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If Western sanctions are the only response to its latest missile test, Pyongyang
will have no choice but to escalate its actions
During the administration of Donald Trump, North Korean denuclearization had been
at the top of the list of US foreign policy priorities. Under Joe Biden, the North
Korean problem has been relegated to the back burner. A recent test of an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) allegedly capable of striking targets
across the US demonstrates the folly of allowing diplomacy to languish.
The launch of the Hwasong-17 ICBM, which had been publicly unveiled at an October
2020 military parade in Pyongyang and again at a defense exhibition in October
2021, represents a dramatic leap forward in terms of North Korean military
capability.
The test, which used a mobile launcher from a site adjacent to Pyongyang
International Airport, was conducted using a lofted trajectory that, according to
North Korean media, saw the missile travel 1,090km (681 miles) for 67 minutes,
reaching an altitude of around 6,250km (3,905 miles), before accurately hitting its
intended target in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Japan.
The flight parameters of the missile test would give the Hwasong-17 a demonstrated
range of just under 15,000km (9,320 miles) – more than enough to hit any target in
the continental United States.
Reportedly, North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, personally oversaw the launch of the
Hwasong-17 – a missile he claimed had been developed due to “the inevitability of
the long-standing confrontation with the US imperialists, accompanied by the danger
of a nuclear war.” According to his nation’s state-run media, it is capable of
carrying multiple nuclear warheads, “exactly met the design requirements,” and was
assessed as being ready for operations “under wartime environment and conditions.”
Thursday’s test had been preceded by a series of missile launches that appeared to
have been related to the testing of individual components in preparation for the
full-scale testing of the missile. While these tests, which used the Hwasong-17 as
a booster to launch military reconnaissance satellites, did not have the rocket fly
to its full potential range, they did serve to validate its propulsion system, as
well as its ability to separate a payload with precision in space – both essential
tasks for an operational ICBM-capable missile.
North Korea has been unable to achieve any meaningful diplomatic traction with the
Biden administration, after four years of unprecedented yet ultimately fruitless
direct engagement with the Trump administration and President Trump personally. As
part of the now-stalled denuclearization talks, in 2018, North Korea undertook a
self-imposed moratorium on the testing of long-range missiles.
The ICBM test is a clear demonstration that Pyongyong believes the diplomatic
window that had been opened with the US under Trump is now closed, and, as such,
was in keeping with the goal of enhancing North Korea’s self-defense capabilities
that Kim had outlined in his end-of-year message to the nation.
The Biden administration has committed toa policy built around a notional “Pacific
pivot” that would place the issue of North Korea and, in particular, its nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile programs, at the forefront. A disastrous withdrawal
from Afghanistan, coupled with heightened tensions with Russia over Ukraine, have
prevented this “pivot” from making the transition from paper to action, however.
The important takeaway from the testing of the Hwasong-17 isn’t that North Korea is
preparing for war, but rather that it is seeking to create an environment in which
a diplomatic solution to the ongoing standoff with the West can once again take
priority. Kim, in the aforementioned end-of-year speech, in December, did not
emphasize military strength, but rather domestic frailty, acknowledging for the
first time that his country was suffering acute food shortages. With devastating
floods crippling North Korean rice production, the UN estimates the country is
facing a food deficit of nearly 860,000 tons (780,179 tonnes), which can only be
met with international assistance.
If the only response by the US and the West to the testing of the Hwasong-17 is yet
another round of economic sanctions, it may have no choice but to escalate its
actions, most likely in the form of renewed nuclear weapons testing. The main
problem today isn’t North Korean belligerency, but a lack of US vision in
exploiting the opportunity created by Pyongyong’s measured provocation.