Production Planning & Control

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Buyer–supplier collaboration during emerging

technology development

Hamid Moradlou, Sam Roscoe & Abhijeet Ghadge

To cite this article: Hamid Moradlou, Sam Roscoe & Abhijeet Ghadge (2022) Buyer–supplier
collaboration during emerging technology development, Production Planning & Control, 33:2-3,
159-174, DOI: 10.1080/09537287.2020.1810759

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2020.1810759

Published online: 25 Aug 2020.

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PRODUCTION PLANNING & CONTROL
2022, VOL. 33, NOS. 2–3, 159–174
https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2020.1810759

Buyer–supplier collaboration during emerging technology development

Hamid Moradloua, Sam Roscoeb and Abhijeet Ghadgea
a
Centre for Logistics, Procurement and Supply Chain Management, Cranfield University, Cranfield, UK; bSchool of Business, Management
and Economics, The University of Sussex, Brighton, UK

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The purpose of this paper is to understand how buyers-suppliers collaborate during the development Received 20 May 2019
of emerging technologies. Using the relational view, the paper examines a high technology aerospace Accepted 22 January 2020
firm as it develops additive manufacturing technology with two suppliers. It is found that the radical
KEYWORDS
novelty and high degree of technological uncertainty associated with emerging technologies lead to a
Additive manufacturing; 3D
small pool of capable suppliers, limited machine capacity and constrained raw material supply. printing; buyer–supplier
Companies, therefore, turn to University Technology Centres (UTCs) to incubate new ideas and test collaboration; supplier
prototypes before involving suppliers in development efforts. Companies also seek out government- involvement in new
funded catapult centres where buyers, suppliers and customers are co-located in a single facility, product development;
allowing them to interact and share knowledge on a regular basis. The study contributes to the rela- relational view
tional view by identifying that regular interaction within collaborative relationships does not necessar-
ily lead to knowledge spill-overs between buyers and suppliers during the development of emerging
technologies. Instead, the study finds that knowledge exchange is facilitated when suppliers have the
freedom to use intellectual property in non-competing industries and have guarantees of future busi-
ness that allow them to invest in machine capacity and raw material supply.

1. Introduction This example suggests that a small supplier pool, limited

Buyer–supplier collaboration is frequently cited as fundamen-
tal to the success of new product development (NPD) efforts
(Scuotto et al. 2017; Le Dain, Merminod, and Yager 2020;
Dowlatshahi 1997). To make significant leaps in new product
design, buyer and suppliers often invest in emerging tech-
nologies (Petersen, Handfield, and Ragatz 2005). Yet, the
development of emerging technologies can present a range
of challenges, including a limited number of capable suppli-
ers and a steep learning curve for buyer–supplier collabor-
ation (Dietrich and Cudney 2011). Take for example the
development of Tesla’s Model 3 electric vehicle. Tesla used
an emerging technology, lithium-ion battery cells, made by
Panasonic to make a step-change in the Model 3’s battery
performance (The Economist 2019). Panasonic was one of
the few suppliers with the technological capabilities to pro-
duce battery cell technology at the scale required by Tesla
and was nominated as their sole supplier from 2014–2019.
However, the Panasonic–Tesla relationship was fraught with
issues, including Panasonic’s decision to freeze its investment
in Tesla’s Giga-factory in Shanghai in 2017, and Tesla’s recent
announcement that Panasonic will no longer be its sole sup-
plier of battery technologies in China (CNBC 2019). As there
was a limited pool of alternative suppliers with the capacity
and capability to meet Tesla’s demanding production target,
it is now exploring the in-house manufacture of lithium-ion
batteries (The Economist 2019).
technological capabilities and unforeseen issues in the
buyer–supplier relationship present a unique set of chal-
lenges for the development of emerging technologies.
Emerging technologies are defined as ‘radically novel and
relatively fast growing technology characterised by a certain
degree of coherence persisting over time and with the potential
to exert a considerable impact on the socio-economic domain’
(Rotolo, Hicks, and Martin 2015, 1828). This definition
explains that emerging technology is characterised by five
general properties; radical novelty, relatively fast growth,
coherence, prominent impact and uncertainty/ambiguity
(Rotolo, Hicks, and Martin 2015). Coherence relates to the
coming together of a community of practice, where practi-
tioners and academics are unified around the development
of a distinct technology (Rotolo, Hicks, and Martin 2015). As
the most prominent impact of emerging technologies is in
the future, the emergence phase is said to be uncertain and
ambiguous (Rotolo, Hicks, and Martin 2015).
The aim of this paper is to answer the research question:
How can buyer and supplier teams overcome the challenges
that arise during the development of emerging technologies?
The paper examines this question through the relational
view, which suggests that firms that rely on internal resour-
ces and capabilities will have difficulty achieving competitive
advantage (Teng and Cummings 2002). To outmanoeuvre
the competition, firms must seek out the valuable, rare, inim-
itable and non-substitutable (VRIN) resources that are

CONTACT Hamid Moradlou Hamid.moradlou@cranfield.ac.uk Centre for Logistics, Procurement and Supply Chain Management, Cranfield University,
College Road, Cranfield MK43 0AL, UK.
ß 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
160 H. MORADLOU ET AL.
available in relational networks (Lavie 2006; Arya and Lin
2007; Dyer and Singh 1998).
The aerospace sector is selected as the context of study
due to its pioneering use of emerging technologies to make
significant leaps in new product design and development
(D’Aveni 2015). We conduct an in-depth case study of a high
technology aerospace firm, using its Additive Manufacturing
(AM) development programme as the unit of analysis. AM is
a suite of emerging technologies that fabricate three-
dimensional objects directly from digital models through an
additive process, typically by depositing and curing in place
successive layers of polymers, ceramics, or metals (Ford
2014). This study concentrates on powder-bed fusion techni-
ques, and Direct Metal Laser Sintering (DMLS) in particular,
because it meets the five criteria of emerging technology
(Rotolo, Hicks, and Martin 2015). While polymers and ceram-
ics have been used for rapid prototyping since the 1980s
(Gardan 2016), DMLS is novel because it emerged in the late
1990s and has gained popularity in industries such as
aerospace, automotive and medical since the mid-2000s
€m et al. 2016; Hopkinson, Hague, and Dickens
(Holmstro
2006). DMLS is also one of the fastest-growing AM techni-
ques in manufacturing-based sectors (Durach, Kurpjuweit,
and Wagner 2017). The development of DMLS demonstrates
coherence, as scholars, practitioners and companies are uni-
fied around the goal of developing a technology capable of
printing three-dimensional metallic parts (Holmstro €m et al.
2016; Gardan 2016; Roscoe, Cousins, and Handfield 2019). At
the same time, DMLS has an uncertain and ambiguous future
due to issues with scalability, process reliability and repeat-
ability related to the material properties of the produced
parts (Malekipour and El-Mounayri 2018). We study the
development of DMLS by collecting data from 46 interviews
with senior managers, middle managers and operational
employees at the case company and 2 of its suppliers. Data
are triangulated using focus groups and secondary company
documentation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 examines the relational view to examine the litera-
ture on buyer–supplier collaboration during new product
development broadly, and additive manufacturing specific-
ally. It draws on the literature to present a conceptual model
of buyer–supplier collaboration during emerging technology
development. Section 3 justifies the case company, research
design, data collection and analysis methods. The findings
from the case study are presented in Section 4, and Section
5 compares the findings with the conceptual model to arrive
at an empirical framework comprising of five propositions.
The paper concludes by outlining its contribution to theory
and practice and by suggesting future research avenues.
2. Literature review
2.1. The relational view
The relational view argues that a firm’s VRIN resources
(Barney 1991) will not necessarily provide a competitive
advantage in today’s business environment (De Man 2004).
The source of competitive advantage stems not only from a
firm’s internal resources, but also from the external resources
located in inter-organisational relationships (Zollo, Reuer, and
Singh 2002; Dyer and Singh 1998). The relational view argues
that it is possible to achieve productivity gains when buyers
and suppliers make relationship-specific investments and
combine resources in unique ways (Dyer and Singh 1998).
For example, buyers and suppliers can make asset-specific
investments in co-located production facilities as well as
transaction-specific investments in customised manufacturing
equipment. At the same time, buyers and suppliers can
develop co-specialised knowledge by sharing experiences
and information during the development of new products
and technologies (Dyer and Singh 1998). Over time, know-
ledge sharing routines emerge due to regular patterns of
interaction between buyer and supplier teams, permitting
the recombination and creation of co-specialised knowledge
(Grant 1996; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh 2002).
Knowledge sharing routines allows the transference of
tacit, difficult to codify knowledge between supply chain
partners (Zollo, Reuer, and Singh 2002; Grant 1996). As
buyers and suppliers work through operational details of col-
laborative agreements, both parties develop a more refined
understanding of each other’s cultures, management sys-
tems, capabilities, strengths and weaknesses (Zollo, Reuer,
and Singh 2002). Gaining a deeper understanding of each
other’s ways of working helps to mitigate coordination
issues, improve conflict resolution and reduce information
gathering problems, which in turn facilitates interactive
learning in the buyer–supplier relationship (Zollo, Reuer, and
Singh 2002). The relationship-specific knowledge that stems
from frequent and intense buyer–supplier interactions leads
to a relational capability that can translate into firm-level
competitive advantages (Dyer and Singh 1998).
Importantly, however, competitive advantage can only be
achieved if buyers and suppliers have complementary sys-
tems and processes (Doz and Hamel 1998; Doz 2007).
Complementarity occurs when one actor brings a distinctive
resource to the partnership; when combined with the resour-
ces of the other partner, this results in a synergistic effect
where the combined resources are more valuable, rare, diffi-
cult to imitate and substitute than before (Dyer and Singh
1998; Doz and Hamel 1998; Doz 2007). Buyers and suppliers
can protect co-developed knowledge from external imitation
by using appropriability regimes, including intellectual prop-
erty rights and non-disclosure agreements (Teece 1986;
Pisano and Teece 2007; Dosi, Marengo, and Pasquali 2006).
Lavie (2006) built on the dyadic relational view to advance
an ‘extended’ resource-based view of relational networks. He
argued that the inimitability of resources depends less on
the nature of those resources and more on the relationship
between the firm and its partners. Similarly, Arya and Lin
(2007) suggested that organisations are not necessarily
profit-seeking entities, but resource-sharing entities that are
embedded in complex network relationships. They concluded
that by focussing on collaborative outcomes as opposed to
competitive factors, collaborative organisations can enjoy
higher monetary and non-monetary benefits compared with

