Tax Exemptions
• Province of Abra vs. Hernando, 107 SCRA 104 (1981)
• Abra Valley College vs. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106 (1988)
• CIR v DLSU, GR 196596, Nov 9, 2016
Double Taxation
• City of Manila v Cosmos Bottlin Company Corp. v GR 196681,
Jun 27, 2018
Due Process
• Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283
SCRA 31, Dec. 12, 1997
Substantive Due Process
• Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindanao, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)
• Knights of Rizal v DMCI Homes, Inc., GR 213948, Apr 25, 2017
• Evasco v Montanez, GR 199172, Feb 21, 2018
• Mayor Fernando v St. Scholastica’s College, GR 16107, May
12, 2013
Void for Vagueness/Over breadth
• Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19,
2001
• Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005
• Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v Anti-
Terrorism Council. 632 SCRA 146 (2010)
Province of Abra vs Judge Hernando, The Roman Catholic Bishop
of Bangued, Inc.
107 SCRA 104
FACTS: The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of The
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. Desirous of being exempted
from a real estate tax, the latter filed a petition for declaratory relief on
the ground that other than being exempted from payment of real estate
taxes, its properties are also “being actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious or charitable purposes as sources of support for the
bishop, the parish priest and his helpers.” After conducting a summary
hearing, respondent Judge Hernando granted the exemption without
hearing the side of petitioner. The petitioner then filed a motion to
dismiss but the same was denied. Hence, this present petition for
certiorari and mandamus alleging denial of procedural due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church in this case is
exempt from taxes.
HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the Constitution
provides that “charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit
cemeteries” are required that for the exemption of “lands, buildings, and
improvements,” they should not only be “exclusively” but also
“actually” and “directly” used for religious or charitable purposes.
There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands,
buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes to be
exempt from taxation. It has been the constant and uniform holding that
the exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so
that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence,
an exempting provision should be construed strictissimijuris. However,
in this case, there is no showing that the said properties are actually and
directly used for religious or charitable uses.
On the other hand, the respondent Judge, in his capacity to hear the case
at bar, would not have erred so grievously had he merely compared the
provisions of the present Constitution with that appearing in the 1935
Charter on the tax exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements."
There is a marked difference. Under the 1935 Constitution:
"Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation." The present Constitution added "charitable institutions,
mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and required that for the exemption
of "lands, buildings, and improvements," they should not only be
"exclusively" but also "actually and "directly" used for religious or
charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The change
should not be ignored. It clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to
accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case
immediately in favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to
abide by the constitutional command of procedural due process. The
petition was granted. Respondent Judge, or whoever was acting on his
behalf, was ordered to hear the case on the merit.
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC., represented by PEDRO V.
BORGONIA vs. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First
Instance. et. al. [G.R. No. L-39086; June 15, 1988] Constitutional
Law| Power of Taxation
FACTS:
Abra Valley College is an educational corporation and institution of
higher learning in Bangued, Abra. In 1974, the CFI ordered for the
seizure and sale of the subject school property for non-payment of real
estate taxes and penalties. Private respondents stated that the college
lot and building in question are not only used for educational purposes
of the college, but also as the permanent residence of the President and
Director, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his family including his in-laws
and grandchildren; while the ground floor of the college building is
