Kathryn A.

Morgan
Virtual Socrates Colloquium. March 9th, 2022

“Socrates’ comic atopia in the Phaedo and Gorgias”

1a) Plato, Philebus 50b

μηνύει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις καὶ κωμῳδίαις, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι
μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου συμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεράννυσθαι,
καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.
Now our argument shows us that in lamentations and tragedies and comedies, not only in
drama, but in the whole tragedy and comedy of life, pains are mixed together with
pleasures—and in many other areas too.

1b) Plato, Philebus 49a

τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διαιρετέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, δίχα, εἰ μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἄτοπον
ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὄψεσθαι μεῖξιν.
Well then Protarchus, we must still divide this in two, if we are going to see childish envy
and its strange mixture of pleasure and pain.

2a) Plato, Symposium 215a

οὐ γάρ τι ῥᾴδιον τὴν σὴν ἀτοπίαν ὧδ’ ἔχοντι εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριθμῆσαι.
It’s not an easy thing for me in the state I am in to enumerate your strangeness easily and
in order.

2b) Plato, Symposium 221d

οἷος δὲ οὑτοσὶ γέγονε τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἅνθρωπος, καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ, οὐδ’ ἐγγὺς ἂν εὕροι
τις ζητῶν, οὔτε τῶν νῦν οὔτε τῶν παλαιῶν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα εἰ οἷς ἐγὼ λέγω ἀπεικάζοι τις αὐτόν,
ἀνθρώπων μὲν μηδενί, τοῖς δὲ σιληνοῖς καὶ σατύροις, αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς λόγους.
What this man is like in his strangeness—both him and his speech—no one could come
close to discovering by investigation, either among men of the present day or in ancient
times, unless one should compare him to those I’m talking about, not to any man but to
silens and satyrs, both him and his speech

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3) Plato, Phaedo 58e-59a

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με
ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῄει· εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἁνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ
τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μηδ’
εἰς Ἅιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν
εἴπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλεινὸν εἰσῄει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν
εἶναι παρόντι πένθει, οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων ὥσπερ εἰώθεμεν —καὶ γὰρ οἱ
λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν—ἀλλ’ ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καί τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις
ἀπό τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος
ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδόν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, τοτὲ μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε
δὲ δακρύοντες
I experienced something amazing when I was there: I didn’t feel pity because I was
present at the death of a friend. For the man appeared to me, Echecrates, to be happy in
his manner and his speech, so fearlessly and nobly did he make his end, so that it
occurred to me that he was not going to Hades without some divine dispensation, but that
he would fare well when he arrived even there, if anybody ever has. So no pity entered
me at all, as one would think was likely in the face of my sorrow, nor yet pleasure
because we were in the midst of philosophical discussion as was our custom—for that
was the content of our conversation—but a simply incongruous feeling came over me,
an unaccustomed mixture, compounded from pleasure together with pain as I
reflected that his death was imminent. Almost everyone present was so disposed,
sometimes laughing and sometimes weeping …

4) Plato, Phaedo 98d-99a

καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἑτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς
καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ
Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται
ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν: ἐπεὶ νὴ
τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ
δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾤμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ
ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἥντιν᾽ ἂν τάττῃ. ἀλλ᾽ αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν
ἄτοπον
and again [it’s as if someone] in the instance of my conversation with you, should speak
of other causes like this: voices and air and hearing, and making countless other things
like this causes, neglecting to tell the real reasons, that, since the Athenians decided it
was better to condemn me, because of this I too have decided that it is better for me to sit
here, and juster to remain and submit to whatever penalty they command—since, by the
dog, I think that these bones and sinews would long ago have been in Megara or Boiotia,
transported by my opinion about what is best, if I did not think it juster and better to

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submit to whatever penalty the city imposes rather than fleeing and running away. To
call things like this “causes” is just too incongruous.

5) Plato, Phaedo 61b

ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα.
ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον: κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, οἷον παρακελεύῃ, ἔφη,
τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνῳ. πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί: σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ᾔσθημαι
οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν σοι ἑκὼν εἶναι πείσεται.
So tell this to Euenus, Cebes: both farewell, and if he is sensible, to follow me as soon as
possible. I shall be leaving today, as it seems, for the Athenians command it. And
Simmias said, “What a recommendation you are making to Euenus, here, Socrates! I have
often met the man. From what I know he will not willingly obey you in any way at all.”

6) Plato, Phaedo 64a-c

Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι
οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον
δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ
ἀγανακτεῖν ὃ πάλαι προυθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον.
Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας, Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νυνδὴ γελασείοντα
ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι
εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας—καὶ συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ—ὅτι τῷ
ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι, καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν.
Καὶ ἀληθῆ γ’ ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ᾗ τε
θανατῶσι καὶ ᾗ ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἵου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἴπωμεν γάρ,
ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις·

“For the rest don’t know that those who have correctly attached themselves to philosophy
probably practice nothing other than to die and be dead. If this is true, it would, I suppose, be
incongruous to desire nothing other than this through one’s whole life but then complain
when what one has been eager for and practicing arrives.” Simmias laughed and said, “By
Zeus, Socrates, you made me laugh just now when I wasn’t at all in a laughing mood. For I
think that the many, if they heard this, would think it was very well spoken against
philosophers, and the people in my country would strongly agree, that philosophers are half
dead and it has not escaped them that they deserve it.” “And they would be telling the truth,
Simmias, except for the provision that it has not escaped them, for it has escaped them how
true philosophers are half dead and are worthy of death, and what kind of death. Let’s tell
them to be off and speak for ourselves.”

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7a) Plato, Phaedo 109a-b

Ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ
Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τινι μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους περὶ τὴν θάλατταν
οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖσι τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν.

And further, he said, [I believe that the earth] is huge, and that we who are between
Phasis and the Pillars of Heracles are in a tiny part, living around the sea, like ants or
frogs around a pond and that many other people live elsewhere in many places such as
this.

7b) Phaedo 109e-110a

ὑπ’ ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος οὐχ οἵους τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπ’ ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα· ἐπεί, εἴ
τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ’ ἄκρα ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν <ἂν> ἀνακύψαντα, ὥσπερ
ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες ὁρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ
κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνασχέσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς
οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθινὸν φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ.
because of our weakness and sluggishness we are not able to make our way into the high
part of the sir. Since, if someone were able to come to its heights, or if he should become
winged and fly up, he could pop his head out and look down, just as here the fishes in the
sea pop their heads out and look at what is here, so somebody could gaze at the things
there, and if his nature were capable of enduring the sight, he would recognize that that is
the true heaven and the true light and the true earth.

8) Plato, Phaedo 115a

ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἱμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδόν τί μοι ὥρα τραπέσθαι
πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν

But now, a tragic character would say, my fated day summons me, and it is pretty much
time for me to turn to my bath.

9) Plato, Phaedo 115b-c

—θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον;
—ὅπως ἄν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῇ
καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν: οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι οὗτος Σωκράτης, ὁ
νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ᾽ οἴεταί με ἐκεῖνον εἶναι ὃν
ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ πῶς με θάπτῃ.
— “How shall we bury you?”
— “However you like, if you catch me and I don’t escape you.” And he laughed quietly
and at the same time looked towards us and said, “I don’t, men, persuade Crito that I
am Socrates here, the one who is now engaging in conversation and arranging each of

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the things that are said, but he thinks that I am that person whom he will see as a
corpse in a little while, and he asks how he should bury me.

10) Aristophanes, Acharnians 395-400

ΘΕΡΑΠΩΝ τίς οὗτος; (395)
Δι. ἔνδον ἔστ’ Εὐριπίδης;
Θε. οὐκ ἔνδον ἔνδον ἐστίν, εἰ γνώμην ἔχεις.
Δι. πῶς ἔνδον, εἶτ’ οὐκ ἔνδον;
Θε. ὀρθῶς, ὦ γέρον.
ὁ νοῦς μὲν ἔξω ξυλλέγων ἐπύλλια
κοὐκ ἔνδον, αὐτὸς δ’ ἔνδον ἀναβάδην ποιεῖ
τραγῳδίαν. (400)
Dik.: Is Euripides inside?
Slave: He’s inside and he isn’t, if you have good judgement.
Dik.: How is he in and then not in?
Slave: Correctly, old man. His mind is outside collecting verselets and is not inside, but
he himself is inside composing a tragedy upstairs.

