused by fish bones
in the intestines.
ISSUE
Whether or not Midoranda is justified by obedience to an order of his superior, Sgt. Margen
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Sergeant did not have the authority to take the law into
his own hands and subject the offender to inhuman punishment. The order was illegal, and
appellant was not obligated to follow it. Furthermore, it does not seem that appellant's
participation in the decease's maltreatment was motivated only by a sense of obligation to his
supervisor.
CASE #46 PEOPLE V. SO
G.R. No. 104664 August 28, 1995

vs.
ELYBOY SO Y ORBES, accused-appellant.
FACTS
In Quiapo, Elyboy So met his lady friend Teresita Domingo in a jeep. Teresita requested Elyboy
to bring her home since Elyboy's house is within walking distance of hers. They passed past the
house of Elyboy's first cousin, Esteban, Edgar, and Emy, all with the surname So, on their way
to Teresita's house. When they passed by his cousins' house, he noticed that there was a
drinking spree going on in front of it. Elyboy went to his cousins' house right after taking Teresita
to hers to honor their invitation. Edgar persuaded him to drink a little and remain a bit longer so
he could meet Mario Tuquero, his future brother-in-law, who would arrive later with his sister
Emy. Edgar asked Elyboy and Ronnie to watch the dance on the playground before Emy and
Mario arrived. Emy welcomed Elyboy into the house and introduced him to her boyfriend Mario.
Esteban, Edgar, Elyboy, Ronnie, Mario, and Emy continued their drinking rampage. Emy went
inside before 3 a.m. because she was sleepy. The commotion from the gathering outside their
house startled Emy awake while she was asleep. Elyboy had a misunderstanding and an
altercation with someone, and he was shouting loudly as a result. Mario suggested Elyboy to
returngo home after calming the protagonists because his loud voice was disturbing the
neighbors. Elyboy rushed home after being appeased and instructed to do so. While Mario and
Emy waiting for a cab to take them to Fairview Subdivision so they could collect the papers for a
vehicle Mario owned, Elyboy appeared from behind and stabbed Mario several times in the
back with an eleven-inch fan knife. Mario slid and fell on the ground on his back as he was
about to run. Elyboy took advantage of the situation and stabbed Mario in the front of the body
several times. Emy pleaded with Elyboy to stop stabbing Mario, but he ignored her and
proceeded to attack Mario with stabbing strikes.
ISSUE
Whether or not Elyboy acted in exempting circumstance of insanity when he stabbed the victim
RULING
No. Dr. Galvez admitted that appellant was doing well and free of psychosis following his last
check-up in 1985, or six (6) years before the crime was committed. This is attributed to insanity
by appellant, but we are not convinced. A man's behavior may indicate that he is insane, but it
does not prove that he is legally insane. The Supreme Court concluded in this case that the
defense failed to present sufficient evidence to disprove the presumption of sanity. The State,
thus, maintains its vigilance against sane murderers who want to avoid punishment by claiming
insanity.
CASE #47 PEOPLE V. DUNGO
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991

vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
FACTS
The prosecution has shown through various witnesses that on March 16, 1987, between 2:00
and 3:00 p.m., a male person identified as the accused, Rosalino Dungo, went to the location
where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform in Apalit, Pampanga.
After a brief conversation, the accused pulled a knife from his pocket and stabbed Mrs. Sigua
several times. He went down the stairwell out of the DAR's office with blood stained clothes and
a bloodied bladed weapon.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the offense
RULING
No. If the Supreme Court are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was
supposed to be mentally ill during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane
person to confront a specified person who may have wronged him. Despite the fact that the
accused was supposed to have memory loss, the Court presumes from this confrontation that
the accused was aware of his actions. This event proves that the accused was not insane, or
that if he was, he had lucid intervals during his insanity. The burden of proving that the
defendant committed the crime charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently has not been met by
the appellant.
CASE #48 PEOPLE V. NUNEZ
G.R. No. 112429-30 July 23, 1997

