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554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In re Atty. Marcial Edillon

AC-1928. August 3, 1978.*

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.

MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

Bar Integration; Attorneys; Disbarment; Payment of membership dues;

Integration of the Bar, its concept and purpose.—An “Integrated Bar” is a
State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do
his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to hear
his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. The
integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as
more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers.
Same; Same; Same; Police power; Integration of the Bar is a valid
exercise of police power of the State; Practice of law, nature of.—Apropos
to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration
of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise
of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not
a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public
interest because a

______________

* EN BANC.

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lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an
officer of the court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest,
the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the

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common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.

Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression
“affected with a public interest” is the equivalent of “subject to the exercise
of the police power”.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Supreme Court authorized to adopt rules
of court to effect integration of the Philippine Bar; Purposes of integration
of the Bar.—When, therefore. Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397
authorizing the Supreme Court to “adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit,” it
did so in the exercise of the paramount-police power of the State. The Act’s
avowal is to “raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.” Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act,
the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in
decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by
fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to
meet the demands of pressing public necessity. The State, in order to
promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal
liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare
of the State (U.S. Gomez, Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes,
“Salus populi eat suprema lex.” The public welfare is the supreme law. To
this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall
into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70, Phil. 726). It is an undoubted
power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all
individuals from some freedom.
Same; Same; Same; Practice of law and exercise of the legal
profession clothed with public interest and lawyers must be bound by such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for

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556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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the common good; Reasons.—Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered

upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the
power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as
might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to
the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not
have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Constitutionality and validity
of Bar integration sustained by explicit grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court under Art. X of the 1973 Constitution resting the Court with
plenary power in all cases regarding admistion to and supervision of the
practice of law.—But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar Integration in the Philippines is the
explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section
5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines. xxx Quite
apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act
(Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,

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and the admission to the practice of law,” it at once becomes indubitable

that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice
of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Membership dues; Effect of Bar integration
upon a lawyer’s freedom of association; Compelling a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar not violative of the constitutional freedom to
associate but the only compulsion a lawyer is subjected is the payment of
annual dues which is not violation of the Constitution; Compulsion upon a
lawyer if any justified by exercise of police power of the State; Reasons.—
The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is no violative of his constitution freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed

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the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an

official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar
Integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free
to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which
he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
professional in his fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program—the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision
does in a sense compel a lawyer to be member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
Same; Same; Same: Same; Same; Provisions of the Court Rule
requiring payment of membership dues by lawyers not violative of the
Constitution; The 1973 Constitution does not prohibit the Supreme Court
from requiring lawyers to pay reasonable membership fees; Nature of
membership fees.—The second issue posed by the respondent is that the
provision of the Court Rule repairing payment of a membership fee is void.
We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)—which power the respondent
acknowledges—from requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that
the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds
for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Enforcement of penalty
provisions for non-payment of membership dues not a deprivation of due
process; Reasons; Practice of law in the courts subject to regulation and
inquiry; Practice of law is not property right but mere privilege.—That
respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence
infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is

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property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practise of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
en-

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558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In re Atty. Marcial Edillon

titles the holder of a license to practise a profession, we do not here pause to

consider at length, as it is clear that under the police power of the State, and
under necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent’s right to practise law before the courts of this country should be
and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
imposed the fee as regulatory measure is recognized, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether
by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But we must here
emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; The
Supreme Court has power and jurisdiction to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys; Court’s jurisdiction provided for in the 1973
Constitution.—Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it
is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been
and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. The Court’s
jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it
explicitly granted to the Court the power to “promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice . . . . . . . and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar . . . . .” (Article X, Sec. 5[5]) The power to pass upon
the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule of Court 139-A and ByLaws of
the Integrated Bar providing for payment of membership dues are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal; Respondent lawyer disbarred and his name
striken from the Roll of Attorneys in the Supreme Court for repeated failure
to pay membership dues; Case at bar.—We thus reach the conclusion that
the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
x x x It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

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In re Atty. Marcial Edillon

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing

attorney in the Philippines.
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On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution
No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano
B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration
and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the
By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

“. . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29,
the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall
be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.”