those that do not advance their collaborative capabilities
(Arya and Lin 2007).
2.2. Buyer–supplier collaboration during new product
development
The relational view informs our understanding of buyer–sup-
plier collaboration in terms of knowledge and resource sharing.
Supply-chain collaboration is defined as ‘two or more chain
members working together to create a competitive advantage
through sharing information, making joint decisions, and sharing
benefits which result from greater profitability of satisfying end
customer needs’ (Simatupang and Sridharan 2002 p. 19).
Scholars studying buyer–supplier collaboration tend to assert
that firms should seek out collaborative relationships with stra-
tegic suppliers and maintain more traditional contractual, or
arms-length relationships with non-strategic suppliers (Carr and
Pearson 1999; Singh and Power 2009). The argument is that
the stronger the relational ties between buyer and supplier,
the easier it is to transfer complex knowledge, implement and
exploit ideas via technology refinement and product develop-
ment (Mayer 2006; Michelfelder and Kratzer 2013). Moreover,
the acquisition and transfer of knowledge between buyers and
suppliers have been positioned as a fundamental driver of
innovation (Cousins et al. 2011). Strong ties with strategic sup-
pliers encourage knowledge spill-overs between buyers and
suppliers during the NPD process (Mayer 2006; Perols,
Zimmermann, and Kortmann 2013). In fact, Le Dain, Merminod,
and Yager (2020) argue that collaboration with suppliers dur-
ing NPD projects is essential for business competitiveness;
knowing why to collaborate leads to enhanced project com-
mitment and trust between buyers and suppliers, which, in
turn, optimises coordination, cross-fertilisation and innovation
practices during the various NPD phases (Schiele 2007; Le
Dain, Merminod, and Yager 2020; Alletto et al. 2017). Other
scholars stress the importance of knowing when to involve
suppliers in NPD projects, as a supplier’s unique perspective
can challenge a buyer’s traditional ways of working (Myhr and
Spekman 2005; Themistocleous, Irani, and Love 2004).
2.3. Supplier involvement in new product development
Supplier involvement in new product development (SI-NPD)
is defined as
the integration of the capabilities that suppliers can contribute to
new product development projects, the tasks they are able to
carry out on behalf of the customer and the responsibility they
assume for the development of a part, process or service’ (van
Echtelt et al. 2008 182).
A review of the SI-NPD literature suggests that the suc-
cess of supplier involvement efforts is moderated by three
factors: technological uncertainty, the timing of supplier
involvement and supplier capabilities.
Some scholars argue that supplier involvement is critical
when firms are faced with heightened degrees of techno-
logical uncertainty (Petersen, Handfield, and Ragatz 2003;
Wasti and Liker 1997). Ragatz, Handfield, and Petersen (2002)
suggest that supplier representation on NPD teams is critical,
PRODUCTION PLANNING & CONTROL 161
especially in situations of high technological uncertainty.
Meanwhile, Song and Di Benedetto (2008) found that
increased asset-specific investments heighten the level of
supplier involvement in the development of radical technolo-
gies, which, in turn, improves new product performance.
Other scholars suggest that the benefits of supplier involve-
ment diminish in cases of high technological uncertainty
(Swink 1999). This position is supported by Eisenhardt and
Tabrizi (1995) who suggest that less supplier involvement is
necessary under conditions of high technological uncertainty.
Similarly, Primo and Amundson (2002) and Phillips et al.
(2006) find that involving existing suppliers may prove
redundant, as new complementary capabilities and technolo-
gies from outside the existing supply chain are required dur-
ing radical technology development.
The second factor that moderates the benefit of supplier
involvement is timing. Petersen, Handfield, and Ragatz (2003;
2005) argue that non-strategic suppliers should only be
involved in an NPD project on an informal basis and after
the product is designed. On the other hand, strategic suppli-
ers should be involved at the concept generation stage
because they can provide expert opinions on new product
design (Petersen, Handfield, and Ragatz 2005; Koufteros,
Cheng, and Lai 2007; Koufteros, Vonderembse, and Jayaram
2005). Koufteros, Cheng, and Lai (2007) contend that select-
ing suppliers based on their product development capabil-
ities leads to higher levels of integration and can positively
affect new product innovation.
The third moderating factor is the sophistication of the
supplier’s NPD capabilities. Lawson, Tyler, and Potter (2015)
challenge the implicit assumption that suppliers can meet or
exceed the quality standards and technological expectations
of a firm. They show that upgrading a supplier’s NPD capa-
bilities does not directly influence project outcomes; instead,
indirect benefits tend to accrue for firms that work with sup-
pliers who are skilled at creative problem-solving and con-
tribute valuable technology to the firm. Making an
investment in the technical capabilities of such a supplier
allows the firm to extract and absorb the supplier’s know-
ledge and generate a new product advantage (Lawson, Tyler,
and Potter 2015). We now turn our attention to literature on
additive manufacturing to gain an understanding of the role
that suppliers play when developing emerging technologies.
2.4. Supplier involvement in additive manufacturing
development
In contrast to conventional subtractive production methods,
AM uses Computer Aided Design (CAD) to build three-
dimensional artefacts layer-by-layer (Ford 2014). Since the
1980s, companies have used AM to print three-dimensional
(3D) prototypes using plastic powders (Lipson and Kurman
2013). Additive manufacturing has now matured beyond the
rapid prototyping environment, giving companies the ability
to print metallic components and integrate the technology
directly into the production process (D’Aveni 2015; Lipson
and Kurman 2013). In comparison to conventional manufac-
turing methods, AM allows companies to build complex
162 H. MORADLOU ET AL.
geometries and lightweight components with high freedom
of design (Holmstro €m et al. 2010). Moreover, AM allows
companies to economically produce small quantities of indi-
vidualised products, to use less material during product man-
ufacturing and to eliminate object-specific tooling, whilst
facilitating the realisation of mass-customisation and product
personalisation (Holmstro €m et al. 2010; Walter, Holmstro €m,
and Yrjo €l€a 2004).
The quickening pace of AM adoption is having a trans-
formative effect on supply chain design (Roscoe, Cousins,
and Handfield 2019). Unlike conventional mass production
techniques, where competitive advantage is gained through
achieving economies of scale, AM focuses on economies of
one that requires non-linear, localised collaboration with ill-
defined roles and responsibilities (Petrick and Simpson 2013;
Wagner and Walton 2016; Schniederjans 2017). AM also
permits a shift towards a more decentralised supply chain
structure (Holmstro €m and Partanen 2014; Oettmeier and
Hofmann 2017). For example, AM allows companies to repat-
riate previously off-shore production from low-cost countries
back to the home country (Roscoe and Blome 2019). AM can
coexist with and complement traditional mass production by
isolating disruptive, low-volume production from scalable
mass customisation (Durach, Kurpjuweit, and Wagner 2017;
Sasson and Johnson 2016).
AM scholars’ position customisation, localised production
(responsiveness) and reduced costs as the main drivers of
AM adoption by firms. However, other scholars argue that a
number of challenges stand in the way of industry-wide AM
adoption. For example, Shukla, Todorov, and Kapletia (2018)
argue that limited object size, slow print speed, poor surface
quality and costs of material and machinery act as barriers to
mass customisation using AM. Similarly, Thomas-Seale et al.
(2018) identified 18 barriers ranging from material and
design to repeatability and validation as inhibitors to the
adoption of AM in global supply chains.
Interestingly, these studies take a firm-centric approach to
understanding AM adoption across interconnected supply
chains. What is missing is an understanding of the challenges
associated with involving suppliers in AM development.
Undeniably, key challenges such as the maturity of supplier
capabilities, the timing of supplier involvement, and
Technology
Uncertainty
Supplier Involvement
in emerging
technology
development
Timing of supplier
involvement
Figure 1. The challenges of buyer–supplier collaboration during emerging technology development.
knowledge sharing between buyer–supplier teams,
addressed in-depth in the SI-NPD literature, go largely unex-
plored in the AM literature. At the same time, issues such as
scalability, technology validation, machine size/speed and
costs of raw material, attract less attention in the buyer–sup-
plier collaboration and SI-NPD literature.
To address these gaps, a conceptual model of the factors
that moderate buyer and supplier collaboration during emerg-
ing technology development is proposed (see Figure 1).
The conceptual model suggests the outcomes of supplier
involvement in emerging technology development are
moderated by technological uncertainty and the timing
of supplier involvement. The model also suggests that buyer–
supplier collaboration is moderated by knowledge sharing
between buyer–supplier teams, the maturity of supplier capa-
bilities, scalability, technology validation, machine size/speed,
and the cost of raw materials. The validity of the conceptual
model is examined by comparing it to findings from a case
study of a high technology aerospace firm.
3. Research design
The research design is based on a theory elaboration
approach (Fisher and Aguinis 2017). Successful theory elabor-
ation hinges on the researcher’s ability to investigate the
general theory and the context simultaneously, in a balanced
manner (Ketokivi and Choi 2014). To do so, efforts at theory
elaboration tend to emphasise abductive reasoning
(Josephson and Josephson 1996; Niiniluoto 1999). Working
abductively means to constantly compare the conceptual
model to empirical observations. A case study design was
selected because we investigate a contemporary phenom-
enon, about which little is known and over which the
researchers had little control (Yin 2014). Consequently, we
attempt to address the following research question:
How can buyer and supplier teams overcome the challenges that
arise during the development of emerging technologies?
We met the duality criterion of rigorous case research by
ensuring the study was situationally grounded while seeking
a sense of generality (Ketokivi and Choi 2014). To ground the
study, we looked for a company in the process of developing
Technology validaon, machine size/speed,
scalability, cost of raw material
Buyer-supplier Successful
emerging
collaboraon during technology
emerging technology development
development project
Maturity of Knowledge sharing between
supplier capability buyer-supplier team