11) Aristophanes, Peace 135-6

οὐκοῦν ἐχρῆν σε Πηγάσου ζεῦξαι πτερόν,
ὅπως ἐφαίνου τοῖς θεοῖς τραγικώτερος.

Shouldn’t you have yoked winged Pegasus, so that you could have appeared more tragic
to the gods?

12) Plato, Gorgias 462e

ΠΩΛ. Ταὐτὸν ἄρ’ ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική;
ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον.
ΠΩΛ. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;
ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με
διακωμῳδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα
Pol. So, are cookery and rhetoric the same thing?
Soc. Not at all, but part of the same practice.
Pol. What is this practice you’re talking about?
Soc. I’m afraid it’s rather boorish to tell the truth, for I’m afraid to speak because of
Gorgias, in case he thinks that I am satirizing his occupation … Then it seems to me
Gorgias, not to be an artful practice, but the practice of a brave soul that proceeds by
guesswork, and one naturally clever at talking to people. And in sum I call it flattery.

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13) Plato, Gorgias 481b-c

ΚΑΛ. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν σε θῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ
σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος
ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;
Tell me, Socrates, am I to set you down now as serious or joking? For if you are serious
and these things you are saying happen to be true, we can only conclude that the life of
humans is turned upside down and we do entirely the opposite, so it would seem, of what
we should.

14) Plato, Gorgias 485e-486b

κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνήσθην.
καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι
‘ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν μειρακιώδει τινὶ
διατρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὔτ᾽ ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ᾽ ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὔτ᾽ εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ
πιθανὸν ἂν λάβοις, οὔθ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο.’ καίτοι, ὦ φίλε
Σώκρατες—καί μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῇς: εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως
ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ
τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν
μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ᾽ ἰλιγγιῴης ἂν καὶ χασμῷο οὐκ
ἔχων ὅτι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατηγόρου τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ,
ἀποθάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι.

So I’m risking experiencing now the same thing that Zethus did towards Euripides’
Amphion, whom I mentioned. For indeed it occurs to me to say to you these same sorts
of things as he said towards his brother, that, Socrates “you neglect the things you should
care for, and you divert such a naturally noble soul in a childish form, and neither could
you correctly offer a word in deliberations about justice, nor is it likely that you could
even grasp what is plausible, nor could you produce an original deliberation on behalf of
someone else.” And yet, dear Socrates—and don’t get angry, because I speak out of
good will towards you—don’t you think it is shameful to be the way I think you are, and
the others who always drive on further in philosophy? For now if somebody should get
hold of you or anybody like you and take you off to prison, saying that you were doing
wrong although you weren’t, you know that you wouldn’t know how to handle yourself,
but would reel and gape and not know what to say. And if you appeared in court and met
with an absolutely vile and villainous accuser, you would die if he wished to punish you
with death.

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15a) Plato, Gorgias 492e-493a

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι.
ΚΑΛ. οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἶεν.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος. οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ᾽ ἂν εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ
ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων—“τίς δ᾽ οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν” καὶ
ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν: ἤδη γάρ του ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν
καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα …
Soc. So are those in need of nothing not correctly said to be happy?
Call. In that case, stone and corpses would be the happiest.
Soc. Well, life as you in fact describe it is terrible. For I would not be surprised if
Euripides was correct when he said the following: “who knows if living is death and to be
dead, living?” And perhaps we are really dead: for before now I actually heard from
some wise person that we are now dead and our body is our tomb …

15b) Plato, Gorgias 493c

ταῦτ᾽ ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὴν ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαί σοι ἐνδειξάμενος,
These things are pretty strange, but they show what I want to prove to you

16) Plato, Gorgias 494d

ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος.
How strange you are, Socrates, absolutely a mob orator!

Cited Bibliography.
Halliwell, S. (2008). Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early
Christianity. Cambridge.
Nightingale, A. (1995) Genres in Dialogue. Plato and the Construct of Philosophy. Cambridge.
Rowe, C. (1993) Plato. Phaedo. Cambridge.
Worman, N. (2008) Abusive Mouths in Classical Athens. Cambridge.