G.R. No.

150758             February 18, 2004 On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner 
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
vs.
maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an
AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the
second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed judgment.
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter
was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, 3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner,
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The Information,5 which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in
lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the
existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that
his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which
the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of
the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6 Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom
he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each
other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that
he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify
from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and
Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the
existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes,
dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City
Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by
the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; 17 and (2) a certification issued by the City
Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro
and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage
contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court
provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract
plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November
10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics
Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3,
1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no
marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of
such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as
to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage.
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would
indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart
from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are
Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first
marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage
had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first
marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is
significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil
Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both
documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration
of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was
subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails
to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that
the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To
our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is
null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage
that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability
for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an
individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between
spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites
for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into
essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence
of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license,
and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). 24 Under Article 5 of the Family
Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by
petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted
the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal
effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. 28 There is therefore a recognition written
into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this
case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a
third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this
is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the
act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State
does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of
which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the
foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy
is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner
Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel
provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present
case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May
14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the
marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground
of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina
of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result
of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that
he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and
void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer
live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
 1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence,
the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on
personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as
a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long
haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there
is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it
is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for
each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
 A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive
of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided
to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding
Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court
takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting
discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject
to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other —
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]

DIANA M. BARCELONA,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R.

BENGZON, respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision1 as well as the 7 August The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine
1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals the existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in
affirmed the Order2 dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch one case must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case, there is no litis
106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first
respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because there is no final
violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied decision on the merits.
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Issues
The Facts
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition
for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case
I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first petition) before the Regional Trial Court of
MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
Quezon City, Branch 87. 3 On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition
which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS TERMINATION AND STATUS.4
petitioner Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24471 (second
petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial court).
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second
petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular The petition has no merit.
No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to
which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action

The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order (first
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is untenable.
order) deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing.
A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the
Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the trial court, through Pairing
plaintiff.5A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a
Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order (second order) denying the
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an
motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the ground
obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant
for dismissal is the complaints failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such
violates the right of the plaintiff.6cräläwvirtualibräry
fact solely from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a
perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent
Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the
claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge Pison declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. 7 The petition
explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil Case No. alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross
Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed without prejudice. Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached to the petition.
The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana
Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of
March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978.
Appeals assailing the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order
The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of
denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such
the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital
obligations in this manner:
Hence, this petition.
xxx
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent,
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house.
deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint states a cause of She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the whole day.
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial courts second order
corrected the situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court in effect
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the
denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the
sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her
second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and
on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily
leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from
petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy another
room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea and
explanation could dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the
petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in
Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the
respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents favor through
an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The separation in fact between
the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The extrajudicial
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an
integral part hereof.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted
up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological
examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent
is void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.
xxx.8cräläwvirtualibräry
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. 9 Ultimate facts refer to the principal,
determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action rests. The term
does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the
material elements.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner Diana relies mainly  on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals  as well as
11 12
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.13 Santos gave life to the phrase psychological
incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by defining the term in this wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in cases
for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.14cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth
in Santosand Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective because it
fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also
fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the
marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any
reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the
marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological
incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new Rules).15 Specifically,
Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 16 The
obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the
petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine
the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to
allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to
allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and control
the human body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know about the root
causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological disorders are still
unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the
new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of
psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second petition complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo,
the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in
violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action,
it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving
the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits
of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can
furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt
Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action,
the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions
has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial dismissal did not also amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of
Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied) non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and
dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits all the factual averments in the complaint.18 Given the hypothetically The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to keep
admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render judgment over the case. the peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened before service of
answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since respondent Tadeo
had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently filed
Forum Shopping
the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision
on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate of non-
forum shopping which does not mention the filing of the first petition and its dismissal without
Circular No. 04-94,23 now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, must be
prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94. 19 Petitioner Diana refers to this portion of Circular No. 04-
interpreted and applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the Circular to
94-
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The Circular should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal
1. The plaintiff, Petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a possible.24cräläwvirtualibräry
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the
following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social institution
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any
and the foundation of the family that the state cherishes and protects. 25 In rendering this
other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending
Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether the marriage is void based on
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any
Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial on the merits
such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must
where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. We
state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding
are merely holding that, based on the allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
alleges a cause of action and does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second
tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or
petition is not subject to attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.
agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been
filed.20cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well as the
Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of non-forum
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
shopping that he had previously commenced a similar action based on the same grounds with
the same prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum shopping should have stated the fact of
termination of the first petition or its status. SO ORDERED.

The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to the
petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself constitutes a
violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the dismissal of the complaint or
petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of substantial compliance
applies to the contents of the certification.21cräläwvirtualibräry

In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the
omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same parties and
issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:

xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not
constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the
dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to be
prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum
Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme
Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of
procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.

