III.

—CONNEXIVE IMPLICATION AND THE

SYLLOGISM

B Y STORKS MOCALL

I T is a well-known fact that not all the valid moods of Aristotle's

syllogistic, and not all the relationships of the square of opposition,
can be directly reproduced in the classical theory of quantifica-

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tion. For example, a straight-forward translation of the mood
Darapti:
A115isC
AIlBis^t
Some A is C
would be the following :
(x) (Bx D Ox)
(x) (Bx D Ax)
(3 a;) (Ax. Cx)
and the theory of quantification recognizes no such valid argu-
ment, either as a principle of inference or as an implication.
Nor does it authorize the inference from ' all' to ' some ' :
(x) (Ax D Bx)
(3z) (Ax. Bx)
which figures in the square of opposition as the relation of
subalternation. In this paper will be presented a system of
predicate logic with quantifiers in which such arguments find
their place. First, however, two previous formalizations of
syllogistic will be noted.
Jan fcukasiewicz, in Aristotle's Syllogistic, is able to capture
all the valid moods of the Aristotelian logic in a formal system
which contains no quantifiers, but which instead takes as
primitive symbols the functions ' All. . . is . . . ' and ' Some . . .
is . . . '. However, as is pointed out by Smiley,1 Lukasiewicz's
system stands somewhat outside the main current of modern
logic, and Smiley himself proposes that we interpret syllogistic
within the framework of the logic of many-sorted quantification.
The suggestion is that we have variables of as many sorts as there
are ' kinds ' of individuals, each of these variables Tanging over a
separate domain. The domains may overlap and include one
1
T. J. Smiloy, ' Syllogism and quantification ', The Journal of Sy^mbolic
Logic (JSL) (1962), pp. 68-72.
346
 CONNEXTVE IMPLICATION AND THE SYLLOGISM 347

another ad lib., but must each be non-empty. Corresponding to

each sort of variable there is a ' sortal predicate ', true of just
those individuals within the range of the variable. If A is the
sortal predicate corresponding to the variable a, B that corres-
ponding to b, etc., then the Aristotelian A-, E-, I- and 0-
premisses may be translated into the following quantified forms :
All A is B (a)Ba
No A is B (a)~Ba

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Some A is B (3a)Ba
Some A is not B (3a)~ifa.
This is an admirable translation, validating within the logic of
many-sorted quantification all the Aristotelian moods and the
laws of the square of opposition. But in one respect Smiley's
proposed formal rendering of syllogistic seems less than wholly
satisfactory, and that is in the matter of existential import.
In the classical (single-sorted) theory of quantification the
inference from' All A is B ' to ' Some A is B' failed in the circum-
stance of there being no A's. Thus we could not infer the false
proposition ' Some unicorns have golden horns' from the true
proposition ' All unicorns have golden horns' (the latter being
vacuously true in the absence of unicorns). But, although
Smiley's syBtem seems at first sight to allow unrestricted passage
from A- to I-propositions, it does not in fact permit the above
inference ; nor is ' All unicorns have golden horns ' rendered by
' (u)Gu '. This is because of the restriction of non-emptiness on
the sortal domains. Hence Smiley's system actually imposes
just the same limitations upon the inference from' all' to ' some '
as does the classical theory, namely that the subject-term of the
A-proposition carry existential import.
Now in my opinion the inference from ' all' to ' some ' ought
to be valid unconditionally. Furthermore it does not seem to
me that ' Some unicorns have golden horns ' implies ' Unicorns
exist' any more than does ' All unicorns have golden horns'.
In fact the whole question of what inferences are logically valid
ought to be entirely independent of what things may or may not
exist—it would be ridiculous to think that the discovery of
unicorns in the mountains of the moon would affect the validity
of an inference. For this reason, philosophers who maintain
that Aristotelian logic is based upon a tacit or unexpressed
presupposition, namely that its terms designate non-empty
classes, or have existent exemplars, seem to me to be on the
wrong track. Aristotelian logic is concerned with inference,
not with existence. And, to put it bluntly, inferences in logic
348 s. MCCALL :
should remain valid in empty universes. If this is so, we should
tailor our logical systems accordingly.1
To see what type of system we need, let us put the clock back
to pre-Russellian times and examine the work of Hugh MacColl
in the last century.2 MacColl was the first logician to define
class-inclusion in terms of implication,3 and, armed with this
definition, he proceeded to base Aristotelian syllogistic upon
the logic of propositions. His method was as follows. Take any