vs.
MICHAEL NUÑEZ y SEVILLA, accused.
RODOLFO CAYETANO y PANGILINAN, accused-appellant.
FACTS
Accused Nuez convinced the victim, Joseph Rivera, to join him under the idea of turning over
the proceeds of a gun purchase to the latter's father. He was also able to persuade Joseph
Rivera to bring Neil Patrick Quillosa along under the idea that Neil would accompany Joseph
home later. The two boys were taken to a nipa hut in the middle of a fishpond to await a man
named "Ka Tony." When they tried to return home, they were told to return because "Ka Tony"
was on his way. Accused Nuez warned them that until they were blindfolded and tied, "Ka Tony"
would not enter the hut. They objected, but accused Nuez promised them that they would not be
harmed. Wire and rope were used to tie the victims' hands and feet. After that, accused Nuez
played a tape on which he demanded three million pesos from Rivera's parents in five hundred
and one thousand peso bills in exchange for his release.
The accused and accused-appellant then took the victims to the river. While accused-appellant
stood guard over Rivera, accused Nuez dragged Neil by the neck to the middle of the river and
left him to drown. Rivera escaped and went to the residence of accused Nuez, where he
contacted his grandmother, while accused-appellant was busy cutting grass near the river. After
that, his grandma fetched him, and he and his father went to the Malabon Police Station to
report the kidnapping.
ISSUE
Whether or not Nuñez was in state of imbecility that exempts him from any criminal liability
RULING
No. The defense counsel's claim of imbecility is not supported by evidence, according to the
Supreme Court. The act of accused-appellant cutting grass rather than guarding his victim could
possibly be signs of imbecility. Rather, it could be considered negligence, but not childishness
or the behavior of someone who is completely deprived of reason, judgment, or willpower. On
cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that he can distinguish what is right and
what is wrong. Assuming that the accused-appellant is an imbecile or a feebleminded individual,
it was held in People v. Formigones that feeblemindedness is not an exempting factor because
the criminal was capable of distinguishing right from wrong. An imbecile or an insane cannot.
CASE #49 PEOPLE V. TANEO
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933

vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Potenciano Tadeo and his wife live at his parents' house in the Dolores barrio. A fiesta was held
in the mentioned barrio on January 16, 1932, and people were entertained in the house. Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao were among them. Potenciano Taneo went to sleep early that
afternoon, and while asleep, he awoke, left the room with a bolo in hand, and when he met his
wife, who tried to stop him, he stabbed her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao, then attempted to attack his father, injuring himself. Potenciano's wife,
who was seven months pregnant at the time, died five days later from her wound, as did the
foetus who had died of asphyxia in the mother's womb.
ISSUE
Whether or not the defendant be not criminally liable as he commits a crime while dreaming
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant acted while in a dream and his actswere
not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability. The Court also find not only a lack of
motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not
committing said acts. Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, stated that considering the
circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an
hallucination and not in his right mind.
CASE #50 PEOPLE V. GIMENA
G.R. No. L-33877 February 6, 1931

vs.
JUAN N. GIMENA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Juan Gimena, the defendant, assisted Gregorio Diana, his father-in-law, in cleaning bamboo.
He returned home after finishing the cleaning and discovered his wife Crispina Diana and a two-
week-old child sleeping on the floor together. Gregorio Diana then heard his daughter, the
defendant's wife, beg for help. He went to the defendant's house, which was near to his own,
and discovered the defendant with a bolo attacking Crispina. Gregorio succeeded in disarming
the defendant and tied him to a house post with the help of Teodulo Gimena, the defendant's
brother.
ISSUE
Whether or not Juan acted in a state of somnambulism when he attacked his wife
RULING
No. The Supreme Court were not convinced to think that this theory can serve as a defense in
the present case. By order of the trial court the defendant was placed under observation for
some time by Dr. Luis B. Gomez, but the doctor apparently did not discover any somnambulism
on the part of the defendant. A defense of that character must be proven and such proof is
lacking in this case.
CASE #51 PEOPLE V. LACENA
G.R No. L-46961 January 15, 1940