[G.R. NO. 157610 : October 19, 2007]
ORLANDO G. TONGOL, Petitioner, v. FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245,
and its Resolution of March 19, 2003, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The CA
Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
149, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by herein petitioner
Orlando Tongol.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August 27,
1967. Out of their union, they begot four children, namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia, born in
1969; Frederick, born in 1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.
On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, which was granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over the objection of the
latter's family; their marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued
interference and attempt to break up their union; greatly influenced by her parents, Filipinas,
even at the early stages of their marriage, already treated Orlando with contempt and without
the love and respect due him as her husband; when Orlando started a junk shop business,
Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving him encouragement; later on, his business became
successful and he was able to embark upon another business venture; he put up a
pharmaceutical company which also became profitable; Filipinas then became interested and
began to interfere in the operation of the business; however, because of her bad attitude, the
employees were aloof; she also resented the fact that her husband got along well with the
employees; as a result, she quarreled with her husband causing the latter embarrassment; she
even suspected that the income of the business was being given to her husband's relatives; their
continued fighting persisted and affected their children; efforts at reconciliation proved futile
because their differences had become irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in 1990,
Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses filed a petition for
dissolution of their property relationship; and the petition was granted in 1995.
In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been
fruitless and that their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed
because it is Orlando who is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married
man.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of
Annaliza Guevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol.
Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological
examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing their marriage, the birth of
their four children, the RTC decision granting the petition for dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the spouses'
psychological examination. On the other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas only
consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the
petition.
On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
1. "WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA. CECILIA VILLEGAS FAILED TO
STATE WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S INADEQUATE PERSONALITY DISORDER
WAS GRAVE, PERMANENT AND INCURABLE" (par. 12, p. 3, Annex "A", hereof).
2. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL" (p. 7, ibid.).
3. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" (Annex "B", hereof).2
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case is enough to sustain a finding that herein respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,3 the term psychological incapacity was defined as:
[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x4
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) Gravity - It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence - It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; andcralawlibrary
(c) Incurability - It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.5
While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals and Molina,6 wherein the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 7 of
the Family Code was laid down, this Court finds it significant to reproduce the same quoted
portion, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x
x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.8
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,9 which took effect on March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines have been modified.
Section 2(d) of the said Rule provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
xxx
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of Q - What exactly do you mean [by] inadequate personality disorder?cra lawlibrary
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged.
A - Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times that in all aspects of her life, she
could not function in the way that she feels or she is confident. She has always been very much
The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor General, stating therein his in doubt of her own capabilities, Sir.
reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. Attachment of expert opinions to the
petition is also dispensed with.
Q - What about hysterical coloring?cra lawlibrary

In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of the examining
A - Hysterical coloring means, there is always an exaggeration of her psychological reactions to
psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas, that respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder.
any stresses, Sir.
However, both courts ruled that the behavior exhibited by respondent does not amount to
psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Q - Exaggeration in what aspect?cra lawlibrary
This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC and the CA for the
following reasons: A - Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if she would be seeing the
husband talking to some employees then, she is suddenly irritable and would present some
tantrums. In short, she cannot control her emotion at the moment of stresses circulations, Sir.11
First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who made the following written
evaluation regarding respondent's psychological makeup:
When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's capacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage, Dr. Villegas expounded as follows:
xxx

ATTY. RENDOR -
On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a matriarchal family where the
mother assumed a more active and dominant role. She was left to the care of her aunt and
developed a basic feeling a (sic) rejection. xxx

The only college graduate among 7 children her operating intellectual ability is low-average.
Sudden change overwhelmed her. When seized by an impulse, she is likely to give way, even
minor pressures upset her and when this happens, emotional control could not be relied upon.
In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their employees, especially with
females, she became (sic) suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and this is related to her basic
feelings of rejection in early life. She coped (sic) up with her uncomfortable feelings by exhibiting
temper tantrums, irritability and dominance, a replica of her mother's attitude, but to the distaste
of her husband.
Q - How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your findings?cra lawlibrary
A - Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she finished commerce. Basically, she has a feeling of
rejection from the start of her development and this was carried on into her adult life. When the
husband started having some good relationship with his employees, then she started to get
jealous and she would embarrass him in front of their employees and insulted him and would go
into tantrums and this was very much resented by Mr. Tongol, Sir.
ATTY. RENDOR -

At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the expectation of further
Q - In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you tell us the reason why Mrs. Tongol acted in such a
rejection. Additionally, she is threatened by a neurological illness (tremor of the hands) for which
way?cra lawlibrary
she is consulting a neurologist.

