Vda. De Bataclan vs. Medina (GR No. L-10126.

October 22, 1957) Ruling:

Topic: Wrongful act different from what was intended
Proximate cause, definition
Plaintiff: Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan
Defendant: Mariano Medina
Ponente: Montemayor, J.
Doctrine: ​The proximate cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result. The person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.
Yes. The proximate cause of Bataclan’s death was the negligence of
the driver which resulted in the overturning of the bus. There is
evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding. It was also found that the driver failed to replace the tires
as was instructed by Medina. By the time the bus had overturned, it
was expected that gasoline would leak from the tank thereby soaking
the area around the bus. Given that the leak could be smelled and
detected even at a distance, the carrier’s agents also failed to warn
the rescuers not to bring the torches too near the bus thereby
causing the bus to burn resulting in the death of 4 trapped
passengers.

Issue: ​Was the negligence of the driver which resulted in the

overturning of the bus the proximate cause for the death of Bataclan
and the 3 other people who also got trapped inside the bus?

Facts: ​A bus owned by Medina Transportation carrying 18 passengers

including the driver and conductor met an accident within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite. One of its front tires burst causing the bus
to zig-zag until it fell into a ditch on the right side of the road and
overturned. After half an hour, rescuers came carrying with them
lighted torches. When they approached the bus, a fire had started
almost immediately due to a gas leak thereby burning the bus and the
4 people trapped inside it, including Bataclan.

People vs. Iligan y Jamito
Topic: Wrongful act different from what was intended
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Fernando Iligan y Jamito
Ponente: Fernan, J.
DOCTRINE: ​El que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado ​- he
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. Criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
ISSUE: ​Is Fernando Iligan criminally liable for the death of Quiñones,
Jr.?
FACTS: ​In the early morning of August 4, 1980, Quiñones, Jr. and his
companions Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban were walking home after
attending a barrio fiesta dance. During their walk, they met accused
Fernando Iligan, his nephew Edmundo Asis, and Juan Macandog (at
large). Edmundo Asis pushed the group of Quiñones aside, which
prompted Zaldy to box him. Lukban expressed that they had no desire
to fight, however, Iligan, seeing his nephew fall, drew his bolo and
tried to hack Zaldy but missed. The trio of Quiñones ran while the
accused pursued them. After realizing they were no longer being
chased, they stopped, and Quiñones invited Zaldy and Felix to his
house. However, on their way to the house, the three accused
emerged from the roadside and without any warning, Iligan hacked
Quiñones with his bolo on the face causing him to fall down. Lukban
and Zaldy ran away horrified. The autopsy done on Quiñones showed
that he had sustained shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages, as
well as a wound on the right eyebrow, and abrasions. The death
certificate indicated that Quiñones died of “shock and massive
cerebral hemorrhages due to a vehicular accident.”
The accused, however, denied having perpetrated the crime, and
created their own alibis for that day, saying they were in their
respective houses at the time the crime was committed. In addition,
the accused maintain the Quiñones’ death was caused by a vehicular
accident.
HELD: YES. The Court has held that Quiñones had fallen after being
hacked by a bolo, and then run over a vehicle. This finding, however,
does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for Quiñones’
death. The intentional felony in this case was the hacking of the head
of Quiñones, done by Iligan. What is material is that by the
instrument used in the hacking and the location of the wound, the
assault was meant not only to immobilize the victim, but to do away
with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the
head. The hacking incident happened on the national highway where
vehicles are expected to pass at any moment. Quiñones, who was
weakened by the hacking blow, sent him to the cemented highway,
and was run over by a vehicle. The sequence of events from Iligan’s
assault on Quiñones, to his being run over by a vehicle, considering
the short span of time between them, constitutes one unbroken
chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape
criminal liability.
 injuries Javier suffered from Urbano. Urbano in response to this
Urbano vs. IAC argues that Javier’s death was not caused by the incident but by
negligence on the part of Javier after immediately returning to his
Topic: Wrongful act differently from what was intended Tobacco farm where he could possibly have gotten the infection.
Petitioners: ​FILOMENO URBANO
Respondents: ​HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND Ruling​:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES No, the petitioner should not be convicted for the result of the
Ponente: Gutierrez, JR. crime he didn't intend to. According to the medico legal of the victim,
Doctrine: there is a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
Issue​: was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
Whether the petitioner should be convicted of a crime he didn't distinct and foreign of the crime.
intentionally commit?

Facts​:
Urbano went to his rice field where he stored his palays
however, found out that is already flooded. Urbano wend to the
elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and sa Marcelo
Jaview (Victim), and Emilio erfe. He asked them who’s responsible for
opening the irrigation canal which Javier answered and admitted to be
his doing. Feeling angry, Urbano unsheathed his bolo and attacked
Javier which was hit in his right palm. He was again hit by Urbano in
his left leg which caused a swelling. Urbano was stopped by his
daughter by embracing him.
Javier was taken to Dr. Padilla who conducted a medico legal
which recorded a 2 inch wound in his right palm. Urbano agreed to
settle the differences and paid for Javier’s Hospital bills. However, 22
days after the incident, Javier died which according to the new medico
legal, was caused by a tetanus infection. Urbano was charged
because of this with Homicide in pursuant to Article 4 of the RPC
“​Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.'' The respondents argue that the tetanus infection,
as ruled by the medico legal as the cause of death was due to the
People vs. Oanis ​(G.R. No. 47722; July 27, 1943)
Topic: Intentional and Negligent Act.
Petitioner: People of the Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta
Ponente: Moran, ​J.
Doctrine:
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder
with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. The crime committed is not merely
criminal negligence but the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
Facts:
Capt. Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the
following tenor: “information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with
bailarina n​ amed Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive.” Accordingly, Capt.
Monsod called his first sergeant and be given four men for the indicated man
hunt. Corp. Alberto Galanta, respondent, and three privates, reported to the
Office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown of the telegram and
the picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and if
overpowered, to follow the instructions contained in the telegram. The same
instruction was given to Chief of the Police, Antonio Oanis, respondent, who
was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. Upon lack of men to assist in the
hunt, Oanis joined the group which was divided into two; the respodents, Oanis
and Galanta, and a private went to route leading to the house where Irene was
supposedly residing. When they arrived at the premises of the house of Irene,
Oanis approached a neighbor of Irene and asked where Irene was living. The
neighbor told the respondents that she was sleeping with her paramour. When
the room of Irene was located by the respondents, Oanis and Galanta saw a man
sleeping and laid on his back which they, the respondents, fired simultaneous
gunshots. Irene awoken by the gunshots saw her paramour wounded and the
respondents still firing the gunshots at the victim. Although, at their realization,
the victim was not the notorious criminal Balagtas but an innocent civilian
named Serapio Tecson.
Issue:
Are the respondents liable for criminal charges – murder?
Ruling:
Yes, the Court deems that the appellants are guilty of murder with the
mitigating circumstance and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
from five (5) years of ​prison correccional ​to fifteen (15) years of ​reclusion
temporal,​ with the accessories of the law and to pay the heirs of the deceased
Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000.
Upon the appellants rely on the case of US vs. Ah Chong, the maxim
ignorantia facti excusat​, applies only on the mistake is committed without fault
or carelessness. In the case there is a common illusion of innocent mistake of
fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused having no
time or opportunity to make a further inquiry and being pressed by
circumstances to act immediately had no alternative but to take the facts as they
then appeared to him and such facts justified his act of killing. Compared to the
instant case, found no circumstance whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The victim who was presumed to be Balagtas was sleeping
and on his back without any means of assault to the respondents. Thus, the case
being invalid.
The Court also reasoned out in the respondent’s defense that they were
in official capacity in killing Balagtas if it deemed necessary as under Article 11,
No. 5, of the RPC. As stated, any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office. However, there is no evidence or clear
manifestation of the victim’s usage of unnecessary force or treating him with
wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be
affected otherwise. The doctrine insists on the rule of the court that “no
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the
person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for
his detention”. As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is
murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. The duty was to arrest People vs. Gona [No. 32066. March 15, 1930]
Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are
overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take
no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the
Topic: Killing the wrong man
person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance for him and Petitioner: The people of the Philippines
without making any prior identification. Respondent: Gona (Mansaca)
Ponente: Ostrand, J.
Therefore, the Court with all the stated reasons deemed that the accused
are guilty of murder with a penalty of five years of ​prison correccional ​to fifteen Doctrine: ​A person committing a felony is still criminally liable even if
years of ​reclusion temporal with the accessory of the law and payment to the
there is a mistake in the identity of the victim.
heirs of Tecson jointly and severally an indemnation of P2,000.