vs.
ANASTACIA LACENA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Marciano Dante awoke with a surprise after his wife Anastacia, the defendant appellant,
stabbed him in the abdomen with a pair of scissors and told him: "Patay ka ngayon" (You are
going to die now). The wound caused the injured party to develop acute peritonitis, which led to
his death.
ISSUE
Whether or not the defendant cannot be criminally liable as she was delirious and has high fever
RULING
Yes. It has been proven that, on the day of the event, attacked by a high fever, the appellant
was delirious and attacked any of those who lived with her in the house. The Supreme Court
finds that the circumstances in which the appellant struck and scissored her husband reveal that
she performed such an act at a time when she was suffering from insanity as a result of her
illness, and therefore, in accordance with the provisions of article 12, paragraph 1. of the
Revised Penal Code, has not incurred criminal responsibility.
CASE #52 PEOPLE V. MANCAO
G.R. No. L-26361 January 20, 1927

vs.
CRISPINO MANCAO and CIRIACO AGUILAR, defendants-appellants.
FACTS
Crispino Mancao approached Graciana Sedimo, Roberto Villela's tenant, with three men and
several women, and asked if there was still corn to be harvested and split between her and
Roberto Villela as per the agreement. Crispino Mancao, the accused, instructed his companions
to begin harvesting the corn. Graciana Sedimo gave her nephew Baldomero Villela the task of
informing Roberto Villela about the situation. When Roberto Villela arrived at the corn field, he
asked the harvesters as to who had instructed them to harvest the corn. Crispino Mancao, who
was standing in the cornfield, said that he was the one who had instructed them to do so, and
he began walking towards Roberto Villela. The latter then asked if the former had received a
court order to harvest the goods. "This is the order," Crispino Mancao said as he struck him with
a bamboo stick. Roberto Villela evaded the blow and snatched the cane. Crispino Mancao, who
had lost his bamboo stick, took up his bolo and attempted to strike Roberto Villela, who repelled
him with a stick he had in his hand. Crispino Mancao continued to strike out at Roberto Villela,
inflicting minor injuries. When he was attacked, Roberto Villela rushed at Crispino Mancao, and
they got into a hand-to-hand combat in which they both fell down and the former was able to
disarm the latter. Crispino Mancao sustained a wound on his right hand and another on his right
leg, and seeing that he was getting the worst of it, he called for help. A man dressed in
khaki emerged on the scene and struck Roberto Villela in the thigh, putting him to his knees.
While in this position, a man in an undershirt approached and struck him twice on the thigh
before leaving. Crispino Mancao then grabbed Roberto Villela's hands, and while he was being
held, the accused Ciriaco Aguilar struck him in the back with his sickle, knocking Roberto Villela
unconscious.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mancao be criminally liable as he committed a crime due to epilepsy
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court found that neither can the defense of lack of free will of the accused
Ciriaco Aguilar, who is an epileptic, be sustained. While Ciriaco Aguilar, as an epileptic, was
susceptible to nervous attacks that may momentarily deprive him of his mental faculties and
lead him to unconsciously attempt to take his own life and the lives of others, nevertheless, it
has not been shown that he was under the influence of an epileptic fit before, during, and
immediately after the aggression.
CASE #53 TALAMPAS V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 180219 November 23, 2011
VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC, Petitioner,

vs.
FACTS
Jose Sevillo testified that he was repairing his tricycle in front of his house with Eduardo Matic
and Ernesto Matic when Virgilio Talampas, who was riding a bicycle, passed by and stopped.
Talampas then get down from the vehicle, took a few steps back, and pulled out a revolver,
which he poked at Eduardo and fired, hitting Eduardo, who had taken cover behind Ernesto.
The appellant fired his gun three (3) more times, one of which hit Ernesto in the right side of his
back, causing him to fall to the ground face down. Another bullet hit Eduardo in the nape of his
neck, knocking him to the ground.
ISSUE
Whether or not the death of Ernesto was accidental death
RULING
No. The Supreme Court finds that the records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas
brandished and poked his revolver at Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed
to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At that point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit
Ernesto at the right portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall face down to the ground.
Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape, causing Eduardo to fall on his back. Certainly, Talampas’
acts were by no means lawful, being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo
and Ernesto.
CASE #54
CASE #55
G.R. No. 105002 July 17, 1997