being used and rented by a commercial establishment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively
for educational purposes and thus exempted from paying taxes.
HELD:
The 1935 Philippine Constitution, Art. VI, par. 3 Sec. 22, expressly
grants exemption from realty taxes for “Cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable
or educational purposes….
Relative thereto, CA No. 470 as amended by RA No. 409, Sec. 54,
paragraph c otherwise known as the Assessment Law, provides:
The following are exempted from real property tax under the
Assessment Law:
(c) churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific or educational purposes.
Thus, the use of the second floor of the main building for residential
purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under
the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or
primary purpose–educational. The lease of the first floor, however, by
a commercial establishment cannot be considered incidental to the
purpose of education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the
conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built,
should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used
by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the
first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, vs. DE LA
SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC.
G.R. No. 196596, November 09, 2016
The Commissioner submits the following arguments:
DLSU's rental income is taxable regardless of how such income is
derived, used or disposed of. DLSU's operations of canteens and
bookstores within its campus even though exclusively serving the
university community do not negate income tax liability.
Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution and Section 30 (H) of
the Tax Code
“the income of whatever kind and character of [a non-stock
and non-profit educational institution] from any of [its] properties,
real or personal, or from any of (its] activities conducted for
profit regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to
tax imposed by this Code.”
The Commissioner posits that a tax-exempt organization like DLSU
is exempt only from property tax but not from income tax on the
rentals earned from property. Thus, DLSU's income from the
leases of its real properties is not exempt from taxation even if the
income would be used for educational purposes.41
DLSU stresses that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the
Constitution is clear that all assets and revenues of non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively
for educational purposes are exempt from taxes and duties.
ISSUE:
Whether DLSU's income and revenues proved to have been
used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes are
exempt from duties and taxes.
RULING: YES.
The requisites for availing the tax exemption under
Article XIV, Section 4 (3), namely: (1) the taxpayer falls under the
classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and
(2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes.
A plain reading of the Constitution would show that Article
XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require that the revenues and income
must have also been sourced from educational activities or activities
related to the purposes of an educational institution. The phrase all
revenues is unqualified by any reference to the source of revenues.
Thus, so long as the revenues and income are used actually, directly
and exclusively for educational purposes, then said revenues and
income shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
Thus, when a non-stock, non-profit educational institution
proves that it uses its revenues actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes, it shall be exempted from income tax, VAT,
and LBT. On the other hand, when it also shows that it uses its assets
in the form of real property for educational purposes, it shall be
exempted from RPT.
We further declare that the last paragraph of Section 30 of the
Tax Code is without force and effect for being contrary to the
Constitution insofar as it subjects to tax the income and revenues of
non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly
and exclusively for educational purpose. We make this declaration
in the exercise of and consistent with our duty to uphold the primacy
of the Constitution. We stress that our holding here pertains only to
non-stock, non-profit educational institutions and does not cover the
other exempt organizations under Section 30 of the Tax Code.
For all these reasons, we hold that the income and revenues
of DLSU proven to have been used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes are exempt from duties and
taxes.

