Ople vs Torres (1998)

G.R. No. 127685 | 1998-07-23

Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National Computerized

Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996.
Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy.
He contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a
usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to privacy.

Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?

Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator,

petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of
Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that the
Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The
blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of
executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.

Republic of the Philippines vs Drugmaker’s Laboratories Inc.

GR No. 190837 March 5, 2014

Facts: The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the “Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act” primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measure
of foods, drugs and devices and cosmetics products. On March 15, 1989, the Department of
Health, thru then Secretary Alfredo RA Bengzon issued AO 67 s. 1989, entitled Revised Rules
and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical products. Among others, it required drug
manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with FDA before they may release
the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence
(BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for these products. However, the
implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there was no local
facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of circulars no. 1 s. of 1997 resumed the
FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the establishment of BA/BE
testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued circular no. 8 s. of 1997 which
provided additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug
products.

Issue: Whether or not the circular issued by FDA are valid.

Held: Yes. Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making power only if
there exist a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated
must be within the confines of the granting statutes and must not involve discretion as to what
the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the
policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and as
an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative powers.

An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule or a

contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation a d designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement
existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly
delegated by the congress amd effect a change in existing law or policy which affect individual
rights and obligations. Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain
existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or
objective is merely to construe the statue being administered and purpory to do no more than
interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no single person
or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by
the said rules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on
the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by EO
292 s. of 1988 otherwise known as the administrative code of 1987 on prior notice, hearing and
publication in order to be valid and binding except when the same is merely an interpretative
rule. This is because when an administrative rule is merely intepretative in nature its applicability
needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the
law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that ca  facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation
of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed
before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that A0 67 is actually the rule that
originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the
issuamce of CPR covering certain pharmaceutical products as such, it is considered an
administrative regulation – a legislative rule to be exact – issued by the Secretary of Health in
consonance with the express authority granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory
mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the FDA prior to their
manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the validity of its issuance, the
court deems that AO 67 complied with the requirements of prior hearing, notice and publication
pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded tl the govt in the exercise of its official duties.

On the other hand, circulars no. 1 and 8 s. of 1997 cannot be considered as administrative
regulations because they do not: a.) implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof; b.) Interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulation under which FDA operates
and/or; c.) Ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA
3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these is for FDA to administer and supervise the
implementation of the provisions of AO 67 s. of 1989 including those covering the BA/BE
testing requirement consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA has sufficient
authority to issue the said circulars and since theu would not affect the substantive rights of the
parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in
the first place – no prior hearing, consultation and publication are needed for their validity

MIRASOL V. DPWH
G.R. No. 158793 June 8, 2006

Facts: Petitioners filed for TRO for DPWH Administrative Order 1, Series of 1968 (prohibiting
bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized) to drive in limited access
facilities) and DPWH Department Order 74, Series of 1993 (Declaration of the North Luzon
Expressway from Balintawak to Tabang and the South Luzon Expressway from Nichols to
Alabang as Limited Access Facilities). Whilst this is pending, DPWH acting thru TRB issued
Department Order 123 allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters
inside limited access facilities. Petitioners assail the DPWH’s failure to provide “scientific” and
“objective” data on the danger of having motorcycles plying our highways. They attack this
exercise of police power as baseless and unwarranted. Trial court dismissed the petition but
declared DO 123 invalid.

Issue: Whether AO1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional on the ground of violating equal
protection law?

Decision: Petition partly granted. DO 74 / 215 / 123 declared void and AO 1 valid. The sole
standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness. What is “reasonable” is not subject to exact
definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test of reasonableness exists for its
determination rests upon human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case. We find that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines
several precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These rules were designed
to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities.
DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has devolved this
function to the DOTC. Thus, DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate
it.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

COURT OF TAX APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION G.R. No.
119761 August 29, 1996 VITUG, J.:
FACTS: Fortune Tobacc Fortune Tobacco Corpora Corporation, engaged in tion, engaged in the
manufacture of the manufacture of differe different cigarette brands nt cigarette brands was
issued separate certificates of trademark registration on various dates for their products
CHAMPION, HOPE and MORE. In a letter by then CIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan Jr. To
Deputy Minister Ramon Diaz of the PCGG, the commission classified these cigarettes as foreign
brands having been listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies.
Fortune Tobacco removed said brands from the foreign brands category by changing the names
to HOPE Luxury and Premium MORE . Pro Premium MORE . Proof was submitted tha of was
submitted that CHAMPION t CHAMPION was their orig was their original product an inal
product and therefore a local brand. Ad valorem valorem taxes were imposed imposed on Hope
Luxury More Premium Premium and Champion Champion International at 40% International at
40% to 45% and Cha to 45% and Champion Kings and Lights at 15% mpion Kings and Lights at
15% to 20%. to 20%. A bill which later which later became RA became RA 7564 became
effective became effective on July 3, 1993 and it amended amended Sec 142(c)(1) of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Two days before RA 7654 became effective RMC 37-9 RMC
37-93 was issued by the BIR the BIR stipulating that since HOPE, MORE and CHAMPION
can’t be traced to a single manufacturer of a single country, they are considered locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to 55% Ad Valorem tax on cigarettes.
On July 2, On July 2, 1993, BIR Deputy Commission 1993, BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor
Deoferio Jr. s er Victor Deoferio Jr. sent a copy of RMC 37- ent a copy of RMC 37- 93 via
telefax to Fortune Tobacco addressed to no particular person. A copy of the same was received
by the company by ordinary mail on July 15, 1993 which prompted them to write a letter to the
appellate division of BIR requesting for review, reconsideration and recall of said memo. The
request was denied and an ad valorem tax deficiency was assessed at P 9,598,334. Fortune
Tobacco filed a petition for revi ion for review with the CTA whic ew with the CTA which ruled
that when ed that when RA 7654 took effect, the brands were not classified and taxed at 55%. As
such , they shall be classified as locally manufactured cigarettes taxed at 45 or 20% as the case
may be. The ad may be. The ad valorem tax assessmen valorem tax assessment was cancelled for
lack t was cancelled for lack of legal basis. With the of legal basis. With the CTA dismissing a
motion for reconsideration, the CIR filed a petition for review with CA which affirmed in all
respect the assailed decision and resolution. There was no Notice and hearing and CIR argued
that the memo was a mere interpretation of the ruling of BIR and as such, notice and hearing is
not required.
ISSUE: WON RMC 37-93 is a mere interpretative ruling which can stand as valid and
enforceable without publication.
RULING: No. Like any government agency, the CIR may not disregard legal requirements and
applicable principles in the exercise of its quasi legislative powers. Lack of notice and hearing
was a violation of the required due process and an infringement of the uniformity of taxation and
equal protection considering further that it excluded other cigarette bearing foreign brands.
Interpretative rules provide guidelines which the administrative agency in charge must enforce.
When merely interpretative, it has no other consequences other than what the law itself has
already prescribed. The memo was not a mere interpretative rule. Instead, it was a legislative rule
in the nature of subordinate legislation designed to implement a primary legislation by providing
details thereof. Being a promulgated legislative rule, it must be published. BIR in its move to
reclassify the three cigarette brands and in raising their ad valorem taxes legislated under a quasi
legislative authority, it did not simply interpret RA 7654. Without RMC 37-93, the enactment of
RA 7654 would have no new tax rate consequence on the products of the private respondent.

Tanada v. Tuvera
GR. No. L-63915

Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no
legal personality or standing to bring this mandamus proceeding in the absence of any showing
that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question, hence, they are not "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presidential issuance in question need to be published in the
Official Gazette for its effectivity

RULINGS: The presidential issuance in question need to be published in the Official Gazette
to complete its effectivity. Article 2 of the New Civil Code invokes publication as an
indispensable requirement for laws to become effective. The clause in such provision stating
that “unless it is otherwise provided” pertains to the effective date but subject to the requirement
of a complete publication.
The Court ordered that unless these presidential issuance were published in the Official Gazette,
these shall have no binding force and effect.

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, INC.

(ASTEC), BATANGAS I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (BATELEC I), QUEZON I
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (QUEZELCO I), and QUEZON II ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (QUEZELCO II), Petitioners, v. ENERGY REGULATORY
 COMMISSION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 192117 : September 18, 2012

FACTS: Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BATELEC I), Quezon I Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (QUEZELCO I), Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (QUEZELCO II) and
Pampanga Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. (PRESCO) are rural electric cooperatives
established under P.D. No. 269. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are members
of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc. (ASTEC). PRESCO is a
member of the Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (CLECA). BATELEC I, et
al. are engaged in the distribution of electricity.

On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 or the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 was enacted. The law imposed a cap on the recoverable
rate of system loss that may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their consumers. The
IRR of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative to file with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB), on or before 30 September 1995, an application for approval of an
amended Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) Clause incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate
of system loss to be included in its schedule of rates.

On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was
also enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC). The ERC issued an Order which provides that rural electric cooperatives
should only recover from their members and patrons the actual cost of power purchased from
power suppliers. The ERC also ordered BATELEC, et al. to refund their respective over-
recoveries to end-users. In addition, the ERC also adopted the new "grossed-up factor
mechanism" in the computation of the over-recoveries of the electric cooperatives to be remitted
to their consumers.

Thus, BATELEC I, et al. moved to reconsider the said orders but the ERC denied the same. On
appeal, the CA upheld the validity of the ERC Orders.

Hence, this petition. BATELEC I, et al. aver that these ERC Orders are invalid for lack of
publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and for their retroactive application.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed orders are invalid for non-publication, non-submission to
the U.P. Law Center and for their retroactivity?

HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.

Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and regulations be published in order
to be effective. In Tada v. Tuvera, this Court articulated the fundamental requirement of
publication, thus: "We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation."

There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication. First, an interpretative
regulation does not require publication in order to be effective. The applicability of an
interpretative regulation "needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed." It "adds nothing to the law"
and "does not affect the substantial rights of any person." Second, a regulation that is merely
internal in nature does not require publication for its effectivity. It seeks to regulate only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the general public. Third, a letter of instruction
issued by an administrative agency concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by subordinates
in the performance of their duties does not require publication in order to be effective.

The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are
interpretative regulations. Publication is not necessary for the effectivity of the policy guidelines.
As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts
extended by power suppliers are also not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center in order
to be effective.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court recognized the basic rule "that no statute, decree,
ordinance, rule or regulation (or even policy) shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly
stated so." A law is retrospective if it "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability,
in respect of transactions or consideration already past." The policy guidelines of the ERC on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are not retrospective. The policy guidelines
did not take away or impair any vested rights of the rural electric cooperatives. Furthermore, the
policy guidelines of the ERC did not create a new obligation and impose a new duty, nor did it
attach a new disability.
However, the grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 as it serves as an
additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied by rural electric cooperatives in
the implementation of the PPA. In light of these, the grossed-up factor mechanism does not
merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 or its IRR.It is also not merely internal in nature. The grossed-up
factor mechanism amends the IRR by providing an additional numerical standard that must be
observed and applied in the implementation of the PPA. The grossed-up factor mechanism is
therefore an administrative rule that should be published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center in
order to be effective.

As previously stated, it does not appear from the records that the grossed-up factor mechanism
was published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center. Thus, it is ineffective and may not serve as
a basis for the computation of over-recoveries. The portions of the over-recoveries arising from
the application of the mechanism are therefore invalid. Furthermore, the application of the
grossed-up factor mechanism to periods of PPA implementation prior to its publication and
disclosure renders the said mechanism invalid for having been applied retroactively.

PARTLY GRANTED

Santiago vs. Bautista

G.R. No. L-25024 | 1970-03-30

Facts: Teodoro Santiago, Jr., a pupil in Grade Six at the public school. Two days before
graduation, he (represented by his mother) filed a certiorari action under Rule 65 sought the
invalidation of the ‘ranking of honor students’ where he ranked ‘third placer’. Santiago alleged
that the teachers of the school who composed the "Committee on the Rating of Student for
Honor" gravely abused their discretion and showed bias through several instances such as the
changing of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Lingat, from
80% to 85%, and some teachers giving petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI. This
resulted to Socorro Medina and Patricia Lingat becoming first and second placers respectively,
which prove that there was already an intention to pull him to a much lower rank at the end of
the school year.

Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case claiming that the certiorari was improper since
it is a remedy against abuse of judicial power and the ranking committee is not a tribunal or body
exercising judicial function. Moreover, the issue has become academic since the graduation has
already proceeded.
Issue: Whether or not there is an actual cause of action for petition for certiorari.

Ruling: No. The court held to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part
of appellant to comply with the requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower
court's holding that appellant's failure to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment or
order subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by
precedents as well.

Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations G.R. No. 46496 | 1940-02-27

Subject: Court of Industrial Relations, Due Process in Administrative Proceedings,
Substantial Evidence
Facts: A motion for new trial was filed before the Supreme Court by the respondent labor union
seeking to vacate its previous decision, and to remand the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations. On the other hand, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Solicitor General
seeking to have the Court reconsider its decision. This case arose out of a labor dispute wherein
the employees of a leather company, members of the respondent union, were laid off, on the
basis of an alleged leather shortage. Thus, a case for unfair labor practice was filed against the
leather company, herein petitioner, before the Court of Industrial Relations. The union now asks
for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence which they could not have filed before
the Court of Industrial Relations despite the exercise of due diligence.
Issue: WON the union was denied due process by CIR.
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is
a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the
Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked
and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as
will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers,
and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to,
and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR
is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's
cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented; (3) The decision must have something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be
substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its
judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. SC said there was a failure to
grasp the fundamental issue involved due to failure to receive all relevant evidence. Thus, the
motion for a new trial was granted and the entire record of this case is remanded to the CIR.

Casimiro v. Tandog,
G.R. No. 146137, June 8, 2005

FACTS: On 04 September 1996, Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andres,

submitted a report[2] based on an investigation he conducted into alleged irregularities in
the office of petitioner Casimero. The report spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax
Declarations No. 0236 in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one in
the name of petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No.
0376 in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and the issuance of new ones in favor of
petitioner’s brother -in-law Marcelo Molina.

Immediately thereafter, respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 13[3]
dated 06 September 1996, placing the petitioner under preventive suspension for thirty
(30) days. Three (3) days later, Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 15,
directing petitioner to answer the charge of irregularities in her office. In her answer,[4]
petitioner denied the alleged irregularities claiming, in essence, that the cancellation of
the tax declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her
assumption to office as municipal assessor, and that she issued new tax declarations in
favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a deed of sale executed by
Antipas San Sebastian in Molina’s favor. 

On 23 October 1996, thru Memorandum Order No. 17,[5] respondent Mayor extended
petitioner’s preventive suspension for another thirty (30) days effective 24 October 1996
to give him more time to verify and collate evidence relative to the alleged
irregularities.

On 28 October 1996, Memorandum Order No. 18[6] was issued by respondent Mayor
directing petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-complaint of Noraida San
Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano.

Noraida San Sebastian Cesar alleged that Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376
 covering parcels of land owned by her parents were transferred in the name of a certain
Marcelo Molina, petitioner’s brother-in-law, without the necessary documents. Noraida
Cesar further claimed that Marcelo Molina had not yet paid the full purchase price of the
land covered by the said Tax Declarations.
In response to Memorandum Order No. 18, petitioner submitted a letter dated 29
October 1996, stating that with respect to the complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar,
she had already explained her side in the letter dated 26 September 1996.

Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter.
After a series of hearings, the committee, on 22 November 1996, submitted its report
recommending petitioner’s separation from service, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Evaluating the facts above portrayed, it is clearly shown that Municipal Assessor
Haydee Casimero is guilty of malperformance of duty and gross dishonesty to the
prejudice of the taxpayers of San Jose, Romblon who are making possible the payments
of her salary and other allowances. Consequently, we are unanimously recommending
her separation from service.

Based on the above recommendation, respondent Mayor issued Administrative Order No.
1[11] dated 25 November 1996 dismissing petitioner.

ISSUE:  whether or not petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process
when she was terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose,
Romblon.

HELD: SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law. 

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely,
that there is deprivation of life, liberty and property and such deprivation is done without
proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process, however, a
distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance.

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice
and a real opportunity to be heard.[18] In administrative proceedings, such as in the case
at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
 “To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru
pleadings.  We opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the
following:

(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a
respondent’s legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
(3) finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted
for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected

In the case at bar, what appears in the record is that a hearing was conducted on 01
October 1996, which petitioner attended and where she answered questions propounded
by the members of the fact-finding committee. Records further show that the petitioner
was accorded every opportunity to present her side.
She filed her answer to the formal charge against her. After a careful evaluation of
evidence adduced, the committee rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the
CSC and the Court of Appeals, upon a
move to review the same by the petitioner. Indeed, she has even brought the matter to
this Court for final adjudication.

Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence
or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient basis for the imposition of any
disciplinary action upon an employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
where the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible
for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and
confidence demanded by his position

Two alleged irregularities provided the dismissal from service of herein petitioner:

1. The cancellation of complainant Teodulo Matillano’s tax declaration and the issuance of a
new one in favor of petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling; and
2. The cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of complainant Noraida San Sebastian
Cesar’s parent in favor of petitioner’s brother -in-law, Marcelo Molina.
Dishonesty is considered as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. It is beyond cavil that petitioner’s acts displayed
want of honesty.