Issue: ​Is Mansaca criminally liable for the death of Mapudul, even if
he did not intend to?

Facts: ​The defendant was charged with the crime of homicide, with
the information reading as follows:
“That on or about October 26, 1928, in the municipal district
of Pantukan, Province of Davao, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of the court, the said accused voluntarily, illegally, and
criminally and with a bolo which he then carried, assaulted the
Mansaca Mapudul, causing him a mortal wound on the left side of the
neck and that, as a consequence of said wound, the said Mapudul
died.”
It appears from the evidence that on the evening of October
26, 1928, a number of Mansacas celebrated a reunion in the house of
the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems to have been a liberal supply of
alcoholic drinks and some of the men present became intoxicated,
with the result that a quarrel took place between the Mansaca Dunca
and the defendant. Dunca and his son Aguipo eventually left the
house and were followed by Mapudul and one Awad. The defendant
left the house about the same time with intention of assaulting
Dunca, but in the darkness of the evening and in the intoxicated
condition of the defendant, he mistook Mapudul for Dunca and
inflicted on him a mortal wound with a bolo. There can be no doubt
that the defendant killed Mapudul and that he is guilty of the crime
charged, but his attorney argues that in view of the fact that said
defendant had no intention to kill the deceased and committed the
crime by mistake, he should have been found guilty of homicide
through negligence under paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal
Code and not of the graver crime of intentional homicide. This
contention is contrary to earlier decisions of the court and so
appealed sentence is affirmed with costs against the defendant.
Ruling: Yes. ​Mansaca is criminally liable for the death of Mapudul.
The court cited an earlier case similar to this. In the case of
United States vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), the court said: "Even
admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario Lauigan
instead of Pedro Acierto, even that, in view of the mortal wound
which he inflicted upon the latter, in no way could be considered as a
relief from his criminal act. That he made a mistake in killing one man
instead of another, when it is proved that he acted maliciously and
willfully, cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility. Neither do
we believe that the fact that he made a mistake in killing the wrong
man should be considered as a mitigating circumstance." The
appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the defendant.
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural
consequences of one’s illegal acts, merely because one does not
intend to produce such consequences
People vs. Esteban (Nos. L-27046 and L-27047. March 30, 1981)
Topic: Incidentally Killing Another
Petitioner: The People of the Philippines
Respondent: Mariano Esteban y Molina, Luis Camaya y Rocha
Ponente: Aquino, J.
Doctrine: ​A person is committing a felony is still criminally liable even
if there is a mistake in the blow.
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural
consequences of one’s illegal acts, merely because one does not
intend to produce such consequences. “He who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused”.
Issue: ​Is Mariano Esteban criminally liable for the death of Maria
Pascua, even if he did not intend to?
Facts: ​In 1963, resided in the vicinity of Protacio street extension and
Gamban Street, Pasay city were Antonio Maravilla, Loreta Alega
(Lulu), Mariano Esteban, Tomas Ablola (Mati), and the spouses Marua
Pascua and Apolonio Lozano. They were all neighbors. In 1961, the
husband of Lulu Alega was killed. 4 people, among whom were
Esteban, Ablola and Camaya, were implicated in the killing. The case
was compromised and it was agreed that the four accused would pay
Lulu 1,500 pesos as settlement of the case. On May 1, 1963, Maravilla
and Lulu were collecting payments for the compromise settlement.
They went to Camaya’s house to collect, but he said that Esteban
would advance the payment sum of 47 pesos and so they went to
Esteban to collect it, but Esteban promised to pay 20 pesos the next
day instead. Maravilla reminded Esteban that the case was only
provisionally dismissed and that nonpayment of the balance might
prejudice him.
Later that night, Maravilla returned to the yard of the house of
Maria Pascua for a drinking spree. After they had finished drinking,
successive gunshots were fired at the group. Maravilla stood up and
looked over the partition in the direction where the shots originated.
Maravilla saw three men about to leave the place, two of whom were
Esteban and Mati. He then collapsed in the street and was found by a
policeman later on, to which Maravilla told him that he identified his
assailants as Esteban and Ablola. The gunshots penetrated the house.
Maria Pascua, who was sleeping inside the house, died.
Once at the Manila Sanitarium, Maravilla was interviewed by
Patrolman Cedilla and pointed out that Esteban and Matt were the
ones responsible for the shooting. Afterwards, Cedilla picked up
Esteban and brought him to the hospital for the confirmation of
Maravilla on whether or not he is the correct suspect. A parafin test
was made on Esteban’s hands on the following day at the forensic
chemistry division of the National Bureau of Investigation. They were
found to be positive with nitrate specks. On May 3, 1963, or less than
forty-eight hours after the shooting, Special Counsel Carlos Rustia of
the Pasay City fiscal’s office filed in the Court of First Instance two
informations against Esteban and two unidentified persons, charging
them with murder for the killing of Maria Pascua and frustrated
murder for the assault on Maravilla.
In the case of Esteban, his alibi was that he was in his house at
the time of the shooting. On that evening, he was supposed to work
in the slaughterhouse with Carnaya from eleven o’clock to six o’clock
in the morning. But, according to his version, he did not work and he
preferred to sleep because Camaya did not pay him the five pesos
which he owed to Esteban and which the latter would use to pay his
electric bill. That flimsy pretext is not credible. Esteban was
sufficiently identified by Maravilla in the hater’s res gestae
declarations as one of the three assailants who fired the shots that
killed Maria Pascua and seriously wounded Maravilla. The paraffin
test proved that he fired a gun shortly before his arrest. At the
confrontation in the hospital, when Maravilla and the policemen
fingered him as the gun wielder, Esteban did not say anything.
Because of his silence the policemen confined him in jail instead of
releasing him. Esteban was infuriated by Maravilla’s threat five hours
before the shooting that the dismissal of the homicide case against
Esteban for his complicity in the killing of Lulu’s husband was only
provisional. Knowing Maravilla to be a criminal character (he was
charged with murder in 1962 in the Court of First Instance at Pasay
City for having killed Zosimo Priego), Esteban feared that Maravilla
was capable of asking for the revival of that homicide case. So,
Esteban liquidated Maravilla to prevent the resurrection of the
homicide case.
Ruling: Yes. ​The fact that Esteban intended to kill Maravilla and in the
course of the assault incidentally killed Maria Pascua makes him liable
for murder just the same because a person committing a felony is
criminally liable although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended (Art. 4, Revised, Penal Code). This rule covers
aberratio ictus or mistake as to victim. As to Maravilla, Esteban is
guilty of frustrated murder. The trial court erred in imposing upon
him a straight penalty of seventeen years and four months. Esteban is
entitled to an indeterminate sentence the maximum of which should
be taken from reclusion temporal minimum and the minimum from
the range o f prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium
since no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances can be
appreciated in connection with that offense.
People vs. Sabalones
Topic: Culpability not diminished
Petitioner - People of the Philippines
Respondents - Rolusape “Roling” Sabalones, Artemios Beronga,
Teodulo Alegarbes, Eufemio Cabanero
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Doctrine: ​Aberratio Ictus​: Error in Personae; Mistake in the identity of
the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on
his intended victim.
Issue: Whether the mistake of Sabalones diminishes the gravity of his
crime.
Facts:
1. At around 11:00pm, Stephen Lim, asked Nelson and Glenn Tiempo,
Rogelio Presores, Rogelio Oliveros, Junio Villoria, Rey Bolo, and
Alfredo Nardo, who was also at the party, for assistance to get his car
to run, and eventually to take it back to his house.
2. Nelson, Rogelio P., Rogelio O., and Junio drove to the residence in
Stephen’s car while the rest rode an owner type jeep to be able to
bring everyone back to the party.
3. Once they go to the residence, they were met with a sudden burst
of gunfire. These aggressors were identified as Teodulo Alegarbes,
Rolusape Sabalones, and Timoteo Alagarbes.
4. Sabalones flee, but was later on caught. Beronga was first to be
arraigned with Alegarbes, who died during the course of the trial,
while Cabanero still remains at large.
5. In the extrajudicial statement presented, it was found that prior to
this case, Sabalones was deemed a suspect in the death of Nabing
Velez, and also the son of Maj. Tiempo.
6. Trial Court ruled Sabalones and Beronga guilty for 2 counts of
murder (Glenn & Alfred), and 3 counts of frustrated murder (Rey,
Rogelio P., & Nelson).
7. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, however stated that the
penalties imposed were erroneous.
Held: No. According to the SC, the conclusion of the trial court and
the CA that the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on the
extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga and also the testimony
of Jennifer Binghoy.
These pieces of evidence sufficiently show that appellants
believed that they were suspected of having killed the recently slain
Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate against
them. Hence, upon the arrival of the victims’ vehicles to the gate of
Stephen Lim, they mistook them to be the avenging men of Nabing
Velez, thus the appellants opened fire,
Nonetheless, ​the fact that they were mistakes does not
diminish their culpability​. The Court has held that ​mistake in the
identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused
zeroes in on his intended victim​.
Therefore, the Court agrees the ruling of the lower courts
sustaining that guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants in 2
counts of murder, and 3 counts of frustrated murder.
People vs. Adriano y Samson
Topic: Miscarriage in the blow: Stray bullet & treachery apprehended
Plaintiff-Appellee: The People of the Philippines
Accused-Appellant: Rolly Adriano y Samson
Ponente: Perez, J.
Doctrine: ​One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all
the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom,
whether foreseen, intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found
in the doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado’,
or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Aberratio Ictus means mistake in the blow. It is a manner of incurring
criminal liability according to Paragraph 1, Article 4, Revised Penal Code. It is
a mistake in the identity of the victim, which may either be (a) "error in
personae" (mistake of the person), or (b) "aberratio ictus" (mistake in the
blow), it is neither exempting nor mitigating.
I​ssues:
(1) Is Adriano responsible for the death of Bulanan (bystander)?
(2) Can treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?
Facts: In March of 2007 in Nueva Ecija, Rolly Adriano, with three
others, overtook a police car and Honda CRV. With intent of
treachery, to kill and willfully shot Danilo Cabiedes, the driver of CRV,
resulting to his instant death. The shooting incident caused a
bystander, Ofelia Bulanan, to be hit by a stray bullet and eventually
die.
Two policemen were able to trace the car used in the incident
and ended up arresting Adriano. RTC found accused ROLLY ADRIANO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death
of Danilo Cabiedes, and also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulanan. CA affirmed
the decision of RTC.
Ruling:
(1) YES. Evidently, Adriano’s original intent was to kill Cabiedes.
However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray
bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the
consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera citing
People v. Ural:
“Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who commits
an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or
not.”
(2) YES. In People v. Flora, the accused was convicted of two separate
counts of murder: for the killing of two victims (the intended victim
and the victim killed by a stray bullet). The Court, due to the presence
of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both killings to
murder. The material facts of People v. Flora are similar in the case at
bar. Thus, we follow its doctrine.