Corona v UHPAP 283 SCRA 31
FACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) promulgated PPA-AO-
03-85, which embodied the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage
Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports.
The rules state that aspiring pilots must have a pilot license and train in
the outports for 3 months and in the Port of Manila for 4 months. Once
they have achieved satisfactory performance, they are given permanent
and regular appointments by the PPA to exercise harbor pilotage until
they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or
physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager.
However, on July 15 1992, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan
issued PPA-AO No. 04-92. This was implemented by providing
therein that all existing regular appointments which have been
previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall
remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments
to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be
only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to
yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance.
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association
and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas,
questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of
Transportation and Communication. DOTC Secretary Garcia refused
to decide on the case saying it was within jurisdiction of the Board of
PPA. Hence, Compas went to the Office of the President, which
dismissed the petition. The case was then brought to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, which ruled in favor of Compas and declared PPA-
AO No. 04-92 void for being in disregard of respondents’ right against
deprivation of property without due process of law.
ISSUES: W/N PPA-AO No. 04-92 is void for being in disregard of
respondents’ right against deprivation of property without due process
of law
HELD:
Yes, PPA-AO No. 04-92 is void and unconstitutional.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights states:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, x x x.
When one speaks of due process of law, it may refer to procedural or
substantive due process. Procedural due process refers to the method
or manner by which the law is enforced, while substantive due process
requires that the law itself, is fair, reasonable, and just.
Respondents argue that procedural due process was not observed
because no hearing was conducted where everyone could explain their
sides. But it is important to note that notice and hearing are essential
only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function.
In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as
issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply
with the requirements of notice and hearing. Since this case deals with
the issuance of an administrative order, which is clearly a legislative
function, a hearing was not required and there was no denial of
procedural due process.
On the other hand, respondents also argued that their right to the
exercise of their profession is a vested right and can only be withdrawn
after the observance of the constitutional mandate of substantive due
process of law. Pilotage as a profession is a property right. It is a
profession that can be practiced only after the issuance of a license.
Before acquiring such a license, the pilots had to go through 5 different
examinations followed by actual training and practice. This license is
in the form of an appointment, allowing them to engage in this
profession until they retire at 70 years of age. It is a vested right.
PPA-AO No. 04-92 does not ensure the pilots of any form of security.
It unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession
before their compulsory retirement. This administrative order forces
them to deal with an annual cancellation of their license which can be
temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their
performance evaluation. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation, which
primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally
infirm. It deprives the pilots of their property without due process of
law.
In conclusion, there is a denial of substantive due process but no denial
of procedural due process in this case.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
[39 PHIL 660; G.R. NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Facts:
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro.
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states
that “provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board”. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative
Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake
be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor.
Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order
No. 2, which says that the provincial governor has selected a site in the
sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the
Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of
Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including
those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were
ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake.
Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall
upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance
with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as
necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as
well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to
introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed
their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be
punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their
liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for
having run away form the reservation.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law.
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Held:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not
deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that
section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United
States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which