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment

on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the
IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edition’s comment: on March
24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution.

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560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In re Atty. Marcial Edillon

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent’s

pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded.
The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of
1
Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) —in
accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated—
and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-
Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to
the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member’s name
from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III
of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to
issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule,
which reads:

“SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues.—Subject to the provisions of

Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.”

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP

is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

‘SECTION 1. Organization.—There is hereby organized an official national

body to be known as the ‘Integrated Bar of the Philippines,’ composed of all
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persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll
of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.”

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following

words of the Court Rule:

“SEC. 9. Membership dues.—Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay

such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. . . . .”

_____________

1 Adopted in the Supreme Court’s Resolution, promulgated on January 9, 1973,

ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines.

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The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions

constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he
is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of
the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court
to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the
said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but
is rather of an “administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
body.”
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court
relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come
up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the
practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the
license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in
a previous case before the Court, entitled “Administrative Case No.
526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.” The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was

“. . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the

arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
‘perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable’. . . .”

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Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

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An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every

lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share
in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear
his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body
of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual
fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
2
member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by
overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to
such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
3
personal convenience of individual lawyers.
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation
directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an
important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a
privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because
a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to

______________

2 114 A.L.R. 101.

3 Memorandum of Authorities on the Constitutionality of Bar Integration, cited in
the Report of the Commission Bar Integration on the Integration of the Philippine
Bar, Nov. 30, 1972; see also Supreme Court Resolution of January 9, 1973, ordaining
the integration of the Philippine Bar.

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In re Atty. Marcial Edillon

the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State—the administration of justice—as
4
an officer of the court. The practice of law being clothed with
public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree
of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts
explained, the expression “affected with a public interest” is the
equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police power” (Nebbia
vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
5
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397
authorizing the Supreme Court to “adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see
fit,” it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
State. The Act’s avowal is to “raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.” Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration
of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973,
and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution

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______________

4 In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark. 35, 259 S. W. 2d 114; Petition of Florida State
Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 134 Fla.
851, 186 So. 280; In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P. 665; Commonwealth ex rel.
Ward vs. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41 98 S. W. 2d 53; Ayres vs. Hadaway, 303 Mich. 589,
6 N. W. 2d 905; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195; Petition
for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; Clark vs.
Austin, 101 S. W. 2d 977; In Re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Assn., 133 Neb.
283, 275 N. W. 265, 114 A.L.R. 151; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 291; Baker vs.
Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E. 2d 90; In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185
Okla. 505, 95 P. 2d 113; State ex rel Rice vs. Cozad, 70 S. Dak. 193, 16 N. W. 2d 484;
Campbell vs. Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S. E. 2d
883; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404.
5 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR
AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, approved on September 17, 1971.

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564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No.

181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet
the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere
with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, “Salus
populi est supreme lex.” The public welfare is the supreme law. To
this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery,
but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726).
It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals
from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom. But the
most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and
validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit
unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section
5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which
reads:

“Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx
“(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Bar xxx”.

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

“SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.”

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Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even withoutthe
enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely tothe
language of the provision of the Constitution granting theSupreme
Court the power “to promulgate rules concerningpleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law,” it at once becomes indubitable thatthis constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court withplenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to andsupervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject
to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the
common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his
liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public
with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now
concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is
without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of
freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated 6
Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group

______________

6 In re Unification of New Hampsire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex.

550, 4P. 2d 643; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826; Railways Employes’ Dept.
vs. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 100 L. ed. 1112, 76 S. Ct. 714.

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of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the

7
Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
8
lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
9
regulatory program—the lawyers.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
10
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision
of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void.
We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the

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admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine

Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)—which power
the respondent acknowledges—from requiring members of a
privileged class,

______________

7 Diokno, Jose W., “Bar Integration—A Sword and a Shield for Justice” (Manor
Press, Q.C., 1962) p. 17.
8 Fellers, James, “Integration of the Bar—Aloha!”, Journal of the Am. Judicature
Society, Vol. 47, No. 11 (1964) p. 256.
9 Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donohue,
367 U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
10 Hill vs. State Bar of California, 97 P. 2d 236; Herron vs. State Bar of California,
24 Cal. 53, 147 P. 2d 543; Carpenter vs. State Bar of California, 211 Cal. 358, 295 P.
23; In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 So. 2d 398; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re
Platz, 60 Nev. 24, 108 P. 2d 858; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; Kelley
vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla. 282, 298 P. 623.

567

VOL. 84, AUGUST 3, 1978 567

In re Atty. Marcial Edillon

such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the

expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
11
purposes of integration.
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the
penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of
its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practise a
profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that
under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s
right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and
is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
12
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

______________

11 Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; In re Integration of Bar

of Hawaii, 432 P. 2d 887; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn.
195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Unification of New
Hampshire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; State Bar
of Oklahoma vs. McGhnee, 148 Okla. 219, 298 P. 580; Kelley vs. State Bar of
Oklahoma, 148 Okla. 282, 298 P. 623; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.
W. 2d 404.
12 In re Gibson, 4 P. 2d 643.
The following words of Justice Harlan are apposite: “The objection would make
every Governmental exaction the material of a ‘free speech’ issue. Even the income
tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been
dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his
conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet
been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.”
(Concurring opinion of Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., in Lathrop vs. Donohue,
367

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568

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In re Atty. Marcial Edillon

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a

13
property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer’s public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably
recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and
14
the authorities holding such are legion.
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the
report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: “The power to
regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not
depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which
is inherent in this court as a court—appropriate, indeed necessary, to
the proper administration of justice . . . the argument that this is an
arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting
from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It
has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an
unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the
ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the
public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is
itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. .
.”
The Court’s jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power

_______________

U.S. 820, 6 L.ed. 2 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826, citing Cardozo, J., with Brandeis and
Stone, JJ., concurring, in Hamilton vs. Regents of Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245,
79 L.ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197.)
13 In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291.
14 Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re Aguas, 1 Phil. 1, and others.

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VOL. 84, AUGUST 3, 1978 569

In re Atty. Marcial Edillon

to “promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . . . and the

admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . . .
.” (Article X, Sec 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court
139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense
of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he

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is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from

the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

     Fernando Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz

Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero,
JJ., concur.

Respondent disbarred.

Notes.—A contract for attorney’s fees cannot be used as a cloak

for an exorbitant exaction. If after receipt of such amount by the
attorney, the petitioner is still required to deposit a sum for the same
purpose, clearly there would be an exorbitant exaction. The test
certainly is one of fairness, and in that sense the due process clause
can be relied upon to protect an attorney’s client. (A.D. Santos, Inc.
vs. C.I.R, 72 SCRA 230; Bachrach vs. Golingco, 39 Phil. 139).
An attorney must establish a clear right to his claim for attorney’s
fees before he may be entitled to a writ of mandatory injunction for
deposit of his alleged fees in court. (Integrated Construction
Services, Inc. vs. Relova, 65 SCRA 638).
Where there is no valid reason to investigate a complaint against
a lawyer, after the complainant filed an affidavit of desistance, the
case will be dismissed. (Santiago vs. Bustamante, 76 SCRA 527).
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining the organization of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the By-laws

570

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Orlino vs. Philippine National Bank

of the IBP did not withdraw from the courts the authority to
investigate and decide complaints against erring members of the Bar.
(In re: Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1).
An attorney abuses his right of recourse to the Supreme Court
where he files multiple petitions for the same cause in false
expectation of getting a favorable action from one division as
against the adverse action of the other division. (Cabagul vs. Court
of Appeals, 67 SCRA 299).

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