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individual S at random out of the universe of discourse (which
need not be the universe of existent things), and let the propo-
sitional variable a mean ' S belongs to the class A '. Then, if
we represent implication by ' -*•' (MacColl used ' : ' ) , the
proposition ' All A is B ' will be denoted by ' a->- b ', and the
syllogistic mood Barbara (' If all B is C, and all A is B, then all
A is C ') by

The latter is a well-known law in the logic of propositions, related

to what is known as the law of the syllogism.* Furthermore,
the particular negative premiss ' Some A is not B' becomes in
MacColl's system ' S may belong to A without belonging to B ',
that is, ' It is not the case that S 's belonging to A implies S 's
belonging to B', that is ' ~ (a-»- b)'. In consequence the mood
Baroco (' If all B is C, and some A is not C, then some A is not
B') will be
[ (6-> c ) . ~ (o->- c) ]->-~ (a-y b ),
easily gotten from Barbara by antilogism. These moods hold
in the usual algebra of classes. But certain other Aristotelian
moods do not, e.g. Darapti, cited at the beginning of the paper,
and Felapton (' If no A is C, and all A is B, then some B is not
C). This is
[(a-»-~ c). (a->- 6)]->-~ (6->- c)
1
Shades of ' free ' logio (see K. Lambert, ' Explaining away singular
non-existence statements', Dialogue (1963), pp. 381-389, esp. p. 388). But
in this paper will be found a new doctrine of general existence, rather than
one of singular existence. For this distinction see H. S. Leonard, ' The
logio of existence ', Philosophical Studies (1956), p. 51.
1
For a general discussion of MacColl's logic, see the section on MacColl
in Paul Edwards' forthcoming Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
3
H. MacColl, ' Symbolic reasoning ', eight papers in Mum (1880-1906).
See also Russell's review of MacColl's Symbolic Logic and its Applications
in MTND (1906), pp. 255-260, in which Russell corrects his previous attribu-
tion of this innovation to Peano.
4
This name is usually reserved for the law (a->-6)->-[(6-».c)->(o->-c)].
 CONNEX1VE IMPLICATION AND THE SYLLOGISM 349

which by a variant of antilogism is equivalent to

[(6->- c). (a-> &)]->~ (a->~ c),
which in turn follows from Barbara if <~ (a-*~ c) (' Some A
is C ') follows from o-> c (' All A is C). In fact it can easily
be shown that all the valid Aristotelian moods are derivable from
recognized laws of propositional logio once the latter implication
is admitted.
The stumbling block of course is, that a->- c does not imply

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•~ (a-v-~ c) in any hitherto respectable system of logic. Even
in MacColTs system, which permits the derivation of the paradox
of strict implication that an impossible proposition implies any
proposition, the implication does not hold, since if a were an
impossible proposition (i.e. if A were empty) then a-*- c would be
true and ~ (a->-~ c) false. MacColl's solution to this difficulty
was to maintain that no class A, B, .. . was empty, so that no
proposition a, b, . . . would be impossible. This swelled the
ranks of his universe of discourse by the addition of numerous
classes of non-existent entities—the class of unicorns, of round
squares, etc.—and brought down on his head the rebuke of
Eussell, who held that all these latter classes were identical with
the null class.1 MacColl, however, had his own ideas about the
null class, and stoutly continued both to defend the presence of
non-entities in his universe, and to deny the truth of propositions
such as ' Every round square is a triangle '.2
Without entering into the controversy over whether the class
of unicorns is identical with the class of round squares, it may
be possible to give a solution to MacColl's difficulty along quite
different lines. Granted that if an impossible proposition
implied any proposition, then a-> c would not imply ~ (a->-~ c),
could we nevertheless not admit the validity of the latter if we
adopted a propositional logic which excluded the paradoxes of
strict implication ? This in fact will be the tack pursued here ;
we shall expound- a predicate logic with quantifiers based upon
what is known as connexive implication. For this species of
implication the thesis (a-vc)-»-~(a-t-~c) holds, so that, the
passage from ' All A is C' to ' Some A is C can be made un-
restrictedly, and the Aristotelian syllogistic placed squarely
within a single-sorted theory of quantification with no non-
emptiness presuppositions.
1
B. Russell, ' The existential import of propositions ', MDTD (1905),
pp. 398-401.
1
H. MacColl, ' The existential import of propositions ', Mnm (1906),
pp. 401-402, 578-680.
350 S. MCCALL :