an emerging technology with a supplier, one that would
allow us to study buyer–supplier collaboration in significant
depth. We identified one such company in the aerospace sec-
tor in the process of developing DMLS with two suppliers.
Single case design was selected because it provides for a
more in-depth level of investigation than multiple cases
(Sigglekow 2007; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frohlich 2002).
Throughout the data collection phase, we paid attention
to contextual idiosyncrasies and sought a sense of generality
by attempting to transcend the empirical context and arrive
at a broader theoretical understanding (Ketokivi and Choi
2014). Specifically, we considered the relationship amongst
constructs, including knowledge sharing routines, relational
capabilities and buyer–supplier collaboration. While guided
by pre-existing theoretical considerations, we remained open
to unanticipated findings and the possibility that the general
theory required reformulation (Merton 1968). We reconciled
the idiosyncrasies of the case with the relational view and
when unanticipated findings were identified, we were able
to elaborate on the relational view.
3.1. Case description and unit of analysis
The aerospace industry was selected as the industry of ana-
lysis because it is highly innovative and often at the cutting
edge of new technology development (Hooker 2011; Pugh
2015). The case company is a highly innovative original
equipment manufacturer that works with suppliers to
develop emerging technologies, including additive manufac-
turing. The company has over 60,000 employees worldwide
and produces sub-assemblies for commercial aircraft. Despite
initially exploring a variety of AM applications, the case com-
pany prioritised the development of powder-bed fusion tech-
niques and DMLS in particular. Powder-bed fusion has very
high rates of adoption across the aerospace industry and is
gaining popularity across a number of manufacturing sectors,
including automotive and medical (Durach, Kurpjuweit, and
Wagner 2017; D’Aveni 2015). The DMLS development pro-
gramme acted as our unit of analysis; it uses a super-thin
layer of metal, usually aluminium or titanium, and spreads it
across a build platform using a roller. A laser fuses the first
layer or first cross-section of the model together. A new layer
of metallic powder is spread across the previous layer using
a roller. Further layers or cross-sections are fused and added.
The process repeats until a near-net-shape model is created.
3.2. Data collection
Data collection occurred for 20 months, from February 2014
to September 2015. Data were collected using a triangulated
data collection strategy that included semi-structured inter-
views, focus groups and secondary company documentation.
To enhance construct validity, the research team interviewed
numerous highly knowledgeable informants who viewed the
phenomena from diverse perspectives (Yin 2014). To ensure
confidentiality, all names and positions were anonymised,
and a typed transcript was sent to interviewees for review
and amendment. We conducted interviews with key
PRODUCTION PLANNING & CONTROL 163
informants working in departments directly involved in the
DMLS development process, including forward sourcing, pro-
curement, future programmes, research and development
(R&D), manufacturing technology, supplier collaboration and
intellectual property. Based on these criteria, the sample
population at the case company included 2 senior execu-
tives, 50 managers and 150 operational level employees.
Data were gathered from a sample of 2 senior executives, 18
managers and 20 operational level employees at the case
company. We then extended the study to include two sup-
pliers (Supplier A and B). Supplier A is a small supplier of
DMLS machines with fewer than 100 employees, while
Supplier B is a large multinational aerospace company work-
ing with the case company at a government-funded catapult
centre to mature a variety of AM applications, includ-
ing DMLS.
At both Supplier A and B, semi-structured interviews were
conducted with 1 senior executive, 1 manager and 1 oper-
ational level employee to gain perspectives across different
organisational levels, bringing the total interviews to 46 (see
Table 1. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour.
A total of 44 hours of interview recordings were collected and
transcribed verbatim, resulting in 782 pages of typed tran-
scripts. Table 1 shows the total time spent interviewing at each
company and organisational level.
The interview findings were corroborated through eight
focus groups held every two months throughout the period of
study. Each focus group lasted approximately two hours and
took a semi-structured format that allowed for discussion while
giving participants the freedom to guide the conversation and
explore new areas of interest (Lee 1999). Detailed notes were
taken and transcribed for later analysis. Table 2 provides a sum-
mary of the individuals involved in the focus group sessions.
The interview and focus group findings were then trian-
gulated using primary and secondary documentation col-
lected from the case company. These included group
procedures, annual reports, strategy documentation and
intellectual property policies.
3.3. Data analysis
Thematic analysis techniques (Braun and Clarke 2006) were
used to analyse the interviews, focus group transcripts and
secondary documentation. A pattern-matching logic was
used to code the data where similar passages of text were
grouped into codes and then appended to themes (Yin
2014). When passages of text were identified that did not
easily fit the coding scheme, a new coding category was cre-
ated and affixed to a new theme. To enhance inter-rater reli-
ability, a second member of the research team repeated the
pattern-matching process (Armstrong et al. 1997). The coding
template was revised in an iterative fashion until the
research team arrived at a final template that provided a
robust explanation of the case (Eisenhardt and Graebner
2007). NVIVO 11 software was used to code the interview
transcripts, focus group notes and company documentation.
To enhance the reliability of the findings, the research team
established a chain of evidence, including a case study
164 H. MORADLOU ET AL.

Table 1. Key informants.

Organization Senior executive Manager Operational level employee Total interviews by organization Total interview time (min)
Case company 2 18 20 40 2345
Supplier A 1 1 1 3 165
Supplier B 1 1 1 3 150
Total Interviews by organisational level 4 20 22 46
Total interview time (min) 234 1154 1272 2,660

Table 2: Focus group participants.

Title Department Role
Chief Manufacturing Engineer Future Programmes Primary Project Sponsor
Strategic Purchasing Executive Forward Sourcing Secondary Project Sponsor
Technologist Strategic Research Centre Focus Group Member
Head of Supply Chain Futures Programmes Focus Group Member
Chief of Research and Technology Manufacturing Technology Focus Group Member
Manufacturing Capability Acquisition Executive Engines and Transmissions Focus Group Member
Head of Research and Technology Research and Technology Focus Group Member
International Business Executive Forward Sourcing Focus Group Member

Table 3. Measures taken to enhance validity and reliability.

Tests of research design quality Data collection
Construct validity  Triangulated data collection strategy (Yin 2014)
including semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and
participant observation
Interviews with numerous highly knowledgeable
informants who viewed the focal phenomena from
diverse perspectives (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007)
Internal validity  Used data triangulation to minimise confirmation bias
(Plous 1993).
External validity  Conducted an in-depth investigation of the relationship
among concepts (Ketokivi and Choi 2014)
Introduced new concepts based on empirical findings
(Ketokivi and Choi 2014)
Reliability  Established a chain of evidence including case study
protocol and case study database (Yin 2014)
Semi-structured interview guide included in case study
protocol (Yin 2014)
Data analysis
 Data analysis in parallel to interview phase to
be receptive to new results
(Eisenhardt 1989)
 Thematic analysis based on pattern matching
and explanation building logic (Braun and
Clarke 2006).
Consideration of rival explanations throughout
the data analysis process (Braun and Clarke
2006; Yin 2014).
 Analytical generalization (Yin 2014)
 All interview transcripts analysed by
interviewer (Yin 2014)
Draft reports viewed by key informants
(Eisenhardt 1989)

protocol that meticulously documented the steps taken dur-
ing the data collection and analysis process. Table 3 summa-
rises how the research team enhanced the validity and
reliability of the case findings.
4. Findings
Before embarking on the development of emerging technol-
ogies, the case company undertakes a make-buy analysis
that considered its in-house innovation capabilities, cost fac-
tors and the strategic importance of the technology. A man-
ager from the Manufacturing Technology Department
explained that DMLS was developed externally because the
company lacked the requisite capabilities in-house:
We’ve not made that decision to bring [additive manufacturing]
internally … That’s one thing, strategically, we’ve been quite
careful to avoid. We have very limited in-house capabilities, none
of which can actually be applied in the development of additive
manufacturing.
Manufacturing Technology Manager, Case Company
The interviewee explained that while DMLS can help with
the production of strategically valuable components, the
technology itself is not seen as a core competency, prompt-
ing the company to partner with external organisations.
Three potential routes for the external development of DMLS
were identified: (1) collaborating with a network of UTCs; (2)
becoming a partner in a government-funded catapult centre;
and, (3) supplier-driven product and process design. These
three approaches are now explored in greater depth.
4.1. University technology centres (UTCs)
The case company relies on its extensive network of UTCs to
advance emerging technologies through the early stages of
new technology development; this considers the concept
development stage (stage 1) to when the technology can be
tested in a laboratory environment (Stage 4). UTCs are situ-
ated within a sponsoring university and associated academics
help to develop innovative new technologies on the case
company’s behalf. One interviewee explained how the UTC

network acts as an incubator for new ideas and allows the
case company to access academic expertise:
Our UTCs are a key part of our innovation model. Each UTC has a
significant capability in a particular technological area. They’re
not used as a nice additional resource; they’re fundamental in
our R&D landscape. By utilising that capability, we’re able to turn
early ideas and technologies and productionise them very quickly
and very efficiently.
Head of Research and Technology, Case Company
The UTCs were given significant freedom to advance mul-
tiple AM applications through the early technology develop-
ment stages, with only light-touch oversight provided by the
case company. It was in the UTC environment that the case
company selected DMLS as the most viable option to pursue;
this was because it could produce complex geometries and
lighter-weight components that are 99.8% dense and robust
for functionality testing. A technologist at the case company
explained how the UTC network acted as the initial location
for DMLS development, and helped mature the technology
over a period of 10 years:
In the dawn of additive manufacturing our manufacturing
technology guys were doing a study with a university, making a
few demonstrator components using DMLS and handing them
around in meetings. That gets senior managers and senior
engineers engaged and interested that it’s a real process. That
process started ten years ago and has matured very quickly. It has
gone from a very limited palette of materials, a limited range of
sintering techniques, to the sort of maturing picture you see now.
And there are several universities that have now set themselves
up as centres of competence in additive manufacturing.
Technologist, Case Company
Ten interviewees felt that the UTC network gave the case
company an advantage over its competitors, as academics
were regularly engaged to tackle challenging technological
issues. One interviewee explained that the strategic purpose
of establishing the UTC network was to develop future talent
for the company. PhD students worked within the UTC struc-
ture and gained knowledge from senior academics, whilst
gaining insights into how the case company operated. After
spending 3-4 years at a UTC, several PhD students then
joined as full-time employees at the case company, allowing
direct knowledge transfer. A further benefit was that the
UTCs were funded by the national government by up to
50%, giving the case company external expertise at an
affordable cost. Focus group members explained that when
DMLS could be tested in the UTC laboratory environment to
prove its functionality, it then followed two different routes
of development: a government-funded catapult centre and
direct development with a DMLS machine supplier.
4.2. Catapult centres
Catapult centres are a ‘not-for-profit’, independent network
of facilities that provide the space and expertise where differ-
ent companies can collaborate on research and development
projects. Companies can join the catapult centre at various
tiers; Tier 1 members are normally the large companies who
benefit from the research outcomes, whereas Tiers 2 and 3
PRODUCTION PLANNING & CONTROL 165
are generally equipment providers and materials suppliers
who might benefit from selling their products to Tier 1 com-
panies. The case company signed as a Tier 1 member of one
such catapult centre and worked closely with Supplier B on
the development of AM. A technology manager at Supplier
B explained the advantages of having raw materials suppli-
ers, machine suppliers, aerospace manufacturers and assem-
blers all in one location working on the development of
additive manufacturing:
You also bring in SMEs and they can use a neutral space where
you can get them to trial stuff on a bigger scale so you can test
out some of their capabilities as well. That’s the beauty of
catapults, they allow you to bring in new suppliers and you can
do collaborative work with your own supply chain as well.
Technology Manager, Supplier B
This quote explains that catapult centres gave the case
company a range of options in terms of different raw mater-
ial suppliers and machines, allowing it to test and experi-
ment with new materials and technological applications. At
the same time, the case company could work closely with
existing suppliers to tailor DMLS to its bespoke needs. The
catapults transformed the case company’s existing supply
chain structure, which normally comprised of multiple
buyer–supplier dyadic relationships, to a new co-located
research and production facility structure (see Figure 2).
The case findings suggest that the novelty of DMLS
necessitated a co-located collaboration model where all sup-
ply chain actors are equally involved in product and process
design while maximising knowledge transfer opportunities.
The finding was supported by a quote from a technologist
working for Supplier B:
What [the catapult centre] does is we end up with a combination
of people, equipment, cash contributions, where we will have
core research programmes including ourselves, an inspection
company, an additive layer company, working side-by-side to
develop these technologies. So, we will use that as a sandpit for
testing out new suppliers, we will use it as a sandpit for testing
out new equipment to build those relationships as well. So what
that centre does is serves as that central area and it is really
useful for building those relationships.
Technologist, Supplier B
This quote explains that within the catapult setting, com-
panies are given the freedom to form partnerships with
existing suppliers and identify potentially valuable new sup-
pliers at the same time. These centres act as risk-pooling
platforms, where companies share risks and rewards for their
joint efforts in developing emerging technologies.
4.3. Supplier driven product and process design
In addition to the UTCs and catapult centres, the case com-
pany worked directly with a DMLS supplier (Supplier A) to
customise the technology to its bespoke needs. One senior
vice president at the case company explained that suppliers
are often key sources of new technologies and ideas:
We’ve got a fantastic supply chain across the world and we rely
very heavily on them to innovate and develop clever ways of
manufacturing to give us a competitive edge. And some of our
166 H. MORADLOU ET AL.
Collaboraon between
buyer-supplier dyads
Collaboraon
Tier 2 supplier Tier 1 supplier
Feedback Feedback
Collaboraon at
Catapult Centre
Tier 2 supplier Tier 1 supplier
Supplier integrated
project team
Focal firm/
Customer
Figure 2. Collaboration in standard supply chain versus catapult centre.
key technologies are driven by working
with suppliers.
Senior Vice President, Case Company
One factor found to promote the development of DMLS was
a supplier-driven product and process design. Supplier-driven
design means involving suppliers in early new technology
design stages to discuss how products can be re-imagined
based on the technology’s capabilities. The case company real-
ised that DMLS machine suppliers had significant expertise from
other industries that could be used in developing new products
for the aerospace industry. For example, since the late 1980s,
Supplier A had used plastic polymer powders to additively
manufacture prosthetics for the medical industry. In 2003,
Supplier A began using titanium powders to additive manufac-
ture cranial implants for hospitals. Supplier A also gained experi-
ence by using metallic powders by building structural
components for the automotive sector. In recognition of
Supplier A’s expertise, the case company engaged them in 2006
to begin printing metallic components for aerospace sub-
assemblies. From 2006 to 2012, the technology matured slowly,
with development largely focussed on prototypes and low-
risk components.
A significant advancement was made in 2012 when a
cross-functional project team was established comprised of
experts from design, engineering and a variety of supply chain
functions at the case company and Supplier A. A technology
champion from the case company was given responsibility for
managing the project team and coordinating the develop-
ment of AM with Supplier A. The general manager at Supplier
A explained how 2012 marked a significant shift in the rela-
tionship between his company and the case company:
It has been a very slow relationship and it has been highly
dependent on some champions within [the case company] who
have helped push additive manufacturing forward within the
company. And they’ve worked very hard on ensuring that we are
part of that development.
General Manager, Supplier A
Since the formation of the project team, the case com-
Focal firm/
Customer pany and Supplier A demonstrated stable patterns of inter-
action through repeated meetings held every two weeks.
Supplier A’s computer-aided design team conveyed know-
ledge to the project team about the design limitations of
AM using formalised training programmes and informal face-
to-face meetings, as explained by the quality assurance man-
ager at Supplier A:
We’ve got a very knowledgeable and technically competent CAD
team. They will spend a significant amount of time with our
customers, trying to explain the general design rules that apply
to this technology, equally looking at design requirements with
the customer and explaining the different ways that they could
achieve those end requirements with additive manufacture. Often
you need quite a different mind-set dealing with a layer-based
manufacture than a subtractive manufacturing technology, and
there aren’t any really clear design guidebooks out there at
the moment.
Quality Assurance Manager, Supplier A
This quote demonstrates that supplier-led training gener-
ated knowledge spill-overs from the supplier to the case
very closely
company during the emerging technology development pro-
cess. While the case company’s designers were comfortable
with creating components using traditional subtractive man-
ufacturing methods, they were unfamiliar with the new
design opportunities that DMLS offered, as described by the
sales manager at Supplier A:
We developed a training course where we went out and we told
people about what additive manufacturing is, to start off with,
but then we looked at limitations to designing for metal
components. For instance, two weeks ago I was at [customer
base] doing a training course there. So we do a half-day training
and then they go away and do some design work and design
components with what they’ve learnt, and then we go back and
spend a day reviewing their designs, what works and what
doesn’t work and why.
Sales Manager, Supplier A
The radical novelty of DMLS necessitated that Supplier A
led the design process and trained the case company’s
designers and engineers on how to fully exploit the technol-
ogy’s capabilities. Importantly, the knowledge gained by
Supplier A in the medical implants field was readily applic-
able to the manufacture of metal components for the aero-
space sector, leading to the co-development of significantly
lighter weight and higher quality parts. However, despite the
success of involving Supplier A in the DMLS programme, a
number of challenges emerged that delayed development
lead times, including disputes over intellectual property own-
ership, limited machine capacity, and restricted raw material
supply in the supply chain.
4.4. Intellectual property ownership
Eighteen interviewees stressed that the case company
attempted to own the intellectual property (IP) generated

during buyer–supplier collaborations. The case company
makes a distinction between background IP, which has been
created independently in the past, and foreground IP, which
is developed jointly between buyers and suppliers during the
new technology development process. Four interviewees at
the case company argued in favour of owning foreground IP,
as the company is not tied to a particular supplier. One inter-
viewee explained the case company’s motivation as follows:
… We’re tending to look from a new technology point of view a
bit closer at IP, so we don’t get tied in to suppliers and, when
we’re exchanging information, [so] that we own the intellectual
property for whatever comes out the other end. Suppliers aren’t
always keen on that. They say, ‘It’s my process’ … But we want to
make sure we’ve got flexibility in the supply chain to be able … if
things do get really rough, to go and take the same parts
somewhere else.
Intellectual Property Manager, Case Company
The preceding quote suggests that some individuals at the
case company place greater emphasis on owning foreground
IP than on nurturing collaborative buyer–supplier relation-
ships. The study found that the case company’s insistence on
owning all foreground IP had the potential to upset suppliers.
The general manager at Supplier A explained that his com-
pany would not enter into any future contractual agreements
that involved the case company owning all foreground IP:
… We have signed IP agreements already, but I think … there is a
real risk with the IP side of things … On the one hand, [the
contract may] be too lax from [the case company’s] point of view
and end up with us owning IP that stops them from doing
something. On the other hand, by [the case company] being too
tight with the ownership of foreground IP, I’ll end up not signing
the agreement because, whatever we do, [the case company]
owns it. I’m not going to sign that.
General Manager, Supplier A
The preceding quote suggests that disputes surrounding
intellectual property ownership can delay the signing of con-
tractual agreements. The knock-on effect is that emerging
technology development projects can be delayed until com-
mon ground is reached. One potential solution offered by an
interviewee at Supplier A was that the IP related to the
design of the component or final product could be owned
by the case company and the IP related to how to manufac-
ture the product could be owned by the supplier:
It’s an issue in the relationship with most of our customers,
because we have a lot of very proprietary knowledge about 3-D
printing. How we use our machines, how we control our
materials. How we achieve the end product. And as soon as we
share that in a format that our customers can either use
themselves or give directly to a competitor, [we] lose all of our
advantage in the marketplace.
Quality Assurance Manager, Supplier A
This quote suggests the lack of a mutually agreed frame-
work for IP ownership in a buyer–supplier relationship can
delay the development of emerging technologies. Fourteen
interviewees at the case company felt that the emphasis on
owning foreground IP inhibited the free exchange of know-
ledge with suppliers. Interviewees gave suggestions on how
the case company could overcome issues with IP ownership
PRODUCTION PLANNING & CONTROL 167
with suppliers, including being clear on which aspects of
technology are strategically important to the company and
only patenting those particular aspects in order to alleviate
unnecessary friction with suppliers:
Owning IP is, if you like, using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
There are many other ways that you can utilise IP without
necessarily owning it. Now, there could be a royalty-free license,
or a supplier [could have] IP they agree only to use in a
particular market segment so they’re free to use IP in medical,
where we’re not competing.
Supply Chain Collaboration Manager, Case Company
This quote suggests buyers and suppliers should reach
consensus on IP ownership prior to the commencement of
emerging technology development projects. Licencing mech-
anisms and other contractual devices would allow suppliers
to use foreground IP in non-competing industries, creating a
mutually beneficial situation. Framing the contract in such a
manner could reduce tension and facilitate knowledge-shar-
ing between buyers and suppliers during emerging technol-
ogy development.
4.5. Technological uncertainty and limited maturity of
supplier capabilities
The uncertainty surrounding the development of DMLS cre-
ated a number of issues in the buyer–supplier relationship.
Focus group participants expressed frustration that, due to
the novelty of DMLS, many suppliers had insufficient experi-
ence and inadequate machine capacity. Four interviewees at
the case company explained that in the early stages of
development, only a handful of suppliers around the world
could source high-quality metallic powders. One interviewee
explained that if a supplier became insolvent or was unable
to deliver for any particular reason, the case company would
struggle to find an alternative source of raw material supply:
The knowledge and maturity of additive manufacturing suppliers
is in pockets and enclaves. You think about a business continuity
point of view. If you have a single point of knowledge and a
single point of potential failure, you haven’t got
business continuity.
Technology Champion, Case Company
Limited access to metallic powders was compounded by
insufficient machine capacity. Supplier A’s inadequate
machine capacity limited the case company’s ability to test
the 3 D printing of metallic parts to a small scale. The gen-
eral manager at Supplier A explained his company’s capacity
constraint as follows:
… We have the capacity for certain moderate-sized orders. But in
terms of our through-put capacity, I would say we have a
fundamental challenge. And that challenge becomes clear when
we get a big order that might be more than a month’s capacity
at any one time. It then becomes very difficult to meet the order.
General Manager, Supplier A
Lack of machine capacity also hindered scalability as the
case company could not test the technology using large-
scale production runs. One interviewee from the case
168 H. MORADLOU ET AL.
company’s manufacturing technology department described
the constraints posed by limited machine capacity as follows:
Most of these external suppliers have, at best, four machines at
any one time. It takes, typically, about a hundred hours to
produce a single part, depending on the geometry of the
component. If you suddenly want to take this to
productionisation, so that you are producing the components to
satisfy the future [final product], you probably need a bank of 30-
40 machines all churning away at the same time. Well, nobody’s
got that because there hasn’t been the demand pull for that.
Procurement Manager, Case Company
To adequately test DMLS in a large-scale production envir-
onment, suppliers require additional machine capacity and a
robust supply of raw material powders. However, interview-
ees at Supplier A explained that significant investments in
equipment and personnel could only occur with guarantees
of future business from customers. Indeed, the General
Manager at Supplier A suggested that a promise of future
work from the case company would allow him to secure
financing to invest in new machines and staff:
If we get significant commitment—in other words, some sort of
cast-iron guarantees that we’re going to get the work—then
sure, we can change the company to match. I’ll move an awful
lot of things around to make sure that we can meet a demand
profile. That would enable me to multiply the capacity by a
factor of 5 or 10 within a short space of time. But I’m not going
to do it just on the off-chance that something might happen.
General Manager, Supplier A
This quote suggests it may be in the case company’s best
interests to provide suppliers with business commitments
that would, in turn, facilitate large-scale testing. The lack of
concrete business investments emerged as a major challenge
in terms of testing the technology on a large scale. These
findings are discussed in relation to the literature and
advance an empirical framework on buyer–supplier collabor-
ation during emerging technology development.
5. Discussion
There is an implicit assumption in the SI-NPD literature that
strategic suppliers can and should be involved in NPD efforts
at the earliest point possible (see Petersen, Handfield, and
Ragatz 2003; Koufteros, Cheng, and Lai 2007). However, this
case shows that when it comes to emerging technologies,
early-stage development may begin at a UTC, with academic,
as opposed to supplier involvement. Indeed, it is the radical
novelty and technological uncertainty of DMLS that led to
few suppliers having the requisite capabilities to develop the
technology to the specifications of the case company.
We found that the UTC partnership gave the case company
a competitive advantage because its major competitors did
not use a similar structure for emerging technology develop-
ment. In fact, the Head of Innovation pointed to the UTC
network as the key factor behind why his company often
brought new products to market quicker than the competi-
tion. This finding challenges the assertion of Greitzer et al.
(2010) who suggest that industry-university collaborations
often produce interesting outcomes (academic papers,
funding proposals, etc.), which have minor or no impact on
company productivity or competitiveness. We found that col-
laboration with universities allows early-stage research to be
conducted in areas such as material sciences and advanced
engineering. This finding supports the assertion of Powell,
Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996) that the locus of innovation
does not reside exclusively within firms, but is commonly
found at the interstices between firms, universities, supplier
and customers. Here it is stressed that university collabora-
tions are better suited to the early stages of emerging tech-
nology development to overcome issues associated with
technological uncertainty and the requirement for expert,
external insight. As the development of incremental technol-
ogies does not necessarily require new ideas from external
sources, their development may better suit a company’s
internal R&D department (Mo €ller 2010). We, therefore, pro-
pose the following:
Proposition 1: By acting as early stage incubators, UTCs can help
to advance emerging technologies through the initial stages of
new technology development.
The SI-NPD literature also assumes that suppliers are able
to meet or exceed the quality standards and technological
expectations of the firm (Lawson, Krause, and Potter 2015).
The findings indicate that due to radical novelty and techno-
logical uncertainty, suppliers do not necessarily have the cap-
ability or capacity to develop emerging technologies to a
buying firm’s requirements. To overcome such challenges,
interviewees suggest that suppliers should be given firm
business commitments, including guaranteed future orders,
so they can secure financing to purchase additional
machines to scale-up production. Buyer investment in sup-
plier capabilities is supported by scholars such as Krause
(1999) who argue that firms should proactively implement
development programmes with critical suppliers to maintain
operational performance imperatives, such as quality, deliv-
ery and technological standards. Lawson, Krause, and Potter
(2015) contend that managers should consider designating
resources for supplier development during new product
development efforts. They argue that firms can secure rela-
tional rents in terms of improved project performance and
product performance (Lawson, Krause, and Potter 2015). We
argue that investment in supplier capacity and capabilities is
required more during the development of emerging, as
opposed to incremental, technologies. Suppliers developing
incremental technologies can draw on past experience and
adapt existing production equipment, therefore requiring
less financial commitment. On the other hand, emerging
technologies require new machines and personnel to ensure
the scalability of the technology. This leads us to pro-
pose that:
Proposition 2: The development of emerging technologies
requires investment in supplier capabilities in the areas of
machine capacity and raw material supply.
The importance of intellectual property protection is not
often discussed in the SI-NPD literature (c.f. Petersen,
Handfield, and Ragatz 2005; Primo and Amundson 2002;
Song and Di Benedetto 2008). Our findings suggest that

supplier involvement in emerging technology development
can be delayed for years because of issues with IP owner-
ship. Interviewees suggested that by embedding licencing
agreements in the buyer–supplier contract, suppliers could
use IP in non-competing markets. This finding supports Le
Dain, Merminod, and Yager (2020) who suggest that collab-
orative buyer–supplier relationships require that partners
clearly define a framework for collaboration, the roles and
responsibilities of each partner, the project management pro-
cess, and agreements on foreground IP. We argue that pre-
agreement on access to IP becomes more important when
developing emerging, as opposed to incremental, technolo-
gies. Incremental technology may not require the co-creation
of foreground IP, and therefore the need for non-compete
agreements and licencing arrangements will not be such a
priority. However, while emerging technologies require exter-
nal involvement, development projects are more likely to
have jointly created foreground IP. As such, buyers and
suppliers should agree on licencing agreements that allow
suppliers to use foreground IP in non-competing industries.
This leads us to propose the following:
Proposition 3: During emerging technology development, buyers
and suppliers can overcome issues related to IP ownership by
embedding licensing agreements in the contract that allow
suppliers to use foreground IP in non-competing industries.
Scholars have argued that gaining a deep understanding
of each other’s ways of working helps to mitigate coordin-
ation issues, improves conflict resolution and reduces infor-
mation-gathering problems: in turn, this facilitates interactive
learning within the buyer–supplier relationship (see Zollo,
Reuer, and Singh 2002). However, we found that the novelty
of DMLS actually meant that knowledge spill-overs were uni-
directional – from the supplier to the buyer. Supplier A had
gained knowledge about DMLS from the medical and F1 rac-
ing industries and transferred this knowledge to the case
company through supplier-led training and design initiatives.
This finding is interesting because earlier studies have identi-
fied the lack of education and training as barriers to AM
development (Shukla, Todorov, and Kapletia 2018). For
example, Thomas-Seale et al. (2018) suggest that ‘some gen-
eralised courses exist to provide an overview of AM, or to teach
compatible software techniques; however, these cannot deliver
the required in-depth understanding over the full spectrum of
AM techniques’ (Thomas-Seale et al. 2018). Similarly, Shukla,
Todorov, and Kapletia (2018) suggest the lack of an expert
designer is one of the top barriers for AM implementation.
Supplier led training can prove particularly beneficial when
focussed on the flexibility, design and feature enhancement
related benefits of AM. Highlighting the benefits of AM can
make the value proposition more compelling than the trad-
itionally lower cost, high volume-based manufacturing
approach used by many manufacturing firms. Moreover, we
argue that supplier-led training and design is more import-
ant during the development of emerging, rather than incre-
mental technologies. The development of incremental
technologies primarily relies on experience and knowledge
gained from the same industry (Dewar and Dutton 1986),
meaning supplier expertise from other industries is not
PRODUCTION PLANNING & CONTROL 169
necessarily required. The novelty of emerging technologies
requires suppliers to take the knowledge gained from other
industries and transfer this knowledge to buying firms
through supplier-led training and design activities. This leads
us to posit that:
Proposition 4: Supplier-led training and design is required during
the development of emerging technologies.
The buyer–supplier collaboration literature tends to adopt
the buyer–supplier dyad as its unit of analysis (Le Dain,
Merminod, and Yager 2020; Alletto et al. 2017; Dowlatshahi
1997). Scholars pay less attention to how buyers and suppli-
ers collaborate within catapult centres, even though this is
an emerging trend in new technology development
(see Greitzer et al. 2010).
The findings suggest that access to new forms of know-
ledge becomes amplified within catapult centres due to
opportunities for collaboration across multiple tiers of the sup-
ply chain, from raw material suppliers, machine providers,
manufacturers and customers (Mena, Humphries, and Choi
2013). The catapult centre concentrates multiple supply chain
actors in one facility and removes inhibitors to collaboration
such as distance and time which are characteristic of global-
ised supply chains (Choi and Krause 2006). Actors at multiple
tiers of the supply chain, which in the past may have been sep-
arated by time zones and national boundaries now have the
opportunity to regularly interact within shared facilities, includ-
ing formal and informal socialisation (Cousins and Menguc
2006). Regular informal socialisation opportunities, such as
water-cooler chats and after-work social events, increase the
likelihood of knowledge exchange (Cousins et al. 2009).
Knowledge exchange within catapult centres is protected
by an overarching non-disclosure agreement, which allows
participants to share ideas freely and interact with new sup-
pliers. The catapults seek to make IPR available to businesses
through appropriate licencing and spin out arrangements.
The catapult centres record and protect existing (back-
ground) IPR, including commercially-sensitive information,
and ensure that new (foreground) IPR created during new
technology development projects is protected and exploited
successfully to the benefit of all project partners. Such IPR
regimes create a safe environment for knowledge sharing
where buyers and suppliers can share ideas and new infor-
mation. We suggest that the appropriability regimes (Teece
1986) established within catapult centres, as well as buyer–
supplier co-location, enhances opportunities for knowledge
exchange during the development of emerging technologies.
Incremental technologies will not necessarily require a cata-
pult centre structure as radically new ideas are not required
from external sources (Song and Di Benedetto 2008) and can
remain within the confines of existing buyer–supplier rela-
tionships. Based on this finding, we propose the following:
Proposition 5: Buyer–supplier collaboration within catapult
centres provides enhanced opportunities for knowledge
exchange and technology access during emerging technology
development.
The five propositions are now combined to inform an
empirically derived framework of buyer–supplier
170 H. MORADLOU ET AL.
collaboration during the development of emerging technolo-
gies. The framework highlights how radical novelty and
technological uncertainty/ambiguity affects supplier involve-
ment in emerging technology development. The framework
suggests that the development of emerging technologies
can follow three distinct routes depending on the stage of
development. During the early stages, ideas and concepts for
emerging technologies can incubate in a UTC environment
until prototypes are ready to be validated in a laboratory
environment. Once validated, emerging technologies may
enter into a traditional buyer–supplier relationship or a more
contemporary catapult centre. These different knowledge
exchange configurations provide a range of opportunities for
knowledge exchange depending on the emerging technolo-
gies’ stage of development (see Figure 3).
6. Contribution and future research directions
6.1. Theoretical contribution
This study elaborates on the relational view by identifying
the different ways in which buyers can access the VRIN
resources held by suppliers during the development of
emerging technologies. We found that UTCs act as early-
stage incubators for emerging technologies, providing firms
with access to the knowledge and expertise of academics. By
being co-located in catapult centres, buyer–supplier teams
interact more frequently and therefore have a greater oppor-
tunity for knowledge exchange. An important facilitator of
this interaction is appropriability regimes, including IPR and
non-disclosure agreements; these allow for the free exchange
of ideas and the potential to exploit ideas through spin-outs
and licencing agreements.
The findings of this study challenge the inherent assump-
tion of the SI-NPD literature that suppliers can join NPD efforts
at any point and collaborative knowledge exchange will take
place. It also confronts the underpinning principle of the
Early Technology
Development stages
Tradional
buyer-supplier
relaonship
Proposion 3: Embedding licensing agreements in the contract
Collaboraon at
Catapult Centre
Figure 3. Framework for buyer–supplier collaboration during emerging technology development.
relational view that regular interactions, knowledge-sharing
routines and collaborative relationships (Dyer and Singh 1998;
Lavie 2006) necessarily lead to knowledge spill-overs between
buyers and suppliers. Instead, it is found that the far-reaching
novelty and technological uncertainty of emerging technolo-
gies present a number of obstacles to supplier involvement.
Buyers must first address issues related to a small pool of cap-
able suppliers, limited machine capacity, restricted access to
raw materials and IP ownership, before involving suppliers in
emerging technology development.
In addition, our findings on catapult centres present some
preliminary challenges to the tenets of supply chain collabor-
ation theory (Barratt 2004; Fawcett et al. 2012; Soosay,
Hyland, and Ferrer 2008). Supply chain collaboration theory
tends to focus on collaborative interactions within the
buyer–supplier dyad. As opposed to linear supply chains, the
catapult centre promotes knowledge exchange within triads
of buyers, suppliers, supplier’s suppliers, customers and com-
petitors, embedded within larger supply networks (Caplow
1956; Choi and Wu 2009). Authors writing on triads within
supply networks suggest an actor’s position within the sup-
ply network (buyer, supplier, or supplier’s supplier) influences
its access to new knowledge and resources and therefore its
power (Choi and Hong 2002; Choi and Wu 2009; Mena,
Humphries, and Choi 2013). For example, a first-tier supplier
may be positioned as a bridge between buyers and raw
material providers, creating a power imbalance in the triad.
Similarly, the raw material supplier may act as a single source
for valuable resources giving it power over the first-tier sup-
plier and buyer (Mena, Humphries, and Choi 2013).
Our study raises the question of what happens when all
of these actors are co-located and can easily share know-
ledge with all supply network actors simultaneously? Does
co-location allow raw material suppliers direct access to man-
ufacturers as they can easily by-pass equipment providers,
and does this change the power balance? Or does co-loca-
tion encourage raw material suppliers to build stronger
Mid to Late Technology
Development stages
Successful
emerging
technology
development
project

relationships with equipment providers to provide an
enhanced value proposition to manufacturers? Another
important question for researchers to consider is how co-
location affects access to knowledge for the network actors
that previously bridged structural holes in the network?
One possible way of extending supply chain collaboration
theory to the triadic level is through the notion of dyadic
extension proposed by Formentini and Romano (2016). To
move beyond the buyer–supplier dyad, they call for an extra-
dyadic extension where revenue sharing contracts are put in
place that spans multiple supply chain partners giving all con-
tracting parties an equitable share of sales revenues. This sug-
gestion is supported by Mena, Humphries, and Choi (2013)
who call for a joint price arrangement between triadic partners
allowing for non-combative and collaborative relationships.
We hope that our study will prompt further investigation
into how co-located supply chain partners exchange ideas
and co-develop technology to deepen our understanding of
supply chain collaboration at the triadic level of analysis. We
believe that researching supply chain collaboration within
co-located facilities will confront our current understanding
of supply network embeddedness (T. Choi and Kim 2008)
and unearth interesting insights on how co-location changes
power imbalances within triads.
6.2. Managerial contribution
This paper contributes to managerial thinking by advancing
a framework for buyer–supplier collaboration during emerg-
ing technology development. The framework suggests that
managers should be aware that emerging technologies
are likely to have a small pool of capable suppliers, creating
exposure to supply chain risks associated with single-sourc-
ing arrangements and limited production capacity. In add-
ition, findings suggest that managers should have open and
honest discussions about IP ownership before starting on the
emerging technology development journey with suppliers.
Buyers and suppliers should map out which aspects of the IP
will be competitively valuable to each party and only seek to
protect those particular aspects. Such licencing agreements,
embedded in the buyer–supplier contract, will provide sup-
pliers with the freedom to work with other customers in
other sectors, and provide buyers with the ability to
approach other suppliers. Following this study, managers are
encouraged to prioritise supplier-led development and
design activities to capitalise on the knowledge that suppli-
ers have gained from other industries.
6.3. Limitations and future research directions
This study adopted a single case study approach within the
aerospace sector, which may limit the statistical generalizabil-
ity of the findings. Instead, the study aimed for analytical
generalizability by elaborating on the relational view and
developing an empirical framework for buyer–supplier collab-
oration during the development of emerging technologies.
The paper calls future researchers to apply this framework to
other emerging technologies in other industries, such as
PRODUCTION PLANNING & CONTROL 171
blockchain in the banking sector or artificial intelligence in
the retail sector. Issues addressed in our framework including
technology scale-up, supplier-led training and intellectual
property protection are not unique to Additive
Manufacturing but apply to emerging innovations more gen-
erally. For AI or blockchain development, our framework pro-
vides useful insights on knowledge exchange opportunities
between platform providers, technology suppliers, buyers
and competitors. Therefore, our framework is valuable to
future researchers because it sheds light on potential ave-
nues for development based on the technology’s develop-
ment stage (early, mid, late) and highlights potential factors
that may be inhibiting development efforts. It is anticipated
that the framework may change or require elaboration as
future research explores other technology-driven industries
as diverse as automotive, agriculture and medicine. To
enhance the generalizability of the findings, we call on future
researchers to adopt a multiple case study approach, per-
haps using longitudinal research techniques. Other promising
avenues for future research could include an in-depth study
of new technology collaborations within catapult centres,
perhaps studying a multitude of participants from suppliers,
buyers, academics and competitors and also the role of regu-
latory agencies in facilitating collaboration between different
members of the supply chain and the adoption of emerging
technologies. Such a study would provide interesting insights
on knowledge exchange between multiple parties during the
development of emerging technologies.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributors
Dr. Hamid Moradlou is a Lecturer in Logistics and
Supply Chain Management at Cranfield University,
School of Management. He has earned his BEng
degree from University of Bath in Mechanical
Engineering with Manufacturing Management fol-
lowed by an MSc in Advanced Manufacturing
Engineering and Management at Loughborough
University. He also obtained his PhD in Supply Chain
Management which was funded by the Wolfson
School of Mechanical, Electrical and Manufacturing Engineering at
Loughborough University. His research interests mainly focuses on inves-
tigating the offshoring and re-shoring phenomenon in developed coun-
tries and the impacts of new generation of technologies, industry 4.0,
on manufacturing location decision.
Dr. Sam Roscoe is a Senior Lecturer in Operations
Management at the University of Sussex Business
School. Sam has published several peer-reviewed
articles, for example, Journal of Operations
Management, International Journal of Operations and
Production Management (IJOPM) and International
Journal of Production Research (IJPR). Sam received
funding from the EPSRC to investigate how 3D print-
ing in reconfiguring pharmaceutical supply chains;
moving production closer to patients and consumers. Sam’s research
172 H. MORADLOU ET AL.
interests are on how emerging technologies (3D printing, Blockchain,
Artificial Intelligence) are reconfiguring global supply chains. He is the
research leader for the Supply Chain 4.0 Hub at the University of Sussex
Business School.
Dr. Abhijeet Ghadge is a Senior lecturer in Logistics
and Supply Chain Management at Cranfield School
of Management, UK. He holds a PhD in Operations
and Supply Chain Management from Loughborough
University, UK, and MTech in Industrial Engineering
and Management from the Indian Institute of
Technology, India. Dr Ghadge has published several
peer-reviewed articles in the operations, logistics
and supply chain focussed journals. He follows a
practice-driven approach to problems across the broad domains of sup-
ply chain risk, sustainability and Industry 4.0; and holds over 13 years of
industrial, academic and consulting experience.
ORCID
Sam Roscoe http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7838-6706
Abhijeet Ghadge http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0310-2761
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