set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons
fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the
only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige
them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the
following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of
the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing
civilized customs among the Manguianes.

Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot

fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is,
indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires
an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen
is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and
the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process
of law has not been followed.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due
process of law. To constitute "due process of law," as has been often
held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances,
even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially
true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative
officers in applying a law to particular cases.

The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the

Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of
nationality. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine
Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole.
The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good
of the country.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of

their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Liabilities of Municipal Corporations: Authority to Demolish Nuisance Per Se
G.R. No. 213948 – Knights of Rizal v. DMCI
CARPIO, J.
Knights of Rizal filed an injunction against the construction of Torre de Manila claiming that
it was a nuisance per se despoiling the view of the Rizal Monument. DMCI claims that it has
obtained all the necessary permits and clearances for the said construction. The court
treated the petition as one for mandamus. It held that the mandamus cannot lie as there is
no law prohibiting the construction of Torre de Manila and thus no legal duty for the city
officials to prohibit the construction. The Torre de Manila cannot also be regarded as
nuisance per se as it had followed all the health and safety standards and was issued the
necessary permits by the City.
DOCTRINE
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila. What is not expressly or
impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs
and public order.
The Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. It cannot be considered as a "direct menace
to public health or safety.
FACTS
1. Sep. 1, 2011 - DMCI Project Developers Inc acquired a lot near Taft Avenue, Ermita
Manila earmarked for the construction of its Torre de Manila condominium project.
2. DMCI secured its Barangay Clearance and obtained a Zoning Permit from the City of
Manila's City Planning and Development Office (CPDO).
3. City of Manila's Office of the Building Official granted DMCI a Building Permit, allowing
it to build a 49 Storey w/ Basement & 2 penthouse Level Res'l./Condominium on the
property.
4. Jul. 24, 2012 - the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office
of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing
that the Torre de Manila will “rise up high above the back of the national monument, to
clearly dwarf the statue of our hero… and ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from
the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point.”
5. His opinion being sought by the building official, City Legal Officer dela Cruz stated in
a letter that there is "no legal justification for the temporary suspension of the Building
Permit issued in favor of [DMCI-PDI]" since the construction "lies outside the Luneta
Park" and was “too far to be a repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on
the artistic and historical significance”.
6. NHCP also maintained that the Torre de Manila project site is outside the boundaries
of the Rizal Park and well to the rear of the Rizal Monument, and cannot possibly
obstruct the frontal view of the National Monument.
7. City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its directive in Resolution
No. 121.
8. Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board
Resolution No. 06, recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's application for variance.
9. City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 5, Series of 2014, adopting Zoning Board
Resolution Nos. 06 and 06-A (amended resolution), confirming all issued permits,
licenses, and approvals issued by the City Council.
10. Sept. 12, 2014 – Knights of Rizal, an NGO created under RA 646, filed a petition for
injunction against the construction of Torre de Manila. One of its contentions is that the
project is a nuisance per se because "[t]he despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal
Monument is a situation that annoys or offends the senses' of every Filipino who honors
the memory of the National Hero Jose Rizal. It is a present, continuing, worsening and
aggravating status or condition. Being a nuisance per se, it deserves to be abated
summarily, even without need of judicial proceeding.
11. DMCI claims that an action for injunction is not the proper remedy for abatement of a
nuisance. It also asserts that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se as it
obtained all the necessary permits, licenses, clearances, and certificates for its
construction.
12. The Court in its resolution to treat the petition as one for mandamus.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. W/N the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila
to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project? NO.
a) There is no law prohibiting the construction of Torre de Manila.
 What is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act
is contrary to morals, customs and I public order. (Manila Electric Company v. PSC).
 It is the law itself - Articles 1306 and 1409(1) CC, which prescribes that acts not contrary
to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if also not contrary
to law.
o Here, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary
to morals, customs, and public order". On the contrary, the City of Manila has
determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent
laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.
 Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the "development of historic
sites and facilities." Section 48 regulates "large commercial signage and/or pylon."
o There is nothing in both Section that disallows the construction of a building
outside the boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect
the background of a historic site.
o Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument
and "cannot possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument."
o Likewise, Torre de Manila is not in an area that has been declared as an
"anthropological or archeological area" or in an area designated as a heritage
zone, cultural property, historical landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP.
 RA 10066 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009 empowers the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and
desist order "when the physical integrity of the national cultural treasures or important