Connexive implication is not new: its definition comes via

Sextus Empiricus.
And those who introduce the notion of connexion say that a
conditional is sound when the contradictory of ita consequent is
incompatible with its antecedent.1
It followB from this definition that no proposition ever con-
nexively implies its own negation, since it is never incompatible
with its own donble negation. Hence the thesis ~ {p-*-~ p)

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is connexive. Furthermore, the two connexive formulae JJ-> q
and p-yr^i q are mutually incompatible, since if p is incom-
patible with ~ q, it is not also incompatible with ~ ~ q.
Hence (j>-> q)-*-~ (:P"H>"~ 9) is a connexive thesis, and together
with ~ (p->r+j p) (since neither is a two-valued thesis) serves
to distinguish connexive implication sharply from material,
strict, intuitionist, ' rigorous ', and other known types of
implication. Further characteristics of connexive implication
include the rejection of the paradoxes of material and
strict implication, and the avoidance of what have come to
be known as the fallacies of relevance and necessity.2 The
properties of this species of implication have been investigated
in another paper by the author, and a formal system of connexive
implication constructed which is shown to be (a) consistent,
(b) independent of two-valued logic, (c) Post-complete.8 This
formal system, known as CGI, consists actually of the axiomatiza-
tion of the following truth-functional matrices for implication,
negation, and conjunction due to Angell,4 where the ' designated '
values are 1 and 2 :
—>•
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
* 1 1 4 3 4 1 1 2 3 4
* 2 4 1 4 3 2 2 1 4 3
3 1 4 1 4 3 3 4 3 4
4 4 1 4 1 4 4 3 4 3
1
Sextus, Hyp. Pyrrh. ii. 110-112, translated by W. and M. Kneale in
The Development of Logic (Oxford, 1962), p. 129. The definition itself
may be ChryBippus's.
1
For the latter see A. R. Anderson and N. D. Belnap,' The pure calculus
of entailment', JSL (1962), pp. 19-52. (Connexive implication actually
satisfies a stricter criterion of relevance than Anderson's and Belnap's—
for this see the paper cited in the next footnote.)
1
S. McCall, ' Connexive implication ', forthcoming in the JSL. Seejalso
the author's abstract, ' A new variety of implication ', JSL (1964), pp.
151-152.
* R. B. Angell, ' A prepositional logic with subjunctive conditionals',
JSL (1962), pp. 327-343.
 CONNEXIVE IMPLICATION AND THE SYLLOGISM 351

The axioms required are the following, together with the rules
of substitution, modus ponens, and adjunction, and with
' p v q ' denned as ' ~ (~ p .~q)' :
1. (!>->?)->• [(?->r)->(p->r)] 2. [(p-> p)-+q]-+ q
3. (p-*q)-+[(p.r)^-(r.q)] 4. (q . q)-+(p-+p)
5. [p.{q.r)]-+[q.(p.r)] 6. (?.?)->[(^ph(?.p)]
7. p-*\j>. (p.p)] 8. [(p-»~?).g]->~p
9. [p . ~ (p . ~ <?)]->- ? 10. ~yv(p.p)