vs.
DIARANGAN DANSAL, accused-appellant.
FACTS
Panda Antalo testified that he and Timal Mosa were walking across a road on their way to see
Mayor Asis on March 2, 1990. They saw the victim, Abubakar Alamat, talking with five (5)
people, one of which being the appellant. Antalo, on the other hand, did not recognize
appellant's companions. He and Mosa heard gunshots when they were five (5) meters away
from the group. He turned around and saw smoke coming out from the appellant's rifle, as well
as empty ammunition falling from it. The appellant and his accomplices were pointing their
Garand guns at the victim, who was laying face up on the ground. Seven (7) shots were fired.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellant was under a compulsion of an irresistable force
RULING
No. A person who invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible force
must prove his defense by clear and convincing evidence. He must show that the irresistible
force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his
will. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the accused no opportunity to
defend himself or to escape. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent
and impending. A threat of future injury is not enough. In this case, the Supreme Court find the
appellant failed to show such compulsion. The appellant failed to prove that the Dorados made
a real and imminent threat on his life or climb sufficient to overcome his free will. Indeed, the
Court finds no acceptable basis for appellant's assertion that he was compelled and intimidated
by the Dorados.
CASE #56
CASE #57
G.R. No. 196005 October 1, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR PIMENTEL, Appellants.
FACTS
JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa, JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. and JO2 Marlon Niturada were inside the nipa
hut searching area near the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned inmate
Dionisio Badua. JO2 Gamboa gave Badua the keys to the prison cells and instructed the latter
to open all the cells for the routine headcount. While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were conversing,
the telephone in the administration building rang and JO2 Niturada ran to answer the phone.
After the phone call, JO2 Niturada on his way towards the basketball court, he turned his head
towards the nipa hut and saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa and shoot
the latter with a short firearm.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an armalite.
Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboa’s gun,
shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal took the armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2
Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2 Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out the
main gate. Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a
parked Tamaraw jeep belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the latter’sknowledge and
consent. They picked up Federico Delim and Chan along the way. Before they reached
Asingan, Pangasinan, the group alighted from the Tamaraw jeep and transferred to a Mazda
pick-up truck. When they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned turtle.
The group abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellants carnapped the car due to uncontrollable fear
RULING
No. A person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of an equal or greater injury. For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending. A person invoking uncontrollable fear
must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not
only without will but against his will as well. In this case, the Supreme Court believed that the
appellants had ample opportunity to escape. By not availing of this chance to escape, accused-
appellants’ allegation of fear or duress becomes untenable.
CASE #58 U.S. V. VINCENTILLO
G.R. No. L-6082 March 18, 1911

vs.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
The defendant is accused of detaining the complaining witness for three days without cause and
without legal authority, without having him presented before the proper judicial authority for an
investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested. As soon as "practicable" after his
arrest, the accused was brought before a justice of the peace. Three days were spent doing so,
but it was conclusively proven at trial that neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary
were in the municipality at the time of the arrest, and that reaching the justice of the peace of
either of the two adjoining municipalities required a long journey by boat.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused ne acquitted for the crime of illegal and arbitrary detention
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court find that there is nothing in the record upon which to base a finding
that the defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise
than in the due performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully
authority in the premises.
CASE #59 PEOPLE V. BANDIAN
G.R. No. 45186 September 30,

1936

vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
The appellant's neighbor, Valentin Aguilar, saw the appellant go into a bush near her home. He
saw her emerge from the bush again a few minutes later, her clothes covered with blood in the
front and back, staggering, and plainly showing signs of being unable to support herself. He
rushed to her aid and, after noticing that she was weak and dizzy, he assisted and supported
her as she made her way up to her house and into her own bed. When questioned what
occurred to her before Aguilar brought her to her house, the appellant simply stated that she
was very dizzy. Valentin Aguilar did not want to remain alone with the appellant in such a
situation, so he called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, for assistance, and later asked him
to get bamboo leaves to stop the appellant's hemorrhage. Comcom had hardly gotten close to
the house when he came across the body of a newborn baby beside a trail that ran across the
bush where the appellant had gone just moments earlier. Comcom informed Aguilar of the
situation, and the latter instructed him to bring the body to the appellant's house. When asked if
the infant she had just seen was hers, the appellant responded affirmatively.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused “killed” her baby because of lawful or insuperable cause
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court viewed that the severe dizziness and extreme debility as an
insuperable cause that prevented the accused take her child from the thicket where she had
given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
CASE #60 PEOPLE V. LEGASPI
G.R. No. 173485 November 23, 2011

vs.
NENITA LEGASPI y LUCAS, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
San Andres was approached by an anonymous informant who told him about the rampant drug
abuse at Centennial Village and the drug pusher known as Legaspi. San Andres quickly alerted
his commander, Police Inspector Villaruel, who ordered him, Sabo, PO1 Aldrin Mariano, and
PO1 Roland Panis to conduct a buy-bust operation. San Andres was assigned as the poseur-
buyer, and Villaruel gave him two hundred-peso bills to serve as buy-bust money. The team
arrived at Centennial Village about 5:15 p.m., where San Andres and the informant were briefed
on their operations before proceeding to Legaspi's house. The informant introduced San Andres
to Legaspi as a "scorer," and Legaspi asked how much they wanted to "score," to which San
Andres replied, "200.00 panggamit lang." After San Andres gave Legaspi the buy-bust money,
Legaspi reached into her pocket and handed him one heat-sealed plastic sachet containing the
suspected shabu. San Andres scratched his head as soon as he received the sachet, signaling
to his colleagues that the transaction was complete.
ISSUE
Whether or not Legaspi was instigated to commit the crime
RULING
No. The criminal intent originates from the instigating person and the accused is lured into the
commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is instigation and no
conviction may be had. However, where the criminal intent originates from the accused and the
criminal offense is completed, even after a person acted as a decoy for the state, or public
officials furnished the accused an opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused
was aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to
prosecute him, there is no instigation and the accused must be convicted. Legaspi was never
forced, coerced, or induced to source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact, San Andres
did not even have to ask her if she could sell him shabu. Legaspi was merely informed that he
was also a "scorer"; and as soon as she learned that he was looking to buy, she immediately
asked him how much he needed.
CASE #61 PEOPLE V. ABELLA
G.R. No. 173485 November 23, 2011

vs.
EVANGELINE ABELLA Y SEDEGO AND MAE ANN SENDIONG, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
The accused-appellants were selling dangerous drugs at Upper Luke Wright, according to
SPO1 Manuel Sanchez, who obtained information from a confidential informant. After
they confirmed that the accused-appellants were actually distributing dangerous drugs, SPO1
Sanchez, SPO2 Ferrer, SPO1 Germodo, SI Tagle, PO2 Corsame, the confidential informant,
and other voluntary informants planned an entrapment on January 19, 2009, about 11:00 a.m.
Tubio, a PDEA asset, was agreed upon to act as the poseur-buyer. Tubio went to Upper Luke
Wright after the planning and met the accused-appellants, while the buy-bust team members
were about seven meters away. Tubio was able to persuade the accused-appellants that he
wanted to buy shabu. Tubio handed Abella the buy-bust money, which she gave to Sendiong
after she agreed to sell. Sendiong handed Abella a heat-sealed transparent sachet, which she
passed to Tubio. Tubio removed his cap when the deal was completed, signaling the team to
begin the arrest of the accused-appellants.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused-appellants was instigated by Tubio
RULING
No. Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to
commit, in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of ways
and means in order to trap or capture a lawbreaker. The Supreme Court find in records
unmistakably prove that Tubio merely convinced the accused-appellants that he would be
buying shabu[55] but never told them that he would be buying it from them. Apparently, the
criminal intent or design to sell shabu originated in the mind of the accused-appellants because
they voluntarily and knowingly transacted with Tubio to sell him a sachet of shabu at the price of
P300.00. Moreover, the fact that Sendiong already had in her possession two heat-sealed
transparent sachets containing shabu confirmed the probability that in actuality both of them
were engaged in selling shabu. The proof that the accused-appellants were engaged in the
illegal trade of selling shabu was only fortified by the buy-bust operation which, in a series of
cases, has been held as a form of entrapment used to apprehend drug peddlers.

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CRIMINAL LAW

G.R. No. L-23249 November 25, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

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