cultural properties [is] found to be in danger of destruction or significant alteration from
its original state.
o Physical integrity refers to the structure itself - how strong and sound the structure
is. The same law does not mention that another project, not itself a heritage may
be the subject of a cease and desist order.
o Thus, it cannot apply to the Torre de Manila project.
b) Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
 Mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the
officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking
mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
 As there is nothing in Ordinance 8119 or any law prohibiting the said construction, there
is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila to consider he standards set under
Ordinance No. 8119, which are standards that can never be applied outside the
boundaries of Rizal Park.
o Mandamus will lie only if the officials of the City of Manila have a ministerial duty
to consider these standards to buildings outside of the Rizal Park. There can be
no such ministerial duty because these standards are not applicable to buildings
outside of the Rizal Park.
 The exercise of the Court’s extraordinary certiorari power can neither be invoked as it
is limited to actual cases and controversies that necessarily involve a violation of the
Constitution or the determination of the constitutionality or validity of a governmental
act or issuance. Specific violation of a statute that does not raise the issue of
constitutionality or validity of the statute.
 Dissenting Opinion: The City, by reason of a mistaken or erroneous construction of
its own Ordinance, had failed to consider its duties under [Ordinance No. 8119] when it
issued permits in DMCI-PDI's favor.
 Such is disproved by the MBZAA Zoning Resolutions.The power of the Court in
mandamus petitions does not extend "to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in
a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise
of either."
o Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily
in issuing the resolution (Fact #8), the Court should respect MZBAA's exercise of
discretion.
 Dissenting Opinion: City of Manila should reevaluate, through the CPDO, the permits
previously issued in favor of the Torre de Manila project to determine compliance with
the standards under Ordinance No. 8119. The circumstances in this case warrant the
pro hac vice conversion of the proceedings in the issuance of the permits into a
"contested case" necessitating notice and hearing with all the parties involved.
 The decision of the Court in this case cannot be pro hac vice because by mandate of
the law every decision of the Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If
another case comes up with the same facts as the present case, that case must be
decided in the same way as this case to comply with the constitutional mandate of equal
protection of the law.
 In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus to compel action in
matters involving judgment and discretion, only in cases where there has been a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
o Here, there can be no determination by this Court that the City of Manila had been
negligent or remiss in its duty under Ordinance No. 8119 considering that this
determination will involve questions of fact.
o Even the KOR could not point to any law that City of Manila had violated and could
only point to declarations of policies by the NHCP and the Venice Charter which
do not constitute clear legal bases for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
o The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the
preservation and restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It is not
a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as law.
 Though DMCI-PDI's Zoning Permit was granted without going through the process
under Ordinance No. 8119, such was rectified when City of Manila ratified the licenses
and permits already given to DMCI-PDI.
o Said ratification is a function of the City Council of Manila, an exercise of its
discretion and well within the authority granted it by law and the City's own
Ordinance No. 8119.
 The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience, and
welfare.
o There is no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm, danger,
or hazard to the people in the surrounding areas except that the building allegedly
poses an unsightly view on the taking of photos or the visual appreciation of the
Rizal Monument by locals and tourists.
o The approval of MBZAA and subsequent ratification by City Council must be taken
as duly authorized exercise of discretion by the city officials.
c) The KOR is Estopped from Questioning the Torre de Manila Construction.
 The KOR itself came up with the idea to build a structure right behind the Rizal
Monument that would dwarf the Rizal Monument. It proposed the building of a 129.25
meter high national theater right behind the monument in the mid 1950s. KOR also
proposed to build a Rizal Center on the park as recently as 2013.
 In contrast, the Torre de Manila is located well outside the Rizal Park, and to the rear
of the Rizal Monument - approximately 870 meters from the Rizal Monument and 3 0
meters from the edge of Rizal Park.
2. W/N the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per se? NO.
 Article 694 CC defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or
safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards
decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.
o 2 Kinds of nuisances:
1) nuisance per se - recognized as a nuisance under any and all
circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or
safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined
law of necessity.
2) nuisance per accidens - depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be
abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing in law constitutes a nuisance.
 The Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. It cannot be considered as a "direct
menace to public health or safety."
o Not only is a condominium project commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI
has, according to the proper government agencies, complied with health and
safety standards set by law.
o DMCI-PDI has also been granted the following permits and clearances: 1) Height
Clearance Permit from the Civil Aviation Authority; (2) Development Permit from
the HLURB; (3) Zoning Certification from the HLURB; (4) Cert. of Environmental
Compliance Commitment from DENR; (5) Barangay Clearance (6) Zoning Permit;
(7) Building Permit; (8) and Electrical and Mechanical Permit. DMCI-PDI also
obtained the right to build under a variance recommended by the MZBAA and
granted by the City Council of Manila.
 Neither is Torre de Manila a nuisance per accidens as now being claimed by KOR.
o The conditions and circumstances determining a nuisance per accidens must be
well established, not merely alleged. The Court cannot simply accept these
conditions and circumstances as established facts.
o The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find facts, to
estimate their force, and to apply rules of law to the case thus made. The Court is
no such authority and is not a trier of facts.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The TRO issued by the Court on 16 June
2015 is LIFTED effective immediately.