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11. {~p V[(y-»> y)-> p] } V { [(p-+p) V (p-»-y)]->3)}
12. (p-> p) -><~ (j?->~ p).
This, then, is the underlying prepositional logic upon which
an ' Aristotelian' system of predicate logic will be built. It is not
proposed to give an axiomatic formulation of the system, but
merely to indicate some of the quantified theses which it contains,
and to give a consistency proof.
To begin with, quantified forms corresponding to the
Aristotelian premisses must be established. Those for the two
universal premisses will be the same as in the classical system,
namely (a;) (Ax-+ Bx) and (x) (.4x->-~ Bx), but ' Some A is
not B ' will be translated d la MacColl as
For some x, it is not the case that X'B being an A implies
X'B being a B,
namely (3x) ~ (Ax-^>- Bx), and similarly ' Some A is B ' will
be (3z)~ (Ax-+~ Bx).1 Given these quantified forms, the
Aristotelian square of opposition looks like this :
All^isB No^Lis-B
(x) {Ax-+ Bx) . (x) (Ax-+~ Bx)
>
Some A is B ^ ^ Some A is not B
[Ax->~ Bx) (3x)~ (Ax-y Bx)
The straight lines join contradictories, and the arrows denote
implication (the relation of subalternation). Note that the other
traditional relations of the square of opposition can be read off
from these. For example, the A- and E-premisses are contraries,
since if the A-premiss is true, the 0-premiss is false (by the
relation of contradiction), and hence the E-premiss, which
implies it, is false too (by modus tollens).
Now we must consider what theses of predicate logic are
needed to reproduce these relations in symbolic form. For the
1
It appears that another logician who has adopted this translation for
the I-premiss rather than the traditional (3a;) (Ax.Bx) is Czeiowski: see
T. KotarbiAski, Lef<ms sur Vhistoire it la logique (Paris, 1964), p. 242.
352 S. MCCALL :
contradictoriness of (a;) {Ax-+ Bx) and (3a;)~ {Ax^- Bx) we
plainly need the equivalence
(1) {lx)Fx^->~ (x)~ Fx.
This we may achieve by taking the universal quantifier as
logically primitive, and defining the existential quantifier in
terms of it in the usual way. Then, for the relation of subalter-
nation, we need two quantified theses and a rule of inference.
Our underlying connexive propositional logic provides us with

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the thesis
{Ax^y jBa;)-»-~ (Ax^>-^ Bx),
and applying the rule of inference we need, namely (2) the rule
of generalization, we obtain
(x) [(Ax-+ Bx)^y~ (Ax^-~ Bx)].
Next the following thesis is required :
(3) (x) (Fx^- Gx)^ [(x) Fx-+ {x) Gx],
using which we obtain
(3a) (a;) {Ax-+ Bx)^>- (a;)~ (Ax-+~ Bx).
Finally, making use of the transitivity of implication and the
following thesis:
(4) (x) Fx^ (3x) Fx,
we arrive at the relation of subalternation
(a;) (Ax-> Bx)^ (3a;) ~ (^b->-~ Bx).
Thus our predicate logic based upon the propositional system
CC1 will contain at least the theses and rule (l)-(4).
It is not difficult to prove that this predicate logic is consistent,
using Church's method.1 Essentially the method consists
in transforming each formula a containing predicate variables
A,B,.. . F,G,..., individual variables, x,y,. . . , and quantifiers,
into a pure formula T(a) of propositional logic, and testing the
latter on the four-valued connexive matrices. The method of
transformation is as follows. First omit all quantifiers from a.
Then replace every part of the form F(xv x2, . .. Xa), where F
is any n-place predicate, by a propositional variable not previously
occurring in a, according to the following rule. Replace two
parte F(xv x2, .. . Xa) and G(yv y2, . . . ym) by the same propo-
sitional variable if and only if F and G are the same predicate
(as is the case only when m =«). We now test T(a) by the truth-
matrices, and call a valid if and only if T(oc) is a four-valued
1
A. Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Princeton, 1966), p. 180.
 CONNEXIVE IMPLICATION AND THE SYLLOGISM 353

tautology. Since T(~a) = ~T(a), and since the matrices

permit no pair of four-valued tautologies T(a) and ~ T(a), we.
see that there can be no pair of valid formulae a and <~ a. Hence
the class of valid formulae is consistent.
It is easily verified that the formulae (1), (3) and (4) above are
valid, and that the rule (2) preserves validity. So does the rule
of modus ponens, since if a and a-»- /3 are valid, then T(a) and
T(a-+/9) are four-valued tautologies, but T(a->-£) = T(a)-> TQ3),
hence, since the matrices satisfy modus ponens, T(fi) is a tautology,

