Cold War

What is Cold War?

- period of hostility and high tension between states, which stop just short of war
o  1945-1991
o  USSR & USA
- emerging 2 powers following the Nazi Germany in 1945
- direct conflict due to mass power was unthinkable
- 45y of ideological conflict, conventional and nuclear arms race and proxy wars
o  economical rivalry, espionage networks
- Lippman – popularized term Cold War
Communism x Capitalism
- key difference, uncapable of coexisting
Economy
- west - individuals should be able to compete with each other with a minimum of state
interference and make as much money
o capitalism
o individuals are encouraged to work hard with the promise of individual reward
- east - capitalism creates divisions between rich and poor
o all businesses and farms should be owned by the state on behalf of the people
o communism
o goods will be distributed to individuals by the state, thus everyone gets what is
needed and everyone will be working for the collective good
Politics
- west - individuals choose the government through voting
o range of political parties
o individuals have certain rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of the
press
o liberal democracy
- east - no need for a range of political parties
o Communist Party truly represents the views of all the workers and rules on
behalf of the people
o individual freedoms valued by the West are not necessary
o one-party state.
Increasing tension priort to WW II.
- intervention of West in the Russian Civil War (1918-1922)
o  support of conservative forces to overthrow Bolshevik gov
- USSR wasn’t diplomatically recognized by the League of Nations until 1934
- appeasment of Hitler in 1930’s
o  fear of Communism greater than of German fascism
- Non-Aggression Pact (Nazi-Soviet Pact) – 1939
 o  allowing Hitler to attack on the West
What elements of self-interest lay behind each country’s ideals?
USA
- The need to establish markets and open doors to free trade
- The desire to avoid another economic crisis of the magnitude of 1929
- President Truman and most of the post-war US administration’s belief that what was good
for America was good for the world
USSR
- The need to secure borders
- The need to recover from the effects of World War Two
- The need to regain strength as the ‘nursery of Communism’
- Stalin’s belief that what was good for the USSR was good for workers of the world
Significance of Stalin
- concrete leader by late 1920’s
o  collectivization of all farms, five-year industrial plans
o  Great Terror – purges of political opponents – gulags
- the dominance of Stalin over the party, and the party over state institutions
- a powerful state security machine
- the ruthless maintenance of power by the elimination of opposing leaders, groups, or
entire sections of the population
- the development of a regime associated with paranoia and violence
Why superpowers?
Military
- To defeat Germany, the USA had become the number-one air-force power in the
world.
- To defeat Germany, the USSR had become the number-one land-force power in the
world.
- France’s and Britain’s inability to defeat Germany had changed the balance of power.
They had become ‘second-rank’ powers. ●
- The USSR now lacked any strong military neighbours. This made it the regional
power.
Economic
- The USA’s economy was strengthened by the war. It was now able to out-produce all
the other powers put together.
- The USA was committed to more ‘open trade’. Its politicians and businesspeople
wanted to ensure liberal trade, and market competition flourished. The United States
 was willing to play an active role in avoiding the re-emergence of the disastrous
prewar pattern of trade blocs and tariffs.
- The USA had the economic strength to prevent a return to instability in Europe.
- The small Eastern European countries that had been created after World War One
were not economically viable on their own, so they needed the support of a stronger
neighbour, and the USSR could replace Germany in this role.
Political
- For the West, the outcome of World War Two showed that the ideals of democracy
and international collaboration had triumphed over fascism. Thus the political system
of the USA was the right path for the future.
- For the Soviet Union, it was Communism that had triumphed over fascism. Indeed,
Communism had gained widespread respect in Europe because of its part in resisting
the Germans.
- The USSR’s huge losses, and the role of the Red Army in defeating the Nazis, gave
Stalin a claim to great influence in forming the post-war world.
- The USSR had the political (as well as military) strength to prevent a return to
instability in Eastern Europe. Communism could fill the political vacuum there.ä

Break down of the Great Alliance

- 1945 – Elba Meeting, defeat of Germany due to collaboration of USA and Allies in
Great Alliance
- late 1949 – Europe dividied into 2 spheres of influence
o  9.1949 – FRG – West Germany
 following the Berlin Blockade
o  10.1949 – GDR – East Germany
- steps that led to division:

1939
- German invasion of Poland: Britain and France declare war on Germany
- Beginning of Winter War between USSR and Finland
1940
 - Hitler’s blitzkrieg through Europe: takeover of Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and France
- Battle of Britain
1941
- Germany begins ‘Operation Barbarossa’ and invasion of USSR
- Britain and USA sign Atlantic Charter Pearl Harbor attack by Japan brings USA into
the war
1942
- German assault on Stalingrad
- German defeat at El Alamein in North Africa
1943
- German defeat at Stalingrad
- Allied invasion of Italy
- Tehran Conference
1944
- D-Day landings by Western Allies begin in Normandy
- Rome falls to allied forces
1945
- Warsaw falls to Soviet troops
- Yalta Conference
- Russian forces enter Berlin
- President Roosevelt dies and is replaced by Truman
- United Nations meets for the first time in San Francisco
- Germany surrenders
- Potsdam Conference
- Nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki Japan surrenders
1946
- Kennan’s Long Telegram
- Iran crisis
- Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech at Fulton, Missouri
1947
- Announcement of Truman Doctrine: aid sent to Greece and Turkey
- Marshall Plan for economic recovery of Europe proposed
- Creation of Cominform
1948
- Czechoslovakian Coup
- Marshall Plan passed by Congress
- Berlin airlift
1949
- COMECON established
- NATO established
- Berlin Blockade ends
- USSR explodes its first atomic bomb
- FRG/GDR established
Breakdown
 - begun in 1941 when Churchill and Roosvelt send troops to aid Soviets
o  realtions tense mainly with UK – distrust
- Soviets demanded more support
o  opeing Second Front in the East
 partially agreed, built if it was the right time
 postponing to permanently weaken USSR
1. Wartime Conferences
- decision of Grand Allience determined the territiorial and political changes in Europe
- key points:
o  state of war
o status of DE, PL, Eastern Europe, JP
o  UN
Tehran Conference
- 11.1943, Stalin, Roosvelt, Churchill
State of the war
o  1943 – start of winning by Allies, following by the turning-point
o  pushing Germany into Eastern front
 W – drawing Germany from North Africa and invaded Italy (Mussol.)
 W – still not making front
o  Germany – different views on post-war, failure of Treaty of Versialles
 no agreement over DE’s furture
o  agreed on goal of unconditional surrender
o  support of Operation Overlord (Allied invasion of nFR begun on D-Day,
6.6.1944)
o  Poland – concern over security and borders
 Stalin wanted to gain the territory of PL – agreement over seized parts
in 1939
 ensuring hostility with Germany & Poland (due to given border)
 puppet regime
 increased tensions over Katyn Massacre
 Soviets blamed Germans
o  Eastern Europe – Soviets demanded siezed teritories
 control over Baltic States, Romania
 W agreed to such annexation
 against Atlantic Charter (agreement, UK x USA)
o  Japan – UK & USA wanted USSR to enter war with JP
 wanted stalin to open second front in Asia
o  UN – wanted to replace League of Nations
 again designed to collective security
Conclusion
- agreement on a new international organization
- agreement on the need for a weak post-war Germany
Yalta Conference
 - 1945
- Stalin’s strong diplomatic position due to occupation of most Eastern Europe
o  Due to strong presence, USSR was ready to invade Germany itself
o  Germany heavily attacked aerialy, and from both fronts
- Germany – demilitarized, de-Nazified, divided in 4 zones of occupation (temporary)
o  Allied Control Council (ACC) – set up to govern Germany
o  reparations set out
- Poland – borders set out by Curzon Line
o  Poles were giving German teritory as compensation as well as more
democratic gov, following ‚free elections‘
o  Lublin Committee communist dominated post-war gov
o  Stalin didn’t paymuch attention to PL
 Katyn Massacre, lack of support for the Warsaw Uprising
 this helped erradicating Poles in favor of free PL
- Eastern Europe – Staling agreed to general free elections
o  percieved as vicotry by W
- Japan – promised to enter war as soon as war was over
o  Soviets demanded JP’s teritory
- United Nations – Stalin agreed to join UN
o  agreement on 5 permanent members of Security Council – each veto
 demanded all Soviet Repblics to have seat in General Assembly
Conclusion
- agreement on the United Nations
- Soviet agreement to join the war in the Pacific against Japan
- the Big Three signing a ‘Declaration on Liberated Europe’ pledging their support for
democratic governments based on free elections in all European countries, including
those in Eastern Europe.
Developments between Yalta & Potsdam Conference
- radical changes in atmosphere:
o President Roosevelt died in April 1945 and was replaced by Truman, who was
to adopt a more hardline, or ‘get tough’, policy towards the Soviets
o Germany finally surrendered unconditionally on 7 May 1945
o Winston Churchill’s Conservative Party lost the July 1945 UK general election
and Churchill was succeeded as prime minister by the Labour Party leader,
Clement Attlee
o As the war in Europe ended, the Soviet Red Army occupied territory as far
west as deep inside Germany
o On 17 July 1945, the day after the Potsdam Conference began, the United
States successfully tested its first atomic bomb
Potsdam Conference
- 1945, Potsdam, Germany
- Stalin, Truman, Attlee
State of war
- 7.5.1945 – Germany surendered
o  War in pacific still raged, USA poised to invade JP
- Germany – agreement of de-Nazification, demiltarization, division
  incapabe to agree how to carry this out
o  agreed uponindependent approach in their zones
o  German economy run as a whole , yet limited to domestic industry and
agriculture
- Poland – Truman not sattsified over agreements
o  establishement of new frontier and reorganisation of gov
o  didn’t feel the elections were free
- Eastern Europe – Truman unhappy about Percentage Agreement (bilateral
agreements between Stalin & Churchill) – sphere of influence according to percentage
o  Truman didn’t want Eastern Europe under Sovit influence
 had little impact
- Japan – 6.8.1945 – Hiroshima & Nagasaki – unconitional surrender
- UN – San Francisco, 1945, 50 nations signed UN Charter
o  USSR – only communis power in Big Five
o  Stalin used veto if something against soviet interest
Conclusion
- agreement for the immediate, practical control of the defeated Germany
- the establishment of the United Nations
Key developments 1946-1947
Salami Tactics
- increase ofinfluence in Eastern Block
- Rakosi, Hungarian Communist leader, commenting on Communist control in Europe
– „like slicing off salami, piece by piece“
o Stage 1: the Soviets supervised the organization of governments in the Eastern
European states, initially establishing a broad alliance of ‘anti-fascists’.
o Stage 2: each of the parties was ‘sliced off ’, one after the other.
o Stage 3: the Communist ‘core’ was left, and then ultimately the local
Communists were replaced (if need be) with Moscow-trained people
- Baggage Train leaders – trustworthy figure who fought in wars returned to countries
o  they would ensure the post-war gov would be dominated by Moscow-backed,
Stalinist Communists
- ‚free elections‘ – 19.1.1947
o  promised at Yalta Conference
o  preceeded by mass murders, censorship, intimidation
o  50k deported
Case study – Poland
- during election:
o  246 candidates from Polish Peasant Party disqulified
 o  1 million take of electoral register
- Donnelly – ‘In these appalling circumstances of intimidation, it was not surprising
that Bierut’s Communists secured complete control in Poland‘
- W had different out look and took it as braching of agreement, E seen it as erradicating
‚western expansionism‘
- this tactics was also used in other countries and persured by the invading Red Troops
Iran
- after the war USSR wanted to increase their sphere of incluence
- Teheran Conforence – UK & USSR agreed that after war they’d withdraw from Iran
o  Stalin - 30,000 troops
 encouraging Communist Uprising
 Allies demanded to withdraw immediately (another breaching)
 1.1.1946 – refused
 US suspected the invasion of Turkey & Black Sea Straits
Instability in Greece & Turkey
- anti-imperialist, nationalist, atmosphere
o  support of pro-Communism
- W believed that rebellions were supported by the USSR
- Churchill enraged due to breaching Percentage Agreements
- Stalin wanted to ensure the international control of Straits of Constantiopole
o  rather than Turkish control
Communist Parties – Italy & France
- post-war influence grew
o  growth of membership due to economic deprivation, hardship experience, ...
- further suspections of Moscow enouragement

Kennan’s Long Telegram – 2.1946

- US diplomat in Moscow, telegram do US State Department about the nature of Soviet
conduct and foreign policy
o  lasting influence on State Department
- ‚Soviet system boyed on the threat of a hostile world outside of borders‘
o ‚highly sesitive to the logic of force‘
- Kennan argued:
o the USSR’s view of the world was a traditional one of insecurity
o the Soviets wanted to advance Muscovite Stalinist ideology (not simply
‘Marxism’)
o the Soviet regime was cruel and repressive and justifi ed this by perceiving
nothing but evil in the outside world. That view of a hostile outside
environment would sustain the internal Stalinist system
o the USSR was fanatically hostile to the West – but it was not ‘suicidal’
- ‚logic of force‘ – driving force behind the policy of containment
 - silimar telegram by Novikov
o  both suggest the suspicion against each other
Churchill’s ‚Iron Curtain‘ speech – 5.3.1946
- one of the defining moment of Cold War
Basis of this speech
- reaction to Communist domunated Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Bulgaria)
o  in spite of ‚free‘ elections
- other not directly linked communist countries – Yuglsolavia, Albania
o  East Germany, Czechslovakia – upcoming years
- remarks made on basis of Red troops present
Soviet Reaction
- quick, Stalin comparing Churchill to Hitler
o they withdrew from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
o they stepped up the tone and intensity of anti-Western propaganda
o they initiated a new five-year economic plan of self-strengthening
- lead to hardening of discontent

Confronation & Containment

- intensification of confronation in every aspect (political, economic, ...)
Truman Doctrine – 12.3.1947
- put forward idea that US had to support free people, resisting the subjugation by
armed minitoties
- Foreign policy whose stated purpose was to counter Soviet geopolitical expansion
during the Cold War. Stated purpose was not to expand American political and
financial interests, although this is of course going to happen
- radical shifting US policies – from isolationalist to containment
o  responsed to unstable Greece and Turkey
 UK established monarchy in GR, yet communist guerrillas in rular area
 UK unable to support
o  US in fear of spreading Communism, passed on this aid
- mutually seen as a sign of spreading influence
- LaFeber - ‚The Truman Doctrine was a milestone in American history … the doctrine
became an ideological shield behind which the United States marched to rebuild the
Western political and economic system and counter the radical left. From 1947 on,
therefore, any threats to that Western system could be easily explained as Communist
inspired, not as problems which arose from difficulties within the system itself. That
was the most lasting and tragic result of the Truman Doctrine. ‘
 Marshall Plan – 1.1947
- with new US Secretary of State
- General G. Marshall – believed that Wester Europe economies needed econimic help
from the USA
o seemed to follow on quite naturally from the Truman Doctrine – it was the
economic extension of the ideas outlined by the president
Dollar Imperialism?
- Marshall Plan – providing help to EU asap
- set out strict rules whether Soviet countries can apply
- Marshall Plan aid were to:
o revive European economies so that political and social stability could ensue
o safeguard the future of the US economy
- 17b dollars – passed in 3.1948
o  succes mailny due to Czech Coup 2.1948
Soviet Reaction to Marshall Plan
- rejection due to allowing to see into financial records
o  example of Dollar Imperialim
- Soviets felt the USA was establishing a European empire, and that its method was
economic domination and dependence, which would ultimately give it political control
- Vyshinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister – openly criticized both for being ‚superpower
oriented‘, ignoring the basics of UN
- prior US had attempted to unite the W with economic tactics
o now building military unity
Molotov Plan
- reaction to Marshall Plan
- bilateral trade agreements aimedto tie Soviet economies of Easter Block and USSR
o  resulted in COMECON – 1.1949 (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)
o  designed to stimulate and control economic development, support
collectivization and development of heavy industry
Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) – 9.1947
- instrument to increase Stalin’s controlover parties
o  originally comprised of USSR, Yugoslavia, CSR, ...
- W feared it could spread Communism in the W
Stalin’s ‘two camps’ doctrine
- Stalin wanted to divide Europe into two camps even before the Churchill’s speech
- Andrei Zhdanov, Cominform delegate
o He stated that the Americans had organized an ‘anti-Soviet’ bloc of countries
that were economically dependent upon them – not only those in Western
Europe, but also in South America and China
 o The ‘second camp’ was the USSR and the ‘new democracies’ in Eastern
Europe
 He also included countries he deemed ‘associated’ or ‘sympathetic’ to
their cause – Indonesia, Vietnam, India, Egypt, and Syria
 ‘two camps’ doctrine was very similar to the ‘new world order’
outlined by Truman
Red Army occupation of Eastern Europe, 1945–1947
- USSR was becoming a satellite empire
o  coutries ket separate legal identities
 yet they were tied to Moscow in:
 Soviet military power (later formalized in the Warsaw Pact in
1955)
 salami tactics which transferred the machinery of government
into the hands of obedient, pro-Soviet Communists
 state police and security/spy networks
 COMECON
o  last country – CSR
 Stalin presented coup as necessary to oust the non.communist leaders
 Soviet military power (later formalized in the Warsaw Pact in 1955)
 salami tactics which transferred the machinery of government into the
hands of obedient, pro-Soviet Communists
 state police and security/spy networks
 COMECON
o  by the end of 1948 satellit states were under contorl of USSR
 W saw this a breach of agreements (Yalta, Potsdam)
 evidence of socialist expansionism
The Czechoslovakian Coup – 2.1948
- CSR seen as more W leaning
o  experssing ideas of acceptingmarshal plan
- sentiment and anger towards USSR due to Munich Agreement (annexation of part of
CSR to Nazi Germany, 1938)
- 2.1948 – Stalin’s organization of ressure on gov
o  12 forced to resign
- under threats of USSR and slight military action Edvard Beneš agreed toformation of
communist-led gov
o  Masaryk, Czech foreign minister, found dead
- Truman usedsuch event to pass on the bill of Marshall Plan
- bloddy purges of disloyal communist occured thorughout the Easter Block
The Berlin Crisis – 1948
- 4 zones of occupation, administered by ACC (Allied Control Council)
- intention to treat as one economic unit and that it would emerge as an independent
state
- 1949 – divided in 2 separate states
Why did they fail to reunify Germany?
Strategic position and different aims of main powers
- geography and potential economic strength
o USSR didn’t want united DE – posing threat – similarly FR
 wanted to get much from reparation
o USA seen the best for peace of EU to economically recover DE
 similar to eradicated socialist influence by using US aid
 UK endorsed this (bankrupt, in favor of aid)
- lack of trust between W x E
o mutual suspicion
 both concerned about the rise of Germany
o US promises to DE that it would not be divided economically
o promise to keep US troops in EU and stand against USSR
- in-German post-war disputes
o division intensified due to:
 economic conflict
 reparations
o USSR – 25% of industry in return for food, raw material
 due to increase of refuge
o secretive about what they took from zone; insufficient
 thus stopping UK & US to supply Soviet zone
 USSR wanted to mine coal, yet US wanted to use it for
economic growth
o early 1947 – Bizonia – merging US & UK zone
 from 4.6.1945 USSR wanted to seize reunified Germany
 donevia use of Red Army and the increasing support of the
Communist Party of Germany (KPD) in other zones
 4.1946 – merging of Communist and Social Democratic party
o Socialist Unity Party (SED)
o incapable of winning over the West Germans
 Germans unlikely to vote for socialist parties
which although might unify Germany, but
wouldn’t provide economical support (compared
to Marshall Plan) and no democracy
 W started considering unifying occupation zones and est
provisional gov
 London Conference of Ministers – 1947
o was supposed to consider German peace treaty
o yet ended in recriminations
 London Conference – 1948
o drawing new constitution for Western Germany
o coming to existence in 1949
o also considering currency reform
 devaluated new currency
  Germany as a barter community
 Stalin saw this as est of ‘new Germany’ forcing
out W out of Berlin
Berlin Blockade – 1948
- 4 occupation zones
- Berlin in the E zone, sealed off from the rest in 1946
o W Berlin relied on W Zones to provide them with supplies
- 3.1948 – Stalin started putting transport restrictions
- with currency reform put on full blockade (23-24.6.1948)
o any communication
o supply of energy from East to West was cut
- USSR left the ACC in 3.1948
- first crisis of Col War and military confrontation
o W didn’t use force, but supplied W Berlin with supplies via air
 200,000 flights in 320 day for 2.2 mil. Berliners
 threat of Soviet military response
o by early 1949, Stalin was failing
- end by 5.1949
Outcomes of Berlin Blockade - 1948
- first time was was a possibility since 1945
o certain any agreement wasn’t possible
- results:
o the division of Germany
o the continuation of four-power control in Berlin
o the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Division of Germany
- failure of blockade meant division was innevitable
o  W – FGR – Federal Republic of Germany
 9.1949
 10.1949 – Adenauer, first chancellor
o  E – GDR – German Democratic Republic
- both sides didn’t want united DE, because of the possiblity of DE as a whole
becoming an ally
o  W – divided DE protected by the USA was m,ore favorable than neutral
united DE
 EU divided economically, politically
- Berlin still remained a divided city
o  4 powers withing GDR
 Berlin as the major source of friction
Formation of NATO
- Wester suspicion was reinforced by the Berlin Airlift, Czech Coup
 o  this emphasiszed the need US defence of EU
- 4.1949 – USA, CA, Brussels Pact, Norway, DK, Iceland, IT, PT
- at the same time US Congress a proved plan of military assistance to build up
Europe’s armed forces
o  major military presence of US in EU
 cleary departing from previous US foreign policy
- Paris Pacts
o  West Germany into NATO
 confirming USSR’s danger
Warsaw Pact - 1955
- all states of Eastern Europe under single military command
o  lack of organaisation
o  initially more pollitican than military alliance
 dividing EU economically, militairly and politically
Situation by the end of 1949
- Europe was now clearly divided along political, economic, and military lines
- Germany was not to be reunited as had been the original aim of the Allies at the end of
World War Two. There were now two clear states, although neither side was prepared
to recognize the existence of the other (until Ostpolitik in the 1970s).
- The USA had abandoned its peacetime policy of avoiding commitments and was now
involved economically (through the Marshall Plan) and militarily (through NATO) in
Europe.
- No peace treaty had actually been signed with Germany, which meant that the borders
of central Europe were not formalized. This was particularly worrying for Poland, as it
now included territory taken from Germany in 1945. (This was not finally resolved
until 1975.)
- Western countries had developed a greater sense of unity due to the Soviet threat.
How this impacted the international relations beyond EU?
- From this time on, many conflicts, wherever they were in the world, would be seen as
part of the struggle between Communism and Capitalism.
- The USA’s policy of containment, which had been developed to fight Communism in
Europe, was to lead the USA into resisting Communism anywhere in the world that it
perceived Communism was a threat. This would involve the USA fighting in both the
Korean War and the Vietnam War.
- The United Nations was never to play the role envisioned in the original discussions
between Roosevelt and Churchill at the time of its foundation. With the USA and the
USSR now opposing each other and able to use their respective vetoes, the UN could
not act effectively to resolve international conflicts.
 How can we explain the breakdown of the Grand Alliance?

Role of ideology
- incompatable idologies that could coexist
o  Red Scare – resentment towards communists in US after the Bolshevik Rev.
 distrust was entrenched even in the domestic US policies by 1945
- to US it seemed like USSR wanted to spread communism worldwide
o Salami tactics after 1945, the Czech Coup and the Berlin Blockade appeared to
be motivated by a desire to spread Communism in Eastern Europe.
o The newly established Cominform was seen as an organization which was
designed to promote worldwide revolution.
o The rise of Communist parties in France and Italy after World War Two and
the civil war in Greece were all seen as being encouraged and funded by the
Soviets.
o Soviet activity in Iran reinforced the belief that Stalin wanted influence outside
of Eastern Europe.
- USSR seen US as wanting to encircle USSR and overthrow the gov:
o The Marshall Plan was seen as an example of ‘dollar imperialism’ and an
attempt to extend influence over Europe and lure East European states away
from the Soviet Union.
o US economic power, and its drive to establish free trade across the globe and
keep markets favourable to US interests, seemed to indicate the possibility of
US global economic domination.
o US actions in Germany, particularly its introduction of the new currency in
Western zones, appeared to be an attempt to spread US influence.
- in both case spropaganda was widely used to undermine eachother
Role of Great Power rivaly – quesitonable importance
- some argue that it was due to traditional Great Power rivalries
- Walter LaFeber and Louis Halle both see the USA and the USSR as expansionist
powers. Therefore, the hostility that followed 1945 was a continuation of policies they
had respectively pursued since the 19th century
- WW II. exasterbated this becaause it tured them into superpowers
o  natural decline of power of other states and naturla want to expand theri
sphere of influences
Role of economic interest
- both set up opposite economy systems within EU
o  signifying economic interest
- post-war devastated EU made easy for them to impose this
- US – est of open markets to preven the return of inter-war economic problems
o  stting up of Bretton Woods system
 included Internationa Momentary Fund, World Bank
  USSR cooperated whoever the tough anti-communist
application for loand cause a great dispute over the US and
USSR
- the emphasis on free market Capitalism cause USSR to withdraw
o „dollar imperialism“ – USSR
- US set up economic aims according to capitalism, promting their influence and appeal
o  Marshall Plan had similar effect
 stronly idological purpose to stop bankrupted EU from supporting
Communism
- as a response COMECON
o  financial assistance to Easter Europe
 this also helped to impose its regiemes in E.EU
- thus both superpowers used similar economic measures to secure ideological aims
- economic interest cause also ifferent views upon DE
o  USA – seen as important tu support DE for general EU recovery as well as
a possible exporter and importer, possible E front
 Marshall Plan
o  USSR – wanted to keep DE weak, so it doesn’t pose a threat
 dismantling of E.DE to weaken
- these different economic view were relfected in:
o the Berlin Blockade (1948) – USSR
o  currency reforms – USA
- different economic interests cause major tensions
How did actions of USSR & USA cause breakdown?
- still large dispute among historians
o  despite different idologies Cold War was not inevitable
USSR
- Roosevelt avised at Yalta that he didn’t want to remain in occupation of DE for more
than 2y
- US also expected for USSR to remain in Bretton Woods and the new economic
structure
o Tony Judt – the mutual benefi ts to be had from an increase in international
commerce and fi nancial stability would eventually overcome national
traditions and political mistrust’
- US supprised to withdraw from Bretton Woods system
o  yet they believed before incidents listed below that cooperation was possible
 Stalin did not keep to the agreement made at Yalta regarding Poland.
He also did not keep to his agreement to allow free elections in the
other East European countries that the Red Army had liberated. Using
‘salami tactics’, all of these countries were under Communist control
by the end of 1948, which meant a Stalinist-style oneparty state with no
individual freedoms.
 Thus his actions were perceived by the West as aggressive and
expansionist.
  The Soviets exploited wartime agreements to retain a military presence
in northern Iran after the war until they were forced to leave in 1946.
 The Berlin Blockade was ill-conceived and seen by the West as a
prelude to a possible attack on West Germany.
 The establishment of Cominform was an attempt to control Communist
parties throughout Europe, which was also a sign that Stalin wanted to
spread Soviet-style Communism.
 Stalin’s suspicious approach to the West meant that he interpreted all
actions as deliberate attempts to weaken the USSR. His policies inside
the Soviet Union indicate that he was not a leader who would support
compromise and conciliation; in fact, he promoted hostility to the West
within the USSR in order to get support for his policies.
- Churchill’s speech and Kennan’s Long Telegram that highlited Stalin’s intentions
o  leading to Truman act of 1947 – containment of Communism
USA
- we can also argue that Stalin because it was US’s overreaction and the pursuit of
ideology and economic interest
- USSR experienced hostility since 1917 (Bolshevik Revolution)
- WW II. – huge causalties, economic impact
- est of Easter European communist countries
o  serving as a Buffer Zone
- not supporting Greek Communist – fake accusations by USA
o  yet breached the Percentage Agreement
 recognized Greece as UK sphere of influence
- therefore we can see setting-up of Stalinist gov, Berline Blockade as the effect of Cold
War not cause, stemming from:
o The dropping of the atom bomb, which, it could be argued, was designed to
make clear to Stalin the military superiority of the US.
o The US’s determination to impose its own ideas for a new world order after
1945 through open markets, self-determination, democracy and collective
security
 Increasingly, this was seen as ‘dollar diplomacy’ – the US imposing its
own values and advancing its own interests.
o The US’s failure to take account of Soviet anxiety and insecurity, which
stemmed from its previous encounters with the West and the immense losses
incurred during the war
 The US failed to see that Stalin’s actions were not about spreading
Communism but were about defending the Soviet Union.
o Truman’s exaggeration of the threat of Communism in his speech to Congress
 to gain support aid for Greece and Turkey.
o The US’s determination after 1947 to interpret all actions of the Soviet Union
as being ideological
 this made the Americans ignore evidence to the contrary
 seen particularly with regard to China becoming Communist
 o USSR was blamed when it was clear (also to US offcials
on the ground in China in 1949) that Mao’s victory had
little to do with Stalin.
o Marshall Plan
 seen by the Soviet Union as ‘Capitalist interference’
o The introduction of a new currency into Berlin
 provocative, and indicated to Stalin that the West was trying to
establish an anti-Soviet state on his borders.
o The West’s establishment of NATO, which was an aggressive action against
the security of the Soviet Union
- USSR actions as an attempt to defend itself as anti-Soviet actions
o every action Stalin took in response to the West, to defend the USSR, was
seen by the West as further evidence of Soviet aggression
Role of suspicion and fear
FEAR
USA
- links to view that idology was the driver and that USA’s reactions were due to fear of
Communism
- although we can argue that Stalin’s actions were defense to USA, we can also argue
that actions take by the USA were the result of USA fearing the communism
examsionism if not contained
- Kennan’s long telegram put forward that USSR wanted to presue world revolution
o  Red Scare
 thereby increasin US actions
o  thus when Czech Coup occured this was taken as the last straw to passing
Marshall Plan
 Berlin Blockade seen as an act of expansion
 Comintern as well
o 1949 – first Soviet atomic bomb increased the threat
 1949 – start of nuclear and arms race
 1949 – est NATO
o  when China became communist and North Korea invaded South Korea, USA
scared of Asian expansion of USSR
USSR
- fear of dollar imperialism
o  to win over E.EU states via financial aid
- USSR economically weakend and USA booming
- aggressive action according to USSR
o  open trade policies
o  Marshall Plan
o  currency reforms in W.DE
o  NATO
- fear of deliberate underminig of the USSR
 o  use of superior
- Gaddis – highlight that fear dictated Stalin’s actions and suspicious nature

Historians interpretations of Cold War

- POV usually determined by the era
Traditional (Orthodox)
- USSR as responsible
- between 1950-1960
- general suspicion that USSR as expansionist according to Marxism
 thus Stalin breached Yalta & Potsdam
- US as in defence
- e.g. – McNeill, Feis
Revisionist
- flourished when consensus over US foreign policies crumbled
- USA responsible
- Appleman Williams – explained in terms of dollar diplomacy
- sees USA as in need forforeign policies oof Capitalism
o  containment driven by the requirement of secure market, free trade, ...

Post-Revisionist
- between these ideas
- John Lewis Gaddis and Walter LaFeber
Post-Cold War historians
- after the fall down
o  no censorship, ...
- Mastny – following Stalin’s role in origin of Cold War
European and Soviet Persepctives
Role of Europeans
- many gov in distress due to post-war era
- some argue that european elite played a role in Cold War
o  locking USA to military and economic support
- UK – did a lot to raise the red threat
o  Churchill’s speech
- arguing the undersetimation of US foreign policies
Soviet Perspective
- most historians W
o  parallel
- in initial stages most convinced in dollar imperialism
- Molotov – Problems of Foreign Policy (book)
o  accusuing US for wanting to take over the EU
o  USSR wanting to find security
 Korean War

1947
Official division of Korea on 38th parallel line
1949
Sept - USSR gets the A-bomb
Dec - Communist victory in Chinese Civil War
1950
April - US National Security Council produces NSC-68
June - North Korea invades South Korea
Sept - US troops land at Inchon
Nov - Chinese launch counter-offensive
Dec - UN troops fall back to 38th parallel
1951
Feb - UN condemns China as aggressor in Korea
April - Eisenhower dismisses MacArthur July Truce talks start in Korea
Sept - USA and Japan sign mutual security pact
Oct - Greece and Turkey join NATO
1952
March - USSR proposes a neutral Germany
Nov - Eisenhower elected US president 1953
March - Death of Stalin
July - Military armistice to end Korean hostilities signed
US Foreign Policy – 1949-1950
- with the emergence of NATO, US was optimistic in eradicating communist expansion
o  Truman Doctrine & NATO
- NATO’s power rested on atomic power
o  no other expenses, demobilized army
 USSR had not
o  thuse ach had its own advantage
USSR – Atomic Bomb – 8.1949
- USA’s advantage shattered after the announcement
China falls under Communism
- US had given little support in Chinese Civil War (1945-1949) to natonalists Chiang
Kai-shek and under Mao Zedong’s guerrilla warfare fell into communism
- White Paper report states that USA couldn’t change the outcome of the war
o  Kai-shek was unpopular with Chinese
 rather a nationalist collapse than communist win
o  percieved differently from Moscow
 Secretaryof State, Acheson: ‚inadequacy of American aid‘
  in 1949 the American experts in Asia believed that they had
done what they could in China
Red Scare, McCarthyism, Anti-Communist crusade in America
- Red Scare exasturbated by McCarthy, proposing that communist sympathizers were
placed into powerful position in USA
o  leading into purges and show trials affecting every level of society
o  some executed
- 1950’s strong anti-communist beliefs
- Mc Carthy, calling for purges of State Department
o  e.g. all American liberals were comsymps
- Truman called „soft on communists“
- this led to reviewing of White Paper and claimed Mao under full influence of Moscow
o all but two of the State Department advisers on China who had said that the
Guomindang was ‘not worth saving’ lost their job
- also cause reviewing of US Foreign & defence policies as the result of Chinese win
and USSR’s atomic bomb
o  possiblity to be engaged in 2 front and atomic war
- Truman refused to recoginize the new Chinese gov
NSC-68: ‘Total Commitment’
- report of US National Security Council of 1950
o  La Feber – ‚one of key documents of Cold War‘
- warned how every communist activity is linked to Moscow
o  all dev had a global scheme and were the result of USSR expansion
 monolithic
o  warning about indefinitie period and danger calling US gov to be ready at all
times
o  increasing military strength
o it encouraged military and economic aid to be given to any country perceived
by the USA to be resisting Communism
- criziczed for being not concrete
North Korea invades South Korea – 1950
- Truman had difficult elections (Democratic Party)
o  wanted to recognize China, commitment in Asia and post-pone NSC-68
- 25.5.1950 – 90,000 N.Korean troops launched attack
o  seen as expansionism
 mirror the USA’s monolithic belief of single communist bloc
o  thouth that the lack of action would seem as a failure of defence
 underminig USA‘ credibility, encouraging communist domino effect
- similar containemnt approach
- drawing UN into the conflict
- 27.6.1950 -China has gained a separate seat at the Security Council (similairly
boycotting as USSR)
- 1.7.1950 – US troops arrived
 o  soon joined by 15 UN commanders
Why did North Korea attach South Korea – 1950?
- „hot war“, only conflict of Cold War (confrontation)
Background
- Japan annexed Korea – 1910
o  still occupied parts of Korea
o  Korean nationalists of 1945 (including many communists)
- USSR & US took part in erradicatin JP inflence
- sepparation on 38th parallel line
o  N – USSR
o  S – USA
- agreement upon provision gov
o  short-term supervision, leading to full independence
- difficulties:
o As the Cold War developed, the USA and the USSR became less willing to co-
operate.
o Despite the Moscow Agreement, separate administrations emerged on either
side of the 38th parallel
 S – the US military government put forward as leader the elderly
Syngman Rhee, a rebel who had fought against the Japanese and spent
much of his life in exile
 N – Soviets supported the Communists and backed a faction headed by
Kim Il Sung, a young Russian-trained Korean Communist who had
been a guerrilla fighter against the Japanese.
 Although were very different, they had much in common:
 both were Korean nationalists,
 both wanted to end the division of Korea
 each saw himself as the leader of a united Korea.
- election have decided into the division
o  ROK – Republic of Korea – Syngman Rhee – 5.1948
o  DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Kim Il Sung – 9.1948
- USA supported Syngman Rhee (economic and military aid)
o withdraw troops mid-1949
- USSR troops withdraw 1948
- US considered EU as the most important in the Cold War, but decided to maintain a
line of off-shore strong points, stretching from Japan to the Philippines, rather than
involve themselves in expensive military commitments on the mainland
o made clear in Dean Acheson’s ‘perimeter’ speech of 1.1950, in which both
South Korea and Taiwan were publicly excluded from the American defensive
perimeter in the Western Pacific

Why did the get involved?

 - ortodox and revisionist views
- Bruce Cumings – ‘that Soviet control over the DPRK was ‘flimsy’ and that Kim Il
Sung could have acted independently of the Soviets since the DPRK was by no means
solely reliant on Soviet arms’
Role of Kim Il Sung
- both Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee wanted to unify country
o  thus civil war was inevitable even without superpowers
 therefore they needed superpower backing in order to unify it
o  Stalin intially had no interest in the attack on South
 thus it’s clear that impetus for war came from Korea, not Moscow
Role of Stalin in Korean War
- although initially unwilling, he gave approval of 1950
- several possibilities why he changed his mind:
o Stalin may have been more hopeful about the chances of world revolution
 The fact that the Communists had won the Chinese Civil War, that the
Soviets now had the atomic bomb, and that the West was facing
economic difficulties, might have convinced Stalin that now was the
time to push forward with spreading Soviet influence in Asia.
o The United States’ role in Japan could have been an impetus to gain influence
specifically in Korea. Stalin knew that the United States had changed its policy
in Japan and was now turning Japan into a strong anti-Communist base
 if he could gain control of South Korea, this could secure the Soviet
position in northeast Asia.
o Historian John Lewis Gaddis points out Stalin’s opportunism as another
possible factor – his tendency to advance himself in situations where he
thought he could do so without provoking too strong a response. Acheson’s
perimeter speech could have provided Stalin with a ‘tempting opportunity’
- still remained cautious
o  warned Korea becaue he had other importan bussines that he will not 100%
support
o  Kim Il Sung also hadto gain Mao’s approval

Importance of Mao Zedong in Korean War

- sceptical about the successes, yet approved due to Stalin’s enthusiasm
o  Mao planning invasionof Taiwan and needed USSR’s support
o  asked if he needed Chinese troops on Chinese borders
- afterwards Mao paid little attention
- planning to win quickly, tank attacks from N
o  aggressive nature of this triggered US
Course of the war
- several dramatic changes in the first months, followed by a  stalemate situation lasting
until armistice of 1953
- The initial push by the North Koreans took them deep into South Korea, leaving only
a corner of the peninsula out of their control
o South Korean and American troops were pushed back into a small area around
Pusan (now called Busan)
- General MacArthur led the UN forces in an amphibious landing at Inchon, to bypass
the Korean troops and cut them off
o Within a month he had retaken Seoul and driven the North Koreans back to the
38th parallel.
- Encouraged by this success, the United States then redefined its war aims, and, rather
than just concentrating on ‘containment’, now decided on a policy of ‘roll-back’
o Liberating the North Koreans from Communist rule and reuniting Korea
o UN forces crossed the 38th parallel into North Korean territory and began a
rapid advance northwards, capturing Pyongyang, the capital of the North, in
October.
- The march towards the Yalu river, however, made China concerned about its own
security
o On 27 November 1950, a force of 200 000 Chinese joined 150 000 North
Koreans and sent the UN troops into a rapid retreat.
o Pyongyang was recaptured in December, and by the end of 1950 the North
Koreans and their allies had retaken all land up to the 38th parallel
o There were heavy American casualties
- A stalemate then developed around the 38th parallel.
- Truman now realized that the United States needed to go back to the original aim of
containing Communism above the 38th parallel. MacArthur disagreed and was
subsequently relieved of his command.
- Peace talks started in 1951 with a focus on the repatriation of prisoners of war
(POWs).
- The war continued for another two years, during which time fighting continued,
causing serious casualties (over 40 per cent of American casualties occurred in this
period). The United States put pressure on China by threatening to use atomic
weapons.
- A military armistice was finally signed at Panmunjom in July 1953.
Results of the Korean War
Actions of USA
- fearing further Soviet agression, these ations were taken:
o NSC-68’s recommendation to triple the defence budget was implemented.
o US land forces in Europe were greatly strengthened.
o NATO was strengthened. Greece and Turkey were brought into NATO and
military bases were set up in Turkey (which had a border with the USSR).
o The need for West Germany to become armed and integrated into NATO was
given top priority.
 - any of thesse were already in consideration, but were exasterbated
- in Asia, US to contain Communism:
o The Treaty of San Francisco with Japan was signed in 1952
 enabling the United States to maintain military bases in Japan
 US focused on building up Japan economically to make it a bulwark
against Communism
o Taiwan had to be defended
 At the start of the Korean War, the US Seventh Fleet had already been
sent to the Taiwan Strait to defend the island against possible
Communist invasion. Following the Korean War, the USA supported
Taiwan’s Jiang Jieshi with military and economic aid and continued to
recognize Taiwan as the only official Chinese state until as late as 1971
o China isolated by the US
 prevented from taking a seat in the UN Security Council
o USA committed to support regimes in Asia that were resisting Communism.
 involvement of Philippines and in Vietnam
o SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) was formed as an anti-
Communist containment bloc in the Asian area
Impacts of Korean War on countries
Korea
- casualties, no hope for reunification
- no longer a local issue – superpower issue
o  N.K. remained under communist rule
- S.K – model capitalist with with American & Japanese investments
China
- isolated yet reputation grew and became a major superpower
- deteriorated aims from self recovery to war effort
- unification with Taiwan was even more difficult
- deterioration from USSR, relying more on themselves
USSR
- indirect cnflict with USA
- fighting agauinst communism
o  even more emboriled than before 1953

Southeast Asia
- monolithic thinking of USA involved whole SE.Asia into the conflict
- harder for nationalist movements to restorefrom in the post-collonial era
o However, it was only in Vietnam that the USA, the USSR, and China became
directly involved in the fighting
Effects of Korean War on Cold War
- globalization of the superpower rivalry and confrontation
 o  spreading conflicts – proxy wars
- greater military commitments, exponentially increasing expenses (US – 10% of GNP,
1950‘s)
- EU – also increse, helping to economically develop
o  USSR – 2.8mil troops (1950) > 5.8mil troops (1955)
- Khrushchev – decreased the number of troops yet still invested into atomic armaments
- Warren I  Cohen – ‚Arming the North Koreans and agreeing to the invasion of South
Korea proved to be Stalin’s most disastrous Cold War gamble. It postponed a thaw in
relations with the United States for twenty years. It intensifi ed a confrontation that
continued for forty years at enormous cost to the major antagonists. The war shifted
the balance of forces within the United States, allowing them to divert the attention
and energies of the American people from needed reform to the hunt of Communists at
home and abroad ‘
 USA & Containment in Asia

1. Case Study – Korea

- can be seen as the success of US containement, as communism was kept north of 38th
o  MacArthur went further north and attempted to roll-back communism
 mutuliated success
- huge casualities
- impact on US foreign policy, with NSC-68 coming into force and thus the
militarization and globalization of the Cold War, also needs to be considered when
assessing if intervention in Korea can be considered a success
- contained in Korea but great costs
o  casualties, economic losses, impact on future US policy
2. Case Study - Japan
- more clearly a success
- US occupied JP after defeat in 1945
- MacArthur – Supreme Comander of the Allied Powers
o  devising and executing policies
o  aim to create pacifist and weak JP
 this changed due to its strategic location in Asia (vital in containment)
o  initial task to demilitarize country, bring war criminals to trial, new
constitution
o  including of the Bill of Rights
- new constitution wasn’t as widely used as the SCAP and was more effective
- favorable economic laws impacting the powerful elite in Japan
o  need for new anti-communist, capitalist ally to counterballance stron
communist influence
- JP had to be able to protect and neutralize any aommunist influence in any
surrounding countries
o  banning of some trade unions
- red purges
- rethinking of JP’s defence
o  no longer seeking weak and pacifist JP
 after the outbreak of Korean War (6.1950) JP was permitted to created
‚self-defence force‘ – 75,000 troops
 US military influence remained even after 1952
- Treaty of San Francisco
- the American– Japanese Security Treaty (1951)
o JP as an effect military protectorate of the US
 retention of military bases, allowing USA to use them whenever it
would contribute to peace
- Was it successful?
o  wanted to use JP as a tool again communism in the Asia
o  rapid ecnomy development
o  gov in strong consensus for economic dev
 thus communism never a threat
o  historians argue thatit wasn’t onyl SCAP motivated (inner motive)
 o  US wanted large military force for JP
 JP resisted this
o  JP wanted economy, US force in self-interest
3. Case Study – Taiwan
- seen as a success
- US policy towatds Taiwan changed with breakout of Korean War
o  formally no interest, bet during Korean War Truman offered US Fleet to
protect nationalists from the Communist Chinese
 the only US recognized China
- US provided essential economic and military aid
- 1953 – Eisenhower withdrew the Seventh Fleet to ‘unleash’ Taiwan’s Nationalist
leader, Jiang Jieshi, and allow him to attack China. Nationalists raided
o later excuse by the Chinese to bombard the islands of Quemoy and Matsu and
invade the Tachen Islands
o  another asian pressure on the USSR
 (there is a lot of bullshit no one’s gonna remember)
o  when China attacked, the 7th Fleet came back to help (1958)
- Was it a success?
o  despite the dangers of crises pver islands, brinkmanship worked
 Taiwan remained independant and was supported by US
4. Case Study – USA & Containment in Vietnam
- failure, where N. Vietnamese communists weren’t contained
o  longitudinal, causualties, expenses, demaging public appeal
- USA pulled out of Vietnam in 1973
- US fear of Asian countries falling like dominoes under communism
o  Cambodia & Laos – 1975
- first French Colony, taken over by JP
o  nationalist movement led by Ho Chi Minh (Vietminh) that was veryactive
agains JP
 after WW II. and defeat of JP, Ho declared independence of
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
o  hostility VIET x FR
 Roosevelt told FR to chill
- opinion on Vietnam on Ho hardened once Trumanbecame the president
o  due to developing situation in EU after 1949
o  Ho’s communist, rather tan nationaist, credentials were emphasised and again
the though of neotilic (driven by Moscow)
- 3.1950 – military aid sent to FR to defeat FR
- domino culture has started beinfg entrenched
o  Vietnam as the key element to Laos and Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, ...
- although US funded 80% of the war, it didn’t personaly intervene
o  FR defeated – 1954
- peacement agreement – Geneva Accords
o The French would withdraw from Indochina
o There would be a temporary division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel
  Ho Chi Minh would control the north of the country
o There would be ‘free elections’ to unite Vietnam in 1956
o There were to be no foreign bases
o Laos and Cambodia would be recognized as independent and neutral states

o  USA didn’t sign as an attempt to strengthen their position in Indochina

o  SEATO
 countries signed were to meet together if attacked
o  Ngo Diem backed the US to lead the gov
 claimed to establish Republic of Vietnam with him as peresident
 million aids
 US military involvment
 training of the army
o  Diem pressured to put in reforms, however him and his borther (chief of
police) crushed opposition
o  no agrarian reforms and the propagation of catholicism
 shapin of brutal family disctatorship
o  1956 – Diem refused to hold elections (with US support)
 held bound to Geneca Accord and didn’t trust communists
 fear of united Vietnam
o  S against Diem’s - military opposition
- National Liberation Front (NLF) – South Vietcong + USA
o  formation of military units
o  support from the N, due to polulation fed up with Diem
- USA became concerned of Diem as an ally and doubet his maintanance of ‚Two
Vietnams policy‘
How did Kennedy widen this problem?
- 11.1960 – Kennedy’s election, and flexible response to USSR’s expansionism
o  this expaned the aavaliable mean for fighting against communism, including:
 Increasing the number of US military advisers in the South (there were
17 000 advisers in Vietnam by the time of Kennedy’s death).
 Starting counter-insurgency operations against Communist guerrillas in
the South. This included ‘search-and-destroy’ missions against the
Vietcong and the spraying of defoliants, such as Agent Orange, in order
to destroy the jungle that gave them cover. The United States also
supported the Strategic Hamlets Program, which consisted of the
resettlement of villagers into fortified villages where they could be kept
‘safe’ from the Communists.
 Introducing a new US military counter-insurgency force, the ‘Green
Berets’, trained in guerrilla fighting
 Encouraging Diem to introduce social and political reforms
- Vietcong still expanding and popular
- Strategic Hamlets Programme, Agent Orange
 o  only alleviation of local peasants
- Diem’s unpopular actions continued to generate mass discontent
o pinnacle in 1963 with a crisis over his anti-Buddhist policies
 rallies, hunger strikes, self-immolations
 international reaction
o  due to this Kennedy started cutting of financial aid
 by 1963 both killed in a coup
- their death only cause more discontent due to increlased involvement of US gov
because of subsequent Saigon gov
o General William C Westmoreland believed that Diem’s assassination ‘morally
locked us into Vietnam’
- after Kennedy’s assasination and with Lyndon Johnes, Vietcong was already under
communism
o  gov in S no longer stable
o  Johnson also continued the war to prevent domino effect
- Johnson needed to increase the commitment to war however needed aán approval
from congress
- Gulf of Tonkin incident
o  excuse to attack
o On the night of 2 August 1964, the American naval destroyer Maddox was
fired on by North Vietnamese patrol boats while it was patrolling and
gathering intelligence in the Gulf of Tonkin, o- the North Vietnamese coast.
Two days later, on 4 August 1964, the US destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy
were allegedly fired on. Ship radar apparently showed that they were under
attack, but there was much confusion, and no physical evidence of an assault
was found. Nevertheless, Johnson called this attack ‘open aggression on the
high seas’, and as a result the United States immediately bombed North
Vietnamese installations
o Gulf of Tonkin incident
 On the night of 2 August 1964, the American naval destroyer Maddox
was fired on by North Vietnamese patrol boats while it was patrolling
and gathering intelligence in the Gulf of Tonkin, o- the North
Vietnamese coast. Two days later, on 4 August 1964, the US destroyers
Maddox and Turner Joy were allegedly fired on. Ship radar apparently
showed that they were under attack, but there was much confusion, and
no physical evidence of an assault was found. Nevertheless, Johnson
called this attack ‘open aggression on the high seas’, and as a result the
United States immediately bombed North Vietnamese installations.
o  Reaction:
 Launching a sustained campaign of bombing North Vietnam, which
was known as Operation Rolling Thunder.
 Sending 100 000 ground forces to South Vietnam in 1965. Led by
General Westmoreland, US soldiers carried out ‘search-and-destroy’
missions. By 1968, there were 520 000 troops in Vietnam
o  devastating impact on population and country
 use ofrockets, napalm, ...
The Tet Offensive
- 1968 – reaching a turning point
o  US’s anti-war movement was gaining
o support (casualties, expenses, ...)
- 1967 that there was ‘light at the end of the tunnel’
o that is, the United States was starting to win the war
o 30 January 1968 – 70 000 Communists surprise attack
 assault that was most shocking
 100 cities in the S
 including Saigon.
 It took 11 days for the US and ARVN forces to regain control of
Saigon
- communist psed back after massive fireback
o  Tet Offensive was a failure for communists
o  40,000 casualties
- progressively US agains war
o  seemingly US supported the regieme flouting the basic civil rights and US was
not winning
- results of the Tet Offensivve changed their strategy
o  bombing stopped and peace initiated
- 31.3.1968 – Johnson adressed US that he would not be standing in elction in 10.
Did President Nixon achieve ‘peace with honour?
- 10.1968 – Nixon elected
- wanted US to withdraw, but didn’t want to accept peace
- wanted to reach a settlement which in the next year would also coast half a million of
casulties
- Kissing er as Nixon key foreign policy adviser
o  dedicated to use force to reach peace
- „covert“ campaign of 14-month of bombing aling Ho Chi Minh Trail (inside neutral
Cambodia)
o  without forcing N to peace agreement
- Nixon intorduced Vietnamization
o gradual withdrawal of US troops and the handing over of the war to the South
Vietnamese government
 1969 – 1973 US troops decreased
- 6.1969 – Nixon Doctrine
o move away from the policies followed in Asia since Truman
 nations were responsible for their own defence
Paris Peace Talks
- 12.5.1972 – 1.1973
- Kissinger’s negotioation with N Vietnam
o  Vietnam also wanted peace with honor
- Vietnam demanded representation in the gov of S
 o  each tried to get an advantage by achieving the upperhand in battle
 US – bombing
- Nixon & Kissinger – détante with USSR and China
o  one of the ways to achieve better relationship with USSR and China was to
put pressure on N Vietnam to agree with the peace settlement
- 27.1.1973 – peace sttlement
o  USA troops withdrawn
 with respect to dividing line
o  N still took the initiative and in 1975 took on Saigon
- by 1975 Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos were under communism
o  containment failed

Was Vietnam a failure for the American policy of containment?

- dominos became a reality
- in isolation, the Vietnam War is America’s biggest and most overt failure
- when stopping the spread of communism they only induced it
- some historians argue that it wasn’t a failure
o ‘the broader aims of America’s e- ort in Vietnam were to keep the Capitalist
semi-democracies of Southeast Asia from falling to Communism’ and that
Vietnam allowed other countries in the region, such as Malaysia, Thailand,
and Singapore – all of whom faced Communist threats – the breathing space
they needed. ‘In other words … America … accomplished in a spectacular way
the broader aims of Asian stability and prosperity that the intervention was
intended to serve’
Conclusion
- by 1949 it was said that containment in EU was successful
- Soviet obvious gains were stopped after 1948 – Air Lift
- Marshall Plan also contriputed to containment in EU and helped multiple economies
o  erradicating possible communist threats in gov
- however in asia it was less successful
o  communism usally linked to nationalists andwas more diverse
- Mao and Ho Chi Minh had great local support and struggle for independence
- although USA wanted to fight against the Soviet imperialism, it only fought the
nationalist’s movements
o  could explain why USA was never succesful in containing these countries
 Peaceful co-existence

Timeline of US-USSR reationships

1953 Eisenhower inaugurated as US president
March - Death of Stalin, who is succeeded by Malenkov and Khrushchev
July - Korean armistice
1954
Jan - US Secretary of State Dulles announces massive retaliation policy
1955
July - Geneva Summit
May - Austrian State Treaty ends four-power occupation of Austria 1956
Feb - Khrushchev denounces Stalin and promotes ‘peaceful coexistence’ policy
June - Polish workers revolt Oct Suez Crisis
Oct - Soviets crush Hungarian rising
1957
Oct - USSR announces Sputnik satellite success
1958
Nov - Khrushchev issues ultimatum to West over Berlin
1959
Sept - Khrushchev visits USA and meets Eisenhower at Camp David
1960
May - U-2 spy plane shot down and Paris Summit collapses Kennedy elected US president
1961
June - Khrushchev and Kennedy meet at Vienna Summit Yuri Gagarin is the first man to
make an earth-orbiting space flight
1962
Oct - Cuban Missile Crisis

Eisenhower, Dulles – Roll-Back, Brinkmanship and the New Look

- 1952 – elected
- both strongly anti-communism
- both were keen on policy of roll-back
o liberating the E.EU
  no actual attempts to to liberate E.EU by US
 although they encouraged rebellion in 1953,1956
 however it wasn’t used to expand their sphere of influence
- ‘The New Look’ – new policy of containment
o this meant preventing extension of communism in the areas where it wasn’t
established using these actions:
 Setting up alliances to encircle the Soviet Union – for example,
SEATO.
 Using military power to protect vulnerable areas – for example, West
Berlin.
 Assisting forces that were fighting Communism – for example, Diem’s
government in South Vietnam.
 Using the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) for covert operations
more extensively than had been done before (see the box below).
 Initiating an increased reliance on nuclear weapons. A national security
document in 1953 stated: ‘The US will consider nuclear weapons to be
available for use as other munitions.’ Conventional weapons would
thus play a smaller role in defence.
 Brinkmanship. This involved threats of massive retaliation as an
instrument of containment. It entailed going to the brink and
threatening nuclear war to intimidate the aggressor into backing down
- US & USSR due to nuclear threat wanted to negotiate – 1955 and 1959
Khrushchev and co-existence
- negotiation of 50’s occued due to Eisenhower’s willingness and new emerging Soviet
leader
- Malenkov forumlated the New Look
o  where after the struggle for leadership renamed it „peaceful co-existence“
o  move away from Stalin’s doctrine where the war was innevitable
o  US believed that without expansion communism would collapse
o  USSR also belived that capitalism would collapde due to its weakness

What encouraged the change of international relagtions?

- keen on avoiding mutual inihillation
- economy
o  USSR – 1/3 of GDP into military, in spite of low living standards
 US – 12% of GNP, higher standards of living
o  with better relations less expense on military
- by 1954 Korean War was over, which was a key conflict
Reality in 1950’s
- Austrian State Treaty – end of 4 power occupation of Austria
- later summits – Geneva Summit
- Soviet Proposals
o Mutual disbandment of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
 o Withdrawal of all foreign troops from Europe followed by the drawing up of a
European Security Treaty.
o Free elections to be carried out for a reunified German government.
- US Reaction
o Hostile. These ideas were unacceptable to the West European governments,
and no agreement was reached on any of these proposals.
- US Proposals
o An ‘Open Skies’ proposal
 This meant each side would exchange plans of military installations
and allow aerial surveillance of each other’s installations.
- Soviet Reaction
o Hostile. The Soviets did not even bother to make a formal reply. They
dismissed it as ‘nothing more than a bold espionage plot’ and Khrushchev said
it would be ‘like seeing into our bedrooms’. However, the United States went
ahead and used the U-2 reconnaissance plane (see pages 98–99).
- although no agreement was reached it was first peace confrontation
o summit also led to better relations in terms of trade exhibitions, exchanging of
certain scientific information, and cultural exchanges
Why did the tension increase once again?
- 2.1956 – Khrushchev’s secret speech about the policy of de-stalinization
o  leading to challenging evvent in Eastern Bloc
 Hungarian Uprising
- US also dealing with issues in the Middle-East
o  Suez Crisis
- both of these dissipate the trials at Geneva
o  Suez Crisis raised the concerns of growing influences in Middle-East
- Eisenhower doctrine
o  1.1957
o  USA to helpany country in Middle East to fight agains communism
Technology race
- 4.10.1957 – launch of first of Soviet satellite Sputnik
o  US thought about USSR’s technological superiority
- Khrushchev used any opportunity to threaten USA
Missile Gap
- US Congress and media promoted the idea of missile gap
o  scenario confirmed by Gaither Report
 findings of top secret investigation
 a vast increase in offensive defence power, especially missile
development
 a build-up of conventional forces capable of fighting a limited
war
  a massive building programme of fallout shelters to protect US
citizens from nuclear attack

- although US spy plans have shown that there was no missile gap
o  to sooth the US fear Eisenhower had established NASA (1958)
o  promotion of science and education

How did events of 1958–1960 affect East–West relations?

- US was certain about nuclear superiority therefore they contemplated banning of
testing (10.1958), followed by USSR
- there were opes of passing test-ban treaty
o  however K in exchange wanted to W to leave Berlin
 K had to back down and next summits were called in USA and Paris
(1959,1960)
U-2 Incident
- during Paris summit USSR announced that US spy plane was shot down (1.5.1960)
o  pilot admitted to espionage
- Eisenhower refused to apologize because it was necessary
- thereby K declined E comming to USSR for negotiations about Berlin nor test-ban
Peaceful co-existence and containemnt: Berlin 1958-1961
1945
Feb - Yalta Conference
July - Potsdam Conference
1948
Feb - Marshall Aid agreed to be Congress
June - Berlin Blockade
1949
April - NATO established
Sept - Federal Republic of Germany established (FGR – West Germany)
Oct - German Democratic Republic established (DDR – East Germany) USSR proposes
neutralized Germany
1953
June - East German uprising 1954 Oct West Germany admitted to NATO and permitted to
rearm
1955
May - Warsaw Pact established July Germany discussed at Geneva summit – no agreement
1958
Khrushchev demands German peace treaty and demilitarized West Berlin
1961
June - Khrushchev threatens to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany
August - Berlin Wall built
Differences between Germanys
Economic
- W larger in every aspect
o  Marshall Aid
o  economic miracle – rapid increase of living standard
- E – collectivization having a disastrous impact
o  many fled to W
Politics
- W – democracy
- E – no free elctions ince 1946 and rigidly Satlinist by 1950’s
o  riots by workers, yet quickly put down by tanks
 first major rebellion in Soviet sphere of influence
- due to these differences there were no further efforts to reunite
- increasingly unstable situation
Berlin Crisis
- after Berlin Blockade Berlin remained devided and their economic and other
differences were quite tangible
- W as an example what capitalism can achieve
o  W encouraged E to escape
- encourgaed by W for skilled young E Germans
o  1945-1961 – 1/6 escaped (German population)
- espionage on E Germany
- 1958 – K proposed peace treaty that’d recognize existence of 2 Germanys
- 27.11.1958 – proposed de-militariaztion of Germany
o  turning it into a free city
- if it wasn’t done within 6 month K threatened W with similar tactics to Berlin
Blockade
o  then W would have to negotiate with E, having them to recognize as
a separate state
 W didn’t want to lose the propaganda and military bases but if not
agreed – possibility of facing war
- the reason why K initiated and the influences on his policy were:
o Soviet fear of West Germany acquiring nuclear weapons
o concern over the failing East German economy
 o pressure from Walter Ulbricht, leader of the GDR
- successful in getting W to disscus this
o  2.1959 – foreign minister conference in Geneva
 both proposed terms of German unity
- mutiple summits to reach an agreement – no result
- inclreasing concern over fleeings
o  K hoped to get an agreement with new president Kennedy
Kennedy and flexible response
- 11.1960
o  more flexible approach to containment
 more spending on conventional forces
 enlarging the nuclear arsenal
 continuing with CIA covert work
 giving economic aid to developing countries to help them resist
Communism
 continuing negotiations with the Soviet Union
o  with this Kennedy broadened ways of fighting communism
- , ‘We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear war.’
K & Ulbricht (Berlin) – Crisis in 1960-1961
- K wanted to exploit Kennedy due to his inexperience
o  wanted to use the Bay of Pigs failure
- K renewed his ultimatum and Kennedy didn’t want to give anything to Soviets
- We cannot and will not permit the Soviets to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or
by force.’
- increase in military and shelter
Berlin Wall
- 12.8.1961 – 40,000 refugees fled
o  K had no intention to start war over Berlin agreed to closure of Berlin
- 13.8.1961 – barbed wire was erected, followed by a concrete wall
Impacts
o  for K it was a defeat as it was a visible mark that communis propaganda has
failed
 communist had to use barbed wire to keep people in
o  it meant that it easened the tensions inside GDR
 fear of Ulbrich acting idependently
o  Ulbricht didn’t get his peace treaty, yet consolidated his power within
o  it had no effect on settling question over Germany
 removal as the key of Cold War negotiations
o  this removed Cold War from EU
 US missile bases in Turkey
Symbolism
- 1961-1989 – symbol of separation
- hundreds killed due to fleeing
Cuban Missile Crisis
- most dramatic confrontation
- 13 days -closes to war as ever
-
- table show the consequence of 1959’s raking over of Fidel Castro
Background and causes
- overhrowing of the gov by Fidel Castro
- Cuba considered as US sphere of influence
o  US controlled most companies, railways, ...
- amendments and policies where US could intervene whenever it was threatening
Cuban independence
- 7.1.1959 – Castro takes over
o  US reluctantly recognized new gov
o  after 7y of guerilla war campaign
- US hoping to control over the abundant economic interest and presences of large pro-
US middle class
- Castro didn’t want to present himself as communist
- 4.1959 – visiting US in order to gain economical support for the reforms Cuba needed
- Castro reforms included nationalization of US economic interest
o  most pro-US middle class move to US rather than resist
- US only agreed if the followed rules by International Momentary Fund
o  he rather turned to USSR – 2.1960
How did US handle this?
- economically, by proclaiming an embargo on all exports to Cuba except for foodstuffs
and medicine
- militarily, by organizing an invasion force of Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro
- it failed
o  only drove Castro to sign more agreements with USSR
o  second plan ended inhumiliation
Bay of Pigs
- 3.1960 – CIA’s plan to overthrow Castro approved by Eisenhower and later again
approved by Kennedy
o  treining of Cuban refugees to invade Bay of Pigs
 ended in capture of 90% ofthe trainees
- they were later returned for 53 mil. dollars worth of food and machinery by voluntary
groups of US
- Kennedy blamed and publcally condemned
o  more fault of CIA
 underestiamtion of Castro‘s inflence
 counting on public revolt, which never materialized
- ineffective – shortage in ammunition, air cover
Results of invasion
- humiliation and loss of prestige
- set-back of Kennedy’s attempts of identifying with anti-colonialism
- Castro’s position strengthened
- K given arguments to criticize US
- US imperalism
 - strengthening of Cuban ties with USSR
o  indentifying as Marxist-Leninist and set up defensive alliance with USSR

- other operations for revolution

o  Mongoose – sabotage of economic targets
o  diplomatic isolation
Why did K put missiles in Cuba?
- 1962
- higly provocatve act
- was to protect Cuba
- having in similar distance – US – Turkey, USSR – Cuba
- important was Khrushchev’s aim to seize a propaganda advantage after the
humiliation of the Berlin Wall, and to acquire a bargaining chip against the stationing
of US nuclear missiles in Europe
Why was it intolerable?
- 14.10.1962 – photos of building launch pads by Soviets
- didn’t affect worldwide unclear balance, yet given USSR first strike capability
o  US public thought that the power has changed
- again humiliating for Kennedy
- upcoming elections
- US though that it was to put pressure to pull out of Berlin
o  another pressure on Kennedy since it would also influence EU
Resolvement
- summit of ExComm, crisis management
- ‘The Thirteen Days’
o Kennedy rejected calls from the military for an immediate air strike followed
by an invasion of Cuba (General Curtis LeMay actually called for the total
elimination of Cuba)
 naval blockade of the island
 Kennedy going public on television to announce the establishment of
the ‘quarantine’ around Cuba to prevent the delivery of any nuclear
warheads to the island
 Khrushchev ignored the quarantine, and Soviet ships containing
missiles headed for Cuba
-  24.10. – six Soviet ships returned
-  26.10. – K send a telegram rgarding that K would withdraw missiles from Cuba, if
Kenney promised not to invade Cuba
o possibly defused the crisis
o subsequent telegram about removal of issiles in Turkey
-  U-2 plane shot over Cuba
o on Cuban behalf
o shown that events could spiral out any timeš
 -  this increased pressure on Kennedy to use military on Cuba
o however, nuclear missileswere already present on Cuba
- later Kennedy’s brother – Robert, Attorney General agreed to proposal
- 28.10. - K cabled President Kennedy and agreed to remove all missiles from Cuba in
return for US assurance that it would not invade Cuba
o no reference to US removal of missiles from Turkey – this part of the deal
remained secret.
How effectivewas Kennedy in halding Cuban Missile Crisis?
Orthodox viev
- stressing that this was Kennedy’s finest hour, and that he successfully used nuclear
brinkmanship to preserve world peace
- Robert Kennedy, Theodore C Sorensen, and Richard E Neustadt all put forward the
following arguments in support of this view:
o Kennedy was right to respond to this crisis in a firm and forceful way, as the
missiles represented a Soviet threat to alter the balance of power either in
actuality or in appearance.
o The idea of imposing a quarantine (blockade) exerted maximum pressure on
the Soviet Union while incurring the minimum risk of war.
o Kennedy himself always remained calm and in control of the situation. He
resisted pressure for action from the military, he was statesmanlike, and he did
not attempt to humiliate Khrushchev.
o The results of the crisis helped to preserve the balance of power and world
peace.
Revisionist view
- Kennedy unnecessarily raised the Cuban episode to the level of crisis and
confrontation and thus subjected the world to the danger of nuclear war
- Roger Hagman and David Horowitz put forward the following arguments in support
of this view:
o The missiles did not affect the nuclear balance and the USA was under no
greater threat. This was rather a political problem that could have been
resolved by political means.
o The imposition of the blockade and the fact that Kennedy made the crisis
public turned it into an unnecessarily dangerous situation.
o Kennedy was only interested in personal and national prestige. The
forthcoming November elections meant that the president wanted the situation
solved quickly, so he could not wait for lengthy negotiations.
o The aftermath of the crisis was not victory but arrogance, which led the United
States to increase its activity in Vietnam.
K’s actions
- claimed a victory
o  Kennedy prmised not to invade Cuba
 thereby communist sphere of influence over Cuba was guaranteed
 - prepared to back down in the face of nuclear war, especially when many saw his
handling of the crisis as a humiliation for the Soviet Union
- Soviet military unhappy about military cuts, hastly withdrawl from Cuba,
humiliuiation due to US inspection of removal
- Castro wasn’tconsulted during this process
o also left with the US base at Guantanamo Bay, while US missiles were
removed from Turkey in 1963
- K had to rebuild relationships with Castro
o  fear of Sino-Cuban alliance developing
Castro’s significance
- particualrly in 24-26.10.
o  dedicated to use the nucelar head present if USA invaded
- shooting down of U-2 planes shows that both K and Kennedy didn’t have a full
control over the situation
Impacts
USA
- Kennedy’s preige increased
- US shock of how fragile their security was
o  increased military strength
USSR
- humiliation for K
o  contributed to fall of power in 1964
- didn’t humiliated the USSR itself and continued to be 30 a superopower
Cuba
- remained in power from the US threat
- to avoid any further conflicts, remained independent from Moscow
- Havana as centerfo revolutionary activity
o  education, propaganda in other countries, ...
- although still depenadan on USSR’s financial aid
China
- saw USSR as a revolutionary state
- unwillingness of USSR to challenge USA
o  this is another event that heped deterriorate the Sino-Soviet relations

International situation
- Orthodox
o A hotline was established between the USSR and USA to make immediate
telephone communication easier.
o Both sides realized the danger of nuclear war. Two important treaties were
signed following the crisis: the Limited Test-Ban Treaty of August 1963,
 which forbade nuclear tests in the atmosphere, space or underwater (not signed
by France and China); and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,
which prevented signatories from transferring weapons, or knowledge of how
to make them, to non-nuclear powers
 these treaties didn‘t prevent arms race intensifying the Missile Crisis
o  the world was more stabile due to no challenges in their sphere of influence

Sino-Soviet Relations

- key difference ideological

o  Mao’s interpretation of Marxism
 using peasant as the basis of revolution
- Hsu – ‚From the infancy of Chinese Communism, Mao’s contact with Moscow was
neither pleasant nor gratifying. His unorthodox method of revolution, based on
peasant mobilization in the countryside, was tolerated by Moscow as legitimate only
because all other types of Communist insurrection in China had failed. Mao’s
approach was never endorsed by Stalin as proper for revolutionizing China‘
- China in Cold War:

- ideological difference wasn’t the only reason why Stalin didn‘t support CCP in
Chinese Civil War:
o feared Mao as a rival for the leadership of the Communist world
o did not want the Cold War to spread to Asia
o knew that Jiang’s GMD would recognize Soviet claims to the disputed border
territory along frontiers in Manchuria and Xinjiang
o underestimated the CCP and believed the GMD to be the stronger party. He
urged the CCP to unite with the GMD, even in the late 1940s, when CCP
victory was looking inevitable
- Mao seen Stalin’s policies as self-interested rather than true revolutionar doctrine
o  Stalin saw Mao as another Tito
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance
- 1950 – Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance
o  USSR became more keen on est realtions after win of CCP
- USSR were superior to China (thought)
 o  soon clear thet USSR wanted to expolit China
- 200 Soviet engineers and planners – 1950’s
o  50 plans
o  Traditional building were put don in order to build Soviet style buildings
The USSR, the PRC, and the Korean War, 1950–1953
- when US troops came close to Chinese border Staln encouraged PRC to snd troops to
battle
- USSR wanted for China to pay back for all the supplies given
Sino-Soviet Relations after 1953
- although Mao respected USSR there were tensions
o  Stalin prolonged the end of war to exhaust PRC
- accroding to Lynch, there was hpe and relaxation of tensiosn after the death of Stalin
The Split
- 3 main potenstials of K for better relationships
o The ‘Secret Speech’ by Khrushchev in Moscow on 24 February 1956 attacking
Stalin’s crimes against the party, including comments about the ‘cult of
personality’, which Mao saw as an attack on his own style of leadership.
o The crushing of the Hungarian Uprising in October/November 1956. Mao saw
this, and Soviet problems in East Germany and Poland, as failures by the
USSR to contain reactionary forces
o Khrushchev’s doctrine of ‘peaceful co-existence’ with the West, which implied
that global revolution could be achieved by means other than armed struggle.
Mao saw this as ideological heresy.
- PRC saw USSR as departing from Marxism and was dominated by revisionists
o 1955 Geneva Summit and the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 – example
Conference of communist parties – 1957
- attended by Mao
- hope for Tito to attend
- Mao calling K out to a abandon revisionism
o declared that international revolution could not be supported by working
alongside ‘class enemies’ - W Capitalists
- Deng Xiaoping – chief spokesperson
o exceptional in putting forward the PRC’s ideological stance, and ultimately he
was very embarrassing for the Soviets
o  putting forward that proletarian world revoluton was to only happen if
capitalism as violently crushed
K’s visit in Beijing – 1958
- trying to ease the tensions
- embarasing
o  pool discussion, no air conditioning
 - Deng attacked Soviet policy
o the Soviets had betrayed the international Communist movement
o the Soviets were guilty of viewing themselves as the only true Marxist–
Leninists
o the Soviets had sent spies posing as technical advisers into China.

Great Leap Forward

- 1.1958
- rapid development of China – agriculture and industry simlutaneously
- wanted to use the vas popuation for it
- thereby disposing of Soviet aid
- wanted to substitute the need ofr heavy machiner with force of poeple
- mostly imbeded in „grain and steel production“

- promotion of backyard steel furnaces

o  amateur steel making
 intellectuals concerned about the value and economy
 use of other fuels in order to burn
 using pot, pans to create this
 not carring about crops
- although he realzed the steel was worthles he still continued with it for most of 1959
o Mao’s reasoning was a desire not to crush the ‘revolutionary spirit’ of the
peasants and workers
- public works launched during the GLF were unsuccesful
o  due to lack of experience and lack of leadership
- close cropping – where crops were planted close to eachother, believing they would
not compte with echother
Failure and Starvation
- Lushan Conference – 7.1959
o  marshal Peng Dehuai spoke against disastrouus impacts
- Mao removed Peng and put campaign against rightist
- from 1959, PRC expereinced widespread famine
- Mao continued with grain export, not to humiliate himself
o  in addition 4 years of bad weather exastruabted the impacts of GLF
- 1.1961 – end of GLF
o  importing gain from Australia and Canada
- economic disaster for PRC
- Frank Dikötter estimates that there were ‘at least’ 45 million premature deaths in
China during the famine
- Mao stepped out as chairman of PRC in 1959 to not be responsible
o  yet still remained chairman of CCP

Soviet reaction
 - dencouncing Mao as having unorthodox concepts and applications
- announced by Soviet media
- Mao determined strike back
o Mao wanted to aid any country that was communist yet dissented from
Moscow’s lead
o  Albania
 1961
 Khrushchev made a speech that year, during the Moscow Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, attacking the Albanian
regime for its ‘Stalinist’ doctrines and backward ways. The PRC
observer at the Congress walked out in protest. China interpreted this
speech as an attack on their system as well.
 PRC offered to replce the aid from USSR
 led to the final severance of diplomatic relations between the
Soviets and the Chinese Communists, after more than ten years
of growing hostility
The Sino-Indian War, 1962
- fight on Indian border
- 1950 – PRC invaded Tibet
o  areas viewed as Chinese
- the brutality of PRC’s actions arose international condemnation
- India sensitve towards troops occupying near border
- it’s speculated that Mao wanted a war with India, mainly over
o  China didn’t recognize border with India draw by British Colonial period and
wanted to renegotiate
 India didn’t want to
- 5.1962 – preparing war with India
o  nuclear test sside withing the reach of India
- 10.10.1962 – war between Chinese People’s Liberation Army X Indian Military
- Soviet’s neutral but given MIG Fighters to India
- 20.10.1962 – end of war
o  Chinese taken up the disputed area
o  although PRC won, it waa temered by the fact that US was ableto gain
sensitive intelligence and access to bases in India

Cuban Missile Crisis – 1962

- further deterioration of relations
- Mao mad about K handling of situation
o mismanagement as an opportunity to expose to the Communist world the
USSR’s lack of commitment to the revolutionary cause
- Mao criticized:
o the placement of detectable missiles
o the ‘capitulation’
 o the negative impact it would have on the struggle against US imperialism
- Hsu – considered K as a coward
Cultural Revolution - 1966-1976
- Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
- 5.1966
- to initiate a revolution at the very heart of traditional Chinese ‘culture’
o elimination of liberal and bourgeois thinking and behavior
o Mao believed that this would re-ignite the revolutionary class struggle
 historians agree that this was really Mao’s ‘relaunch’ of himself after
the disasters of the Great Leap Forward
- young were the main tool
o  re-education of teachers, parents, ...
o  mostly carried out via Red Guards, wielding Mao’s Little Red Book
o  power struggle developed at both local and national level
- no set out way
o  some attacks, leading to 500,000 dead
- able to remove any reactionaryelements and gaining full control over PRC
o  wanted it to end by 1969, in hope that society could get under order
- many Maoists were sent to countryside to learnfrom peasants
- K left by 1964
o  no reconciliation USSR & PRC
o  USSR continued in isolate PRC
- almost leading to civilwar
o  soviets denounced revolution as fanaticism and anarchy
- Soviets criticized and accused PRC:
o trading illegally with the apartheid regime in South Africa
o receiving assistance from West Germany on nuclear research
o developing a worldwide opium trade
o sending supplies to US forces in Vietnam
PRC, USSR – Nuclear Weapons
- by 1957, USSR gained superiority over USA (Sputnik)
- Mao wanted to use to undermine USA
- Mao’s belief that nuclear was wa inevitable part of revolution
- K used superiority as to convince USA to co-existence
o  this disagreement of USSR & PRC climaxed over The Test-Ban Treaty (1963)
- K crizicized Mao
- if PRC wanted help from USSR, that would mean USSR’s control over Chinese
defence policy
- over the course of 10 years China independently developed
o  1964 atomic bomb
 showed itself as a superpower and that it was bale to work indepenently
of USSR
- Mao made fun of the scientist withdrawl
 o  Mao emphasized nuclear weapons as important tool of diplomacy
- with launching of satellite in 1970’s USSR scared of PRC developing ICBMs
PRC & Brezhnev – 1968-1982
- during Brezhnev, no imporvement occured
- Brezhnev Doctrine
o Soviet Union stated that to maintain order in Eastern Europe, the satellite states
had to accept Soviet leadership
- Prague Spring – 1968
o  during period of liberalization
o  unidermining USSR’s standing with other states and demaged PRC’s isolation
- Mao scared that Brezhnev Doctrine and Soviet military strength might be used against
PRC
Sino-Soviet Border War - 1968
- hostility usually materialized along borders
- USSR as imperialist, due to not giving mack territory seized in 19th century
- both sides increased troops at borders
- 1969 – frontie dispute erupted into actual war
o tension boiled over into actual fighting on 2.3.1969 on Chen-pao or Damansky
Island in the Ussuri River
o  by August there was a possiblility of full out war
 danger of nuclear war
- no escalation of events
o  most powerful communists on the brink of war
- historians view 1969 as the lowest point in Sino-Soviet relations due to:
o serious border incidents threatened to turn into full-scale war
o the PRC and Soviet Union realigned missiles to face one another
o there was an intensification of the rivalry to be the leading Communist nation

- 1978 – Soviet– Vietnamese Treaty of Peace and Friendship

o  due to airlift during Vietnam War
o  PRC didn’t allow for USSR to se their airports, causing more dicsontent
- due to growing inflence of USSR in Vietnam, PRC tried to get closer ties with
Cambodia
o  1975 - Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge party (communist – Maoist)
 brutal, between 1975-1979 – 2.5mil died
- 17.2.1979 – China invaded Vietnam
o intent was to draw Vietnamese/Soviet forces out of Cambodia
 USSR – increase backing of Vietnam
o no quicky victory, although Vietnam won, PLA acclaimed success
 heavy casualties – had to withdraw
o  major set pack for PRC propaganda against USSR

Sino-Soviet Rapprochement – 1982-2000

 - reasons for relaxation of tensions:
o Mao Zedong’s death in 1976
o the overthrow of the anti-Soviet Gang of Four in China
o the adoption by the new PRC leader, Deng Xiaoping, of a more tolerant line in
relation to the Soviet Union and the West
o Brezhnev’s death in 1982
- attempts by Andropov and Chernenko (short-term leaders)
o  e.g. diplomatic formalities were renewed in 1982, and high-ranking Chinese
attended Brezhnev’s funeral
- key issues dividing USSR & PRC:
o the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
o Soviet troops on the border with China
o Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia
- invasion of Afghanistan in 1979
o  condemned by PRC
 imperial expansions
 PRC did not view the invasion as a ‘defensive move’ as the Soviets
claimed, but as an excuse to mass troops on the border with China
Mikhail Gorbachev (1985) and Deng Xiaoping
- first chance of impovement of relationships
- 1986 – new agreements, restored diplomatic relations
- 11.1987 – G asked to meet with D
o  declined due to Vietnamese allies were still present in Cambodia
- 5.1988 – PRC & USSR – signing of cultural exchange agreement
- improvement when USSR withdrawn from Afghanistan in 1989
Tiananmen Square, 1989
- PRC’s decision to brutally crush the Chinese pro-democracy movement
demonstrations in Beijing
- depicting the fundamental differences of the regime
- G initiated far-reaching reforms of glsnost (more political freedom and reform) &
perestroika (economic restructuring)
o  first time a Soviet leader dismantles Stalin’s structure
- Deng – also economic reforms
o  no corresponding policy of political openness
- before G visit, demonstrations for freedom and restructuring by students (16.4.1986)
- 13.5 – 3,000 srudents on hunger strike
o  highly embarasing to PRC with coming G
- 19.5 – 500,000 support of hunger strike
o  20.5 – martial law
o  Deng refused compromise
- 4.6.1989 - troops were sent in to disperse the crowd by Deng
o  troops opened fire
o  thousands died
  hunting down and aresting
- denying 1,000s dead
- struck entire world
Fall of USSR
- due to reforms bringing down of the segime Deng convinced that his appraoch was
right
- PRC no longer a competitor

Sino-American Relations

Background
- USA given material assistence to CCP to fight agains common enemy – JP
- CCP and GMD – civil war
o US pumped material assistance and advice to Jiang’s ‘antiCommunist’ forces
 US hoping GMD would win
- 10.1949 – when China became communist, USA didn’t want to recognize communist
gov
o  indested USA supported the fled gov of GMD in Taiwan
- Taiwan – key area of discussion fo USR & PRC
- other areas of discussion
o  Korean, Japan, Tibet
- Mao started developing cnucelar weapons g´fater firt Taiwan crisis (1954-1955)
- disputed sover underlying ideology
Tibet – 1950
- PLA invaded Tibet
o  Mao considered as domestic concern
o  PRC seen ti as a consolidaiton of power
 reunificaiton of former Chinese territories
- brutality
- USA percievedas an expansionism
- Dalai Lama (Tibetian spiritual leader)
o  calling it a cultural genocide

Korean War -1950-1953

- Kim Il Sung’s invasion of South was under Mao & Stalin
o  joint venture
- however Mao was perusaded by Kim Il Sung to agree to invasion
- PRC more concerned about Tibet & Taiwan
o  also wanted to initiate revolutionary reforms
- Mao condemned American actions, USA claiming that N was the agressor nd Mao – S
- PRC – mass demonstrations and warning USA that if they pushed N they’d take action
o  PLAs volunteers already fighting with N Korea
 - 10.1950 – when USA crossedthe 38th parallel the PRC started attack over the Yalu
River
o  by 1953 – PLA lost almost a 1 million men
Impact of Korean War on Sino-American relations
- led to open conflict
- Panmunjom Armistice
o Americans had previously been reluctant to guarantee long-term protection for
Taiwan, but after the war they pledged themselves to the defence of the island.
o Mao less in awe of the potential military might of the USA
- hostility between PRC & USSR as the key factor in internaitonal relations
- PRC weakened by Korean War (in all aspects)
o  however it strengthened the position of CCP
- Soviet wanting PRC to pay for given equpiments, strengthening their alone position
Taiwan – 1954 & 1958
- Korean War altered the USA’s persepctive towards Asia
- Taiwan as a key element in containment policy:
o Taiwan was well defended and the PRC was not confident it had the air power
or the landing craft necessary.
o The US Navy Seventh Fleet, which had been based in the area to secure
Taiwan for strategic reasons during the Korean War, was now present.
o At the end of the Korean War, the United States stated it would protect Taiwan
from aggression.
- 1954 – Mao wanted to test US committment and shelled islands Quemoy & Matsu
o  Eisenhower’s quick response,suggesting nuclear weapons
- USA had to show to it’s allies in region
o  also confidents the USSR would also go so far if PRC threatened
- 1958 – Mao’s shelling of same islands
o  with build-up of PLA
o  USA navy vessels
 both prepared for attack
o  no attack occured
- USA belief in PRC being expansionist and in support of surounding communist
turnovers
o  linked to Domino effect theory
o  Chinese goals percieved genuine threat to security of W
- policies of containment of China:
o a US trade embargo with the PRC
o obstruction of the PRC’s entry to the United Nations
o huge economic and military aid to Taiwan
o an aid programme for the region
o instigation of a regional containment bloc – SEATO
o bilateral defence treaties with Asian states seen as under threat from the PRC
Reltions in 1960’s
- McCarthyism had significant impact during Eisenhower
- these polcies continued with Kennedy, mainitaing isolation & containment
- USA used the failure of GLF
o  highlighting the excesses of Marxist-driven economic experiment
o  PRC’s willingness to sacrifice millions of lives in pursuit of Communist
ideology
- key disputes in 1960’s:
o Taiwan
o Vietnam
o decolonization movements
o the Chinese Cultural Revolution
- PRC wanted ro reunify with Taiwan
o Margaret MacMillan writes: ‘The existence of a separate government and
another China was an affront to the Chinese nation and to Chinese
nationalism’
- although no more brinks of war such as 1958, it was still a key debate fo PRC
o overriding preoccupation, and no compromises, such as ‘two Chinas’, were
acceptable to them
o  PRC percienved that if Taiwan was not a separate state
- Vietnam War hightened these tensions, including its allies for USA
- PRC considered USA’s intervention into Vetnam as expansionist
o  also cited Taiwan the same
- Mao criticized that UN was dominated by imperialist of the W
PRC & Decolonization
- PRC wanted to decolonice and get rid of the foreign influence as it wanted to be take
as the leading interational revolutionary (replacing USSR)
- Bandung Conference
o  1955
o  premier Enlai assertedthe USA was a threat to peace
o  held in response to SEATO
 anti-communist allience
- 1966 - Dean Rusk outlined the USA’s policy towards China to the US Congress:
o The USA does not seek to overthrow the PRC.
o The USA objects to PRC involvement in the affairs of other countries: that is,
encouraging revolutionary forces worldwide by providing training.
o Although the PRC is more violent in word than action, it still should not be
underestimated
o EXAGGERATION
- PRC ineffective in decolonizing – lacking resources

The USA and the PRC’s Cultural Revolution

- GLF & CR weakened PRC’s position to conduct any foreign policy
 - both USSR & USA wanted Chinese turmoil
o clear demonstration of the out-of-control fanaticism of the Maoist leadership,
which seemed to lack both stability and coherency
- PRC as a danger in region as a domino effect
- during Cultural Revolution
o  increased hsostility towards USA and its allies
o  PRC feared that USA wanted tobring about regieme change
o  similar threat from USSR, leading to first few nervous years of CR
Sino-Soviet Détante – 1970’s
- focus areas for Sino-Soviet relations in 1970’s
o Taiwan
o Vietnam
o the United Nations
o the Soviet Union
- détante started in 1969 when USA eased the trade restrictions
o  patrols by Seventh Fleet in Taiwan Straits were halted
- major turning point when USA changed their opinion on PRC’s mebership in UN
- ping-pong diplomacy – USA table tennis team invited to China
o  secret talk of Kissinger & Enlai
- climax took place in 1972
o  Nixon and Mao Zedong meeting
o joint communiqué issued, establishing a new relationship between the two
superpowers

Why did the USA want détente with the PRC?

- reasons why did US moved from détante:
o The situation in Vietnam had led the United States to believe containment was
not possible there, and it wanted the PRC’s assistance in its exit strategy.
o The USA wanted to put pressure on the Soviet–American attempts at détente.
o Nixon wanted to ‘make history’.
o There was public support in the USA for more constructive strategies
following the Vietnam War.
o The PRC had developed ICBM capability, so it was now the American view
that it was more dangerous not to have contact.
o The USA hoped to be able to reduce commitments in Asia, while retaining
bases in the Pacific.
- started to believe that communism wasn’t as monolithical
o  Nixon wanted toshift his policies mostly into reactions to other’s actions
 not ideological formulas
o  shift in UN – not able to resent more PRC not being in UN
 both seemed to hive up hegemony in Asia
 Shanghai Communiqué – 2.1972
  joint Sino-American statement
Why did China wand détente with USA?
- In the 1960s and 1970s the PRC saw the USSR as its main rival, so it wanted to reduce
tensions with the USA.
- China could gain concessions on key foreign policy issues: for example, UN
membership, Taiwan, US withdrawal from Vietnam and Indochina as a whole.
- The PRC was worried about a resurgent Japan, and wanted its power limited.
- The PRC maintained that the détente would be ‘temporary’, and that it would remain
vigilant against US imperialism and aggression. Mao had argued in an article in 1940,
‘On Policy’, that it was legitimate to play o enemies and to do whatever was necessary
to defeat the main enemy at a given time.
- Moderation of its stance against the West could improve the PRC’s standing in the
developing world.
What did China gain from détente with USA?
- 1950’s – unrealistic hope for PRC to be in UN, due to W dominance in UN
o  each year voted fro place
- 1965 - US ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, outlined why the United States did
not believe the PRC should be a member state:
o The CCP was not the legitimate government of China – it had come to power
through force, not by democracy. It also used force to maintain its power.
o It had a record of aggression, and was thus not a ‘peace-loving’ nation.
o Its sponsorship of revolutionary groups in the developing world would hamper
UN work in these areas.
o Taiwan had an honourable record, and should not be expelled
- neutral and developing countries started to dominate General Assembly
- 1970 – USA intiriated ‚two China policy‘
o  Taiwan remained in seat
- summer 1971 – Nixon announced visit of PRC
Result of UN membership for PRC
- now power to veto
- 1971 – PRC veto prevented the admission of Bangladesh to the UN
o done in retaliation for the ‘victory’ of the USSR and its Indian allies over PRC-
backed Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan War
- With its wider access to diplomatic contacts through the UN, the PRC also gained
better links with countries in the developing world
- It was able to increase its prestige and influence, present views on the world stage, and
publicly support its allies and denounce its enemies (including the USSR)
Japan
- 12.8.1978 – China and Japan signed a friendship treaty
o relationship developed over the next few years
 through economic ties
 China and USA the only trading with JP
  additional benefit for the PRC, further pressure on the Soviet
Union
 USSR were concerned at this new friendship between historic
enemies, and the situation led to more fears in the USSR of
being ‘encircled’
What did US gain from détente with PRC?
Vietnam
- attempt of USA to use PRC to get rid of Vietnam
- this pressure on USSR was achieved with new policy with China
Wider Context
- Americans unwilling to play the China card in relation to USSR
o  fear ofcreating more instability, especially if USSR felt encircled
- America’s China policy had some impact on relieving its commitment to mainland
Asia
o  less agressive persue was favored by asia and europe

PRC & Cold War

- China emerges as a significant factor to Cold War
o  Chinese influence grew with its nuclear power, increasingly hostile
relationship with the USSR and, ultimately, their growing rapprochement with
the USA
- turning conflict into tri-polar
Tiananmen Square – 1989
- wide refroms after Mao’s death
o removal of the fiercely anti-American Gang of Four, modernization initiatives
(Deng Xiaoping), relations between the PRC and the United States became
more co-operative
- 1989 – pro-democracy brutaly crushed by Chinese gov
o  leading to protests in W
o  althoug huge resonse from the world, PRC didn’t afacte that much
 including USA
o  wordlwide condemnation but no diplomatic isolation nor economic sanctions
 USA didn’t want to disrupt their trade links with PRC
USA & PRC by the end of Cold War
- by 1990’s USSR withdrawn from Pacific
- with the end of Cold War, China as the leading Communist nation
- China instead of seizing power focused on becoming the world power
o  economic power over
- USA giving PRC ‚most favored nation status‘
 o  leading to booming relationship and trades of USA x China

Why did détente end in second Cold War?

- period of détente started in 1968 and ended with Reagan coming to power in 1980
o  détente – relaxation of tensions
 word used to describe attempts of USA & USSR to become more stable
and co-operative and other super-power relationships
- after 1980, détente replaced with Second Cold War
Timeline of détente
1968 - Richard Nixon elected US president
1969 - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed by over 100 countries
1970 - SALT talks open in Vienna
1971 - Treaty to denuclearize the seabed signed by 74 countries
-Nixon accepts invitation to visit China
-UN admits China to membership (Taiwan expelled)
1972 - Nixon visits China
-Nixon visits USSR for summit with Leonid Brezhnev
- SALT I signed East Germany and West Germany sign Basic Treaty
1973 - Washington Summit between Nixon and Brezhnev
- Yom Kippur War
1974 - Moscow Summit between Nixon and Brezhnev
- Nixon resigns over Watergate; Gerald Ford becomes president
- Vladivostok Summit between Ford and Brezhnev
1975 - Helsinki Final Act signed by 35 countries
1976 - Jimmy Carter elected as US president
1978 - Carter warns USSR against involvement in domestic affairs of other countries
1979 - USA and China open diplomatic relations
- Shah flees Iran
- Carter and Brezhnev sign SALT II agreement in Vienna
- US Embassy in Tehran seized and diplomats taken hostage
- USA announces plans to deploy cruise missiles
- Soviet forces invade Afghanistan
1980 - US Senate suspends SALT II debate
-Ronald Reagan elected US president
1981 - US hostages released by Iran
1982 - Death of Brezhnev; Yuri Andropov becomes Soviet leader
1983 - Reagan explains Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
- USSR shoots down Korean Airlines flight 007 over its airspace
- First cruise missiles arrive in Europe
1984 - Death of Andropov; Konstantin Chernenko becomes Soviet leader
- Reagan re-elected US president
 - key event that pused superpowers into imporvement was the threat of nuclear war
- after confrontations of Berlin & Kuba
o  by 1969 – nuclear parity
- also personal reasons:
o  USSR
 USSR’s economy stagnating
 in order to improve its living standard it had to produce
consumer goods able to import to W
 deterroriating relationship with PRC
 Sino-Soviet Split – 1969 – war
o  USA
 need a way to end Vietnam War
 need for realistic foreign policy
 pursuit of realpolitik
 via using détente they wante to put pressure on PRC, USSR to end the
Vietnam War
 it would also eliminate the arm expences
Reasons for PRC-USA rapprochement
- PRC x USSR – by late 1960’s very low relations
- PRC afraid of isolation
o  USA repproachment as an opportunity and cuased concerns in USSR
- for USA, better relations with PRC was part of realpolitik
o  Kissinger’s aim to restore fluidity to international politics, moving away from
obsession with Vietnam
o  also knew that it would give them upper hand when negotiating with USSR
What were the reasons for improved East– West relations in Europe?
- events of 1968 shown political instability
o  Prague Spring, student strikes in FR
- chancellor Brandt (FGR) believed that to improve conditions between the 2
Germanys, it was necessary to easen the conditions on whole of continenet
o  Ostpolitik - policy of encouraging the opening of channels between East and
West
- USSR impetus for improvement
o  formal treaty about acceptance of new borders hadn’t been signed
 wanting to win W acceptance of current territorial sit. in E.EU
Successes of détante
Arms agreement between USA x USSR – SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty)- 1972
- after Cuban Missile Crisis
o  multiple arms control agreements
- 1972
- covering 3 areas:
o The ABM Treaty: ABMs (Anti-Ballistic Missiles)
  allowing only two sites – each site containing no more than hundred
missiles
 this limitation was key for ensuring the continued emphasis on MAD
(mutually assured destruction) and thus the deterrence of nuclear war
o The Interim Treaty:
 limits on the numbers of ICBMs (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles)
and SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles).
o The Basic Principles Agreement:
 rules for the conduct of nuclear war and development of weapons, and
committed the two sides to work together to prevent conflict and
promote peaceful co-existence.
 1973 – Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which
said that if a nuclear conflict looked imminent, both sides would
‘… immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other
and make every effort to avert this risk’.
- Mason – ‚began process of institutionalized arms control‘
- cooperation – Nixon’s visit – 1972
o  Brezhnev – Washington – 1973
- crizticism of SALT as doing limited in terms of arm contron
o  mainly MIRV

SALT II – 1979
- started in 1974 and signed in 1979
o a limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers) for each side
o a ban on the testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, heavy mobile
ICBMs, and rapid reload systems
- most extensive arms agreement
Agreements between Germanys & USSR
- by early 1970’s:
o The Moscow Treaty
 8.1970
 USSR, PL, FRG
 recognized the border between East Germany and West Germany and
also formally accepted the post-World War Two border in the East with
Poland
o The Final Quadripartite Protocol
 1972
 major victory for Willy Brandt
 agreed to the maintenance of the ‘status quo’ in Berlin, confirming that
the West had a legal basis for its access routes to the city
 W Berlin had greater security.
o The Basic Treaty
 1972
  signed by East Germany and West Germany. It accepted the existence
of two Germanys. West Germany now recognized East Germany and
agreed to increase trade links between the two countries
- these reduced tensions in EU
o  criticized by some USA
 giving legal recognition to USSR over E.EU
Agreements between the United States and China
- significant areas of improvement USA x PRC:
o The USA dropped its objections to China taking its seat on the Security
Council. Therefore, mainland China (the PRC) replaced Taiwan.
o Trade and travel restrictions between the two countries were lifted.
o Sporting events between the two countries took place, the most famous being
the visit of the US table-tennis team to Beijing (so-called ping-pong
diplomacy).
o Nixon visited China – the first American president to do so.
- these spurred deterrioration of USSR & PRC relations
o  upperhand over USSR together
- triangular diplomacy
o  USR & PRC relation gave more leverage and bargaining power in arms
agreement in USSR
- USA – still supporting Taiwan and stood firm in its independence
Helsinki Agreement
- high point of détente
- 1972 – Nixon agreed to take part in European Security Conference
o  held in Helsinki, 1973
- 33 countries producing The Final Act on 1.8.1975, taking form of baskets
o Basket 1: Security basket
 followed Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik negotiations with the Soviet Union
and recognized that Europe’s frontiers were ‘inviolable’(that is, they
could not be altered by force)
 both East Germany and West Germany were now recognized by both
sides of the Cold War divide
o Basket 2: Co-operation basket
 called for closer ties and collaboration in economic, scientific, and
cultural fields
o Basket 3: Human rights basket
 all of the signatories agreed to respect human rights and individual
freedoms, such as freedom of thought, conscience, or religion, and
freedom of travel
- USSR attitude controversial to Basket 3
o  W hoping to undermine USSR’đ control in satellite states
 setting up organisation to look over this
o  however for Berzhnev the 1 and 2 Baskets were more important
Why did détente between the USA and the USSR come under pressure?
Political factors undermining détante
- USA though that arms agreement were benefitting USSR
o USSR building up a strategic based of ICBMs
o SALT I was effectively allowing the USSR to win the Cold War
- actions in Middle East & Africa as continuing expansionism
o Yom Kippur War 10.1973
 USA suspected that the USSR known in advance about Egypt’s
surprise attack on Israel
 agreement mentioned earlier, which the USA and the USSR had signed
promising to inform each other of any conflict that might threaten
world peace, the attack on Israel and its aftermath, in the words of
Anatoly Dobrynin, ‘definitely damaged the trust between the leadership
of both countries’
o Civil war in Angola
 supporting the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) with military aid
 USSR aid, along with aid given by Cuba, was key to the success
of the MPLA
o Ethiopia against Somalia in 1977
 scale of intervention was worrying to the USA
 seemed that the Soviets were involved expansionism in key areas
 it was more a case of the Soviets randomly assisting Marxist
rebels throughout the world
o Dobrynin notes, this policy was a kind of ‘ideological
bondage’ which did not in fact benefit the Soviet Union
in the long term
- dissilusionment over the Basket 3 – presented by Carter (1976)
o  e.g. allowing new trading agreements only if the Soviet Union would allow
Soviet Jews to emigrate
- Soviet Criticism of détente
o When Israel struck back in the 1973 war, trapping Egypt’s Third Army, the
Soviets tried to negotiate a solution with the US within a détente framework
(UN Security Council) to agree to a joint ceasefire.
 The Israelis ignored this, however, and Soviet attempts to get the USA
to force Israel to abide by the ceasefire failed.
o  USSR still believed that USA was in support of 3rd World anti-communist
regimes
Economic factors undermining détente
 - both seen economic benefit
o  USA economy started recoverin in 1970’s
o Oil price crisis of 1973, when OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries) launched an oil embargo against Israel’s allies in the
Yom Kippur War, W economies wanted to secure their economies
 finding new sources of energy and setting up the G7
 group of the main world economies, to work at creating
economic stability at the international level
 1974-1978 - oil price stabilized, laying foundation for further
economic growth, thus removing economic motivations for
détente from the US’s side
- USA’s economy in decline
- USSR – inefficiency in central planning, rise of interest rates
o  disastrous impact on economy
o  1950’s – 7% growth
o  1970’s – 3% growth
- Jackson–Vanik Amendment 1974
o significant restrictions on US–Soviet trade
o USSR thus pulled out of trade deals which would have given it the access it
needed to US technology
o  thaw also due to USA’s pressure to persue Basket 3
- economic imbalance benefiting USA
o  further USA hed less economic interest in détante
- the importance of safe guarding oil
o  USA realizing their importance thus preventing any Soviet expansion
joepardizing it
Why did détente collapse?
- struggling to survive by late 1970’s
o  collapsed completly by Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979
- this seemed as proof of Soviet intenations
o  USSR considered as a peace threat
o determination to spread their influence beyond their borders
- Carter refused to sign SALT II
- stopping all electronic export to USSR
- forbiding Olympic participation in Moscow of 190
- also pledged to increase defence spending
- Carter Doctrine
o committing USA to intervention if the Soviets threatened Western interests in
the Persian Gulf
Was détente a fail?
- post-revisionist – Bowker/Williams
 o détente was a necessary strategy to deal with the international situation and to
find methods of managing competition ‘in a way which prevented them from
degenerating into hostilities’
- Right-wing historians interpret détente as a weak policy that allowed the USSR to to
strengthen itself and gain access to Western technology at the expense of American
interests.
o Pipes, who views détente as nothing more than a ‘trick’ on the part of the
Soviets. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s is seen as a result of
hardline policies towards the Soviet Union. Détente had failed because it had
helped to keep the Soviet Union going.
Second Cold War
- election of Reagan – wave of anti-communism
- believed detente has been a failure
o  that it was ised by USSR to presure their aims of world revolution
- anti-Soviet policies:
o Defence spending was increased by 13 per cent in 1982 and over 8 per cent in
each of the following two years. This was the largest peacetime build-up in US
history.
o New nuclear weapons were developed, including the stealth bomber and
Trident submarines.
o A new Strategic Defense Initiative was announced in 1983 (‘Star Wars’). This
was a research programme for setting up a space-based laser system that would
intercept and strike Soviet missiles. It undermined the whole idea of MAD
(mutually assured destruction – the ‘balance of terror’), which had acted as a
deterrence against either side using nuclear weapons.
o The Reagan Doctrine was announced. This gave assistance to anti-Communist
insurgents as well as anti-Communist governments – for example, the Contras,
a right-wing guerrilla group fighting against the left-wing government of the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The USA also supported an unpopular right-wing
government in El Salvador against a growing popular revolt by the left and, in
1983, US forces invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada and deposed its left-
wing government. In addition, aid was stepped up to the Mujahidin in
Afghanistan.
o The US deployed Intermediate Range Missiles (IRMs) in Western Europe to
counter the Soviet SS-20s.
o Reagan restricted trade with the Soviet Union, limiting Soviet access to US
technology as well as access to US oil and gas.
o He used aggressive language towards the Soviets, calling them an ‘evil empire’
and ‘the focus of evil in the modern world’.
- these renewed tensions were not easened by USSR, where Brezhnev died in 1982 and
was succeded by Andropov and then Chernenko in 1984, dying in 1985
- cimax of this occured when USSR shot down the Korean plane
o  USSR claimed it was a CIA spy plane
o  causing a lot of outrage
- this radically changed with emergence of Gorbachev as permier of Soviet Union
(1985)
 Soviet containment 1945–1980

- 1944-1948 – USSR gained controlover E.EU countries

o  establishing tight Soviet control:
 The establishment of one-party rule, including installation of national
leaders dependent on the USSR.
 Nationalization of private enterprise.
 The establishment of Soviet-style five-year plans. Heavy industry was
encouraged and agriculture collectivized.
 Integration of the economy of Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union, to
o- set the weakness of industry and agriculture in the USSR. Each
country had to produce what the USSR needed: for example, Poland
produced coal, steel, and ships. The satellite states were not to co-
operate economically with each other, however. This situation was one
of exploitation of the satellite states for the economic advantage of the
USSR, and it had disastrous effects on any attempts at economic
modernization in the satellites.
- this economical and political system was ensured by:
o social and ideological controls (Cominform, secret police)
o censorship of all media
o suppression of religious freedom
o military presence of Soviet troops
o political purges
- timeline of Soviet control over E.EU:
1948 June Yugoslavia expelled from Cominform
Purges begin in other satellite states to get rid of ‘Titoists’
1953 June Strikes break out in East Germany and Soviet troops restore order
1956 Feb Khrushchev gives de-Stalinization speech
June Polish workers’ revolt suppressed by Soviet troops
Oct Soviet suppression of Hungarian Uprising
1968 Apri Dubcek reveals plans for modernization of Czechoslovakia, Prague Spring
l
Aug Warsaw Pact forces invade Czechoslovakia
Sept Brezhnev announces Brezhnev Doctrine, Albania leaves Warsaw Pact
1979 Dec Soviet forces invade Afghanistan
1980 Aug Strikes in Poland. Gdansk agreements recognize Solidarity
1981 Dec Martial law imposed in Poland

Challenge in E.Germany (GDR) – 1953

- combination of relaxation and repression triggered E.German riots in 1953
o  crisis due to mass exodus to W via Berlin
- Beria, deputy Soviet prime minister, suggested getting rid of troubeled FDR, selling to
W
o  idea not take by his collegues
 - Ulbricht, forced by Soviet gov to conciliatory approach in his policy of
collectivization and socialization
o this softer approach came too late, and no attempt was made to reduce the high
production targets that had been set for the workers by Ulbricht
 creating dngerous situaltion on 16-17.6, where workers of Beling rose
up in revolt
 first time thos occured in USSR
 quickly supressed by Red Army
 it was still embarassing to USSR
o  Beria executed for being a W agent
- idea of frendly DE was abondened
o  Ulbricht and Krushchev building the GDR as separate state
Challenges to Soviet control under Khrushchev
Khrushchev and de-Stalinization
- 1956 – 20th Congress of Communist Party
o  Krushchev proclaime dperiod of de-Stalinization
- strengthened position at home
o  although it weakened his communist position elsewhere
 ironic that Khrushchev got rid of Stalin’s weapons of terror and yet he
had to use more force than Stalin had ever done in order to keep control
in Hungary
Khrushchev and Tito
- Khrushchev claimed that Stalin had made a major error concerning Tito and
Yugoslavia
o Stalin understood Tito and the national cause he represented, Yugoslavia
would never have broken away from the East European bloc. He thus restored
relations with Yugoslavia, visiting Tito in 1955 and 1956. However, Tito
continued to maintain his non-aligned status in his relationship with the USSR.
Khrushchev and Poland
- K seeing how it turned out inYugoslaia, he didn’t want to revise other states
o  states though he might be more open to it
- 6.1956 – first protests in Poznan
o  quickly spread
o  workers wanted bettwer conditions
o  100,000 protestors put down with force
 10,000 troops and 400 tanks
o  60 killed
- this led to reinstatement of Gomulka, imprisoned under Stalin
o  he implemented rapid de-stalinization
- 19.10.1956 - Khrushchev flew to Warsaw and Soviet military forces moved into
intimidating positions
 o Gomulka refused to be intimidated and threatened to arm the Polish workers to
resist
- Gomulk had no intention of taking PL out of Warsaw Pact
o  this soothed K and Klet him remain in power
- significant due to first time USSR allowed for compromise
o Gomulka turned out to be a trusted ally of Khrushchev, and the freedoms
acquired by the Poles in 1956 were gradually taken away
Hungarian Uprising – 1956
- no compromies and this is an example of how K was determined to maintain Stalin’s
control over satellite states
- news of PL success spread to HU
o  repressive regime of M. Rakosi
- crowds wanted to replace with moderate I. Nagy
o  K agreed to this but protests continued
o  K ordered Red Army to put down the situation
 K failed to due that when Nagy negotiated the withdrawl of Soviet
forces (18.10.1956)
o  shortly after Nahgy announced the leaving of Warsaw Pact and neutralism
 also planning to share gov with non-communists
- K knowing that majority focus was on Suez Crisis, K couldn’t tolerate this launched
a general offensive against Hungarians
o  2,500 Hungarians dead, 700 troops dead
 200,000 fled the country
- K successful in bringing under control
- new gov est – J Kadar
o  I. Nagy executed
What actions did the USA take?
- encouraged by CIA boradcasts of Radio Free Europe
o  making hungarians belief they had US support
- US made it clear they would not any actions so save Nagy
o  US attention to Suez Crisis
o  no evidence of Eisenhower ever considered interfering
- maybe because he knew K was prepared to risk nuclear war
Why did the Soviets act differently in Hungary and Poland?
- in PL communism retained control but in HU, it lost it
o  Nagy’s decision of neutalism would remove it from Soviet influence,
weakening the buffer zone
- K actions showed that de-stalinization didn’t mean weakening of USSR’s maintanance
- if USSR was to lose any of spheres of influence it was to do whatever it took
What were the results for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union?
- strengthening of K’s position by events of Suez and Hungary
 - USSR could now be confident that there would be no US influence
o  also shown that Warsaw Pact (unlike NATO) was based on voluntary
participation
o  also that USSR could not rely on loyalty of satellit states
Prague Spring – 1968
- in 1960’s dissatisfaction started to galvanize when Alexander Dubčekbecame the First
Secretary of the Communist Party in 1968
o  marking as the beginning
- aim was to create socialism with human face
o  introduction of measures to modernize and liberate economy
o  wider power for trade unions, expansion of trade into W, freedom of travel
- in June abolishment of censorship and encouraged criticism
- after seeing what happened in Hungary, he remained careful and remained in
a Warsaw Pact and a valuable ally
What actions did the Soviets take?
- Berzhnev and other leader resorted to use force
- 8.1968 – troops of WarsawPact invaded Czechoslovakia
o  gov didn’t resist to avoid Hungary 1956
 Czechoslovaks resorted to passive resistance
 organized strikes and peaceful anti-Russian demonstrations
- govs forced to abandon reforms
- 1969 – Dubcek was replaced by Gustav Husak
o subservient to Moscow and remained in power until 1987
Results of Invasion
- to justify Brezhnev’s doings he presented Brezhnev Doctrine:
o ‘There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and Communist
parties have and must have freedom … theirs must damage neither socialism
in their own country nor the fundamental interests of other socialist countries
… This means that every Communist party is responsible not only to its own
people, but also to all the socialist countries and the entire Communist
movement. Whoever forgets this in placing sole emphasis on the autonomy and
independence of Communist parties, lapses into one-sidedness, shirking his
internationalist obligations …’
- with this any threat to socialist community that was dealt with was viewed as justified
- Brezhnev Doctrine ensured that any attempt at liberalism wouldn’t be tolerated
o reform plans throughout the region were abandoned, with disastrous economic
consequences for the future of the Soviet bloc
- invasion hampered USSR prestige of communism
o  China, Yugoslavia, Albania condemned this action
- many communist in W.EU stopped seeking Moscow help
- major impact on E-W relations
- slowed down détente
 - Ouimet – ‚Moscow’s goals in Czechoslovakia led most observers on both sides of the
Iron Curtain to regard the intervention as a decisive Soviet victory. Relations with the
West experienced some setbacks … Ultimately, however, the need to involve Moscow
in negotiations with North Vietnam overcame American indignation …The invasion …
created instant tensions with the East European nations that had not taken part in the
operation. As for the nations remaining in the Soviet-led alliance, the invasion confi
rmed that autonomous political reforms would no longer be tolerated … [also] the
invasion seriously damaged Moscow’s ability to build a united front against the
Chinese. ‘
The challenge from Poland in the 1980s
- late 1970’s poor economic situation
o  industrial unrest, food shortages, strikes
- opposition to gov centered in Gdansk
- 1980 – shipyard workers went on strike
o  led by L. Walesa
- successful in securing economic and political rights, including the right to strike and
form free trade unions
o establishment of the independent trade union movement called Solidarity
- 1981 – 10 mil. members
o  seen as a threat to USSR
o  Red Army sent to border, but didn’t invade
- S. Kania, the new leader of PL, convinced Brezhnev in restoring order himself
o possible that American warnings against the use of force kept back the Soviet
troops
- 12.1981 – elements of PL army used inseizing gov
o  W. Jaruzelski as the prime minister declared martial law
 banning of Solidarity, arrest of thousands activists
- 1983 – gov infirm control
o  economic problems, support for Solidarity still remained
- martial law and invasion of Afghanistan weakened détenté,which already struggled to
survive
To what extent were Soviet leaders following Stalin’s structural legacy?
- although K wanted tto bring about de-stalinization, reducing tensions and improving
relation with Tito, there was no fundamnetal change in relationship of USSR &
satellite states
- Power remained centralized in Moscow; economically the satellite states continued to
develop their economies to suit that of the Soviet Union. After the Brezhnev Doctrine
was introduced, all economic experiments in the Soviet bloc aimed at modernization
and increased competitiveness came to an end.
- The leaders of the satellite states remained men who were loyal to Moscow.
- When any of the states attempted to resist or deviate from this situation, the Red Army
was used ruthlessly to restore order and maintain the system; the Brezhnev Doctrine
justified this as necessary for preserving socialism throughout the Eastern bloc.
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
- Brezhnev doctrine used for Afghan Invasion of 1979
o  although not part of USSR sphere of influence, USSR threatened by situation
that might develop in Afghanistan and threaten USSR
Why did the Soviets intervene in Afghanistan?
- 4.1978 – PDP (People’s Democrtic Party) of Afghanistan seized power
o  PDP – pro-Soviet organization recieving aid from USSR
o  H. Amin from 1979
 carried out social and economic policies that included land reform,
women’s rights and secular education
 reforms were resisted by both fundamentalist Muslims within
Afghanistan and other factions within the PDP
- Afghan muslims begun joining Mujahidin, who declared jihad against Amin regime
o  increasing deendant on Soviet aid
- Amin alsoinitated US & CIA contact
o  this was the turningpoint, where USSR decided to intervene and to replace
Amin, by pro-Soviet B. Karmal
- Soviet reasons for invasion:
o The USSR did not want the ‘Afghan Revolution’ defeated and Afghanistan
turned into a pro-Western state.
o The USSR believed that the victory of the ‘counter-revolution’ would result in
a ‘bloodbath’ caused by religious zealots and vengeful feudal lords.
o The USSR believed that a victory for the counter-revolution’s forces would
allow for massive American military involvement in Afghanistan. This was a
country bordering the USSR, and thus a threat to Soviet security.
o The USSR claimed that it would have ‘ceased to be a great power’ if it turned
away from taking ‘unpopular, but necessary, decisions’.
- these also included unoffocial reasons:
o The moderate Western response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia may have
encouraged the Soviets in their decision to invade Afghanistan
o Détente was already in difficulties, so the impact that the invasion might have
on relations with the USA was not so much of a concern to the Soviet
leadership as it might have been several years earlier.
- Karmal’sregime wa dependant on Soviet strength to maintain control over
reolutionary troops and Afghan Islamist forces
What was the American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?
- USSR miscalculated impact of invasion upon W
o  not seen as maintanace of control in own sphere of influence but expansionism
- Carter chose a stringent reaction:
o The ‘Carter Doctrine’ was announced – it pledged US intervention in the
Persian Gulf if the Soviets threatened its interests there.
o Carter’s National Security team decided to resist the Soviet invasion by
‘proxy’: that is, by providing the Mujahedin rebels with weapons.
 - Reagan in 1981 wa seven more aggressive
o  increase in aid
o mid-1980s – began to send US supplies of arms to the Mujahidin and their
Afghan allies
- as the war approached Brezhnev’s death and reigme of Antropov, Chernenko, it gave
the rebels the upper hand
- more than 500,000 casualties; 25,000 Red Army troops
- excessive expences
- with emergence of Gorbachev, he withdrew due to him putting more emphasis on
domestic reforms
o Gorbachev announced his intention to pull Soviet troops out of Afghanistan in
February 1988. By the following February, the USSR had completed its
military withdrawal
Afghanistan and its impact on détente
- according to right-wing it was an example of USSR’s expansionism
o  thereby USSR held responsible for breakdown of détente
- post-revisionist – USSR only took defensive actions to genuine threat
o  also in sphere of influence
o  US response was cynical wand wanted to tak advantage of unstable situation
cause by Islamist fundamentalism if Afghanistan
 due to changes in US foreign policy that led to renewed tensions

Confrontation: The impact of the arms race on the Cold War

- dropping of first a-bomb had a massive impact on Cold War

- these terrifying weapons caused:
o started an arms race between the major powers, which became an integral part
of the Cold War, helping to maintain and continue the hostility between the
superpowers
o caused both sides to rethink military strategy and thus the way conflicts were
handled during the Cold War
o put huge economic strains on both countries and thus played a role in the
ending of the Cold War
How did the nuclear arms race develop during the Cold War?
- Truman’s use of a-bomb in Pacific cause much debate
- by historians seen as first act of Cold War
o  possible trigger for arms race of USSR & USA
- a-bomb seen as counter USSR militant superiority
o  USSR – a-bomb in 1949
 - this triggered USA into development of hydrogen bomb (more powerful)
o  1952 – USA, 1953 – USSR
- 1950’s – dev of ICBM’s
o  USA became converned about USSR as it was using faster in terms of tech
development
- after launch of Sputnik USA percived this as the missile gap
o  U-2 spy flights over USSR assured Eisenhower of no actual gap
- USA still onctunued with dev ov ICBMs
o  1968 – USSR response with ABM defensive missile system
- USA – MIRVs
o  increasing their reach of nuclear missiles
- USSR – 1975 – their own MIRV programme
Why was the arms race so intense during the Cold War?
- both seen stockpiling of weapons as for the safeguard interest
o  each other advances made each other more valnurable
- fears of USSR catching up (US concern) and falling behing USSR (USSR
concern)fuelled this race
- therefore, until the 1980s, both sides continued to develop increasingly powerful and
sophisticated weapons
What strategies were developed for using nuclear weapons?
- both had vast numbers of highly destructive weapons
- B. Brodie, a leading American strategist at the time, was quick to see the military
significance of nuclear weapons
o Book The Absolute Weapon (New York 1946) he explained that whereas
before the invention of nuclear weapons the chief purpose of the military had
been to ‘win wars’, from now on their chief purpose would be to ‘avert them’.
He claimed that the new weapons could have no other purpose.
- both seen the danger of nuclear weapons
- both also believed in strategy inwhich they could use it
Eisenhower and massive retaliation
- although Eisenhower and his advisers were both working towards the idea of limited
nuclear warefare
- Eisenhower himself put forward the idea of massive retaliation –
o that the United States would fight with every weapon at its disposal if attacked,
despite the devastating consequences
- although highly dangerous he was consious of danger
McNamara and ‘counterforce’
- Kennedy willing to expand idea of massive retaliation
o Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, developed a
‘counterforce strategy’ in which the objective would be to destroy the enemy’s
military forces, but not cities and thus not civilian populations
- issues of this policy:
 o the issue of successfully hitting a target accurately at this early stage of missile
development
o hitting a military target without affecting a city when so many military
facilities were located near to cities
o ensuring that the Soviets also followed the same ‘no cities’ rule
- USSR angered by this new policy and implied that the United States would make ‘pre-
emptive strikes’ in a crisis situation
- public aso criticized this policy, amking nuclear war as more likely

The impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis: mutually assured destruction (MAD)
- during CMS the tensions have peaked
- McNamara changed his policy to cause as much casualties
o  known as MAD
 if there was no one after, there’s no one to win
- proposed by B. Brodie in 1946
- both came to this concept and developed even more weapons but also wanted an
agreement to manage them
- thereby CMS was followed by:
o the Test-Ban Treaty in 1963, which stopped nuclear weapons testing in the
atmosphere
o the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, which required nations
possessing nuclear weapons not to pass on relevant information or technology
to non-nuclear countries
o the Strategic Arms Limitation Interim Agreement in 1972, which restricted
the number of land- and sea-based ballistic missiles
- Eisenhower’s idea of open skies where satellites reconnaissance would be used to
minimalizethe probability for suprise attack
- The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 also banned defences against long-range
missiles. This was to ensure that MAD remained the key strategy. If defences were
allowed, then one or both superpowers might believe that they stood a chance of using
nuclear weapons and this would take away the ‘stability’ that came from MAD
The impact of Reagan and Gorbachev
- Reagan changed this stability
o  steppin up arms race (biggest arsenal in US history)
 new advances (neutron bomb)
- SDI/Star Wars concerned the USSR
- dev of space-based missiles that could intervene any time
o  undermining MAD, giving USA firststrike capability
- USSR’s economy on verge of collapse
o  couldn’t compete with USA and it’s nucelear advance
- some historians believe that it was the threat of SDI that led directly to the success of
arms talks between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan
- change of Soviet premier G has also altered this course
 o  agrued that nuclear war was not possible, security must therefore be gained by
political rather than military means, and that negotiation and co-operation were
as important as the continued build-up of the military
- ‘reasonable suffciency’ - which meant that the Soviet Union should have only enough
weapons to defend itself, rather than enough to launch a pre-emptive strike or fight a
preventative war
o change in the Sotiet mindset and good relationship between Gorbachev and
Reagan - leading to end of rams race
The role of conventional weapons
- due to not ability of use of nuclear weapons, convetional had to be used
o  central military strength
- Korean War & Vietnam War fought with conventional weapons
- USSR leading position
- mid-1970s, the Warsaw Pact countries had nearly twice as many men and three times
as many tanks in Europe as their counterparts in NATO
Space Race
- following the success in 1950’s K, claimed that the ‘economy, science, culture and the
creative genius of people in all areas of life develop better and faster under
Communism’
- part of military superiority and technology race
- Sputnik
o  causing USA’s hysteria, not just because the USSR had beaten the US, but
because it could launch ballistic missiles that could reach the US
- satellites important for surveillance of the other side’s military installations
- succeded by first person in space
o  Y. Gagarin – 12.4.1961
- US peak -Appolo 11 – 20.7.1969 – moonlanding
- key event symbolizing détente was the 41972 agreement on a co-operative Apollo–
Soyuz Test Project
o resulting in the 7.1975 meeting of a US astronaut crew with a Soviet
cosmonaut crew while orbiting the earth
Confrontation and reconciliation: The collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War
What was the impact of Mikhail Gorbachev?
- USSR’s legacy remained in authoritarian, single-party leadership, economically
focusing on military hardware, rather than housing, food, consumer goods and health
care
- G came into politburo with a fresh mindset
- introduction of glastnost (principle that every area of the regime should be open to
public scrutiny) & perestroika (restructuring the economy)
o  radical change
o  greater democratization
- trying to make it more productiove and responsive
o  part of it was the reduction of economy spending
- decided to abondenthe arms race and negotiated reduction of arms with USA
- Mason – ‘He called for a new thinking in international a- airs, and he said that there
could be ‘no winners’ in a nuclear war. Gorbachev declared the world to be
interdependent and likened all its people ‘to climbers roped together on the
mountainside’
- Cherobyl disaster only hightened the awareness of nuclear destruction
- Reagan was also interested in disarmament
o put forward to USSR an arms control proposal – ‘zero option’
 elimination of all intermediate-range missiles in Europe
o G was prepared to discuss this option
- leading to summits regrading arms control:
o Geneva Summit, 11.1985
 no substantial progress
 establishment of personal rapport and agreement that ‘a nuclear war
cannot be won and must not be fought’.
o Reykjavik Summit, 10.1986
 without agreement, mainly due to disagreement over SDI
 G said that SDI should be ‘confined to the laboratory’
 R refused to make any concessions
 However, the talks also covered the most sweeping arms control
proposals in history, and Gorbachev declared that it had ‘been
an intellectual breakthrough’ in relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union
o Washington Summit, 12.1987
 agreement was reached.
 An Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty) was
signed, agreed to abolish weapons: land-based missiles of intermediate
and shorter range
 first step in reducing the nuclear powers
 agreement was also reached for the first time on inspection of the
destruction of missiles
o Moscow Summit, 5.1988
 disagreement over SDI, but arms reductions negotiations continued
  Standing in Red Square, Reagan confessed that he now no longer
believed in the ‘evil empire’
What was the role of Ronald Reagan?
- G willingness to tackle nuclea issue, new style politics
o  as significant factors of end of Cold War
- somehistorians argue that Reagan’s approach in 1980’s crucial in pushing USSR to
negotiate
- Reagan victory school is critical of détente approach to USSR relations
o  P. Glynn – ‚The Jimmy Carter–Cyrus Vance approach of rewarding the
Soviet build-up with one-sided arms control treaties, opening Moscow’s
access to Western capital markets and technologies, and condoning Soviet
imperial expansion was perfectly designed to preserve the Brezhnev-style
approach, delivering the Soviets from any need to re-evaluate (as they did
under Gorbachev) or change their policies. Had the Carter–Vance approach
been continued … the Cold War and the life of the Soviet Union would almost
certainly have been prolonged. ‘
- M. McGuire
o Reagan played important role, but this role was more connected to his views
on eliminating nuclear weapons
 which helped at negotiation summits to convince Gorbachev of the
possibilities of halting the nuclear arms race
 Reagan’s character and willingness to engage with Gorbachev was also
important
Long-term factors in the ending of the Cold War
What was the role of the Soviet economy?
- by the death of Brezhnev in 1983, USSR’s economy wa salready in eocnomic and
political crisis
- USSR had enormous expenses on foreign policy
o  despite the arms treaties, USSR still wanted to reach pairity with USA
- mid-1980’s – 25% GDP spent on military
o  USA – 4-6%
- support of Soviet bloc, satellite states and sphere of ifluence was costly (billions)
- Brezhnev’s era as as periosd of stagnation
o  reisous lack of consumer goods, domestic economy
 still based on command economy
o  falling behind and industrial output declining
- most agricultural workers lived in poverty
o  grain imported
- labor morale low – high abstenteeism, alcoholism
- G inherited seriously hapered economy
- 1967-1980 – annual growth declinedfrom 5.2% to 2%
o  also hit by fall of oil and gas prices
 - thus G was forced to take the actions that he did in both internal reform and
negotiations with the W
- given situation in USSR, some historians argue (in direct contradiction with the
historians of the ‘Reagan victory school’) that keeping the Cold War going through
containment and détente played a role in bringing about the end of the Cold War
rather than prolonging it
Gorbachev’s informs – Impact
- internal reforms were significant in collapse
o  perestroik & glasnost
- economic reforms ecouraging private ownership – leading to large chaos
o The Law on Co-operatives of 1987
 permitted private ownership of businesses in the service,
manufacturing, and foreign trade sectors. Workers were allowed to
leave collective farms.
o The Enterprise Law in July 1987
 transferred decision-making from the central ministries to the
enterprises and managers in state-owned companies, who were now
given much more power.
o The Law on Joint Ventures
 allowed foreign ownership of companies.
- no effective system that would take care of market economy
o liberalization coincided with a fall in the world’s oil prices
 1991 – economic growth had dropped to −15%
- glasnost – floodgate for criticism
o  both old & current policies
 old – criticized for failing to compete capitalism
 new – failure to solve country’s problem
What was the role of ideological challenge and people power in ending the Cold War?
- late 1980’s resurgence in nationalist movement in satellite states because:
o deterioration of living standards
 as in the Soviet Union, the state-controlled industries in the satellite
states were ineffcient in quality and quantity
 consumer goods short supply (food, clothes, housing)
 E.Germany and CSR, on the borders of W.Europe, could see
images of Capitalist living on W.German television, and it
looked decidedly superior to what they were experiencing in the
East
 economic slow-down of the Soviet Union further impacted on
the satellite states
o growing disillusion with the Communist Party
 corrupt – leaders interested in preserving their own privileges than in
making life better for the workers
 1980s – the regimes of E.Europe were led by men who had no interest
in reform, and were out of touch with the people they ruled
  They maintained their positions through a repressive police network.
o implications of G reforms of glasnost and perestroika. Gorbachev also made it
clear that he was unwilling to use force to maintain control over the satellite
states
- 7.12.1988 – UN speech of G
o  announcinf the USSR would cout by half of its troops to Warsaw Pact
o  suggesting the force is not a tool of foreign policy, emphasizing freedom
 clear signal for E.EU
o  denouncing Brezhnev Doctrine
o  satellite states could determine their own internal affairs
 sometime called Sinatra Doctrine
o  Reynolds wanted to humanity to took precendence
 ‚Unlike Khrushchev in 1956, Brezhnev in 1968, or the Chinese
Communist regime that very year in Tiananmen Square, he refused to
sanction the use of force when reform got out of hand and turned into
revolution ‘
- thus 1989 series of revolution in satellite states
- collapse begun in 5.1989
o HU Prime Minister M. Németh
 gov could not afford to maintain the automatized border control along
the boundary against Austria
 belief that it was no longer necessary, since Hus were allowed to travel
 many escaped to W
Events in PL
- Solidarity supressed in 1981 by Jaruzelski
o  declared martial law
- still strong support and with economic stagnation, which the government failed to
solve, and support from the Catholic Church
- in response to G reforms
o Solidarity was legalized in 1988
o attempt to introduce reforms was made
- Solidarity was first free elections in 1989
- Jaruzelski remianed president, but leader of Solidarity of Walesa became prime
minister
- Communist Party defeated by a huge popular vote
o the first in the Eastern bloc since the 1940s not to be controlled by
Communists
- G didn’t intervene
o absence of internal or external support, the Polish Communist Party collapsed
Events of E.Germany
- Honecker, hardline communist, in power since 1971
o  although the most successful still below W
- Honecker used sport for focus for national identity
 o  still wanting reunified DE
- Evidence of the insecurity felt by Honecker’s regime was the extremely repressive
nature of the East German secret police, the Stasi.
o kept files on 5.5 million people
o regime was unpopular, Honecker hated
o mid-1980s – growing pressure on the government to remove him
- Honecker wanted to consolidate power
o  open criticism and demand for reforms
- many E.DE escaped trhough HU
- coming back to Berlin War (prior)
- ‘New Forum’ groups that decided to stay and resist rather than flee to the West
- Honecker wanted to use force to consolidate power
o  G didn’t want to intervene if full-scale revolt
- demonstrations in E.DE cities continued to grow and a new leader, E. Krenz, put in
Politburo
o 9.11.1989 – the easing of travel and emigration restrictions
 not actually intended to signify an immediate opening of the
checkpoints through the Berlin Wall, the lack of clarity in the ofcial
statement meant that thousands of East Berliners immediately
descended on the checkpoints
- guards had no option than to open the barrier
- Berlin Wall ceased to be the symbol of Cold War division
- 1990 – free elections
o parties in favour of unification won a majority of seats
- East and West Germany were finally reunited on 3 October 1990.
The end of the USSR
- abroad G was admired for his policies
- 1990 – Gawarded Nobel Price
o the unability to economically improve the situation decreased his popluarity
- situation in E.EU cause other states of USSR to call for independence
- 1991 – disintegration of USSR
o  8.1991 - Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania claimed their
independence, as did the other republics that had been part of the USSR
- this break-up intensified hostility towards G in USSR
- 8.1991 - n attempted coup by Communist hardliners against G
o defeated by Boris Yeltsin, who was already president of Russia at this time and
an opponent of Gorbachev due to his much more radical views on how to deal
with the economyy, the structure of the Soviet Union, and the position of the
Communist Party
- Although G was restored as a result of Yeltsin standing up to the hardliners, he had
now lost authority
o humiliated by Yeltsin
o 25.12.1991 G resigned as president of the USSR
o Commonwealth of Independent States was established and the Soviet Union
formally ceased to exist
What was the impact of the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War?
- huge impact on international politics, economic situation due to many countries
depended on USSR’s aid
- USA percieve themselves as wiinners
o  unipolar politics – with USA the only country capable of having having
military allience with
- capitalism triumphed
o  communism - Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, China
 China and Vietnam, changes in economic controls allowed free-market
forces to have an impact
- Cuba – economic crisis due to lack of Soviet economic aid and US trade embargo
- Africa – supported by USSR
o  economically suffered
- other states that had been the focus of superpower conflict and fighting, such as
Afghanistan, conflict continued:
o  Westad - ‚Indeed, many of the Third World countries that had been the focus
of excessive superpower interest in the 1970s and 1980s were dubbed ‘failed
states’ in the 1990s as civil strife continued unabated and often with relatively
little attention from the rest of the world. ‘
 The impact of Cold War tensions on the United Nations

Timeline of United Nations and the Cold War:

- set up by the endof WW II.

o  was to replace League of Nations
- key function was to maintain peace and international security
o body of protection from agression and unwanted influence (collective security)
 - planned in Atlantic Charter (1941)
o  Tehran Conference (1943), Yalta & Potsdam Conderence (1945)
- allies wanted to build a safer world
- aims:
o maintain international peace and security
o develop friendly relations among nations
o achieve international co-operation in solving problems
o act as the centre for collective action
- failure of League of Nations
o  lack of commitment to peacemaking and ally back-up
- key advocates: Roosevelt, Churchill
o  Anglo-American document
UN System
- allies wanted to promote equality and to establish conditions under which ‘justice and
respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can
be maintained’
- force only when absolutely necessary
- 6 main areas:
o General Assembly
 forum for decision making of all allies
o Security Council – USA, UK, USSR, China (Taiwan), FR
 most powerful
 General Assembly only invited by Security Council to make
reocmendations
 executive body presiding over important issues
 USSR willing to accept the W dominated ()
o Secretariat
o International Court of Justice
o Economic and Social Council
o Trusteeship Council
Main principles
- to be a forum for discussion and decision
- to meet as a syndicate for action
- to employ non-forcible measures to improve the world
- to spread moral values and higher standards in international relations
o  different ideologies led to differet interpretations
- both concerned over sovereignity
o  none wanted to besubversive
o  veto – able to block, what they considered against country’s best interest

Principle of Collective Security

- most key principle
- members were to take effective measures to prevent/remove threats to peace
 - not allowing domestic matters (speheres of influence)
o  explaing the nature of UN why they didn’t intervene
- respective superpowers asserted that any ‘suppression’ of groups seen as anti-
American or antiSoviet in their sphere of influence was legitimate
Regional Principle
- allowing of regional developments or refional arrangements or agencies for dealing
with threats to peace in a region, as long as they worked in line with UN principles
o  with approval of Security Council they could mobilize UN allies

Association Principles
- setting up of peace-lowing states together
- dispute over USSR x USA – as not interiely peace-loving
o example, between 1946 and 1961 the Soviet Union used its veto 96 times to
block the memberships of Ceylon, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, and Spain. The USA
and its Western allies did likewise over the memberships of Albania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Romania
The American perspective and expectations
- superpowers had different expectations
- former isolationists had no practical experience as leaders in peacetime
- belief that the international collective represented by the UN would support US values
o UN was to promote only moderate and constructive change
o revolutionary and violent change was to be suppressed
 foundation for peace would be built on fostering US-style economic
objectives in a global free market
The Soviet perspective and expectations
- USSR in contrast set out UN to promote their ideological beliefs
o  opposing to US model
- seeing US as only to prevent great war
- aimed to encourage revolutionar change
o  also wanted to reatin power
- from their perspective economic and social change couldn’t be based on global free
marekt
- suspicious of UN Charter & International Court of Justice
o  as some clauses appeared to support capitalism
- viewing its role as marginal
The impact of the emergence of Cold War tension on the UN
- Cold War would have an impact on actions of UN
- Senator William Fulbright commented about the first years of the UN, it was ‘a
history of retreat from false hopes and of adjustment to the reality of a divided world’
- although peacemaking the main aim it was difficult
o  due to its main superpowers being against
 impeding UN’s actions
 - UN didn’t intervene in 1945-1949 in USSR nor with Truman Doctrine
- no UN alternative of US aid to shift Soviet sphere of influence
- during first Cold War crisis of Berlin Blockade the UN was powerless
o Whittaker suggests, by the end of the 1940s it was clear that ‘Europe’s
collective security depended then on a pull-back from the brink by major
contestants without any prospect of UN intervention’
- this suggest that UN’s pursuit of peacemaking were hapered by the superpower
rivalries
- points to UN being marginalized in 1940’s due to its lack of intervention
o only way of avoiding irrelevance was ‘mediation principle’
 ‘peacekeeping’ would give the United Nations a role in the Cold War
The UN and the global Cold War: the 1950s
- poised to take global dimension with increasing hostility
o international relations were increasingly determined by individual countries
aligning with one or other of the superpowers thus hampering their importance
- NSC-68 proclaimed USSR as ‘slave society’ and claimed that communism must be
resited with force
o  addition of McCarthyism – UN working of USSR (spying on USA)
 despite USA having superiority
- Truman, 1948 - ‘The United Nations is a God-given vehicle through which the United
States can build up a community of powers … to resist Soviet aggression and maintain
our historic interests.’
- USSR percieved UN as tool of W
o  e.g. American refusal in 1949 to recognize Mao’s new People’s Republic as
the legitimate Chinese government
 USSR boycotting UN as a result of Korean War
The impact of Cold War tensions on the UN’s first decade
- significant impacts:
o Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Convention on Genocide (1948)
- still limited in terms of international crisis
- broadening Korean War
o  violating UN princile mandate
- impact on Suez was limited
o  due to main superpowers involved
- fails to act:
o Hungarian Uprising (1956)
o  USA interference in internal affairs of sovereign states
- cover operations of US – Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954)
o  overthrowing of gov