OTHER NOTES
DIGESTER: Sophia Sy
HON. FERNANDO vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE G.R NO. 161107,
MARCH 12, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent’s St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) and St. Scholastica’s
Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are educational institutions organized under
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal offices and business
addresses at Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West Drive, Marikina Heights,
Marikina City, respectively. Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land
measuring a total of 56, 306. 80 square meters, located in Marikina Heights and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located within the property
are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of Benedictine Order, the formation
house of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property
enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting
the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities and other improvements.
On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Marikina
City enacted Ordinance No. 192 entitled “Regulating the Construction of Fences and
Walls in The Municipality of Marikina. Sections 3.1 and 5 of the ordinance are
pertinent to the issue at hand, to wit:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed under
this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more
than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess
of one (1) meter shall be an open fence type, at
least eighty percent (80%) see-thru;
xxx xxxx xxx
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five
(5) meter parking area allowance located between the front monument line and
the building line of commercial and industrial establishments and educational
and religious institutions.
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina
property to make it 80% see-thru, and at the same time, to move it back about six
(6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park. On April 26, 2000, the
respondents requested for an extension of time to comply with the directive. In
response, the petitioners, through then City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the
enforcement of the subject Ordinance. The respondents filed a petition for prohibition
with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
arguing that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance
No. 192, asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
That demolishing their fence and constructing it 6 meters back would result in the loss
of at least 1, 803. 34 square meters, worth about P9, 041, 700.00, along West Drive,
and at least 1, 954. 02 square meters, worth roughly P9, 770, 100. 00, along East Drive.
The respondents, thus, asserted that the implementation of the ordinance on their
property would be tantamount to an appropriation of property without due process of
law; and that the petitioners could only appropriate a portion of their property through
eminent domain. They also pointed out that the goal of the provisions to deter lawless
elements and criminality did not exist as the solid concrete walls of the school had
served as sufficient protection for many years.
The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the ordinance was a
valid exercise of police power, by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights
for the protection of public safety, health, morals or the promotion of public
convenience and general prosperity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid
exercises of police power by the City Government of Marikina.
RULING:
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes
and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people. The State, through the legislature, has delegated the
exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State. This
delegation of police power is embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A No. 7160), known as the General Welfare Clause. Ordinance No. 192
was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise of its police
power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity,
two tests have been used by the Court – the rational relationship test and the strict
scrutiny test. We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis
of equal protection challenges.
“Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld
if they are rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Applying strict
scrutiny test, the focus is on the presence of compelling rather than substantial
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest. “
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test,
Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down for not being reasonably
necessary to accomplish the City’s purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of
private rights. Under the rational relationship test, local governments may be
considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the following
requisites are met:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require its exercise and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a
violation of the due process clause.
Setback Requirement
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback
requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the public, considering that
it would no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be
available for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
a provision on eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation. Regarding the beautification purpose of the
setback requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely
to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The Court, thus,
finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the
respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes.
Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
80% See-Thru Fence Requirement
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners must show
the reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights, and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is “to
discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts”. The
ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to ensure public safety
and security. The means employed by the petitioners, however, is not reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly oppressive to private
rights. The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to
this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide better protection and a higher
level of security, or serve as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid
concrete wall. Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with
the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which
necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their property. The
enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue interference with the
respondents’ rights to property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is, thus,
also invalid and cannot be enforced against the respondents.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is hereby
issued commanding the petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing or
implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended,
on the respondents’ property in question located in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila.
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN CASE DIGEST
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
FACTS:
On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal
Case No. 26558, finding probable cause that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
then the President of the Philippines has committed the offense of plunder, and
that he be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime
of Plunder). The petitioner contended that RA 7080 was unconstitutional, on the
grounds that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt”
standard in criminal prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, thus violating the
fundamental rights of the accused. The said law allegedly suffers from vagueness
on the terms it uses, particularly: ‘combination’, ‘series’, and ‘unwarranted’. Based
on this, the petitioner used the facial challenge to question the validity of RA
7080.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
2. WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder leads to its violation of the right of the
accused to due process.
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so,
whether it is within the power of Congress to classify it as such.
RULE:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law.
The over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of a possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.
Ong vs Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 126858 Sept. 16, 2005
ANALYSIS: Presumption of Innocence, Forfeiture Proceedings
1. NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the
employment of general terms or the failure to define the terms used FACTS:
therein. The validity of a law is sustained, so long as that law provides
some comprehensible guide as to what would render those subject to the
said law liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the void-for- Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-Affidavit,
vagueness doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to laws that claiming that petitioner Jose U. Ong, then Commissioner of the BIR,
merely consist of imprecise language. has amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful
2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal income.
prosecutions to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Thus he
is entitled to an acquittal unless the State succeeds in demonstrating the
guilt of the accused with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The contention Ong submitted an explanation and analysis of fund sourcing, reporting
that Sec. 4 of RA 7080 does away with proof of each and every his net worth covering the calendar years 1989 to 1991 and showing
component of the crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each his sources and uses of funds, the sources of the increase in his net
and every criminal act done, it is enough that the prosecution proves worth and his net worth as of December 13, 1991.
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the crime as a whole.
3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Ong filed a Counter-Affidavit, submitting his Statement of Assets and
The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 (which has been declared as Liabilities for the years 1988-1990, income tax return for 1988, bank
constitutionally valid in a previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous certificate showing that he obtained a loan from Allied Bank,
offense implies that it is a malum in se. certificate from SGV & Co. showing that he received retirement
benefits from the latter, a document entitled Acknowledgement of
CONCLUSION: Trust showing that he acquired one of the questioned assets for his
Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the brother-in-law, and other documents explaining the sources of funds
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
with which he acquired the questioned assets.