People v. Cagoco
Date of Case: October 6, 1933| Judge: Vickers |GR No. L-38511|
Topic: Treachery
PLAINTIFF: ​The ​People of the Philippine Islands
DEFENDANT: ​Francisco Cagoco y Ramones (alias Francisco Caguro, alias
Francisco Admones, alias Bucoy, alias Frisco Guy)
DOCTRINE: ​CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; LACK OF INTENTION TO
COMMIT SO GREAT A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED;
TREACHERY.·Under the circumstances of this case the defendant is ​liable for the
killing of the deceased because his death was the direct consequence of defendant's
felonious act of striking him on the head​. If the defendant had not committed the
assault in a treacherous manner, he would nevertheless have been guilty of
homicide, although he did not intend to kill the deceased, and since the defendant
did commit the crime with treachery, ​he is guilty of murder, because of the presence
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
ISSUE: ​Is Cagoco liable for murder?
FACTS:
1. On July 24, 1932, in the City of Manila, Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and
son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk at the corner of Mestizos and San
Fernando Streets in the District of San Nicolas, Yu Lon was standing near
the outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back to the street.
2. While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once
or twice, and when Yu Yee was about to leave his father, the man that had
been passing back and forth (Francisco Cagoco) approached Yu Lon from
behind and willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any just cause
therefor and with intent to kill and treachery, assault and attack him by
suddenly giving him a fist blow on the back part of the head, ​under
conditions which intended directly and especially to insure the
accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself arising from any
defense the victim Yu Lon might make​. Immediately after the said incident,
Cagoco ran away.
3. Yu Yee and two other witnesses (Chin Sam & Yee Fung) pursued him
through San Fernando, Camba, and Jaboneros Streets and then lost sight of
him. The blow caused Yu Lon to fall on the ground. As a consequence, Yu
Lon suffered a lacerated wound on the scalp and a fissured fracture on the
left occipital region which were necessarily mortal and caused his
immediate death.
4. The next day, Yu Yee promptly reported the incident to the police. Cagoco
was later apprehended and identified by Yu Yee as his father‘s assailant.
5. After hearing the evidence, Judge Torres found the defendant guilty with
the crime of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
RATIO:
Yes, the accused struck the deceased on the back of the head because it would have
been necessary for him to go between the deceased and Yu Yee who were then
conversing. As a result, Yu Lon suffered a lacerated wound on the scalp and a
fissured fracture on the left occipital region which were necessarily mortal and
caused his immediate death. Since the accused struck the deceased from behind and
without warning, he acted with treachery.
There is ​treachery when the offender commits a crime employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly to insure its execution without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended part might make​. In order that
a person may be criminally liable for felony different from that which he proposed to
commit, these two requisites should be present: 1. that a felony was committed and
2. that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime
committed by the offender.
In the case at bar, there is nothing to indicate that Yu Lon‘s death was due to some
extraneous case. It was clearly the direct consequence of the accused‘s felonious act
of striking him on the head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a
treacherous manner, he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although
he did not intend to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did commit the crime
with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery​. The fact that he did not intend to cause so great an injury
does not relieve him from the consequences of his unlawful act, but is merely a
mitigating circumstance.
As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
People vs. Quianzon

Topic:
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Ponente:

People vs. Mananquil
Topic: Wrongful act different from that intended
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Valentina Mananquil
Ponente: Cuevas, J.
DOCTRINE: Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. One who inflicts injury on
another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
mediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that
other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of
responsibility.
ISSUE: ​Is Mananquil guilty of parricide as a result of setting her
husband on fire?
FACTS: ​On March 6, 1965, Mananquil went to her husband Elias’
place of work in the NAWASA building in Pasay City where he worked
as a security guard. Mananquil had in her possession a bottle
containing gasoline, and she poured said gasoline all over Elias,
ignited the gasoline, and as a result, Elias suffered burns and injures
which subsequently caused his death.
Mananquil, however, has her own account of the events that occured
that night. After putting her grandson to bed, she remembered that
the next day was Sunday and she had to go to church, and thus, had
to clean her church shoes with gasoline. She proceeded to go to the
gas station, and according to her, she remembered that her husband
needed gasoline for his lighter, so she went to his place of work. Upon
seeing Mananquil, Elias, who was under the influence of alcohol,
began shouting and cursing at her. Mananquil was scared and
became dizzy, and she did not realize that she was already sprinkling
gasoline on Elias’ face. Mananquil, in her effort to exculpate herself,
claims that her husband had died as a result of pneumonia because
he had been drinking, proved by the toxicology report. Assuming that
she had set her husband on fire, Mananquil asserts that she should
not be criminally liable for her husband’s death.
HELD: ​YES. The claim that her husband drank liquor while confined in
the hospital cannot suffice to exculpate Mananquil. As testified by Dr.
Reyes, pneumonia is not caused by drinking alcohol. The Hon.
Solicitor General has also pointed out that the intake of liquor was
not an efficient supervening cause of his death.
As shown by the necropsy report, the cause of Elias’ death is
pneumonia, with second degree burns secondary. There is no
question, however, that the burns sustained by him as shown by the
post-mortem findings involved about 62% of the victim’s entire body.
Evidence clearly shows pneumonia was a mere complication of the
burns sustained. The Court has accepted that pneumonia is the
immediate cause of death, however, this would not have been the
result had the victim not suffered from second degree burns. In
conclusion, the Court holds that with pneumonia only contributed to
the cause of death.
 Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
People vs. Toling (GR No. L-27097, Jan. 17, 1975) wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The
presumption is that “a person intends the ordinary consequences of
Topic: Wrongful act different from that intended his voluntary act (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Intended consequence of voluntary act
Plaintiff/ The rule is that “if a man creates in another man’s mind an immediate
Appellee: The People Of The Philippines sense of danger which causes such a person to try to escape, and in
Defendants/ so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of
Appellants: Antonio Toling, Jose Toling mind is responsible for the injuries which result.”
Ponente: Aquino, J.
However, the absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping
from the train of the four victims already named precludes the
Issue: Are the Toling brothers criminally liable for the death of the 4 imputation of criminal responsibility to the Toling twins for the
victims who jumped off the moving train? ghastly deaths of the said victims.

Facts:
Antonio and Jose Toling, identical twins and farmers from Samar,
were convicted of multiple murder and attempted murder. The twins
took the Bicol express train on their way home from Manila after
visiting Antonio’s daughter. After leaving the station in Laguna,
Antonio with a pair of scissors went into a stabbing frenzy along with
his brother who was wielding a knife. There was a total of 12 victims -
8 died from stab wounds while 4 jumped from the moving train to
avoid being killed.

Ruling:
No. They cannot be held criminally liable for the death of the 4
victims who jumped off the train.
 YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby
MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of
Intod vs. CA arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the
law, and to pay the costs
Topic: Impossible Crime
Petitioner: Sulpicio Intod · Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL LIABILITY. — Criminal Liability shall be
​

Respondent: CA and People of the Philippines incurred:

Ponente: Campos, Jr., J.
(2) By any person performing an act which would be an
DOCTRINE: offense against persons or property, were it not for the
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of
would not amount to a crime. the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

ISSUE: Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on

Whether or Not Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an
impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)
FACTS:
On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio
and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked
him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. They
then had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that
he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany them.
Otherwise, he would also be killed.
All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house at around 10:00
pm and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the
room.
the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the
crime inherently impossible. The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the
Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability to
punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2). Legal impossibility occurs
where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime.
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in
violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime

RULING:
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown
to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime – this case
People vs. Peralta ​(G.R. No. L-19069; October 29, 1968)
Topic: Facets, nature & quantum of proof
Petitioner: People of the Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Amadeo Peralta, et al
Ponente: ​per curiam
Doctrine:
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Facts:
In the municipality of Muntinlupa, province of Rizal, two known
warring gangs inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-Sigue” and “OXO” were
known to have multiple riots resulting in the death of many of their respective
member and sympathizers. While they were preparing to attend Sunday mass on
February 16, 1958 at 7:00AM the members of the gangs and prisoners alike,
assembled in the plaza which resulted to a big commotion between the rival
gangs. The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the
investigation while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to
their respective quarters.
In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO” members,
Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio
Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants charged therein
with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by virtue of
final judgments. ​They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided
each other, with evident premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly
weapons and improvised ones, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously killed “Sigue-Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa
and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting,
stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons,
pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious
injuries which directly caused their deaths. The act of murdering the
“Sigue-sigue” sympathizers were testified by witnesses which they saw the
accused’s stabbing the said sympathizers.
Issue:
Is there enough proof that the accused had a conspiracy to commit
murder against the sympathizers?
Ruling:
No, the Court deemed that conspiracy arises at the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide
to commit it. Also, the Court provides support from the ​People v Custodio, t​ here
is no showing of the opportunity for reflection and the persistence in the criminal
intent that characterize the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
The conspiracy to do harm to a person or property regardless of
committing the said criminal act, the mere attendance of conspiracy in which
“any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the
band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the
band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.” In this instance,
the conspiracy need not be proven, as long as the existence of a band is clearly
established. The liability of a member of the band for the assaults committed by
his group is likewise anchored on the rule that the act of one is the act of all.
The proof of conspiracy is by nature a planned of utmost secrecy, it can
seldom be proven by direct evidence. Thus, competent and convincing
circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish conspiracy. Conspiracies are
generally proven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances
which vary according to the purposed to be accomplished. It can also be inferred
that proofs of facts and circumstances which taken together apparently indicate
that they are merely parts of some complete whole. Also, that conspiracy is
proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors
committed an offence in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.

The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused

acted in concert from the moment they bolted their common brigade. It is not
indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a direct part in every act and
should know the part which the others have to perform. Conspiracy is the
common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the
execution of the crime. All those who in one way or another help and cooperate
in the consummation of a felony previously planned are co-principals. Hence, all
of the six accused are guilty of the slaughter of the victims each is guilty of three
separate and distinct crimes of murder.

It is significant to note that in the mentioned cases, this Court

consistently stressed that once conspiracy is ascertained, the culpability of the
conspirators is not only solidary or all co-principals but also multiple in relation
to the number of felonies committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. It can also
be said that had there been a unanimous Court in the ​Masim and Macaso cases,
multiple death penalties would have imposed upon all the conspirators. Under
Article 70 of the RPC, states that “all penalties corresponding to the several
violations of law should be imposed.” The conviction for multiple felonies
demands the imposition of multiple penalties as per the case of ​Balaba.​ Also,
under Article 87, “when a person found guilty of two or more felonies or
misdemeanors, all the penalties corresponding to the several violations of law
shall be imposed, the same to be simultaneously served, if possible, according to
the nature and effects of such penalties.”

Therefore, with the above mentioned reasons the Court decided to

modify the judgment of the trial court that the accused are each pronounced
guilty of three separate and distinctive crimes of murder and each sentence to
three death penalties; and all of them, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs
of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; each will pay
one-sixth of the costs.