UN during 1960’s
- USA’s colonial domination
- Africa in battle between idologies
o  former colonies and new states needed aid, making them valnurable
  e.g. Congo
- throughout 1960’s UN persuing peacemaking
o  usually in not strategic area to superpowers
o USA’s force to impose on Cuba
  invasion of Bay of Pigs
 lack of UN involement
The UN and détente, 1968–1979
- fear of mutual destructions between USA & USSR
o both more likely to look for agreement whenconflicts arose
- more willingness for UN cooperation
- 1960’s – change in UN
o shift from W dominated to non-aligned states
 by end, USA was no-longer ideologically superior
- unmber of limites successes
o 1965 – UN involved in achieving a ceasefire in Kashmir (India x Pakistan)
o 1974 – Cyprus invaded by Turkey
- UN impotent in terms of superpower aggression
o 1968 – Prague Spring
- Security Council waned to take actions, yet vetoed by USSR
o USSR claimed that the CSR requested assistance - CSR denied
o UN was powerless
- UN powerless in Chile
o 10.1970 – elected Marxist government of S. Allende
 CIA involved in covert attempts to undermine Allende in election
 Nixon with use of CIA wanted to destabilize it for 3y
o 9.1973 – military coup
 Allende dead
 gov under anti-Communist General, A. Pinochet
 UN impotent
The UN and the Second Cold War
- resumed tensions after détente, revealing again the superpower dependence
o unable to reach agreements on responses of Security Council
- could be argued that the UN’s key function of responding to potential conflict
situations, only possible when the Cold War was not played out in the Security
Council
- shifting UN’s function to protection of smaller nations from afression of biggere
nations and their spehres of influence
o only importance of UN
The UN and the end of the Cold War
- due to ineffectiveness of UN during Cold War many hoped for bigger influence post
o no longer held by opposing forces, crippling its ability
- launch of peacemaking missions
 o mainly post 1988
- however the UN was still dominated by self-inerested states
The UN and the Cold War: Conclusion
- 1950’s – seen as W alliance system
- General Assembly dominated by W
- decolonization movement in 1960’s
o emergence of newly independent states shifted this balance
- Cold War more significant on the UN than the other way around
- times when states were able to stand up to the dominance of the superpowers
o Non-Alignment Movement – but even this did not really empower the UN as
an independent organization
- UN success dependant on superpowers
o sometimes only had to remain passive
- usually when it got involved it had negative impact upon USSR and USA relationship
o peacekeeping missions often aggravated the tensions between the Soviets and
the Americans
- generally accepted Cold War held UN hostage
o however, this perception may have been an exaggeration, as during the post-
Cold War era the UN has had similar problems in controlling the domination
of the USA, and has shown itself limited in achieving collective security
through military action
 The impact of leaders on the course and development of 17 the
Cold War

- Molotov – ‘Roosevelt believed that Russians would come and bow down to America
and beg, since Russia is a poor country, without industry, without bread. But we
looked at it differently. For the people were ready for sacrifi ce and struggle.’
- key summary points:
Gorbachev
- He pursued a foreign policy based on co-operation rather than confrontation.
- He believed that negotiations should take place to reduce nuclear weapons and end the
arms race. His nuclear policy was now ‘reasonable suffciency’.
- His actions towards the West were conciliatory and reassuring: for example,
withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan, agreeing to several face-to-face
meetings, and ultimately signing the INF Treaty.
- His actions within the Soviet Union inadvertently brought about the end of the Cold
War; his economic reforms caused the collapse of the Soviet Union from within.
- He abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine and did not use force against the protests in the
USSR’s satellite states; this allowed the peaceful collapse of the satellite empire
Reagan
- His military spending of the early 1980s forced the Soviets to compete with the USA;
due to the economic weakness of the USSR, they could not keep up, and this was a
factor that forced Gorbachev to seek both internal economic reform and negotiation.
- Reagan’s policy of SDI undermined the concept of MAD and left the USSR
vulnerable. This again forced the USSR to the negotiating table.
- Reagan’s hardline approach to Soviet actions in Afghanistan made it di- cult for the
USSR to continue this war.
- Reagan also exposed the weaknesses of détente, which was a policy that favoured the
USSR.
- He was committed to anti-nuclearism.
- In negotiating with Gorbachev, he proved to be a good negotiator who was also
prepared to reverse his views on the ‘evils’ of Communism.
Sample essay title
Compare and contrast the roles of Reagan and Gorbachev in the course and development of
the Cold War.
Comparisons
- Both men saw the dangers of nuclear weapons – they even discussed the zero option
of getting rid of nuclear weapons altogether.
- Both men worked together in the various summits to come to an agreement on nuclear
weapons.
- Both were prepared to reverse their previous positions in order make compromises.
Contrasts
- Reagan started out with a very hardline position against the Soviet Union and by
increasing spending on weapons; Gorbachev started out by being conciliatory.
- Gorbachev’s actions were determined more by events within the USSR; he needed to
reduce spending on weapons. Reagan on the other hand was prepared to keep up
spending on the military if necessary.
- Gorbachev’s actions had a larger impact as they led to the collapse of the USSR and
thus, ultimately, the end of the Cold War (though some historians would argue that
this was still determined by Reagan’s actions).

The impact of Cold War tensions on nations

Cuba
- embroiled in Cold War politics since Castro took on and started carrying out political,
economic and social reforms
- throughout he allied USSR and with Cuban Missile Crisis shown its independent path
- USA tried to get rid of him
Impact of Cold War tensions on the nature and direction of Cuba’s revolution
- Castro immediatelly adressed his five revolutionary laws that would become his
mainfesto:
o return power to the people
o give land rights for those holding or squatting on smaller plots
o allow workers to have a 30 per cent share of profits
o allow sugar plantation workers to have a 55 per cent share of profits
o bring an end to corruption
- promises of hospitals, pensions, public education, nationalization , ...
- after entering Havana in 1959, following the defeat of Batista after a guerrilla war, he
was ready to implement the fi ve revolutionary laws
- in context of Cold War these policies seemed suspicious to USA (as communist)
o  e.g. Agrarian Reform Act of July 1959, which sought to break up the large
land holdings and redistribute them to the peasants
- Castro apprached USA with aid for revolution, but refuted due to communist nature
 o getting rid of US monopolies and breaking up large estates (many American)
 confirmed the US’s views
o USA – imposed economic embargoes on the country, reducing the amount of
sugar that was bought, before ultimately imposing a total blockade
 Operation Mongoose involved the CIA carrying out acts of sabotage
against the Cuban economy
- Castro started calling revolution socialist only after US air raids (16.4.1961), in
prelude to Bay of Pigs
- From Bay of Pigs invasion through end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro openly
claimed he is Marxist
o Cuban military needed military support and commitment of USSR to protect
Cuban revolution from US
 US failure at the Bay of Pigs increased nationalist sentiment in Cuba
 perceived threat and ‘siege’ conditions imposed
 enabling Castro to consolidate his control
The impact of the Cold War on Cuba’s economy
- Castro believed that Soviet command economy would be suitable
- with USA’s trade embargo, Castro co-operated with USSR
o  similar approach to Stalin in 1930’s with isolation
- despite USSR’s investment the sugar producation fluctuated
o  poor harvest of 1968-1969
- ‚battle of sugar‘ – increasing yields of sugard
- 1970’s economy increased bue to increased sugar prices
- still developed debt to USSR
o  this led to them seek economic advice
 7.1972 – joining COMECON
 Castro went to Moscow to finalize 15y economic agreement with
Brezhnev
 gave Cuba even more subsidies, including an increase in price
for sugar, deferment of debt, and $350 million of investment
- USSR determined to support Cuba
- as the tensions decreased, so did USSR’s interest
- economic relationship between Cuba and the USSR changed as Mikhail Gorbachev
introduced his wide-ranging reforms
- G wanted to reduce Soviet support
o cut subsidies
o informed that Cuba now has to pay in US dollars for USSR goods
- dramatic impact of the end of Cold War
o  end of agreements
o cut oil supplies by 60 per cent by 1991 – gas, electricity, water shortages
o  almost collapsed – -35% GDP by 1993
- 7.1993 - Castro responded by legalizing dollar
- permitted ‘self-employment’
- despite the real crisis in the economy, Cuba maintained much of his Cold War rhetoric
and his opposition to Capitalism
The impact of the Cold war on the nature of Castro’s government
- continued hostility of Cuba and US lead to important strengthening of power
o  under the threat of imperialism, Cuba forced to take on laws
- Bay of Pigs, survival of US attacks hightened Castro’s appeal and nationalism
- importance of unity – due to threats and propaganda
Impact of Cold War tensions on Cuban Foreign Policy
- rivalry led to USSR dependence
- after Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro felt as a pawn in superpower game
o due to this he tried to follow more independent path
- Non-Alignment Movement
o  due to importance of USSR’s aid forced to follow USSR’s policies
Latin America
- Cuban victory seen as victory over American imperialism
- his victory used to support other colonial countries
- wanted to export revolution
o  Cuba as an example of the successes of guerilla war agains oppresive systems
- in line with Marxist–Leninist ideology in terms of fostering class struggle and
liberating the exploited masses
- Cuba trained revolutionary groups
- USA concerned over Cuban provocation
- where ever Cuba tried to intervene or start revolution USA would intervene
o  Grenada – 1983 (Reagan)
Africa
- Castro as a proponenet of internationalism and anti-imperialism
o  encouraging decolonization
- USSR & USA again supporting different rebel groups
- Castro sending troops
o  e.g. Mozambique, Angola
- Angola strengthened Castro’s position
- 9.1979 – Castro was elected leader of the Non-Aligned Movement

Egypt
- G.A.Nasser – 1956
- affected by Cold War policies
- belief that he could pursue an independent course in the Cold War
o quickly drew suspicion from the US and more closely into an USSR alliance

Impact of Cold War tensions on the direction of Nasser’s domestic policy

- Nasser not a communist and wanted to persue Islamic modernization
- 1956 – new constitution
 o  Islam as national religion, Egypt aspart of Arab nation, restructured gov
- National Union – 1957, replaced all political parties
o didn’t want democracy, bcz it worried that the poor would be drawn to Muslim
Brotherhood or Communists
o middle classes would elect a government that supported their propertied
interests
o  women allowed to vote in 1957
o approved measures to prevent child labour, improve working conditions, and
provide healthcare
- wanting to make court secular
o  criticized by MB
- attending Non-Alignment Movement conference
o  stating to be neutral
- due to his neutrality he caused Suez Crisis:
o initially US persuaded for economic support to fund the Aswan Dam project
o Baghdad Pact (1955)
 NATO-style alliance which was aimed at preventing the spread of
Soviet infl uence in the Middle East
o repeatedly disappointed by the refusal of the USA to sell arms to Egypt
 decided to assert his independence from the West by buying arms from
CSR
 condemned by the US; the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
believed that the move was as dangerous as the North Korean invasion
of South Korea in 1950
- USA alarrmed by Agrarian Refroms
o Egypt – history of W investment
 UK & FR - Suez Canal (1860s)
 competed for imperial influence and control
 Nasser showing socialist tendencies and seeming to now be seeking
help from the Communist bloc, the USA withdrew funding for the
project to build the Aswan Dam
 4.8.1956 - nationalizing Suez Canal
o although insufficients this brought him public support at home and acclaim
from other Arab states and the wider African region. In the ensuing crisis over
the Suez Canal, Nasser balanced the superpowers against one another and
emerged the winner. He kept the canal, humiliated the colonial powers,
checked his involvement with the USA and the USSR, and emerged as the
leader of Arab nationalism
The impact of the Cold War on Egypt’s economic policy
- Suez Crisis pushed Middle East into Cold War
- 1957 – Eisenhower Doctrine - stating that any Middle Eastern country could request
American economic assistance or aid from US military forces if it was being
threatened by armed aggression from another state
o Israel, US ally – Egypt faced hostility from the West for his reforms, Nasser
closer to the USSR
 - capitalism not appropriate as it was associated with capitalist power
- National Planning Committee organized Egyptianization – removal of foreign
financial dependence
- 1958 – first five-year plan – increase of industrial output
o  also wanted more land reforms – landowners resissting
- amount of land owned was limited by state, huge resistence to this
o  thus no significant impact on production, only small % peasants gained lands
- Nasser tried to include private investments
o  wanting mixed economy – frther nationalization in 1960s
- never full control of economy
o  2/3 privately owned
- combination of population growth and lack of output
o  goods shortages
o  inflation & foreign import
- Aswan Dam completion
o  USSR – 500 milion pounds
o  after K visit in 1964 in first stage completion, K gave 100 mil if he set up
second five-year plan
- many studying at Soviet Unis, yet Nasser forbade communsit proselytizing
- Nasser also dependent on USA
o  50% grain imported
- 1966 – acute grain shortages
o  USA sent to India
o  Nasser asserted that if L. Johnson was president he couldn’t improve relations
- W superpower agencies intended to assasinate Nasser
- Nasser died in 1970
o successor, Anwar Sadat, moved away from USSR and attempted to get support
from the USA
Impact of Cold War tensions on Egyptian Foreign Policy
- Nasser nationalist and promoted Arab League idea
o  consolidation of Arab interest of Middle East
 Palestine Issue – hostile towards Israel
- Nasser in support of Non-Aligned Movement
o 1956 – Suez Crisis demonstrated that the superpowers could not push smaller
states around, nor could they always get what they wanted
- neutralism gave them powerful in terms that superopowers wanted to bring them to
their side
- after Suez Crisis, Cold War intensified with Eisenhower Doctrine and US support in
Israel
o  leading to increase support of USSR in Arab states, including Egypt
- Israeli-Syrian tensions – 1966-1967
- 13.5 – USSR intelligence falsely claimed that Israeli troops were massing on the
Syrian border
 o Egyptian troops moved into the Sinai in order to reassure Syria and to deter
Israel
- Nasser asking UN froces on Sinai to leave
o  removing buffer between Israel & Egypt
- 22.5 - Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran
- Nasser continued to raise the tension through aggressive speeches threatening Israel
- 28.5 – Jordan & Egypt formed defence pact – joint defence
o  29.5 – Iraq
o  Syria already in pact with Egypt
- 5.6. – Israel launched a pre-emptive strike removing Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian
air forces on the first day.
o Israel went on to push the Egyptians out of Gaza and the Sinai, as well as
capturing the old city of Jerusalem and occupying all of Jordan west of the
Jordan River
 N, the Israelis gained the Golan Heights.
o 6 days
- humiliation for Nasser and needed support of USSR
o  Sadat – 1970
 reduction of USSR influence
 expelling Soviet advisors
 belived that with Isreael they should negotiate, reducing defence
burden and agin US support
 US – preoccupied with détente – failed to put pressure on Israel or help
Sadat in his bid for peace
- thereby Sadat started planning another war agains Israel, in order to presuade to
makde peace (accepting arabs)
- 1973 – Egypt & Syria pused Israeli back from Sinai, Golan Heights
o  Israel massived US aid
- US changed its attitude and helped to bring about a peace agreement at Camp David
between Egypt and Israel
Sample essay
Compare and contrast the impact of Cold War tensions on two nations, each chosen from a
different region.
- write an introduction that focuses on the question. You also need to give clear context
here; state what your case studies will be (that is, Egypt and Cuba), and point out the
fact that Cuba remained under the same leader and government for the whole Cold
War, whereas in Egypt there was a change of leadership and thus government policy.
- Develop a clear line of argument: are there more similarities or more diff erences in
how these countries were impacted by the Cold War? What is the most important
similarity? What is the most important diff erence?
Similarities
- Both countries found themselves the focus of superpower interest in the 1950s due to
their geographical locations.
- The Cold War aff ected the nature of their regimes – pushing them closer to the Soviet
Union in both cases in the 1950s and 1960s.
- Both powers sought to avoid being caught up directly in Cold War politics by joining
NAM.
- However, both were also forced to rely on the Soviet Union for economic aid and
military aid at diff erent times.
- Both attempted to spread their revolutionary ideas further afi eld and to support similar
governments.
- Both faced hostility from the USA and assassination attempts by the CIA.
- Both countries were the focus of Cold War crises, in which they faced or experienced
invasion.
Differences
- Cuba was aff ected more dramatically by the Cold War; the USA was more active in
trying to get rid of Castro by invasion and sabotage as well as assassination.
- Connected to this point, Castro aligned himself more politically with the USSR by
declaring himself a Marxist–Leninist.
- Cuba was a flashpoint of Cold War tensions in the missile crisis of 1962, when the
island again faced invasion and even annihilation.
- The proximity to the US and the continued attempts of the US to get rid of Castro
meant that the Cuban regime was more isolated, and as a result paranoid and
repressive.
- Egypt never faced the hostility from the USA that Cuba faced; whereas the US had a
complete embargo against Cuba, Egypt traded with the US – increasingly so under
Sadat.
- Cuban foreign policy was more directly aimed at spreading socialist revolution,
whereas Egyptian foreign policy, apart from the involvement in Yemen, was focused
on the struggle against Israel and promoting Arab nationalism. Under Sadat, it was
focused on getting a peace deal with Israel.
 Cold War Crisis

Berlin Crisis – 1948-1949

- first major crisis of Cold War
Causes
- the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences
- the issues of reparations
- the actions of the Western powers
- the actions of Stalin
Impacts
- the permanent division of Germany into two states
- the setting up of NATO
- the continuation of Berlin as a divided city within the Soviet zone
- the containment of Communism
Significance
- It illustrated the policy of containment in action and showed that the West, by 1948,
was not prepared to see the Soviets expand any further.
- It was a propaganda disaster for Stalin, who had to back down.
- However, it showed that Stalin was not prepared to escalate the conflict and risk war.
- It brought about the fi nal stage in the division of Europe: economically, politically,
and militarily.
- Berlin remained a source of tension between the superpowers

Cuban Missile Crisis – 1950-1953

Causes – up in the doc
Impacts – up in the doc for different countries
Significance

Sample essay
Compare and contrast the causes, impacts, and signifi cance of the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1961
and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962.
Similarities of causes
- It could be argued that both were initiated by the Soviet Union under Khrushchev.
- Both involved the consolidation/defence of superpower spheres of infl uence.
- Both crises were precipitated by US economic policies towards Cuba and Berlin.
- In both cases, Khrushchev was under pressure from the local Communist leadership –
Castro and Ulbricht – to take action.
- In both cases, the USSR presented its actions as defensive.
- There was a fear on both sides that, as tension escalated, it could lead to direct
confrontation.
Differences of causes
- Putting missiles in Cuba was Khrushchev’s idea, whereas with regard to Berlin,
Ulbricht seized the initiative to build a wall.
- Khrushchev’s bid to force the West out of Berlin, followed by the building of the wall,
was an attempt to save the economy of East Germany, so was a more passive and
defensive measure, whereas putting missiles in Cuba was more off ensive.
- The Berlin Crisis was an attempt to push the USA out of the Soviet sphere of infl
uence, whereas the Cuban crisis was an attempt by the Soviets to expand into the US
sphere of infl uence in the Americas region.
- The US reaction to the construction of the wall was to merely condemn it, whereas it
reacted strongly to the missiles going into Cuba and demanded their removal.
Similarities of impact
- Both brought the USA and USSR dangerously close to confl ict, especially after the
Vienna Summit (for Berlin) and after missiles were discovered (for Cuba).
- Both ultimately led to an easing of tension – though the arms race continued and
intensified.
- The handling of both crises was criticized by other Communist countries.
- It could be argued that the outcome of both crises was a failure for Khrushchev but a
victory for Kennedy.
- However, in both crises Khrushchev had gained something – the sealing of the escape
route via East Berlin and the dismantling of the missile bases in Turkey.
Differences of impact
- The Berlin Wall resolved the issue that had led to the crises – the USA was content to
let the wall remain and there was no longer pressure on the USSR over the human
exodus. Although the wall was embarrassing, the fact that Khrushchev was forced to
remove missiles from Cuba was deeply humiliating. The USSR lost a lot of credibility
because of the crisis.
- The issue of missiles in Cuba was more dangerous; having missiles only 90 miles off
the coast of the USA was an even greater issue for America than the question of
Berlin.
- The Cuban Missile Crisis was far more damaging for the USSR in terms of its
relationship with other Communist countries; the results were condemned by the PRC
and led to a period of hostility and resentment from Castro’s Cuba.
- Whereas the results of the Berlin Crisis led to the refocusing of superpower rivalry to
other regions, the Cuban Missile Crisis led to a more tangible period of rapprochement
as both sides wanted to prevent another crisis on this level. It led to the development
of more direct lines of communication and it led to arms talks.
Similarities of significance
- Both showed that the two sides were prepared to pull back from the brink to prevent a
nuclear war.
Differences of significance
- The Berlin Wall removed the issue of Germany – as a source of confl ict – from the
Cold War, but Cuba remained an ongoing problem for America.
- The Cuban Missile Crisis had a greater impact on the behaviour of the two
superpowers and ultimately helped lead to arms agreements and to détente.
- The Cuban Missile Crisis further developed the Sino-Soviet split.