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hence /} is valid. As was stated earlier, it is not intended here to
produce an axiomatic system of predicate logic, though it is
worth noting that the two axiom-schemata which Church adds,
together with the rule of generalization, to two-valued prepo-
sitional logic in order to arrive at thefirst-orderpredicate calculus,
are both valid under the present interpretation.1 Care is called
for, however, since the following undesirable formula, which
would eliminate the difference between Fx and (x)Fx, is also
valid :
Fx-+ (x)Fx. (5)
Hence any complete axiomatization of a worthwhile system of
connexive predicate logic will have to involve showing the non-
derivability of (5).
Let us now recapitulate briefly. It was seen that a theory of
quantification could reproduce Aristotle's syllogisms directly
if the inference from ' All A is B' to ' Some A is B ' could be
accommodated simpliciter, without any existence hypotheses.
This was done by translating ' Some A is B ' as (3z)~ (Ax^>~
Bx) and using the connexive thesis (p-^>-c[)-+'^~'{p-+~q).
Finally a consistency proof for a theory of quantification based
on connexive logic was given. It is urged that this theory does
more justice to our intuitions concerning quantity than does the
classical theory—to this end we cite the unrestricted inference
from ' all' to ' some ', the consistency of the falsehood of the
proposition ' All round squares are triangles ', i.e. ~ (a;) \_(Rx-
Sx)—>- Tx], with the proposition ' There are no round squares ',
i.e. r^i (3a;) (Rx. Sx), and the contrariety of the propositions
' All unicorns have golden horns ' and ' No unicorns have golden
horns ', both of which are true on the classical theory.
In conclusion three points will be discussed, two of which are
prima facie objections to the views put forward here, while the
last lends them support. The first objection attempts to show
that certain inferences allowed by connexive predicate logic are
1
Church, p. 172.
354 s. MCCALL :

invalid. For example, let us start with the (true) premiss

' No miners havefoinnp.llp.fito the centre of the earth ' :x
(a) (x) (Mx^>~ Tx).
We then convert this E-proposition, obtaining
(6) (x) (Tx->~Mx).
The relation of subalternation yields
(c) (3x)~ (Tx-+ Mx),

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and we now rapidly obvert and convert to obtain
id) ( 3 z ) ~ (~Jtfz->~ Tx).
But this is absurd (it will be said), for the conclusion reads
' Some non-miners have tunnelled to the centre of the earth ',
and surely this is false. Softly, however. Looked at in a certain
way, it is perfectly true that some non-miners have tunnelled to
the centre of the earth. Which non-miners ? Why, those that
have tunnelled to the centre of the earth. The proposition
' Some beings that have tunnelled to the centre of the earth
have tunnelled to the centre of the earth ' is a truism. What is
not true is that there are some beings that have tunnelled to the
centre of the earth, i.e.
(e) (3x) Tx.
But whereas (e) would follow from ' Some non-miners have
tunnelled to the centre of the earth' in classical logic, (e) does
not follow from (d) in connexive logic. Hence the objection can
be turned aside.
The second objection is that it is not a logical truth in
connexive logic, though it ought to be, that green apples are
apples. That it is not a logical truth obtains from the fact that
the following formula is not valid :

which in turn derives from the circumstance of the law of

conjunctive simplification, (p. q)-+ p, failing in connexive
prepositional logic. The reason for this lies in the fuller scope
given to the notion of contrariety or opposition in connexive as
compared with classical logic. If (p . g)-> p were admitted in
connexive logic then (p .~p)-> p would follow, and also, by the
commutativity of conjunction, (p . ~ p)->~ p. But the latter
two propositions are contraries in connexive logic (though not in
1
This example ia taken from J. W. Miller's Syllabus of Introductory
Logic (mimeographed) (Montreal, 1962), p. 94.
 CONNEXIVE IMPLICATION AND THE SYLLOGISM 355

classical logic): if both were admitted, they would lead to a

contradiction via the law (p-± 5)->'~ (p->-~ q). Hence both
must be excluded, together with the law of conjunctive simplifi-
cation and the quantified formula (/). Those who regret losing
the logical truth about green apples being apples may be consoled
by the fact that they also thereby lose the contradiction which
would be produced by round squares being (i) round, (ii) square,
i.e. not round. The derivation proceeds as follows :

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(9) (x) [(Rx. Sx)-* Rx]
(h) ' (a;) [(Rx. Sx)^- Sx] Premisses
(*) (x) (Sa;^-~ Rx)
U) (x) [(Rx. Sx)-+~Rx] (h), (i)
(k) (x) (Fx^>- Ox)-* (x)~ (F a;->~ Gx) (3a) above
(I) ( x ) ~ [(Rx. Sx)-*~Rx 1 (9)> (*)
(m) ~ (3x) t(Jto . -Sx)^~Rx~ (l),(l) above
(») (3a;) [(i2z. <Sa;)->r~Rx\ (j), (4) above
Finally, support for the theory of' all' and' some ' propositions
given here comes from an unexpected quarter—the theory
indicates the solution to a pair of problems in inductive logic.
It has been suggested by some philosophers that induction may
usefully be regarded as the converse of deduction. Thus if a
yields /? by deductive reasoning, the truth of /3 may be regarded
as providing inductive confirmation of the truth of a. This
seems reasonable, but is not a model which the classical theory
of ' a l l ' and ' some ' propositions fits. To take a hackneyed
example, the proposition.' All swans are white ',
(o) (a;) {Sx-> Wx),
is considered to be provided inductive support by the propositions
' Odile is a swan and Odile is white', ' Ugduk is a swan and
Ugduk is white ', etc :
{p) So. Wo
{q) Su.Wu.
But note the sinister fact that (o) does not imply either {p) or (q),
even on the classical theory, so that here the model of induction
being the converse of deduction breaks down. The reason is
not far to seek. What provides partial confirmation of ' All
swans are white ' must be regarded as identical with that which
provides complete confirmation of ' Some swans are white',
and if this I-proposition is
(r) (3a;) (Sx . Wx),
356 8. MCCALL : CONNEXTVE IMPLICATION AND THE SYLLOGISM

then only propositions such as (p) and (q) can do the latter, so
that only propositions such as (p) and (q) can do the former. Of
course if we translate the I-proposition differently as
(«) ( 3 z ) ~ (&c->-~ Wx)
the whole picture changes. Individual observations which
provide partial confirmation of (o) and complete confirmation of
(s) will be of the form' If Odile is a swan then Odile is white ', etc.,
(«) So^ Wo,

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implied by (o) and implying (s) via
(u) ~ (&>->~ Wo).
Furthermore, letting propositions of the form (t), rather than
of the form (p), represent individual observations or samplings,
enables us to by-pass one particularly embarrassing problem in
the logic of confirmation. The proposition ' All swans are white '
is equivalent to ' All non-white things are non-swans ', namely
(«) (a;) ( ~ F a ; - * ~ Sx),
and the question is, does the discovery that Corax is a raven and
Corax is black,
(w) ~ We . ~ Sc,
provide confirmation for (o) ? This problem has been thrashed
over so long that it appears insoluble. But if a confirmatory
instance of (v), instead of being (w), were ' If Corax is not white,
then Corax is not a swan ',
(x) ~ Wc^~ Sc,
then things would look brighter, (x) is as much a confirmation of
(o) as (t) is, and the problem vanishes.
Makerere University College
Kampala, Uganda