People vs. Caballero
Topic: Facets, nature and quantum of proof
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Armando Caballero, Ricardo Caballero, Marciano
Caballero, Robito Caballero
Ponente: Callejo, SR., J
Doctrine: ​There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is always
predominantly mental in composition because it consists primarily of
a meeting of minds and intent. Conspiracy must be proved with the
same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. However, direct proof is not required.
Issue: ​Whether or not the appellants are guilty for the death of
Eugene and Leonilo and injuries sustained by Arnold?
Facts: ​In the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Armando, Robito, and
Marciano Jr., all surnamed Caballero, were having a drinking spree in
the house of their brother Ricardo in the Mondragon compound.
Eugene Tayatac and Arnold Barcuma arrived in a sari-sari store which
is across the Mondragon compound. Arnold went to Susana, Eugene’s
girlfriend, and left Eugene to have his dinner in the store. Armando
suddenly approached Eugene in an agitated manner and
subsequently left, he then stood outside the gate of the Mondragon
compound and was accompanied by his brothers: Ricardo, Robito,
and Marciano. Ricardo and Robito were armed with knives. Eugene
went to Susana’s house which was 15 meters away from the sari-sari
store when the store closed. However, upon passing the compound,
he was suddenly grabbed and stabbed by Armando and was assaulted
by the Caballero brothers. Arnold saw that commotion and went to
help Eugene. However, upon arriving he was stabbed by Ricardo and
was also assaulted by the Caballero brothers. Arnold then fled to save
his life. Leonilo Broce rushed from his house, which was next to the
Mondragon compound, to stop the Caballero brothers. However, he
was met by Robito who stabbed him in the chest. The commotion
stopped upon the arrival of Teresito Mondragon. In the meantime,
Leonilo, Arnold, and Eugene were rushed to the Planters Hospital for
medical treatment. Unfortunately, Eugene and Leonilo eventually
died from the stab wounds they sustained. They were convicted for
the murder of Leonile and Eugune and the frustrated murder of
Arnold.
Ruling: ​Yes, the Court held that the appellants are guilty for the death
of Eugene and injuries sustained by Arnold only. Under Article 8 of
the Revised Penal Code there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists
primarily of a meeting of minds and intent. Conspiracy must be
proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is,
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, direct proof is not
required. In this case, the appellants ganged up and assaulted both
Eugene and Arnold. Patently, all the appellants by their simultaneous
collective acts before and after the commission of the crimes were
united in one common objective, to kill Eugene, and cause injuries to
Arnold for trying to intervene and prevent bloodshed. Hence, all the
appellants are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the
injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who among the appellants
stabbed Eugene or inflicted injuries on Arnold. The act of one is the
act of the others. However, for the death of Leonilo, the Court
believes that the appellants are not criminally liable. The prosecution
failed to adduce evidence that the appellants and the accused Robito
conspired to kill Leonilo.

Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan
Topic: Conspiracy as a crime or mode of committing a crime
Petitioner: Felicisimo F. Lazarte
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Ponente: Tinga, J
Doctrine: ​Conspiracy should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy
can be a mode of committing a crime or it may be a constitutive of
the crime itself.
Issue: ​Whether or not Lazarte’s constitutional right has been violated
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
due to the failure of the Information to specify his participation in the
commission of the offense?
Facts: ​On June 1990, the National Housing Authority awarded the
original contract for the infrastructure work on the Pahanocoy Sites
and Services Project to A.C. Cruz Construction. Mr. Fajutag, Project
Engineer, noticed certain deficiencies on the works of A.C. Cruz
Construction. The contractor failed to comply with work instructions.
As a result, the contract for the project was terminated and was
awarded to a new contractor named “Triad Construction and
Development Corporation”. Triad discovered that certain work items
that had been reported in the inventory report were in fact
non-existent. Thus, A.C. Cruz Construction had been overpaid by as
much as P232,628.35, which amount is more than the net payable
due per the computation of the fourth unpaid billing. Consequently,
Lazarte and other NHA officials were charged in violation of RA 3019
(The Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act) by allegedly conniving with
Arceo C. Cruz, as the General Manager of A.C. Cruz Construction.
Thus, providing Mr. Arceo unwarranted benefits.
Ruling: ​No, the Court held that the constitutional right has not been
violated. The Court stresses the fact that under the Philippine Law,
conspiracy should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a
mode of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the crime
itself. Generally, crime is not a crime in our jurisdiction. When
conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the
elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or
Information. But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself
but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar,
there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information
because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The
case at bar represents conspiracy of the public officials was just
constitutive of the crime itself which is the violation of RA 3019.
Hence, there is less necessity of reciting the particularities of the
conspiracy because it is not the gravamen of the offense charged.

People vs. Del Rosario (GR No. 127755, April 14, 1999)
Topic: Not mere presence and transcends companionship
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Joselito Del Rosario y Pascual
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Doctrine: To convict an accused, the presence of an ​implied
conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The
fact that an accused was with other accused at the time when the
crime was committed is insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere
companionship does not establish conspiracy.
Issue: Whether the fact that Joselito was with the persons who
committed the crime at the time it was committed, makes him liable
as an accessory to the crime.
Facts:
1. Tricycle driver Paul Vicente Alonzo, herein eyewitness,
stopped his tricycle on the side of the road to pick up
passengers when he saw a few meters in front of him the
tricycle of Joselito.
2. Shortly after, he saw 2 men and a woman grappling for the
possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag, one of the
two men, who was armed with a gun, started chasing a man
who was trying to help the woman. The other man left in the
scene proceeded to kick the woman sending her to the
ground.
3. Then the armed man who chased the helper, Jun Marquez,
returned and shot the woman dead, while she still lay on the
ground.
4. The bag was then brought to the tricycle of Joselito, as they
sped away from the crime scene.
5. Alonzo chased the tricycle and was able to get the license
plate, and also recognize its driver. The driver was then
identified as Joselito Del Rosario. His name was given to the
local police as Alonzo reported the incident.
6. Joselito claimed that he was hired by a cartain”Boy” Santos,
just to drive him to a cockpit, but later on was asked to
proceed to the market place to fetch “Jun” Marquez and
“Dodong” Bisaya.
7. He stated that he was then asked to stop at the same location
witness Alonzo stated that he saw the crime being committed.
8. Joselito said that he tried to leave and ask for help but he his
life and the life of his family was threatened by “Boy” Santos,
who stayed inside the tricycle preventing him from doing
anything.
9. Joselito was found guilty by the trial court and was sentenced
to death.
Held: ​No. The SC stated that the lower court erred in ruling Joselito
guilty when he was also a victim in this case.
While Joselito admits that he was the driver of the getaway
car, he also proved that he had no inkling of the malevolent desire of
his co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given any briefing
thereof. He was merely hired by “Boy Santos” to drive to an agreed
destination and he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the scene
of the crime since he was ordered to help them escape.
It was found that there was no evidence that the accused
came into an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decided to commit the same. Therefore, in order to convict an
accused, the presence of an ​implied conspiracy is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. ​The fact that Joselito was with
other accused at the time when the crime was committed is
insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not
establish conspiracy.
The only evidence against him is that he was at the scene of
the crime but as already explained, the reason for his presence was
that he was hired to drive the tricycle to a certain location and
nothing more. By then, he feared for his life and the life of his family
because of the threats made to him.
This does not show that he participated in the overt act of
robbing and shooting although he was with the persons who
committed the crime​.

Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People ​(G.R. No. 220598; July 19, 2016)
Topic: Chain and Wheel Conspiracy
Petitioner: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
Respondent: The Honorable Sandiganbayan
Ponente: Bersamin, ​J.
Doctrine: The ​corpus delicti o​ f plunder is the assessment, accumulation or
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not lee than P50,000,000. The failure to
establish the ​corpus delicti s​ hould lead to the dismissal of the criminal
prosecution.
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former
President GMA and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some
other officials of PCSO and the Commission on Audit) for conspiracy to commit
plunder, as defined and penalized under Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, amended by
R.A. No. 7659.
During the period from January 2008 to June 2010, the accused took
undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring, and confederating with one
another. In which they willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate
and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the total value of
P365,997,915.00 more or less.
One of the major findings was presented by the main witness Atty. Aleta
Tolentino, is a Certified Public Accountant for 30 years and a lawyer for 20
years, and a Board of Director of the PCSO. She states that the former
management of the PCSO was commingling the charity fund, the prize fund and
the operating fund. By commingling she means that the funds were maintained
in only one main account. This violates Section 6 of R.A. 1169, the PCSO
Charter and the generally accepted accounting principles. Also, the auditing
committee found out that there was excessive disbursement of the Confidential
and Intelligence Fund (CIF). There were also excessive disbursements for
advertising expenses. The internal audit department was also merged with the
budget and accounting department, which is a violation of internal audit rules.
There was also a disbursement from the CIF exceeding P10,000,000 which was
also in violation of the PCSO Charter.
The financial statements from 2006 to 2009 indicate that the PCSO was
operating in deficit. It also did not have a registry of budget utilization. In 2005,
the deficit was P916 million; in 2006, P1,000,078,683.23. The net cash provided
by operating expenses in 2006 is negative, which means that there were more
expenses than what was received. Then in 2007, 2008, and 2009 COA report,
there were no deposits made to the prize and charity funds, despite the
instruction and recommendation of COA.
Thus, GMA and Aguas filed separately for petitions of bail which were
denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence against them was
strong. Then they separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against the which was
subsequently denied by the Sandiganbayan. In its defense, the Sandiganbayan
holds that there was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to
commit plunder. Also filed for motions of reconsideration which were likewise
denied, then filed for respective petitions for certiorari.
Issue:
Does the state have sufficient evidence to charge the accused of the
crimes of plunder and the existence of conspiracy among the accused?
Ruling:
No, the Court grants the petitions for certiorari, annuls and sets aside the
resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan; grants the petitioners’ respective
demurrers to evidence. The Court dismisses the criminal case against the
petitioners for insufficiency of evidence; orders the immediate release from
detention of the petitioners; and makes no pronouncements on costs of suit.
The denial of the Sandiganbayan of the petitioners’ motion of demurrer
to evidence was improper as for her rights to due process. The Court deemed that
the Sandiganbayan was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously
denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the
factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.
The prosecution’s alleged conspiracy between GMA, Aguas and Uriarte
does not provide any factual evidence. Conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a
mere means to commit a crime. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime,
it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the
conspirators, or their community of criminal design must be alleged and
competently shown. In the case at bar, GMA points out that all that the State
showed was her having affixed her unqualified ‘ok’ on the requests for the
additional CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such an act was not even an overt act
of plunder because it had no immediate and necessary relation to plunder by
virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or irregular. There is no proof of
conspiracy between the accused and the co-accused and that the prosecution was
unable to prove their case against Arroyo. In this regard the Court sees that the
Sandiganbayan have gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
its jurisdiction. Also, under Letter of Instruction 1282, required request for
additional confidential funds (CIFs) to be accompanied with detailed, specific
project proposals and specifications; and COA Circular No. 92-385, which
allowed the President to approve the release of additional CIFs only if there was
an existing budget to cover the request. Noting that Arroyo’s handwritten
unqualified ‘ok’ as an overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted
considering that such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying
approval of a fund release by the President.
The wheel of conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group
(the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the
spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with another
spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a
single conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned
with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.
A chain of conspiracy is successive communication and cooperation in
much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer
and wholesaler, then the wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.
This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal
objective.
In the case of plunder, under R.A. 7080, amended by R.A. 7659,
requires that a public officer must be identified as the one who amassed,
acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is
committed by an public officer who, by himself or in connivance with anyone
that amasses or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total values
of P50 million through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
prescribed by Section 1. If conspiracy and plunder was proven to be true, the
ill-gotten wealth acquired, P365,997,915.00 would be separately divided to the
ten accused government-officials, equally divided, P36,599,791.50. Thus, not
liable for criminal charges of plunder. The Court deems that after the review of
the records, it was duly found and ruled that the prosecution had no case for
plunder as the above-mentioned requirements for such charges.
Therefore, with the above mentioned reasons the Court deemed to grant
the petition for certiorari and sets aside the resolutions issued in the criminal case
against the petitioners. The Court grants the petition of their respective
demurrers of evidence; dismisses the criminal case against the petitioners for
insufficiency of evidence; order the immediate release from detention; and
makes no pronouncements on costs of suit.
People vs. De Vera

Topic: Lookout’s Liability

Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Edwin De Vera, Roderick Garcia, Kenneth Florendo,
and Elmer Castro
Ponente: Panganiban, J.

Doctrine:
Issue:
Facts:
Ruling:
 U.S. v. Eduave
Date of Case: February 2, 1917| Judge: Moreland |GR No. L-12155|
Topic: Never passes subjective phase
PLAINTIFF: ​The ​United States
DEFENDANT: ​Protacio Eduave
DOCTRINE: ​CRIMINAL LAW; FRUSTRATED CRIMES.·A felony is frustrated
when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
ATTEMPTED CRIMES.·There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which constitute the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own voluntary desistance.
SUBJECTIVE PHASE.·The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the
crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last
act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is objective. It may also be said
to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control·that
period between the point where he begins and the point where he voluntarily desists. If
between these two points the offender is stopped by any cause outside of his own
voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is attempt. If he is
not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.
ISSUE: ​What is the precise crime committed by Eduave?
FACTS:
1. Protacio Eduave, who was the querido of the victim’s mother, rushed upon
the victim and suddenly struck her from behind, with a sharp bolo,
producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight
and one-half inches long and two inches deep, severing all of the muscles
and tissues of that part.
2. The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for
the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before the local
officials with having raped her and with being the cause of her pregnancy.
3. In this case, the intent to kill is evident. A deadly weapon was used. The
blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor stated his
purpose to kill, thought he had killed, and threw the body into the bushes.
When he gave himself up, he declared that he had killed the complainant.
RATIO:
It is clear that the crime committed is ​frustrated murder.​ The fact that the accused
made a sudden attack upon his victim from the rear, or partly from the rear, and
dealing her a terrible blow in the back and side with his bolo, thus, such an attack
constitutes the finding that it was made treacherously; and that being so, the crime
would have been qualified as murder if death had resulted. However, the crime is not
consummated because of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the
offender and that the elements of the crime’s execution and accomplishment were
not complete, as the victim is alive.
Neither was the crime an attempted murder because Eduave’s actions already passed
the subjective phase. There was no external force or intervention of a foreign cause
or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment
when all the acts have been performed preventing the accused from performing all
the acts necessary to commit a felony.
Also, a crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the
commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside
cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. In other
words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a
foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the
moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a
consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform.
The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in
the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between
the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts
have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the
former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of
performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of
that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
People vs. Lamahang
Topic: Attempt: Indeterminate offense; Logical relation to a concrete
offense; inchoate as to other possible offense
Plaintiff-Appellee: The People of the Philippines
Accused-Appellant: Aurelio Lamahang
Ponente: Perez, J.
Ruling: ​YES. He was mistakenly declared guilty of attempted robbery.
But the accused is then held guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling,
committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day
of arresto mayor.

Doctrine: ​In the case of robbery, it must be shown that the offender
clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some
personal property belonging to another. In this case, it may only be
inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter
by means of force store against the will of its owner. There is nothing
in the record to justify a concrete finding that his final objective, once
he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical
injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense.

Issue: Was the accused mistakenly declared guilty of attempted

robbery?

Facts: ​The defendant, Aurelio Lamahang, is on appeal from a decision

finding him guilty of attempted robbery. At early dawn of March 2,
1935, policeman, Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling at Delgado
and C.R. Fuentes streets of IloIlo City, caught the accused in the act of
making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap
goods located on C.R. Fuentes Street. At that time, the owner of the
store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinese citizen. The
accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening
another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly
arrested him and placed him under custody.
People vs. Lizada (GR Nos. 143468-71, Jan. 24, 2003)
Topic: Attempt, Overt acts and necessary causal relation with
intended crime; Attempted, consummated rape or acts of
lasciviousness?
Plantiff/Appellee: The People Of The Philippines
Defendant/Appellant: Freedie Lizada
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J
Doctrine:
For overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is necessary that
their objective be known and established or such that acts be of such
a nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal
objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as
ground for designation of the offense.
Issue:
1. Is Lizada criminally liable for consummated rape?
2. Is Lizada criminally liable for acts of lasciviousness?
3. Is Lizada criminally liable for attempted rape?
Facts: Lizada was charged with 4 counts of qualified rape, and was
meted with death penalty in each and every case. He had sexually
abused his 11-year old stepdaughter for 3 years and had threatened
to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to her. He denied
such allegations on the basis of Analia’s genital examination which
showed that: (a) there was no evident sign of extragenital physical
injuries, and (b) the hymen was still intact.
Ruling:
1. No. Lizada is not criminally liable for consummated rape. There
was no introduction of the penis of the accused into the aperture
or within the pudendum of the vagina of the offended party.
2. No. Lizada is not criminally liable for acts of lasciviousness. To be
convicted of such, the prosecution is burdened to prove the ff.
essential elements: (a) that the offender committed any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness, (b) that it was done under any of the
following circumstances: (i) by using force or intimidation, or (ii)
when the offended party was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party was under 12 years
old.
3. Yes. Lizada is criminally liable for attempted rape. The elements of
an attempted felony are: (a) the offender commences the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts or external acts
that have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed, (b) he does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony, (c) the offender’s act be not
stopped by his own spontaneous desistance, and (4) the
non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or
accident other than his spontaneous desistance.
The series of overt acts proven by the prosecution were not mere
preparatory acts. He had commenced the execution of rape
which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the
crime of rape. Although he desisted from performing all the acts
of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he
was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and
 unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, he is guilty only of attempted Marlon, failed to clearly and positively identify him as the malefactor
rape. responsible for his brother's death and insists that his testimony is
People vs. Listerio insufficient to convict him of the crimes charged. He likewise insists on
the absence of conspiracy and treachery in the attack of the victims.
Lastly, the defense persistently seeks to establish that the attack was
Topic: Proposal and conspiracy - direct proof not essential; implied
provoked mentioning that Marlon and the victim, had a drinking spree
conspiracy
prior to the incident.
Appellee: People of the Philippines
Appellant: Agapito Listerio
Ruling​:
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
Yes, the accused should be criminally liable despite the
Doctrine​: A direct proof is not essential in proving that someone is
absence of direct proof of his involvement in a conspiracy. The story
criminally liable for a crime of conspiracy. As long as sufficient
told by Marlon Araque was given in a categorial, convincing, and
evidence is present to point out his involvement in the group, he is
straightforward manner during the cross examination. Also, there is no
automatically criminally liable because in conspiracy, an act of one is
showing that he was motivated by any ill-feeling or bad blood to
the act of all.
falsely testify against the accused, hence, the court believes that the
testimony of the lone witness, Marlon Araque, is the one that should
Issue​: Whether the accused should be criminally liable despite the
be believed in.
absence of direct proof of his involvement in a conspiracy
With regards to the absence of direct proof of his accused
involvement, the court noted that it should be remembered that direct
Facts​:
proof of conspiracy is rarely found for criminals do not write down their
Marlon Araque discloses that at around 5 pm, he and his
lawless plans and plots. Conspiracy, to exist, does not require an
brother Jeonito were in Purok 4, Alabang Muntinlupa to collect a sum
agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. In the
of money from a certain Tino. On their way back tramo near Tino’s
testimony of Marlon Araque, it clearly stated that he saw all of them
place, a group composed of the appellant, Agapito Listerio, Samson
armed with a deadly weapon which indubitably shows the ​criminal
Dela Torre, Georg Dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre, and Bonifacio
design to kill the victims. Thus, even assuming that the prosecution’s
Bancaya blocked their path and attacked them with lead pipes and
eyewitness may have been unclear as to who delivered the fatal blow
bladed weapon.
on the victim, the accused is still liable for the crime because he is a
Agapito Listerio, Marlon dela Torre, and George dela Torre,
co-conspirator as proven by the prosecution’s testimony, and in
armed with bladed weapons stabbed Jeonito from behind. Marlon
conspiracy, ​the act of one is the act of all.
Araque was hit on the head and lost consciousness. When he
regained his senses, he saw that Jeonito is already dead.
Agapito Listerio on the other hand disagrees with the facts
stated by Marlon saying that he was asleep at his home during the
time of the commission of the crime, and was just woken up to be
informed of the quarrel near the railroad track. He further argues that

Yap vs. People ​(G.R. No. 234217; November 14, 2018)
Topic: When intent to kill absent
Petitioner: Johnny Garcia Yap
Respondent: People of the Republic of the Philippines
Ponente: Peralta, ​J.
Doctrine: ​When the intent to kill is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the
victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only.
Facts:
Johnny Garcia Yap, accused-petitioner, and George Hao Ang, alleged
victim, have been friends for more than ten (10) years. They have gone out
together fishing, gambling, and meeting girls. On November 5, 2012, they both
met at a KFC along Vito Cruz St., Manila to meet a businessman or some girls.
Ang waiting for Yap at KFC saw with him two coffee cups and a plastic bag, the
latter insisted to wait at the former’s car. Yap offered coffee to Ang but resisted
because he does not drink coffee. However, Yap insisted that the coffee was
expensive. When Ang drank ¾ of the coffee, he droggy and subsequently, lost
consciousness. Yap laced the coffee of Ang with benzodiazepines, a
sleep-inducing psychoactive drug. Upon returning to consciousness, Ang felt
something hitting his head. Thereupon, he saw Ang holding a bloodied rolling
pin and hitting him with it. Feeling helpless, Ang opened the car door and
successfully escaped despite Yap’s attempt to prevent him from doing so.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision that the accused, Yap
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder and sentenced
minimum imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months and maximum
imprisonment of eight (8) years; and to pay for actual and moral damages to the
victim. Yap filed for a motion of reconsideration to the RTC but was denied; he
then appealed to the Court of Appeals which he was allowed to probational
liberty under the same bail. However, the C.A., found no merit to grant Yap’s
appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. Therefore, the appeal, dismissed.
Thus, the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Is there enough evidence to convict Yap for attempting to commit
murder?
Ruling:
No, the Court deemed the petition for certiorari, partly granted, and the
decision of the CA and RTC, modified. Instead, the Court finds the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of slight physical injuries and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of fifteen (15) days ​arresto mayor.​ The petitioner
is also ordered to pay moral damages to the victim, Ang, in the sum of five
thousand pesos, P5,000.
The Court deemed that the evidence of the victim’s wounds and
sleep-inducing drug does not provide a reasonable intent to kill the person. The
victim’s wounds as testified by the physician who administered the wounds was
not serious or severe; did not obtain any head fracture and his injuries were
proved to be superficial as they only consisted hematoma, contusion, and
laceration (an inch length). Further, the victim after treatment of two hours was
sent immediately home. This provides a clear indication that the victim’s life and
limbs were never actually in peril.
Also, there is a direct contradiction in the evidence, the sleep-inducing
drug found on the victim’s urine was five times the therapeutic dosage given to a
patient, which should have lasted for five hours. Thus, the victim should have
manifested the drug’s effects at the time of his treatment in the hospital. The
Court noting that there is no evidence that proves of the petitioner’s intent to kill
the victim, as for the case at bar.
Thus, with above mentioned reasons the Court deemed the petitioner
guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the RPC, sentenced to
arresto mayor​, and payment of moral damages.
 Court convicted him for rape and was sentenced for life
imprisonment. Salinas then appealed the case stating that the trial
People vs. Salinas court erred in disbelieving his alibi and giving credence to the
testimony of Meryl. Furthermore, he also stated that the lack of any
Topic: In rape, touching the mons pubis of the pudendum sign of external violence on her vagina and her intact hymen belied
Petitioner: People of the Philippines her claimed defilement.
Respondent: Benito Salinas y Sillo
Ponente: Cruz, J Ruling: ​Yes, the Court held that a broken hymen is not essential to
consummate a rape. In any case, for rape to be committed, full
Doctrine: ​For rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of
Its is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ with entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the
the pudendum of the female organ. female organ. Even the slightest penetration is sufficient to
consument the crime of rape. Thus, Salinas is guilty of rape even
Issue: ​Whether or not the absence of broken hymen will constitute as though upon the consumating the act did not produce a broken
rape? hymen, he still guilty of rape.

Facts: ​Benito seeks for the reversal of his conviction for rape of a 13
year old girl. Benito Sillo is 25 year old neighbor of the alleged victim,
Merly Alonzo, who was just living across Benito’s house. Merly
claimed that at about 2 in the early morning of December 19, 1991,
while sleeping in her bedroom, she heard the closing of the door
leading to the terrace of her house. As she sat up, she saw Benito and
subsequently covered her mouth and pointed a fan knife at her neck,
threatening her to keep quiet. Salinas ordered Meryl to lie down,
yanked her shorts and panty. He then mashed her breasts and kissed
her lips and other parts of her body. Likewise, he tried to penetrate
her vagina, however, upon constant resistance of Meryl, only the
head of the penis was able to penetrate the vagina. Frustrated in his
blunt efforts to engage her, Salinas withdrew and threatened Merly
to stay quiet. After two days, Merly told her story to his brother and
the corresponding rape case was filed against Salinas in the RTC. The
People vs. Pareja
Colinares vs. People
Topic:
Petitioner: Topic:
Respondent: Petitioner:
Ponente: Respondent:
Ponente:
Velasco vs. People

Topic:
Petitioner:
Respondent:
Ponente:

Palaganas vs. People (GR No. 165483, September 12, 2006)
Topic: Is degree of injury proper basis of criminal liability?
Frustrated homicide/murder - Necessary proof of nature and
severity that without timely medical assistance death would
result
Petitioner: Rujjeric Palaganas
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.
Doctrine: It is in the Courts precedence that when the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the
crime committed is f​rustrated murder or frustrated homicide
depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances
under Art. 249 of the RPC are present.
However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case
were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted
murder or attempted homicide.
Issue: Is Rujjeric Palaganas liable for frustrated homicide in shooting
Michael Ferrer?
Facts:
1. Around 9:45 at night, the 3 brothers (Servillano, Melton, and
Michael Ferrer) decided to move their drinking from their
house to Tidbits Videoke Bar.
2. A little over an hour, Jaime Palaganas, Ferdinand Palaganas,
and Vergilio Bautista also arrived at the videoke bar,
occupying separate tables from the brothers.
3. Later on, while Jaime was singing “My Way”, Melton sang
along with him. This aggravated Jaime which resulted to Jaime
confronting the brothers, and also hitting Servillano on the
back of his head with the microphone. This eventually resulted
to the Palaganas fighting with the Ferrers (Vergilio Bautista
left once the fighting commenced).
4. In the middle of the rumble, Ferdinand went out of the bar.
Michael attempted to follow him but was later on stopped by
Servillano. They both went back inside to continue fighting
with Jaime.
5. The fight eventually concluded with the arrival of Edith
Palaganas, Jamie’s sister and owner of the karaoke bar.
6. The brothers proceeded to go outside, in search of Servillano’s
lost wristwatch. As they headed out, they saw Ferdinand along
with a companion, pointing to them and saying “they are the
ones, shoot them.”
7. Said companion, who was later found to be Rujjeric Palaganas,
shot at the brothers. Servillano was hit first at the left side of
his abdomen, followed by Melton who also fell to the ground.
Michael then picked up some stoned and proceeded to throw
them at the Palaganas, causing them to leave.
8. The police came and the brothers were then rushed to the
hospital.
9. It was then discovered that Michael took a blow to his right
shoulder while Melton was fatally hit in the head, causing the
latter’s death.
10. The trial court rendered Rujjeric guilty beyond reasonable
doubt on one count of Homicide (Melton), and two counts of
 frustrated homicide (Michael & Servillano). The CA also
affirmed the RTC ruling.

Held: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower
courts in holding Rujjeric liable for Homicide and the frustrated
homicide of Melton and Servillano, respectively. However, they did
not agree that the wounds inflicted on Michael were fatal enough to
be categorized under frustrated homcide.
It is in this Courts’ precedence that when the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault, and his ​victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the
crime committed is f​rustrated murder or frustrated homicide
depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances
under Art. 249 of the RPC are present.
However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case
were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only ​attempted
murder or attempted homicide.​
In this case, Michael’s gunshot would was located in his right
shoulder. It was also written in his medical certificate that he was
discharged on the same day. Given these facts, it is clear to the Court
that ​the wound sustained by Michael in his right shoulder was not
fatal or mortal since the treatment period for his wound was short
and he was discharged from the hospital on the same day he was
admitted therein.
Therefore, the petitioner is liable only for the crime of
attempted homicide as regards to Michael’s case.
Serrano vs. People beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide of the regional trial
court. The petitioner appealed to the CA about the trial court’s
Topic: Homicide/ Murder decision which the CA modified from frustrated homicide, to an
Petitioners: Giovanni Serrano y Cervantes attempted one.
Respondents: People of the Philippines
Ponente: Brion, J. Ruling​: Yes, the gravity of the victim’s injury determines whether the
Doctrine: The gravity of an injury could greatly affect whether the committed felony is an attempted homicide, or a frustrated one. The
felony is committed frustratedly, or attemptedly; court ruled that the CA made a right judgement in modifying the case
Attempted homicide: The victim was seriously injured although ​not to frustrated homicide because the prosecution failed to prove that the
fatal​, and the victim didn't die. injury that the victim had, was a fatal one. In Paddayuman v people,
Frustrated homicide: The victim was seriously injured and it was because there is no evidence that the wounds suffered were fatal
medically proven to be fatal​, but the victim didn't die. enough as to cause her demise, the rendered decision is an
attempted murder. Likewise, in this case, since neither the attending
physician of the victim nor even his discharge summary from East
Issue: avenue medical center specified that the gravity of his wounds were
Whether the gravity of the victim's injury determine whether it is an fatal, then the case should be an attempted homicide, and not a
attempted homicide, or a frustrated one. frustrated one.
The elements of a frustrated homicide are (1) the accused
Facts: intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
The victim, together with his friends were on their way to weapon in his assault; ​(2) the victim sustained fatal of mortal
Fatima Ii in Pook Dagohoy, Up Campus when they came across wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance.
Gener Serrano, the petitioner’s brother. They tried to settle their
previous quarrel with Gener however, this only led to a fistfight
between them. Gener lost the fight which led to another rumble by the
members of the 2 groups. The petitioner sought to get back at the
victim and his friends, took out his knife and began chasing them. The
victim was left alone which the petitioner's group took advantage to
gang up on him. During this commotion, the petitioner stabbed the
victim in the left side of his stomach and continued to beat him until he
fell into a nearby creek.
The victim saw that a portion of his intestines showed and began
asking for help. He was immediately taken to the infirmary but was
transferred to the East Avenue Medical Center to have his needed
surgery. A case was filed against the petitioner and was found guilty
Valenzuela vs. People
Topic: 5. Stages of Punishable Conduct: A. Attempt: Theft
C. Consummation
Petitioner: Aristotel Valenzuela
Respondent: Court of Appeals
Ponente: Tinga, J.
DOCTRINE: ​Theft cannot have a frustrated stage and can only be
attempted or consummated.
ISSUE: ​Is Valenzuela guilty of frustrated felony?
FACTS: ​On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon
were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the
Shoe Mart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a
security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking
area of the supermarket saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela,
hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded
them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela
then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more
cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started
loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave,
the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the
merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
subsequently apprehended at the scene.
The items seized from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide
Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional
cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00.
In a Decision promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, convicted both petitioner and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. They were sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years of ​prision correccional
as minimum to seven (7) years of ​prision mayor​ as maximum.
Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that
he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able
to freely dispose of the items stolen.
Decision dated 19 June 2003, the Court of Appeals rejected
this contention and affirmed petitioner’s conviction, thus the Petition
for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.
RULING:​ NO. The petition was DENIED.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is
consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.
Article 308 states that, in the crime of theft, the following
elements should be present: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking
be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things.
The Court held that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is
immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the
property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of
execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued
from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and
can only be attempted or consummated