ISSUE:

Does the presumption of innocence apply to forfeiture proceedings?

RULING:
No. The presumption of innocence clause of the Constitution refers to
criminal prosecutions and not to forfeiture proceedings which are civil
actions in rem. The Constitution is likewise not violated by RA 1379
because statutes which declare that as a matter of law a particular
inference follows from the proof of a particular fact, one fact
becoming prima facie evidence of another, are not necessarily invalid,
the effect of the presumption being merely to shift the burden of proof
upon the adverse party.
The presumption of innocence clause is not violated by Sec. 2 of RA
1379 which states that property acquired by a public officer or
employee during his incumbency in an amount which is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to
his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired. As elaborated by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, under the principle of
presumption of innocence, it is merely required of the State to
establish a prima facie case, after which the burden of proof shifts to
the accused.
ONG v. SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 126858 Sep. 16, 2005 J.
Tinga
Petitioners: Jose Ong and Nelly Ong
Respondents: Sandiganbayan (3rd Division) and Office of the
Ombudsman
Summary
BIR Commissioner Ong challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 2 of
RA 1379, which creates a presumption of guilt in cases where the
value of the property is
disproportionate to the public officer’s lawful income. He alleged that
it violates the
presumption of innocence. SC said that in statutory crimes, no
constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by
the State of some material fact or facts shall constituteprima facie
evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant
for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are
committed without unlawful intention.
facts of the case:
BIR Commissioner Jose Ong was charged with violation of RA 1379
for allegedly amassing properties worth disproportionately more than
his lawful income. He was questioned on his acquisition of properties
totaling to P21.47M when his lawful income from public employment
and other sources only amounted to P1.06M. His annual salary was
only P200K.
In his counter-affidavit, he explained that his properties were lawfully
acquired; these were from his P7.8M retirement pay from SGV & Co.,
money market placements, proceeds of his loan from Allied Bank and
one property was from his brother-in-law.
The Office of the Ombudsman thereafter ordered him to submit in
writing the pertinent documents to prove his claim, i.e. documents on
loan availment, records of the retirement benefit, documents on money
market placements and ITR
Instead of complying with the Order, Ong filed a Motion alleging that
questioning the Order for being violative of his rt to be presumed
innocent. Motion was denied. In his petition before the SC, he raised
the ff. relevant
ARGUMENTS:
a.RA 1379 is unconstitutional for disregarding the presumption of
innocence
b.It also violates the right against self-incrimination
OSG: the presumption of innocence clause refers to criminal
prosecutions and not to forfeiture proceedings which are civil actions
in rem. The Constitution is likewise not violated by RA 1379 because
statutes which declare that as a matter of law a particular inference
follows from the proof of a particular fact, one fact becoming prima
facie evidence of another, are not necessarily invalid, the effect of the
presumption being merely to shift the burden of proof upon the
adverse party.
Issue: WON RA 1379 is unconstitutional
NO
Ratio:
1. It is well-within the rt of the legislature, in enacting statutory
crimes, to declare w/c act are criminal, as well as what proof
shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt Sec. 2 of RA 1379
which states that property acquired by a public officer or
employee during his incumbency in an amount which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer
or employee and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property shall be presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
2. As elaborated by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, under the principle of
presumption of innocence, it is merely required of the State to
establish a prima facie case, after which the burden of proof
shifts to the accused.
In People v. Alicante, it was already declared thatin case of statutory
crimes, no constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing
that proof by the State of some material fact or facts shall constitute
prima facie evidence of guilt , and that then the burden is shifted to the
defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent
and are committed without unlawful intention.
The State having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within
certain well defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts
shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima
facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden
of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not committed
with any criminal intent or intention.
3. The constitutional rt against self-incrimination is N/A hereThe
right is a prohibition against the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused. It is
simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
accused's own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt.
In this case, petitioners are not compelled to present themselves as
witnesses in rebutting the presumption established by law. They may
present documents evidencing the purported bank loans, money market
placements and other fund sources in their defense.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al.
G.R. No. 178552 : October 5, 2010
FACTS:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known
as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the
various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of,
at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary
Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National
Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary
Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of
the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should prosper
POLITICAL LAW- Requisites of power of judicial review
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two
requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or legal
standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional
question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of
being suspected "communist fronts" by the government,
especially the military; whereas individual petitioners
invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been
subjected to "close security surveillance by state security
forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and
"vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored
by "men with military build." They likewise claim that they
have been branded as "enemies of the State. Even
conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners
have yet to show any connection between the
purported"surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
POLITICAL LAW- A facial invalidation of a statute is
allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules
of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism
under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and
"coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard
to measure the prohibited acts.
A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.The overbreadth
doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand
what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.
Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affectingreallitigants, afacial invalidation is
an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his
concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines,as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable
to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a
facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a penal statute
may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of
"terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an
actual or imminent charge against them.
cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected
speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an
element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime
entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like
in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in
haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in
negotiating a deceitful transaction.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an
actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA
9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The
Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future
effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in
Congress.
Petitions Dismissed

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law

penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of .
"unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372,

there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to
trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other
elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition