EN BANC the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.
April 24, 2018 G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner  The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION
peralta, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks
to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in
SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition
for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a
judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25,
2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial
hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial
courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the
Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to
appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the
title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations therein,
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted.
enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after
die proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the
Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce
Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her
daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese
husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear
anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer
her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed
by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of
entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant
to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by
virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said
entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname,
MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for
her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be
sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5,
2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that
the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that,
based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad,
if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in
the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as
citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to
Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition
and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the
latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably
with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the
law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative
intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still
married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is
inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo,
Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad
by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage,
are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the
marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves
the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital
bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is
allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took
effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17,
1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second
paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil
Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a
Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26
now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws
in force in the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her
to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine
the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount
to trying a divorce case.22Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the
spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or
she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim
was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New
Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter
have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and
perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce
proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v.
Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition
of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the
cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would
not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she]
decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of
marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation,respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his
Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised
sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction,
on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the
"nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider,
arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied.
In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the
Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that
the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x
x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint
was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render
an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be
declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her
ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy;
that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court
discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in
the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States
of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court
of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his
own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from
Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national,
was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage
between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the
ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We
ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the
entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of
the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse
not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the
right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a
spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title
III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed
for divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the
RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that
the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his
capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that,
consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing
the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of
evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When
this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the
Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the
usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity.
When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal
status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the
divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as
she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that
that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but
also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is,
therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the
same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading
of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the
foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither
can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers. 37 The legislature is presumed to know
the meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its
intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to
mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still,
the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. 40 As held
in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the
resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of
a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or
the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the
law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry
under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign
divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is
at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose
marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are
severed by operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found
under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the
mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide
for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must
be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes
of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are
constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and
that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such
classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a
stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is
required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press,
assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand,
what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 50 It is akin to the paramount
interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It essentially
involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual
rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle
applies with respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law
unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who
is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences
between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and
religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too
unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend
with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her
Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the
foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon
the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws,
both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien
land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate
against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in
treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a
Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based
on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In filing for
divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking
foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with
whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be
"reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties
before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family
Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would
have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and
how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly
situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically
grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to
the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate
practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings
against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to
support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good
faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e.,
satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to
the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been
obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on
the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a
fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine
love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial
notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in
nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages.
And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry
an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise
serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart,
to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 64 Nevertheless, it was
not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis
Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this
point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be
understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make this
a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention
was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily
discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal
opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11,
1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on
the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No.
2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in
the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine
Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which
repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as
intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing
of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such
an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable
insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government
was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the
New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or
abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet
17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the
House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act
Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on
Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on
Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the
grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or
amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than
six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other
than one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual
agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar
procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child
or a child of a petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more
than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2)
years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce
based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as
follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the
marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or
personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited
with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to
be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the
marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time
the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family
Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition
from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce
with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total
breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at
reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to
our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an
institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can
do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither
cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor
can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state
religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs,
even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country.77While marriage is
considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by
the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the
State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in
total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others,
the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the
State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is
not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims
of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation
passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The
Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act
of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act
of 2012").Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic
autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional
mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human
rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We
disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the
existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or
she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the
stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a
restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be
tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without
denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed
according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from
all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is
recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans
more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the
unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human
potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage.
Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same
time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In
reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law,
the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law
as it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law,"
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court. 94 As it appears, the existence
of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the
divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground
of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial
the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
Juan, Metro Manila. should be resolved in the negative.96

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of
divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of
an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall
squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18,
2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
law on divorce.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may SO ORDERED
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of
the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by
the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the
Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a
fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment
decreeing the divorce.93
 G.R. No. 210766. January 8, 2018.*
MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a.CONCEPCION N. SINGSON,
petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; The validity of
marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our Constitution and statutory
laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of the
continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of
the same rests at all times upon the petitioner.—It is axiomatic that the validity of
marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our Constitution and statutory
laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of the
continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of
the same rests at all times upon the petitioner. “The policy of the Constitution is to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally
inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.” Article 1 of the
Family Code describes marriage as “a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life” and as “the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; It is settled that
“[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations,
and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will.”—Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a
pathological gambler, is irresponsible, and is unable to keep a job, necessarily
translate into unassailable proof that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations. It is settled that “[ps]ychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty,
refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.” “[I]t is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so
because of some psychological, not physical, illness.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Habitual Drunkenness; Gambling; Failure to
Find a Job; Habitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while
undoubtedly traits, are nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’], in
the absence of [incontrovertible] proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.—[H]abitual
drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while undoubtedly negative traits,
are nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’], in the absence of
[incontrovertible] proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Well-entrenched is the rule that “there must
be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the
respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations.”—Well-
entrenched is the rule that “there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the
basic marital obligations x x x.” “A cause has to be shown and linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It has been held that the parties’ child is not
a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as “he could not have been there when
the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between his parents until long after his birth.”—Needless to say, petitioner
cannot lean upon her son Jose’s testimony that his father’s psychological incapacity
existed before or at the time of marriage. It has been held that the parties’ child is not
a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as “he could not have been there when
the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between his parents until long after his birth.” To support her Article 36
petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing, competent and trustworthy
evidence to establish the cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity and
that the same antedated their marriage. If anything, petitioner failed to successfully
dispute the CA’s finding that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent
before they got married and that respondent was a kind and caring person when he
was courting her.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Alentajan Law Office for petitioner.
   Antolin P. Camero for respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
 
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the August 29, 2013
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its January 6, 2014 Resolution3 in C.A.-
G.R. CV No. 96662, which reversed and set aside the November 12, 2010
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Civil
Case No. 07-0070.
 
Factual Antecedents
On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N.
Singson (petitioner) filed a Petition5for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines6 (Family Code). This was docketed as
Civil Case No. 07-0070.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson
(respondent) were married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis
Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four children, all of whom
are now of legal age; that when they started living together, petitioner noticed that
respondent was “dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the family’s
welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually,”7 and a compulsive gambler; that
respondent was immature, and was unable to perform his paternal duties; that
respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that
respondent’s abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render any help,
support, or assistance to her; and that because she could expect no help or
assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support
her family as the sole breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was
confined at Metro Psych Facility,8a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that
respondent’s attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio),
made the following diagnosis on respondent:
Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is
diagnosed to be suffering from Pathological Gambling as manifested by:
a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with
which to gamble as seen in his stealing and pawning jewelries and
appliances[;]
b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to
achieve the desired effect[;]
c. lies to family members or others to conceal the extent of [his]
involvement with gambling[;]
d. committed illegal acts such as forging the signature of his wife, issuing
bouncing checks in order to finance his gambling[;]
e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife, lost the respect of his
children, lost a good career in banking because of gambling[;]
f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to provide money to
relieve a desperate financial situation caused by gambling[;]
While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral changes
as a young boy, it would be difficult to say that the psychotic episodes he
manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are] ethologically related to the general medical
condition that occurred in his childhood.
Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of behavior that
deviates markedly from the expectations of our culture as manifested in the
following areas:
a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own] self, other people,
and events[;]
b. his emotional response[;]
c. his poor impulse control[;]
Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to significant
impairment in social, occupational and interpersonal relationship. In
[respondent’s] case, this has persisted for several years, and can be traced
back [to] his adolescence since he started gambling while in high school. He is
therefore diagnosed to be suffering from Personality Disorder.
All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing his marital
obligations.9
 
Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a “distraught” family and
had a “dysfunctional” childhood;10 that respondent had all the love, care, and
protection of his parents as the youngest child for some time; but that these parental
love, care and protection were, however, transferred to his youngest brother who was
born when respondent was almost five years old; and that these factors caused
respondent emotional devastation from which he never recovered.
Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school student,
was already betting on jai alai. She also claimed that she tried to adjust to
respondent’s personality disorders, but that she did not attain her goal.
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any
antenuptial agreement to govern their property relations as husband and wife and that
they had no conjugal assets or debts.
On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer.11
Traversing petitioner’s allegations, respondent claimed that “psychological
incapacity” must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability,
which are not present in the instant case because petitioner’s allegations are not
supported by facts.
Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed to render any help,
support or assistance to petitioner and their family; that the family home where
petitioner and their children are living was in fact his own capital property; that his
shortcomings as mentioned by petitioner do not pertain to the most grave or serious
cases of personality disorders that would satisfy the standards required to obtain a
decree of nullity of marriage; that petitioner’s complaint is nothing more than a
complaint of a woman with an unsatisfactory marriage who wants to get out of it; that
contrary to petitioner’s claim that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college
degree in business administration, and is a bank employee, and, that it was money
problem, and not his alleged personality disorder, that is the wall that divided him and
petitioner.
Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the basis for the conclusions
of the psychiatrist to the effect that he is suffering from pathological gambling and
personality disorder; that petitioner’s allegation that he came from a distraught family
and that he suffered emotional devastation is vague, and bereft of particular details,
and even slanderous; and that assuming that he had not acted the way petitioner
expected him to conduct himself, his actions and behavior are not psychological
illnesses or personality disorders, but simply physical illnesses of the body, akin to
hypertension and allied sicknesses, and that these physical illnesses are not at all
incurable psychiatric disorders that were present at the time of his marriage with
petitioner.
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and
debts; that the land where their family home is built came from his earnings, hence
the family home is their conjugal property; that he and petitioner also have a house
and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts that are in petitioner’s name only;
and he and petitioner also have investments in shares of stocks, cars, household
appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets because they
came from petitioner’s salaries and his (respondent’s) own inheritance money.
Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the present Petition,
petitioner had caused him to be admitted into the Metro Psych Facility for treatment;
that on account of his confinement and treatment in this psychiatric facility, he has
incurred medical expenses and professional medical fees; and that since it is
petitioner who manages all their finances and conjugal assets it stands to reason that
he should be awarded “spousal support.”
On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order.12
Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner’s witnesses included herself, her son, Jose
Angelo Singson (Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.
On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which
included a photocopy of the marriage contract; the birth certificates of their four
children; her son Jose’s Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio’s Judicial Affidavit dated June 25, 2008; Clinical Summary of respondent
issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio dated February 11, 2007 (Clinical Summary); her
(petitioner’s) own Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 179751 registered in the names of the parties’ four
children; and a notarized document entitled “Summary of Sources and Uses of Funds
for the period November 1999 to March 31, 2008” executed by petitioner and
described as a detailed summary of expenses paid for with the proceeds of
respondent’s share in the sale of the latter’s house in Magallanes Village.13
Respondent filed his Comment thereon.14
On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner’s exhibits.15
On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 16“on the ground that
the totality of evidence presented by petitioner did not establish [his] psychological
incapacity x x x to comply with the essential marital obligations x x x.”17Petitioner filed
her Opposition18 thereto, and respondent tendered his Comment thereon.19
On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and stood pat
on its March 29, 2010 Order.20
During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent’s counsel manifested that his
client was waiving the right to present countervailing evidence. Respondent’s counsel
also moved that the Petition at bar be submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence already on the record. The RTC thus declared the case submitted for
decision.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC disposed thus —
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is
GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered[:]
1.  DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage between MARIA
CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N.
SINGSON and BENJAMIN L. SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974
in Mandaluyong City or any other marriage between them on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent.
2.  ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the
National Statistics Office to cancel the marriage between the petitioner
and the respondent as appearing in the Registry of Marriage.
There are no other issues in this case.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of
Mandaluyong City and Para[ñ]aque City, the Office of the Solicitor General,
the Office of the Civil Register General (National Statistics Office) and the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Parañaque City.
SO ORDERED.22
 
The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code are present in the instant case because the
totality of evidence showed that respondent is suffering from a psychological
condition that is grave, incurable, and has juridical antecedence.
The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of petitioner and Dr. Sta. Ana-
Ponio convincingly showed that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations; that respondent’s inability to perform his
marital obligations as set out in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code, was essentially
due to a psychological abnormality arising from a pathological and utterly irresistible
urge to gamble.
The RTC cited “[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s] findings [which] reveal that respondent is
suffering from Personality Disorder known as Pathological Gambling.”23 It ruled
that it has been shown that this personality disorder was present at the time of
celebration of marriage but became manifest only later; that because of this
personality disorder respondent had already jeopardized his relationship with his
family; and that respondent’s psychological disorder hinders the performance of his
obligations as a husband and as a father.
Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in common by the spouses
was donated in favor of the parties’ children as evidenced by TCT No. 179751 — a
fact not at all controverted, in view of respondent’s waiver of his right to present
evidence.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.
But in its Order dated January 6, 2011, 24 the RTC denied respondent’s motion for
reconsideration. It reiterated that the expert witness had adequately established that
respondent is suffering from “Pathological Gambling Personality Disorder” which is
grave, permanent, and has juridical antecedence.
On February 4, 2011, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal 25 which was given due
course by the RTC in its Order26 dated February 28, 2011.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC, and disposed as
follows:
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12
November 2010 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque
City in Civil Case No. 07-0070, declaring the marriage between Maria
Concepcion N. Singson and Benjamin L. Singson null and void ab initio, is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.27
The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations, which in this case, was not at all proven to be grave or serious, much less
incurable, and furthermore was not existing at the time of the marriage. What is more,
the CA declared that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage, and against its dissolution and nullity, in obedience to
the mandate of the Constitution and statutory laws; and that in this case, petitioner
failed to discharge the burden of proving that respondent is suffering from a serious or
grave psychological disorder that completely disables or incapacitates him from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital union.
According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the downright or utter incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The CA
did not go along with the RTC, which placed heavy reliance on Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations due to a personality disorder known as pathological gambling. The
CA held that, contrary to petitioner’s claim that respondent’s pathological gambling
was grave or serious, the evidence in fact showed that the latter was truly capable of
carrying out the ordinary duties of a married man because he had a job, had provided
money for the family from the sale of his own property, and he likewise provided the
land on which the family home was built, and he also lives in the family home with
petitioner and their children.
On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of a spouse, is different
from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; that the
evidence at bar showed that respondent’s alleged pathological gambling arose after
the marriage; that in fact petitioner admitted that she was not aware of any gambling
by respondent before they got married; that petitioner moreover acknowledged that
respondent was a kind and a caring person when he was courting her; that petitioner
likewise admitted that respondent also brought petitioner to the hospital during all four
instances when she gave birth to their four children.
In other words, the CA found that respondent’s purported pathological gambling
was not proven to be incurable or permanent since respondent has been undergoing
treatment since 2003 and has been responding to the treatment.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration28 of the CA’s Decision. But her motion was
denied by the CA in its Resolution of January 6, 2014.29
 
Issue
 
Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the following question —
[WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
[RTC].30
Petitioner’s Arguments
 
In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, and in
asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, petitioner argues in her
Petition,31 Reply,32and Memorandum33 that respondent’s psychological incapacity had
been duly proved in court, including its juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity.
First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform the marital duties of
mutual love, respect and support; that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s expert findings are
corroborated by the testimonies of petitioner end her son Jose both of whom
demonstrated that respondents psychological incapacity is grave or serious rendering
him incapable to perform the essential marital obligations; that for his part,
respondent had adduced no proof that he (respondent) is capable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage for the reason that everything that the family
had saved and built had been squandered by respondent; and that respondent’s
confinement at the rehabilitation facility is itself proof of the gravity or seriousness of
his psychological incapacity.
Second, petitioner contends that respondent’s psychological incapacity preceded
the marriage, as shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s Clinical Summary, which pointed out
that such psychological incapacity, which included pathological gambling, can be
traced back when respondent was already betting on jai alai even in high school, and
this was not known to his family; that the Clinical Summary was based on information
provided not only by petitioner, but by respondent’s sister, and by respondent himself;
that such juridical antecedence was neither questioned nor overthrown by
countervailing evidence; and that the root cause could be traced back to respondent’s
flawed relationship with his parent which developed into a psychological disorder that
existed before the marriage.
Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that
personality disorders are generally incurable and permanent, and must continuously
be treated medically; that in this case the Clinical Summary had pointed out that
respondent’s understanding of his gambling problem is only at the surface level; and
that in point of tact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that personality disorders are
incurable.
Respondent’s Arguments
 
In his Comment34 and Memorandum,35 respondent counters that the assailed CA
Decision should be affirmed. He argues that the grounds cited by petitioner are the
self-same grounds raised by petitioner before the RTC and the CA; that petitioner’s
evidence indeed failed to prove convincingly that he (respondent) is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, hence there is no basis
to declare the parties’ marriage void ab initio.
 
Our Ruling
 
The Petition will not succeed.
 It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are
enshrined in our Constitution and statutory laws, hence any doubts attending the
same are to be resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage and
that the burden of proving the nullity of the same rests at all times upon the
petitioner.36 “The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Because of
this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties.”37
Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as “a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life” and as “the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution.”
In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social institution by
suing out pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
 
Petitioner’s case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched case law
rulings interpreting and construing the quoted Article, to wit:
‘Psychological incapacity,’ as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical
— incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must
be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c)
incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved). The Court laid down more
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known as the Molina
guidelines]. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the
Court established in Santos.38
 
In setting aside the RTC’s ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner failed to
prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations because she failed to establish that such incapacity was grave and
serious, and that it existed at the time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We
agree.
At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of the
conflicting findings between the trial court and the appellate court. 39 We thus did
peruse and review the records, and we are satisfied that the CA correctly found that
respondent has the capability and ability to perform his duties as a husband and
father as against the RTC’s rather general statement that respondent’s psychological
or personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic obligations as a husband
and a father.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that
respondent’s psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by
jurisprudential parameters since “[respondent] had a job; provided money for the
family from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family home was built
on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and their children.”40
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter
“was working at a certain point.”41 This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio’s Clinical Summary and testimony, which were both included in petitioner’s
formal offer of evidence, respecting the parties’ relationship history that petitioner and
respondent met at the bank where petitioner was applying for a job and where
respondent was employed as a credit investigator prior to their courtship and their
marriage.42
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her
evidence a notarized summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses
paid for by the proceeds of respondent’s share in the sale of his parents’ home in
Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to around P2.9 million. Although petitioner
was insinuating that this amount was insufficient to cover the family expenses from
1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the items for their family
budget, such as their children’s education, the payments for association dues, and for
electric bills came from this money.
And no less significant is petitioner’s admission that respondent provided the land
upon which the family home was built, thus —
 
[Respondent’s counsel to the witness, petitioner]
Q:   Does [respondent] [own] any real property?
A:   No.
Q:   He does not [own] any real property?
A:   No.
Q:  Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal which has been transferred with the Register of
Deeds of Parañaque and is now renumbered as S-25470, which is in
the name of [respondent], Filipino, of legal age, single.
x x x x
[COURT to the witness, petitioner]
Q:   Who owned this property?
A:  Based on the document, it’s Benjamin Singson.
Q:   Where is this property located?
A:    It is located in United Parañaque.
 Q:   Where in United Parañaque?
A:   No. 2822 Daang Hari.
Q:   Are you staying in that property?
A:   We are staying in that property.
x x x x
[Respondent’s counsel to the witness, petitioner]
Q:  How about the house there, in the United Parañaque [property], who
owns it?
A:   It was donated to the children.
x x x x
[COURT to the witness, petitioner]
Q:  Based on the document, who is the registered owner?
A:   It says there, [respondent], Your Honor.
Q:   Who owns it now?
A:  The children because it was donated [to them].43
 
What’s more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband and
wife since their marriage on July 6, 1974 (and in the company of their four children,
too). In fact, shunting aside the time that resppndcnt was under treatment at the
Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not allege any instance when respondent failed to
live with them.
To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself admitted, that
respondent likewise brought her to the hospital during all four instances that she gave
birth to their children.44
By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s mere
confinement at the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s
psychological incapacity.
Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is
irresponsible, and is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate into unassailable
proof that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. It is settled that “[ps]ychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will.”45 “[I]t is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some
psychological, not physical, illness.”46
Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s testimony in open court and her Clinical Summary
be taken for gospel truth in regard to the charge that respondent is afflicted with utter
inability to appreciate his marital obligations. That much is clear from the following
testimony —
 
[Petitioner’s counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]
Q:  Madam witness, do you know the respondent in this case, Benjamin
Singson?
A:  Yes. [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003, during his first
admission and again [in] 2006, [S]ir.
Q:  So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam witness?
A:   Yes, [S]ir.
Q:   Why was he confined, Madam witness?
A:   He was initially confined because of problems with gambling and
subsequently because of [behavioral] problem, [S]ir.
x x x x
Q:  What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam [W]itness?
A:   Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However, [in]
September of 2006, he knocked on the doors of the maids in the
middle of the night. And in one occasion, he got his car in the garage
and drove out bumping the car parked right across the garage and he
[also kept] taking things out from his cabinet. And if the maids would
clean [these], he [would] immediately take them out again. So, he was
brought to the facility in October because of his uncontrolled behavior,
[S]ir.
x x x x
Q:  So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the respondent,
Benjamin Singson, Madam witness?
A:  Based on history, mental status examination and observations during
his stay, I found that [respondent] is suffering from pathological
gambling. Also, with his history of typhoid fever when he was younger,
it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in
2003 and 2006. Aside from pathological gambling, [respondent] is
suffering from a personality disorder, [S]ir.
Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality disorder with
[regard] to [respondent’s dealings] with other people, with his wife and
his family, [M]adam witness?
A:  Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my memory.
COURT:
     Go ahead.
A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees [sic] his
problems which [makes] his personal[,] family[,] and social life[,] and
even his vocational pleasure [suffer]. He was preoccupied with
gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen
in his stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances. He needs to
gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve his
desired effects into gambling, [S]ir.
COURT:
     Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report?
  A:    Yes, Your Honor.
   x x x x
[Cross examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent’s counsel]
Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam witness?
A:   I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist did the
psychological testing, [S]ir.
Q:  Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam witness, which we
would like to request [from] this Honorable Court, later on, that you
present your credentials as expert witness, you concluded that the
respondent is suffering from personality disorder?
A:    Yes, [S]ir.
Q:   What does this mean in layman’s language, [M]adam witness?
A:   Personality disorder is a maladaptive pattern of behavior that has
distracted his ability to perform his functions as a married man to his wife, as a
 father to his children and as a person who is sup-posed to be employed
productively, [S]ir. 47
Furthermore, “[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while
undoubtedly negative traits, are nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological
incapacity’], in the absence of [incontrovertible] proof that these are manifestations of
an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.”48
We now turn to the second point. Again in view of the contrasting findings of the
trial court and appellate court,49we take recourse to the records to assist us in
evaluating the respective postures taken by the parties.
Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that “there must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse
from complying with the basic marital obligations x x x.”50 “A cause has to be shown
and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.”51
Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay down the
bases or premises for this particular finding relative to respondent’s psychological
incapacity, thus:
Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent’s
inabilities to perform his marital obligations was a result of not mere intentional
refusal on his part but are caused by psychological abnormality. Such
psychological incapacity of the respondent has been shown as already
present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only after
the solemnization. x x x.52
 
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC
did not specifically identify the root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to a definite or a definitive
cause, viz.: “with his history of typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to
attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006.”53Besides, Dr.
Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but another psychologist who
conducted the tests.54And this psychologist was not presented by petitioner.
More than that, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s testimony regarding respondent’s alleged
admission that he was allegedly betting on jai alai when he was still in high school is
essentially hearsay as no witness having personal knowledge of that fact was called
to the witness stand. And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio claimed to have interviewed
respondent’s sister in connection therewith, the latter did testify in court. And we are
taught that “[t]he stringency by which the Court assesses the sufficiency of
psychological evaluation reports is necessitated by the pronouncement in our
Constitution that marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State.”55
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner’s claim that respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity could be attributed to the latter’s family or childhood, which are
circumstances prior to the parties’ marriage; no evidence has been adduced to
substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding petitioner’s contention that
respondent’s family was “distraught” and that respondent’s conduct was
“dysfunctional”; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious
charges which must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately,
petitioner did not at all adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific
finding that this was the origin of respondent’s alleged inability to appreciate marital
obligations.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose’s testimony that his
father’s psychological incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage. It has been
held that the parties’ child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as “he
could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been
expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.”56
To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing,
competent and trustworthy evidence to establish the cause of respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity and that the same antedated their marriage.57 If anything,
petitioner failed to successfully dispute the CA’s finding that she was not aware of any
gambling by respondent before they got married and that respondent was a kind and
caring person when he was courting her.58
Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA’s declaration that petitioner failed
to prove that respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity is serious or grave and
that it is incurable or permanent.
To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner’s assertion that
“personality disorders are generally incurable” as this is not a matter that courts are
mandated to take judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.59
“Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or
one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the
time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital
life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we are
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.”60This is the situation here.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and
January 6, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 96662
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—It has consistently been held that psychological incapacity, as a ground
to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. (Republic vs. Romero
II, 785 SCRA 164 [2016])
Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” does not
constitute psychological incapacity nor does failure of the parties to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons. (Republic vs. Pangasinan, 800
SCRA 184 [2016])
 G.R. No. 173540. January 22, 2014.*
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, petitioner, vs. TECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO, respondent.
Civil Law; Documentary Evidence; Marriage Certificates; While a marriage
certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as
the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.—We uphold the reversal by the CA of
the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, 636 SCRA 420 (2010) we said, citing precedents, that: While a
marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that
the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Edgardo T. Mata and Romero A. Boniel for petitioner.
   Apolinario Veruasa for respondent.  a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to
 
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
 
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been
validly married to the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de
Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased
Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to
Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated
by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is
evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were
destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children,
namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on
23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido,
Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his
whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that
Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura
Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman
by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void
for being bigamous — an action she sought to protect the rights of her children over
the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with
counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio
who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been
celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended
that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right
and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of: 
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido
(Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid
marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2)   Documentary evidence such as the following:
1944 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon,
Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the
Office of the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO),
R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages
that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO
Manila, started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the
Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945,
were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by
the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12
i.   Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by
Second World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of
Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true
transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13
j.  Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30
March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and
Peregrina.15 
 
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to
Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how
she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her
knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of
Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate her
allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit: 
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of
marriage on 3 March 1979;
2)   Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single
when he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law
relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely:
Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18
3)  Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4)  Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the
Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was
initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right
and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21denying Tecla’s petition, as
well as Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:  Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio.
For The Foregoing, the petition for the “DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE” filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against
respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The “COUNTERCLAIM” filed by respondent PEREGRINA
MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is
hereby DISMISSED.22
 
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged
disregard of the evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the
validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the
marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void.
The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she
personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2)
the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that
the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting
the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the
failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25 dated 5 June 2008,
raises the following legal issues:  well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
  1.      Whether or not the court can validly rely on the “presumption of marriage”
to overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;
2.       Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken
cognizance of, without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of
the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document; and
3.       Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a
probative value to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest
who is  sued the same being presented to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented
during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to
Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages
during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the Certification
issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed: 
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it,
likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit “B”) stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally
destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945.
What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter
part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from
1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not
issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage
between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on
30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27
 
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the
testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving
assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even
produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to
prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful
marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and
wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary
evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well
as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created,
according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial
court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is
 We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently,
in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents,
that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other
proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda. de Jacob v.
Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract,
both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence
of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have
thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as “secondary” evidence
of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the
execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be prove[n] by
secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution
are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a
matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be
shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
x x x x
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last
analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally
consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when
the document is actually produced, its authencity is not
necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its
contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to
produce the document, when available, to establish its
execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented
but not the admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this
issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that “marriage
may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by
the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the
parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution
thereof. The Court has also held that “[t]he loss may be shown by any person who
[knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the
court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of
similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost
was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.”
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela
Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a
party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit
of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible
evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and
documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO
was established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be
present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to
the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of
Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the
due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the
evidence presented, secondary evidence — testimonial and documentary — may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the Supreme Court held
that “marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person
who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to
the fact of marriage.”
x x x x
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally
witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on
30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and
[Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO,
and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It
should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of
its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated
on the rationale behind the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and
of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always
presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the
testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted fact of the birth within the
cohabitation of Tecla and Eustaquio of four (4) children coupled with the certificates of
the children’s birth and baptism; and the certifications of marriage issued by the
parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner
Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Notes.—The marriage contract still remains the best evidence to prove the fact of
marriage. (People vs. Abello, 582 SCRA 378 [2009])

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a

marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only
needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. (Fujiki vs.
Marinay, 700 SCRA 69 [2013])
 G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; “Limited Purpose” Marriages; Words and Phrases; In the
United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose
or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose” marriages. A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child. Another is for immigration purposes.―The institution of marriage carries with it
concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole
purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a
couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have
been referred to as “limited purpose” marriages. A common limited purpose marriage
is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. Another, which is the subject
of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned
with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, and it attempts to filter
out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.
Same; Same; Same; A “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to
establish a life together at the time they were married.”―In 1975, the seminal case of
Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
“marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at
the time they were married.” This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the
couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not “entered into for the purpose
of evading the immigration laws of the United States.” The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of
evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely
for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity
or existence of a marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be
valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer.―Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be
valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must
also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of
their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs,
or hypnotism.
Same; Same; Marriages in Jest; A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage,
legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the
actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be
bound; Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
consent, but for a complete absence of consent.―In ruling that Albios’ marriage was
void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of
jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by
any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended
marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties
whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are
void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete
absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
Same; Same; A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under
the grounds provided by law; There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as
the acquisition of foreign citizenship; Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.―The avowed purpose of
marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal
and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered
into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Same; Same; Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise,
such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid.―Motives for entering into a
marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind
of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go
into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status,
and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid.
Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.
Same; Same; No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a
ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances.―Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of
fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under
Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a
previous conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a
pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and
(4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws
does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47
(3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to
enter into the sham marriage.
Same; Same; No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State; The Supreme Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily
be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when
no longer needed.―No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily
be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when
no longer needed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
  Albert T. Villaseca for respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC), declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and
respondent Liberty Albios (Albios) as void from the beginning.
The Facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married
before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong
City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage,
they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had
any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore,
null and void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13,
2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The
RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and
determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor
complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both
parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did
not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial,
hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from
the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement,
petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired
any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife
of respondent.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United
States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC,
thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order,7 dated
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage
was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that
the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to
live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was
primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT
HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
 OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONE IN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American
citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent
to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew
the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent
should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of
marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her
stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void
from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its
petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, it shall first examine the phenomenon of
marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits.
In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose”
marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage
fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom
did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.” This standard
was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of
1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage
was not “entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States.” The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life
together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted,
however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore,
does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage. 
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent
for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent. The early
cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In
1946, the notable case of United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in
order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not
to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge
Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission
to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual
consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or
ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not
contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all.
x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be
valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing
it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an
end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never
really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation
as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a
pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic
Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain
entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided “merely
because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose.”20 The 1980 immigration
case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was
intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one. 
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have
generally denied annulments involving “limited purpose” marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as
valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage
was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family
life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to
the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence
of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar
to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to
enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build
a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed
lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite
of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires that
the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must
be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both
the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should
not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice
of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as
to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized
such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage,
legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the
actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be
bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter
into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no
intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any
purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond
necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that
only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was,
thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a
legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the
couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a
marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same
Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it
is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise
serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples
to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live
apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage
for dishonest purposes, it cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous conviction
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another
man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug
addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a
marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any
of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud
may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham
marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her
marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail
to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply
have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use
the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a
judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed
to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
 No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.
This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into
when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No.
1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,**  Brion *** and Peralta, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, judgment annulled.
Notes.―Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case for
parricide. (Pimentel vs. Pimentel, 630 SCRA 436 [2010])

Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by
a spouse of foreign nationality provided it is valid according to his/her national law.
(Vda. de Catalan vs. Catalan-Lee, 665 SCRA 487 [2012])
No. L-28248. March 12, 1975.*
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined
by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO,
ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO
No. L-28248. March 12, 1975.
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO,
ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband
BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ,
EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE
PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO,
ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners, vs . MARIA PERIDO,
SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO,
MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO,
TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.
Evidence; Presumption of marriage and legitimacy of children;Presumption may
be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege illegitimacy.—The
statement of the civil status of a person in a certificate of title issued to him is not
conclusive to show that he is not actually married to another. It is weak and
insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife
are married to each other. This presumption, especially where the legitimacy of the
issue is involved, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who
allege the illegitimacy .
Same; Same; Reason for presumption of marriage.—The basis of human
society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public
is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would
be living in the constant violation of decency and law.
Appeals; Findings of appellate court on matters involving appreciation of
evidence binding on Supreme Court; Reason.—The issue raised also involves
appreciation of the evidence and, consequently , the finding of the appellate court on
the matter is binding on the Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an
examination of all the evidence introduced before the trial court, a consideration of the
credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances surrounding the case, their relevancy
or relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal of the probabilities
of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary appeal
on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the purpose for
which the latter procedure has been established.
APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
     Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R.
No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the Co urt of First Instan ce of Negros
Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Hima maylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his
lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3 ) children:
Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with
whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia, and Gonzalo. Lucio
himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is
still living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his childre n Inocencia,
Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora
Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons,
Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita’s other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children,
namely:
Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is
dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido’s five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead,
namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido,
Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz
Perido, while Juan is surviv ed by his only ch ild, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15 , 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second
marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as “Declaration of
Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,” whereby they partitioned among themselves
Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey
of Hima maylan , Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second
thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a comp laint in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, which comp laint was later amended on February
22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for th e annulment of
the so-called “Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition” and  for another
partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone. They alleged,
among other th ings, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the
document in question through misrepresen tation, false promises and fraudulent
means; that the lo ts which were partitioned in said document belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talo rong; and that the
five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all ille gitimate and
therefore had no successional righ ts to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942.
The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
 After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the
“Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition.” However, it did not order the
partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that
the fiv e children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were
legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio
Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No . 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
“IN VIE W OF ALL THE FOREGOI NG, the Court renders judgment as follows:
declaring the following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio
Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia Perido,
Leonora Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia
Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo
Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido,
Susano Perido, deceased; great grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and
Wilfredo Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the legitimate
children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio
Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido,
Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido,
deceased; grandson, Juan A. Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo
Perido; (3) declaring all lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot
No. 458 as exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them should be
divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but because of his
death leaving eight (8) children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows:
1/64 to Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married to
Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to
Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba; 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age,
married to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz;
1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but because she is
now dead the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde,
of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael
Perido, but because he is already dead leaving five children, the same should b e
divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to
Alfredo Perido, of age, married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is
already dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to
Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs t o Margarita Perido, of age, widow; 1/8
belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he is already dead with seven children, the
same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age,
single; 1/56 goes to Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of
age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age, married to Leopoldo
Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of age,
single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to
Juan B. Perido, but because he is already dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to
Juan A. Perido, of age, ma rried to Salud Salgado; 1/8 goes to Maria Perido, of age,
married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to
Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12
shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat, which should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido
to be divided into eight (8) equal shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be
divided into five (5) equal shares or 11/120 for each of the children and again to be
divided by the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido owner
of 1 /12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be determined accordingly
later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit “J” of the plaintiffs which is Exhibit “10” for
the defendants, without costs and without adjudication with respect to the
counterclaim and damages, they being members of the same family, fore quity and
justice .”
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1)
in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofron ia Perido and
Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots
Nos. 471, 506, 511 , 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Hima
maylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in
holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lu cio Perido
and Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals
affirmed it in toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down . There
upon they instituted the instant petition for review reiterating in effect the assignments
of error and the arguments in the brief they submitted to the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitima cy of th e five children of Lucio Perido with
Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on th e
theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio
Perido’s first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not
recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In support of their
contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first th ree children
were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner
Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on
the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married
his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through
the testi mony of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained . The Court of Appeals found that there was
evidence to show that Lucio Perido’s wife, Benita Talo rong, died during the Spanish
regime. This finding is conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the
circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat
before the birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title
issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not
conclusiv e to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat.
Furthermore, it is weak and in sufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living
together as husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption, especially
where the legiti macy of th e issue is in volved, as in this case, may be overcome only
by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong
vs. Cheong Seng Gee,1 this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption,
thus: “The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as bein g, they would be living in th e constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is ‘that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.’ (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio—
Always presume marriage.”
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the
presumption of marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both
the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated
testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said
witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio
Perido only in 1925, merely replied th at she knew it because “during the celebration
of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and
placed in the altar.” Ev id en tly, she was n o t ev en an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five
children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during th eir marriage and,
th erefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots
Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive properties of
Lucio Perido. In disposing of the contention of the petitioners th at said lo ts belonged
to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of
Appeals said:
“x x x. We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the lands
covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all declared in the name of
Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing that the lands were inherited by Lucio
Perido from hi s grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were
the exclusive properties of the late Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and
second marriages. By fiat of law said properties should be divided accordingly among
his legal heirs.”
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the
aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother and
contend that they were able to establish through the testi monies of th eir witnesses
that the sp ou ses Lu cio Perido an d Ben ita Talo ro ng acqu ired th em during their
lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question involves
appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals, the
factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the
appellate court:
“With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
21769 issued in 1925 the same should be considered conjugally owned by Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this
point need not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that
Lucio Perido, the registered owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the
previous land titles. If the law presumes a property registered in the name of only one
of the spouses to be conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs.
Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes
stronger when the document recites that the spouse in whose name the land is
registered is married to somebody else, like in the case at bar. It appearing that the
legal presumption that Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership had not been
overcome by clear proofs to the contrary , we are constrained to rule, that the same is
the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.”
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners ma intain that they were able to
prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido
and his first wife, Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12
of said lot came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido
and his three children of the first marriage. As in the seco nd assignment of error, the
issue raised here also involves ap preciation of the evidence and, consequently, the
finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court. Indeed, a review
of that finding would require an examination of all the evidence introduced before the
trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances
surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as
well as an appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish
the distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari
on the other, and thus defeat the purpose for which th e latter procedure has been
established.2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioners.
Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ.,concur. Muñoz Palma, J., is on leave
abroad.
Decision affirmed.
Notes. a) Presumption of marriage and legitimacy.—Two of the strongest
presumptions in law are that a man and woman living together as husband and wife
are lawfully married, and that a child born of that union is presumed to be legitimate.
These presumptions can be repelled only by strong, convincing and conclusive
evidence to the contrary ( Arriola-Uy Company vs. Director of Forestry, CA-GR No. 21
899-R, June 16, 1959).
b) Appeal and certiorari as modes of review.—Appeal, and not certiorari, is the
proper remedy if review of the judgment on the merits is sought ( Casilan vs.
Ybañez, L-199 68-69 , October 31, 1962). Mistake of fact or of law is not within the
reach of certiorari, but the proper reme dy is by appeal (Lopez vs. Alvendia, L-20697,
December 24, 1964). Change of procedure does not affect the nature of the
proceedings as an appeal by way of certiorari (Gamalog vs. Court of Appeals, L-
28643, November 28, 1969).
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.*  (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. 95-61-MTJ)
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage.—There is nothing ambiguous
or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage,
a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
Same; Same; Same; Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint
affidavit submitted by the groom.—In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on
the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, “The following marriage shall be void from the beginning; (4) Those
bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41.”
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.*  official to administrative liability.—A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. 95-61-MTJ)
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.*  diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. 95-61-MTJ)
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.*
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. 95-61-MTJ)
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY,
respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Even if the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
marriage.—There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In
fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration
of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code
to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage
has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
Same; Same; Same; Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on
the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom.—In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it
was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, “The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning; (4) Those bigamous x x x
marriages not falling under Article 41.”
Same; Same; Same; Instances where a marriage can be held outside of the
judge’s chambers or courtroom.—As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can
be held outside of the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances:
request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
Same; Same; Same; Article 8 which is a directory provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer.—Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the
“authority of the solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.”
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the
Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless
of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Judges; By citing Article 8 and the
exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent
judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
—Inasmuch as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein
as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court finds respondent to have acted in
gross ignorance of the law.—Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in
gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our
attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that
respondent’s failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Misconduct and
Inefficiency.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October
27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at
the respondent judge’s residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall
within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located
some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers
that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone
else, who, as the mayor’s “lackey,” is overly concerned with his actuations both as
judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative
Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15,
1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, “Antonio Adapon v. Judge
Hernando C. Domagtoy,” which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his
act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the
Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.1 With
respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s
jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from
his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the
Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With
respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between
Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code
which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings
submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant
have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of
and respondent judge’s answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed
by themselves to prove the latter’s malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga states that Tagadan’s civil status is “separated.” Despite this declaration, the
wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a
joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and
sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar.3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent
judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that
they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in
September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she
has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the
presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is
sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda’s presumptive death, and ample reason for him to
proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
“A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.” (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law
is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code
to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage
has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest
error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by
the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, “The following marriage
shall be void from the beginning; (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling
under Article 41.”
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the
court’s jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

“Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;
x x x      x x x      x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to that effect.”
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his
having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside of his court’s jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can
be held outside of the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances:
(1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon
request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no
pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote
place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge
was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of
the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the
“authority of the solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.”
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop.
An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites
of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where
a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect
the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.5
Inasmuch as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein
as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law.
The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary
and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent’s failure to apply them
is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in
the instant case.6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently.7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law,
in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and
Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a
six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is
advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
     Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy suspended for six (6) months with stern
warning against repetition of similar acts.
Note.—While an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
the marriage the party or parties responsible for the same shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable. (Cosca vs. Palaypayon, Jr., 237 SCRA 249 [1994])
 G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.*
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.
RECIO, respondent.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Divorce; Conflict of Laws; Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce, hence, our courts cannot grant it, and a marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad.—At
the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.—A comparison between marriage and
divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. decrees that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.”
Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.—Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree
is a public document—a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it
requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution. Respondent is getting
ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment
is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Proof of Foreign Public or Official
Records; Requisites.—Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication, or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The divorce decree
between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A party’s failure to object properly renders a
foreign divorce decree admissible as a written act of the court of another State.—
Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only
to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification.
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizenship; A former Filipino is no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquires another State’s citizenship.—
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary, respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof lies with the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action; Where a divorce decree is a defense raised by a party, the burden of proving
the pertinent foreign law validating it falls squarely upon him.—The burden of proof
lies with “the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws—like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
—It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In its strict legal sense,
divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage; A decree nisi or an interlocutory order—a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce—is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.—Respondent’s contention is untenable. In
its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro.
The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was
procured by respondent. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree—a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the
lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. Even after
the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be
limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground
of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage
only after proof of good behavior.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; A divorce decree does not raise a
disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to the civil status of the person
presenting it where no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce
decree obtained under the foreign law.—We also reject the claim of respondent that
the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his
civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason
that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained
under Australian laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificate of Legal Capacity; The legal capacity to
contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned; The
certificate of legal capacity mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code is sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of a foreign national—a duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien
applicant for a marriage license.—Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal
capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with
the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry. We clarify. To repeat, the legal
capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it
in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The absence of a certificate of legal
capacity is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal requirements for
procuring a marriage license, an irregularity which will not affect the validity of a
marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate.
—In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity
in complying with the formal requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under
Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage
celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate.
(Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, 1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines
Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations
Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.).
Same; Same; Same; Same; A divorce decree does not ipso facto clothed a
divorcee with the legal capacity to remarry—he must still adduce sufficient evidence
to show the foreign State’s personal law governing his status, or at the very least, he
should still prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.—Based on the
above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
We agree with petitioner’s contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal
law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract
the second marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court may not declare the second marriage of
a divorcee null and void on the ground of bigamy where there is a possibility that,
under the foreign law, the divorcee was really capacitated to remarry as a result of the
divorce decree—the most judicious course is to remand the case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show the divorcee’s legal capacity to remarry.—
Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law,
he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry
petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’
marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon,
Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Br. 28.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
 Olivia Velasco-Jacoba for petitioner.
     Anarica De Jesus Castillo co-counsel for petitioner.
     Gomez and Associates for respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law
of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved
and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties.”3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Austrian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
“Certificate of Australian Citizenship” issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner
—a Filipina—and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10
in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy—respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that
she learned of respondent’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his
first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to many petitioner in
1994.
On July 7, 1998—or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for
the declaration of nullity was pending—respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down.”13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that
it stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted
for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued
in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage
ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondent’s alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
“1 The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia
by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
“2 The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent.
“3 The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
case.
“4 The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40,
52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
“5 The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our
courts.”19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall
concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to many petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between
Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court’s recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the
divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this
jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce, and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably
failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of
the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” 26 A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. decrees that “aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.”28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must
first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the
Family Code. These articles read as follows:
“ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall
file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar
which shall specify the following:
x x x      x x x      x x x
“(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved
or annulled;
x x x      x x x      x x x”
“ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage, x x x.
“ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.”
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document—a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication, or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only
to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification.37
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary, respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known
by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with “the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.”41 In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.42
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws
are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judirial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondent’s Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent
was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their
marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent’s contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are
of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimony,
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing
in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree—a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed
period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes
and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may
be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the
ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license.
According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent,
had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a
marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal
capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only
the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit “A”—Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit “B”—Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit “C”—Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in
Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit “D”—Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan
City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Redo and
Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit “E”—Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;55 (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit “1”— Amended
Answer;56 (b) Exhibit “2”—Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage
in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit “3”—Certificate of Australian Citizenship
of Rederick A. Recio;58 (d) Exhibit “4”—Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit “5”—Statutory Declaration of the
Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January
12, 1994. We agree with petitioner’s contention that the court a quo erred in finding
that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to
remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to
contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law,
he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry
petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’
marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon,
Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we
REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that,
of declaring the parties’ marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Melo (Chairman), Vitug and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Case remanded to trial court for reception of evidence.
Notes.—Once proved that a wife was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of
her divorce from her husband, then she could very well lose her right to inherit from
the latter. (Quita vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998])
The ruling in People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843 (1954) and People v. Aragon,
100 Phil. 1033 (1957) that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned—the prevailing rule is found in
Article 40 of the Family Code. (Te vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327 [2000])
 G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.*
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR.,
petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage
under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80 (3) in relation to Article 58.—A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic “autonomous social institution.” Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an “inviolable social institution,” and is the foundation of family
life which shall be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as “a special contract of permanent union” and case law considers it “not
just an adventure but a lifetime commitment.”
Same; Same; Same; There are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with.—There are several instances
recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The
rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation
of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name
for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their
privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
Same; Same; Same; The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.—Working on the assumption
that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This
5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity—that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction
as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be
no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order
to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two
shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Same; Same; Same; Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime
of the first spouse shall be illegal and void.—This is the same reason why our civil
laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only
to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of
two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The law sanctions monogamy.
Same; Same; Same; The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and
wife.”—Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation
was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of
the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as “husband and wife.”
Same; Same; Same; Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left: as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.—The Code is silent as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while
a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Same; Same; Same; No judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage.—Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. “A void marriage
does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind
of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained
and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.”
Same; Same; Same; Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.—Other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in
a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Roldan R. Mangubat for petitioners.
     Daryll A. Amante for private respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in
her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11,
1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could
file an action for “annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is “rather silent, obscure,
insufficient” to resolve the following issues:
(1)Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G.
Niñal is already dead;
(2)Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is
null and void ab initio;
(3)Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their father’s death.1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
and void their father’s marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage.2 Hence, this petition for review with this
Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because “the verification failed to state the
basis of petitioner’s averment that the allegations in the petition are ‘true and correct.’
” It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under
Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,6 the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)7 in relation to Article 58.8
The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic “autonomous social institution.” 10 Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an “inviolable social institution,” and is the foundation of family
life which shall be protected by the State.11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as “a special contract of permanent union”12 and case law considers it “not
just an adventure but a lifetime commitment.”13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status.15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that “they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other.”16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of
whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment
may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words,
the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a preconceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that
two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar.17 The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: “x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x.”
Article 64: “Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under
oath. x x x”
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: “x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x.”
Article 18 reads in part: “x x x.In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his
findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x.”
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus,
any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void,18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil
law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital
affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.19 The law
sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of
his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming
that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years,
the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It
is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and
wife.”
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of
the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their father’s marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge’s ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be
applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second
ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows “the
sane spouse” to file an annulment suit “at any time before the death of either party” is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can
be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other
can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid.22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership (4) For causes mentioned
in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the
force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased; For causes mentioned
in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the
marriage or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children
born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Articles 43 and 44
as well as Articles 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
     Pardo, J., On official business abroad.
Petition granted, order reversed and set aside. Case ordered reinstated.

Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the death of petitioner’s father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed
as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Note.—Per current jurisprudence, “a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact” before any party thereto can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void. (Apiag vs. Cantero, 268 SCRA 47 [1997])

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.24 “A void marriage does not require a
judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage
void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient
that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction.”25 “Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as
though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband
and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.” It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio.26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage27 and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.28 For the same reason, the
law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage imprescriptible.29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the
cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
 A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001.*
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ.)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC,
Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
Marriage; Marriage Licenses; Husband and Wife; Legal Ratification of Marital
Cohabitation; Requisites.—For this provision on legal ratification of marital
cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman
must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other, 3. The
fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other];
and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; A judge ought to know that
a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void.—Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that
a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he
known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of
Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated
in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Separation; Legal separation does not dissolve the
marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry, and this holds true all the
more when the separation is merely de facto.—The fact that Manzano and Payao had
been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial.
Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal
separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds
are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage—marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who
are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from
marriage license.—Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between
two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior
existing marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; A judge demonstrates
gross ignorance of the law when her solemnizes a void and bigamous marriage.—
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses
no one” has special application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic
legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure
to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two. contracting parties who were both
bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint
against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta,
Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent
Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta
Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March
1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he
knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.”
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated
the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and
wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their
joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he
would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be
charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit
and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed.
Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the
dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites
the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits 5 of the late Manzano and of
Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction.
In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that
they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since
their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left
their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore.
Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1.The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage;
2.The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3.The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the
time of marriage;
4.The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at
least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5.The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained
the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their
marriage.6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note
that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated
the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were “separated.”
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In
fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married
he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent
Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous
marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses
for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses
who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other,
but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the
case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano
and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses
no one” has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic
legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure
to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
     Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Recommendation adopted with modification.
Notes.—A judge who solemnizes a marriage without the required marriage
license dismally fails to live up to his commitment to be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. (Moreno vs. Bernabe, 246 SCRA 120
[1995])
A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage—he is a partner
who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until
death. (Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451 [1998])
That a marriage license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony
does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same
parties to the marriage, for the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the
first. (Ty vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 86 [2000])
 G.R. No. 175581. March 28, 2008.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.
G.R. No. 179474. March 28, 2008.*
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.
Marriages; Marriage License; A marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract, in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license did not
make the marriage void; The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage
license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.—Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract. This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a
marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted
by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.
Same; Same; Ratification of Marital Cohabitation; The reason for the law on
ratification of marital cohabitation, whereby no marriage license is required, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in
a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.—The instant case pertains to a
ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage. The reason for the law, as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in
a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.
Same; Same; Same; The falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where
the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.—It is not contested
herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that “they have attained
the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each
other.” One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an
affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack
of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Marriages of exceptional character are,
doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license, and under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed.—Marriages of exceptional
character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved
in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to
the latter by implication. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non
thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that,
being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76
of the Civil Code leaves the Court with no other expediency but to read the law as it is
plainly written—the exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire
to marry each other.—A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with
no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a
marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil
Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76
is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability
carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be
valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a
directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy
to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the
requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths;
and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in
an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; The question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature.—It is noteworthy that the question as to whether they
satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises
when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Under
Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review. It is already
well-settled that: The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of
Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the
Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The rule that persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married does not apply to a case which does not
involve an apparent marriage.—Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of
marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar.
Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the
prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still
needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a
contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the
instant consolidated Petitions.
Same; Same; Same; The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of
fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law
sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.—The
declaration of the Civil Code that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the
validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements
of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was
one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite
for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not
just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an
abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set
forth in our laws.
Same; Same; Same; The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating
to the period of the parties’ cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as
an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity,
for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath—if the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a
lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.—We are not
impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is
not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited
for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with
reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one.
Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in
the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper,
without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
Same; Same; Same; Equity; Equity finds no room for application where there is a law.
—In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based
on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and
cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be
stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. There is a law on
the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of
the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.
Same; Declaration of Nullity; Prescription; An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.—The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose
is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage
license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990,
and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in. This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license.
No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the
right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Same; Same; Common-Law Cohabitation Period; To settle all doubts,
jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation
period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of a marriage.—To settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule
that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year
period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity—
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years—and continuity
that is unbroken.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the amended decision of the Court of Appeals.
   
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Public Attorney’s Office for Felisa Tecson-Dayot.
  Urbano C. Victorio, Sr. for Jose A. Dayot.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are
Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void
ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the
Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a
marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24
November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that
being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that
he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter,
he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some
three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia.
At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three
folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so.
However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed
by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the
pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged
that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house.
When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract
with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity
of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man
and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. 5 In her pre-
trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3
June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose
and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. 6
The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It
disposed:
“WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by
both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a
favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].”9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed
Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
“Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him
or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something
was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but
it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said
package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact
that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will
not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to “discover” that
the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose]
does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be “taken in for a
ride” by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly
notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year
after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false.
[Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be
contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why
her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then.
This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully
wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she
signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate
(T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he
voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29,
1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of
his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.”10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It
cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of
marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the
discovery of the fraud. Thus:
“That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by
[Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he
discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any
action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.”12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal
to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.”13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa
as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court
observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the
parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of
fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals
struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
“Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in
giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already
prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by
fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years
after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the
complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.”15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to
Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was
solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with
the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived
together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the
validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to
the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The
appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment
to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither
he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged.
According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that
either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing
officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718 of
the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper
application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE
and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C.
Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.”19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in
Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that: 
“In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without
a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of
majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and
that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
“x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the 5 years and continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing
a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that
two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning.
Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the
absence of a marriage license.”21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate
court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that
the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and
set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be
declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as
G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1
August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of
uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance
of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY
OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25
She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties
therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her
cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment
of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had
been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of
nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a
considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by
petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress
its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated
24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s
position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the
solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was
legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage
not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in
their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In
addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that their
marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the
signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary
evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following
documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May
1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993
issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3)
Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a
false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in
order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24
November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil
Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.” (Emphasis
ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the
Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it
clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void,
this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old
Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties,
after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2,
Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in
articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote
places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed
marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of
the Civil Code, which provides:
“ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity
attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state
of cohabitation from legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without
a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that “they have
attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to
marry each other.”37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether
the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen
short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly 38 but
reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court
will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. 41 For the exception in
Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency
but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under
Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous
terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other
reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to
mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the
requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years
at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic
admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted
Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. 44 The appellate
court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum
five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need
to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. 46 Under Rule 45, factual
findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:
“The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on
this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the
trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals
and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of
Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record
or based on substantial evidence.”48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and
Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond
question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in
the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and
formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it
cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without
the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the
explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of
a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the
same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a
presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. 50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied.
There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage
on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated
Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or
fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and
extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and
Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the
stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent
and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by
making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. 52 The protection of marriage
as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but
the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of
a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to
protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage
under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained,
so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The
former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the
absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of
the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by
the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is
but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no
affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on
equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and
cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be
stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. 54 There is a law
on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76
of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is
claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding
Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took
Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set
in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. 56 Jose and

Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can
be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void
marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed
back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of a marriage. 57 It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the five years—and continuity that is unbroken.58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage
of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice
to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez (Acting Chairperson), Tinga,** Velasco, Jr.*** and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

Petitions denied, amended decision affirmed.

Notes.—“Secret marriage” is a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to

refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or
friends of either or both of the contracting parties. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 236
SCRA 257 [1994])
A marriage license is a formal requirement, and its absence renders the marriage void
ab initio. (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 550 [2000])
 [No. L-9005.   June 20, 1958]
 
ARSENIO DE LORIA AND RICARDA DE LORIA, PETITIONERS, vs. FELIPE
APELAN FELIX, respondent.
1.MARRIAGE IN "ARTICULO MORTIS"; LACK OF AFFIDAVIT AND NON-
REGISTRATION OF MARRIAGE.—In the celebration of the marriage in articulo
mortis, where all the requisites for its validity were present, the marriage is not
voided by the failure of the priest to make and file the affidavit required in sections
20 and 21 of the Marriage Law and to register said marriage in the local civil
registry.
2.ID.;   FAILURE   TO   SIGN   MARRIAGE   CONTRACT;   EFFECT   OF.—
The signing of the marriage contract is a formal requirement of evidentiary value,
the omission of which does not render the marriage a nullity.
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
 
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.
Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.
 
BENGZON, J.:
 
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of the
validity of the marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan
Felix.
It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons
lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired
properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and
surrounding territory, Matea became seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two
young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales
and Judith Vizcarra1 visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched
Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning
that the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage,
asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both
agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old woman,
gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then
solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis,2 Carmen
Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29
or 30, 1945.
 
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be
denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista
performing the burial ceremonies.
 
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to
compel defendant to render an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the
deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to
be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action,
setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first
instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.
 
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the
legal question-which they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief—whether
the events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a
valid and binding marriage.
 
1 Now a nun at Sta. Escolastica College.
2 In  his   presence,   Matea   and   Felipe   expressed   mutual   consent
to be thenceforward husband and wife.
According to the Court of Appeals:
"There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista,
solemnized the marriage in articulo mortis of Defendant Apeljan Felix and Matea de la
Cruz, on January 29 and 30, 1945, under the circumstances set forth in the
reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista, a respectable old priest of Pasay City then,
had no reason to side one or the other. * * * Notwithstanding this positive evidence on
the celebration or performance of the marriage in question, Plaintiffs-Appellees
contend that that the same was not in articulo mortis, because Matea de la Cruz was
not then on the point of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified, however, that her
condition at the time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and according to his observation,
she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive was he about her condition
that he decided in administering to her the sacrament of extreme unction, after
hearing her confession, x x x .The greatest objection of the Appellees and the trial
court against the validity of the marriage under consideration, is the admitted fact that
it was not registered.'
The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act
No. 3613) as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections
1, 3, 20 and 21.
 
There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage.
There is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and
that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that
''they took each other as husband and wife."
 
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:
 
(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses
and the priest, as required by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and
 
(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil
registry.
 
The factual basis of the first proposition—no signing— may seriously be doubted.
The Court of Appeals made no finding thereon.    Indeed if anything, its decision
impliedly held such marriage contract to have been executed, since it said "the
marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the only question at issue was whether
"the failure of Fr. Bautista to send copies of the certificate of marriage in question to
the Local Civil Registrar and to register the said marriage in the Record of Marriages
of the Pasay Catholic Church * * * renders the said marriage invalid." And such was
the only issue tendered in the court of first instance.    (See p. 14, 34, Record on
Appeal.)
 
However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the
"marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the
Marriage Law which provides:
 
"Sec. 3. Mutual Consent,—No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is
required, but the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses, of legal age,
that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in
an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and
said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. * * *." (Italics
ours).
 
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates
the causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one
of them.
 
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are
the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter
being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other
as husband and wife"—which in this case actually occurred .3 We think the signing of
the marriage contract or certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose
of evidencing the act .4 No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it
an essential requisite—not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we
believe it is. The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be
established is quite another.
 
"Certificate and Record.—Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage
usually provide for the issuance of a certificate of marriage and for the registration or
recording of marriage * * * Generally speaking, the registration or recording of a
marriage is not essential to its validity, the statute being addressed to the officials
issuing the license, certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and
registration or recording." (Sec. 27 American   Jurisprudence   "Marriage"   p.   197-
198.)
 
"Formal Requisites.— * * *The general rule, however, is that statutes which direct
that a license must be issued and procured, that only certain persons shall perform
the ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses shall be present, that a certificate of
the marriage shall be signed, returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the
conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed to persons in authority
to secure publicity and to require a record to be made of the marriage contract. Such
statutes do not void common-law marriages unless they do so expressly, even where
such marriage are entered into without obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is
the purpose of these statutes to discourage deception and seduction, prevent illicit in-
tercourse under the guise of matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of parties
who live together as man and wife, by providing competent evidence of the marriage.
* * *." (Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp. 188-189.) Italics Ours. (See
also   Corpus  Juris   Secundum  "Marriage"   Sec.   33.)
 
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence
of one or several formal requirements of this Act * * *."    (Section 27.)
 
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties
copies of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission
(section 41)  implies his obligation to see that such  
"certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the
wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which ap-
parently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila
and its environs.
 
Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required
by sections 20 and 21. It was the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should
bring no serious consequences to the married pair, specially where as in this case, it
was caused by the emergency.
 
"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and
mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does
not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present,
the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the requisites.,,
(Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.
 
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it
requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data us-
ually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically substitutes
the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable
(under Act 3613),5 this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
 
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and
women who have lived publicly in a state of concubinage 6, (section 22), we must
hold this marriage to be valid.
 
The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased
than the plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana.    "In the absence
of
 
Because it is a formal requisite" (Section 7 as amended. See American
Jurisprudence, supra. However, the New Civil Code seemingly rules otherwise.    (Art.
80   (3)   ).
brothers or sisters and of nephews, children of the former * * * the surviving
spouse * * *shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased."    (Art 952, Civil
Code.)
 
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs.     So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Conception, Reyes, J. B.
L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998.*
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD
(deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
Criminal Law; Family Code; Marriages; Circumstances which would constitute
competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage.—Pugeda vs. Trias ruled that when
the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the
following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the
matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the
alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such
union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
Same; Same; Paternity and Filiation; A baptismal certificate though not a conclusive
proof of filiation, is one of “the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and
special laws” to show pedigree.—Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a
conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of “the other means allowed under the Rules of
Court and special laws” to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of
Appeals: “What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account
is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by ‘any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,’ according to the Civil Code,
or ‘by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,’ according to the
Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Property; Prescription; Co-ownership; No prescription runs in favor of a co-
owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.—Private respondents have not
acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-
ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former
repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of
the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to
the other co-owners.—Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription
the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly
communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]).
Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by
laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for
partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque
vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
     Liberato R. Ibadlit for private respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and
filiation be proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the
Court of Appeals1 Decision promulgated on December 1, 19942 and Resolution
promulgated on February 8, 19953 in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the
decision of the trial court and dismissed petitioner’s action for partition and damages.
On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint 4 for partition and
damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad,
before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I.5 On October 28, 1982, Felix died
without issue, so he was not substituted as a party.6
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision7 in favor of the
petitioner, in which it ruled:8
“Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate
son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his
deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this case.
Although the plaintiff had testified that he had been receiving [his] share from said
land before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what
year he stopped receiving his share and for how much. This court therefore cannot
rule on that.”
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground
that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were
legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in.
The assailed Decision disposed:9
“WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision. In lieu thereof, the
Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioner’s] complaint and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.”
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads:10
“The Court DENIES defendants-appellants’ motion for reconsideration, dated
December 15, 1994, for lack of merit. There are no new or substantial matters raised
in the motion that merit the modification of the decision.”
Hence, this petition.11
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows:12
“On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of
Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described
therein, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3)
children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land.
Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3)
children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the
defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-
third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single
when he died in 1941, before plaintiff’s birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had
lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had
been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not
given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children,
namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the
above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23).
Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that the above-
mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he be
given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this
Court hereby reproduces pertinent portions of the trial court’s decision:13
“EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she
testified in 1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since
1972. She testified that before being elected as barrio captain she held the position of
barrio council-woman for 4 years. Also she was [a member of the] board of director[s]
of the Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the
plaintiff because they are neighbors and she knows him from the time of his birth. She
knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad
Molato; both were already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very
much later. Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan,
on July 21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was
about 30 meters away from plaintiff’s parents[’] house and she used to go there 2 or 3
times a week. That she knows both the defendants as they are also neighbors. That
both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes
Trinidad who is the father of the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and
Lourdes Trinidad. She testified she also knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and
Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad who is already dead but left
several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels subject of this litigation. That she
knows all these [parcels of] land because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land,
witness answered and mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That she knew
these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was a
native also of Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the [war] and after his death
the land went to his 3 children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the
land was never partitioned or divided among the 3 children of Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she
identified a woman in the picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a
hat holding a baby was identified by her as Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other
woman in the picture was pointed by the witness as the wife of the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad
pointed to by her in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are the
plaintiff and the defendants in this case, witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification.
She testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes
Trinidad was holding a child which witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad.
When asked by the court when x x x the picture [was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff
answered, in 1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness answered
yes, as she had gone to the house of his parents. Witness then identified the
certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as
Exhibit C-1 and the name of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and
mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being July 21,
1943 was also marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well
as she used to pass by it always. It was located just near her house but she cannot
exactly tell the area as she merely passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the
photographer who took the pictures presented as Exhibit A and B, witness answered
she does not know as she was not present during the picture taking. However, she
can identify everybody in the picture as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his
only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow.
She testified having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad and
that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister and that their father was
Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That she knew Inocentes Trinidad
and Felicidad Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New
Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That
she knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer she
also owns a parcel of land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her
during planting and harvesting season. That she knows that during the lifetime of
Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and usufructed
the 4 parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio. That upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the property without giving the
widow of Inocentes any share of the produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers,
namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the one possessing and usufructing the 4
parcels of land up to the present. The witness testified that upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he was still small, about 3
years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That while Arturio was growing up, he
had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being taken care of by
Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad
wanted to get his father’s share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that
defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being the
brother and sister of his father. That the parents of his father and the defendants were
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That both his father, Inocentes Trinidad, and
mother, Felicidad Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father having
died in 1944 and his mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a
certificate of baptism which had been previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth
certificate was burned during World War 2 but he has a certificate of loss issued by
the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being
their nephew as his mother was already dead. Plaintiff’s mother died when he was 13
years old. They treated him well and provided for all his needs. He lived with
defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19, he left the house of the defendants and lived
on his own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited by
the defendants to live with them. So he and his wife and children lived with the
defendants. As proof that he and his family lived with the defendants when the latter
invited him to live with them, he presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B
where there appears his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiff’s daughter, his
uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family picture according to him. Another family
picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad,
carrying plaintiff’s son. According to him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his
wife and children were living with the defendants. That a few years after having lived
with them, the defendants made them vacate the house for he requested for partition
of the land to get his share. He moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to handle his
case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which parcel 1 is an
upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest
is 100 coconuts every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The
boundaries are: East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo
Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree
and 1 bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are:
East-Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio; West-Patricio Trinidad and
SouthGregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad,
the deceased father of the defendants and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans
two times a years [sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio
Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an
area of 540 square meters is the subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No.
703310 with reference to one of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to
Anastacia Briones, one-half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No.
863 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad
married to Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while
parcel 2 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and
another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad
while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were
getting the share in the produce of the land like coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff
further testified that his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad
Molato. They were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay.
When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan,
plaintiff answered he does not know because he was not yet born at that time. That
he does not have the death certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was
wartime. That after the death of his father, he lived with his mother and when his
mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and uncle, the defendants in this case. That
during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother receiving the share of the produce
of the land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and
they have no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioner’s] highest educational
attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed
and a resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the defendants,
Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They being his first cousins because the mother of
Lourdes and Felix by the name of Anastacia Briones and his father are sister and
brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and Lourdes
and he is already dead. According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940
and at the time of his death Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he knew this
fact because at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing with
his aunt, “Nanay Taya,” referring to Anastacia Briones who is mother of the
defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the
time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his
aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with his children before 1940 for only 3 months. When
asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with anybody before his death, he
answered, “That I do not know,” neither does he kn[o]w a person by the name of
Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he can recall if during the lifetime of
Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had
lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro Briones, answered that he could not recall
because he was then in Manila working. That after the war, he had gone back to the
house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always visit[s] her every
Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if after
the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the
defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones,
answered: “I do not know about that.”
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan, he started to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property of their father
was located there. When asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the
subject matter of this case before the court, witness answered that he does not know.
What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is the
eldest. And that at the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940, according to the
witness when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was around 65 years old. That
according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead before the war.
When asked on cross examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was buried
when he died in 1940, witness answered that he was buried in their own land
because the Japanese forces were roaming around the place. When confronted with
Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture of the plaintiff and the defendants,
witness was able to identify the lady in the picture, which had been marked as Exhibit
A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as
Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad, he said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES
TRINIDAD. She stated that she is 75 years old, single and jobless. She testified that
Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already dead and he died in 1941 in
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That before the death of her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, he
had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in 1941.
According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes Trinidad,
lived only for 15 days before he died. While his brother was in Manila, witness
testified she was not aware that he had married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived
in Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get married. When asked if she knew one by the
name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered she knew her because Felicidad Molato
was staying in Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her
brother, Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife.
When asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she said, ‘Yes,’ but she denied
that Arturio Trinidad had lived with them. According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did
not live with the defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the name of Maria
Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died already. When asked by the
court if there had been an instance when the plaintiff had lived with her even for days,
witness answered, he did not. When further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her
in her house, witness also said, ‘He did not.’
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her
parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes
Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already
dead, she is the only remaining daughter of the spouses Patricio Trinidad and
Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix
Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same manner that her brother,
Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and children. She herself testified that she
does not have any family of her own for she has [no] husband or children. According
to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in their private lot in
Tigayon because nobody will carry his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of
Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t]
could not be true that Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke
out in December 1941 and March 1941 was still peace time, the witness could not
answer the question. When she was presented with Exhibit A which is the alleged
family picture wherein she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she
answered; ‘Yes.’ And the child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio
Trinidad. According to her, she was only requested to hold this child to be brought to
the church because she will be baptized and that the baptism took place in the parish
church of Kalibo. When asked if there was a party, she answered; ‘Maybe there was.’
When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the picture carrying the child,
witness identified herself and explained that she was requested to bring the child to
the church and that the picture taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad
and the latter’s child was taken during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not
have a case in court yet. She likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child
marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix. When asked if the child being carried by
her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff, witness answered she does
not know because her eyes are already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to identify
the woman in the picture who was at the right of the child held by her brother, Felix,
and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife, witness
answered that she cannot identify because she had a poor eyesight neither can she
identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture for the same
reason. When asked by counsel for the plaintiff if she knows that the one who took
this picture was the son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad who was
also their cousin, witness testified that she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that
she knew Arturio Trinidad because he was her neighbor in Tigayon. In the same
manner that she also knew the defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all
surnamed Trinidad because they were her cousins. She testified that a few months
after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lola’s house whose name was
Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost
in his lifetime in Manila and he went home only when his father fetched him in Manila
because he was already sick. That according to her, about 1 1/2 months after his
arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that she knew
Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes
Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died. According to
her she was born in 1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke
out. When asked if she can remember that it was only in the early months of the year
1943 when the Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She further
testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their private lot because Kalibo was
then occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be buried
in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old
and a resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that x x x she knew both the
[petitioner] and the [private respondents] in this case very well as her house is only
around 200 meters from them. When asked if it is true that according to Lourdes
Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15
days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year because he died in the
year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a
house which is only across the street from her house. According to the said rebuttal
witness, it is not true that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the
name of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington,
Aklan. That she knew this fact because she was personally present when couple was
married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived
from Manila he was in good physical condition. That she knew both Inocentes
Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics but that according to her, their marriage
was solemnized by a Protestant minister and she was one of the sponsors. That
during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and
Felix Trinidad were also present.

When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not
able to present a marriage contract of his parents but instead a certification dated
September 5, 1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of births,
deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were destroyed during
the Japanese time.”
Respondent Court’s Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes
Trinidad, Respondent Court ruled:14
“We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient
evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to
claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument, or that he was in continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the
defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One
witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad
married Felicidad Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized by
a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n.
Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the marriage, nor
of Inocentes’ acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
Where one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property
without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14,
1958) acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497). Admittedly, the defendants
have been in possession of the parcels of land involved in the concept of owners
since their father died in 1940. Even if possession be counted from 1964, when
plaintiff attained the age of majority, still, defendants possessed the land for more
than ten (10) years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription
(Article 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines).”
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:15
“1.Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence
the marriage of his parents.
2.Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to
prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private respondents
(defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3.Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of the
Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the Family Code
became effective on August 3, 1988.
4.Whether or not petitioner’s status as a legitimate child can be attacked collaterally
by the private respondents.
5.Whether or not private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired
ownership of the properties in question by acquisitive prescription.”
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1.Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents’ marriage and of his
filiation?
2.Was petitioner’s status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the
action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?
The Court’s Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricio’s real properties
requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent’s
estate.16 His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born
during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother
(Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was
successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision
and Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate court’s assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court
is not a trier of facts. But in the face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate
and the trial courts, such rule does not apply here. So, we had to meticulously pore
over the records and the evidence adduced in this case.17
Petitioner’s first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were
validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage. This,
according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias18 ruled that when the question of whether a
marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute
competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public
and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and
the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such
nuptial in subsequent documents.19
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification20 from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost,
burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact,
however, is not fatal to petitioner’s case. Although the marriage contract is considered
the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof
that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place.21
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel
Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and
Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who
testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage.
Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of
the local parent-teachers’ association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad’s house
twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away.22 On July 21, 1943,
Gerardo dropped by Inocentes’ house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She
also attended petitioner’s baptismal party held at the same house.23 Her testimony
constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting marriage.24 It further gives rise
to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.25 Petitioner also
presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were
named as the child’s father and mother.26
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
“ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth
appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation
shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.”27
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy,
Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil., 1988 ed., p. 246]”
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family
by either consanguinity or affinity,32 her testimony does not constitute family
reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish
petitioner’s legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates
over private respondents’ self-serving negations. In sum, private respondents’ thesis
is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents’
witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the
estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery
in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the Japanese forces. His testimony, however,
is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months, and
his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive:33
“ At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or not?
Q:

A: Not married.
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification28 that records relative to his birth were
either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?
to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two
family pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardo’s testimony. A: I was staying with them.

The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second Q: When you said ‘them,’ to whom are you referring to [sic]?
daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2)
carrying petitioner’s first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioner’s first child x x x      x x x      x x x
(Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they
do not directly prove petitioner’s filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad an
accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes’ legitimate son ante litem motam. children before 1940?

Lourdes’ denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that A:
Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioner’s daughter, she demurred Q:
that she did so only because she was requested to carry the child before she was
baptized.29 When shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother—but not
petitioner, his wife and the couple’s children—slyly explaining that she could not A:
clearly see because of an alleged eye defect.30
Q:
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of A:
“the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws” to show Q:
pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:31
“What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an A:
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by ‘any other means
Q:
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,’ according to the Civil Code, or ‘by
evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,’ according to the Family
Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a A:
family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof Q:
For only three months.
Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do
you know if he had cohabited with anybody before his death?
[T]hat I do not know.
You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
No, sir.
Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known
of anybody with whom he has lived as husband and wife?
I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt
Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
Yes, sir.
How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
x x x      x x x      x x x
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody
who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes
Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.”
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that, when the
Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to
Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia
Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in March 1941, one and a half
months after his return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a
resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes.34
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not
convinced that Inocentes died in March 1941.35 The Japanese forces occupied Manila only on
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that, when the
Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to
Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia
Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in March 1941, one and a half
months after his return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a
resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes.34
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the
bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes
died in March 1941.35 The Japanese forces occupied Manila only on January 2,
1942;36 thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only
then that local residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery in Kalibo,
because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area.37
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes’ surname (Trinidad) without
objection from private respondents—a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes’
legitimate child.38
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side
outweighs that of the adverse party. 39 Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly
written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Court’s holding that petitioner failed to
prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the
preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
their interest or want thereof, and their personal credibility.40 Applying this rule, the
trial court significantly and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in
petitioner’s favor. It declared:
“x x x [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the
status of being their nephew x x x before plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a
family of his own where later on he started demanding for the partition of the share of
his father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the defendants x x x is
shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family pictures were
taken at a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his father’s share. x
x x x His demand for the partition of the share of his father provoked the ire of the
defendants, thus, they disowned him as their nephew. x x x x In this case, the plaintiff
enjoyed the continuous possession of a status of the child of the alleged father by the
direct acts of the defendants themselves, which status was only broken when plaintiff
demanded for the partition x x x as he was already having a family of his own. x x x x.
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes
Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the
preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo,
who is the barrio captain. This witness was already 77 years old at the time she
testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer
and the court sized her up as a civic minded person. She has nothing to gain in this
case as compared to the witness for the defendants who are either cousin or nephew
of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant, Lourdes Trinidad,
being already 75 years old, has no husband nor children.”41
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. 42 Rather than rely on this
axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his parents’
marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to
petitioner’s cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription
Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the
interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the
co-ownership, and because private respondents had been in possession—in the
concept of owners—of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they
acquired ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the
property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one
benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. 43
Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-
owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner,
in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the
produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by
private respondents was beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their
repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioner’s father Inocentes over the land.
Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in their father’s name. Although
private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not
shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still,
they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court held:44
“x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to
the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription
is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In the other
words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532
[1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other
co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other
co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs.
IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]. On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to
be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165
SCRA 118 [1988]).”

Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding

that petitioner’s claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court’s decision dated July 4,
1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, decision and resolution reversed and set aside. Decision of court a
quo reinstated.

Note.—A co-owner is entitled to a written notice from selling co-owner in order to

remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions as well as its efficacy
and status. (Verdad vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 593 [1996])
 G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
respondent.
Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; The Supreme Court holds that paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.—This case
concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree,
and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised
is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage. x x x We
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is unanimous in holding that paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.—We are unanimous in
our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also
to remarry.
Same; Same; Same; The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.—We state
the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There
is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case,
when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it,
the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
Civil Procedure; Declaratory Relief; Requisites of a Petition for Declaratory Relief.—
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Br. 23.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for respondent.
     Public Attorney’s Office for respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its
Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.”3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by
him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. 5
Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation.
The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order
or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also
adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution
of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity
to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The
issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators
in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the “Family Code,” which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented
by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1.The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able
to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2.This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11
In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The
wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced
by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can
thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:
1.There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2.A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced”
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges
of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it
would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would
still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted
by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that
his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry
as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient
to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as
an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution set aside.
Note.—The accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the
Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy. (Diego
vs. Castillo, 436 SCRA 67 [2004]).
G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
respondent.
Civil Registry; Correction of Entries in Birth Certificates; Clerical Error Law
(R.A. No. 9048); R.A. No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors—Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.—The determination of a
person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look
to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic
Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction
or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Same; Same; The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of
the Civil Code; The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.—Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a
correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code
and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles
407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408.
The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths;
(4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated
under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
Same; Same; Intersexuality; Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH); Words and
Phrases; During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term “intersexuality” to
apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female—an
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female
sexes.—Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
“inappropriate” appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with
this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX
chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral
opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female;
(2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear
male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty.
About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH. CAH is one of many
conditions that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term “intersexuality” to apply to human beings who cannot be classified
as either male or female. The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality “is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be
neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is
not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such
rigid classification.—Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different
cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to
either a male or female gender role. Since the rise of modern medical science in
Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had
their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals. More
commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a “disorder” which is
almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking
lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the
category of either male or female. In deciding this case, we consider the
compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial. “It has been suggested that there is
some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who
are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female.’” The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but
this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex; Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive—it is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed.—Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently
and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition.
Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system
naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent
has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male. Ultimately, we are of
the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender
of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To the person with Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health,
and to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation.—In the absence of a law
on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately
private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to
undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will
not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in
order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to
undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as
society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is
the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to
the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial
choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court
affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of
being a male.
Same; Same; Names; There is merit in the change of name of a person with
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) where the same is the consequence of the
recognition of his preferred gender.—As for respondent’s change of name under Rule
103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences
that will follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform
with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Siniloan,
Laguna, Br. 33.
  
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for petitioner.
  Edgard N. Smith for respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely
questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision1 dated January 12, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan
and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the
name “Jennifer Cagandahan” changed to “Jeff Cagandahan” and (2) gender from
“female” to “male.”
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess
both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to
have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound
where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed
that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no
breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus,
she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court.
The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s
condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally and she has two sex organs—female and male. He testified that this
condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack
of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that
respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender
because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and
the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which
reads:
“The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to
the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear
and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that
petitioner’s body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action
and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and
wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby
ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal
certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.”3
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of
the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE
NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
 CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE
OF “SEX” OR “GENDER” IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT’S
MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT
MAKE HER A “MALE.”4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of
entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female
to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from
“Jennifer” to “Jeff,” under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section
3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not
implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is
fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of
such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 6 The
OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth
certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make
her a male.7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of
Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth
Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition,
the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in
the course of the proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his
birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, 9 change of sex or
gender is allowed under Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the
requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue.—A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition
to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of
Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition.—A petition for change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his
behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner’s name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing.—If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance,
the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for
the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of
general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date
set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within
four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing.—Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on
behalf of the Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment.—Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the
order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the
petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing
the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with
the prayer of the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment.—Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this
rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court
issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.—Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations;
(h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election,
loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings.—The court in which the proceedings is brought
may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order.—After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy
of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate
the same in his record.”
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent’s petition did not
implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be
made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had. 12
Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the
same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. 13
The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and
all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,15 Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the
matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108
when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides:
“ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.”
Together with Article 37616 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic
Act No. 904817 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction
or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex
is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
“ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.”
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or “inappropriate”
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition
produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX
chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral
opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female;
(2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear
male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty.
About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions21 that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the term “intersexuality” to apply to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female.22 The term is now of widespread use.
According to Wikipedia, intersexuality “is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may
have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.”
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most
societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or
female gender role.23 Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies,
some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia
surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.24 More commonly, an
intersex individual is considered as suffering from a “disorder” which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication
in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. “It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a
‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female.’ ”25
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances
when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis
for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on
medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other
than female, then a change in the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition.
Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system
naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent
has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering
that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural
steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has
already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone
treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,26 to force his body into the
categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has
instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his
male characteristics.
respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment of RTC of Siniloan, Laguna, Br. 33 affirmed.
Notes.—The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization
which serves to distinguish him from all others—this symbol is his name. The
appropriate remedy for change of name is covered by Rule 103, a separate and
distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in
the civil registry. (Republic vs. Capote, 514 SCRA 76 [2007])
No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of
sex reassignment. (Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373 [2007])

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will
the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit
the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path
of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an “incompetent”27 and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals
with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. 28 The trial court’s
grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a
feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s
change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
 G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007.*
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Change of Name; The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification; A change of name is a privilege, not a right.—
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of
name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides: ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
Same; Clerical Error Law (RA 9048); Administrative Law; Jurisdictions; RA 9048 now
governs the change of first name, and vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned; The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied—in
sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.—RA 9048 now governs the change of first
name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name
to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form
and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Sex Change; A change of name does not alter one’s
legal capacity or civil status—RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on
the ground of sex reassignment.— Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his
first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible
with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person
can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show,
or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name.
Same; Same; A petition in the trial court in so far as it prays for change of first name
is not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should be filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, namely, where the birth certificate is kept.—The
petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed
with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue
was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
Same; Same; Sex Change; No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate
as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment; Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil
registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error—it is
a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.—Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
x x x      x x x      x x x (3) “Clerical or typographical error” refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) Under
RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of
the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction; No reasonable
interpretation of Art. 407 of the Civil Code can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment; To correct simply means “to make or
set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute.”—The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on
the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.” The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal
situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of
his age, nationality and his family membership.—“Status” refers to the circumstances
affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a
person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. The status of a
person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent
in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include
such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. (emphasis
supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and
family relations—it is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status; There is no
such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.—A
person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status
shall be governed by special laws. But there is no such special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Register Law (Act 3753); Under the Civil Register
Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth—thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant;
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable.—Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical
record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time
of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; When words are not
defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent; The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used
in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other
laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there
being no legislative intent to the contrary; Sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of
structure and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction
between male and female”; The words “male” and “female” in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment; While
a person may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason.— When words are not defined in a statute they are to be
given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and
laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to
the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male
and female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the
sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words
“male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that
sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” Since the statutory language of
the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it
cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through
surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category “female.” For these reasons, while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern
surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the
entries in his birth certificate.
Same; Same; Same; Marriage; To grant the changes in name and sex sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and
family relations—it will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone
sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).—The changes
sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but
petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws
on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition
were to be granted.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; Article 9 of the Civil
Code which mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law” is not a license for courts to
engage in judicial legislation; In our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition
of the effects of sex reassignment.—It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates
that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage
in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statutebased.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege; The Supreme Court cannot enact a
law where no law exists.—To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for
change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where
they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and
what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for
this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law
on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal,
but the remedies involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.—Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also
entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams.” No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences
and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Benito R. Cuesta for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondent.
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male
and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices
coming from inside the bamboo. “Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!,” the
voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo
cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other
was a female. Amihan named the man “Malakas” (Strong) and the woman “Maganda”
(Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with
regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name
and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment
surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for
the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded
the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as “male.”
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the
United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a “woman” culminated on
January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic
and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto”
to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and
his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:
“Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG]
has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering
the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth
of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from “Rommel Jacinto” to MELY
and petitioner’s gender from “Male” to FEMALE.”5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no law allowing
the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of
sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case
No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name
Cannot Be Changed On the
Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of
name and sex. As found by the trial court:
“Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex.” (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he
became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of
name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:
“ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.”
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular,
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
“SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname.—No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without
a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.”
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:
“SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname.—The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1)The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2)The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3)The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought
he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not
alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result
of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s
first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have
been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It
was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue
was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name doe snot
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry
In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On
the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides:
“ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.”

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048
in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removedfrom the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to
substantialchanges and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographicalerror” is:
“SECTION 2. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
     x x x      x x x      x x x
(3) “Clerical or typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance
of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth
or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex
of the petitioner.” (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
“ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.”
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of
the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of
sex reassignment.
To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from”
while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute.”26 The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts
(such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization),
events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees
(such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction,
judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and
judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws.
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article
407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total
of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27
“The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term
status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity
to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.”28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides:
“ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.”
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioner’scause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
“SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births.—The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent
of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be
sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician
or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts:
(a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may
be required in the regulations to be issued.
x x x      x x x      x x x” (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth. 29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,”
“male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and
ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection,
sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female”32 or “the distinction between male and female.” 33 Female is “the
sex that produces ova or bears young”34 and male is “the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.”35 Thus, the words “male” and “female” in
everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are employed in a statute which had at the
time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the
context compels to the contrary.”36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register
Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that
the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that
allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category
“female.”
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth
Certificate As to First Name or Sex
Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no
harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but
petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws
on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition
were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty
of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in
this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what
grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall
be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing
the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person
may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has
no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot
enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its
co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly
into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for
them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
     Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—Petitions for adoption and change of name have no relation to each
other, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any
common question of fact or law—in short, they do not rightly meet the underlying test
of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under the Rules. (Republic vs.
Hernandez, 253 SCRA 509 [1996])
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and
reasonable cause for which the change is sought. Legitimate children shall principally
use the surname of their father. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 138
[1998])
The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to
distinguish him from all others—this symbol is his name. (Republic vs. Capote, 514
SCRA 76 [2007])
 G.R. No. 187462. June 1, 2016.*
RAQUEL G. KHO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and VERONICA
B. KHO, respondents.
Civil Law; Marriages; Marriage License; Article 58 of the Civil Code makes
explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by
the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but
not those under Article 75.—Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75. Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1)
marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages
in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5)
religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7)
mixed marriages. Petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage does not fall under any of
these exceptions.
Same; Same; Same; The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license
under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.—Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence
of the marriage contract. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage
license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage. Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a
marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
Same; Same; Same; To be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence or such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.—
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar
that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. Indeed, all the evidence cited
by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract
was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. As cited
above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional
character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner’s and
respondent’s marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Cebu City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Cenesio Gavan for petitioner.
 
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and
January 14, 2009, respectively, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA
Decision reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner’s
favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private
respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by
herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the
Petition allege as follows:
 
x x x x
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner’s parents summoned one
Eusebio Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer,
instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were
required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to
take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from
witnessing the marriage ceremony;
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage
ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00 o’clock before dawn of June 1,
1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just
situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance
only finished at around 2:00 o’clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for
marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in
connection with the procurement of a marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the
treasurer’s office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31,
1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the
actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license
therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized
on even date null and void for want of the most essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner’s and Respondent’s marriage
aforestated was solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void
from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the
requirement of such marriage license;
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on
June 1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect.
x x x x 4
 
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license
issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June
1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack
of cause of action because there is no evidence to prove petitioner’s allegation that
their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on the
contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil
registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented before their marriage
was solemnized.
Upon petitioner’s request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the
RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their
respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage
contracted between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and
void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the
Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar for proper registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.
SO ORDERED.7
 
The RTC found that petitioner’s evidence sufficiently established the absence of the
requisite marriage license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the
CA promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing thus:
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25
September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the
petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and
subsisting for all intents and purposes.
SO ORDERED.8
 
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between
the contending parties, there is a presumption that a marriage license was
issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such
presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the
marriage certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in
the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties’
marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 but the CA denied it in
its Resolution dated January 14, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
 
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED “ETHICAL DIMENSION” TO PETITIONER’S CAUSE,
ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN
REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS
MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE
OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS
APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING PETITIONER’S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING
WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT’S JUDGMENT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A
NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.10
 
Petitioner’s basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of
the CA to give due credence to petitioner’s evidence which established the absence
or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner and respondent’s marriage was
solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not on the basis
of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as
ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a
procedural question by arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the present
petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into these
issues in a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing
law and prevailing jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is the
question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which is a question of fact
and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.11
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was
indeed a marriage license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting.
Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. 12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union.
Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage
as a contract, to wit:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.13
 
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. 14 Under the Civil Code,
marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising
Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point
of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages;
(4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner’s and
respondent’s marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without
the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the
marriage contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license
under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.16 Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is
the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a
marriage license which they presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage
was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity
of marriage and that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed,
this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional policy which
protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar
of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is
sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is
clearly in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.18 There, it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage
license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. 19 It was further held
that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that
it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage
was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar “has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in
favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972.”21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification,
the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been
overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is
valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not
able to discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating
priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent
could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives and
Records Section, where information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of
issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do so.
The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC’s agreement with petitioner’s
observation that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as
respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was conducted but
neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner
and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent’s categorical claim that she and
petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence to
prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.23
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar, coupled with respondent’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage
license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a
total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the
marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage
license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the
corresponding marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner’s evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the
basis of this Court’s ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local
civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage license, must
categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent
search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court
considered the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due
search and inability to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the
absence of a categorical statement that “such document does not exist in their
records despite diligent search.” The Court, citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry
as to the purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that
there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the above stated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee
Cariño,27 this Court considered the marriage of the petitioner and her deceased
husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the local
civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that
the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is
undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-
Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the
ruling in Republic v. CA,30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a
marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued by the local
civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as
the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration,
nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court does not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover,
in the said case, this Court ruled that:
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence
to the contrary. We held, “The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.” No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. x x x31
 
In all the above mentioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the
absence of the subject marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by
a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties.32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence
of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning,
except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code.
As earlier stated, petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may
well be that his motives are less than pure — that he seeks a way out of his marriage
to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must
be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is
clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009,
respectively, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated
September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Brion,** J., On Leave.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally
examine the marriage license presented. (Tupal vs. Rojo, 717 SCRA 236 [2014])
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for the issuance
of a marriage license, the Supreme Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise
of police power by the government; All the law requires is for would-be spouses to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition.
(Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146 [2014])
 G.R. No. 182438. July 2, 2014.*
RENE RONULO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Performing Illegal Marriage Ceremony; Article 352 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony.—Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority
of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In
the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged “blessing” by
the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an “illegal marriage ceremony”
which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
Same; Same; While Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, does not specifically define a “marriage ceremony” and what constitutes its
“illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these
matters.—While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a
“marriage ceremony” and what constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6
of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from
Article 55 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 of the
Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 6 of the Family Code provides
that “[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; A judge may
examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test
the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth.—The petitioner’s allegation that
the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuade us. A
judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to
draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support
or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if
the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to
destroy the theory of one party.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; No prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required.—We also do not agree with the petitioner that
the principle of separation of church and State precludes the State from qualifying the
church “blessing” into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation,
this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it
provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is
required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in
conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core
requirements of law be observed.
Constitutional Law; Marriages; Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested.—We emphasize at this point that Article 15 of the Constitution
recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based
on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its
constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it
is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and
mockery of marriage.
 
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Reynaldo A. Corpuz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Fr. Rene
Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008 decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-
G.R. CR No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC)
Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that[3] Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were
scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish
Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage
upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse,
Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalog, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown,
together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent
Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested
the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed
despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same
date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their
parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.[4]
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.[5]
     The petitioner entered the plea of “not guilty” to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents
of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor
in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She
also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a
document.[6] She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the
marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took
pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given
to her by Joey.[7]
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare
during the ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.[8] Days after the
wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage
license was issued to the couple.[9]
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of
blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as
contemplated by law.[10]
The MTC’s Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, and imposed on him a P200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No.
3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage
ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple
as husband and wife.[11] It further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony
without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC
which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The
MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation
of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be
promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for
violation of the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine
in the amount of P200.00.[12]
The RTC’s Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances
surrounding the act of the petitioner in “blessing” the couple unmistakably show that a
marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the
prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative
statements.[13] The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section
39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA’s Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is
no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides
minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the
solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each other as husband
and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.[14] According to the
CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a
marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.[15]
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or
found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.[16]
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is
Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be
promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds:
First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define what
constitutes “an illegal marriage ceremony.” Assuming that a marriage ceremony
principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of
the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take
each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration
in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
solemnizing officer.[17] The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to
prove that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife.[18]
Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot
interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore,
the State cannot convert the “blessing” into a “marriage ceremony.”[19]
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the “blessing” in
good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.[20]
Fourth, the nonfiling of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350
of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.
[21]
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The
present case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was
not found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.[22]
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
were proven by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime
are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an
illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged “blessing” by
the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an “illegal marriage ceremony”
which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a “marriage
ceremony” and what constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the
Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from Article
55[23] of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3[24] of the
Marriage Law with no substantial amendments.
Article 6[25] of the Family Code provides that “[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for
the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the
contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife.”[26]
Pertinently, Article 3(3)[27] mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly
defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the
rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the
minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the
personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and
second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take
each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before
him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find
that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the
testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take
each other as husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to
Florida fails to persuade us. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He
may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to
extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that
testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It
cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to
reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.[28]
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its
failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s
admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony
that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as
husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and
wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the
defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had
any ill motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and
State precludes the State from qualifying the church “blessing” into a marriage
ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly
preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives
any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites,
subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 15[29] of the Constitution recognizes marriage
as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional
policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its
power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of
marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a
marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with.
While the petitioner may view this merely as a “blessing,” the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this “blessing”
into a “marriage ceremony” as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this
marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is
the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner
admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the
“blessing” of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that
the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The
marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence
of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates
his criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage
ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the
requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the nonfiling of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal
liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an
element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this
provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of
the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44
which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage.—Any priest or minister solemnizing
marriage without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or
who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when
called upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons
having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or
sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications previous to
the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the
immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any
officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be
punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by
a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos.
[emphasis ours]
 
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause.—Any violation of any provision of this Act not
specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
[emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and
the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section
44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.
As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of
the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of
the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On
this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613
which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated
by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted
after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of P200.00 pursuant to
Section 44 of the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Petition denied.
 
Notes.—The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing
officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age. (Abbas vs. Abbas, 689 SCRA 646 [2013])

The certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. (Id.)