A - Because of her basic rejection at that time, Sir. She was afraid that Mr. Tongol was already
Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr. Orlando Tongol is
rejecting her as a wife and being attracted to other people, but it is the way of how Mrs. Tongol
suffering from some depressive features, which seems to be a recent development as a result of
reacted to her own feelings of rejection, Sir.
marital problems. On the other hand, Mrs. Tongol is suffering from an Inadequate Personality
Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which renders her psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage. She is unable to cope with the sudden work and xxx
environmental shifts, that overwhelmed her, due to insufficient psychological inner resources.10
Q - What made you say that because of inadequate personality disorder, Mrs. Tongol rendered
In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's personality disorder in this wise: her psychological (sic) incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the marriage.
What is your basis in saying that?cra lawlibrary
ATTY. VILLAREAL -
A - She belongs to a very matriarchal family. The mother was very dominant. She always gets
what she wanted in the house. In short, she was the authority in the house and during her
xxx
growing up stage, she was given up to the aunt, for the aunt to take care of her. She only came
back to the family when she was already a sort of an early teenager. With this, there has always
been a feeling of rejection during her personality development. Besides, she feels that she is
one of those not favor (sic) by the mother during her growing up stage, Sir.
Q - Based on your examination of the spouses, what do you recommend as far as the marriage
is concerned, considering that this is a petition for the annulment of marriage?cra lawlibrary
A - I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings
from (sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less
permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some depression, Sir.12
The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of Dr. Villegas that as a child,
Filipinas had always felt rejected, especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those
feelings of rejection even when she became an adult and got married; that her fits of jealousy
and temper tantrums, every time she sees her husband having a good interaction with their
employees, are ways of coping up with her feelings of rejection. However, Dr. Villegas failed to
link respondent's personality disorder to her conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform her obligations as wife and mother. The Court cannot see how
respondent's personality disorder which, according to Dr. Villegas, is inextricably linked to her
feelings of rejection, would render her unaware of the essential marital obligations, or to borrow
the terms used in Santos, "to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." What has been
established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of inadequacy and rejection,
respondent not only encounters a lot of difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her
obligations towards her husband, such as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court
has ruled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.13 As held in Santos:
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.14
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of
respondent is grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Petitioner contends that respondent's exaggerated reactions to normal situations, her
unreasonable feelings of rejection brought about by her dysfunctional upbringing, are all
indications of the gravity of her psychological condition. Even granting that respondent's
psychological disorder is serious, the fact remains that there is no evidence to prove that such
condition is of such nature as to render respondent incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation nor
in her testimony did Dr. Villegas categorically and conclusively characterize respondent's
inadequate personality disorder as permanent or incurable. Dr. Villegas was not sure of the
permanence or incurability of respondent's illness as shown by her following statement:
I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from
(sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent
and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some depression, Sir.15 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant
to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.16 The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the
psychological incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In the present case, the testimonies of both
petitioner and respondent as well as the other witnesses regarding the spouses' differences and
misunderstanding basically revolve around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the
management of their business. In fact, respondent herself, in her Memorandum submitted to the
trial court, claimed that their quarrels arose solely from their disagreement on how to run their
business.17 This is confirmed by the testimony of petitioner's sister who lived with the spouses for
a considerable period of time.18 However, a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.19
In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under the
Family Code include the mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and
provide support for the family, which means that compliance with this obligation necessarily
entails the management of the income and expenses of the household. While disagreements on
money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one's marriage as to make the
wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground to declare a marriage null and void. In the
present case, respondent's disagreement with her husband's handling of the family's business
and finances and her propensity to start a fight with petitioner spouse regarding these matters
can hardly be considered as a manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the
fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence
between husbands and wives.
Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also one's
obligation toward their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that
respondent had been remiss in performing her obligations toward their children as enumerated
in Article 220 of the Family Code.20
It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. 21 It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. 22 It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 23 In the instant case, the Court finds no error in the
findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the aversive behavior of petitioner and
respondent towards each other is a mere indication of incompatibility brought about by their
different family backgrounds as well as their attitudes, which developed after their marriage.
In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological
disorder.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
However, the totality of the evidence presented in the present case does not show that her
personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as
jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its
recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution.24 Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision and March 19, 2003
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in
the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court
of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa,
Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds
they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each
other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back
and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first
night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined
during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a
together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated
by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of
during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant erection. (Exh. "2-C")
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking
chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not
same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was
he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or
no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even
five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why
his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time.
While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage
entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt.
show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow
Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished
pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her,
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil
the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency
Registrar of Manila.
status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

SO ORDERED.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be
annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
Hence, the instant petition.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled
I
and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can
be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science. in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse
between the parties without making any findings of fact.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the II
reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have
sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses
her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with
forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
III
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to
pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
consummate their marriage.
IV
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very
young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
 in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has
the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for
the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might
have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
— why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to
March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The
fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the
action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court
is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
physical disorder as stated above.
complaint shall always be proved.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court
had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is
party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
prove such a claim.
intercourse between them.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled.
This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of
both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he
did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did
it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife,
'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599,
 cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she
would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten
months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who
has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative
of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is
— a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-
way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but
for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, 
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted
by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the
controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision  1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second
was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan
Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a
total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to
her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file
her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where
she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased
and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5and 2) a certification dated March 9,
1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO
CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969.
Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number
from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal
purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half
of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4
Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY
IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE
OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED
AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully man, 17 -
entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the deceased.
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of contributions ...”
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,  13 renders the marriage void
ab initio. 14
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children
fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that
the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
therefore in order.
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license. The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by
is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
is not one of them.
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
of the household.
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the
spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are
void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of
thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case,
both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject
SO ORDERED.
“death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and
the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,  20 where the Court awarded one-half of
the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife,
holding that:

“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s
share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in
the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in
the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing
property regime.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,  22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code,
clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition
precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to
contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first
marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second
marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because
the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money
anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is
necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that
would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the
court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the
marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the
applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family
Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
 ROMERO, J.:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of
discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.

On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of
Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at
the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with
Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous
marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing;
she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued
them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia
and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual
vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been
unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her
personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was
cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of
her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter
appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he
failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on
account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and
of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all
properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore,
superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which is in his
possession.

On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to
dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:

Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a

man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court
of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish
the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100
Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case
there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with
herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993 void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be
judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,  of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms,
vs. thus:
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
MOISES R. AVERA, respondents. And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can
 be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316,
326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from
the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the
aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that
petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue
that may be determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On
September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner
fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case
of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court
do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases
dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for separation
of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation
and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon
proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or
not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid
duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this
proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles
48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage
such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction,
the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the
remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an
adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover
certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP.
No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private
respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his
own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP
No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition
should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the
separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the
former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As
such, it is from the beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their
marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases
where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however,
dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there
would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether
that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the
same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's
share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the
nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need
for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government
Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied
the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a
declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her
deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no
force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted
her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted
what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry
again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only
void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above
provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked  void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for
himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is
needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified
to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice
Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they
still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does
it include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage
is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in
some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice
Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require
first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages,
with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable
marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which
the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then
the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if
they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the
provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral
defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea
in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the
marriage is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added
that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof.
Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption
that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right
to raise the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability
is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no
judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken
up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a
suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that
Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of
remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final
judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except
as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will
not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
 For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one
enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment
declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the
original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again.
With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries
again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the
recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who
was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and
living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter
remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner
submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to
allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word
"solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise
intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state
"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . .
.," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage,
thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case
of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the
erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children
and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party
who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another
marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was
an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage,
why should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute
nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other
than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." 20 In more
explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of
the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the
purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of
both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a
contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more.
Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on
very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and
far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant
institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts
definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be
contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family
Code to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how,
when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the
petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-
J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term
"solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for
purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a
final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely"
instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP
unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil No. 1989-J.
action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In
such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated
clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he
February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits that all the
properties were acquired with private respondent's money.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage
such as the separation of their properties."

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall
provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
G.R. No. 167109             February 6, 2007
and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following: FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
BRAGANZA, Respondents.

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the

case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of
the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse
who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875
dated August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between
respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well
as the Resolution3 dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan.4 Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988.5

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall
be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of
property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be
separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family
Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the
separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to
reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's
properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in
Calasiao, Pangasinan.6Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7 against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was
allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the merits ensued.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and against
defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is declared
null and void ab initio;
 2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral
damages the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, including costs of this
suit; and
3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property
donated is ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.
SO ORDERED. 10
Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No. D-
10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE
NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;
II.
WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED
MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12
Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought
embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to
address her grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation.
She claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage
void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral
marriages.13
The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. However, this
issue may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual issues of whether the
petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and
whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the
case,14 there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when the findings of facts of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based.15
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando were
naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However,
after a careful review of the records, we note that other than the allegations in the complaint and
the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their
naturalization and divorce.
The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:
In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and testimonial evidence
she presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American citizens and had
this citizenship status when they secured their divorce decree in April 1988. We are not
therefore dealing in this case with Filipino citizens whose marital status is governed by the
Family Code and our Civil Code, but with American citizens who secured their divorce in the
U.S. and who are considered by their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x x16
Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or
contest the allegation in respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando were American
citizens at the time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of
naturalization and divorce.17 We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that
they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce
decree.18 It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.19
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 20 A divorce obtained abroad by
an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner.21 However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.22
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue
of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the
divorce decree becomes absolute. 23 In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the
marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini,
Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope, 24 and
the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.25
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of
Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that
petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest
nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might
subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest
in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this
subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were
married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can
file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest 27 and must be based on a cause
of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother
as it affects their successional rights.1awphi1.net

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically
provides:

SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —

(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it.
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary
to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign
law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the
amount of moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages from
₱200,000.00 to ₱25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition
to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its
proper disposition. No costs.